## 1

#### Interp: The aff must defend an institutional action –to clarify it doesn’t have to be topical but in order for them to engage in debate they should make clear what method and instution they defend. .

#### Violation: There’s no plan/institution they defend.

#### Prefer:

#### 1---Vagueness---debates inevitably involve the AFF defending something, but only our interp forces that to be clearly defined that from the start. Their model leads to late-breaking debates that destroy ground, for example we won’t know if asteroid mining or space exploration are offense until the 1AR, which skews neg prep.

#### 2---Topic ed---specific policies teaches lets us go deep into the topic, uniquely important given the evolving character of space law – outweighs bc we only have 2 month topics, and phil ed is solved by free textbooks – space law is inseparable from actual policy actions.

**3----Critical education – its important to think about our advocacy and policy actions with institutions for education.**

**4----Utopian fiat – having imaginary policies they functionally get to fiat perfection as opposed to explaining in depth how we go from point A to point B. this kills any ability for neg engagement on the method because the whole point of method debate is about political strategy and it forces the neg into a position where we have to contest the values of the aff is bad which is impossible on a non-t aff.**

**TVA – they could say that debate tournaments should implement a disability policy.**

#### Vote on fairness –

#### a] testing – you can’t evaluate their args because the round was skewed – if they have 10 minutes to win their aff or fairness bad and I have 1 for the opposite they will win

#### b] they concede its authority via speech times and tournament procedure

#### Competing interps over reasonability – a] to avoid judge intervention and b] framework is about the very structure of debate so they should be forced to defend theirs

#### Drop the debater – a] to deter future abuse and b] drop the arg on T is functionally the same

#### No RVI – a] logic – I’m fair vote for me makes no sense and outweighs because all args must be logical, b] baiting – rvis incentivize abuse to win on theory

## 2

### K

#### Forms of fragmented politics completely cedes the political to capitalism. Engagement in undercommon communication is too individualized and resists collective and concrete change. This constitutes enjoyment of melancholic pleasures of being distanced and accommodated to the real world, and as a result remains stuck in parasitic oppression without change – Dean 13:

“Communist Desire”, Jodi Dean, , 2013, LHP AM

An emphasis on the drive dimension of melancholia, on Freud's attention to the way sadism in melancholia is 'turned round upon the subject's own self', leads to an interpretation of the general contours shaping the left that differs from Brown's**. Instead of a left attached to an unaclmowledged orthodoxy,** **we have one that has given way on the desire for communism, betrayed its historical commitment to the proletariat, and sublimated revolutionary energies into restorationist practices that strengthen the hold of capitalism**. **This left has replaced commitments to the emancipatory, egalitarian struggles of working people against capitalism - commitments that were never fully orthodox, but always ruptured, conflicted and contested - with incessant activity** (not unlike the manic Freud also associates with melancholia), and so **now satisfies itself with criticism and interpretation, small projects and local actions, particular issues and legislative victories, art, technology, procedures, and process**. It sublimates revolutionary desire to democratic drive, to the repetitious practices offered up as democracy (whether representative, deliberative or radical). **Having already conceded to the inevitably of capitalism, it noticeably abandons 'any striking power against the big bourgeoisie',** to return to Benjamin's language. For such a left, **enjoyment comes from its withdrawal from responsibility, its sublimation of goals and responsibilities into the branching, fragmented practices of micro-politics, self-care, and issue awareness**. Perpetually slighted, harmed and undone**, this left remains stuck in repetition, unable to break out of the circuits of drive in which it is caught** - unable because it enjoys. **Might this not explain why such a left confuses discipline with domination, why it forfeits collectivity in the name of an illusory, individualist freedom that continuously seeks to fragment and disrupt any assertion of a collective or a common?** The watchwords of critique within this structure of left desire are moralism, dogmatism, authoritarianism and utopianism - watchwords enacting a perpetual self-surveillance: has an argument, position or view inadvertently rukeo one of these errors? Even some of its militants reject party and state, division and decision, securing in advance an inefficacy sure to guarantee it the nuggets of satisfaction drive provides. **If this left is rightly described as melancholic, and I agree with Brown that it is, then its melancholia derives from the real existing compromises and betrayals inextricable from its history - its accommodations with reality, whether of nationalist war, capitalist encirclement, or so-called market demands.** Lacan teaches that, like Kant's categorical imperative, the super-ego refuses to accept reality as an explanation for failure. Impossible is no excuse - desire is always impossible to satisfy. A wide spectrum of the contemporary left has either accommodated itself, in one or another, to an inevitable capitalism or taken the practical failures of Marxism-Leninism to require the abandonment of antagonism, class, and revolutionary commitment to overturning capitalist arrangements of property and production. **Melancholic fantasy (the communist Master, authoritarian and obscene) as well as sublimated, melancholic practices (there was no alternative) shield this left, shield Ltd, from confrontation with guilt over such betrayal as they capture us in activities that feel productive, important, radical.**

#### The alternative is the politics of the comrade – one that is oriented toward a shared communist horizon – only our methodology can fight capitalism, anything else allows it to take over co-opting any movement – Dean 19:

JODI DEAN, January 18, 2019, “Capitalism is the End of the World” <https://mediationsjournal.org/articles/end-of-world> //LHP AV

Conclusion From the loss of comradeship Lessing describes, **we can salvage the comrade as form of political relation among those who desire collectivity**, **who see themselves as on the same side of a struggle for communism.** As a generic, abstract figure of political belonging, **comrade promises alienation and fulfillment: liberation from the constraints of racist patriarchal capitalism and a new relation born of collective political work toward an emancipatory egalitarian future**. **Exceeding a sense of politics as individual conviction and choice, comrade points to expectations of solidarity as indispensable to political action**. When we do things out of comradeship, **we show up to meetings we would miss, do political work we would avoid, and try to live up to our responsibilities to each other**. We experience the joy of committed struggle, of learning through practice. We overcome fears that might overwhelm us had we no choice but to confront them alone. **My comrades make me better, stronger, than I could ever be on my own. Some on the Left are skeptical of such political belonging**. Seeing comradely discipline only as constraint rather than as a decision to build collective capacity, **they substitute the fantasy that politics can be individual for the actuality of political struggle and movement**. **This substitution evades the fact that comradeship is a choice**. It also ignores the liberating quality of discipline: **when we have comrades, we are freed from the obligation to be and know and do everything – there is a larger collective** with a line, program, and set of tasks and goals; we are freed from the cynicism that parades as maturity because of the practical optimism that faithful work engenders. Discipline provides the support that frees us to make mistakes, learn, and grow. When we err – and each of us will – our comrades will be there to catch us, dust us off, and set us right. We aren’t abandoned to go it alone. Disorganized Leftists too often remain entranced by the illusion of everyday people spontaneously creating new forms of life that will usher in a glorious future. This **illusion fails to acknowledge the deprivations and decapacitations that forty years of neoliberalism have inflicted.** If it were true that austerity, debt, the collapse of institutional infrastructures, and capital flight enabled the spontaneous emergence of egalitarian forms of life, we would not see the enormous economic inequalities, intensification of racialized violence, declines in life expectancy, slow death, undrinkable water, contaminated soil, militarized policing and surveillance, and desolate urban and suburban neighborhoods that are now commonplace. Exhaustion of resources includes the exhaustion of human resources. **People often want to do something, but they don’t know what to do or how to do it.** **They may be isolated in non-unionized workplaces, over-burdened by multiple flex-time positions, stretched thin caring for friends and family. Disciplined organization, the discipline of comrades committed to common struggle for an emancipatory egalitarian future, can help here**. **Sometimes we want and need someone to tell us what to do because we are too tired and over-extended to figure it out for ourselves. Sometimes when we are given a task, we feel like our small efforts have larger meaning and purpose**, maybe even world-historical significance in the age-old fight of the people against oppression. **Sometimes just knowing that we have comrades who share our commitments, our joys, and our efforts to learn from defeats makes political work possible where it was not before.** Some Leftists agree with everything I’ve said thus far…and add “but.” But won’t we end up disappointed and betrayed**? Won’t it all ultimately fail (as it has so many times)?** What about the harms comrades have inflicted on each other in the name of comradeship? What about the persistence of sexism and racism, bigotry and bias? **What happens when we are no longer on the same side, when we cannot say “we” or acknowledge a side?** **The critical tendency to reject an idea because of a slew of possible future failures is widespread in left milieus. An intellectual façade masks a failure of political will that would be unconvincing in any other context** – don’t meet that person for coffee in case you fall in love and later have an expensive and hateful divorce. **Worries about the end foreclose possibilities of beginning. Relationships end. Failures happen. But failure is nothing to fear – it’s something to learn from, a next step. We lose our comrades. The fact of an end should not forestall beginning.**

#### The role of the ballot is fidelity to the truth – dedication to a shared horizon is liberatory, Dean 19:

Dean, Jodi. Comrade: An essay on political belonging. Verso, 2019. // LHP BT + LHP PS

The idea that comrades are those who belong to the same side of a political struggle leads to the fourth thesis: **The** relation between comrades is mediated by **fidelity to a** truth**;** practices **of comradeship** materialize **this** fidelity**. The “same side” points to the truth comrades are faithful to—the political truth that unites them**—**and the fidelity with which they work to realize this truth in the world.** “Belonging” invites attention to the expectations, practices, and affects that being on the same side generates. The notions of truth and fidelity at work here come from Alain Badiou. In brief, **Badiou rejects the idea of truth as a proposition or judgment, arguing instead that** truth is a process**. The process begins with the eruption of something new, an event.** **Because an event changes the situation, breaks the confines of the given, it is undecidable in terms of the given; it is something entirely new**. Badiou argues that this undecidability “induces the appearance of a *subject* of the event.”[60](about:blank) **This subject isn’t the cause of the event. It’s an effect of or response to the event,** “the decision to *say* that the event has taken place.” Grammar might seduce us into rendering this subject as “I.” **We should** avoid this temptation and **recognize the subject** **as** designating an inflection point, **a response that extends the event.** **The decision that a truth has appeared, that an event has occurred, incites a process of verification**, the “infinite procedure of verification of the true,” **in** **what Badiou calls an “exercise of fidelity**.”[61](about:blank) **Fidelity is a working out and working through of the truth, an engagement with truth that extends out into and changes the world. We should recognize here the unavoidably collective dimension of fidelity: in the political field, verification is a struggle of the many.** Peter Hallward draws out some implications of Badiou’s conception of truth. First, it is subjective. Those faithful to an evental truth involve themselves in working it out, exploring its consequences.[62](about:blank) Second, fidelity is not blind faith; it is rigorous engagement unconcerned with individual personality and incorporated into the body of truth that it generates. Hallward writes:Fidelity is, by definition, ex-centric, directed outward, beyond the limits of a merely personal integrity. To be faithful to an evental implication always means to abandon oneself, rigorously, to the unfolding of its consequences. **Fidelity implies that, if there is truth, it can be only cruelly indifferent to the private as such.** **Every truth involves a kind of anti-privatization, a subjective collectivization. In truth, “I” matter only insofar as I am subsumed by the impersonal vector of truth—say, the political organization, or the scientific research program.**[**63**](about:blank) **The truth process builds a new body**. This body of truth is a collective formed to “work for the consequences of the new” and this work, this collective, disciplines and subsumes the faithful.[64](about:blank)Third, collectivity does not imply uniformity. The infinite procedure of verification incorporates multiple experiments, enactments, and effects.Badiou writes, “An organization lies at the intersection between an Idea and an event. However, this intersection only exists as process, whose immediate subject is the political militant.”[65](about:blank) We should amend this statement by replacing *militant* with *comrade*. Comrade highlights the “discipline of the event,” the way that political fidelity cannot be exercised by a solitary individual—hence, the Marxist-Leninist emphasis on the unity of theory and practice, the barren incapacity of each alone. Comrade also affirms the self-abandonment accompanying fidelity to a truth: its vector, its unfolding, is indifferent to my personal experiences and inclinations. For communists, the process of truth has a body and that body is the party, in both its historical and formal sense. Already in *Theory of the Subject*, Badiou recognizes the necessity of a political body, the party as the “subject-support of all politics.”[66](about:blank) He writes:The party is the body of politics, in the strict sense. The fact that there is a body by no means guarantees that there is a subject … But for there to be a subject, for a subject to be found, there must be the support of a body.[67](about:blank) **As a figure of political belonging, the comrade is a faithful response to the evental rupture of crowds and movements, to the egalitarian discharge that erupts from the force of the many where they don’t belong, to the movement of the people as the subject of politics.**[**68**](about:blank) **Comrades demonstrate fidelity through political work; through concerted, disciplined engagement. Their practical political work extends the truth of the emancipatory egalitarian struggle of the oppressed into the world.** Amending Badiou (by drawing from his earlier work), we can say that the comrade is not a faithful subject but a political relation faithful to the divided people as the subject of emancipatory egalitarian politics.[69](about:blank) **For us to see the revolutionary people as the subject in the struggles of the oppressed, for their subject to be found, we must be comrades.** In *Ninotchka*, Nina Ivanova Yakushova can’t tell who her comrades are by looking at them. The party has told her who to look for, but she has to ask. After Iranoff identifies himself, Yakushova tells him her name and the name and position of the party comrade who authorized her visit. Iranoff introduces Buljanoff and Kopalski. Yakushova addresses each as comrade. But it’s not the address that makes them all comrades. They are comrades because they are members of the same party. **The party is the organized body of truth that mediates their relationship. This mediation makes clear what is expected of comrades—disciplined, faithful work.** Iranoff, Buljanoff, and Kopalski have not been doing the work expected of comrades, which is why Moscow sent Yakushova to oversee them in Paris. That Kopalski says they would have greeted her with flowers demonstrates their *embourgeoisment*, the degeneration of their sense of comradeship. But they are all there for work. Gendered identity and hierarchy don’t mediate relations between comrades. The practices of fidelity to a political truth, the work done toward building that truth in the world, do. The solidarity of comrades in political struggle arises out of the intertwining of truth, practice, and party. It’s not reducible to any of these alone. **Comrades are not simply those who believe in the same truth—as in, for example, the idea of communism. Their fidelity to a certain truth is manifested in practical work.** Work for the realization of a political truth brings people into comradely relation. **But carrying out similar tasks in fidelity to the same truth isn’t sufficient for comradeship. The work must be in common; no one is a comrade on their own. Practices of comradeship are coordinated, organized. The party is the organization out of which comradeship emerges and that comrade relations produce. It concentrates comradeship even as comradeship exceeds it.**

## On Case

**Science fiction inherently translates the alien into the other, and therefore justifies anihilation and dehumanization. This turns their case and perpetuates all of the harms of the 1AC**

**Sardar & Cubitt, 02**, Ziauddin, London-based scholar, writer and cultural-critic who specializes in the future of [Islam](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islam), science and cultural relations. Sean, Director of the Program in Media and Communications at the University of Melbourne and Honorary Professor of the University of Dundee, Introduction, Aliens R us, the other in science fiction, 6/24/11, EG

In science fiction, the ‘other’ as ‘alien’ is deployed to concretise the deeply divisive dichotomies of race and gender embedded in the repressive structures and relations of dominance and subordination. Modernity remains intact, the moral guardian of the future, whilst the ‘other’ emerges demonised and thus can be justifiably annihilated. ‘The centre,’ as John Rutherford has argued, ‘invests the “other” with its terrors. It is the threat of dissolution of self that ignites the irrational hatred and hostility as the centre struggles to assert its boundaries, that constructs self from not self.’2Of all the categories of cinema, ‘alien invader’ films are the most prolific and conservative for, as Susan Hayward notes, ‘They point at otherness as threatening to life and/or social mores’ and ‘represent the most “worrying” category of all with their innate potential for misogyny, racism and nationalistic chauvinism’.3

#### 1] Capitalist structures control root cause of ableism and violence that stems from it – voting negative is a necessary pre-requisite – Russell 02:

vRussell, M. (2002). What Disability Civil Rights Cannot Do: Employment and political economy. Disability & Society, 17(2), 117–135.doi:10.1080/09687590120122288

**Disabled workers face inherent** micro-economic **discrimination within the capitalist system**, stemming from employers’ expectations of encountering additional production costs when hiring or retaining a non-standard (disabled) worker as opposed to a standard (non-disabled) worker who has no need for job accommodations, [7] interpreters, readers, environmental modi cations, liability insurance, [8] maximum health care coverage (inclusive of attendant services) or even health care coverage at all (Russell, 2000, p. 349). ‘**Disability’ is a (historical) social creation of capitalism that defines who is offered a job and who is not, and what it means varies with the level of economic activity.** **This is so because a root cause of the** work-place **discrimination experienced by disabled people is to be found in an accountant’s calculation of the present cost of production versus the potential contribution the employment of a given worker will make to future profits.** Pure economic theorists conclude then that if disabilities among the direct producers add to the cost of production without increasing the rate of profit, owners and managers will necessarily discriminate against them. Expenses to accommodate ‘disabled’ persons in the workplace will be resisted as an addition to the fixed capital portion of constant capital. [9]

#### 2] Cap v Disability – Gleeson 97:

GLEESON, B. J. (1997). Disability Studies: A historical materialist view. Disability & Society, 12(2), 179–202.doi:10.1080/09687599727326

**Far from being a natural human experience, disability is what may become of impairment as each society produces itself sociospatially**: there is no necessary correspondence between impairment and disability. There are only historical geographical correspondences which obtain when some societies, in the course of producing and reproducing themselves, oppressively transform impaired ®rst nature as disablement. As the foregoing survey demonstrated, there is an established tendency for disability analysts to reduce disability to impairment: the ahistorical and aspatial assumption that nature dictates the social delimitation of disability. Against this, materialism recognises that different societies may produce environments which liberate the capacities of impaired people whilst not aggravating their limitations. **It is certainly possible to point to historical societies where impairment was sociospatially reproduced in far less disabling ways than has been the case in capitalism.** The historical analyses of Morris (1969), Topliss (1979), Finkelstein (1980), Ryan & Thomas (1987), Gleeson (1993) and Dorn (1994) have all opposed the idea that capitalist society is inherently less disabling than previous social forms. **Gleeson’s (1993) substantial empirical investigation has shown, for example, that whilst impairment was probably a prosaic feature of the feudal England, disablement was not.** **Gleeson (1993) attributes the non-disabling character of feudal English society both to a concerned realm of physical interaction and, more importantly, to the relatively weak presence of commodity production.** He argues that the growth of commodity relations in late feudal England (i.e. from around the 15th century) slowly eroded the labour-power of impaired people. **Market relations, and the commodi®cation of labour, introduced a social evaluation of work** Ðthe law of valueÐ **into peasant households which had heretofore been relatively autonomous production units.** The increasing social authority of the law of value meant the submission of peasant households to an abstract external force (market relations) which appraised the worth of individual labour in terms of average productivity standards. From the ®rst, this competitive, **social evaluation of individual labour-power meant that** `slower’ , **`weaker’** or more in¯ exible **workers were devalued** in terms of their potential for paid work [see also Mandel (1968) on this]. **Impaired workers thus entered the first historical stage of capitalist accummulation handicapped by the devaluing logic of the law of value and competitive commodity relations.** Also under the impress of commodity relations, sites of production were themselves evolving (in fact, convulsively by the late 18th century), and were recreating as social spaces which were compelled by the logic of competition to seek the most productive forms of labour-power. The `original handicap’ which early commodity relations bestowed upon impaired people was crucial in setting a trajectory of change in both the social relations of production and their sociospatial settings (e.g. factories) which progressively devalued their labour power. **The commodification of labour resulted in the production of increasingly disabling environments** in Britain and its colonies. **The emergence of the industrial city in the late eighteenth century crystallised the sociospatial oppression of disabled people** which had been slowly rising after the appearance of commodity relations in the late feudal era. **One disabling feature of the industrial city was the new separation of home and work**, a common (if not universal) aspect of industrialism which was all, but absent in the feudal era. **This disjuncture of home and work created a powerfully disabling friction in everyday life for physically impaired people. In addition, industrial workplaces were structured and used in ways which disabled `uncompetitive’ workers,** including physically impaired people. **The rise of mechanised forms of production introduced productivity standards which assumed a `normal’** (viz, usually male and non-impaired) **worker’s body** and disabled all others. **As Marx** (1981) **pointed out** at the time, **one result** of these changes **was the production of an `incapable’ stratum of labour, most of which was eventually incarcerated in a new institutional system of** workhouses, **hospitals, asylums**, and (later) `crippleages’. Industrialism, he believed produced too great a section of the population which is ¼ incapable of work, which owing to its situation is dependent on the exploitation of the labour of others or on kinds of work that can only count as such within a miserable mode of production. (Marx, 1981, p. 366.) **For impaired people then, the social history of capitalism appears as a sociospatial dialectic of commodification and spatial change which progressively disabled their labour power**

#### 3] Social context determines disability discrimination.

Anastasiou and Kauffman ’13 (DIMITRIS - Associate Professor and Program Coordinator, Ph.D., National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2004. JAMES M. - Professor Emeritus of education at UVA, Ed.D. in special education from University of Kansas. “The Social Model of Disability: Dichotomy between Impairment and Disability.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 38: 441–459, 2013. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/James\_Kauffman/publication/249647375\_The\_Social\_Model\_of\_Disability\_Dichotomy\_between\_Impairment\_and\_Disability/links/02e7e521b55fa0504d000000.pdf)-JJN

V. Disabilities in Social Context Proponents of a social model seem to support the idea that disability is a product of wrong interpretation of impairments (Reindal, 1995) related to disabling social structures. Our question is very simple: Assuming that we have an ideal, perfect, caring society, will disabilities no longer exist? If we followed the arguments of the social model, in an ideal society we would have only impairments but not disabilities! Unfortunately, we do not think that it would be possible to eradicate disabilities by changing only the sociopolitical context. Why? Because the dichotomy between impairment and disability is methodological; it is not ontological. The names we give to physical or mental conditions do not create disabilities or turn disabilities into abilities (Kauffman et al., 2008; Kauffman, 2011). Of course, names have their importance, because they circulate in a social context and turn back on the named people. Also, a much better social context can substantially improve the quality of life of people with disabilities, and this is not a trivial matter. But whatever names we use in our societies, the most profound restrictions related to intrinsic factors will remain for the vast majority of people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the discussion about social context is an important issue. Disabilities should be viewed as embedded in their social context in many different ways. First, a certain disability is conceptualized within a specific social context and characterized by a discrepancy between the individual’s performance and the expectations or demands of the social group to which the person belongs. This brings social values into the appreciation of disabilities. Any conceptualization of disability, whether physical or mental, is inevitably value-laden. Disabilities naturally arouse children’s curiosity, but social perceptions can change. The recognition of disabilities can take different directions according to social values. Zola, an American sociologist, has eloquently described it: “Children spontaneously express an interest in wheelchairs and leg braces, but as they grow older they are taught that . . . it’s not nice to ask [about] such things” (1982, 200). Values and attitudes exert profound influence on the way nondisabled people perceive others with disabilities, as Zola stated: When the “able-bodied” confront the “disabled,” they often think with a shudder, “I’m glad it’s not me” . . . The threat to be dispelled is the inevitability of one’s own failure. The discomfort that many feel in the presence of the aged, the suffering, and the dying is the reality that it could just as well be them. (1982, 202) Second, social decisions about the border between disability and normality are difficult because of the statistical phenomena involved. In many cases, the border is both vague and rather arbitrary (Kauffman and Hallahan, 2005; Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011; Kauffman and Lloyd, 2011 ). Defining the qualitative differences we call disabilities by making binary decisions (yes or no, has or does not have) requires making judgments about people, even though the quantitative data are continuous statistical distributions. The identification of a disability depends on judgment, and judgment means that one arrives at a cutpoint on continuously distributed abilities. Inevitably social values are linked to the judgmental identification of disabilities. However, not making such a judgment precludes the kind of assistance we consider necessary for social justice (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011). Third, although categorizing and labeling have become major issues in disability and special education debates, the debate is often misguided. Kauffman (2002, 2011) and Kauffman et al. (2008) have argued analytically for the inevitability of labeling, given that we really want to offer special services and benefits to specific individuals. We simply cannot offer extra or better services to individuals without speaking about difference or special needs, and this is as true for disabilities as it is for economic assistance or any social program. For this reason, an individual-based perspective is necessary for identifying people with special needs for certain services (Reindal, 1995). Without a definition based on individual criteria of disability, the rights of people with disabilities cannot be fully guaranteed (see Kauffman and Landrum, 2009). Even in Norway, a country with an extended safety net of social welfare services, the identification of benefits to be received is based on judgment of individual need (Reindal, 1995). Antilabelists imagine services without labels. But even in an ideal communitarian society with enough resources, we cannot offer excellent services according to the old socialistic principle “from each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs” without any need identification process. Perhaps the process is more obvious in an antagonistic society with a plurality of interests and unequal distribution of power, status, and wealth. Those who want to avoid all labels commit a great mistake in confusing the relationship between education and social change. Public education, by its nature, is a rather conservative institution that reflects the mainstream values of society and represents an adopted social agenda. It is a trailer and not a leader in political, economic, and social change. Historically great social changes precede important educational changes. Imagining the opposite relationship and neglecting today’s predominant sociopolitical forces is a political fallacy. The danger is that without labels the needs of individuals with disabilities will be ignored (see Kauffman, 2011). Surely labeling is not trivial, because labels are used to describe human beings as well as things. Labels often carry unintended stigma to receivers of services. And in many cases, the experiences of being disabled are socially constructed, mirroring the thoughts, feelings, and values of the social milieu. Indeed, the institutional response to disabilities is difficult. The “dilemma of difference” has been underlined in special education’s literature. If we emphasize existing differences (including disabilities), then we are in danger of unjustified discrimination; if we ignore the existence of disabilities or pretend that they do not exist, then we are in danger of leaving critical humans’ needs untreated (Hallahan and Kauffman, 1994; Kauffman and Badar, forthcoming). Fourth, disabilities are defined in a specific sociopolitical context and a system of social relations. Many dimensions of disabilities are part of the social process by which the social meanings of disability are negotiated (Zola, 1989). Public policy has a great impact on the lives of people with disabilities, and the formulation of disability strategy in education and public arena is of huge importance (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2010, 2011). In summary, disabilities are sealed within their social context. And many concepts about disabilities, whether involving low-incidence disabilities (e.g., severe intellectual disabilities) or high-incidence disabilities (e.g., mild intellectual disabilities, specific learning disability), have socially constructed aspects. It is not accidental that they have been classified and reclassified, defined and redefined according to the status of scientific knowledge and social values (e.g., Bruno Bettelheim’s theory of “refrigerator mothers” as a cause of autism—that autism was caused by cold, distant, and unconsciously rejecting mothers). Using the reasoning of Hacking (1999), we could make a distinction between the idea of autism (and the surrounding conceptual context) as socially constructed and autistic behaviors, which are real. Social construction does not give us insight into the severely restricted communication and social interaction of children with autism. Recognizing the influence of social context does not mean that there are no other viable ideas about disabilities. Social factors such as biomedical technology and special education can interact with biological factors, codetermining the evolution of disabilities as atypical predicaments. Thus, social and individual explanations of disabilities should be seen not as mutually exclusive but as codeterminants of development of people who have disabilities (Williams, 1999).