**Framing**

**Resistance strategies must be collectivized by communities of shared concerns, preserving while simultaneously negotiating difference. Medina13 [1]**

Medina José. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. Oxford University Press, 2013. //LHP MS

**We have to take responsibility** in the present **for the failures of our imagination,** that is, **for** **the manner in which our collective imaginings contribute to** prolong **social** **harms** and exclusions that were initiated in the past. In particular, Gatens and Lloyd call attention to the special problems that arise in this respect for societies with a colonial past in which native populations were displaced, excluded, and oppressed: **without a radical rethinking of the past, the institutions of** contemporary democratic societies with **a colonial past will continue to “**oppress, **marginalize** **or,** at best, **ignore those who did not figure in their design.”** (p. 139) Contemporary forms of marginalization of indigenous popula- tions still bear the traces of past displacements and exclusions; and these on- going forms of oppression cannot be fully eliminated and overcome without a radical transformation of the social imagination by opening it up to multiple forms of contestation and making it answerable to oppressed and previously excluded perspectives. To illustrate this point, Gatens and Lloyd analyze the example of the so-called Mabo judgment in which Australia’s High Court over- turned the legal fiction that Australia was terra nullius prior to British coloniza- tion. As Gatens and Lloyd explain, Eddie Mabo was one of five people who took a claim to the High Court of Australia for the legal recognition of their traditional ownership of land in the Torres Strait area, an area which had been annexed to the Australian state of Queensland in 1879. Mabo and others claimed that their entitlement to their land derived from their membership of an organized social group, governed by law, who had occupied and cul- tivated their land continuously since colonization. Their claim was a direct challenge to all the assumptions underlying the “settlement” of Australia. (p. 140)  As Australia’s High Court commented in its judgment in the Mabo case, a case like this can be taken as an opportunity to critically rethink the relation of all Australians to their land, and also as an opportunity to critically rethink their relation to each other, and to their common past, present, and future. As Gatens and Lloyd put it, “The Mabo judgment disturbed not only mining, farming and other financial interests of present-day non-indigenous Austra- lians, it also severely disturbed the social imaginary which grounds the ‘we’ of contemporary Australian identity” (p. 146). “The process of de-colonization cannot avoid dealing with these multiplicitous pasts in the endeavour to nego- tiate a just and fair present for all” (p. 148). And this brings us to a larger point about shared responsibility with respect to the social imagination that we have inherited and internalized and are somehow immersed in**. It is only collectively that we, as members of pluralistic societies, can develop the “capacity to accept responsibility for the harmful effects on others of the social imaginaries which we inhabit and which have formed us as the types of persons we are”** (Ibid.). **Ongoing contestations and critical interrogations of the social imaginary—as exemplified by the Mabo case—are not just occasions either for reopening wounds and revitalizing antagonisms or for forging new agreements. The con- sensus-dissension false dichotomy actually obscures what is most interesting and promising about these instances of radical contestations of the social imaginary, namely, that they are occasions for the collective rethinking and reimagining that can trigger multiple and interrelated processes of self-transformation for differ- ently situated groups and standpoints as they assume radical responsivity and solidarity with each other and are brought together as a community of shared concerns**—**not a community of agreements or disagreements. And it is in fact crucial that we do not assume a priori that the collective processes of self-critique associated with radical contestability be aimed at either the merging of perspec- tives or at fostering antagonisms, but rather at the ongoing self-transformation of a radically pluralistic social imagination, which can have quite different effects and can be viewed quite differently from different perspectives.** I do not want to deny, of course, that both agreement and disagreement can be part of these processes of self-interrogation and self-transformation that are triggered when the social imagination opens itself to radical contestation; but these transfor- mative processes can include and yield all sorts of things: new agreements and disagreements in some cases, but also new forms of communication, new forms of respect, new shared understandings or shared concerns, new forms of coor- dination, new habits and attitudes, and so on. **Acknowledgment, rather than agreement or disagreement, is the crucial normative relation that brings people together through a radically pluralistic sensibility.** And acknowledgment is pre- cisely an ethical relation that, through cognitive and affective means, we estab- lish with others (with their experiences, problems, aspirations, values, etc.) through the imagination. A vibrant democratic community of shared concerns can only be created by the mutual acknowledgment of indefinitely many dif- ferent forms of human experience and human life that a radically pluralized social imagination makes possible. What is crucial in a society’s attempts at self-critique and at assuming shared responsibility for its social imagination is well described by Gatens and Lloyd in the following thought: “Encounters with significantly different others may open one imaginary to another, offering perspectives and opportunities for the re-negotiation of identity” (p. 146). **The collective transformation of the social imagination “must be thought and negotiated with actually existing different others in historical time” (p. 147)—hence the importance of the embodied aspects of the imagination, of an imagination grounded in actual bodily inter- actions with significantly different others in the flesh. As Gatens and Lloyd put it, “Negotiating difference necessarily involves the embodied presence of the relevant parties because negotiating difference involves negotiating (at least two) ‘worlds’” (p. 148). And this critical and transformative engagement with different experiential perspectives can only happen with specific, embodied, situated others, for it requires “the exercise of the capacity to see the specificity of one’s own world as one among others”** (p. 149; my emphasis). As Carol Gould (2007) has put it, a genuinely pluralistic solidarity “requires an effort to under- stand the specifics of the other’s concrete situation, to imaginatively construct for oneself their feelings and needs, and to listen to their own account of these, where possible” (pp. 156–57). Radical solidarity is indeed a very demanding form of social relationality, and its demands affect both our cognitive-affective structures and our practices. Radical solidarity requires a very challenging form of social sensibility, but it also requires political work: that is, it demands that we develop cognitive and affective capacities that enable us to acknowl- edge indefinitely many experiential perspectives in their specificity and con- creteness; but it also demands from us a political commitment to create and sustain contexts and practices that foster the flourishing of genuinely plural perspectives and voices that can critically engage each other without having to suppress their differences. The tasks of radical solidarity are indeed not easy tasks. The normative implications of a radically pluralistic approach to the social imagination do not make our life easier, but they provide guidance in the difficult struggle to meliorate our life in common while becoming forever more sensitive to our differences. In the next section I will explore how to develop radical solidarity with the past by using a properly pluralized social imagina- tion retrospectively, or—in other words—by contesting any hegemonic mo- nopolization of the past through exclusionary historical narratives. Drawing on Foucault, I will try to show how genealogical investigations and insurrec- tionary practices of counter-memory can produce epistemic friction and keep always alive the critical interrogation of the social imagination.

**Any staticization of identity or truth premised on anything other than friction will necessarily produce exclusion.**

**Medina [2]**

Medina José. The Epistemology of Resistance: Gender and Racial Oppression, Epistemic Injustice, and Resistant Imaginations. Oxford University Press, 2013. //LHP MS

**What we need in order to maintain the ongoing possibility of resistance is *epistemic friction*. Epistemic friction involves the mutual contestation of differently normatively structured knowledges; it interrogates epistemic exclusions, disqualification, and hegemonies.** Epistemic friction is acknowledged and celebrated in pluralistic views of our epistemic negotiations and our cognitive lives, but not every kind of epistemic pluralism makes room for epistemic frictionin the same way. In this section I want to explore the implications of a thoroughgoing epistemic pluralism for genealogical investigations. For this purpose, I will compare and contrast Foucault’s pluralism with two different kinds of epistemic pluralism that can be found in American philosophy, ar- guing that **Foucaultian pluralism offers a distinctive notion of epistemic friction that has tremendous critical force. Different experiential and agential standpoints can make different contribu- tions to genealogical investigations and even offer alternative genealogical his- tories. Given the right sociopolitical conditions, the critical reconstruction and reevaluation of our beliefs can (and should) be reopened and resumed when- ever new standpoints appear on the scene, but also whenever we discover that certain voices or perspectives were never considered or were not given equal weight.** Thus it is not surprising that populations feel particularly compelled to reopen the conversation about their past when the sociopolitical conditions change **in such a way that voices and perspectives that had previously been ignored or not fully taken into consideration can now participate differently in the reconstruction of their past, because they enjoy a different kind of agency**. For example, this has been happening periodically in different ways and on different fronts in the public debates about past dictatorial regimes that have In these countries, different segments of the population (as well as particular individuals) have demanded a sustained effort to critically revisit the reconstruction of a shared past in the light of evidence, testimony, and articulations or interpretations of facts that challenge established beliefs or are simply not integrated in the col- lective memory and “official history” in circulation. **There is a plurality of lived pasts and of knowledges about the past that *resist* unification and create *friction*. But what are we to make of this *resistance and friction*? Pluralistic views of truth and knowledge make productive use of those forms of epistemic friction and resistance, whereas monistic views regard epistemic diversity always as a problem**. I will restrict myself here to pluralistic views, but I want to emphasize that different kinds of epistemic pluralism involve different normative attitudes with respect to epistemic diversity and the kinds of epistemic friction and taken place in countries such as Argentina, Chile, or Spain.  resistance that heterogeneous perspectives can exert. I want to distinguish three very different attitudes with respect to epistemic differences and the plurality of heterogeneous perspectives that we can find in pluralistic accounts of truth and knowledge. In the first place, in classic pragma- tists such as C. S. Peirce and G. H. Mead (at least under some interpretations),19 we can find an approach to epistemic practices that places emphasis on the plurality of experiential perspectives, but nonetheless preserves a commitment to unification, so that all available standpoints must ultimately be subsumable under a *single perspective*—for example, if we were to reach a hypothetical end of inquiry, or if we were to push our communicative processes far enough until all perspec- tives were heard and integrated. This is what I call a converging pluralism. For converging pluralisms, the diversity and heterogeneity of conflicting perspectives are merely contingent—and in principle, transitory—features of our epistemic practices that we should aspire to eliminate or at least minimize. By contrast, in more thoroughgoing pluralistic views such as that of William James, diversity and heterogeneity are unavoidable features of our epistemic lives that can be hidden or repressed only with violence and exclusions, but can never be fully erased. In Jamesian pluralism, though more radical, the possibilities for epistemic friction and resistance are qualified and constrained for the sake, not of consensus and unification, but of coordination and cooperation. This is what I call a melioristic pluralism.  As I have argued elsewhere,20 by contrast with consensus theories of truth and knowledge, according to James’s radical fallibilism and pluralism, the openness to contestations and reinterpretations of our beliefs never goes away and constitutes the very normative core of our epistemic lives: this openness calls attention to the kind of accountability and responsiveness to others required by our epistemic agency. However, although in this pluralistic view epistemic differences and conflicts are not erased, they are put at the service of mutual improvements. On this melioristic pluralism, epistemic contestations and negotiations are directed toward improving the objectivity of the different standpoints available, toward correcting their biases and mistakes, and toward maintaining their truth alive—that is, dynamic, adaptable, and integrated in the lives of those who hold those experiential perspectives. Although here there is no aspiration to combine and unify all perspectives into a single one, there is the normative expectation that the interactions among diverging per- spectives will result in an increase of objectivity and in the improvement of the articulations and justifications of beliefs and epistemic appraisals. In this view, epistemic friction among perspectives is always an opportunity for learning from each other and correcting each other. In section 6.4 **I will defend a ver- sion of this melioristic pluralism, but first I want to call attention to a different kind of pluralism that we can find in Foucault: a *guerrilla pluralism* with a particularly radical subversive force. It is my view that this more subversive pluralism is precisely what is needed to address *radical exclusions*. In other words, I will argue that *guerrilla pluralism* is what we need when equitable and fair melioration for all is not yet possible, that is, when in a fractured society the conditions are not given for beneficial epistemic friction that results in mutual corrections and a collective process of learning in which all social groups can participate. In a Foucaultian pluralistic framework, epistemic frictions are no more tools for learning than they are tools for unlearning (for undoing power/ knowledges—e.g., for undoing ways of remembering and forgetting, when it comes to knowledge of the past).** In this view, epistemic frictions are not merely instrumental or transitional—that is, tools for, or steps toward, har- mony or conflict resolution. Epistemic frictions are sought for their own sake, for the forms of resistance that they constitute. This is why I call this more rad- ical epistemic pluralism that can be found in Foucault a guerrilla pluralism. It is not a pluralism that tries to resolve conflicts and overcome struggles, but instead tries to provoke them and to re-energize them. It is a pluralism that aims not at the melioration of the cognitive and ethical lives of all, but rather, at the (epistemic and sociopolitical) resistance of some against the oppression of others. This is a pluralism that focuses on the gaps, discontinuities, tensions, and clashes among perspectives and discursive practices. With respect to knowledges of the past, Foucaultian genealogical investigations do not simply revive alternative memories that can act as correctives of each other and coop- erate without losing their specificity, as a Jamesian melioristic pluralism would have it. Rather, Foucaultian genealogical investigations resurrect counter- memories, not just for the sake of joint cooperation, but for the sake of reactivating struggles and energizing forms of resistance. In this view, alternative memories are not simply the raw materials to be coordinated in a heterogeneous (but nonetheless shared) collective memory; rather, they remain counter-memories that make available multiplicitous pasts for differently constituted and positioned subjectivities and their discursive practices.

**Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is to center indigenous knowledge, creating indigenous empowerment while simultaneously intervening in colonizing structures. Wilson04**

Wilson, Angela Cavender. “Introduction: Indigenous Knowledge Recovery Is Indigenous Empowerment.” The American Indian Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 3, 2004, pp. 359–372., doi:10.1353/aiq.2004.0111. //LHP MS

**Indigenous knowledge recovery is an anticolonial project.**' It is a project that gains its momentum from the anguish of the loss of what was and the determined hope for what will be. It springs from the disaster resulting from the centuries of colonialism's efforts to methodically our ways of seeing, being, and interacting with the world. **At the dawn of the twenty-first century the recovery of Indigenous knowledge is a conscious and systematic effort to revalue that which has been denigrated and revive that which has been destroyed.** It is about regaining of being that allowed our peoples to live a spiritually balanced, sustainable existence within our ancient homelands for thousands of years. **In privileging writings about current work in Indigenous recovery, we are challenging the powerful institutions of colonization that have routinely dismissed alternative knowledges and ways as irrelevant to the modern world. Because Indigenous Peoples and other advocates of Indigenous knowledge have typically been denied the academic power structures that legitimize such knowledge, special issue of American Indian Quarterly offers us a rare scholarly opportunity to validate it. In carving a new space for discussion about Indigneous knowledge, we are testifying to its importance. This special issue provides a forum for sharing the ways in which researchers and writers are engaging Indigenous knowledge in the academy and in communities, both on individual and collective levels**. **Rather than engaging issue simply as an intellectual exploit, our goal is to discuss knowledge in the broader context of Indigenous empowerment. All the contributors to this collection would agree that Indigenous knowledge is meaningless and actually harmful if its holders and practitioners are not simultaneously empowered and supported in our efforts to not only survive but also thrive.** In addition to our physical subjugation, the process of colonization re- quired the complete subjugation of our minds and spirits so that our lands and resources could be robbed from underneath our bodies. Ngugi wa Thiong'o describes the largest weapon of imperialism as the "cultural bomb": "The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people's belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves." 2 Indeed, through the combined efforts of government institutions and Christian workers, Indigenous Peoples in the United States and Canada faced severe persecution for practicing our spirituality, for speaking our languages, and for attempting to live the way our ancestors before us had lived. The federal boarding and residential schools continued this tradi- tion, aiming their most concerted and brutal assaults on our most vul- nerable and precious populations-the children.3 While the devastation wrought from these assaults was not totally complete, it has been thor- ough enough to severely disrupt our ways of living and to cause us to question the usefulness and importance of the ways of life given to us. The colonizers taught us that the conquest and "civilizing" of our people was inevitable; that we, too, must give way to "progress." It was hammered into our heads that our Indigenous cultural traditions were inferior to those of Euroamericans and Euro-Canadians, that there was nothing of value in our old ways, and that those ways were incompatible with modernity and civilization. In order for the colonizers to complete their colonizing mission, they were required to make not only them- selves believe these ideas, but us as well. In one way they were correct; within the confines of colonialism our ways were irrelevant and incompatible. Indigenous traditions are of little value in a world based on the oppression of whole nations of people and the destructive exploitation of natural resources. Our values and lifeways are inconsistent with the materialism and militarism characteristic of to- day's world powers. In this world that colonialism has created, there is no place for Indigenous knowledge. **When Indigenous Peoples were taught the worthlessness of our traditions and knowledge, it was designed to perpetuate the colonial machine**. If Indigenous cultural traditions had been deemed to be on equal ground with the colonizer's traditions, colo- nialist practices would have been impossible to rationally sustain. **Unless they were willing to complete a project of complete extermination, their sense of peace required the muting of Indigenous voices, the blinding of Indigenous worldviews, and the repression of Indigenous resistance. To meet their aims, our capacity for producing knowledge had to be diminished into nonexistence.** Within a broader context we now understand that these ideas promoted in the Western world are just one form of knowledge out of many. It was not inevitable that Western knowledge would conquer Indigenous knowledge, or that our ways of life had to end. At any point in history we could have worked jointly toward conditions that would facilitate the re- turn of Indigenous ways of being while appreciating the knowledge that supported those ways. Even now this is not an impossible task. **The same human beings who created the conditions of this world also have the capacity to change them. In telling us we must change and adapt, they really meant that the old ways must end because they were unwilling to change their colonizing ways**. **They were unwilling to end their occupation of our homelands; they were unwilling to foster the restoration of the plants and animals indigenous to our homelands; they were unwilling to discontinue their exploitation and destruction of all that we cherished; and they were unwilling to let us retain the knowledge of alternative ways of being**. Because the colonizers wanted to continue colonizing, we had to change and our way of life had to be destroyed. So goes the nasty business of empire building.The legacy of this colonizing objective is frequently parroted by Indigenous Peoples, even by some academics, who have obediently learned to restrict their own vision according to the parameters set for us by our colonizers.4 **Fortunately there have always been those among us who understood the political motivations behind their thinking, who held fast to the original directions given specifically to our ancestors, and who resisted colonization by carrying that knowledge into the present.** There is a growing number of Indigenous people and non-Indigenous allies who have seen the fallacy of Euroamerican and Euro-Canadian self- purported superiority and who have complete faith in the ways of life that sustained us for thousands of years. In fact, many of us even go so far as to suggest that eventually these ways may resolve some of the global crises facing all populations today.

**Plan**

**Protection of indigenous pharmacology is needed now. Ezeanya13**

Ezeanya, Chika A.. “Contending Issues of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Indigenous Knowledge of Pharmacology in Africa South of the Sahara.” The Journal of Pan-African Studies 6 (2013): 24-43.//LHP MS

There is need for an appropriate global intellectual property system to protect against the misappropriation of Africa’s traditional knowledge by the West. Oguamanam (2004) argues that the **present international system of IPR** **protection**, especially the patent regime, **benefits the ‘western scientific** or biomedical **model**,’ **and could be** considered a **threat to the continued existence and development of traditional medicine in Africa**. The holistic approach of indigenous medical heritage is in stark contrast with conventional biomedical and intellectual property regimes. Therefore, the yardsticks of the western scientific knowledge when used in protecting indigenous medical knowledge would result in what Oguamanam calls, “an alien standard of validation based on a narrow epistemic genre- western science” (Oguamanam 2006, 34). **There is an urgent need for the adoption of** culturally oriented and sensitive approach toward **the protection of African indigenous pharmacology**.

**Thus the plan— Member nations of the WTO ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines, opening space for Indigenous sovereignty by removing jurisdiction of intellectual property protections on native land.**

**Ezeanya2**

Ezeanya, Chika A.. “Contending Issues of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Indigenous Knowledge of Pharmacology in Africa South of the Sahara.” The Journal of Pan-African Studies 6 (2013): 24-43.//LHP MS

New legal alternatives are **to** be considered to **protect indigenous pharmacology, in order to stem the tide of** ‘illegal’ **patenting and economic exploitation by the West.** This work recommends **a sui generis approach** that **provides** for the nature of **indigenous intellectual property to be defined in accordance** to **the** cultural **values of t**he **indigenous communities.** Unlike the IPR regime that provides a shelf life for inventions, **the sui generis provision should recognize the timeless nature of Africa South of the Sahara in indigenous pharmacology** and should be **devoid** **of the provisions f**or originality and material form, which **the** global **IPR regime upholds**. **The provisions**, to be **generated from** within **Africa**, and **under a regional framework would**, among others **ensure that the** issue of **Africa South of the Sahara** in **pharmacological exploitation** for economic benefits by **Western producers is** comprehensively **addressed**. Most importantly, a **sui generis approach recognizes** indigenous **pharmacology in Africa South of the Sahara as a new legal concept** with a previously unacknowledged rationale, which needs to be **g**r**anted** **a**n exclusive **platform of protection**, based on its unique attributes.

**Advantage**

**Biopiracy is a big problem where companies steal and use indigenous knowledge for commercial benefit.**

**McGonigle 16**

McGonigle, Ian(PhD Candidate in Anthropology and Middle East Studies at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University.) “Patenting nature or protecting culture? Ethnopharmacology and indigenous intellectual property rights” Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 6 February 2016. <https://academic.oup.com/jlb/article/3/1/217/1751287> // LHP NP

In the 1990s, **activists responded to** the work of **corporations negotiating trade contracts** for access to the biological resources of developing countries **using the term ‘biopiracy’** **to describe the illegitimately deemed**, and sometimes illegal, **resource extraction that** such **companies engaged in**. Since the 1990s, commercial drug development from natural products has subsided significantly. Today most ethnopharmacology research is conducted within academic institutions. For practicing ethnopharmacologists, **sufficient modifications of a plant substance** or traditional therapy **for legal proprietorship are rather simple**. **This may be as little as an alteration to the chemical structure** of the active compound of a medicine, **a small inventive step**, **or** the **use of a** **semisynthetic chemical analog**, a slightly modified version of the original compound. Perhaps, the most notable example of this kind of proprietorial move occurred in the case of the **indigenous peasant farmers of rural Mexico** (Oaxaca), who **cultivated** **barbasco yams and sold them for use in the burgeoning Mexican pharmaceutical industry**. The barbasco yam (Dioscorea Mexicana), also simply called the Mexican yam, produces the steroid compound diosgenin, which is a precursor for the synthesis of the female sex hormone, progesterone. **These yams were instrumental in the development of the female contraceptive pill during the** 19**70s** and 19**80s**. **Peasants’ expert ecological know-how** **became** publicly **recognized** **through their central role in** the **bioscience development of Mexico**, **but in the 1990s**, **developments** **in synthetic chemistry made the** wild **yams redundant as a source**, **cutting out the peasants from the commercial networks and eliminating their role in the industry altogethe**r. In this case, the drug product that the indigenous peasant farmers helped to produce ultimately led to their exclusion from downstream benefits. **Rather than affording protection to indigenous knowledge and contribution, the law allows companies to cut off any rights of the bearers of the indigenous knowledge that initially made the development possible. The current international regime favors the interests of commercial parties that can develop a synthetic alternative.**

**Current IPR is incompatible with Indigenous law.**

**Ezeanya3**

Ezeanya, Chika A.. “Contending Issues of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Indigenous Knowledge of Pharmacology in Africa South of the Sahara.” The Journal of Pan-African Studies 6 (2013): 24-43.//LHP MS

**Indigenous knowledge does not feature in** **the** **present** global Intellectual Property Rights (**IPR) system**. The existing global IPR regulatory mechanism is **based on Western description of knowledge**, **and its conceptions of individual intellectual property ownership**. According to Adam Moore, ‘at the most practical level the subject matter of intellectual property is largely codified in Anglo-American copyright, patent, and trade secrets law, as well as moral rights granted to authors and inventors within the continental Europe doctrine’ (Moore 1997, 2). Moore argues that, **although these systems of property encompass much of what is thought** to count **as intellectual property, they do** **not** in reality **take cognizance of the entire landscape** of what **intellectual property** truly **signifies, which includes indigenous knowledge.**

**Exploitation of indigenous knowledge reproduces settler logic or elimination.  Ezeanya5**

Ezeanya, Chika A.. “Contending Issues of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Indigenous Knowledge of Pharmacology in Africa South of the Sahara.” The Journal of Pan-African Studies 6 (2013): 24-43.//LHP MS

**Indigenous knowledge** is the variant of knowledge that is generated, and which **resides within a given locality.** **It is the outcome of generations of** working with and **understanding one’s environment** to produce the best possible processes for addressing specific challenges. Indigenous knowledge has been defined as the unique, traditional, local knowledge existing within and developed around specific conditions of women and men indigenous to a particular geographic area” (Warren, 1991). The World Bank notes that **indigenous knowledge is “**developed and adapted continuously to gradually changing environments and passed down from generation to generation and **closely interwoven with** people’s **cultural values**” (2013). Scholars in trying to understudy indigenous knowledge tend to descend into a comparison with western knowledge. **Evaluating indigenous knowledge in comparison to western science**, according to Oguamanam, **presupposes** **an, ‘overarching comparator in the form of universal reason** or science, **which is ontologically privileged’** (Oguamanam 2006, 4). **Such comparison places western science** at a vintage point **as** the **superior** form of knowledge, which other forms must seek to measure up to. The need for comparison between Western and indigenous knowledge is not necessary since there is in existence, a baseline of universal reason in every culture, “enforced by shared human economic need and cognitive processes although, activated and expressed in different cultural contexts.” (Oguamanam 2006,15).  What exists between Western form of knowledge and traditional knowledge is a marked difference in approach that gives each a distinguishing identity. The distinction must not be equated with superiority and therefore, does not justify the exclusive appropriation of validity to Western knowledge system. These differences are philosophical in nature, arising from the differences in socio-cultural processes and worldviews. Some of these differences are enumerated (Oguamanam 2006, 16).

## Underview

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory—they can be infinitely abusive in the NC and I’ll have no ability to call them out on it. This outweighs because there is literally no way for me to win without it. And prefer the 1AR theory paradigm issues:

#### a) drop the debater because 2AR is too short to have a fair shot at substance and theory, which means if theory is drop the arg it destroys theory as resource since I lose a time-trade off for checking abuse.

#### b) Competing Interps since 2NR can win multiple layers and risk of offense framing is a necessity to check back on defensive dumps.

#### c) No RVI since a 6-minute 2N dump on theory makes the 2AR impossible.

#### 2] Aff gets rvis A) Under-develop – without an RVI the time crunched 1ar will always have to under-develop the T debate since it’s just a NIB they can’t win off- means an rvi is key to good T debates B) Reciprocity – T is a unique avenue to the ballot that the aff can’t access – makes T structurally unfair without the RVI.