# 1N Doubles Woodward ☺

## 1 – Spec Bad

#### 1 –Interpretation: The affirmative debater may not specify a type of appropriation to ban.

#### Violation: They spec mining.

#### Vote neg –

#### Definite singulars imply a generic “rules reading” in the context of moral statements

Cohen 1 — (Ariel Cohen, Professor of Linguistics @ Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, PhD Computational Linguistics from Carnegie Mellon University, “On the Generic Use of Indefinite Singulars”. Journal of Semantics 18: 183-209, Oxford University Press, 2001, accessed 12-7-20, HKR-AM) \*\*BP = bare plurals

According to the rules and regulations view, on the other hand, generic sentences do not get their truth or falsity as a consequence of properties of individual instances. Instead, generic sentences are evaluated with regard to rules and regulations, which are basic, irreducible entities in the world. Each generic sentence denotes a rule; if the rule is in effect, in some sense (different theories suggest different characterizations of what it means for a rule to be in effect), the sentence is true, otherwise it is false. The rule may be physical, biological, social, moral, etc. The paradigmatic cases for which this view seems readily applicable are sentences that refer to conventions, i.e. man-made, explicit rules and regulations, such as the following example (Carlson 1995: 225):

(40) Bishops move diagonally.

Carlson describes the two approaches as a dichotomy: one has to choose one or the other, but not both. One way to decide which approach to choose is to consider a case where the behavior of observed instances conflicts with an explicit rule. Indeed, Carlson discusses just such a case. He describes a supermarket where bananas sell for $0.49/lb, so that (41a) is true. One day, the manager decides to raise the price to $1.00/lb. Immediately after the price has changed, claims Carlson, sentence (41a) becomes false and sentence (41b) becomes true, although the overwhelming majority of sold bananas were sold for $0.49/lb.

(41) a. Bananas sell for $0.49/lb.

b. Bananas sell for $1.00/lb.

Consequently, Carlson reaches the conclusion that the rules and regulations approach is the correct one, whereas the inductivist view is wrong.

While I share Carlson’s judgements, I do not accept the conclusion he draws from them. Suppose the price has, indeed, changed, but the supermarket employs incompetent cashiers who consistently use the old price by mistake, so that customers are still charged $0.49/lb. In this case, I think there is a reading of (41a) which is true, and a reading of (41b) which is false. These readings are more salient if the sentence is modified by expressions such as actually or in fact:

(42) a. Bananas actually sell for $0.49/lb.

b. In fact, bananas sell for $1.00/lb.

BP generics, I claim, are ambiguous: on one reading they express a descriptive generalization, stating the way things are. Under the other reading, they carry a normative force, and require that things be a certain way. When they are used in the former sense, they should be analysed by some sort of inductivist account; when they are used in the latter sense, they ought to be analysed as referring to a rule or a regulation. The respective logical forms of the two readings are different; whereas the former reading involves, in some form or another, quantification, the latter has a simple predicate-argument structure: the argument is the rule or regulation, and the predicate holds of it just in case the rule is ‘in effect’.

#### The resolution is a generic moral statement that implies that the aff has to defend all forms of private appropriation being unjust.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision outweighs.

#### A] stasis point – the rez is a precondition to debate – abandoning it makes us two ships passing which destroys the activity

#### B] link turns pragmatics since no precision justifies the aff defending anything which is the most unfair and un-educational.

#### C] Jurisdiction – tournament rules say to vote under the topic which makes it a meta constraint on the ballot

#### 2] Limits – they explode them since they can defend any form of appropriation compounded by infinite combinations, every aff can say only their aff, that outweighs since the neg can never beat back extensive frontlines to unique affs geared to take out generics and encourages cherry picking abusive affs the neg can’t respond to. Controls the internal link to ground – affs will always be hyperspecific and negs general prep won’t work against them.

#### TVA – you could have just read the plan as an advantage under a whole res advocacy

#### Vote on fairness since anything else arbitrarily skews the round to the unfair debater. Competing interps since reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention, and I win under reasonability if I win strong standards.

#### Drop the debater

#### A] to deter future abuse

#### B] dropping the advocacy is functionally the same.

#### No RVIs

#### A] logic – im fair vote for me makes no sense – logic comes first on all args because they need to make sense to be evaluable

#### B] rvis make affs abusive to bait theory and win on a long counterinterp

#### C] chilling effect – people won’t read theory against good theory debaters which makes infinite uncheckable abuse that outweighs

#### Prefer a norms creation model of competing interps, in which you defend a norm being good or bad based on all potential applications and benefits of said norm:

#### [1] Resolvability - no way to determine how much abuse happened in the round because it’s not tangible, means we need to debate if the norm itself is good or bad

#### [2] Norm Setting - anything else allows debaters to get away with infinitely abusive practices because they will make arbitrary and self serving arguments as to why in round they were not abusive - norm setting is the terminal impact to theory & the reason it was created in the first place

## 2

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not defend action on celestial bodies. To clarify, if the affirmative does defend an action, it must only be within outer-space.

#### Merriam-Webster defines Outer Space as:

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space // LHP PS

**space immediately outside the earth's atmosphere**

#### That outweighs on text – it relates to the physical space outside the atmosphere not land on other planets themselves.

#### Merriam-Webster defines Celestial Bodies as:

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/celestial%20body> // LHP PS

**an aggregation of matter in the universe (such as a planet, star, or nebula) that can be considered as a single unit (as for astronomical study)**

#### And, Toppr defines them as:

toppr.com/guides/physics/stars-and-solar-system/celestial-bodies // LHP PS

**By the definition, a celestial body is a natural object outside of the Earth’s atmosphere. For examples, Moon, Sun, and the other planets of our solar system. But, actually, these are very partial examples. The**[**Kuiper belt**](https://www.toppr.com/ask/question/what-is-the-difference-between-the-kuiper-belt-and-the-oort-cloud-d60b8d-1/)**is holding many celestial bodies. Any asteroid in our space is the celestial body.** This article will give the necessary details about the celestial bodies in a simple manner.

#### It’s actively confusing and bad for international law to conflate outer space and celestial bodies – Cheng 2k:

Cheng, Bin. "Properly speaking, only celestial bodies have been reserved for use exclusively for peaceful (non-military) purposes, but not outer void space." International Law Studies 75.1 (2000): 21.// LHP BT + LHP PS

First of all, it may be necessary to clarify the meaning of the term "outer space" and to introduce the term "outer void space." **Up to and including the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explo~ ration and Use of Outer Space in General Assembly Resolution 1962, adopted on December 13, 1963,7 the United Nations, including its Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), where international space law was constantly being discussed with a view to its progressive development, always referred to outer space separately from celestial bodies**. For instance, Article 3 of the Declaration provides: "Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national appropriation .... " (emphasis added). According to this terminology, extraterrestrial space consists, therefore, of "outer space" and "celestial bodies." Celestial bodies are thus treated as a cate~ gory apart from outer space as such, as illustrated in figure 1. However, since the 1967 Space Treaty, which in other respects follows the 1963 Declaration closely in form and in substance, the United Nations always speaks of "outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies" in treaties and other in, struments relating to outer space which it has sponsored. Thus, the 1967 Space Treaty, in its Article II, which is equivalent to the above,quoted Article 3 of the 1963 Declaration, provides: "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation .... " (emphasis added). In other words, henceforth the moon and other celestial bodies were no longer treated as being separate from outer space as such, but rather as forming part of it, as shown in figure 2. It follows that **whenever reference is made to "outer space," the moon and all the other celestial bodies are automatically included. One of the consequences of this change in the use of the term outer space is that the vast space in between all the celestial bodies has lost any specific desig, nation. It has become nameless, causing a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding.**

#### Outweighs –

#### A] Policy Freeze – they actively make it impossible for policymakers to determine what to do

#### B] Common usage – every treaty makes an explicit distinction between them by either saying outer space or/and celestial bodies which demonstrates an understood legal difference engrained within law.

#### C] Pragmatics – Cheng 99:

Cheng, Bin. "Introducing a New Term to Space Law." The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy 11 (1999): 321-327. // LHP BT + LHP PS

**However, one of the consequences of this change in the use of the term outer space is that the vast space in between all the celestial bodies (including in this case also the Earth) has lost any specific designation**. **It** **has become nameless**, as Figure 2 seeks to show. **The problem with this new nomenclature in depriving the vast void in outer space of a name is that it can cause a great deal of confusion and misunderstanding**. For instance, **there is a prevelant misconception that, because Article IV(2) of the 1967 Space Treaty provides that “[t]he moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes”, this means that the whole of outer space, including the whole empty space in between the celestial bodies, has been reserved exclusively for uses for peaceful purposes, but this is far from the truth.** **This vast empty space has not been totally demilitarized**. **Only certain restrictions have been placed on its military use by Article IV(1**) of the Treaty under which “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.” Otherwise, the **States** Parties **remain entitled** to use this empty space **for any military** **purpose** they wish, subject only to the observance of international law and treaty obligations, including the United Nations Charter. This **misunderstanding** can easily have **arisen because of** the **lack of a term** **to describe this vast empty space.**

#### Violation: They defend –

#### Vote neg for limits – they explode them – multiple warrants – A] their model justifies an infinite possibility of affs as space is extremely unexplored which is extremely unpredictable and impossible for negs to have prep to – B] justifies reading any aff because Earth is a celestial body, and if celestial bodies and space are the same Earth is included, which means the aff can read any action on Earth which kills quality engagement and negative ground. That also justifies affs reading trivially true affs.

## 3

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### China wants to colonize Mars – it’s key to CCP legitimacy specifically, Hong 20:

Brendon Hong Updated Jul. 29, 2020 4:00AM ET / Published Jul. 28, 2020 4:35AM ET, “China Wants to Be First to Colonize the Moon and Mars” <https://www.thedailybeast.com/china-wants-to-be-first-to-colonize-the-moon-and-mars> //LHP AV

HONG KONG—**China launched its most ambitious space mission last week**, with a trio consisting of an orbiter, lander, and rover loaded onto a massive rocket that is heading **to Mars**. The mission is an impressive scientific feat, one that is **entangled with Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping’s push to define China as a conquering superpower in space**. Called Tianwen-1, the Chinese Mars mission involves a seven-month journey to the red planet. When the rocket nears its destination after traveling 39 million miles, it will release the orbiter to scan and map Mars from above, while the lander will carry the rover to the planet’s surface. If everything goes according to plan and the rover maintains communication with ground control on Earth, **China will be the second nation to successfully place an operational robot on Martian soil**—**a significant achievement for a country that is attempting to establish technological supremacy on a global and now interplanetary scale**. Yet **that triumph comes loaded with CCP officials’ desire for space colonization**. One senior aerospace engineer and the head of China’s lunar exploration program, Ye Peijian, indicated two years ago that **his country’s designs for space expedition mirror Beijing’s plan for the South China Sea**—that is, **the party seeks to occupy the moon and Mars at any cost**. “The universe is an ocean, the moon is the Diaoyu Islands, Mars is Huangyan Island,” Ye said at the CCP’s annual plenary session in Beijing two years ago, referencing geological formations that are also known as Senkaku and Scarborough Shoal, and are claimed by Japan, Taiwan, as well as the Philippines. “If we do not go there now even though we can, then **we will be blamed by our descendants**,” Ye also said. “If others go there, then they will take over, and you will not be able to go even if you want to. This is reason enough.” The message was clear then: **it’s a zero-sum game.** The **party’s officials see space as a place to be conquered, so they are compelled to stake a claim—fast**. China has designs to become an astral superpower. Details about state funding for space missions are opaque, but in 2018, **Beijing earmarked at least $8 billion for the China National Space Administration, second only to the U.S. That amount has almost certainly increased every year since then, with Beijing hastening efforts to establish a permanent presence in space**. China already has rovers on the moon. It will likely launch the core module of a space station to low Earth orbit next year. It **is laying the groundwork for a crewed lunar mission in the 2030s, with plans to build a base near the lunar south pole.** And Mars? If we take Ye’s words at face value, then the plan is to seize, annex, and build on top of it. NASA’s Perseverance Mars rover is scheduled to launch this week, on July 30. Like Tianwen-1’s as yet unnamed rover, it will hunt for carbon-containing molecules that may point to Martian life in the past, as well as collect dirt samples for scientific analysis. After Tianwen-1 left its launchpad, NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine tweeted out well wishes, welcoming China to a small, elite group of nations that are exploring Mars. Yet it is impossible to ignore that the current confrontations between China and the U.S. look more and more like a Cold War with each passing day, and the competing space programs resemble a page out of the ideological showdown between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Beijing and Washington have locked horns on every front. The two largest economies in the world are trapped in a spiral of tariffs. China’s military is looking to project its power in new places around the globe, grating against American spheres of influence, particularly in East Asia and the Middle East. And tech companies on either side of the Pacific Ocean are racing to one-up each other, fueled by bonfires of cash from venture capital funds that place bets on both coasts. **The competition between China and the United States is multi-pronged, extending beyond the stratosphere too. If Tianwen-1 is a success, Xi Jinping will score a major win within the party’s hierarchy, and feed the justification of his decree to remain president for life**. **Space exploration in any form is an inspiration, and the pride shared by Chinese people while watching a rocket built by their country fly to Mars is pure. Many young people will no doubt heed the call to build careers in STEM fields, or even dream of becoming the first Chinese person to leave footprints on another planet.** But the CCP’s extra dimension of conquest taints this legacy, and even maps the potential for conflict beyond our world.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – deterrence fails, Taiwan raises the stakes – extinction, BRANDS & BECKLEY 22

Brands, Hal, and Michael Beckley. “Washington Is Preparing for the Wrong War with China.” Foreign Affairs, 11 Jan. 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-12-16/washington-preparing-wrong-war-china.

All of this would make forging peace more difficult. The expansion of war aims narrows the diplomatic space for a settlement and produces severe bloodshed that fuels intense hatred and mistrust. Even if U.S. and Chinese leaders grew weary of fighting, they might still struggle to find a mutually acceptable peace. GOING NUCLEAR A war between China and the United States would differ from previous hegemonic wars in one fundamental respect: both sides have nuclear weapons. This would create disincentives to all-out escalation, but it could also, paradoxically, compound the dangers inherent in a long war. For starters, both sides might feel free to shoot off their conventional arsenals under the assumption that their nuclear arsenals would shield them from crippling retaliation. Scholars call this the “stability-instability paradox,” whereby blind faith in nuclear deterrence risks unleashing a massive conventional war. Chinese military writings often suggest that the PLA could wipe out U.S. bases and aircraft carriers in East Asia while China’s nuclear arsenal deterred U.S. attacks on the Chinese mainland. On the flip side, some American strategists have called for pounding Chinese mainland bases at the outset of a conflict in the belief that U.S. nuclear superiority would deter China from responding in kind. Far from preventing a major war, nuclear weapons could catalyze one. Once that war is underway, it could plausibly go nuclear in three distinct ways. Whichever side is losing might use tactical nuclear weapons—low-yield warheads that could destroy specific military targets without obliterating the other side’s homeland—to turn the tide. That was how the Pentagon planned to halt a Soviet invasion of central Europe during the Cold War, and it is what North Korea, Pakistan, and Russia have suggested they would do if they were losing a war today. If China crippled U.S. conventional forces in East Asia, the United States would have to decide whether to save Taiwan by using tactical nuclear weapons against Chinese ports, airfields, or invasion fleets. This is no fantasy: the U.S. military is already developing nuclear-tipped, submarine-launched cruise missiles that could be used for such purposes. A local war could turn into a whole-of-society brawl that spans multiple regions. China might also use nuclear weapons to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The PLA has embarked on an unprecedented expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and PLA officers have written that China could use nuclear weapons if a conventional war threatened the survival of its government or nuclear arsenal—which would almost surely be the case if Beijing was losing a war over Taiwan. Perhaps these unofficial claims are bluffs. Yet it is not difficult to imagine that if China faced the prospect of humiliating defeat, it might fire off a nuclear weapon (perhaps at or near the huge U.S. military base on Guam) to regain a tactical advantage or shock Washington into a cease-fire. As the conflict drags on, either side could also use the ultimate weapon to end a grinding war of attrition. During the Korean War, American leaders repeatedly contemplated dropping nuclear bombs on China to force it to accept a cease-fire. Today, both countries would have the option of using limited nuclear strikes to compel a stubborn opponent to concede. The incentives to do so could be strong, given that whichever side pulls the nuclear trigger first might gain a major advantage. A final route to nuclear war is inadvertent escalation. Each side, knowing that escalation is a risk, may try to limit the other’s nuclear options. The United States could, for instance, try to sink China’s ballistic missile submarines before they hide in the deep waters beyond the first island chain. Yet such an attack could put China in a “use it or lose it” situation with regard to its nuclear forces, especially if the United States also struck China’s land-based missiles and communication systems, which intermingle conventional and nuclear forces. In this scenario, China’s leaders might use their nuclear weapons rather than risk losing that option altogether.

## Case

#### Scenario 1: extemp

#### Scenario 2:

#### [1] This wildly misunderstands how technology and funding work: --A] there’s millions of scientists to work on different things –B] space colonization wont steal climate scientists, they need ROCKET scientists –C] Too many alt causes for climate change distraction, the fact that neither space exploration nor climate change is NOT the United State’s main focus means they cant actually solve other scientist occupation fracture

#### Scenario 3:

#### No space war, and no impact if it does happen

Handberg 17 Roger Handberg 17, Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida, 2017, “Is space war imminent? Exploring the possibility,” Comparative Strategy, Vol. 36, No. 5, p. 413-425

The assumption made is that space war will be successfully waged in both the heavens and on the Earth itself. This assumption, however, is grounded on several hypotheticals occurring. First, that total devastating strategic surprise can be achieved—the side attacked becomes so damaged and devastated that further resistance is impossible to sustain regardless of national will, since nuclear weapons overhang the entire enterprise. The analogy usually invoked for American audiences is a “Pearl Harbor” type attack. This scenario is premised on equivalent American incompetence and lack of readiness as exhibited in December 1941. One must note that Pearl Harbor ended as a strategic failure for Japan—it led to defeat because the attack mobilized U.S. power without hesitation, given the intense political divisions over whether to enter the worldwide conflicts already raging. The attack was a military failure because Navy carriers were not destroyed along with battleship row along with critical fuel facilities. Similar analogies invoke September 11, 2001 as the prototype for such attacks more recently, but the same caveats apply. Total surprise assumes that all relevant opponent systems and civilian assets are disabled and left vulnerable to follow on attacks. In fact, collapse of U.S. defenses leaves U.S. cities as hostages to the rulers of the heavens, or vice versa if the U.S. moves first. Space war is extremely destabilizing, as will be discussed, since survivability of one's strategic assets becomes problematic. Second, surprise requires that sufficient offensive space assets be placed in orbit without triggering a response by other states—the scale of such technology deployment is in itself possibly self-defeating given high costs and a likely lack of launch capacity. In addition, much launch capacity is now international rather than national, so maintaining secrecy becomes even more difficult. Space as an operational environment suffers from excessive transparency, meaning any launches can be monitored and tracked by others with strong evidence as to what is being deployed. One must remember that the original satellite launches in the 1950s were accurately tracked by a British grade-school class as a science project. In addition, at least since the early 1960s, remote sensing has increased exponentially the global capability to detect buildup of military assets of differing types, whether in space or on the ground. Commercial remote-sensing capabilities further enhance the capacity to detect militarily relevant actions. For example, commercial imagery is accessed by private parties to monitor the North Korean missile and nuclear weapons programs, in effect expanding the capacity of the world to look in on various states' interior regions, scanning for relevant information, including weapons buildup and launch capabilities. Even construction of physical facilities for production of space assets or for other weaponry can be monitored, making surprise more difficult but not impossible, as demonstrated in earlier monitoring of North Korea and, in 1998, the nuclear tests by both Pakistan and India. That means if the ASAT weapons come from ground locations, there is a high probability that they can be detected but no guarantee exists that detection will in fact occur. The uncertainty will impact calculations of attack success. Third, the most obvious initial attack of space-based assets will most likely come from cyber attacks, given that such actions do not necessarily require the scale of resources necessary for other modalities such as kinetic weapons, or even lasers or other energy-type weapons. One will have to position the weapons plus the infrastructure to permit rapid recycling of the weapons for the next attack. Firing off interceptors will likely be a one-off, meaning extremely precise targeting will be required if the attack is to be successful. Note that none of these systems require that individuals be placed in Earth orbit, despite the imagery describing such operations in fictional universes. Deployment requires a large lift capacity for initial deployment plus replenishment of destroyed or inoperative space assets, since a space conflict assumes that assets will be lost either kinetically or be compromised by cyber or energy beams. In any case, the combatants must be able to recover their capabilities lost during the conflict; failure to do would mean defeat or at least stalemate, negating the reason for the attack. That raises a major question when one considers the problem or expectation that space war can be successfully conducted or defended. Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) remains a critical weak point for all potential space-war participants. Loss of space assets occurs routinely during operations, but actual combat losses can be exponential depending on the weaponry used, and replacing those losses becomes the race to the next level after the initial exchange or combat. Unfortunately, ORS remains a major weakness of the United States and likely other states; deploying replacement satellites remains a multiyear process, while launch capabilities are scheduled long in advance. The rise of multiple private-launch competitors may partially alleviate some of the delay but that remains problematic given that the military payloads may be competing with commercial vendors also trying to replace losses. The tradeoff is that. in principle, private-launch vendors may be able to do so more cheaply, but their capacity may be saturated by demand from the civil and commercial sectors, leaving few “uncommitted” launch options for military purposes. Normally this is not an issue, but the available launch options may be third party rather than national-flag carriers, which raises severe security concerns. Fourth, several other assumptions become essential to make the strategy work, including that such an attack does not render Earth orbit so debris-saturated that further military space operations become impossible to sustain. Also, damage to civilian space assets remains, such that their continuation is possible if undamaged replacements can be quickly reintroduced to restart economically critical operations. Globalization has been fostered through satellite technologies. Their disruption can be devastating for all parties, regardless of who is the winner or the loser. What may occur is the graveyard of the modern economic system. No potential space participants would be immune to the damage, regardless of whether or not they were participants in the actual conflict. Fifth, there must be no difficulty in separating potential targets from the enemy, allied states, and nonbelligerent states. This creates a situation in which the spread of space technologies globally complicates actions, expanding the range of participants beyond the combatants, much like earlier wars at sea, where there were the combatants' ships, along with those of nonbelligerents, including neutrals whom the combatants struggled to draw into the conflict on their side, or at least to render their services unavailable to the other side. The earliest discussion of space conflict was premised on Cold War analogies, meaning two major combatants, either U.S.–Russia, or U.S–-China, or even a three-way war. Presently, analyses focus on a bilateral conflict with the U.S. opposed to China and Russia. Whether that would occur is obviously unknown, despite political rhetoric about a Eurasia coalition of likeminded states. What it does is multiply the number of potential targets and complicates reactions to neutrals' actions to protect their interests or assets. The distinction between combatants and neutrals or third parties will be possibly blurred beyond separation. The byproduct of a kinetic space conflict is massive amounts of space debris, destroying or damaging most space assets regardless of their state sponsor or nationality. Initial attacks may be focused and precise, but the result is still the same. The debris generated by armed conflict will endure beyond the immediate clash. The obvious alternative is a strictly electronic attack on space assets' operating systems, leaving the satellites in orbit, although without the ability to move them or control possible erratic changes in orbit due to collisions with other space debris. Other forms space war will take Reality is more complicated—kinetic action produces debris, the ultimate deterrent to actual space war. Therefore, space war could likely track several distinct phases. The first is cyber attacks, which disable or destroy the working systems of the spacecraft or the ground-support network—in effect, a series of stealth attacks. Civilian satellites are extremely soft targets—defense requires a capacity to detect and analyze any attack on the spacecraft, not available presently for most commercial spacecraft due to cost considerations. Otherwise, one could use nuclear weapons to create electromagnetic pulses (EMP) which can fry unprotected electronics both in space and on the ground, depending on where the weapons are detonated. Interestingly, space war scenarios have some territorial war aspects in that any attacks on space assets will devastate both military and civilian targets without distinction between the war participants and civilians. Similar to unrestricted submarine warfare, all targets in the relevant area will become casualties or otherwise impacted in their operations. Second, attacks that are conducted against the ground down links and/or communications systems, leaving the spacecraft without guidance or instructions, and also no information is returned to the commanders even if the satellites survive the initial onslaught. These can involve kinetic attacks against specific locations or insertion of special operations forces to render the facility inoperative. For example, antennas can be disabled or destroyed, disrupting operations until new facilities are brought online. Other alternatives could include kinetic weapons launched from space, “rods from God.”20 Air strike packages could include electronic warfare elements capable of scrambling or disrupting operations of such facilities even prior to physical strikes against the targets. Spacecraft not destroyed or disabled in the initial two stages of the attack can be directly attacked by “dazzling” their receivers, with laser impulses destroying the receivers for which there are few replacements without replacing the spacecraft physically. Third, rapid replacement of inoperative satellites, regardless of the reasons, does not occur, which translates into a race for the third, possibly end, phase of the war, replenishment. Inability to replace losses may mean that none of the combatants are able to dominate in the end, meaning conventional conflict may be the outcome, although issues of global reach may confine conflicts to relatively small areas. In previous conventional conflicts, large-scale forces were moved, albeit slowly, across the globe to the conflict, i.e., Desert Shield morphing into Desert Storm after a nearly six-month buildup.

#### Deterrence solves.

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More important, U.S. policymakers should avoid making decisions on the basis of a possible, though highly improbable, space Pearl Harbor. They should recognize that latent counterspace capabilities—as exemplified in 2008’s Operation Burnt Frost, which saw the United States repurpose a ballistic missile interceptor to destroy a satellite—are more than sufficient to deter adversaries from launching a major surprise attack in almost all scenarios, especially in light of the aforementioned deep interdependence in the space domain. Adding to the deterrence effect are uncertain offensive cyber capabilities. The United States continues to launch incursions into geopolitical competitors’ critical systems, such as the Russian power grid, and has demonstrated a willingness to employ cyberattacks in the wake of offline incidents, as it did after Iran shot down a U.S. drone last week. Unlike in the nuclear arena, where anything short of the prospect of nuclear retaliation holds limited dissuasive power, space deterrence can stem from military capabilities in various domains. For this reason, an attack on a U.S. satellite could elicit any number of responses. The potential for cross-domain retaliation, combined with the high strategic value of space assets, means that any adversary risks extreme escalation in launching a major assault on American space architectures. Again, well-conceived diplomatic efforts are useful in averting such scenarios altogether.

#### Space weapon deployment doesn’t cause an arms race or increase chance of war

Lopez 12 [LAURA DELGADO LO´ PEZ, Institute for Global Environmental Strategies, Arlington, Virginia. Astropolitics. "Predicting an Arms Race in Space: Problematic Assumptions for Space Arms Control." https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14777622.2012.647391]

The previous discussion demonstrates that although a globalized space arms race could follow U.S. deployment of space weapons, it is also plausible and more likely that it may not happen at all. As Mueller states: ‘‘In the end, most of the inevitability arguments are weak.’’62 The assumptions discussed here break the argument into a series of debatable maxims that other scholars have also considered. Hays, for instance, counters the inevitability argument by pointing out that previous ASAT tests did not have this purported destabilizing effect, to which we can add that even after the Chinese ASAT test, neither Russia nor the United States, who would be both capable and more politically likely to launch space weapons, moved forward in that direction.63 Although some may draw attention to the recent wake-up calls in order to underline a sense of urgency, one should also recall that when it seemed truly inevitable before, it did not happen either. In his detailed account of military space developments from 1945 to 1984, Paul Stares described how superpowers’ assessment of the value of space weapons shifted, with a ‘‘hiatus in testing’’ reflecting the attractiveness of satellites as military targets.64 In this changed landscape, Stares also assumed the inevitability argument, claiming that ‘‘the chances of space remaining a ‘sanctuary’ [absence of weapons] into the 21st century appear today to be remote.’’65 Perhaps the conditions are more conducive now, but the important point to be reiterated is that the outcome is not inevitable, and that any such prediction must be undertaken with caution. One of the most prominent theorists to propose an alternate picture and pair it with an aggressive pro-space weapons stance is Everett Dolman. In his Astropolitik theory, Dolman summarizes the steps that the United States must take to assume control of space, particularly through withdrawal from the current space regime.66 This move, he argues, would benefit not only the United States, but also the rest of the world, since having a democracy controlling space is a catalyst for peace.67 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘‘Only a liberal world hegemon would be able to practice the restraint necessary to maintain its preponderant balance of hegemonic power without resorting to an attempt at empire.’’68 Accordingly, he believes that this strategy would be ‘‘perceived correctly as an attempt at continuing U.S. hegemony,’’69 but that other countries, correctly assessing U.S. leadership in space, would not seek to deploy their own systems. Having the ability to prevent the stationing of foreign weapons systems in space, he writes, ‘‘makes the possibility of large-scale space war and a military space race less likely, not more.’’70 In fact, he says, ‘‘to suggest that the inevitable result is a space arms competition is the worst kind of mirror-imaging.’’71 Dolman argues that the weaponization of space by the United States would ‘‘decrease the likelihood of an arms race by shifting spending away from conventional weapons systems,’’ which would reduce U.S. capabilities in territorial occupation