## 1

#### [1] They can’t cross-apply why agency is important to take out the K; I also have an understanding an agency, but the K critiques how we build agency –not as a static being, but a becoming process that is not complete, always changing.

#### [2] Saying the standard allows for different empirical differences among subjects – the claim that we are purely rational but deviate from it in the material world – doesn’t delink the K my arg is that the logic of establishing a base criteria for a subject creates a desire from lack and leads to individual oppression.

#### [3] Their framework grounds agency in a static conception of reason and a definite view of the subject. This is incoherent – two warrants:

#### First, desire – underpinning any rational thought is an irrational desire that makes the subject inherently unstable. SMITH ‘88:

[Smith, Daniel W. Jun, Nathan. “Deleuze and Ethics. Pg. 137. University of Edinburgh. 1988., it’s a team purchased PDF, DOA: Feb 19, 2022 LHP MK]

3. Third, **the difference between interest and desire** could be said to **parallel[s] the difference between the rational and the irrational. “Once interests have been defined within the confines of a society, the rational is the way in which people pursue those interests and attempt to realize them”** (Deleuze 2004: 262–3) – the interest for a job, or cavity-free teeth. “But **underneath that**,” Deleuze insists, “**you find desires, investments of desire that are not to be confused with investments of interest**, and **on which interests depend for their determination and very distribution: an enormous flow, all kinds of libidinal-unconscious flows that constitute the delirium of this society**” (Deleuze 2004: 263). As Deleuze will say: **Reason is always a region carved out of the irrational** – it is **not sheltered from the irrational at all, but traversed by it and only defined by a particular kind of relationship among irrational factors. Underneath all reason lies delirium and drift.** Everything about capitalism is rational, except capital . . . A stock market is a perfectly rational mechanism, you can understand it, learn how it works; capitalists know how to use it; and yet what a delirium, it’s mad . . . It’s just **like theology: everything about it is quite rational – if you accept sin, the immaculate conception, and the incarnation, which are themselves irrational elements**. (Deleuze 2004: 262)

#### Impacts:

#### [A] New link to the K – proves your conception of an agent is one that restricts the free-flowing bounds of subjectivity and recognition of difference.

#### [B] There is no conceptual structure of an agent. The link from the structure of an agent to its motivation in people is not accounted for in practical reason. The only way we can motivate individuals is to follow through with their unfolding affects and desires so the K is a prior question.

#### [C] Takes out reason - it is always changing – just like our desires. It is not ground in the agent because that assumes the agent has one universal will, but that view is incoherent.

#### Second, time – the ‘I think’ is not the ‘I am’. The ‘I think’ does not determine the subject – it is merely its capacity. Thinking only affects a subject as a being in time and so is not a transcendent feature. Transcendent subject hood fails because of differentiation through time causes instability. DELEUZE:

[Deleuze, Gilles. “Difference and Repitition.” Translated by Paul Patton. Columbia Press. 1994. Physical book I own, DOA: Feb 19, 2022 LHP AA]

Temporally speaking - in other words, from the point of view of the theory of time - nothing is more instructive than the difference between the Kantian and the Cartesian Cogito. It is as though **Descartes's Cogito** **operated** **with** two logical values: determination and undetermined existence. **The** **determination (I think) implies an undetermined** **existence** (**I am,** because 'in order to think one must exist') - **and** **determines it precisely as the existence of a thinking subject**: I think therefore I am, I am a thing which thinks. **The** entire **Kantian** **critique [is]** amounts to objecting against Descartes that it is impossible for determination to bear directly upon the undetermined. **The determination ('I think')** obviously **implies** something undetermined **('I am'), but** **nothing so far tells us how it is that** **this undetermined is determinable** **by the 'I think'**: 'in the consciousness of myself in mere thought I am the being itself although nothing in myself is thereby given for thought.'8 **Kant** therefore **adds** a third logical value: **the determinable**, or rather the form in which the undetermined is determinable (by the deter­ mination). This third value suffices to make logic a transcendental instance. It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but **in the form of a transcendental** **Difference** between the Determination as such and what it determines; **no[t] longer in the form of an external difference which separates**, **but in the form of an** **internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation** between thought and being. Kant's answer is well known: the form under which undetermined existence is determinable by the 'I think' is that of time ...9 The consequences of this are extreme: **my undetermined existence can be determined only within time as the existence of a** **phenomenon**, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject appearing within time. As a result, **the spontaneity of which I am** **conscious in the 'I think' cannot** **be understood as the** **attribute of a substantial** and spontaneous **being**, **but only as the affection** **of a passive self** **which experiences its own thought** - its own intelligence, that by virtue of which it can say I - being exercised in it and upon it but not by it. Here begins a long and inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense. **The activity of thought applies** to a receptive being, **to a passive subject which represents that activity to itself rather than enacts it**, which experiences its effect rather than initiates it, and which lives it like an Other within itself. **To 'I think' and 'I am' must be added the** **self** - **that is, the passive position** (what Kant calls the receptivity of intuition); to the determination and the undetermined must be added the form of the determinable, **namely** **time**. Nor is 'add' entirely the right word here, since it is rather a matter of establishing the difference and interiorising it within being and thought. It is as though the **I were fractured** from one end to the other: fractured **by** the pure and empty form of **time**. In this form it is the correlate of the passive self which appears in time. **Time signifies a** fault or a **fracture in the I and a passivity in the self**, and the correlation between the passive self and the fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, the element of the Copernican Revolution. **Descartes could draw his conclusion only by expelling time, by reducing the Cogito to an instant** and entrusting time to the operation of continuous creation carried out by God. More generally, the supposed identity of the I has no other guarantee than the unity of God himself. For this reason, the substitution of the point of view of the 'I' for the point of view of 'God' = than is commonly supposed, so long as the former retains an identity that it owes precisely tt. If the greatest tmttattve of transcendental philosophy was to introduce the form of time into thought as such, then this pure and empty form in turn signifies indissolubly the death of God, the fractured I and the passive self. It is true that Kant did not pursue this initiative: both God and the I underwent a practical resurrection. Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly filled by a new form of identity - namely, active synthetic identity; whereas the passive self is defined only by receptivity and, as such, endowed with no power of synthesis. On the contrary, we have seen that receptivity, understood as a capacity for experiencing affections, was only a consequence, and that the passive self was more profoundly constituted by a synthesis which is itself passive (contemplation ontraction). · The possibility of receiving sensations or impressions follows from this. It is impossible to maintain the Kantian distribution, which amounts to a supreme effort to save the world of representation: here, synthesis is understood as active and as giving rise to a new form of identity in the I, while passivity is understood as simple receptivity without synthesis. The Kantian initiative can be taken up, and the form of time can support both the death of God and the fractured I, but in the course of a quite different understanding of the passive self. In this sense, it is correct to claim that neither Fichte nor Hegel is the descendant of Kant - rather, it is Holderlin, who discovers the emptiness of pure time and, in this emptiness, simultaneously the continued diversion of the divine, the prolonged fracture of the I and the constitutive passion of the self.10 Holderlin saw in this form of time both the essence of tragedy and the adventure of Oedipus, as though these were complementary figures of the same death instinct. **Is it possible that Kantian philosophy should thus be the heir of Oedipus?**

#### Takes out their framework – it assumes a consistent model of the subject throughout time which ignores how time influences the subject.

#### The Alternative is to interrogate the stable concept of the subject in favor of alignment with the Body without Organs, to allow the subject to exist in society independent of social constructs such as gender, class, and nationality that have previously composed the stable subject, SMITH 18

[Smith, Daniel. "What is the body without organs? Machine and organism in Deleuze and Guattari." *Continental Philosophy Review* 51.1 (2018): 95-110.] it’s a team purchased PDF, DOA: Feb 19, 2022 // LHP HL

As scholars have noted, the body without organs (sometimes abbreviated to BwO) is a somewhat confusing term, because it does not describe ‘‘a body deprived of organs,’’ as the term seems to indicate, but rather ‘‘an assemblage of organs freed from the supposedly ‘natural’ or ‘instinctual’ organization that makes it an organism.’’43 As Deleuze and Guattari put it, for the body without organs, the ‘‘enemy’’ is not the organs, but the organism, the particular arrangement and configuration of the organs.44 The body without organs is supposed to designate all of those things that an organic body could do, but that it is prevented from doing because of its homeostatic self-regulation processes. The body without organs is the full set of capacities or potentialities of a body prior to its being given the structure of an organism, which only limits and constrains what it can do: it is ‘‘what remains when you take everything away.’’45 As they ask in A Thousand Plateaus: Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly?46 The injunction here is to use our bodies and our organs in ways which are not in thrall to the overarching plan of the organism, to put them to work doing things other than those for which they were designed. In short, to treat them as machines capable of producing ‘‘events.’’ The organism, then, can be defined as being a certain way in which the body without organs is ‘‘captured,’’ one which restricts its capacities, and constrains it: ‘‘the BwO howls: ‘They’ve made me an organism! They’ve wrongfully folded me! They’ve stolen my body!’’’47 Of course, ‘‘organisms’’ are not the only way in which the body without organs can be ‘‘captured,’’ and in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari analyse a number of other ‘‘strata’’ which impose their own forms on it and limit its capacities.48 The fact that there are other ‘‘strata’’ helps to explain their otherwise puzzling comment that the body without organs is not an ideal, unattainable point, but something we are attaining all the time.49 One example is the human face, the subject of an entire chapter of A Thousand Plateaus. It is clear that the face is not wholly subordinated to organic functions: we use it to express our emotions, we treat it as an aesthetic object, we use it for communication, and so on. In fact, if one believes the early Levinas, the human face opens us to the very possibility of ethics.50 All of these functions have nothing to do with the head qua organism, and would not have been made possible had the face not first been ‘‘freed’’ from its relation with the organic body and its place within this hierarchy of its system. It is in this sense that the face ‘‘removes the head from the stratum of the organism,’’ and thereby frees it to be used in different ways.51 Thus, rather than following the conservative tendencies of the organism that always pull it back towards the statistically normal, relegating everything that falls beyond this range to the register of the ‘‘pathological,’’ Deleuze and Guattari recommend a kind of experimentation whose ultimate goal is the event, that is, the production of something new. And as we saw in the first section, the production of an event changes even the thing that produced the event in the first place, so that the organic body will not remain the same after it has made itself into a body without organs. We humans are able to carry out this kind of experimentation because, as Canguilhem notes, we are fortunate enough to have a surfeit of organs: ‘‘too many kidneys, too many lungs, too much parathyroid, too much pancreas, even too much brain, if human life were limited to the vegetative life.’’52 Pathological states thus arise not when we use our bodies in ways that make us deviate from the statistical norm, or when we make use of our organs in ways which take them beyond the range of possibilities considered ‘‘normal’’ by the organism, but only when our ‘‘experimentation’’ goes too far, reaching the point where, instead of increasing our capacities, it reduces them, and prevents us from creating something new.53 Now that we have explored Deleuze and Guattari’s modifications to the concepts of ‘‘machine’’ and ‘‘organism,’’ let us briefly summarize our findings. Whereas we usually think that machines are defined by their substance, that is, the way in which they are constructed, the form which they take, Deleuze and Guattari understand them according to what they do. As they write, a machine should be understood ‘‘by function, not by form’’ (recall the example of the knife-rest: understanding it as a machine means understanding what it is used for, not its geometric properties).54 Whereas we usually think that organisms are defined by what they do, that is, by their behaviors, by the kinds of activities they carry out, Deleuze and Guattari instead understand them according to their structure. As we saw in the distinction between ‘‘analogy’’ and ‘‘homology,’’ what makes organisms similar to one another has nothing to do with their function. Rather, comparisons should be based on morphology, that is to say the virtual schema out of which the body emerged. In other words, an organism should be understood by form, not by function (recall the example of the bat wing: understanding it as an organism means understanding the order and connection of it bones, not what it is used for).55 Further, in both cases, there is no substantial link between the form it has and the function it carries out one can no more deduce the function of a bat’s wing from its morphology than one can deduce the function of a knife-rest from its geometrical properties.56 There is something like a priority of creation in Deleuze and Guattari, a preference for the new, which leads them away from what might otherwise appear to be a kind of symmetry between the two concepts (function not form vs. form not function), towards a valorization of the idea of the machine, and a strong criticism of the idea of the organism. This leads, first, to an asymmetry between the scope of the two concepts: whereas their idea of ‘‘machine’’ is supposed to be universal (everything is a machine), their idea of ‘‘organism’’ is restricted to a certain kind of body. But perhaps more importantly, it also leads them to a different understanding of the relation between the two terms, centered on their concept of the ‘‘body without organs.’’ Their non-mechanical mechanism, which is also a vitalism of the inorganic, highlights not the form or structure that bodies actually have, but rather the virtual capacities that bodies have to do something different. A body may be structured like an organism, but, since its organs are all machines, it will always retain the capacity to ‘‘disarticulate,’’ as they put it, to cease to be an organism. The body without organs, then, can be defined as the becoming-machine of the organism; it is what happens when one part of the body enters into combination with some other machine in a way which allows it to escape from the organism’s regularizing, normalizing processes. Seen in this way, the body previously considered an organism is opened up to a whole host of new connections, each of which may lead to the production of an event.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to interrogate the image of thought, the current figure of thought that manipulates the subject into conforming with societies demand, such as the capitalist image yelling, “Work or die!”. Vote for the debater which better presents methods to question structures of limitation and oppression against the individual, it is only from this ROB can we move away from structures such as whiteness and settler innocence and resist oppressive mindsets that hold us all captive by dictating thought, DRONSFIELD 12

Dronsfield, Jonathan. "Deleuze and the image of thought." Philosophy Today 56.4 (2012): 404-414. it’s a team purchased PDF, DOA: Feb 19, 2022 // LHP HL

The image of thought is Deleuze’s characteri- sation of what comes before thinking: that which philosophy implicitly presupposes and explicitly projects, a pre-philosophical and natural and hence dogmatic image of what thinking is. The dogmatic image supposes that what thought wants, wants both materially and wilfully, is the true. Morality leads us to presuppose this. It is pre-supposed in the sense that everybody knows what it means to think, as though it were common sense. We all have this common picture of what it means to think. It’s an image in which subject and object and being and beings are already assigned their proper place and relation one to the other. And so long as philosophy holds to this image it does not matter what it goes on to think conceptu- ally. If the image of thought guides the creation of concepts then those concepts will be part of the same image projected. Moreover, it is the suppo- sition of a natural capacity to think in this way that permits philosophy to claim to begin without suppositions. It is a supposition which is en- dowed with the power to undercut the conditions of the present moment and its attendant perver- sions. It is not a particular image of thought that worries Deleuze; it’s that thought is pre-con- ceived as an “image in general.” This is philoso- phy’s subjective presupposition and the frame of Deleuze’s critique. “Nous ne parlons pas de telle ou telle image de la pensée,” he says, “variable suivant les philosophies, mais d’une seule Image en général qui constitue le présupposé subjectif de la philosophie dans son ensemble.”5 Part of the image, its stance as it were, is that thought is construed as “naturally upright.” “Up- right” here means proper and good-willed. Thought is upright because it is the possession of the subject. As the unity of the faculties it reduces every other faculty to modes of the subject. Be- cause thinking is subjective in this way the sub- ject’s model of thought is recognition. The fac- ulty of sensibility can grasp only that which can be recognised by all the other faculties in the sub- jective act of recognition. When thinking is mod- elled on recognition, that which can be recog- nised is a reflection of the subject. The subject for whom recognition is the model of thought is filled with no more than an image of itself. Thought is left with no means of grasping that which cannot be recognised, at least whilst it remains erect and standing. But Deleuze makes clear that it is not a ques- tion of opposing “another image” to the dogmatic image of thought. Even the schizophrenic cannot be imaged, because the schizophrenic becomes a possibility for thought and is “revealed as such” only through the “abolition” of the dogmatic im- age.6 Deleuze is unequivocal then about the ne- cessity of theorising a thinking without image. Deleuze’s thought must be measured by the ex- tent to which it thinks without image. Its new- ness, its “répétition authentique,” will be its thinking without image. Indeed, so rigorous would the denunciation of the image as non-phi- losophy be that it would yield the prize of “the greatest destructions and demoralisations,” so obstinate would a thought without image be that it would have no ally but paradox, having re- nounced both representation and common sense, so original would a thinking purged of the image be that thought could finally begin to think. But thought can only begin, and it is this that would allow it continually to begin again, only when liberated from the image and its postulates.7 If representation for Deleuze is a transcendental il- lusion in which thought is “covered over” [se recouvre] by an image, it implies that in over- coming representation the image must be re- moved t;hought is only “uncovered” once the shroud of the image is taken down.8 The insistence that thought can and should happen “without images” extends even to valo- rising creator-writers, writers who are creators before they are authors, as “blind.” Deleuze’s self-understanding in the form of his “dialogue” with Claire Parnet in 1977, a dialogue which is no way an encounter because in it we recognise a Deleuze pre-given and decided, figures the likes of Nietzsche and Proust not as authors but as cre- ators, creators precisely because they are not au- thors. For as soon as the designation “author” is made, thought is once again determined as an im- age [“qu’on soumet la pensée à une image”], and writing made an activity of life.9 Creation is en- counter, in which the writer encounters himself, and a writing which because it is its own life ne- cessitates that reading be an act of creation. Such encounters are “acts of thought without image,” and at once both blind and blinding [“aussi bien aveugles qu’aveuglants”]10—a thought blind to itself, and one which refuses to form itself as an image which might enable it to be visible. It is the imperceptible, it is that which dwells in the dark- est regions. This is not to argue for a thought no longer subject to recognition and representation, but to a thought no longer determinable as an im- age as such. It is as if an image can only order, or- der correct ideas rooted in goodwill and recogni- tion and governed by an origin of representation and the already decided. And what philosopher would not hope to set up an image of thought that no longer presupposes goodwill and a pre-medi- tated decision? But philosophy is too much on the side of friendship to achieve this.11 In place of the image of thought “rooted” in such postulates Deleuze instates a thinking in which the passional, aimless and horizontal line will be favoured over the natural and upright stance, a thinking always already begun, with its beginning in the repetition of a beginning again. Thinking becomes no longer a natural capacity we all possess but an activity some of us are forced into doing by that which we do not recog- nise but sense; moreover sense in a way which differentiates the faculty of sensibility from all other faculties, indeed brings it into discord with them whilst at the same time confronting them with their own limits. That which cannot be re- cognised has neither form nor figure, yet it “stares” at us. It “stares” at us, but “sans yeux.”12 The thought without image is a ground. It is the ground that an individual brings to the surface, or we might have to say raises to eye-level, the level of the eye-line of the one stared at—if, that is, that otherness is to be encountered and bring us into question—without being able to give the ground form, the ground that draws the eye from out of the body to it, a ground which “penetrates” thought with its stare, “the unrecognised in every recognition.” And that ground will be what al- lows for a metamorphosis productive of the new. For instance habit, the foundation of habit, will be metamorphosed into the failure of habitus, leading to the expulsion of agency in favour of a new individuality, an agency in the condition of continual expulsion. It is a ground which must be turned and brought to the surface, re-turned and repeated as surface, for only then will it be meta- morphosed. Recognition is defeated only if the ground is turned or “bent” [“coudé”] such that what it grounds it relates to the groundless.13 The thought without image is that which stares, even without eyes, “blind and blinding,” from within the imperceptible, and this thought is the ground- lessness of the ground. The question then arises, how is this ground turned and brought to the surface? We envisage the following answer: by the step, underfoot, by the walk of the one metamorphosed.

## Case

### OV

#### [1] –A] No 1ar theory, 4 min 1ar can pick any layer the 1N had to go for and collapse onto like 2 minutes of 1n responses –B] the 6min 2N neets strategic flexability, if the 2N has to split on both layers I can’t engage and the 3 min 2ar will just win every time cus they’ll go for the undercovered layer

#### [2] Its DTA: --A] if u read a shell on one part of the 1N I should jus be able to drop it since it didn’t fill much time anyway, the shell takes shorter to read than the NC –B] DTA lets us shift back to substance and engage in education clash

#### [3] Yes RVIs: --A] baiting, 4 min 1ar will go for a bunch of shells I cant respond to or win off of in the 2N with sufficient time allocation –B] the time skew stuff from DTA links here too

#### [4] Substance comes first: --A] it’s the actual educational debate –B] no proportionality, link chains mean its significantly easier for the 1AR to answer the 1N than it takes the 1N to read the offs –C] the 1N is always responsive so if I was abusive its your fault for forcing me into the corner with the AC

#### [5] Yes new 2N theory args and paradigm issues if aff makes them: --A] 1ar args violate too, ur not reciprocal –B] Just go for 3 min of another voter o/w, the 6min 2n doesn’t dump on a single paradigm issue, there aren’t enough args

### Interp

#### Counterinterp: I defend the violation

#### [1] Phil Ed: Its bad for phil ed to have to concede one or another because the other way to udnerstnadi afwrk is in its application

#### [2] real world Ed: it reinforces that there is a strict sepeartion between values and empirics which makes us worse policy makres

#### [3] Neg Flex: I need to respond in order to collapse in 2N, or else aff can sandbag entire 1AR

#### Counterinterp: The neg debater can contest both AC framework and offense if they have one uncondo route to ballot on neg

#### [1] its reciprocoal,we both have the same engagements with the round, anything else means im structurally precluded

Voters are extempted

#### Interp proper:

#### [1] No stat skew: double bind: --A] your offense and framework are true and you shouldn’t have a problem winning them, OR they suck and you don’t deserve to win with them –B] collapsing solves, Kant isn’t a perfect syllogism –C] No reaction, the NC has to be entirely responsive, and that aff gets to set terms, means I could get structurall precluded if I don’t understand the AC

### Framework:

OV and extempted to moore 03

#### [1] Descartes 41: --A] No, affect solves since we are able to constitute and control active affect that give us certain pleasures, i.e. I know that spending time with my family is good and gives me a joyful affect so I use it

#### [2] Kant 81: --A] The agent’s consequences and action are not based in reason soley, affect is a factor, refer to the K links –B] The agent doesn’t start the chain of consequences cus constant affect from around the world alters mindsets

#### [3] Kastafanas 14: --A] there is no constituvie ability indepdent of external affect, I can be happy or sad and that impacts my reason –B] there are other constituvie factors of humans, i.e. having a beating heart so why wouldn’t we look at that?

#### [4] Regress: --A] again reason isn’t stable we cant follow it the same every time –B]individuals violate all the time, i.e. murder

#### [5] Inescapability: --A] affect controls individual reason, empriicalyl proven by the fact that we don’t all reason the same, but rather our unique position in assemblages changes us –B] turn, you cant escape assemblages since they are molded around us

#### [6] Their 1 Point: --A] its circular, they use reason to justify reason –B] different situations are the only way to give punishment, i.e. murder is only bad in some circumstances not self defense

#### [7] Apriori conditions : --A] they only matter in the context of the world, i.e. 2+2=4 only matters based on how we use it –B] tailoring objection, everything is contradictory

#### [8] Every agent is morally relevant, but their personalities and positions in the world I are not due to structures like colonialism, etc. Only deleuze takes into conception the structures of hierarchy and dissolves them

#### [9] Pecorino 02: --A] individuals don’t care, its not binding,--B] people treat each other differently, i.e. I don’t treat a nazi how I would to be treated

#### [10] Varden 10: --A] there is no omnilateral will, individuals have their own conceptions of goodness and will

#### [11] Motivation: ---a] motivation isn’t constitutive, i.e. depression –B] reason isn’t motivating or else there would be no crime –C] agency has moer implications on motivation than reason, i.e. peoples emotions have a larger implication onto their will

#### [2] deleuze jsutifes normative principles, extempted but policy officer exampel

#### Intent stuff:

### Offense

#### Vote neg –

#### 1] Injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights– therefore, private appropriation of outer space cannot be unjust, Feser 05:

Edward Feser, [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College] “THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION,” 2005, team purchased pdf, DOA: Feb 19, 2022 //LHP AV

The reason **there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition** of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply **does not apply** to initial acquisition. **It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place**. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose** **an individual** **A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R**. **For it to be** the case that A commits an **injustice** in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual** **B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. **But for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however**, **B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all**. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, **the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R**. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer**. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7