# Woodward Round 6: 1AC

## Part 1: Lines of Flight, 2:12

#### The nomad is one who roams, constantly searching for and creating meaning in places like Outer space.

#### Outer Space constitutes enormous potential for lines of flight if presented in a smooth model that implies no arborescent connections between points. However, practices of appropriation attempt to organize and strictly territorialize Outer Space into static modes that prevent nomadic flows and impose striation and arborescent hierarchy into Earth itself through modes of positivity and cartography, SAGE “16

Sage, Daniel. How outer space made America: Geography, organization and the cosmic sublime. Routledge, 2016. This is a team purchased PDF accessed Feb 10. // LHP HL

Within Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (1987) we are provided with an explicitly spatial, if mysterious sounding, philosophy: concepts such as ‘lines of flight,’ ‘nomadology,’ ‘strata,’ ‘territories,’ ‘mapping,’ ‘surveying’ as well as ‘territorialization’ and ‘re/deterritorialization’ abound. Articulated across these concepts are two specific modes of thinking with space: ‘smooth’ and ‘striated’ space. The former resembles the desert where the rhythms and movements of nomadic hunters, prey, sand, wind, water and landscapes emerge Introducing a Geography of Outer Space 5 in their playful interplay; the latter corresponds to the oasis town, on the desert’s edge, populated by more sedentary people and animals whose movements follow well-worn tracks around fixed water sources, homes, markets and agricultural land. Importantly, these modes of space are not conceptualized in opposition to one another; rather they are closely related: ‘the two spaces in fact exist only in a mixture ... one organizes even the desert; in the second the desert gains and grows; and the two can happen simultaneously’ (p. 474–5). Deleuze and Guattari (1987) are not proposing here some sort of social geomorphology, but rather a geo-philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994): a ‘project that entails thinking [with] earth, ground, land and territory’ (Bonta and Protevi, 2006: 8). As Buchanan (2005: 5) explains, in conceptualizing these two modes of thinking with space, Deleuze and Guattari oppose the subject-object model of space, popularized by scholars such as Henri Lefevbre, across and beyond geography. Instead of space being conceived of in terms of containers of ‘reality- representation-subject’, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that thinking with, rather than about, space implies no subjective centre or external margins; all stable wholes, including conscious thought, is an effect of spatialized processes of smoothing (of ‘deterritorilizaiton’) and striation (of ‘re/territorialization’). Thus, our brains, bodies, houses, gardens, towns, organizations, States and Earth, emerge through ‘molar’ striations which are effects of organizations of matter, energy and thought, induced by concurrent ‘deterritorializing’ ‘molecular’ ‘lines of flight,’ or ‘becomings,’ whether flows of wind, sea, noise, art, mathematics, philosophy, animals, disease, migration, or global capitalism (Bonta and Protevi, 2006; DeLanda, 2006). And so, for example, factories are lost to the accelerated flows of money of capitalism, just as bodily tissues are lost to disease. In turn, such deterritorializations prompt reterritorializations: attempts to substitute something, as a token, for that which is lost. So we build modern apartments to replace lost factories (Buchanan, 2005: 31) or replace lost organs with artificial ones: space is reconstituted, organized again, but not as before. How then can these ways of thinking with space relate to Space? Deleuze and Guattari (1987) only mention space travel once in A Thousand Plateaus. With reference to the 1960s space race they describe how the US sought to effectuate the ‘deterritorialization’ of capital “to the moon”’ (p. 455) (and presumably beyond); however ‘the USSR, which conceived of extraterrestrial space as a belt that should circle the earth taken as the “object’’’, (p. 455), aborted their lunar program; thus the Earth was produced as an a object for reterritorialization of capital, and further striation. The important point here, that Deleuze and Guattari (1987) make all too briefly, is that outer space, just like the Earth, is simultaneously composed of a triad of interwoven processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. Space is replete with emergent lines of flight, where coherent subjects and objects become imperceptible from each other in emergent, indeterminate movements (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 480): these flows of thought, matter and energy are excessive to our attempts to render them visible, whether the initial singularity, moments before the Big Bang, when space and time 6 How Outer Space Made America (and all life) did not (yet) exist, to the celestial transcendence of an omnipotent and omnipresent God of Judeo-Christian cosmologies. But Space is also occupied by ‘molar’ reterritorializing practices that organize it by drawing lines between fixed points (whether the mapping of Mars for colonization—Dittmer, 2007; Lane, 2011; the monitoring civilians with GPS on Earth—Macdonald, 2007, or the legal mapping of Earth orbit—Collis, 2009). Rather regrettably, Deleuze and Guattari (1987) do not discuss space exploration in more detail. Instead they develop a series of other models of smooth/striated space. Arguably the most related to outer space is their maritime model: the sea is a ‘smooth space par excellence’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 479) as despite centuries of ocean mapping, vessels, like submarines, can flow through it to evade being mapped, acting like nomads drifting in the desert; however, submarines move with the ‘purpose of controlling striated space (i.e. the land) again more completely’ (p. 477). Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari (1987) explain ‘smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory’ (p. 500)—they can and do service imperial States to effect more striation, more control. Likewise, military surveillance of civilians and enemy combatants now routinely occurs from Earth orbit (Macdonald, 2007). Deleuze and Guattari’s (1987) maritime model of smooth space, and their brief mention of the Space Race, suggests that the significance of the cosmos is that it offers an un-representable smooth space from which to effect more Earthly striations; however, this move does not really fully permit us to take seriously the spacelessness of Space, and specifically its sublime character: if Space is only a celestial sea through which to effect terrestrial striations more forcibly, perhaps via a military satellite or submarine launched ballistic missile, then we soon arrive back again at a geography of mappable points, lines and relations. Perhaps the cosmos (although maybe not Earth’s orbital zone—Collis, 2009) is a smooth space par excellence: energy, matter and thought can be rendered transcendent in the cosmos, operating beyond striations of space and time, and beyond ourselves, as we consider the initial singularity of the Big Bang, or narratives of spiritual transcendence. The cosmos appears an absolute threshold of deterritorialization, of smoothing. Yet following Deleuze and Guattari’s geo-philosophy even ‘Absolute deterritorialization does not take place without reterritorialization’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 101).

#### Private appropriation and expansion of markets seek to compartmentalize and enforce major thought onto outer space. Only a nomadic relation of Cosmopolitan identity frees the space nomad to freely roam outer space, free of appropriation. Thus, I affirm “the private appropriation of outer space by private entities for the purpose of creating or installing private property is unjust” through the lens of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, TURNER and HOLTON “10

Turner, Bryan S., and Robert J. Holton, eds. *The Routledge international handbook of globalization studies*. New York: Routledge, 2010. This is a team purchased PDF accessed Jan 29 // LHP HL

Our argument has major implications for social identity and the politics of outer space. Addressing recent sociological literature on cosmopolitanism is a good way to restate our argument and some political implications (e.g. Beck and Sznaider 2005; Beck 2006; Turner 2006). Current developments such as environmental crises, terrorism, and Earthly conflicts of many kinds all militate, it is argued, for a ‘cosmopolitan’ citizenship and identity. This recognizes global society as a single moral community while simultaneously recognizing ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ within that community. This version of cosmopolitanism echoes the argument discussed earlier, that ‘the outside’ is now fully ‘inside’. As Beck and Sznaider (2005: 160) put it, ‘rooted cosmopolitanism points out that in a postcolonial world, there is no pure, precolonized nation to go back to.’ But in light of our argument that outer space is capitalism’s new outside, we suggest that the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’ should again be revisited. It is useful to recall the kind of cosmopolitanism developed by Ancient Greek philosophers from the Stoic and Cynic traditions. The cosmos, rather than the immediate locality in which people lived, was seen by these Ancients as the common denominator affecting literally everyone’s lives. It, rather than the city and its artificial laws, is the true home of humanity. The emancipatory aim of the Stoic and Cynic philosophers such as Diogenes and Zeno was to enable everyone to become a cosmic citizen, sharing a common existence within a set of laws literally affecting everyone. What, according to these Ancients, should relations with the cosmos be? According to the Stoics and Cynics, it was to be an undivided, commonly-possessed, entity. Within such an entity wise cosmic ‘sages’ should ‘graze’ like herd animals over common pasture. Contemporary philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatari share the Cynics’ and Stoics’ relative indifference to the city or region where one happened to have been born. They too promote the idea of an undivided cosmos available for all people to traverse like ‘nomads’ (Deleuze and Guatari 1987; Sellars 2007). The vision of cosmopolitanism offered by Cynic–Stoic philosophers also entails a radically different vision of human ‘freedom’ from that now being offered and pursued in the cosmos as it is ‘opened for business’. Contemporary ideals of ‘freedom’ are often couched in terms of the individual freedom to consume. And it is indeed this kind of freedom that is now being pursued by the vast majority of pro-space activists, including those promoting space travel. As we have elsewhere outlined in detail, such activists tend to be possessed of a psychology in which using outer space in accordance with their own personal desires and fantasies plays a central part (Ormrod 2007; Dickens and Ormrod 2007). It is above all a form of narcissism, one in which adults have not fully surrendered their childhood self and its expectation that the world, and now the cosmos, is simply out there to be controlled and consumed to satisfy human wants. The social implications of such ‘freedom’ are manifold. It is a freedom sometimes enjoyed by elites but with the great mass of people not being able to realize such freedoms, even if granted them in principle. The alternative view of freedom implied in the writings of the Cynics and Stoics is a corrective to possessive individualism and to the entrepreneurs and the many pro-space activists hoping to extend the ‘free market’ vision of freedom out into the solar system. The cosmopolitanism outlined by them suggests an alternative kind of undivided space outside of the state’s division and allocation of land. Instead of just incorporating this outside within capitalist social relations, there is now an opportunity to use it for the enhancement of all. Fulfilment is more likely to be found through social interaction and interaction with the cosmos in a commonly-held space rather than through continued acquisition of private property for individual consumption. The coming humanization of the cosmos therefore offers the opportunity for making our cosmic society very different from that on Earth. Aspirations and visions of this kind will need new alliances and political practices. One suggestive example comes in the form of the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space. As this movement asserts, there are many pressing issues to be confronted down here on Earth, not least the conversion of armaments-production into institutions aimed at directly fulfilling many human needs. Owning and controlling parts of the universe will lead to yet more inequalities and potential dangers not only on Earth but now in outer space. From within the Earthly ‘empire’ of capitalism comes resistance to continued imperialism as it threatens to dispossess the world of its cosmos; a cosmos to which activists ascribe meaning and value. Given an ideal of cosmic cosmopolitanism and alternative social and political coalitions, the original intentions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty could be revived with a much more explicit ban on private property in outer space. Humanizing the cosmos does not have to be imperialistic, warlike and dominated by the economically and politically powerful. Popular control over space-humanization could lead to the creation of alternative social, environmental, and political priorities.

#### Expansion of capital into space creates a space for it to thrive, preventing engagement with new strata and entrenching every corner of the earth with even more exploitation– Shammas and Holen 19:

[(Victor L, a sociologist working at the Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo; Tomas B., independent scholar in Oslo, Norway) “One giant leap for capitalistkind: private enterprise in outer space,” 1-29-2019, pg. 5-6] TDI Recut LHP PS, last access December 23

No longer terra nullius, space is now the new terra firma of capitalistkind: its naturalized terroir, its next necessary terrain. The logic of capitalism dictates that capital should seek to expand outwards into the vastness of space, a point recognized by a recent ethnography of NewSpace actors (Valentine, 2016, p. 1050). The operations of capitalistkind serve to resolve a series of (potential) crises of capitalism, revolving around the slow, steady decline of spatial fixes (see e.g., Harvey, 1985, p. 51–66) as they come crashing up against the quickly vanishing blank spaces remaining on earthly maps and declining (terrestrial) opportunities for profitable investment of surplus capital (Dickens and Ormrod, 2007a, p. 49–78). A ‘spatial fix' involves the geographic modulation of capital accumulation, consisting in the outward expansion of capital onto new geographic terrains, or into new spaces, with the aim of filling a gap in the home terrains of capital. Jessop (2006, p. 149) notes that spatial fixes may involve a number of strategies, including the creation of new markets within the capitalist world, engaging in trade with non-capitalist economies, and exporting surplus capital to undeveloped or underdeveloped regions. The first two address the problem of insufficient demand and the latter option creates a productive (or valorizing) outlet for excess capital. Capitalism must regularly discover, develop, and appropriate such new spaces because of its inherent tendency to generate surplus capital, i.e., capital bereft of profitable purpose. In Harvey’s (2006, p. xviii) terms, a spatial fix revolves around ‘geographical expansions and restructuring…as a temporary solution to crises understood…in terms of the overaccumulation of capital'. It is a temporary solution because these newly appropriated spaces will in turn become exhausted of profitable potential and are likely to produce their own stocks of surplus capital; while ‘capital surpluses that otherwise stood to be devalued, could be absorbed through geographical expansions and spatio-temporal displacements' (Harvey, 2006, p. xviii), this outwards drive of capitalism is inherently limitless: there is no end point or final destination for capitalism. Instead, capitalism must continuously propel itself onwards in search of pristine sites of renewed capital accumulation. In this way, Harvey writes, society constantly ‘creates fresh productive powers elsewhere to absorb its overaccumulated capital' (Harvey, 1981, p. 8). Historically, spatial fixes have played an important role in conserving the capitalist system. As Jessop (2006, p. 149) points out, ‘The export of surplus money capital, surplus commodities, and/or surplus labour-power outside the space(s) where they originate enabled capital to avoid, at least for a period, the threat of devaluation'. But these new spaces for capital are not necessarily limited to physical terrains, as with colonial expansion in the nineteenth century; as Greene and Joseph (2015) note, various digital spaces, such as the Internet, can also be considered as spatial fixes: the Web absorbs overaccumulated capital, heightens consumption of virtual and physical goods, and makes inexpensive, flexible sources of labor available to employers. Greene and Joseph offer the example of online high-speed frequency trading as a digital spatial fix that furthers the ‘annihilation of space by time' first noted by Marx in his Grundrisse (see Marx, 1973, p. 524). Outer space serves at least two purposes in this regard. In the short-to medium-term, it allows for the export of surplus capital into emerging industries, such as satellite imaging and communication. These are significant sites of capital accumulation: global revenues in the worldwide satellite market in 2016 amounted to $260 billion (SIA, 2017, p. 4). Clearly, much of this activity is taking place ‘on the ground'; it is occurring in the ‘terrestrial economy'. But all that capital would have to find some other meaningful or productive outlet were it not for the expansion of capital into space. Second, outer space serves as an arena of technological innovation, which feeds back into the terrestrial economy, helping to avert crisis by pushing capital out of technological stagnation and innovation shortfalls. In short, outer space serves as a spatial fix. It swallows up surplus capital, promising to deliver valuable resources, technological innovations, and communication services to capitalists back on Earth. This places outer space on the same level as traditional colonization, analyzed in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, which Hegel thought of as a product of the ‘inner dialectic of civil society', which drives the market to ‘push beyond its own limits and seek markets, and so its necessary means of subsistence, in other lands which are either deficient in the goods it has overproduced, or else generally backward in creative industry, etc.' (Hegel, 2008, p. 222). In this regard, SpaceX and related ventures are not so very different from maritime colonialists and the trader-exploiters of the British East India Company. But there is something new at stake. As the Silicon Valley entrepreneur Peter Diamandis has gleefully noted: ‘There are twenty-trillion-dollar checks up there, waiting to be cashed!' (Seaney and Glendenning, 2016). Capitalistkind consists in the naturalization of capitalist consciousness and practice, the (false) universalization of a particular mode of political economy as inherent to the human condition, followed by the projection of this naturalized universality into space—capitalist humanity as a Fukuyamite ‘end of history', the end-point of (earthly) historical unfolding, but the starting point of humanity’s first serious advances in space. What role, then, for the state? The frontiersmen of NewSpace tend to think of themselves as libertarians, pioneers beyond the domain of state bureaucracy (see Nelson and Block, 2018). ‘The government should leave the design work and ownership of the product to the private sector', the author of a 2017 report, Capitalism in Space, advocates. ‘The private companies know best how to build their own products to maximize performance while lowering cost' (Zimmerman, 2017, p. 27). One ethnographer notes that ‘politically, right-libertarianism prevails' amongst NewSpace entrepreneurs (Valentine, 2016, p. 1047–1048). Just as Donald Rumsfeld dismissed the opponents to the Iraq War as ‘Old Europe', so too are state entities’ interests in space exploration shrugged off as symptoms of ‘Old Space'. Elon Musk, we are told in a recent biography, unlike the sluggish Big State actors of yore, ‘would apply some of the start-up techniques he’d learned in Silicon Valley to run SpaceX lean and fast…As a private company, SpaceX would also avoid the waste and cost overruns associated with government contractors' (Vance, 2015, p. 114). This libertarianism-in-space has found a willing chorus of academic supporters. The legal scholar Virgiliu Pop introduces the notion of the frontier paradigm (combining laissez-faire economics, market competition, and an individualist ethic) into the domain of space law, claiming that this paradigm has ‘proven its worth on our planet' and will ‘most likely…do so in the extraterrestrial realms' as well (Pop, 2009, p. vi). This frontier paradigm is not entirely new: a ‘Columbus mythology', centering on the ‘noble explorer', was continuously evoked in the United States during the Cold War space race (Dickens and Ormrod, 2016, pp. 79, 162–164). But the entrepreneurial libertarianism of capitalistkind is undermined by the reliance of the entire NewSpace complex on extensive support from the state, ‘a public-private financing model underpinning long-shot start-ups' that in the case of Musk’s three main companies (SpaceX, SolarCity Corp., and Tesla) has been underpinned by $4.9 billion dollars in government subsidies (Hirsch, 2015). In the nascent field of space tourism, Cohen (2017) argues that what began as an almost entirely private venture quickly ground to a halt in the face of insurmountable technical and financial obstacles, only solved by piggybacking on large state-run projects, such as selling trips to the International Space Station, against the objections of NASA scientists. The business model of NewSpace depends on the taxpayer’s dollar while making pretensions to individual self-reliance. The vast majority of present-day clients of private aerospace corporations are government clients, usually military in origin. Furthermore, the bulk of rocket launches in the United States take place on government property, usually operated by the US Air Force or NASA.13 This inward tension between state dependency and capitalist autonomy is itself a product of neoliberalism’s contradictory demand for a minimal, “slim” state, while simultaneously (and in fact) relying on a state reengineered and retooled for the purposes of capital accumulation (Wacquant, 2012). As Lazzarato writes, ‘To be able to be “laissez-faire”, it is necessary to intervene a great deal' (2017, p. 7). Space libertarianism is libertarian in name only: behind every New Space venture looms a thick web of government spending programs, regulatory agencies, public infrastructure, and universities bolstered by research grants from the state. SpaceX would not exist were it not for state-sponsored contracts of satellite launches. Similarly, in 2018, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—the famed origin of the World Wide Web—announced that it would launch a ‘responsive launch competition', meaning essentially the reuse of launch vehicles, representing an attempt by the state to ‘harness growing commercial capabilities' and place them in the service of the state’s interest in ensuring ‘national security' (Foust, 2018b). This libertarianism has been steadily growing in the nexus between Silicon Valley, Stanford University, Wall Street, and the Washington political establishment, which tend to place a high value on Randian ‘objectivism' and participate in a long American intellectual heritage of individualistic ‘bootstrapping' and (allegedly) gritty self-reliance. But as Nelson and Block (2018, p. 189–197) recognize, one of the central symbolic operations of capitalistkind resides in concealing its reliance on the state by mobilizing the charm of its entrepreneurial constituents and the spectacle of space. There is a case to be made for the idea that SpaceX and its ilk resemble semi-private corporations like the British East India Company. The latter, “incorporated by royal charter from Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth I in 1600 to trade in silk and spices, and other profitable Indian commodities,” recruited soldiers and built a ‘commercial business [that] quickly became a business of conquest' (Tharoor, 2017). SpaceX, too, is increasingly imbricated with an attempt on the part of a particular state, the United States, to colonize and appropriate resources derived from a particular area, that of outer space; it, too, depends on the infrastructure, contracts, and regulatory environment that thus far only a state seems able to provide. Its private character, like that of the East India Company, is troubled by being deeply embedded in the state. As one commentator has observed of SpaceX, ‘If there’s a consistent charge against Elon Musk and his high-flying companies…it’s that they’re not really examples of independent, innovative market capitalism. Rather, they’re government contractors, dependent on taxpayer money to stay afloat' (cit. Nelson and Block, 2018, p. 189). Perhaps this should not come as a surprise. As Bourdieu (2005, p. 12) observed, ‘The economic field is, more than any other, inhabited by the state, which contributes at every moment to its existence and persistence, and also to the structure of the relations of force that characterize it'. The state lays out the preconditions for market exchanges. Under neoliberalism, the state is the preeminent facilitator of markets. The neoliberal state is not so much a Minimalstaat, night watchman state, or slim state as it is the prima causa of market society (see, e.g., Wacquant, 2012). Similarly, in the political theory of Deleuze and Guattari, any economic development presupposes the political differentiation caused by the state (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a, p. 237–238). Even in the global environment of contemporary capitalism, the market cannot operate without the state becoming integrated with capitalism itself, as ‘it is the modern state that gives capitalism its models of realization' (Deleuze and Guattari, 2004b, p. 480). For capitalism to survive in outer space, the state must create a regulatory environment, subsidize infrastructure, and hand down contracts – in short, assemble outer space as a domain made accessible in legal, technical, and economic ways

## Part 2: Becoming Democratic, 1;41

#### The nomad as it is now is at risk of misery and constraint, we can only achieve nomadology within a smooth state free from images of thought that limit movement in smooth spaces, DEUCHARS “11

Deuchars, Robert. "Creating lines of flight and activating resistance: Deleuze and Guattari’s war machine." AntePodium (2011): 1-28. Team purchased pdf cut March 17, 2022 // LHP HL

Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us‟i In an essay called “Nomad Thought”, first published in the 1970s, Gilles Deleuze identifies what he believes to be the exemplar of counter-Enlightenment culture in the figure of Friedrich Nietzsche. Deleuze sees in Nietzsche the triumph of speed, movement, and warrior nomadism over the Kantian and neo-Kantian weaknesses of the dialectic. In place of binary opposites the Nietzschean war machine replaces opposites with difference and becoming over being. As Deleuze notes, „difference is the object of a practical affirmation inseparable from essence and constitutive of existence. Nietzsche‟s “Yes” is opposed to the dialectical “no”; affirmation to dialectical negation; difference to dialectical contradiction; joy, enjoyment, to dialectical labour; lightness, dance to dialectical responsibilities.‟ii The nomad thought of Nietzsche the warrior supplants the sedentary nature of codification and recodification of the three elements of philosophical discourse Deleuze identifies as being central to societal codification; „law, institutions and contracts.‟iii On the contrary Nietzsche‟s discourse is according to Deleuze: above all nomadic; its statements can be conceived as the products of a mobile war machine and not the utterances of a rational, administrative machinery, whose philosophers would be bureaucrats of pure reason. It is perhaps in this sense that Nietzsche announces the advent of a new politics that begins with him (which Klossowski calls a plot against his own class). iv If nomadism was first identified in the figure of Nietzsche it reached its logical conclusion, paradoxical and still elusive in the second volume of A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to ask a number of questions. Firstly, what is nomad thought and the war machine in Deleuze and Guattari? Secondly, what is the war machine‟s relationship to contemporary power? And, finally, can the war machine, when not captured by the apparatus of the state form, be considered as a meaningful and ultimately positive form of politico-cultural resistance to global capital? In contemporary societies we now see this interplay between the nomadic and the sedentary in all aspects of existence, from disembodied social networking to the global “war on terror”. It is not simply a refusal to be identified; rather it is intrinsically implicated in the instability of identities, whether that takes on an aesthetic value viewed in positive terms or even in the most venal acts by state terrorists and retail terrorists alike. For example, the suicide bomber is celebrated by many and cannot be said to be a “worse” person than the controller of a drone aeroplane who sits in an aircraft hanger in Nevada, and neutralises others “from a distance”. Is it the quintessential modernist figure or the body that speaks? Which one of these two can be considered a warrior? The one who seeks death or the one who fights and kills without being exposed to danger? Perhaps it is both, each with a radically different and changing subjectivity. It is as, Deleuze highlights in Nietzsche, a refusal to be fixed or to be pinned down, to be always moving even if one doesn‟t go anywhere; for example the soldier- warrior who sits, rather than marching. Deleuze says as follows: „even historically, nomads are not necessarily those who move about like migrants. On the contrary they do not move; nomads, they nevertheless stay in the same place and continually evade the codes of settled people.‟v In short it is war: a war of becoming over being, of the sedentary over the nomadic. Becoming different, to think and act differently. This form of ambiguity of the decentred self, continuously shifting defines both the warrior who “wars” without war and the warrior who “wars” without the chance of “winning”. They both denote a shift in the calculus of modern war. Deleuze asserts that it is with Nietzsche that creative force can be utilised for revolutionary ends while avoiding the repetition of the state-form that revolutionary struggle fights against. He argues that there is no point in overthrowing the state-form merely to re-create it. Rather he points to the originality of Nietzsche who „made thought into a machine of war – a battering ram – into a nomadic force.‟vi Nomad thought, then, represents a fundamental shift in the thinking of the left as it breaks completely with the idea of the mass party being the motor of resistance to capital. Deleuze sees through the emptiness and ultimately the futility of such movements and posits a radical re-thinking of thought; a type of thought that is intrinsically subaltern, experimental, and uncertain but in a non-negative sense. In other words it is celebratory of the ambiguous nature of being, or more accurately for Deleuze, of becoming[s]. Deleuze sees in Nietzsche‟s experimental “nomadism”, a form of non-philosophy that escapes the confines of the philosophical discourse of his time. This discourse is firmly rooted in the outside or exterior to the philosophy of state or of sovereignty. The philosophy of state is characterised by a principle of interiority and a system that is centred and hierarchical. By way of contrast, nomad thought is characterised by a principle of exteriority and a system that is decentred and rhizomatic or non-hierarchical. It implies movement, speed, and unexpected irruptions and sets itself in opposition to the tired and worn effects of dialectics;vii in other words the affirmation of chance, creation and most of all in the eternal return. The dicethrow in Nietzsche confirms „affirmation of the many. But all the parts, all the fragments are cast in one throw; all of chance, all at once.‟viii However, although Deleuze and Guattari argue that the war machine originated with nomads, there is nothing especially important about them. At one level of thought, many social forms can constitute war machines. They can take the form of artistic movements all the way to revolutionary movements and they draw „a plane of consistency, a creative line of flight, a smooth place of displacement.‟ix These are war machines but of consequence only insofar as they demonstrates groups‟ abilities to carve out space, rather than occupy the space created by a higher or pre-given ordering principle or process (hylomorphism). As Deleuze and x Guattari argue using the example of metallurgists, they are assumed to be sedentary but this is not necessarily the case as „they had to enjoy a certain technological autonomy, and social clandestinity, so that even controlled, they did not belong to the State any more than they were themselves nomads.‟xi Itinerant metallurgists occupy an ambiguous relationship with the state form similar but not coequal to the stonemasons and artisans who constructed Gothic cathedrals. Their action or “betrayals” avoid the over-coding of the state apparatus. Although it has to be noted that in this case, i.e. of itinerant metallurgists, they can constitute a war machine assemblage in their own right but also can be put in the service of the state as weapon makers. So the artisan formation has at least a dual purpose and a particular ambiguity. The first form is in the making of tools (and weapons) external to the state-form but once captured by the state-form being in its service (in part or whole). In this sense many social formations have the potential to constitute a war machine, but one of relatively little importance when it comes to the consideration of active and effective resistance to the globalising tendencies of contemporary capitalism. As Deleuze and Guattari say, it is not the nomad who defines this constellation of characteristics; it is the constellation that defines the nomad, and at the same time the essence of the war machine.‟xii What is important in Deleuze and Guattari‟s identification of many types of war machine is that they are all irreducibly social in nature. It is the social base of all war machines that enables the conceptual tension of the term “war machine” itself to be appreciated. War machines are assemblages and all assemblages as well as possessing material properties possess enunciative ones as well. It is not only nomads that can form a war machine, but eventually the state itself can become something altogether different; a war machine formed by social formations that proceed to “take over” the state apparatus itself; Nazi Germany for example. At this early juncture it may be useful to capture the conceptual tension inherent in the word “nomad”. It has become popularised and too easily equated with a postmodern form of freedom of the subject, but we should stop momentarily to ponder carefully on nomads and their sedentary counterparts. It may well be true that whilst we surf the net, seek out new forms of expression and style and so on that we dwell for a while on the nomads who are not free to choose – migrants, refugees, people literally creating lines of flight from conflict zones and so on. However, this is not a “line of flight” in the Deleuzean sense. Creating a line of flight does not mean to flee but to re-create or act against dominant systems of thought and social conditions. Thus Deleuze and Guattari maintain that a “line of flight” „never consist in running away from the world but rather in causing runoffs ... There is nothing imaginary, nothing symbolic, about a line of flight.‟xiv So we should tread carefully when discussing nomads and migrants in the modern world with “nomad thought”. They are not the same phenomenon. As Noyes notes, „it is a miserable plight to be a postmodern nomad, to be homeless, wandering, a refugee, following not a dream of disembodied bliss but a slim hope for survival.‟xv What type of existence is to be found at the fringes of globalising capitalism? What type of freedom is found in homelessness and in being up-rooted? Is it merely the freedom to starve, to be marginal, unable to speakxvi and to be marginal(ised)? This may be the case and cannot be equated with freedom or emancipation from oppression in all its forms. But I hope to demonstrate in the pages that follow that this tension can indeed be resolved. So it is with caution that we should seek to apply the concept of the war machine to specific instances or events in the contemporary world. It may be tempting to try to find empirical examples to “apply” nomad thought to but in most, if not all cases, it is a fruitless task to do so. There is the temptation, seen earlier in the use of philosophers of all shades to “squeeze” their work and concepts into spaces where they do not belong. Similarly there is a tendency that should be avoided in the discipline of International Relations to appropriate the concept of the “war machine”, to celebrate “Otherness” and to valorise modern-day “nomads”. Deleuzean concepts are very specific and are conceived philosophically in the traditional sense; they do not translate well into generalised situations or events and scholars in International Relations do not do themselves any favours when they appropriate nomads and war machines and mis-use them to make them “fit” into International Relations literature. This essay hopes to serve as a warning against the received wisdom of “nomad thought” for both adherents and critics alike in the current debate on the use and mis-use of Deleuze in International Relations. “Nomadism” and the “war machine”, when applied properly (non- metaphorically) are creative, affective and affirmative concepts, although we should always be aware of the negative potential of every war machine, for it to become something other, destructive, cancerous, suicidal, fascist. xvii As Deleuze and Guattari maintain, fascism comes in at least two distinct forms. The first is the historical fascism associated with Hitler‟s Germany and Mussolini‟s Italy (molar) and in smaller, localised settings (molecular), i.e. the fascism to be found in „rural fascism and city or neighbourhood fascism, youth fascism and war veteran‟s fascism, fascism of the left and fascism of the right, fascism of the couple, family school and office.‟xviii Whereas for Foucault it is power that permeates all social relations, Deleuze and Guattari see fascism everywhere and although there is a conceptual tension between these two interpretations of the societal formation, Foucault in his preface to Anti-Oedipus is generally approving of Deleuze and Guattaris reading of social power relations. This molecular type of fascim may or may not eventuate in the molar or state level but they argue that molecular fascism prefigures the molar form. However, on the same page they also state that „there is fascism when a war machine is installed in each hole, in every niche.‟xx Although the war machine is exterior and opposed to the state it does not by definition mean that something “good” will eventuate. They go on later to suggest that „the very conditions that make the State or World war machine possible, in other words, constant capital (resources and equipment) and human variable capital, continually recreate unexpected possibilities for counterattack, unforeseen initiatives determining, revolutionary, popular, minority, mutant machines.‟xxi So we have forces of destruction and oppression and forces of creation and freedom entangled in a complex interplay at the same time and in the same spaces.

#### Minoritarian movements play a key role in rejecting rampant images of thought and oppression that negate their very existence. Minoritarian movements and constitutions of normativity are fostered by democratic becomings. It is only through reterritorializing social conceptions of identity that we become able to create a new society capable of realizing difference and breaking away from the major standard all are held to contrast. Thus, the ROB is to become democratic, PATTON “08

Patton, Paul. "Becoming-democratic." Deleuze and politics (2008): 178-195. This is a team purchased PDF accessed Jan 1 // LHP HL

In democratic societies, responding to the intolerable will inevitably engage with elements of the political normativity through which they are governed. The complex concept of democracy ties together a number of the political norms at the heart of modern political thought. Different forms of democratic political society amount to determinate actualisa- tions of this concept, while many forms of resistance within such soci- eties will draw upon elements of democratic political normativity to suggest ways in which the injustice of existing institutional forms of social life might be removed. In this manner, the concept of ‘becoming- democratic’ serves the political vocation of philosophy as Deleuze and Guattari define it: becoming-democratic is a means to counter-actualise what passes for democratic society in the present. Philosophy pursues or supports processes of becoming-democratic when it challenges existing opinions about what is acceptable, right or just with the aim of extend- ing the actualisation of democracy within contemporary societies. In principle, there will be as many ways of becoming-democratic as there are elements of the concept of democracy. In practice, philosophy can only effectively advance the becoming-democratic of a given politi- cal society when it engages with deterritorialising movements that rely upon actualised or actualisable elements of democratic political norma- tivity. Minoritarian-becomings are one source of such movements. With regard to the minoritarian orientation of ‘becomings’ and their relation to majoritarian politics, we should note that democracy is exclusively a matter of majority only in a relatively simplistic and numerical sense. It is majoritarian insofar as majority vote is the mechanism through which the will of the people is typically determined. However, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of minority was always defined in terms of quality rather than quantity. In A Thousand Plateaus, they point to the existence of the ‘fact’ that the adult, white, heterosexual, European et cetera male occupies the position of majority, not because he is more numerous than children, non-whites, homosexuals or women, but because he forms the qualitative standard against which these others are measured (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105). The existence of such a standard presupposes the exercise of power over women, children, non-whites and other excluded groups: ‘Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not the other way around’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 105). At the same time, they point out that this ‘fact’ is a kind of fiction that represents no one in particular. It is the public figure of the majority in a qualitative sense that must be contrasted with the ‘becoming-minoritarian of every- body,’ understood as the creative potential of individuals or groups to deviate from the standard (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 106). Becoming- minor expresses the sense in which individuals and societies never entirely conform to the majoritarian standard but exist in a process of continuous variation. To the extent that the rights and duties of citizens at any moment are based upon the majoritarian ‘fact’ of the society concerned, there is also a qualitative sense in which democracy is majoritarian. Democracy has always relied upon the principle of majority rule but the prior question ‘majority of whom’ has always been settled in advance and usually not by democratic means. ‘Majority’ here does not refer to the quantitative majority of those counted but to the qualitative majority of those among the population at large who are considered fit to be counted. In these terms, for example, Kant distinguished active from passive citizens on the basis of their independence from others in gaining their livelihood (Kant 1996: 458). On this basis, children, indentured servants and women will only be passive citizens, excluded from participation in the law-making role of the active subjects of a democratic republic. By the same token, however, there is a sense in which minoritarian-becoming is bound up with the transformation of the majoritarian subject of democracy. A con- stant source of conflict in democratic nation-states ever since their incep- tion has been the struggle to broaden the base of those who count as citizens and thus enjoy full access to the entire range of basic legal and political rights. These struggles amount to the subjection of the majori- tarian standard to various kinds of minoritarian becoming. These have given rise to a succession of measures to extend the scope of the standard and thereby broaden the subject of democracy: for example, by extend- ing the vote to women and other minorities, or by changing the nature of political institutions and procedures to enable these newly enfranchised members to participate on equal terms. Efforts to achieve political repre- sentation of women in proportion to their numbers in the population are ongoing in most European countries, despite their having been enfran- chised for the better part of a century. Efforts to change the nature of public institutions in ways that both acknowledge and accommodate dif- ferences in relation to sexual preference, physical and mental abilities, and cultural and religious backgrounds are also ongoing in many democratic societies. In this sense, minoritarian becomings provide one important vector of ‘becoming-democratic’ in contemporary societies. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari clearly adopt the polit- ical perspective of minoritarian-becoming, insisting that the power of minoritaries ‘is not measured by their capacity to enter into and make themselves felt within the majority system’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 471). By their nature, processes of minoritarian-becoming will always exceed or escape from the confines of any given majority. They carry the potential to transform the affects, beliefs and political sensibilities of a population in ways that amount to the advent of a new people. Moreover, to the extent that a people is constituted as a political com- munity, the transformations it undergoes will affect its conceptions of what is fair and just and therefore the nature of the rights and duties attributed to the new majority. Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge the importance of efforts to enlarge and transform the character of the majority when they affirm that ‘molecular escapes and movements would be nothing if they did not return to the molar organizations to reshuffle their segments, their binary distributions of sexes, classes and parties’ Another kind of becoming-democratic arises from a conflict that has been present ever since the introduction of modern democratic govern- ment, namely the coexistence of formally equal rights alongside enormous disparities of wealth and material condition. The history of modern democracies has been in part a history of struggle to reduce material inequality and to ensure that the basic rights of citizens have at least approximately equal value for all. Deleuze alludes to this ongoing problem in his interview with Negri when he contrasts the universality of the market as a sphere of exchange of commodities and capital with the manner in which it generates poverty as well as enormous wealth and dis- tributes these unequally. The benefits of market economies are not uni- versally shared and inequalities of condition are handed down from generation to generation in direct contravention of the principle that all are born equal. The same principle of equality with regard to material condition underpins Deleuze’s response to the question put to him by Claire Parnet: ‘What does it mean to be on the left?’ First, he says, it’s a matter of perception. Those who live in the comparative wealth of a rel- atively privileged first-world country, and who are not on the left, perceive problems of inequality and injustice from the perspective of their own unsustainable position of privilege: they ask ‘what can we do to make this situation last?’ By contrast, those on the left perceive the situation from the perspective of those farthest from their centre of privilege. These people ‘know that it cannot last, that it’s not possible, [the fact that] these millions of people are starving to death, it just can’t last, it might go on a hundred years, one never knows, but there’s no point kidding oneself about this absolute injustice’. Those on the left know that such problems must be dealt with, that the problem is not to find ways to maintain the privileges of Europe but of ‘finding arrangements, finding world-wide assemblages’ which address these problems. Deleuze here assumes an egalitarian and even cosmopolitan perspective on matters of distributive justice. Pointing out the unjust distribution of wealth and poverty that results from existing assemblages of production, distribution and redistribution is another way of attempting to render intolerable that which is widely tolerated. It thereby seeks to encourage a further dimen- sion of becoming-democratic in the society at large. The second part of Deleuze’s definition of what it means to be on the left is his claim that this is a matter of becoming-minoritarian as opposed to being majoritarian. It is a matter of knowing that the majority is an abstract and empty representation of an ideal identity that is linked to particular systems of power and control and of knowing that there are minoritarian becomings in which everyone can be engaged and which have the power to disrupt and transform these systems. As we noted above, theTtransformations in a people brought about by different kinds of minoritarian-becoming will affect its conceptions of what is fair and just. To the extent that these form the basis of the political conception of justice reflected in its constitution (in the broadest sense of the term) and in its basic structure and institutions, they provide a crucial motor of efforts to remove injustice. The two vectors of becoming-democratic identified above directly con- front the two kinds of limitation on the actualisation of democracy in the modern world: the struggle against the arbitrary nature of the qualitative majority challenges the weight of nationalitarian political and philo- sophical opinion, while the struggle against unjust inequality of condi- tion challenges fundamental elements of the capitalist axiomatic. The different kinds of minoritarian-becoming that give rise to movements to reconfigure the subject of democracy, such as the struggle for equal representation of women or for equal rights for homosexual partners, encounter varying degrees and kinds or resistance depending upon the details of nationalitarian opinion in each case. Efforts to achieve a more equitable distribution of primary social goods encounter resistance sus- tained by other axioms of the capitalist axiomatic. In both of these ways, the concept of becoming-democratic points toward the deterritorialisa- tion of existing democracies and their reconfiguration in new social and political forms.

## Part 3: Subjectivity, 1:36

#### The body is constituted by the unending stream of affect. Yet only active affects are able to hold the line against determinist causes and effects, otherwise the subject becomes chained with passivity they have no sovereign control over. The subject must recognize certain interactions of joy and constitute relations with those specific movements in order for the affect to become active and the subject to attain power, HARDT “14

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The next step requires that we understand, engage, and select among the affects: this is the second level of the theory of the power to be affected. “What a body can do,” Deleuze writes, “corresponds to the nature and limits of its power to be affected,” and this in turn depends on the qualities of the affects that “fill” it (1992, p. 218). In order to understand the nature of the affects, Spinoza creates a whole catalogue—including love and hatred, jealousy and indigna tion, and shame and pride—that combines basic affects in various permutations to define ever more complex ones. In effect, Spinoza generates for the affects a combinatoire the basic elements of which are power and causality. Joy, for instance, is the increase of our power to think and act, and sadness is the decrease. Love, then, is joy accompanied by the recognition of an external cause, and hatred is sadness plus an external cause. Then, take this one step further: compassion is love insofar as it affects someone who is happy at another’s good fortune, and envy is hatred insofar as it affects someone who is happy at another’s ill fortune. The precise correspondence between Spinoza’s definitions and our everyday use of these terms is less important, in my view, than the way his catalogue reveals power and cause at the center of the field of affects. One might reasonably assume, when reading through these definitions of the affects, that we should seek what brings us joy and avoid sadness, and that is indeed a worthy goal, but it is not easily accomplished posed simply in those terms. Indeed with regard to many of the affects, the path to joy is difficult to discern. The power to be affected as we really are (not as some people wish us to be) is filled with affects that are complex and contradictory. The field of the affects often looks like a briar patch, impassable, and sometimes a minefield. By focusing on the causes of the affects, however, Spinoza points toward a practical project. All affects can be either active (that is, caused internally) or passive (caused externally). Indeed one advantage of using “affect” instead of the more colloquial “emotion” or “feeling” to translate Spinoza’s Latin term “affectus” is that it highlights the causes and effects of actions by and upon us. Once the causes are revealed, the project becomes to shift from passive to active affections, from external to internal causes. The reason to prefer active over passive does not reside in the experience of the affect, which does not change depending on cause or source. A passive affection, Deleuze explains, “does not express its cause, that is to say, the nature or essence of the external body: rather, it indicates the present constitution of our own body, and so the way in which our power to be affected is filled at that moment” (1992, pp. 219–220, translation modified). Just like passive affections, active affections too indicate the present constitution of our body. The crucial difference is really a temporal one and regards duration and repetition. We need the ability to select, as Nietzsche would say, in order to extend and repeat those encounters and affects that are beneficial and prevent those that are detrimental. The repetition of passive affections is completely out of our control. Some random encounters, of course, do bring us joy, but that passes quickly if we cannot make them last or repeat them. And most random encounters, unfortunately, result in sadness. If we leave this to hazard, we will stay stuck with no way forward. “As long as you don’t know what is the power to be affected of a body, as long as you understand it like that, in chance encounters, you will not have a wise life, you will not have wisdom” (1978 “L’affect et l’idée”). The great advantage of the active over the passive affection is that it is no longer dependent on the vagaries of external forces. Since the body causes itself to be affected, chance is removed and it is able to control the duration and repetition of encounters. The issue, then, is not only understanding and expanding your power to be affected but also augmenting proportion of that power that is filled with active rather than passive affections. This notion of active affection could appear obscure or, worse, moralistic if not linked to Spinoza’s definition of bodies (and, ultimately, subjects). From his perspective, there is no basic or default unitary body. “A body,” Spinoza explains, “is constituted by the relation among its parts” (1985 Ethics, IV P39 dem), and the number and constitution of those parts is changeable. We need to shift perspective so as no longer to consider a body as an entity (or even a cluster of entities) but instead as a relation. When a new relation is added, a larger body is composed, and when a relation is broken, the body diminishes or decomposes. All this simply means that the border between the inside and outside of bodies, and hence between internal and external causes, is fluid and subject to our efforts. In order for a passive affection to become an active one, then, it is not necessary for the body that previously experienced the effect of an external body somehow to cut off that relationship and learn to become itself the cause. The body instead can, under certain conditions, envelop the cause—this is the term Deleuze uses—by creating a relation with it or, really, by expanding the relation that constitutes the body. You only gain the knowledge of when these conditions exist through encounters with others: every encounter reveals the extent to which the relations that constitute your body agree with or are “composable” with those of another. And a joyful encounter always indicates that there is something in common to discover. “We must, then,” Deleuze explains, “by the aid of joyful passions, form the idea of what is common to some external body and our own” (1992, p. 283). Once we recognize those common relations, we can compose a new, greater body, which contains the cause of our joy. The cause, then, does not really change. It simply becomes internal—annexed, as it were, by the affected body. The real change is the border between inside and outside and hence the composition of the body. Once the cause is internal and the affection is active, then you are no 8 longer subject to chance: the affect can be prolonged and repeated as long as it brings you joy. The practical project to transform passive into active affections thus ultimately involves a strategy of bonds and relations to maintain or transform the constitution of the body. The advice, if Spinoza were your therapist, could be as simple as this: first, discover your body’s power to be affected and the affects that compose it, and, then, if an encounter with someone or something results in joy, form a relationship with it, make it part of you, and transform the passive affection into an active one so that you can repeat the encounter or make it last until the joy no longer results. You have to recognize that you are not a fixed entity but a bundle of relations and your task is to compose new joyful relations and decompose sad ones. Increasing the proportion of active affections does not primarily mean becoming the cause, at least not in a direct way. The bad therapist is the one who simply berates you to take control of your life as if it were an act of sovereign will. Instead you must discover joyful encounters and then make the passive affection into an active one by forming a consistent relation with the cause, thereby enveloping the cause with a new relation that constitutes us as a new body. Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s technical vocabularies might make this process sound obscure when it is really a very practical project. Consider, for example, your power to think together with others. In many intellectual discussions and encounters, you find yourself more confused and less able to think. Occasionally, though, you encounter a person or a group with whom you are able to think more clearly and more powerfully than you could before. Suddenly, you understand things that previously seemed completely incomprehensible. This is a joy as pure as Spinoza can imagine. Well, the practical thing to do is not to leave such joyful encounters to chance and the fluctuations of external causes. Compose a stable relation with the source of intellectual joy; make the encounters repeat and last. Maybe form a discussion group or write a book together. This will change you, of course, since you are defined by relations, but it will change you for the better.

#### The Transcendent subject of normativity fails in every creation of the new. It is this static sense of the rulebook that ignores constant passive and active affect. Deterritorialization is the only normative method that can critique the status quo and reassert new, egalitarian models constituted by realized active affect. Was it not deterritorialization that legalized gay marriage, passed the civil rights act, passed the 13th amendment? SMITH “03

[Daniel W. Smith (2003) Deleuze and the liberal tradition: normativity, freedom  
and judgement, Economy and Society, 32:2, 299-324, DOI: 10.1080/030851403200007345] This is a team purchased PDF accessed Jan 1 // LHP HL

The first liberal notion Patton makes use of in his reading of Deleuze is the concept of normativity. Though the term is not listed in the index, it appears frequently in the third section of the chapter on power. these two central chapters – on ‘Power’ and ‘Desire’ – is to argue (persuasively, in my view) that Deleuze’s theory of desire can be brought together with the theory of power one finds in Foucault and Nietzsche, despite certain conceptual differences. The discussion of normativity that occurs in this context, however, touches a much more difficult question, one that lies at the heart of several recent debates in political philosophy. Critics such as Nancy Fraser and Jürgen Habermas, for instance, have argued that Michel Foucault’s well-known theory of power is entirely ‘non-normative’ (Patton 2000: 59). Normativity is itself a somewhat overdetermined philosophical concept, one that corresponds to the question, ‘What is the source of the authority that moral considerations have over us?’ It is usually contrasted with the descriptive, as ‘ought’ is contrasted with ‘is’. When Habermas and Fraser critique Foucault for failing to provide normative criteria for discriminating between different ways of exercising power, they are therefore accusing Foucault of failing to answer one of the central concerns of liberal political theory and the social contract tradition, namely, ‘When and in what ways is power, especially State power, justified?’ (Patton 2000: 59). Patton attempts to respond to such criticisms from a Deleuzian perspective. ‘Unlike Foucault’s analytic of power’, he writes, Deleuze’s approach to power is ‘explicitly normative’ (Patton 2000: 65, 49). This is a somewhat surprising claim, since Deleuze is often condemned along with Foucault for neglecting (or avoiding, or refusing) questions of normativity. Indeed, one could imagine two possible Deleuzian responses to the criticisms of non-normativity. One might ask if normativity is a good or rigorous concept, and proceed to criticize the concept from a Deleuzian viewpoint. In this case, one could argue that Foucault and Deleuze do not address issues of normativity because their work entails a critique of the very notion of normativity. Patton, however, follows the opposite approach. He takes the problem of normativity seriously, and argues that, despite appearances, one can find an explicit normative criterion in Deleuze’s work, which he identifies by name: ‘The overriding norm is that of deterritorialization’ (Patton 2000: 9). This is the third key thesis of Deleuze and the Political: ‘A central claim of the present study is that it is the concept of “deterritorialization” which bears the weight of the utopian vocation which Deleuze and Guattari attribute to philosophy’ (Patton 2000: 9). In what sense, then, does Deleuze’s notion of deterritorialization play the role of a normative concept? If Deleuze’s political philosophy effects a shift from subjects to processes, then the concept of normativity would have to be altered accordingly. According to Patton, this is exactly what occurs in Deleuze’s work: it is the concept of deterritorialization that provides ‘a normative framework within which to describe and evaluate movements or processes’ (Patton 2000: 136). For Deleuze, to analyze a social formation is to unravel the variable lines and singular processes that constitute it as a multiplicity: their connections and disjunctions, their circuits and short-circuits and, above all, their possible transformations. To introduce elements of transcendence into the analysis of such fields of immanence, says Deleuze, it is enough to introduce ‘universals’ that would serve as constant co-ordinates for these processes, and effectively ‘stop their movement’ (see Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 47; Deleuze 1995b: 85, 145–6). Deleuze constantly insists that universals are abstractions that explain nothing; they are rather what need to be explained. For instance, there is no such thing as a ‘pure reason’ or a universal rationality, but rather a plurality of heterogeneous ‘processes of rationalization’ of the kind analyzed by Alexandre Koyré, Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem in the field of epistemology, Max Weber in sociology and François Châtelet in philosophy. Likewise, there is no universal or transcendental Subject, which could function as the bearer of universal human rights, but only variable and historically diverse ‘processes of subjectivation’, to use Foucault’s term (Deleuze 1988a: 14–17, 1992: 162). What one finds in any given socio-political assemblage is not a universal ‘Reason’, but variable processes of rationalization; not universalizable ‘subjects’, but variable processes of subjectivation; not the ‘whole’, the ‘one’ or ‘objects’, but rather knots of totalization, focuses of unification, and processes of objectification. Such processes operate within concrete multiplicities, and are relative to them, and thus need to be analyzed on their own account. Deleuze would no doubt have followed the same approach in his analysis of normativity had he addressed the issue directly. Foucault himself spoke of the power of what he called the process of normalization, which creates us, as subjects, in terms of existing force relations and existing ‘norms’. For Foucault, normalization is not merely an abstract principle of adjudication but an already actualized (and always actualized) power relation. Foucault’s question then became: is it possible to escape, or at least resist, this power of normalization? In Deleuze’s terminology, the same question would be stated in the following terms: within a given social assemblage or ‘territoriality’, where can one find the ‘line of flight’, or the movement of relative deterritorialization, by means of which one can escape from or transform the existing norm (or territoriality)? From this viewpoint, neither Foucault nor Deleuze avoid the issue of norma- tivity, they simply analyze it in terms of an immanent process. The error of transcendence would be to posit normative criteria as abstract universals, even if these are defined in intersubjective or communicative terms. From the view- point of immanence, by contrast, it is the process itself that must account for both the production of the norm as well as its possible destruction or alteration. In a given assemblage, one will indeed find normative criteria that govern, for instance, the application of the power of the State, but one will also find the means for the critique and modification of those norms, their deterritorializa- tion. A truly ‘normative’ principle must not only provide norms for condemning abuses of power, but also a means for condemning norms that have themselves become abuses of power (e.g. the norms that governed the treatment of women, slaves, minorities, etc.). An immanent process, in other words, must, at one and the same time, function as a principle of critique as well as a principle of creation (the ‘genetic’ method). ‘The conditions of a true critique and a true creation are one and the same’ (Deleuze 1994: 139). The one cannot and ‘must’ not exist without the other. If deterritorialization functions as a norm for Patton, then, it is a somewhat paradoxical norm. Within any assemblage, what is normative is deterritorializa- tion, that is, the creation of ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze) or ‘resistance’ (Foucault) that allow one to break free from a given norm, or to transform the norm. What ‘must’ always remain normative is the ability to critique and transform existing norms, that is, to create something new (the category of the new should be understood here in the broad sense, including not only social change, but also artistic creation, conceptual innovation and so on.) One cannot have pre-existing norms or criteria for the new; otherwise it would not be new, but already foreseen. This is the basis on which Patton argues that Deleuze’s conception of power is explicitly normative: ‘What a given assemblage is capable of doing or becoming’, he writes, ‘is determined by the lines of flight or deterritorialization which it can sustain’ (Patton 2000: 106). (One might note here that the concept of ‘nomadic war-machines’, which was introduced in A Thousand Plateaus, is Deleuze and Guattari’s attempt to address the question of a social formation that would itself be constructed along such movements or lines of flight. Patton suggests that such assemblages should in fact be called ‘metamorphosis’ machines (2000: 110), since they have only an external relation to war and a historically contingent relation to nomads; this is a suggestion that will no doubt be taken up by others. Metamorphosis machines would be the conditions of actualization of absolute deterritorialization and the means by which relative deterritorialization occurs: ‘They bring connections to bear against the great conjunction of the apparatuses of capture or domination.’ . . . A metamorphosis machine would then be one that . . . engenders the production of something altogether different. Patton is therefore using the concept ‘normativity’ in a quite different manner than Fraser or Habermas. They would say that deterritorialization is not norma- tive, and cannot be, since it eludes any universal criteria and indeed allows for their modification. Patton in effect responds by saying: for that very reason, it is deterritorialization that should be seen as a normative concept, even if that entails a new concept of what normativity is. At one point in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes that ‘one can conserve the word essence, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that essence is precisely the accident or the event’ (1994: 191). Patton seems to be saying something similar: one can conserve the word normativity, if one wishes, but only on the condition of saying that the normative is the new or the deterritorialized. Patton’s own trajectory is thus beginning to come into focus: rather than simply dropping or ignoring the concept of normativity, he instead proposes to create a new concept of normativity by critiquing components of the old one, and linking it up with a quite different set of related concepts. In this manner, he is effecting a transfor- mation of the liberal concept, while still attempting to situate his own work fully within the liberal tradition.

#### Independently prefer our views of normativity and instability:

#### 1] Bindingness – every experience redefines us as subjects and leads to some affective response, we can’t opt out of being part of assemblages since those are molded around us

#### 2] Hijacks other frameworks – affectivity is a prerequisite to evaluating the effects of other actions since we first need to know how they change the subject

#### 3] Pre-fiat praxis – they get up and larp as a policy actor or kritikal academic only in the circumstances of the round but engage in different normative standards outside the round, proves obligations are subjective

## Part 4: Reterritorializing Debate

#### [1] The 1AC comes at a higher layer to theory, --A] deterritorialization constitutes our understanding of education and fairness i.e., questioning racist pedagogies and norms in the past, --B] theory itself is a static territorialized standard that disregards assemblages –C] theory is a major standard all are held to contrast, it IS NOT about access to debate, it’s about them WEAPONIZING theory otherwise they would have asked before the round or ADVOCATE for norms outside of round

#### [2] Controls the internal link to all K alts and radical politics – the ability to speak out and fight for particular reforms is guaranteed by the deterritorialization and democratic becomings – alternatives without the aff shut down the collective ability to reterritorialize societal norms to advance that agenda

#### Common usage also concludes appropriation is the taking of or exercise of control over property

**Bohm 13** [JEFF BOHM, Chief Judge. In re Cowin, 492 B.R. 858 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013).] TDI

1. Application of the Facts in the Instant Disputes to Embezzlement under Section 523(a)(4)

(i) "The Debtor appropriated funds." **"Appropriation" is defined as "the exercise of control over property; a taking of possession."** BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 98 (7th ed. 1999). In connection with its analysis under the TTLA in section C.2.b., supra, this Court has determined that the Debtor appropriated the excess proceeds from the foreclosure sales of the Countrywide Property, the Chase Property, and the WMC Property that rightfully belonged to the Plaintiffs. Not only did the Debtor control the disposition of the excess proceeds via the WCL and Dampkring Deeds of Trust, but he ensured that the proceeds were deposited to Perc and TRH, entities controlled by his co-conspirator Allan Groves. Thus, the first element is satisfied.

(ii) "The appropriation was for the Debtor's use or benefit." This element does not require a showing that the Debtor himself personally benefitted by the amounts that the Plaintiffs were damaged. For example, in affirming a bankruptcy court's decision that a debt was nondischargeable due to embezzlement under section 523(a)(4), the Sixth Circuit stated: