## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must not defend a non-status quo policy option. To clarify, the affirmative may not fiat \_\_\_\_\_ (their advocacy)

#### Violation: They do (explain)

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision – the resolution doesn’t entail an actor nor does it an action – they are definitionally not topical or even a subset of the resolution – vote them down –

#### A] stasis point – the topic is the only reasonable focal point for debate – anything else destroys the possibility of debate because we will be two ships passing –

#### B] internal link turn – violating semantics justifies the aff talking about whatever with zero neg prep or prediction which is the most unfair and educational –

#### C] Jurisdiction – you can’t vote for them because the ballot and the tournament invitation say to vote for the better debater in the context of the resolution –

#### D] objectivity – only semantics are objective whereas pragmatics are subjective which means intervention

#### 2] Limits – they explode them – they are super Extra T and justify an infinite possible number of affirmatives and different actors – none of which are part of the resolution which means there is no prediction ground. Multiple Impacts – A] Stable Ground – they deck neg preparation ability and impose an infinitely reciprocal research burden on the negative to have to guess the infinite policy options and possible permutations and to cut specific disads to those - B] Predictability – no actor or action means its impossible to have a way to predict affs on this topic which decks quality engagement and education – C] Infinite Abuse – being non-topical justifies picking a trivially true aff which means they always win

#### 3] TVA – don’t defend an action and use ideal theory to explain why appropriation is bad - That’s better – it promotes in-depth philosophical clash over law that’s constitutive to LD

#### No RVIs – Logic

#### Drop the debater – Deter future abuse, drop the arg is same bwecause offense is all fiated

#### Fairness Extempted-

#### Education \_ Extempted

## 2

#### Space-Based Solar Power (SBSP) is a megaconstellation, and it’s going to happen within 10 years in the squo. Aff banning private megaconstellations kills the necessary tech – David 21:

David, Leonard. 11/03/21 Space Solar Power’s Time May Finally Be Coming.”https://www.space.com/space-solar-power-research-advances // LHP BT + LHP PS

The sun never sets in space. **The idea of** harvesting solar energyvia power-beaming satelliteshas therefore long intrigued researchers looking for ways to feed an energy-ravenous [Earth](https://www.space.com/54-earth-history-composition-and-atmosphere.html). That reflection has fomented for decades but is now garnering new looks all over the world: Technologists in the U.S. and China, experts in Japan and researchers within the European Space Agency and the United Kingdom Space Agency are all working to make space-based solar power a reality. Related: [Solar power stations in space could be the answer to our energy needs](https://www.space.com/solar-power-stations-in-space-could-be-the-answer-to-our-energy-needs.html) History machine Peter Glaser, the father of the solar power satellite concept. (Image credit: Arthur D. Little Inc.) The idea of wireless power transmission dates back to [Nikola Tesla](https://www.livescience.com/45950-nikola-tesla-biography.html) near the end of the 19th century. Fast-forwarding to 1968, the notion of a solar power satellite was detailed and patented by U.S. space pioneer Peter Glaser. He blueprinted a novel way to collect energy from sunlight using solar cells and beam down an energetic muscle of microwaves to receiving antennas ("rectennas") on Earth. Those microwaves could then be converted to electrical energy and supplied to the power grid. Then, in the mid-1970s, microwave power transmission experiments in the tens of kilowatts were successfully conducted at the Goldstone Deep Space Communications Complex in California, a facility of NASA's [Jet Propulsion Laboratory](https://www.space.com/16952-nasa-jet-propulsion-laboratory.html). And this "power trip" doesn't stop there.The Space Solar Power Incremental and Demonstrations Research (SSPIDR) project is designed to beam power from space to Earth. SSPIDR consists of several small-scale flight experiments that will mature technology needed to build a prototype solar power distribution system. (Image credit: Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL)) Impressive **advances Over the past decade,** researchers have made impressive advances **that** increase **the** likelihood **that space solar power (**SSP**)** will be realized during the next decade, said John Mankins, president of Artemis Innovation Management Solutions of Santa Maria, California. His view: the longstanding vision for SSP as a sustainable energy alternative should be revisited in light of such recent advances.Bolstering that outlook is a set of key perspectives, Mankins told Space.com. "Climate change is really going to be a disaster. Nations are committed to go [carbon net-zero](https://www.livescience.com/climate-report-net-zero.html) … and they have no idea how to do it."**The** rapidly unfolding value of "NewSpace**" is also** reshaping the landscape of 21st century space activities**, he added. "Two of the biggest hurdles to the realization of SSP have always been the cost of launch and the cost of hardware**," said Mankins. "Add flight rate, and all of a sudden you're looking at numbers always talked about for solar power satellites."Related: [What is climate change?](https://www.livescience.com/climate-change.html) Megaconstellations **Another** recent change isthedawn of the megaconstellations, Mankins added. **That's** exemplified by SpaceX's [Starlink](https://www.space.com/spacex-starlink-satellites.html) broadband network**, a** mass-production effort that now cranks out 30 tons of satellites a month**. SpaceX is on course to potentially manufacture 40,000 satellites within five years, and launch all of them. "The path to low-cost hardware has been shown," Mankins said. "It's modular and mass-produced. The hurdles of less-expensive launch and lowering hardware costs have been overcome.**"Mankins said that the economics of SSP concepts in the near term, within the next decade, have never been more viable. He flagged advances in space launch capabilities; progress in robotics for space assembly, maintenance and servicing systems; and the growth in various component technologies, such as high-efficiency solid state power amplifiers. **As a result, SSP is ready to see the light of day,** Mankins said.Astroelectricity An early entrant in focusing on understanding the energy policy needed and establishment of SSP is James Michael Snead, president of the Spacefaring Institute. He's adopted the use of the term "astroelectricity" to describe the transmitted electrical power produced by SSP systems.In looking at what he terms the "[coming age of astroelectricity](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5E-0NYnAaUA)," he sees a world needing a replacement for oil and natural gas, the two primary sources of energy currently maintaining an industrial standard of living. Snead envisions a world in the year 2100 where about 20% of electrical power comes from terrestrial nuclear and renewables, with 80% supplied by astroelectricity."Just as the military, economic and diplomatic control of Middle East oil has substantially influenced world events for the past 80 years, the control of space solar power platforms will come to dominate outer space activities this century," Snead told Space.com. Wanted: high-priority leadershipIf SSP becomes a reality later this century, Snead said, the U.S. military will be required to protect and defend these new sources of national energy security just as it guards oil infrastructure in the Persian Gulf today."While some people are developing SSP concepts that would be launched from the Earth and autonomously assembled in geostationary Earth orbit, I do not see this as a successful proposition," said Snead. He believes that building the thousands of SSP platforms needed requires a substantial [space industrialization effort](https://www.space.com/nasa-low-earth-orbit-iss-commercialization.html) involving more than a million people in space by the end of the century. The starting point, Snead said, will be establishing the enabling "astrologistics" infrastructure operating throughout the Earth-moon system. He stressed that those astrologistics require high-priority U.S. Air Force — not [Space Force](https://www.space.com/42089-space-force.html) — leadership to draw upon nearly a century of human flight/operational logistics experience and expertise.That is necessary to manage industry's efforts to design and build the required new human spaceflight systems, with a clearly needed emphasis on safety and effectiveness, Snead said. As these new military astrologistics capabilities begin, Snead contends, commercialization of these capabilities will extend these safety and operational benefits to support the coming space industrial revolution needed to undertake SSP. "This is exactly what happened to enable U.S. airline manufacturers to dominate the airline and air cargo industry for decades. It is a successful model to now replicate in space — a model that neither NASA nor the U.S. Space Force can effectively execute," Snead said. The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory’s Paul Jaffe holds a module designed for space solar power investigations in front of a customized vacuum chamber used to test the device. (Image credit: NRL/Jamie Hartman) 'Performing like a champ' While new artwork, economic plots and conceptual SPS thinking and visions flow, there's an in-space technology experiment already underway. On its latest mission, which launched in May 2020, the Space Force's robotic [X-37B space plane](https://www.space.com/25275-x37b-space-plane.html) is toting the Photovoltaic Radio-frequency Antenna Module Flight Experiment (PRAM-FX), a Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) investigation into transforming solar power into radio-frequency microwave energy. The focus of that X-37B investigation is not establishing an actual power-beaming link, but more on appraising the performance of sunlight-to-microwave conversion. "It is performing like a champ," said Paul Jaffe, an NRL electronics engineer working on power beaming and solar power satellites. "We are getting data regularly, and that data is exceeding our expectations," he told Space.com. [PRAM-FX](https://www.space.com/x-37b-space-plane-solar-power-beaming) is principally made out of commercial parts, not "space-grade" hardware. "The fact that it is continuing to operate and give us positive results is quite encouraging," Jaffe said. Commercial parts are mass-produced, while many space-grade parts are one-offs. Solar power satellites, like those envisioned in high Earth orbit, would have thousands of elements made out of similar components being tested onboard the X-37B, Jaffe said. [The US Space Force's secretive X-37B space plane: 10 surprising facts](https://www.space.com/x-37b-military-space-plane-surprising-facts) Space-based solar power could help the UK achieve net-zero emissions by 2050, according to a leading British systems, engineering and technology company. (Image credit: Frazer-Nash Consultancy) Making the economics work There's much more work ahead, of course. "The big strike against space solar power has always been making the economics work. People who have looked at the idea seriously do understand that, from a physics standpoint, there is no reason you couldn't do it," Jaffe said. "With mass production of space hardware, and with the cost reduction of space access, it is more plausible that it could work," he added. "I would caution against excessive optimism … but also point out that things are changing. There are a lot of encouraging developments." SPS will assuredly be compared to a "levelized cost of energy" metric, Jaffe concluded. "There's just not enough data to come up with a levelized cost of energy basis for space solar power. It's premature. What you are seeing now is laying the foundation for that sort of evaluation." Clear, affordable path To that end, Mankins of Artemis Innovation Management Solutions has rolled out SPS-ALPHA ("Solar Power Satellite by means of Arbitrarily Large Phased Array"), a design he showcased at the 72nd International Astronautical Congress, which was held from Oct. 25 to Oct. 29 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Detailing a business model and step-by-step SSP roadmap, he feels the concept promises a clear, affordable path to deploying a critically needed new energy option. "**I believe you could have operational solar power satellites to scale within a decade,"** Mankins said. That possibility, combined with the fact that multiple nations are eying SSP as a promising power generation system of the future, begs a question: Is there a solar power satellite race afoot? It is close to that, Mankins said. "I think it has to be cooperation among friends and allies. But I think it's very likely to end up being competition with China. The longer we wait with regard to the urgency of policies on [climate change](https://www.space.com/climate-change-dimming-earth), the more likely it is we're going to miss the boat." Mankins is a 26-year veteran of assessing SSP and the technologies required. "The moment has come," he said. "I think the right answer is really clear: We need to just go do it."

#### SBSP key to solve climate change – Katete 21 –

Katete, Esthere. (December 17 2021) “Space-Based Solar Power: The Future Source of Energy?”https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2020/02/space-based-solar-power // LHP BT + LHP PS

Space-based solar power (SBSP) involves collecting the sun’s energy in space, and then wirelessly transmitting it to Earth. There are several [advantages to solar energy](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2014/08/5-advantages-and-5-disadvantages-of-solar-energy). Although expensive, it **is** **a** great source of [clean energy](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/clean-energy) that has the capacity to provide more energythan the world consumes **or is predicted to consume in the future**. A space-based solar power technological process includes using [solar panels](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/solar-energy/solar-panels) to collect solar energy in space with reflectors or inflatable mirrors that direct solar radiation onto solar panels, and then beaming it on Earth through a microwave or laser. The energy is then received on Earth via a microwave antenna (a rectenna). **According to the** [**National Space Society**](https://space.nss.org/space-solar-power/)**,** space-based solar power **has the** potential to dwarf all the other sources of energy combined**. They argue that space-based solar power can provide large quantities of energy** with very little negative environmental impact**. It can also** solve our current energy and greenhouse gas emissions problems**.** The infographic below highlights information about space-based solar power, current related trends, and what different countries are doing in terms of research and funding. Current Global Energy Consumption and Trends **The** world’s energy consumption is only growing. According to a report by the University of Oxford’s Our World in Data, on the global primary energy consumption, the current world consumption is over 160,000 TWh annually. Solar energy contributes only 585 TWh. Although there is an increase in renewable energy solutions, investments, and usage, oil, coal, and gas still generate more than 80% of the global energy that is consumed - with solar energy generating less than 1%. Between 2004 and 2015, investments in renewable energy increased by 600% from £36.2 billion (US$46.7 billion) to £220.6 billion (US$284.8 billion). Current predictions indicate that the world population will reach [9.7 billion by 2050](https://www.un.org/development/desa/en/news/population/world-population-prospects-2019.html). With the increase in population, the world energy consumption is also predicted to grow by 50% by 2050. In addition, climate change impacts are accelerating. Although we generate a big percentage of the world energy from fossil fuels, fossil fuels contribute significantly to the increase of climate change. **Comparatively,** solar energy is the [safest source of energy](https://ourworldindata.org/uploads/2020/02/Safest-source-of-energy.png) today - though it still only contributes a small percentage of the global energy production. The death rates from solar production are 1,230 times lower than coal, and it has one of the lowest CO2 emissions, at 5g CO2 eq per kWh. Why Space-Based Solar Power? Space-based solar power has several benefits; unlike solar panels on our roofs that can only generate electricity during the day, space-based solar power can generate continuous electricity, 24 hours a day, 99% of the year. This is because, unlike Earth, the space environment does not have night and day, and the satellites are in the Earth's shadow for only a maximum of 72 minutes per night. **Space-based solar panels can generate** 2,000 gigawatts of power constantly. This is **40 times more energy than a solar panel would generate on Earth annually**. This is also several folds higher than the [efficiency of solar panels](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2014/11/how-efficient-are-solar-panels) today. **What’s more, is that space-based** solar power would generate [0% greenhouse gas emissions](https://space.nss.org/space-solar-power/) unlike other alternatives **energy like nuclear, coal, oil, gas, and ethanol**. The current source of energy that generates the lowest CO2 is nuclear power, which generates CO2 of 5g CO2 eq per kWh. **Space-based solar power** generates almost 0% hazardous waste to our environment **compared to nuclear power**. Why Are We Not There Yet? While space-based solar power is an innovative concept, we are not able to fully launch a system into space yet. Launching a space-based solar system is very expensive. In fact, the cost is estimated to be about 100 times too high to compete with current utility costs. One of the causes of the high costs is the high cost of launching the panels to space, which is mostly due to the high mass per watt generated by the current solar panels. In other words, the solar panels are currently too heavy per watt generated to make it feasible. Currently, the cost of launching in space is estimated to be £7,716 per kilogram - approximately £154 per watt. In comparison to the cost that homeowners pay today, which is approximately £2 per watt peak, the cost in space is extremely high to be competitive. In UK homes, the [installation cost of solar panels](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2014/08/what-is-the-installation-cost-for-solar-panels) can be as low as £1.5 per watt. Other reasons for high costs include the overall high transport costs to space. This is because transporting all other materials that are needed to space would require many space shuttle launches, and these space shuttles are currently not reusable. So, not only is the launch of solar panels themselves expensive, but the additional materials needing to be transported is also expensive. A lot of research and engineering is still ongoing to find the most feasible way to launch space-based solar panels and launch systems, at a lower cost. The environment out in space also has several hazards that could cause damage to the solar panels. These include space debris and extreme solar radiation, which could degrade the solar panels up to 8 times faster than panels installed on Earth. Finally, there is a potential of wasting large amounts of energy when transporting or during transmission from space to Earth. Therefore, scientists and engineers must continue their R&D efforts to ensure little to no energy is lost during the process. Current SBSP Projects and Progress The key players in SBSP include China, the US, and Japan, who have shown progress in terms of technology advancements, partnerships, and launch plans. China is already progressing to launch into space. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation plans to launch small to medium solar satellites in the stratosphere that can harness energy in space between 2021 and 2025. China also plans to generate one megawatt of energy from space-based solar panels by 2030, and to be operating a commercially viable solar space station by 2050. In the US, there are ongoing partnerships and investments. For example, a $100 million partnership between Northrop Grumman and U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory has been established to provide advanced technology for SBSP. Also in the US, a $17.5 million collaboration between Northrop Grumman Corporation and Caltech was set up to develop the space solar power project called ‘The Space Solar Power Initiative’. The initiative’s goal was to develop scientific and technological innovations that would enable a space-based solar power system generate electricity at a cost comparable to current sources of electricity. There has been ongoing research and technological advancements. In the US, the development of the SPS-ALPHA Mark-II concept is underway. This, if successful, would enable construction of huge platforms in space that can remotely deliver tens of thousands of megawatts of electricity to Earth, using wireless power transmissions. This will also enable delivery of affordable power to Earth and on space missions. In addition, progress is being made to build reusable launch systems. Success in this will lower the cost of transport to space and overall cost of space-based solar power. An example is SpaceX, that is currently working on reusable launch vehicles that can be used for transport to space. In Japan, researchers successfully transmitted electric power wirelessly using microwaves. Researchers transformed 1.8 kW of electric power into microwaves and accurately transmitted it into a receiver that was 55 metres away. This was a technological advancement towards bringing SBSP closer to reality. Japan also made space-based solar systems part of its future space exploration vision. Future Outlook for SBSP Fossil fuels are finite and can eventually run out. According to predictions, oil and natural gas could run out in 50 years and coal production in 115 years. With ongoing research and investments, there is a high possibility that space-based solar power is the viable [future of solar power](https://www.greenmatch.co.uk/blog/2015/01/the-future-for-solar-power-in-the-uk). If the cost of space-based solar power can be lowered, it is likely to be a major source of sustainable energy that cannot diminish. Major players like China, who already have timelines of implementing the technology in space, may be able to provide some key learnings for future improvements in the technology.

#### Warming causes extinction - Xu 17:

Yangyang Xu 17, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose **existential threats** to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and **species extinction**. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of **tipping points**. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as **abrupt and irreversible climate changes**, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has **catastrophic human health effects**. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose **existential risks to humans** and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses **existential threat** if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and **expose** as much as **90% of species to** the dangers of **extinction** (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of **existential threats**. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

## Case

#### Nuke war won’t cause extinction, but it’ll spur political will for meaningful disarmament.

Deudney 18 [Associate Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. 03/15/2018. “The Great Debate.” The Oxford Handbook of International Security. www.oxfordhandbooks.com, doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.22] // Re-Cut Justin

Although nuclear war is the oldest of these technogenic threats to civilization and human survival, and although important steps to restraint, particularly at the end of the Cold War, have been achieved, the nuclear world is increasingly changing in major ways, and in almost entirely dangerous directions. The third “bombs away” phase of the great debate on the nuclear-political question is more consequentially divided than in the first two phases. Even more ominously, most of the momentum lies with the forces that are pulling states toward nuclear-use, and with the radical actors bent on inflicting catastrophic damage on the leading states in the international system, particularly the United States. In contrast, the arms control project, although intellectually vibrant, is largely in retreat on the world political stage. The arms control settlement of the Cold War is unraveling, and the world public is more divided and distracted than ever. With the recent election of President Donald Trump, the United States, which has played such a dominant role in nuclear politics since its scientists invented these fiendish engines, now has an impulsive and uninformed leader, boding ill for nuclear restraint and effective crisis management. Given current trends, it is prudent to assume that sooner or later, and probably sooner, nuclear weapons will again be the used in war. But this bad news may contain a “silver lining” of good news. Unlike a general nuclear war that might have occurred during the Cold War, such a nuclear event now would probably not mark the end of civilization (or of humanity), due to the great reductions in nuclear forces achieved at the end of the Cold War. Furthermore, politics on “the day after” could have immense potential for positive change. The survivors would not be likely to envy the dead, but would surely have a greatly renewed resolution for “never again.” Such an event, completely unpredictable in its particulars, would unambiguously put the nuclear-political question back at the top of the world political agenda. It would unmistakeably remind leading states of their vulnerability It might also trigger more robust efforts to achieve the global regulation of nuclear capability. Like the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that did so much to catalyze the elevated concern for nuclear security in the early Cold War, and like the experience “at the brink” in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the now bubbling nuclear caldron holds the possibility of inaugurating a major period of institutional innovation and adjustment toward a fully “bombs away” future.

#### Counterforcing ensure only a few million die.

Mueller 9 [Woody Mueller, Chair of National Security Studies, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, Cato Senior Fellow, 2009 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda,” *Google Books*, October 5th, p. 8] // Re-Cut Justin

To begin to approach a condition that can credibly justify applying such extreme characterizations as societal annihilation, a full-out attack with hundreds, probably thousands, of thermonuclear bombs would be required. Even in such extreme cases, the area actually devastated by the bombs' blast and thermal pulse effective **would be limited**: 2,000 1-MT explosions with a destructive radius of 5 miles each would directly demolish **less than 5 percent** of the territory of the United States, for example. Obviously, if major population centers were targeted, this sort of attack could inflict massive casualties. Back in cold war days, when such devastating events sometimes seemed uncomfortably likely, a **number of studies** were conducted to estimate the consequences of massive thermonuclear attacks. One of the **most prominent** of these considered several probabilities. The most likely scenario--one that could be perhaps considered at least to begin to approach the rational--was a "counterforce" strike in which well over 1,000 thermonuclear weapons would be targeted at America's ballistic missile silos, strategic airfields, and nuclear submarine bases in an effort to destroy the country’s strategic ability to retaliate. Since the attack **would not** directly **target population centers**, most of the ensuing deaths would be from radioactive fallout, and the study estimates that from 2 to 20 million, depending mostly on wind, weather, and sheltering, would perish during the first month.15 That sort of damage, which would kill less than 10 percent of the population, might or might not be enough to trigger words like “annihilation.”

#### Small arsenals and tests prove no extinction

Frankel et al. 15 [Dr. Michael J. Frankel is a senior scientist at Penn State University’s Applied Research Laboratory, where he focuses on nuclear treaty verification technologies, is one of the nation’s leading experts on the effects of nuclear weapons, executive director of the Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, led development of fifteen-year global nuclear threat technology projections and infrastructure vulnerability assessments; Dr. James Scouras is a national security studies fellow at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and the former chief scientist of DTRA’s Advanced Systems and Concepts Office; Dr. George W. Ullrich is chief technology officer at Schafer Corporation and formerly senior vice president at Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), currently serves as a special advisor to the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Group’s Science and Technology Panel and is a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board. 04-15-15. “The Uncertain Consequences of Nuclear Weapons Use.” The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory. DTIC. <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a618999.pdf>] Justin

Scientific work based on real data, rather than models, also cast additional doubt on the basic premise. Interestingly, publication of several contradictory papers describing experimental observations actually predated Schell’s work. In 1973, nine years before publication of The Fate of the Earth, a published report failed to find any ozone depletion during the peak period of atmospheric nuclear testing.26 In another work published in 1976, attempts to measure the actual ozone depletion associated with Russian megaton-class detonations and Chinese nuclear tests were also unable to detect any significant effect.27 At present, with the reduced arsenals and a perceived low likelihood of a large-scale exchange on the scale of Cold War planning scenarios, official concern over nuclear ozone depletion has essentially fallen off the table. Yet continuing scientific studies by a small dedicated community of researchers suggest the potential for dire consequences, even for relatively small regional nuclear wars involving Hiroshimasize bombs. Nuclear Winter The possibility of catastrophic climate changes came as yet another surprise to Department of Defense scientists. In 1982, Crutzen and Birks highlighted the potential effects of high-altitude smoke on climate,29 and in 1983, a research team consisting of Turco, Toon, Ackerman, Pollack, and Sagan (referred to as TTAPS) suggested that a five-thousand-megaton strategic exchange of weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union could effectively spell national suicide for both belligerents.30 They argued that a massive nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union would inject copious amounts of soot, generated by massive firestorms such as those witnessed in Hiroshima, into the stratosphere where it might reside indefinitely. Additionally, the soot would be accompanied by dust swept up in the rising thermal column of the nuclear fireball. The combination of dust and soot could scatter and absorb sunlight to such an extent that much of Earth would be engulfed in darkness sufficient to cease photosynthesis. Unable to sustain agriculture for an extended period of time, much of the planet’s population would be doomed to perish, and—in its most extreme rendition—humanity would follow the dinosaurs into extinction and by much the same mechanism.31 Subsequent refinements by the TTAPS authors, such as an extension of computational efforts to three-dimensional models, continued to produce qualitatively similar results. The TTAPS results were severely criticized, and a lively debate ensued between passionate critics of and defenders of the analysis. Some of the technical objections critics raised included the TTAPS team’s neglect of the potentially significant role of clouds;32 lack of an accurate model of coagulation and rainout;33 inaccurate capture of feedback mechanisms;34 “fudge factor” fits of micrometer-scale physical processes assumed to hold constant for changed atmospheric chemistry conditions and uniformly averaged on a grid scale of hundreds of kilometers;35 the dynamics of firestorm formation, rise, and smoke injection;36 and estimates of the optical properties and total amount of fuel available to generate the assumed smoke loading. In particular, more careful analysis of the range of uncertainties associated with the widely varying published estimates of fuel quantities and properties suggested a possible range of outcomes encompassing much milder impacts than anything predicted by TTAPS.37 Aside from the technical issues critics raised, the five-thousand-megaton baseline exchange scenario TTAPS envisioned was rendered obsolete when the major powers decreased both their nuclear arsenals and the average yield of the remaining weapons. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the nuclear winter issue essentially fell off the radar screen for Department of Defense scientists, which is not to say that it completely disappeared from the scientific literature. In the last few years, a number of analysts, including some of the original TTAPS authors, suggested that even a “modest” regional exchange of nuclear weapons—one hundred explosions of fifteenkiloton devices in an Indian–Pakistani exchange scenario—might yet produce significant worldwide climate effects, if not the full-blown “winter.”38 However, such concerns have failed to gain much traction in Department of Defense circles.

#### Empirics – we’ve nuked ourselves 2,000 times and the largest event was only 1/1000th as powerful as natural disasters

Eken 17 [Mattias Eken - PhD student in Modern History at the University of St Andrews. “The understandable fear of nuclear weapons doesn’t match reality”. 3/14/17. <https://theconversation.com/the-understandable-fear-of-nuclear-weapons-doesnt-match-reality-73563>] // Re-Cut Justin

Nuclear weapons are unambiguously the most destructive weapons on the planet. Pound for pound, they are the most lethal weapons ever created, capable of killing millions. Millions live in fear that these weapons will be used again, with all the potential consequences. However, the destructive power of these weapons **has been vastly exaggerated**, albeit for good reasons. Public fear of nuclear weapons being used in anger, whether by terrorists or nuclear-armed nations, has risen once again in recent years. **This is** in no small part **thanks to the current political climate** between states such as the US and Russia and the various nuclear tests conducted by North Korea. But whenever we talk about nuclear weapons, it’s easy to get carried away with doomsday scenarios and apocalyptic language. As the historian Spencer Weart once argued: “**You say ‘nuclear bomb’ and everybody immediately thinks of the end of the world.**” Yet the means necessary to produce a nuclear bomb, let alone set one off, remain incredibly complex – and while the damage that would be done if someone did in fact detonate one might be very serious indeed, **the chances that it would mean “the end of the world” are vanishingly small**. In his 2013 book Command and Control, the author Eric Schlosser tried to scare us into perpetual fear of nuclear weapons by recounting stories of near misses and accidents involving nuclear weapons. One such event, the 1980 Damascus incident, saw a Titan II intercontinental ballistic missile explode at its remote Arkansas launch facility after a maintenance crew accidentally ruptured its fuel tank. Although the warhead involved in the incident didn’t detonate, Schlosser claims that “if it had, much of Arkansas would be gone”. But that’s not quite the case. The nine-megaton thermonuclear warhead on the **Titan II** missile had a blast radius of 10km, or an area of about 315km². The state of Arkansas spreads over 133,733km², meaning the weapon **would have caused destruction across 0.2% of the state.** That would naturally have been a terrible outcome, but certainly not the catastrophe that Schlosser evokes. Claims exaggerating the effects of nuclear weapons have become commonplace, especially after the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. In the early War on Terror years, Richard Lugar, a former US senator and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that terrorists armed with nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the Western way of life. What he failed to explain is how. It is by no means certain that a single nuclear detonation **(or even several)** would do away with our current way of life. Indeed, **we’re still here despite having nuked our own planet more than 2,000 times** – a tally expressed beautifully in this video by Japanese artist Isao Hashimoto). While the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty forced nuclear tests underground, **around 500 of** all **the nuclear weapons detonated were unleashed in the Earth’s atmosphere**. This includes the world’s largest ever nuclear detonation, the 57-megaton bomb known as **Tsar Bomba**, detonated by the Soviet Union on October 30 1961. Tsar Bomba was more than 3,000 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. That is immense destructive power – but as one physicist explained, **it’s only “one-thousandth the force of an earthquake, one-thousandth the force of a hurricane”.** The Damascus incident proved how incredibly hard it is to set off a nuclear bomb and the limited effect that would have come from just one warhead detonating. Despite this, some scientists have controversially argued that an even limited all-out nuclear war might lead to a so-called nuclear winter, since the smoke and debris created by very large bombs could block out the sun’s rays for a considerable amount of time. To inflict such ecological societal annihilation with weapons alone, we would have to detonate hundreds if not thousands of thermonuclear devices in a short time. Even in such extreme conditions, the area actually devastated by the bombs would be limited: for example, **2,000 one-megaton explosions with a destructive radius of five miles each would directly destroy less than 5% of the territory of the US**. Of course, if the effects of nuclear weapons have been greatly exaggerated, there is a very good reason: since these weapons are indeed extremely dangerous, any posturing and exaggerating which intensifies our fear of them makes us less likely to use them. But it’s important, however, to understand why people have come to fear these weapons the way we do. After all, nuclear weapons are here to stay; they can’t be “un-invented”. If we want to live with them and mitigate the very real risks they pose, we must be honest about what those risks really are. Overegging them to frighten ourselves more than we need to keeps nobody safe.

#### Isolated island populations repopulate after radiation and nuclear winter – bunkers and submarines.

Turchin and Green 18 [Alexey Turchin – Scientist for the Foundation Science for Life Extension in Moscow, Russia, Founder of Digital Immortality Now, author of several books and articles on the topics of existential risks and life extension. Brian Patrick Green – Director of technology ethics at the Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, teaches AI ethics in the Graduate School of Engineering at Santa Clara University. <MKIM> “Islands as refuges for surviving global catastrophes”. September 2018. DOA: 7/20/19. <https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/FS-04-2018-0031/full/html?fullSc=1&mbSc=1&fullSc=1>] // Re-Cut Justin

Different types of possible catastrophes suggest different scenarios for how survival could happen on an island. What is important is that the island should have properties which protect against the specific dangers of particular global catastrophic risks. Specifically, different islands will provide protection against different risks, and their natural diversity will contribute to a higher total level of protection: **Quarantined island survives pandemic**. An island could impose effective quarantine if it is sufficiently remote and simultaneously able to protect itself, possibly using military ships and air defense. **Far northern aboriginal people survive an ice age**. Many far northern people have adapted to survive in extremely cold and dangerous environments, and under the right circumstances could potentially survive the return of an ice age. However, their cultures are endangered by globalization. If these people become dependent on the products of modern civilization, such as rifles and motor boats, and lose their native survival skills, then their likelihood of surviving the collapse of the outside world would decrease. Therefore, preservation of their survival skills may be important as a defense against the risks connected with **extreme cooling**. Remote polar island with high mountains survives brief global warming of median surface temperatures, up to 50˚C. There is a theory that the climates of planets similar to the Earth could have several semi-stable temperature levels (Popp et al., 2016). If so, because of climate change, the Earth could transition to a second semi-stable state with a median global temperature of around 330 K, about 60˚C, or about 45˚C above current global mean temperatures. But even in this climate, **some regions of Earth could still be survivable for humans**, such as the Himalayan plateau at elevations above 4,000 m, but below 6,000 (where oxygen deficiency becomes a problem), or on polar islands with mountains (however, global warming affects polar regions more than equatorial regions, and northern island will experience more effects of climate change, including thawing permafrost and possible landslides because of wetter weather). In the tropics, the combination of increased humidity and temperature may increase the wet bulb temperature above 36˚C, especially on islands, where sea moisture is readily available. In such conditions, proper human perspiration becomes impossible (Sherwood and Huber, 2010), and there will likely be increased mortality and morbidity because of tropical diseases. If temperatures later returned to normal – either naturally or through climate engineering – **the rest of the Earth could be repopulated**. ‘‘Swiss Family Robinsons’’ survive on a tropical island, unnoticed by a military robot ‘‘mutiny’’. Most AI researchers ignore medium-term AI risks, which are neither near-term risks, like unemployment, nor remote risks, like AI superintelligence. But a large drone army – if one were produced – could receive a wrong command or be infected by a computer virus, leading it to attack people indiscriminately. Remote islands without robots could provide protection in this case, allowing survival until such a drone army ran out of batteries, fuel, ammunition or other supplies: Primitive tribe survives civilizational collapse. The inhabitants of **North Sentinel Island**, near the Andaman Islands in the Indian Ocean, are hostile and uncontacted. **The Sentinelese survived the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami apparently unaffected** (Voanews, 2009), and if the rest of humanity disappear, **they might well continue their existence without change.** Tropical Island survives extreme global nuclear winter and glaciation event. Were a **nuclear**, bolide impactor or volcanic “**winter**” scenario to unfold, these islands would remain surrounded by Warm Ocean, and local volcanism or other energy sources might provide heat, energy and food. Such island refuges may have helped life on Earth survive during the **“Snowball Earth”** event in Earth’s distant past (Hoffman et al., 1998). Remote island base for project “Yellow submarine”. Some catastrophic risks such as a gamma ray burst, a global nuclear war with high radiological contamination or multiple pandemics might be best survived **underwater in nuclear submarines** (Turchin and Green, 2017). However, after a catastrophe, the submarine with survivors would eventually need a place to dock, and an island with some prepared amenities would be a reasonable starting point for rebuilding civilization. Bunker on remote island. For risks which include multiple or complex catastrophes, such as a bolide impact, extreme volcanism, tsunamis, multiple pandemics and nuclear war with radiological contamination, **island refuges could be strengthened with bunkers**. Richard Branson survived hurricane Irma on his own island in 2017 by seeking refuge in his concrete wine cellar (Clifford, 2017). Bunkers on islands would have higher survivability compared to those close to population centers, as they will be neither a military target nor as accessible to looters or unintentionally dangerous (e.g. infected) refugees. These bunkers could potentially be connected to water sources by underwater pipes, and passages could provide cooling, access and even oxygen and food sources.

#### No nuke winter – conversion to hydrophilic black carbon eliminates the entire climate effect---and that’s an overestimate.

Reisner et al. 18 [Jon Reisner, atmospheric researcher at LANL Climate and Atmospheric Sciences; Gennaro D'Angelo, UKAFF Fellow and member of the Astrophysics Group at the School of Physics of the University of Exeter, Research Scientist with the Carl Sagan Center at the SETI Institute, currently works for the Los Alamos National Laboratory Theoretical Division; Eunmo Koo, scientist in the Computational Earth Science Group at LANL, recipient of the NNSA Defense Program Stockpile Stewardship Program award of excellence; Wesley Even, R&D Scientist at CCS-2, LANL, specialist in computational physics and astrophysics; Matthew Hecht is a member of the Computational Physics and Methods Group in the Climate, Ocean and Sea Ice Modelling program (COSIM) at LANL, who works on modeling high-latitude atmospheric effects in climate models as part of the HiLAT project; Elizabeth Hunke, Lead developer for the Los Alamos Sea Ice Model, Deputy Group Leader of the T-3 Fluid Dynamics and Solid Mechanics Group at LANL; Darin Comeau, Scientist at the CCS-2 COSIM program, specializes in high dimensional data analysis, statistical and predictive modeling, and uncertainty quantification, with particular applications to climate science; Randall Bos is a research scientist at LANL specializing in urban EMP simulations; James Cooley is a Group Leader within CCS-2. 03/16/2018. “Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, vol. 123, no. 5, pp. 2752–2772] // Re-Cut Justin

\*BC = Black Carbon

The no-rubble simulation produces a significantly more intense fire, with more fire spread, and consequently a significantly stronger plume with larger amounts of BC reaching into the upper atmosphere than the simulation with rubble, illustrated in Figure 5. While the no-rubble simulation **represents the worst-case scenario** involving vigorous fire activity, **only a relatively small amount of carbon makes its way into the stratosphere** during the course of the simulation. But while small compared to the surface BC mass, stratospheric BC amounts from the current simulations are significantly higher than what would be expected from burning vegetation such as trees (Heilman et al., 2014), e.g., the higher energy density of the building fuels and the initial fluence from the weapon produce an intense response within HIGRAD with initial updrafts of order 100 m/s in the lower troposphere. Or, in comparison to a mass fire, wildfires will burn only a small amount of fuel in the corresponding time period (roughly 10 minutes) that a nuclear weapon fluence can effectively ignite a large area of fuel producing an impressive atmospheric response. Figure 6 shows vertical profiles of BC multiplied by 100 (number of cities involved in the exchange) from the two simulations. The total amount of BC produced is in line with previous estimates (about 3.69 Tg from no-rubble simulation); however, the majority of BC resides **below the stratosphere** (3.46 Tg below 12 km) and can be **readily impacted by scavenging from precipitation** either via pyro-cumulonimbus produced by the fire itself (not modeled) or other synoptic weather systems. While the impact on climate of these more realistic profiles will be explored in the next section, it should be mentioned that **these estimates are** still **at the high end**, considering the inherent simplifications in the combustion model that lead to **overestimating BC production**. 3.3 Climate Results Long-term climatic effects critically depend on the initial injection height of the soot, with larger quantities reaching the upper troposphere/lower stratosphere inducing a greater cooling impact because of longer residence times (Robock et al., 2007a). Absorption of solar radiation by the BC aerosol and its subsequent radiative cooling tends to heat the surrounding air, driving an initial upward diffusion of the soot plumes, an effect that depends on the initial aerosol concentrations. **Mixing and sedimentation** tend to **reduce this process**, and low altitude emissions are also significantly impacted by precipitation if aging of the BC aerosol occurs on sufficiently rapid timescales. But once at stratospheric altitudes, aerosol dilution via coagulation is hindered by low particulate concentrations (e.g., Robock et al., 2007a) and lofting to much higher altitudes is inhibited by gravitational settling in the low-density air (Stenke et al., 2013), resulting in more stable BC concentrations over long times. Of the initial BC mass released in the atmosphere, most of which is emitted below 9 km, **70% rains out within the first month** and 78%, or about 2.9 Tg, is removed within the first two months (Figure 7, solid line), with the remainder (about 0.8 Tg, dashed line) being transported above about 12 km (200 hPa) within the first week. This outcome differs from the findings of, e.g., Stenke et al. (2013, their high BC-load cases) and Mills et al. (2014), who found that most of the BC mass (between 60 and 70%) is lifted in the stratosphere within the first couple of weeks. This can also be seen in Figure 8 (red lines) and in Figure 9, which include results from our calculation with the initial BC distribution from Mills et al. (2014). In that case, only 30% of the initial BC mass rains out in the troposphere during the first two weeks after the exchange, with the remainder rising to the stratosphere. In the study of Mills et al. (2008) this percentage is somewhat smaller, about 20%, and smaller still in the experiments of Robock et al. (2007a) in which the soot is initially emitted in the upper troposphere or higher. In Figure 7, the e-folding timescale for the removal of tropospheric soot, here interpreted as the time required for an initial drop of a factor e, is about one week. This result compares favorably with the “LT” experiment of Robock et al. (2007a), considering 5 Tg of BC released in the lower troposphere, in which 50% of the aerosols are removed within two weeks. By contrast, the initial e-folding timescale for the removal of stratospheric soot in Figure 8 is about 4.2 years (blue solid line), compared to about 8.4 years for the calculation using Mills et al. (2014) initial BC emission (red solid line). The removal timescale from our forced ensemble simulations is close to those obtained by Mills et al. (2008) in their 1 Tg experiment, by Robock et al. (2007a) in their experiment “UT 1 Tg”, and © 2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. by Stenke et al. (2013) in their experiment “Exp1”, in all of which 1 Tg of soot was emitted in the atmosphere in the aftermath of the exchange. Notably, the e-folding timescale for the decline of the BC mass in Figure 8 (blue solid line) is also close to the value of about 4 years quoted by Pausata et al. (2016) for their long-term “intermediate” scenario. In that scenario, which is also based on 5 Tg of soot initially distributed as in Mills et al. (2014), the factor-of2 shorter residence time of the aerosols is caused by particle growth via coagulation of BC with organic carbon. Figure 9 shows the BC mass-mixing ratio, horizontally averaged over the globe, as a function of atmospheric pressure (height) and time. The BC distributions used in our simulations imply that the upward transport of particles is substantially less efficient compared to the case in which 5 Tg of BC is directly injected into the upper troposphere. The semiannual cycle of lofting and sinking of the aerosols is associated with atmospheric heating and cooling during the solstice in each hemisphere (Robock et al., 2007a). During the first year, the oscillation amplitude in our forced ensemble simulations is particularly large during the summer solstice, compared to that during the winter solstice (see bottom panel of Figure 9), because of the higher soot concentrations in the Northern Hemisphere, as can be seen in Figure 11 (see also left panel of Figure 12). Comparing the top and bottom panels of Figure 9, the BC reaches the highest altitudes during the first year in both cases, but the concentrations at 0.1 hPa in the top panel can be 200 times as large. Qualitatively, the difference can be understood in terms of the air temperature increase caused by BC radiation emission, which is several tens of kelvin degrees in the simulations of Robock et al. (2007a, see their Figure 4), Mills et al. (2008, see their Figure 5), Stenke et al. (2013, see high-load cases in their Figure 4), Mills et al. (2014, see their Figure 7), and Pausata et al. (2016, see one-day emission cases in their Figure 1), due to high BC concentrations, but it amounts to only about 10 K in our forced ensemble simulations, as illustrated in Figure 10. Results similar to those presented in Figure 10 were obtained from the experiment “Exp1” performed by Stenke et al. (2013, see their Figure 4). **In that scenario as well, somewhat less than 1 Tg of BC remained in the atmosphere after the initial rainout**. As mentioned before, the BC aerosol that remains in the atmosphere, lifted to stratospheric heights by the rising soot plumes, undergoes sedimentation over a timescale of several years (Figures 8 and 9). This mass represents the effective amount of BC that can force climatic changes over multi-year timescales. In the forced ensemble simulations, it is about 0.8 Tg after the initial rainout, whereas it is about 3.4 Tg in the simulation with an initial soot distribution as in Mills et al. (2014). Our more realistic source simulation involves the worstcase assumption of no-rubble (along with other assumptions) and hence serves as an upper bound for the impact on climate. As mentioned above and further discussed below, our scenario induces perturbations on the climate system similar to those found in previous studies in which the climatic response was driven by roughly 1 Tg of soot rising to stratospheric heights following the exchange. Figure 11 illustrates the vertically integrated mass-mixing ratio of BC over the globe, at various times after the exchange for the simulation using the initial BC distribution of Mills et al. (2014, upper panels) and as an average from the forced ensemble members (lower panels). All simulations predict enhanced concentrations at high latitudes during the first year after the exchange. In the cases shown in the top panels, however, these high concentrations persist for several years (see also Figure 1 of Mills et al., 2014), whereas the forced ensemble simulations indicate that the BC concentration starts to decline after the first year. In fact, in the simulation represented in the top panels, mass-mixing ratios larger than about 1 kg of BC © 2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. per Tg of air persist for well over 10 years after the exchange, whereas they only last for 3 years in our forced simulations (compare top and middle panels of Figure 9). After the first year, values drop below 3 kg BC/Tg air, whereas it takes about 8 years to reach these values in the simulation in the top panels (see also Robock et al., 2007a). Over crop-producing, midlatitude regions in the Northern Hemisphere, the BC loading is reduced from more than 0.8 kg BC/Tg air in the simulation in the top panels to 0.2-0.4 kg BC/Tg air in our forced simulations (see middle and right panels). The more rapid clearing of the atmosphere in the forced ensemble is also signaled by the soot optical depth in the visible radiation spectrum, which drops below values of 0.03 toward the second half of the first year at mid latitudes in the Northern Hemisphere, and everywhere on the globe after about 2.5 years (without never attaining this value in the Southern Hemisphere). In contrast, the soot optical depth in the calculation shown in the top panels of Figure 11 becomes smaller than 0.03 everywhere only after about 10 years. The two cases show a similar tendency, in that the BC optical depth is typically lower between latitudes 30º S-30º N than it is at other latitudes. This behavior is associated to the persistence of stratospheric soot toward high-latitudes and the Arctic/Antarctic regions, as illustrated by the zonally-averaged, column-integrated mass-mixing ratio of the BC in Figure 12 for both the forced ensemble simulations (left panel) and the simulation with an initial 5 Tg BC emission in the upper troposphere (right panel). The spread in the globally averaged (near) surface temperature of the atmosphere, from the control (left panel) and forced (right panel) ensembles, is displayed in Figure 13. For each month, the plots show the largest variations (i.e., maximum and minimum values), within each ensemble of values obtained for that month, relative to the mean value of that month. The plot also shows yearly-averaged data (thinner lines). The spread is comparable in the control and forced ensembles, with average values calculated over the 33-years run length of 0.4-0.5 K. This spread is also similar to the internal variability of the globally averaged surface temperature quoted for the NCAR Large Ensemble Community Project (Kay et al., 2015). These results imply that surface air temperature differences, between forced and control simulations, which lie within the spread may not be distinguished from effects due to internal variability of the two simulation ensembles. Figure 14 shows the difference in the globally averaged surface temperature of the atmosphere (top panel), net solar radiation flux at surface (middle panel), and precipitation rate (bottom panel), computed as the (forced minus control) difference in ensemble mean values. The sum of standard deviations from each ensemble is shaded. Differences are qualitatively significant over the first few years, when the anomalies lie near or outside the total standard deviation. Inside the shaded region, differences may not be distinguished from those arising from the internal variability of one or both ensembles. The surface solar flux (middle panel) is the quantity that appears most affected by the BC emission, with qualitatively significant differences persisting for about 5 years. The precipitation rate (bottom panel) is instead affected only at the very beginning of the simulations. The red lines in all panels show the results from the simulation applying the initial BC distribution of Mills et al. (2014), where the period of significant impact is much longer owing to the higher altitude of the initial soot distribution that results in longer residence times of the BC aerosol in the atmosphere. When yearly averages of the same quantities are performed over the IndiaPakistan region, the differences in ensemble mean values lie within the total standard deviations of the two ensembles. The results in Figure 14 can also be compared to the outcomes of other previous studies. In their experiment “UT 1 Tg”, Robock et al. (2007a) found that, when only 1 Tg of soot © 2018 American Geophysical Union. All rights reserved. remains in the atmosphere after the initial rainout, temperature and precipitation anomalies are about 20% of those obtained from their standard 5 Tg BC emission case. Therefore, the largest differences they observed, during the first few years after the exchange, were about - 0.3 K and -0.06 mm/day, respectively, comparable to the anomalies in the top and bottom panels of Figure 14. Their standard 5 Tg emission case resulted in a solar radiation flux anomaly at surface of -12 W/m2 after the second year (see their Figure 3), between 5 and 6 time as large as the corresponding anomalies from our ensembles shown in the middle panel. In their experiment “Exp1”, Stenke et al. (2013) reported global mean surface temperature anomalies not exceeding about 0.3 K in magnitude and precipitation anomalies hovering around -0.07 mm/day during the first few years, again consistent with the results of Figure 14. In a recent study, Pausata et al. (2016) considered the effects of an admixture of BC and organic carbon aerosols, both of which would be emitted in the atmosphere in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange. In particular, they concentrated on the effects of coagulation of these aerosol species and examined their climatic impacts. The initial BC distribution was as in Mills et al. (2014), although the soot burden was released in the atmosphere over time periods of various lengths. Most relevant to our and other previous work are their one-day emission scenarios. They found that, during the first year, the largest values of the atmospheric surface temperature anomalies ranged between about -0.5 and -1.3 K, those of the sea surface temperature anomalies ranged between -0.2 and -0.55 K, and those of the precipitation anomalies varied between -0.15 and -0.2 mm/day. All these ranges are compatible with our results shown in Figure 14 as red lines and with those of Mills et al. (2014, see their Figures 3 and 6). As already mentioned in Section 2.3, the net solar flux anomalies at surface are also consistent. This overall agreement suggests that the **inclusion of organic carbon aerosols, and** ensuing **coagulation** with BC, **should not dramatically alter the climatic effects** resulting from our forced ensemble simulations. Moreover, aerosol growth would likely **shorten the residence time of the BC particulate in the atmosphere** (Pausata et al., 2016), possibly **reducing the duration of these effects.**

#### Analysis of historical volcano activity disproves nuclear winter – an eruption 5 times the size of a regional nuclear exchange dissipated in just 2 years

Reisner et al. 18 [Jon Reisner, atmospheric researcher at LANL Climate and Atmospheric Sciences; Gennaro D'Angelo, UKAFF Fellow and member of the Astrophysics Group at the School of Physics of the University of Exeter, Research Scientist with the Carl Sagan Center at the SETI Institute, currently works for the Los Alamos National Laboratory Theoretical Division; Eunmo Koo, scientist in the Computational Earth Science Group at LANL, recipient of the NNSA Defense Program Stockpile Stewardship Program award of excellence; Wesley Even, R&D Scientist at CCS-2, LANL, specialist in computational physics and astrophysics; Matthew Hecht is a member of the Computational Physics and Methods Group in the Climate, Ocean and Sea Ice Modelling program (COSIM) at LANL, who works on modeling high-latitude atmospheric effects in climate models as part of the HiLAT project; Elizabeth Hunke, Lead developer for the Los Alamos Sea Ice Model, Deputy Group Leader of the T-3 Fluid Dynamics and Solid Mechanics Group at LANL; Darin Comeau, Scientist at the CCS-2 COSIM program, specializes in high dimensional data analysis, statistical and predictive modeling, and uncertainty quantification, with particular applications to climate science; Randall Bos is a research scientist at LANL specializing in urban EMP simulations; James Cooley is a Group Leader within CCS-2. 03/16/2018. “Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations.” Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres, vol. 123, no. 5, pp. 2752–2772] // Re-Cut Justin

To quantitatively account for natural and forced variability in the climate system, we created two ensembles, one for the natural, unforced system and a second ensemble using a range of realistic vertical profiles for the BC aerosol forcing, consistent with our detailed fire simulation. The control ensemble was generated using small atmospheric temperature perturbations (Kay et al., 2015). Notably, the overall spread of anomalies in both ensembles is very similar. These ensembles were then used to create “super ensembles” using a statistical emulator, which allows a robust statistical comparison of our simulated results with and without the carbon forcing. Our primary result is the **decreased impact on global climate indices**, such as global average surface temperature and precipitation, relative to standard scenarios considered in previous work (e.g., Robock et al., 2007a; Stenke et al., 2013; Mills et al., 2014; Pausata et al., 2016). With our finding of **substantially less BC aerosol being lofted to stratospheric heights** (e.g., over a factor of four less than in most of the scenarios considered by previous studies), these globally averaged anomalies drop to **statistically insignificant levels** after the first several years (Figures 14 and 16). Our results are generally comparable to those predicted by other studies that considered exchange scenarios in which only about 1 Tg of soot is emitted in the upper troposphere (Robock et al., 2007a; Mills et al., 2008; Stenke et al., 2013). There are more subtle suggestions of regional effects, notably in the extent of the region over which sea surface temperature differences between ensembles remain significant in the final years of simulation (Figure 17). Further work is required to adequately analyze these and other potential regional effects. Historical analysis of several large volcanic eruptions and a recent large fire also supports this result. For example, Timmreck et al. (2010) claim that nonlinear aerosol effects of the Toba Tuff eruption 74,000 years ago helped **limit significant global cooling** impacts to a **two-year time period** and that any cooling beyond this time period could be due to other effects. It should be noted that this eruption was estimated to have produced **106 Tg** of ash and comparable amounts of other gases, such as sulfur dioxide (SO2), while the estimated amount of soot produced by a regional exchange is on the order of **10 Tg**, or **5 orders of magnitude smaller than the ash** (not including gases) **produced by the Toba eruption**. Noting that a nuclear exchange is not identical to volcanic events, it has been asserted that BC particles produced by fires should have a **greater impact on absorbing solar radiation** than even has the significantly larger amounts of ash and various gases produced by large eruptions (e.g., Robock and Toon 2010). Likewise, recent work in analyzing BC emissions from large fires suggests that in such fires, similar to large volcanic eruptions, **coating of soot particles with other particles** in convective eddies **tends to increase their size and hence increase their subsequent rainout** (China et al., 2013) before they can reach the stratosphere. In fact, the recent study of Pausata et al. (2016) found that growth of BC aerosol via coagulation with organic carbon significantly reduce the particles’ lifetime in the atmosphere

## 3

#### Interpretation: The Affirmative cant specify

#### Violation: they did

#### Standards:

#### Ground: The Aff specificizing \_\_\_\_ kills my ability to get ground. i.e. if I read a Doctors DA, they can just say that they do not defend that. o/w into Strat skew because they can spec out of my strats in the same way

#### Limits: Specification explodes limits because you can spec infinite number of jobs and AFFS which leads infinite abuse and o/w) Cherry Picking - you can do a trivially true AFF which explodes my ability to win b) I can’t have any stasis point of my being able to predict it, so I cannot engage links into Prep skew) I cannot prep for something I cannot predict, which kills all my prep, while they had two months too.

#### Breath v Death: Talking about specifically \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ kills all ability to talk about the general amount of worker which is what the topic focuses on. i.e It is more important for everyone to know about how to get many different jobs rather than how to be a teacher

**Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms.**

**Competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.**

#### No RVI’s –

#### (a) creates a chilling effect – aff is dangerous on theory because they get to prep a long counterinterp in the 1ar and then get the 2ar to collapse, weigh, and contextualize - negs would always be disincentived from reading theory against good theory debaters which leads to infinite abuse so it outweighs time skew(b) they’re illogical - “I’m fair vote for me” doesn’t make any sense - you dont win for meeting ur burden of being fair - logic comes first on theory since all args need to make sense in order to be evaluable.

Voters:

**Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Education – its why schools fund debate and has portable impacts.**