## 1

#### Interpretation: The Affirmative cant specify a a government in the AC plan ext

#### Violation: they did

#### Standard:

#### 1] Ground/Shiftiness: The Aff specificizing People’s Republic of China kills my ability to get ground. i.e. if I read a Doctors DA, they can just say that they do not defend that. o/w into Strat skew because they can spec out of my strats in the same way

#### 2] Limits: Specification explodes limits because you can spec infinite number of jobs and AFFS which leads infinite abuse and o/w) - you can do a trivially true AFF which explodes my ability to win b) I can’t have any stasis point of my being able to predict it, so I cannot engage links into Prep skew) I cannot prep for something I cannot predict, which kills all my prep, while they had two months too links to breath v death

**Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] set better norms.**

**Competing interps – a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate**

#### No RVI’s –

#### (a) creates a chilling effect – aff can prep a long counterinterp in the 1ar and always win(b) they’re illogical - “I’m fair vote for me” doesn’t make any sense - you dont win for meeting ur burden of being fair

Voters:

**Fairness –[a] debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Education – its why schools fund debate and has portable impacts.**

## 2

#### The 1AC’s perception of property and limitation of appropriation obliterates the subject’s transcendence of the mind, leaving them without freedoms. Property isn’t a totalizing relation that limits others access, instead Appropriation of outer space allows the subject to escape natural confines and attain freedom from their Earth prison, BUCHANAN “99

Buchanan, Ian. "Deleuze and Cultural Studies". *A Deleuzian Century?*, edited by Ian Buchanan, New York, USA: Duke University Press, 1999, pp. 103-118. [https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822395973-006 //](https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822395973-006%20//) LHP HP

According to Deleuze, association both transcends and differs frorn the imagination, which is to say, it affects the imagination. "We can now see the special ground of empiricism: nothing in the mind transcends human nature, because it is human nature that, in its principles, transcends the mind; nothing is ever transcendental." This is the basis of what Deleuze de scribes as the "coherent paradox" of Hume's philosophy: "It offers a subjectivity which transcends itself, without being any less passive." 11 The subject, in other words, is constituted in the given but also able to transcend the given. This is possible because the relation between the imagination and the principles of associatio.n operating there is dynamicP Association, then, far from being a product, which would involve an unnecessary hypostatization, is in fact "a rule of the imagination and a manifestation of its free exercise." As such, association at once guides the imagination (thereby giving it uniformity) and constrains it. It is through this relation that the imagination becomes human nature: "The mind, having become nature, has acquired now a tendency." 13 The notion of tendency is anthropological and, in this sense, humanist, since it posits an individual composed of social codes (and thus available to interrogation via those codes). But it is not fully humanist: the subject it posits is a fragmented one. Although the subject is said to have transcended itself, that does not rnean it is a transcendental subject. It does not stand outside what it organizes or makes coherent; rather, organization and coherence-made possible by the principles of association-take place in the subject, which is why the subject is fragmented. As the site of the instance of coherence referred to as subjectivity, the subject is not the principle of totalization that would supply that coherence. "Ernpirical subjectivity is constituted in the mind under the influence of principles affecting it; the mind therefore does not have the characteristics of a preexisting subject." 14 It transcends itself to the extent that the mind becomes a subject.15 "In Hume's empiricisrn, genesis is always understood in terms of principles, and itself as a principle." The subject, therefore, can only be apprehended via its constitutive principles - which must be external in order to be apprehended in themselves - and chief among these is habit: "Habit is the constitutive root of the subject." 16 The paradox of habit is that it is formed by degrees (therefore cons tituted, not constitutive) and a preformed principle of nature (therefore constitutive, not constituted). But as Deleuze shows, this implies no contradiction: the subject invents the very norms and general rules it lives by. Despite appearances, habit is not the same thing as habitus, not as Bourdieu understands the term anyway. In his formulation, habitus is an acquired "system of generative schemes" with "an infinite capacity for generating products-thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions-whose lirnits are set by the historically and socially situated conditions of its production."18 The transcendental ernpirical subject, in contrast to Bourdieu's conception, is as much the product of self-invention as it is the consequence of conforrning to an existing structure. To put it another way, in the given the subject is without agency; he or she is simply one particle among many and must rnove and sway with the ebb and flow of the social tide. To gain agency, the subject must transcend the given. How the subject does this is perhaps the most vital question we can ask of Deleuze's version of empiricism. It is the process of appropriation that enables the passively synthesized subject to become active-to self-fashion, as it were.19 By "appropriation" 1 mean precisely what Deleuze describes in reference to Artaud as the necessary effort to think. This concept of appropriation posits "uses" as creative acts. It is through the practices of everyday life-the rnultiplicity of "uses" to which social structures, the regulatory bodies that shape culture and cultural cornrnodities, the already appropriated and about to be appropriated items that combine with desire to produce a culture, are put-that the passively formed subject becornes active. The value of this pivotaI "mechanism" to cultural studies is that it is liberating, enabling the subject to particularize the universaI and, as a result, to put the so-called normative institutions which ordinarily govern his or her existence to his or her own use. Appropriation is therefore a path to freedom. 108 Jan Buchanan Prisons provide an excellent test case for this hypothesis. If it can be shown that freedom is possible, via appropriation, in a place so purposively unfree as a prison, then we can be sure that freedorn is always possible. The crucial problem for our the ory is that circumstances cannot be ignored or relegated to a secondary role. There would be nothing profound in the clairn that freedom is possible even in Auschwitz, say, if circurnstances are totally ignored. The gas chambers, the crematoria, the electrified-wire fences, the irnpossibly small bunks, the desperate lack offood, the wooden clogs that permit only clumsy hobbling-none of these circumstantial elements can be discounted or dismissed.20 But, by the sarne token, none can be said to be decisive either or we will be forced to conclude that freedom in this situation is impossible. If the prisoner is an other, then what rnust be found is a means of expressing, simultaneously, otherness as an insular identity with its own sovereign power and otherness as a deplorable state of oppression. This is, in fact, the principal utility of appropriation as an analytic rnodel: by not defining the Self in relation to an Other, it enables cultural studies to express the everyday as a dynamic and complex series of interlocking relations between existing forms and current uses (i.e., between passive forrns and active transforrnations), allowing us to theorize concomitantly-despite the law of noncontradiction-oppression and resistance. Such a facility, in turn, enables us to apprehend the fact that an imprisoned person can simultaneously conform to an imposed "foreign" order and subvert that order.21 Because the social structure defining the parameters of people's lives-oppressed or otherwise-has to be enunciated by thern in order to be actualized, it is always available to appropriation. The passively formed subject is always becoming active. When, for example, Arthur Koestler's Rubashov (in Darkness at Noon) is taken into custody, the given ofhis everyday lifè is radically altered.22 He undergoes what Deleuze and Guattari call an "incorporeal" transformation and becornes a political prisoner.23 When Rubashov says "1" in prison, he realizes the potential of the prison to turn hirn into a prisoner. In saying "1 am a prisoner," he actualizes his imprisonrnent as the given of his daily existence, but, in order to do that, he has to appropriate the language of incarceration. This is an uncertain enterprise: while appropriation can certainly be shown to lead to freedom, the freedom it results in is not constant; rather, it varies according to degrees of intensity, that is, there are diflerent modalities of freedom (a problern 1 will return Deleuze and Cultural Studies lOg to). In this respect, the interrogation scene that takes up much of the third section of the novel is revelatory. At this moment in his detention, Rubashov is able to regain agency by appropriating his interrogation, and subsequent confession, to his own existentially motivated purposes. What this means, in effect, is that while the prison and its regulations define the circurnstances of Rubashov's existence, they do not fully determine the conditions for his freedom. It becomes possible to say, now, that one is not free in prison, but that one can nevertheless achieve freedom there.

#### Thir view is a direct violation of the subject infinite potential. Each individual is dictated to have a certain identity only when they are surrounded by stable structures that force the individual to understand themselves in a single way. We must be able to interact with new spacesDELEUZE and GUITARRI 88

[Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. *A thousand plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 1988. Pg 53-55] // LHP HL

Forms relate to codes and processes of coding and decoding in the parastrata; substances, being formed matters, relate to territorialities and movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization on the epis-trata. In truth, the epistrata are just as inseparable from the movements that constitute them as the parastrata are from their processes. Nomadic waves or flows of deterritorialization go from the central layer to the periphery, then from the new center to the new periphery, falling back to the old center and launching forth to the new.16 The organization of the epistrata moves in the direction of increasing deterritorialization. Physical particles and chemical substances cross thresholds of deterritorialization on their own stratum and between strata; these thresholds correspond to more or less stable intermediate states, to more or less transitory valences and existences, to engagements with this or that other body, to densities of proximity, to more or less localizable connections. Not only are physical particles characterized by speeds of deterritorialization—Joycean tachyons, particles-holes, and quarks recalling the fundamental idea of the "soup"—but a single chemical substance (sulfur or carbon, for example) has a number of more and less deterritorialized states. The more interior milieus an organism has on its own stratum, assuring its autonomy and bringing it into a set of aleatory relations with the exterior, the more deterritorialized it is. That is why degrees of development must be understood relatively, and as a function of differential speeds, relations, and rates. Deterritorialization must be thought of as a perfectly positive power that has degrees and thresholds (epistrata), is always relative, and has reterritorialization as its flipside or complement. An organism that is deterritorialized in relation to the exterior necessarily reterritorializes on its interior milieus. A given presumed fragment of embryo is deterritorialized when it changes thresholds or gradients, but is assigned a new role by the new surroundings. Local movements are alterations. Cellular migration, stretching, invagination, folding are examples of this. Every voyage is intensive, and occurs in relation to thresholds of intensity between which it evolves or that it crosses. One travels by intensity; displacements and spatial figures depend on intensive thresholds of nomadic deterritorialization (and thus on differential relations) that simultaneously define complementary, sedentary reterritorializations. Every stratum operates this way: by grasping in its pincers a maximum number of intensities or intensive particles over which it spreads its forms and substances, constituting determinate gradients and thresholds of resonance (deterritorialization on a stratum always occurs in relation to a complementary reterritorialization).17 As long as preestablished forms were compared to predetermined degrees, all one could do was affirm their irreducibility, and there was no way of judging possible communication between the two factors. But we see now that forms depend on codes in the parastrata and plunge into processes of decoding or drift and that degrees themselves are caught up in movements of intensive territorialization and reterritorialization. There is no simple correspondence between codes and territorialities on the one hand and decodings and deterritorialization on the other: on the contrary, a code may be a deterritorialization and a reterritorialization a decoding. Wide gaps separate code and territoriality. The two factors nevertheless have the same "subject" in a stratum: it is populations that are deterritorialized and reterritorialized, and also coded and decoded. In addition, these factors communicate or interlace in the milieus. On the one hand, modifications of a code have an aleatory cause in the milieu of exteriority, and it is their effects on the interior milieus, their compatibility with them, that decide whether they will be popularized. Deterritorializations and reterritorializations do not bring about the modifications; they do, however, strictly determine their selection. On the other hand, every modification has an associated milieu that in turn entails a certain deterritorialization in relation to the milieu of exteriority and a certain reterritorialization on intermediate or interior milieus. Perceptions and actions in an associated milieu, even those on a molecular level, construct or produce territorial signs (indexes). This is especially true of an animal world, which is constituted, marked off by signs that divide it into zones (of shelter, hunting, neutrality, etc.), mobilize special organs, and correspond to fragments of code; this is so even at the margin of decoding inherent in the code. Even the domain of learning is defined by the code, or prescribed by it. But indexes or territorial signs are inseparable from a double movement. Since the associated milieu always confronts a milieu of exteriority with which the animal is engaged and in which it takes necessary risks, a line of flight must be preserved to enable the animal to regain its associated milieu when danger appears (for example, the bull's line of flight in the arena, which it uses to regain the turf it has chosen).18 A second kind of line of flight arises when the associated milieu is rocked by blows from the exterior, forcing the animal to abandon it and strike up an association with new portions of exteriority, this time leaning on its interior milieus like fragile crutches. When the seas dried, the primitive Fish left its associated milieu to explore land, forced to "stand on its own legs," now carrying water only on the inside, in the amniotic membranes protecting the embryo. In one way or the other, the animal is more a fleer than a fighter, but its flights are also conquests, creations. Territorialities, then, are shot through with lines of flight testifying to the presence within them of movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization. In a certain sense, they are secondary. They would be nothing without these movements that deposit them. In short, the epistrata and parastrata are continually moving, sliding, shifting, and changing on the Ecumenon or unity of composition of a stratum; some are swept away by lines of flight and movements of deterritorialization, others by processes of decoding or drift, but they all communicate at the intersection of the milieus. The strata are continually being shaken by phenomena of cracking and rupture, either at the level of the substrata that furnish the materials (a prebiotic soup, a prechemical soup ...), at the level of the accumulating epistrata, or at the level of the abutting parastrata: everywhere there arise simultaneous accelerations and blockages, comparative speeds, differences in deterritorialization creating relative fields of reterritorialization.

#### Alternative is to interrogate the stable concept of the subject in favor of alignment with the Body without Organs. The Body without Organs is the exact moments a subject has infinite potential to become anything they may wish. The Alternative allows the subject to exist in society independent of social constructs such as gender, class, and nationality that have previously composed the stable subject, SMITH 18

[Smith, Daniel. "What is the body without organs? Machine and organism in Deleuze and Guattari." *Continental Philosophy Review* 51.1 (2018): 95-110.] // LHP HL

As scholars have noted, the body without organs (sometimes abbreviated to BwO) is a somewhat confusing term, because it does not describe ‘‘a body deprived of organs,’’ as the term seems to indicate, but rather ‘‘an assemblage of organs freed from the supposedly ‘natural’ or ‘instinctual’ organization that makes it an organism.’’43 As Deleuze and Guattari put it, for the body without organs, the ‘‘enemy’’ is not the organs, but the organism, the particular arrangement and configuration of the organs.44 The body without organs is supposed to designate all of those things that an organic body could do, but that it is prevented from doing because of its homeostatic self-regulation processes. The body without organs is the full set of capacities or potentialities of a body prior to its being given the structure of an organism, which only limits and constrains what it can do: it is ‘‘what remains when you take everything away.’’45 As they ask in A Thousand Plateaus: Is it really so sad and dangerous to be fed up with seeing with your eyes, breathing with your lungs, swallowing with your mouth, talking with your tongue, thinking with your brain, having an anus and larynx, head and legs? Why not walk on your head, sing with your sinuses, see through your skin, breathe with your belly?46 The injunction here is to use our bodies and our organs in ways which are not in thrall to the overarching plan of the organism, to put them to work doing things other than those for which they were designed. In short, to treat them as machines capable of producing ‘‘events.’’ The organism, then, can be defined as being a certain way in which the body without organs is ‘‘captured,’’ one which restricts its capacities, and constrains it: ‘‘the BwO howls: ‘They’ve made me an organism! They’ve wrongfully folded me! They’ve stolen my body!’’’47 Of course, ‘‘organisms’’ are not the only way in which the body without organs can be ‘‘captured,’’ and in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari analyse a number of other ‘‘strata’’ which impose their own forms on it and limit its capacities.48 The fact that there are other ‘‘strata’’ helps to explain their otherwise puzzling comment that the body without organs is not an ideal, unattainable point, but something we are attaining all the time.49 One example is the human face, the subject of an entire chapter of A Thousand Plateaus. It is clear that the face is not wholly subordinated to organic functions: we use it to express our emotions, we treat it as an aesthetic object, we use it for communication, and so on. In fact, if one believes the early Levinas, the human face opens us to the very possibility of ethics.50 All of these functions have nothing to do with the head qua organism, and would not have been made possible had the face not first been ‘‘freed’’ from its relation with the organic body and its place within this hierarchy of its system. It is in this sense that the face ‘‘removes the head from the stratum of the organism,’’ and thereby frees it to be used in different ways.51 Thus, rather than following the conservative tendencies of the organism that always pull it back towards the statistically normal, relegating everything that falls beyond this range to the register of the ‘‘pathological,’’ Deleuze and Guattari recommend a kind of experimentation whose ultimate goal is the event, that is, the production of something new. And as we saw in the first section, the production of an event changes even the thing that produced the event in the first place, so that the organic body will not remain the same after it has made itself into a body without organs. We humans are able to carry out this kind of experimentation because, as Canguilhem notes, we are fortunate enough to have a surfeit of organs: ‘‘too many kidneys, too many lungs, too much parathyroid, too much pancreas, even too much brain, if human life were limited to the vegetative life.’’52 Pathological states thus arise not when we use our bodies in ways that make us deviate from the statistical norm, or when we make use of our organs in ways which take them beyond the range of possibilities considered ‘‘normal’’ by the organism, but only when our ‘‘experimentation’’ goes too far, reaching the point where, instead of increasing our capacities, it reduces them, and prevents us from creating something new.53 Now that we have explored Deleuze and Guattari’s modifications to the concepts of ‘‘machine’’ and ‘‘organism,’’ let us briefly summarize our findings. Whereas we usually think that machines are defined by their substance, that is, the way in which they are constructed, the form which they take, Deleuze and Guattari understand them according to what they do. As they write, a machine should be understood ‘‘by function, not by form’’ (recall the example of the knife-rest: understanding it as a machine means understanding what it is used for, not its geometric properties).54 Whereas we usually think that organisms are defined by what they do, that is, by their behaviors, by the kinds of activities they carry out, Deleuze and Guattari instead understand them according to their structure. As we saw in the distinction between ‘‘analogy’’ and ‘‘homology,’’ what makes organisms similar to one another has nothing to do with their function. Rather, comparisons should be based on morphology, that is to say the virtual schema out of which the body emerged. In other words, an organism should be understood by form, not by function (recall the example of the bat wing: understanding it as an organism means understanding the order and connection of it bones, not what it is used for).55 Further, in both cases, there is no substantial link between the form it has and the function it carries out one can no more deduce the function of a bat’s wing from its morphology than one can deduce the function of a knife-rest from its geometrical properties.56 There is something like a priority of creation in Deleuze and Guattari, a preference for the new, which leads them away from what might otherwise appear to be a kind of symmetry between the two concepts (function not form vs. form not function), towards a valorization of the idea of the machine, and a strong criticism of the idea of the organism. This leads, first, to an asymmetry between the scope of the two concepts: whereas their idea of ‘‘machine’’ is supposed to be universal (everything is a machine), their idea of ‘‘organism’’ is restricted to a certain kind of body. But perhaps more importantly, it also leads them to a different understanding of the relation between the two terms, centered on their concept of the ‘‘body without organs.’’ Their non-mechanical mechanism, which is also a vitalism of the inorganic, highlights not the form or structure that bodies actually have, but rather the virtual capacities that bodies have to do something different. A body may be structured like an organism, but, since its organs are all machines, it will always retain the capacity to ‘‘disarticulate,’’ as they put it, to cease to be an organism. The body without organs, then, can be defined as the becoming-machine of the organism; it is what happens when one part of the body enters into combination with some other machine in a way which allows it to escape from the organism’s regularizing, normalizing processes. Seen in this way, the body previously considered an organism is opened up to a whole host of new connections, each of which may lead to the production of an event.

#### The Role of the Ballot is to interrogate the image of thought, the current figure of thought that manipulates the subject into conforming with societies demand, such as the capitalist image yelling, “Work or die!”. Vote for the debater which better presents methods to question structures of limitation and oppression against the individual, it is only from this ROB can we move away from structures such as whiteness and settler innocence and resist oppressive mindsets that hold us all captive by dictating thought, DRONSFIELD 12

Dronsfield, Jonathan. "Deleuze and the image of thought." Philosophy Today 56.4 (2012): 404-414. // LHP HL

The image of thought is Deleuze’s characteri- sation of what comes before thinking: that which philosophy implicitly presupposes and explicitly projects, a pre-philosophical and natural and hence dogmatic image of what thinking is. The dogmatic image supposes that what thought wants, wants both materially and wilfully, is the true. Morality leads us to presuppose this. It is pre-supposed in the sense that everybody knows what it means to think, as though it were common sense. We all have this common picture of what it means to think. It’s an image in which subject and object and being and beings are already assigned their proper place and relation one to the other. And so long as philosophy holds to this image it does not matter what it goes on to think conceptu- ally. If the image of thought guides the creation of concepts then those concepts will be part of the same image projected. Moreover, it is the suppo- sition of a natural capacity to think in this way that permits philosophy to claim to begin without suppositions. It is a supposition which is en- dowed with the power to undercut the conditions of the present moment and its attendant perver- sions. It is not a particular image of thought that worries Deleuze; it’s that thought is pre-con- ceived as an “image in general.” This is philoso- phy’s subjective presupposition and the frame of Deleuze’s critique. “Nous ne parlons pas de telle ou telle image de la pensée,” he says, “variable suivant les philosophies, mais d’une seule Image en général qui constitue le présupposé subjectif de la philosophie dans son ensemble.”5 Part of the image, its stance as it were, is that thought is construed as “naturally upright.” “Up- right” here means proper and good-willed. Thought is upright because it is the possession of the subject. As the unity of the faculties it reduces every other faculty to modes of the subject. Be- cause thinking is subjective in this way the sub- ject’s model of thought is recognition. The fac- ulty of sensibility can grasp only that which can be recognised by all the other faculties in the sub- jective act of recognition. When thinking is mod- elled on recognition, that which can be recog- nised is a reflection of the subject. The subject for whom recognition is the model of thought is filled with no more than an image of itself. Thought is left with no means of grasping that which cannot be recognised, at least whilst it remains erect and standing. But Deleuze makes clear that it is not a ques- tion of opposing “another image” to the dogmatic image of thought. Even the schizophrenic cannot be imaged, because the schizophrenic becomes a possibility for thought and is “revealed as such” only through the “abolition” of the dogmatic im- age.6 Deleuze is unequivocal then about the ne- cessity of theorising a thinking without image. Deleuze’s thought must be measured by the ex- tent to which it thinks without image. Its new- ness, its “répétition authentique,” will be its thinking without image. Indeed, so rigorous would the denunciation of the image as non-phi- losophy be that it would yield the prize of “the greatest destructions and demoralisations,” so obstinate would a thought without image be that it would have no ally but paradox, having re- nounced both representation and common sense, so original would a thinking purged of the image be that thought could finally begin to think. But thought can only begin, and it is this that would allow it continually to begin again, only when liberated from the image and its postulates.7 If representation for Deleuze is a transcendental il- lusion in which thought is “covered over” [se recouvre] by an image, it implies that in over- coming representation the image must be re- moved t;hought is only “uncovered” once the shroud of the image is taken down.8 The insistence that thought can and should happen “without images” extends even to valo- rising creator-writers, writers who are creators before they are authors, as “blind.” Deleuze’s self-understanding in the form of his “dialogue” with Claire Parnet in 1977, a dialogue which is no way an encounter because in it we recognise a Deleuze pre-given and decided, figures the likes of Nietzsche and Proust not as authors but as cre- ators, creators precisely because they are not au- thors. For as soon as the designation “author” is made, thought is once again determined as an im- age [“qu’on soumet la pensée à une image”], and writing made an activity of life.9 Creation is en- counter, in which the writer encounters himself, and a writing which because it is its own life ne- cessitates that reading be an act of creation. Such encounters are “acts of thought without image,” and at once both blind and blinding [“aussi bien aveugles qu’aveuglants”]10—a thought blind to itself, and one which refuses to form itself as an image which might enable it to be visible. It is the imperceptible, it is that which dwells in the dark- est regions. This is not to argue for a thought no longer subject to recognition and representation, but to a thought no longer determinable as an im- age as such. It is as if an image can only order, or- der correct ideas rooted in goodwill and recogni- tion and governed by an origin of representation and the already decided. And what philosopher would not hope to set up an image of thought that no longer presupposes goodwill and a pre-medi- tated decision? But philosophy is too much on the side of friendship to achieve this.11 In place of the image of thought “rooted” in such postulates Deleuze instates a thinking in which the passional, aimless and horizontal line will be favoured over the natural and upright stance, a thinking always already begun, with its beginning in the repetition of a beginning again. Thinking becomes no longer a natural capacity we all possess but an activity some of us are forced into doing by that which we do not recog- nise but sense; moreover sense in a way which differentiates the faculty of sensibility from all other faculties, indeed brings it into discord with them whilst at the same time confronting them with their own limits. That which cannot be re- cognised has neither form nor figure, yet it “stares” at us. It “stares” at us, but “sans yeux.”12 The thought without image is a ground. It is the ground that an individual brings to the surface, or we might have to say raises to eye-level, the level of the eye-line of the one stared at—if, that is, that otherness is to be encountered and bring us into question—without being able to give the ground form, the ground that draws the eye from out of the body to it, a ground which “penetrates” thought with its stare, “the unrecognised in every recognition.” And that ground will be what al- lows for a metamorphosis productive of the new. For instance habit, the foundation of habit, will be metamorphosed into the failure of habitus, leading to the expulsion of agency in favour of a new individuality, an agency in the condition of continual expulsion. It is a ground which must be turned and brought to the surface, re-turned and repeated as surface, for only then will it be meta- morphosed. Recognition is defeated only if the ground is turned or “bent” [“coudé”] such that what it grounds it relates to the groundless.13 The thought without image is that which stares, even without eyes, “blind and blinding,” from within the imperceptible, and this thought is the ground- lessness of the ground. The question then arises, how is this ground turned and brought to the surface? We envisage the following answer: by the step, underfoot, by the walk of the one metamorphosed.

## FW

#### [1] Death is not the ultimate impact, its simply the other half of life’s dialectic, --A] falling out of life and into death just constitutes potential for more relations and engagements within assemblages to fill the void [b] Using Util in public entites will never conclude anything as they will all disagree onf whats pleasurable or painful

#### [2] On Bostrom struff: NO extinction first –A] Infinite side constraints – any action has a possibility of leading to extinction –B] Extinction of ethics is inevitable under cap, passive affection overwhelms us into determinism, –C] Extinction first has been used as a conservative framing issue against deterritorialization –D] Extinction has already happened; terror and horror of extinction is the same as major structures who have committed genocide and how various form of minorities have already disappeared off of the world, --E] moral uncertainty is useless, resolving moral dilemmas is frivolous, individuals will not just magically conform to an imaginary truth and boo yah become perfectly moral –

## Case

#### They explain how Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

#### They say, Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise, so the plan is seen as a complete 180

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Turn - Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### [a] They claim China will long-term outspace the US in space like they claim, it delinks this means they have no competition.

#### [b] If only scarcity and ilaw makes US competition inevitable it means that there is no way to solve and its Non – Unique

#### [c] China wants to go to space so they can just publicly do it and it still leads to competition

#### [d] US and China going to war menas that US should stop publicly appropriating using NASA means that both public and private us bad, so we have to look at private

#### [e] Their Brands evidence turns themselves space comp will ultimately leave to heg, but if heg is good it will not collpase, if its bad it will collapse as its weaker if its corrupt because people don’t like it No impact

#### [f] China becoming heg solves it leads to less lower class as its communist so net better than US. China has a military leading to heg – if not then Us will always be above

#### [g] No impact – if there is no hegemony than there is no reason to be violent and secure war

#### Second Advocacy

#### [1] No evidence explaining that China is careless rather it explains that general careless ness is bad.

#### [2] Debri collisions are not high nothing has happened yet

#### [1] Debris collisions happen even without private appropriation. States have been putting satellites into space for decades and will continue to in the world of the affirmative. That means the affirmative cannot solve for space debris – launches happen either way. So, only the negative’s impacts matter in this round – they outweigh on probability and solvency.