# 1N

#### Permissibility negates if everything is permissible then it’s impossible to say something is unjust because it’s just permissible, unjust is different from necessary

## 1 – Alienation

Subjectivity is naturally productive and conscious, entailing creative productivity. Wartenberg 82’

“"Species-Being" and "Human Nature" in Marx” by Thomas E. Wartenberg Human Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1982) p.79-80 LHP AM

The central point that Marx makes is that it is through productive activity that human beings actualize themselves as human beings. This means that it is not thought per se or a contemplative life that constitutes the good for human beings. Rather, it is our ability to structure the material world in accordance with our own purposes that is distinctive about human beings. Of course, thought is one of the necessary ingredients for such self-realization. Marx always talks of activity in accordance with a conscious plan as the specifically human good. But the key aspect of this assertion is Marx’s replacement of “thought” by “labor” as the central concept for understanding the human good. Rather than seeing labor as only a brutal necessity forced upon human beings by their animal natures that they would be glad to be rid of, Marx sees labor as a “positive, creative activity” (Marx, 1973, p. 614). Indeed, in criticizing Adam Smith in the Grundrisse, Marx makes this point explicitly in language almost identical to that he uses in the Manuscripts. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating process—and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits—hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labor (Marx, 1973, p. 611). Marx’s use of “labor” as being the distinctive capacity of the human species is striking. It involves not a simple rejection of the tradition’s stress on thought, but rather a generalization of that notion. For Marx is claiming that the tradition has focused on one particular form that “free conscious activity” can take, namely that of contemplation. What is required is a generalization of that notion into an appropriate categorical structure that will still provide us with a view of the distinctively human character. In Marx’s view, here as elsewhere, it is Hegel who managed to do this, even if he conceived of the truth in a mystified way. The importance of Hegel’s Phenomenology and its final result—the dialectic of negativity as the moving and producing principle—lies in the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object, as alienation and as supersession of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the nature of labor and conceives objective man—true, because real man, --as the result of this own labor (Marx, 1974, pp. 385-386). Thus, it is Hegel who, according to Marx, first sees the human being[is] as essentially a laboring creature. Hegel is misled, however, because he recognizes “only the positive and not the negate side of labor.” It remains for Marx to make the final adjustments that will allow this truth to emerge in all its centrality. In thus identifying labor as constitutive of the human essence, Marx radically reconceptualizes the philosophic tradition’s stress on contemplation as the most distinctively human activity. By no longer singling out one form of activity as that most fit for human beings, Marx achieves a “democratization” of theory. No longer can we see a person as better than another simply because of the type of activity he/she chooses to pursue. Rather, we can see conscious activity itself as [is]human and, in an egalitarian assumption, something to be valued for its own sake.

#### AND the structure of the will is intrinsic and is a pre-req to all ethical theories:

#### [1] Subjectivity – The will and the capacity to question our will defines the subject & what is intrinsic to it. That means the will is intrinsic and when evaluating subjectivity we must evaluate the subject’s relation to the will.

#### [2] Proceduralism – The agent uses the will to engage in everything, which means being able to will is an intrinsic good under every ethical theory regardless of content and a pre-requisite to their ethical theory

#### [3] Morality – Expression of the will is how we arrive at moral truth; it enables us to weigh between arguments & situations to find the best one. Controls the internal link to their ethical theory

#### Therefore my standard is consistency with the structure of the will.

#### [1] Appropriation is the process through which the subject exerts the will on the world and therefore, constitutes itself as a being with will, Jaeggi

Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/ // LHP AB

What does it mean to appropriate something? 12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession. 13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own . Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are constantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept: the possibility of appropriating something refers, on the one hand, to a subject’s power to act and form and to impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent meaning and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (Thus a role, for example, in order to be appropriated, must always be “found” as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is formable, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, “I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate.” 14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of re appropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creatio ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a successful appropriation of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them

#### Therefore, all roles, including social roles, only exist as they are appropriated – you cannot separate the appropriator from the appropriated; they both define each other; this means the subject only exists as appropriated. Doing the affirmative destroys the subjectivity insofar as they unilaterally say apprporiation is bad when cases of it are essential to formulating the subject. Hijacks Kant – even if the will is important, only alienation takes the will’s interactions with the outside world into account. You can add an a priori here if you want.