# 1N vs Debris

## 1 – Xi DA

#### Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

**Mitter and Johnson 21** [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, [Rana Mitter](https://hbr.org/search?term=rana%20mitter&search_type=search-all) is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. [Elsbeth Johnson](https://hbr.org/search?term=elsbeth%20johnson&search_type=search-all), formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, [https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21](https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china%20accessed%2012/14/21)] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.

China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to [innovate](https://hbr.org/2011/06/what-the-west-doesnt-get-about-china). It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.

Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

#### Xi has committed to the commercial space industry as the linchpin of China’s rise – the plan is seen as a complete 180

**Patel 21** [Neel V. Patel, Neel is a space reporter for MIT Technology Review. 1-21-2021, "China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US," MIT Technology Review, <https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/> accessed 12/14/21] Adam

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called [Document 60](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/www.cpppc.org/en/zy/994006.jhtml) that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a[2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/e/ev/evaluation-of-chinas-commercial-space-sector/d-10873.ashx). More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it [released the first images taken by the satellite](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/spacenews.com/spacety-releases-first-sar-images/), Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

Making friends

The most critical strategic reason to encourage a private space sector is to create opportunities for international collaboration—particularly to attract customers wary of being seen to mix with the Chinese government. (US agencies and government contractors, for example, are barred from working with any groups the regime funds.) Document 60 and others issued by China’s National Development and Reform Commission were aimed not just at promoting technological innovation, but also at drawing in foreign investment and maximizing a customer base beyond Chinese borders.

“China realizes there are certain things they cannot get on their own,” says Frans von der Dunk, a space policy expert at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln. Chinese companies like LandSpace and MinoSpace have worked to accrue funding through foreign investment, escaping dependence on state subsidies. And by avoiding state funding, a company can also avoid an array of restrictions on what it can and can’t do (such as constraints on talking with the media). Foreign investment also makes it easier to compete on a global scale: you’re taking on clients around the world, launching from other countries, and bringing talent from outside China.

Although China is taking inspiration from the US in building out its private industry, the nature of the Chinese state also means these new companies face obstacles that their rivals in the West don’t have to worry about. While Chinese companies may look private on paper, they must still submit to government guidance and control, and accept some level of interference. It may be difficult for them to make a case to potential overseas customers that they are independent. The distinction between companies that are truly private and those that are more or less state actors is still quite fuzzy, especially if the government is a frequent customer. “That could still lead to a lack of trust from other partners,” says Goswami. It doesn’t help that the government itself is often [very cagey about what its national program is even up to](https://archive.md/o/bc9l4/https:/www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-54076895).

And Hines adds that it’s not always clear exactly how separate these companies are from, say, the People’s Liberation Army, given the historical ties between the space and defense sectors. “Some of these things will pose significant hurdles for the commercial space sector as it tries to expand,” he says.

#### Shifts in regime perception threatens CCP’s legitimacy from nationalist hardliners

Weiss 19 Jessica Weiss 1-29-2019 “Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China” <http://www.jessicachenweiss.com/uploads/3/0/6/3/30636001/19-01-24-elite-statements-isq-ca.pdf> (Associate Professor of Government at Cornell University)//Elmer

Public support—or the appearance of it—matters to many autocracies. As Ithiel de Sola Pool writes, modern dictatorships are “highly conscious of public opinion and make major efforts to affect it.”6 Mao Zedong told his comrades: “When you make revolution, you must first manage public opinion.”7 Because autocracies often rely on **nationalist mythmaking**,8 success or failure in defending the national honor in international crises could burnish the leadership’s patriotic credentials or spark opposition. **Shared outrage at the regime’s foreign policy failures could galvanize street protests or elite fissures, creating intraparty upheaval** or inviting military officers to step in to restore order. Fearing a domestic backlash, authoritarian leaders may feel compelled to take a tough international stance. Although authoritarian leaders are rarely held accountable to public opinion through free and fair elections, fears of popular unrest and irregular ouster often weigh heavily on autocrats seeking to maximize their tenure in office. Considering the harsh consequences that authoritarian elites face if pushed out of office, even a small increase in the probability of ouster could alter authoritarian incentives in international crises.9 A history of nationalist uprisings make Chinese citizens and leaders especially aware of the linkage between international disputes and domestic unrest. The weakness of the PRC’s predecessor in defending Chinese sovereignty at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 galvanized protests and a general strike, forcing the government to sack three officials and reject the Treaty of Versailles, which awarded territories in China to Japan. These precedents have made Chinese officials particularly sensitive to the appearance of hewing to public opinion. As the People’s Daily chief editor wrote: “History and reality have shown us that public opinion and regime safety are inseparable.”10 One Chinese scholar even claimed: “the Chinese government probably knows the public’s opinion better and reacts to it more directly than even the U.S. government.”11

#### Xi will launch diversionary war to domestic backlash – escalates in multiple hotspots

Norris 17, William J. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges. CFR Discussion Paper, 2017. (Associate professor of Chinese foreign and security policy at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service)//Elmer

Populist pressures might tempt the **party leadership** to encourage **diversionary nationalism**. The logic of this concern is straightforward: the Communist Party might seek to **distract a restless domestic population** with **adventurism abroad**.19 The **Xi** administration wants to **appear tough** in its **defense of foreign encroachments** against China’s interests. This need stems from a long-running narrative about how a weak Qing dynasty was unable to defend China in the face of European imperial expansion, epitomized by the Opium Wars and the subsequent treaties imposed on China in the nineteenth century. The party is **particularly sensitive** to **perceptions of weakness** because much of its **claim to legitimacy**—manifested in **Xi’s Chinese Dream** campaign today—stems from the party’s claims of leading the **restoration of Chinese greatness**. For example, the May Fourth Movement, a popular protest in 1919 that helped catalyze the CPC, called into question the legitimacy of the Republic of China government running the country at that time because the regime was seen as not having effectively defended China’s territorial and sovereignty interests at the Versailles Peace Conference. **Diversionary nationalist frictions** would likely occur if the Chinese leadership portrayed a foreign adversary as having made the first move, thus forcing Xi to stand up for China’s interests. An example is the 2012 attempt by the nationalist governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, to buy the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands from a private owner.20 Although the Japanese central government sought to avert a crisis by stepping in to purchase the islands—having them bought and administered by Ishihara’s Tokyo metropolitan government would have dragged Japan into a confrontation with China—China saw this move as part of a deliberate orchestration by Japan to nationalize the islands. Xi seemingly had no choice but to defend China’s claims against an attempt by Japan to consolidate its position on the dispute.21 This issue touched off a period of heated tensions between China and Japan, lasting more than two years.22 Such dynamics are not limited to Japan. Other possible areas of conflict include, but are not necessarily limited to, **Taiwan**, **India**, and the **South China Sea** (especially with the **Philippines** and **Vietnam**). The Chinese government will use such tactics if it believes that the costs are relatively low. Ideally, China would like to appear tough while avoiding material repercussions or a serious diplomatic breakdown. Standing up against foreign encroachment—without facing much blowback—could provide Xi’s administration with a tempting source of noneconomic legitimacy. However, over the next few years, Xi will probably not be actively looking to get embroiled abroad. Cushioning the fallout from slower growth while managing a structural economic transition will be difficult enough. Courting potential international crises that distract the central leadership would make this task even more daunting. Even if the top leadership did not wish to provoke conflict, a smaller budgetary allotment for security could cause **military interests** in China to **deliberately instigate trouble** to **justify** their **claims over increasingly scarce resources**. For example, an air force interested in ensuring its funding for a midair tanker program might find the existence of far-flung territorial disputes to be useful in making its case. Such a case would be made even stronger by a pattern of recent frictions that highlights the necessity of greater air power projection. Budgetary pressures may be partly behind a recent People’s Liberation Army reorganization and headcount reduction. A slowing economy might cause a further deceleration in China’s military spending, thus increasing such pressures as budgetary belts tighten. Challenges to Xi’s Leadership Xi Jinping’s efforts to address economic challenges could fail, unleashing consequences that extend well beyond China’s economic health. For example, an **economic collapse** could give rise to a Vladimir **Putin–like redemption figure** in China. Xi’s approach of centralizing authority over a diverse, complex, and massive social, political, and economic system is a **recipe for brittleness**. Rather than designing a resilient, decentralized governance structure that can gracefully cope with localized failures at particular nodes in a network, a highly centralized architecture **risks catastrophic**, **system-level failure**. Although centralized authority offers the tantalizing chimera of stronger control from the center, it also puts all the responsibility squarely on Xi’s shoulders. With China’s ascension to great power status, the consequences of internecine domestic political battles are increasingly playing out on the world stage. The international significance of China’s domestic politics is a new paradigm for the Chinese leadership, and one can expect an adjustment period during which the outcome of what had previously been relatively insulated domestic political frictions will likely generate **unintended international repercussions**. Such dynamics will influence Chinese foreign policy and security behavior. Domestic arguments over ideology, bureaucratic power struggles, and strategic direction could all have **ripple effects abroad**. Many of China’s party heavyweights still employ a narrow and exclusively domestic political calculus. Such behavior increases the possibility of international implications that are not fully anticipated, **raising the risks** of **strategic miscalculation** on the world stage. For example, the factional power struggles that animated the Cultural Revolution were largely driven by domestic concerns, yet manifested themselves in Chinese foreign policy for more than a decade. During this period, China was not the world’s second largest economy and, for much of this time, did not even have formal representation at the United Nations. If today’s globally interconnected China became engulfed in similar domestic chaos, the effects would be felt worldwide.23 Weakened Fetters of Economic Interdependence If China successfully transitioned away from its export-driven growth model toward a consumption-driven economic engine over the next four or five years, it could no longer feel as constrained by economic interdependence. To the extent that such constraints are loosened, the U.S.-China relationship will be more prone to conflict and friction.24 While China has never been the archetypal liberal economic power bent on benign integration with the global economy, its export-driven growth model produced a strong strategic preference for stability. Although past behavior is not necessarily indicative of future strategic calculus, China’s “economic circuit breaker” logic seems to have held its most aggressive nationalism below the threshold of war since 1979. A China that is both comparatively strong and less dependent on the global economy would be a novel development in modern geopolitics. As China changes the composition of its international economic linkages, global integration could place fewer constraints on it. Whereas China has been highly reliant on the import of raw materials and semifinished goods for reexport, a consumption-driven China could have a different international trade profile. China could still rely on imported goods, but their centrality to the country’s overall economic growth would be altered. Imports of luxury goods, consumer products, international brands, and services may not exert a significant constraining influence, since loss of access to such items may not be seen as strategically vital. If these flows were interrupted or jeopardized, the result would be more akin to an inconvenience than a strategic setback for China’s rise. That said, China is likely to continue to highly depend on imported oil even if the economic end to which that energy resource is directed shifts away from industrial and export production toward domestic consumption.

#### US–China war goes nuclear – crisis mis-management ensures conventional escalation - extinction

Kulacki 20 [Dr. Gregory Kulacki focuses on cross-cultural communication between the United States and China on nuclear and space arms control and is the China Project Manager for the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2020. Would China Use Nuclear Weapons First In A War With The United States?, Thediplomat.com, https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/would-china-use-nuclear-weapons-first-in-a-war-with-the-united-states/] srey

Admiral Charles A. Richard, the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, recently told the Senate Armed Service Committee he “could drive a truck” through the holes in China’s no first use policy. But when Senator John Hawley (R-MO) asked him why he said that, Commander Richard backtracked, described China’s policy as “very opaque” and said his assessment was based on “very little” information. That’s surprising. **China** has been exceptionally **clear** **about** its **intentions** **on** the possible **first** **use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons**. On the day of its first nuclear test on October 16, 1964, China declared it “will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.” That **unambiguous** **statement** **has** **been** a **cornerstone** **of** **Chinese** **nuclear** **weapons** policy for 56 years and has been repeated frequently in authoritative Chinese publications for domestic and international audiences, including a highly classified training manual for the operators of China’s nuclear forces. Richard should know about those publications, particularly the training manual. A U.S. Department of Defense translation has been circulating within the U.S. nuclear weapons policy community for more than a decade. The commander’s comments to the committee indicate a familiarity with the most controversial section of the manual, which, in the eyes of some U.S. analysts, indicates there may be some circumstances where **China** **would** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **first** **in** a **war** **with** **the** **U**nited **S**tates. This U.S. misperception is understandable, especially given the difficulties the Defense Department encountered translating the text into English. The language, carefully considered in the context of the entire book, articulates a strong reaffirmation of China’s no first use policy. But it also reveals **Chinese** military planners are **struggling** **with** **crisis** **management** **and** **considering** **steps** **that** could **create** **ambiguity** **with** **disastrous** **consequences**. Towards the end of the 405-page text on the operations of China’s strategic rocket forces, in a chapter entitled, “Second Artillery Deterrence Operations,” the authors explain what China’s nuclear forces train to do if **“**a strong military power possessing nuclear‐armed missiles and an absolute advantage in high‐tech conventional weapons is carrying out intense and continuous attacks against our major strategic targets and we have no good military strategy to resist the enemy.**”** The military power they’re talking about is the United States. The authors indicate China’s nuclear missile forces train to take specific steps, including increasing readiness and conducting launch exercises, to “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks.” The manual refers to these steps as an “adjustment” to China’s nuclear policy and a “lowering” of China’s threshold for brandishing its nuclear forces. Chinese leaders would only take these steps in extreme circumstances. The text highlights several triggers such as U.S. conventional bombing of China’s nuclear and hydroelectric power plants, heavy conventional bombing of large cities like Beijing and Shanghai, or other acts of **conventional** **warfare** **that** “**seriously** **threatened**” the “safety and **survival**” of the nation. U.S. Misunderstanding Richard seems to believe this planned adjustment in China’s nuclear posture means China is **preparing** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** first under these circumstances. He told Hawley that there are a “number of situations where they may conclude that first use has occurred that do not meet our definition of first use.” The head of the U.S. Strategic Command appears to assume, as do other U.S. analysts, that the **Chinese** would **interpret** **these** types of U.S. conventional **attacks** **as** **equivalent** **to** a **U.S. first use** **of** **nuclear** **weapons** against China. But that’s not what the text says. “Lowering the threshold” refers to China putting its nuclear weapons on alert — it does not indicate Chinese leaders might lower their threshold for deciding to use nuclear weapons in a crisis. Nor does the text indicate Chinese nuclear forces are training to launch nuclear weapons first in a war with the United States. China, unlike the United States, keeps its nuclear forces off-alert. Its warheads are not mated to its missiles. China’s nuclear-armed submarines are not continuously at sea on armed patrols. The manual describes how China’s nuclear warheads and the missiles that deliver them are controlled by two separate chains of command. Chinese missileers train to bring them together and launch them after China has been attacked with nuclear weapons. All of these behaviors are consistent with a no first use policy. The “adjustment” Chinese nuclear forces are preparing to make if the United States is bombing China with impunity is to place China’s nuclear forces in a state of readiness similar to the state the nuclear forces of the United States are in all the time. This step is intended not only to end the bombing, but also to convince U.S. decision-makers they cannot expect to destroy China’s nuclear retaliatory capability if the crisis escalates. Chinese Miscalculation Unfortunately, alerting Chinese nuclear forces at such a moment could have terrifying consequences. Given the relatively small size of China’s nuclear force, a U.S. president might be tempted to try to limit the possible damage from a Chinese nuclear attack by destroying as many of China’s nuclear weapons as possible before they’re launched, especially if the head of the U.S. Strategic Command told the president China was preparing to strike first. One study concluded that if the United States used nuclear weapons to attempt to knock out a small fraction of the Chinese ICBMs that could reach the United States it may kill tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The authors of the text assume alerting China’s nuclear forces would “create a great shock in the enemy’s psyche.” That’s a fair assumption. But they also assume this shock could “dissuade the continuation of the strong enemy’s conventional attacks against our major strategic targets.” That’s highly questionable. There is a **substantial** **risk** **the** **U**nited **S**tates **would** **respond** **to** this implicit **Chinese** **threat** **to** **use** **nuclear** **weapons** **by** **escalating**, rather than halting, its **conventional** **attacks**. If China’s nuclear forces were targeted, it would put even greater strain on the operators of China’s nuclear forces. A **slippery** **slope** **to** **nuclear** **war** Chinese military planners are aware that attempting to coerce the United States into halting conventional bombardment by alerting their nuclear forces could fail. They also know it might trigger a nuclear war. But if it does, they are equally clear China won’t be the one to start it. Nuclear attack is often preceded by nuclear coercion. Because of this, in the midst of the process of a high, strong degree of nuclear coercion we should prepare well for a nuclear retaliatory attack. The more complete the preparation, the higher the credibility of nuclear coercion, the easier it is to accomplish the objective of nuclear coercion, and the lower the possibility that the nuclear missile forces will be used in actual fighting. They assume if China demonstrates it is well prepared to retaliate the United States would not risk a damage limitation strike using nuclear weapons. And even if the United States were to attack China’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons, China still would not strike first. In the opening section of the next chapter on “nuclear retaliatory attack operations” the manual instructs, as it does on numerous occasions throughout the entire text: According to our country’s principle, its stand of no first use of nuclear weapons, the Second Artillery will carry out a nuclear missile attack against the enemy’s important strategic targets, according to the combat orders of the Supreme Command, only after the enemy has carried out a nuclear attack against our country. Richard is wrong. There are no holes in China’s no first use policy. But the worse-case planning articulated in this highly classified military text is a significant and deeply troubling departure from China’s traditional thinking about the role of nuclear weapons. Mao Zedong famously called nuclear weapons “a paper tiger.” Many assumed he was being cavalier about the consequences of nuclear war. But what he meant is that they would not be used to fight and win wars. U.S. nuclear threats during the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait Crisis in the 1950s – threats not followed by an actual nuclear attack – validated Mao’s intuition that nuclear weapons were primarily psychological weapons. Chinese leaders decided to acquire nuclear weapons to free their minds from what Mao’s generation called “**nuclear** **blackmail**.” A former director of China’s nuclear weapons laboratories told me China developed them so its leaders could “sit up with a straight spine.” Countering nuclear blackmail – along with compelling other nuclear weapons states to negotiate their elimination – were the only two purposes Chinese nuclear weapons were meant to serve. Contemporary Chinese military planners appear to have added a new purpose: compelling the United States to halt a conventional attack. Even though it only applies in extreme circumstances, it **increases** the **risk** **that** a **war** between the United States and China **will** **end** **in** a nuclear exchange with unpredictable and **catastrophic** **consequences**. Adding this new purpose could also be the first step on a slippery slope to an incremental broadening the role of nuclear weapons in Chinese national security policy. Americans would be a lot safer if we could avoid that. The United States government should applaud China’s no first use policy instead of repeatedly calling it into question. And it would be wise to adopt the same policy for the United States. If both countries declared they would never use nuclear weapons first it may not guarantee they can avoid a nuclear exchange during a military crisis, but it would make one far less likely.

## 2 – Kessler CP

#### CP: Private entities appropriate space in the outer atmosphere through satellite launches must equip their technology with safety technologies in accordance with the Space Safety Coalition’s recommendations and best practices for collision avoidance – Wall 21:

Wall, Mike. “Kessler Syndrome and the Space Debris Problem.” Space.com, Space, 15 Nov. 2021, https://www.space.com/kessler-syndrome-space-debris. // LHP GB + LHP PS

**In 2019, for example, the Space Safety Coalition (SSC) laid out a set of proposed voluntary guidelines designed to keep the Kessler Syndrome, and space junk in general, at bay over the coming years.** One recommendation is that **all satellites operating above 250 miles** (400 km) **be equipped with propulsion systems allowing them to maneuver away from possible collisions.** **Drawing the line there makes sense for multiple reasons**, **according to the SSC: It's the altitude at which the ISS flies**, **and satellites that circle below this boundary tend to encounter enough atmospheric drag to fall out of orbit relatively soon after their operational lives come to an end.** The **SSC** also **recommends** that **satellite designers** consider **building** **encryption systems into the command systems** of their craft, so **they'll be harder for chaos-seeking hackers to hijack**. And **operators who control satellites in low Earth orbit should include in their launch contracts a requirement that rocket upper stages be disposed of in the atmosphere shortly after liftoff.** More **active debris-fighting strategies could also be part of the solution.** **Removing just a handful of rocket bodies or big, dead satellites every year could help us keep our space-junk problem under control**, according to some studies. And **researchers** around the world are **developing** and **testing** **ways to do just that, using nets, harpoons and other methods**. Such activities would have to be carefully coordinated and thought out. Space objects, including junk such as spent rocket bodies, belong to the nation that launched them, so **the U.S. government or a U.S. company couldn't just unilaterally de-orbit a bunch of spent Russian rocket bodies** (or vice versa). Such action might spark an international incident, not least because debris-removing tech might also be viewed as a potential space weapon that could take out operational satellites. But **the space-junk issue is a global one, so governments around the world should already be having meaty conversations about how to deal with it. Let's hope the talks, the decisions and the tech end up outpacing the problem**, for all of our sakes.

#### The Space Safety Coalition (SSC) is the best actor – they have academic consensus on space safety and has open membership to both public and private space operators – solves case - Space Safety Coalition 21:

“Participation in the SSC Is Open to All Space Operators -- Including Governmental or Intergovernmental Entities -- Space Industry Associations, and Industry Stakeholders.” Space Safety Coalition Expands Membership: Increased Attention, Global Coordination Needed to Protect Space as Critical Infrastructure, 22 Nov. 2021, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewpr.html?pid=58807. // LHP GB + LHP PS

The Space Safety Coalition (SSC) announced today a doubling of the number of space companies who have endorsed SSC’s set of best practices since its inception in 2019, increasing to more than 50 global participants. **The SSC is the first-of-its-kind global ad hoc coalition dedicated to developing and maintaining a set of aspirational space safety best practices that continue to evolve based on the needs, threats, and advancements in space technology. Coalition members include leading space operators, industry associations, and stakeholders from across the globe. Newest endorsees include: Space Micro Inc., Astro Dynamic Ltd.,Slingshot Aerospace, LeoLabs Inc., and ClearSpace.** “In light of the recent Russian ASAT incident, it is even more paramount that – collectively - we increase our attention and global coordination on space safety issues and protecting space as a critical infrastructure,” said Dan Oltrogge, administrator of the SSC. **The SSC actively promotes responsible space safety through the voluntary adoption of relevant international standards, guidelines, and practices, coupled with the development and adoption of aspirational space safety guidelines and industry best practices. More than 50organizations have endorsed the SSC’s Best Practices document.** “SSC endorsees around the globe are committed to promoting and implementing our set of best practices for the long-term sustainability of space operations,” said Oltrogge. “Participants have been actively involved in space sustainability discussions, development of international standards for Orbit Data Messages and Conjunction Data Messages, and working to codify best practices for Large Constellations and for Space Traffic Coordination.” **The SSC’s best practices are applicable to all spacecraft regardless of physical size, orbital regime, and constellation size. These best practices directly incorporate existing guidance and standards published by entities including the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).** **“By endorsing treaties, guidelines, and standards, spacecraft operators and stakeholders can collectively achieve the long-term sustainability of space operations -- frequently improving upon minimum-accepted consensus levels,”** said Oltrogge. **The SSC and its members are committed to continuing to publish, coordinate, and periodically update the SSC’s best practices in order to keep them strategically and operationally aligned with responsible space operations and the evolving understanding of the orbital debris environment, to address gaps in space governance, and promote better spacecraft design, operations, and disposal practices associated with long-term space operations sustainability.** Participation in the SSC is open to all space operators -- including governmental or intergovernmental entities -- space industry associations, and industry stakeholders.

#### Kessler syndrome causes extinction – CP solves. Competes through net benefits.

## 3 – Lib NC

#### In setting an end, every agent must recognize freedom as a necessary good, Gewirth 84 bracketed for grammar and gendered language

[Alan Gewirth, () "The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative" American Journal Of Jurisprudence: Vol. 29: Iss. 1 Article 5, 1984, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol29/iss1/5/, DOA:9-10-2018 // WWBW Recut LHP AV]

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes [t]he[y] regards as good.** Hence, **[t]he[y] must regard as necessary goods the freedom** and well being **that [is]** are the generic features and **necessary conditions of** his **action** and successful action in general. From this, it follows that **every agent logically must hold or accept** that he has **rights to these conditions**. For if he were **to deny** that he has **these rights**, then he **would** have to **admit that it is permissible** for other persons **to remove** from him the very **conditions** of freedom and well-being **that**, as **an agent**, he **must have**. But **it is contradictory** for him **to hold both that [t]he[y] must have these conditions and also that he may not have them.** Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, **every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency** on which he must ground his own right-claims. What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action.

#### Prefer –

#### A] performativity – argumentation requires the assumption that freedom is good – else agents would be unable to make arguments

#### B] prerequisite – condoning any action requires condoning the freedom required to take that action – so my theory’s a prerequisite to theirs and my offense acts as a side-constraint to your framework.

#### C] culpability – absent a conception of free will, people can just claim they were acting of desires they can’t control.

#### D] probability – it’s logically contradictory to deny my framework because that would use freedom to do so. Therefore, it’s impossible for my framework to be false

#### The universality of freedom justifies a libertarian state. Otteson 09

Otteson 09 brackets in original James R. Otteson (professor of philosophy and economics at Yeshiva University) “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3, Winter 2009

In a crucial passage in Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that the “Universal Principle of Right” is “‘[e]very action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual’s will to co-exist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right.’” He concludes, “Thus the universal law of right is as follows: **let your external actions be such that the free application of your will can co-exist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law**” (1991, 133, emphasis in original).5 **This** stipulation **becomes** for Kant **the grounding justification for the existence of a state**, its raison d’être, and the reason we leave the state of nature is to secure this sphere of maximum freedom compatible with the same freedom of all others. Because this freedom must be complete, in the sense of being as full as possible given the existence of other persons who demand similar freedom, it entails that **the state may**—indeed, must—**secure this condition** of freedom, **but undertake to do nothing else because any other** state **activities** would **compromise** **the** very **autonomy the state seeks to defend**. **Kant’s position** thus outlines and implies a political philosophy that **is broadly libertarian**; that is, **it endorses a state constructed with the sole aim of protecting** its citizens **against invasions of** their **liberty**. For Kant, individuals create a state to protect their moral agency, and in doing so they consent to coercion only insofar as it is required to prevent themselves or others from impinging on their own or others’ agency. In his argument, **individuals cannot rationally consent to a state that instructs them in morals, coerces virtuous behavior, commands them to trade or not, directs their pursuit of happiness, or forcibly requires them to provide for** their own or **others**’ pursuits of happiness. And except in cases of punishment for wrongdoing,6 **this** severe limitation on the scope of the state’s authority **must always be respected**: “The rights of man must be held sacred, however great a sacrifice the ruling power may have to make. There can be no half measures here; it is no use devising hybrid solutions such as a pragmatically conditioned right halfway between right and utility. For all politics must bend the knee before right, although politics may hope in return to arrive, however slowly, at a stage of lasting brilliance” (Perpetual Peace, 1991, 125). The implication is that **a Kantian state protects** against invasions of **freedom and does nothing else**; in the absence of invasions or threats of invasions, it is inactive.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with a libertarian state.

#### Impact calc – Aggregation fails – there is no one for whom aggregate good is good-for. Korsgaard:

Christine Korsgaard, “The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature” Harvard, n.d. RE

According to the second view I will consider, hedonism, the good just is pleasurable experience or consciousness and the absence of painful experience or consciousness. What makes a being capable of having a final good is simply that the being is conscious. Otherwise, its good is not relative to its nature. As is often noticed, on this theory it is a real question whether some of the other animals might not have a better life, or at least be capable of having a better life, than human beings, given their apparent enthusiasm for simple and readily available joys. Although I’ll treat it as a separate theory, hedonism, I believe, has an inherent tendency to collapse either into a version of the intrinsic value theory, or into a version of the third view I am about to describe. Obviously, it is possible to regard hedonism simply as a particular instance of the intrinsic value theory, one that singles out conscious experience as the only possible bearer of intrinsic value. But I think this way of looking at hedonism does not do justice to the intuition that has made hedonism seem plausible to so many thinkers, which is precisely the idea that the final good must have an irreducibly subjective or relational element. That is, what makes hedonism seem plausible is precisely the idea that the final good for a sensate being must be something that can be felt or experienced as a good by that being. It is something that can be perceived or experienced as welcome or positive from the being’s own point of view, and that is therefore relative to the being’s own point of view.9 The intrinsic value version of hedonism tries to capture the essentially subjective element of the final good by attaching objective intrinsic value to a subjective experience, but when this move is made the essentially relational or relative character of subjectivity tends to drop out. The goodness of the experience is detached from its goodness for the being who is having the experience, and instead is located in the character of the experience itself. This defect shows up most clearly in utilitarian versions of hedonism, which allow us to add the goodness of pleasant experiences across the boundaries between persons or between animals. There is no subject for whom the total of these aggregated experiences is a good, so the aggregate good has completely lost that relational character: the goods are detached from the beings from whom they are good. This relational element of value, I believe, is better captured by the third theory I am about to describe.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Coherence – anything else is either repugnant or infinitely regressive, Boaz 15 bracketed for glang:

David Boaz, executive vice president of the Cato Institute, “The Libertarian Mind: A Manifesto for Freedom”, 2/10/15, <https://books.google.com/books/about/The_Libertarian_Mind.html?id=zs8NBAAAQBAJ>. //LHP AV \*Bracketed for gendered language\*

Any theory of rights has to begin somewhere. Most libertarian philosophers would begin the argument earlier than Jefferson did. **Humans**, unlike animals, come into the world without an instinctive knowledge of what their needs are and how to fulfill them. As Aristotle said, man is a reasoning and deliberating animal; humans use the power of reason to understand their own needs, the world around them, and how to use the world to satisfy their needs. So they **need a social system that allows them to** use their **reason,** to **act** in the world, and to **cooperate with others** to achieve purposes that no one individual could accomplish. Every person is a unique individual. Humans are social animals—we like interacting with others, and we profit from it— **but** **we** think and **act individually**. **Each** individual **owns himself or herself [themselves]**. **What other possibilities** besides self—ownership **are there?**  • **Someone** – a king or a master race – **could own others.** Plato and Aristotle did argue that there were different kinds of humans, some more competent than others and thus endowed with the right and responsibility to rule, just as adults guide children. Some forms of socialism and collectivism are—explicitly or implicitly—-based on the notion that many people are not competent to make decisions about their own lives, so that the more  talented should make decisions for them. **But** that would mean **there were no universal** human **rights,** only rights **that** some haveand others do not**, denying the** essential **humanity of those who are** deemed to be **owned**.  • **Everyone owns everyone**, a fully-fledged communist system. **In such** a system, **before any**one **could** take an **act**ion**, [t]he[y] would need to get permission from everyone** else. **But how could each** other person **grant permission without consulting everyone else**? **You’d have an infinite regress, making any action** at all logically **impossible**. ln practice, since such mutual ownership is impossible, this system would break down into the previous one: some- one, or some group, would own everyone else. That is what happened in the communist states: the party became a dictatorial ruling elite.  Thus, either communism or aristocratic rule would divide the world into factions or classe. **The only possibility** that is humane, logical, and suited to the nature of human beings **is self-ownership**. Obviously, this discussion has only scratched the surface of the question of self-ownership; in any event, I rather like Jefferson’s simple declaration: Natural rights are self-evident.

### Contention

#### Injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights– therefore, private appropriation of outer space cannot be unjust, Feser 05:

Edward Feser, [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College] “THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION,” 2005 //LHP AV

The reason **there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition** of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply **does not apply** to initial acquisition. **It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place**. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose** **an individual** **A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R**. **For it to be** the case that A commits an **injustice** in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual** **B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. **But for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however**, **B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all**. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, **the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R**. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer**. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7