# NSD – AC – Alienation

#### [1] Cx checks solves – the neg can read infinite interps which can be easily prevented by asking in cross. No abuse if I provide whatever necessary before their prep.

#### [2] 1AR theory paradigm –

#### a] grant me it else infinite abuse – neg won’t have any deterrence

#### b] drop the debater because the 1ar is too short to win theory and substance

#### c] no RVIs – the 2nr has enough time and the 2ar needs strategic flexibility

#### 1ar theory first – Strat skew – short 2AR needs collapse to counter the long 2N collapse

#### [3] Aff RVIs on 1n theory (On Counterinterps) –

#### a] reciprocity –the neg has access to T and theory, so we need an RVI and theory to compensate for your unique avenue to the ballot

#### b] time skew– they justify being able to read a bunch of shells in the 1N with no offense – the 2N collapse magnifies the abuse by creating a double bind

#### c] 1ar can’t win theory and substance due to high volume and time crunch

#### [4] No omissions: All neg theory violations and kritik links must come from the text of the AC, not the absence of specification. a) I have a limited time to speak so it’s an infinite aff burden b) they can always make some sort of shell or link even if I don’t do anything which allows for infinite neg abuse.

#### [5] Presumption/Permissibility Affirm –

#### a] you presume statements true until prove false -- if I said my name was Ayman you’d believe me till disproven

#### b] affirming is harder 7-4-6-3 time skew, and Shah 19,

[Shah, Sachin. “A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SIDE-BIAS ON THE 2019 JANUARY-FEBRUARY LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATE TOPIC.” NSD Update, National Symposium of Debate, 16 Feb. 2019, http://nsdupdate.com/2019/a-statistical-analysis-of-side-bias-on-the-2019-january-february-lincoln-douglas-debate-topic/.] //LHPSS

As a final note, it is also interesting to look at the trend over multiple topics. In the rounds **from** 93 TOC bid distributing tournaments (**2017 – 2019** YTD), **the neg**ative **won 52.99% of ballots** (**p-value < 0.0001)** and 54.63% of upset rounds (p-value < 0.0001). **This suggests the bias might be structural, and not topic specific, as this data spans six different topics.**

#### c] Freezes action – requiring pro-active justification for all our actions would make it impossible to make morally neutral claims like ‘I ought to drink water’ which means we always assume we can take an action absent a proactive reason not to.

## Framework

#### Volition, the structure of the will, is intrinsic and is a pre-req to all ethical theories:

#### [1] Bridging the Gap – The will is what bridges the gap between the self and the external world – i.e. when I am willing that I paint something, my personal identity is coming across to the outside world in that action of painting I chose. Only the will can account for the way the self relates to the outside world.

#### [2] Subjectivity – The will and the capacity to question our will defines the subject & what is intrinsic to it. That means the will is intrinsic and when evaluating subjectivity we must evaluate the subject’s relation to the will.

#### [3] Proceduralism – The agent uses the will to engage in everything, which means being able to will is an intrinsic good under every ethical theory regardless of content and a pre-requisite to their ethical theory

#### [4] Morality – Expression of the will is how we arrive at moral truth; it enables us to weigh between arguments & situations to find the best one. Controls the internal link to their ethical theory.

### Syllogism

#### **[1] Subjectivity is naturally productive and conscious, entailing creative productivity. Wartenberg 82’**

“"Species-Being" and "Human Nature" in Marx” by Thomas E. Wartenberg Human Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1982) p.79-80 LHP AM recut LHP AB

The central point that Marx makes is that it is through productive activity that human beings actualize themselves as human beings. This means that it is not thought per se or a contemplative life that constitutes the good for human beings. Rather, it is our ability to structure the material world in accordance with our own purposes that is distinctive about human beings. Of course, thought is one of the necessary ingredients for such self-realization. Marx always talks of activity in accordance with a conscious plan as the specifically human good. But the key aspect of this assertion is Marx’s replacement of “thought” by “labor” as the central concept for understanding the human good. Rather than seeing labor as only a brutal necessity forced upon human beings by their animal natures that they would be glad to be rid of, Marx sees labor as a “positive, creative activity” (Marx, 1973, p. 614). Indeed, in criticizing Adam Smith in the Grundrisse, Marx makes this point explicitly in language almost identical to that he uses in the Manuscripts. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating process—and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits—hence as self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labor (Marx, 1973, p. 611). Marx’s use of “labor” as being the distinctive capacity of the human species is striking. It involves not a simple rejection of the tradition’s stress on thought, but rather a generalization of that notion. For Marx is claiming that the tradition has focused on one particular form that “free conscious activity” can take, namely that of contemplation. What is required is a generalization of that notion into an appropriate categorical structure that will still provide us with a view of the distinctively human character. In Marx’s view, here as elsewhere, it is Hegel who managed to do this, even if he conceived of the truth in a mystified way. The importance of Hegel’s Phenomenology and its final result—the dialectic of negativity as the moving and producing principle—lies in the fact that Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, objectification as loss of object, as alienation and as supersession of this alienation; that he therefore grasps the nature of labor and conceives objective man—true, because real man, --as the result of this own labor (Marx, 1974, pp. 385-386). Thus, it is Hegel who, according to Marx, first sees the human being[is] as essentially a laboring creature. Hegel is misled, however, because he recognizes “only the positive and not the negate side of labor.” It remains for Marx to make the final adjustments that will allow this truth to emerge in all its centrality. In thus identifying labor as constitutive of the human essence, Marx radically reconceptualizes the philosophic tradition’s stress on contemplation as the most distinctively human activity. By no longer singling out one form of activity as that most fit for human beings, Marx achieves a “democratization” of theory. No longer can we see a person as better than another simply because of the type of activity he/she chooses to pursue. Rather, we can see conscious activity itself as [is]human and, in an egalitarian assumption, something to be valued for its own sake.

#### [2] How you will. Impaired will is volition that is disturbed in its functional capacity – when we do not have ourselves at our command and cannot meaningfully identify. Thus, alienation a question about the structure of the will – Jaeggi

Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/ // LHP AB

This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition between modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipaternalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a “true volition” and therefore not subject to internal constraints. I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. This criterion is, in the first place, formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.” 7 Second, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of alienation can be linked up with this conception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be understood as obstructions of volition and thereby—formulated more generally—as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s command, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom.

#### [3] Appropriation & Social Roles – Whether or not subjects are willing in an alienated way is determined by how they appropriate; appropriation is when the subject makes something truly their own, Jaeggi

Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation/ // LHP AB

What does it mean to appropriate something? 12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own. Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession. 13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own . Relations of appropriation, then, are characterized by several features: appropriation is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world. It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed. The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are constantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept: the possibility of appropriating something refers, on the one hand, to a *subject’s power to act and form* and to *impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates*. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent meaning and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (Thus a role, for example, in order to be appropriated, must always be “found” as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is formable, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, “I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate.” 14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of re appropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creatio ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a successful appropriation of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them

#### Therefore, all roles, including social roles, only exist as appropriated. You cannot separate the appropriator from the appropriated; they both define each other. When the subject appropriates something, they push themselves onto the outside world. What they and others push onto the outside world (appropriation) in turn applies to themselves.

#### Thus, the standard and role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best resists alienation – moving past alienation requires an ethics of grounded reciprocal relations with others, the only way to manage the type of authenticity in the 1AC. Any offense consistent with the internal links in the 1AC framewok and ROB counts as offense under the ROB. – Nicholas 21,

Nicholas, L. (2021). *Remembering Simone de Beauvoir’s “ethics of ambiguity” to challenge contemporary divides: feminism beyond both sex and gender. Feminist Theory, 22(2), 226–247.* doi:10.1177/1464700120988641

Having established sex and gender as humyn categories of thought and opened the possibility that other ways of being could be, Beauvoir dedicated much time to discussing what should be. **Beauvoir** was concerned with freedom, **rejecting happiness as the ultimate principle in place of freedom** (1997: 28). **She describes freedom as an intentional ‘re-creation of the world which should be the task of every man [sic] if freedom were no longer enchained anywhere’** (1976: 88; emphasis mine). **She describes this as ‘transcending immanence’, immanence being the state of ‘subjec- tion to given conditions**’ (Beauvoir, 1997: 29), **the inability to act and pursue freedom**, which she interchangeably calls ‘facticity’. **Beauvoir conceptualised life as an intentional project, with freedom as its goal**: ‘it is a matter of pursuing the expansion of his [sic] existence and of retrieving this very effort as an absolute’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 79), to ‘aim positively through his [sic] projects at his own future’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 81). While a goal of intentional freedom may sound individualistic, **Beauvoir’s situated ontology means that freedom** cannot, and **should not, be attained individually, but only collectively. Her ethical aim of freedom combined with her ontological premise that freedom is contingent on, and can be blocked by, situation explains why Beauvoir dedicated much of her work to analysing alterity and those oppressed by it.** **Alterity is the state of being the other to a dominant norm** (Beauvoir, 1997: 16), **and inheres a lack of reciprocity between subjects, where one subject is always rendered object, i.e. oppressed**. For Beauvoir, being in this state is exemplary of immanence, and something she applied to the position of women (1997) and the colonised (1976). Hence**, Beauvoir’s ontological bases mean that what is required to transcend immanence is a collective and situated effort to foster a new context and mode of relating that does not create this humyn situation of alterity**. Sex and gender are immanence In my reading, sex and gender – as humyn ideas – inherently create alterity and thus facticity. Thus, they need to be eradicated to make situations in which people can use their freedom. While GCFs aim to abolish gender but retain sex, and GIFs to expand gender categories but not do away with them, both collapse into the given. Beauvoir’s perspective, rather, can be used to argue for the transcendence of both, my extrapolation being that transcendence is blocked by the very existence of sex and gender as intersubjectively and individually attributed cultural resources. Imposing pre-existing frames on people that they are born into renders them immanent because ‘freedom can not will itself without aiming at an open future’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 71). Sex and gender represent closure and delimit the project of the self. My utopian picture of freedom, reached through Beauvoir’s analysis, involves the eradication of sex and gender. For the GCF position, the fundamental realness of sexual difference limits the picture of what is possible and means that freedom lies in getting rid of gender and re-valuing sex. For the GIF position, freedom would be the freedom to acknowl- edge the variability of both sex and gender, and to self-identify in a multiplicity of ways. Both remain stuck in the frame of sex or gender as real things, as natural rather than humyn facts. However, I argue that these humyn concepts derive from, refer to and collapse back into binaries. I argue that both are so conceptually mired in their origin in alterity-creating, binary sexual referents that they need to be eradicated to make truly free situations in which people can use their freedom. Sexual difference can never be maintained as a concept without denoting two species of humyn that are attributed upon people without their will, and gender can never be separated from binary to the point of being truly multiplicitous. The evidence thus far indicates that both will inevitably collapse back into binaries (Nicholas, 2014; Lorber, 2018; Risman, 2018), thus perpetuating alterity. Taking instead Beauvoir’s constructivist-materialist ontological premise**, it becomes possible to argue for** the **freedom to re-create the self, humyn intelligibility and the wor**ld, in ways not delimited by humyn conceptions of sex and gender. **This does not mean either homogenised denial of differences, or denial of material oppression as a result of humyn binaries. Instead, it means the collective pursuit of a more enabling way of understanding the self, others and the world that does not derive from oppositional and unequal binaries and otherness, described by Beauvoir as ‘reciprocity’**. I now outline the extent to which the pursuit of another way of being is, for Beauvoir, a fundamentally situated and collective process, before outlining what the concept of reciprocity entails and how it could replace the concepts of sex/gender. Freedom is collective To will oneself free is also to will others free (Beauvoir, 1976: 73). Beauvoir’s work has sometimes been written off for being too rationalistic and modernist, and for suggesting women’s freedom will come from them becoming existential individualistic subjects ‘like men’ (Vintges, 1999; a position challenged by Stavro’s [2007] interpretation). However, given her fundamentally situational and intersubjective ontology, **transcending immanence is not merely a volitional process. Freedom and choice are the aim, and everyone has the potential for these but is delimited by situation. People ‘must disclose the world with the purpose of further disclosure and by the same movement try to free men [sic], by means of whom the world takes on meaning’** (Beauvoir, 1976: 74). Situation and its limit on freedom outlined above is what distinguishes Beauvoir from malestream existen- tialism, and what underpins her commitment to collective politics. **Thus, ethics and politics become collective and intersubjective, not reduced to common identity but replaced by a relation of reciprocity**. New modes of thinking and relating that do not impose pre-determined frameworks like sex/gender are required. Freedom is reciprocity **A collective relation of freedom can be understood as** Beauvoir’s utopian vision: **reciprocity as the opposite of oppression** (alterity). **This does not get rid of other- ness through creating homogeny, but replaces it with a new approach to otherness not founded in hierarchy that renders some subjects objects**. For me, this repre- sents the missing piece in sex/gender deconstructive work that properly explicates ‘the particulars of how individuals might cease contextualizing and communicating their subjective experience of phenotype’ (Williams, 2020: 732). Indeed, as Davy points out, ‘those questions that concentrate on deconstructing embodied trans- gender practices [. . .] often leave us no place to go’ (2019: 2**). In positing an ontology of potential alongside a valuing of freedom delimited by imposition of situation that negates us, we ‘must re-establish concretely and genuinely the reciprocity between human consciousnesses, the negation of which constitutes the most fundamental form of injustice’** (Beauvoir, 2004: 249). **This does not mean eradication of otherness; it means eradication of oppressive or subordinating otherness embodied by alterity, and revaluing the other.** If alterity, of which man/woman is the paradigmatic subject/object relation, is a relation of otherness that creates subordination, then ‘the subject-subject or “reciprocity” mode’ is Beauvoir’s ideal for both the Individual Other and the Social Other (Fullbrook and Fullbrook, 1995: 109**). Reciprocity means entering interaction, and indeed existence, without preconceived binary – and concomitantly hierarchical – categories of otherness,** instead ‘being led by the other in their otherness’ without the imposition of sex/gender: ‘It is only as[...]something free, that the other is revealed as an other. And to love him [sic] genuinely is to love him in his otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 67). **This is not just interactive; it is an individual orientation and a cultural and institutional context.** Indeed, in Kruks’ reading, **Beauvoir’s ideal is ‘relations of otherness between social equals [where] otherness is “relativised” by a kind of “reciprocity” [. . .] mediated through institutions’** (cited in Simons, 1995: 14). This is not a mere culturist analysis on the level of recognition as charged at much poststructuralist work: ‘**Beauvoir’s notion of alterity allows her to tackle the prob- lem of economic and political marginality and culturally debased identities’** (Stavro, 2007: 455). This otherness is also not an identity; it is an ethos**. It is not possible to predetermine what somebody else’s otherness will look like or indeed how it may change, only the relations it must have (reciprocity).** Beauvoir’s rejec- tion of ‘stationary future [. . . means] the struggle will never cease’ (1976: 118). Beauvoir’s utopian vision of relationality also allows for value distinctions rather than representing an anarchic individualistic picture of freedom. **Due to our situatedness, the subjecthood of one cannot be gained at the expense of anothe**r: ‘To be free is not to have the power to do anything you like; it is to be able to surpass the given toward an open future; the existence of others as a freedom defines my situation and is even the condition of my own freedom’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 911**). One can only be recognised in subjectivity by another subject; hence the aim is reciprocity, not autonomy**. To refuse recognition of others, as with some GCFs, is not in line with this picture of collective co-constitutive freedom. Being a feminist ethos, Beauvoir rejects masculinist values of self over other and ‘argues for both men and women to become a sensitive self’ (Vintges, 1999: 133). I have outlined elsewhere (Nicholas, 2014) how reciprocity shares much with feminist care ethics in terms of being other oriented, but what is key to Beauvoir’s ethics is her rejection of reducing to either self or other orientation, as both ‘forfeits the requirements of reciprocity’ (Bergoffen, 1995: 190). While Beauvoir is utopian, then, in proposing an alternative way of being, she is not idealistic at the expense of materialism and a politics of the present. **While she maintains her ultimate aim as the freedom to transcend immanence, hers is ‘a philosophy that begins with humans in particular situations, not individuals as abstract entities’** (Hekman, 2015: 146).

#### Even though this view of freedom is situated in the world, politics always fails unless it engages first from the perspective of protecting freedom – the reason people may care about consequences is because of reciprocal relations. Nicholas 2

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**What does this morality and the picture of agency mean for political action and strategy to get to this aim of freedom?** **For Beauvoir, there is a keen attentiveness to both means and ends without privileging one over the other**. Arguably, both GCF and GIF are privileging means over ends, stopping short of dismantling the actual root cause of gender oppression in the service of strategy in the given world. **This is both understandable and, for Beauvoir, a core part of her political approach. For example, in discussing how to prioritise political struggles and aims, she says that ‘the question is political before being moral: we must end by abolish- ing all suppression** [. . . but] What order should be followed? What tactics should be adopted? It is a matter of opportunity and efficiency’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 89). **However, her normative distinctions mean that one should not undertake actions that subordinate another in the prioritising of means over ends, and one never loses sight of the ends**: a key binary that Beauvoir seeks to evade or negotiate beyond is that of means and ends. A key text here is Beauvoir’s essay ‘Moral Idealism and Political Realism’ from 1945, which treads this precise line between rigid **strategies, arguing against an ethics that remains ‘at the level of generality and abstraction’ but also against the conservativism of reductionist anti-utopian real- ism (2004: 178). She illustrates this with the example of those ‘Frenchmen [who] accepted collaboration with Germany in the name of realism**’ (Beauvoir, 2004) in 1940, **and in doing so lost sight of the ideal of human freedom.** Likewise, can those ‘gender critical’ feminists who are allying with the Christian conservative right (McCann and Nicholas, 2019) against trans rights in the name of realist strategy be said to have maintained their feminist ethic of freedom? I have emphasised that, in the current context, sex/gender identity is compulsory for intelligibility (Butler, 2008). Indeed, if one attempts to individually eschew it, it will be imposed upon you by others and institutions, and imposition undermines subjecthood. It is for this reason that identity politics is not just understandable, but unavoidable. However, Beauvoir’s utopianism means that in ‘using gender to undo gender’ (to borrow a phrase from Lorber, 2000), either by appealing to the category of woman or by creating new categories, it is important not to reify the means. This is an ethos echoed later by Judith Butler in her critique of identity politics, one foreshadowed by Beauvoir who observed that ‘no group sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over against itself’ (Beauvoir, 1997: 17). This underpins much feminist theory that advocates for ‘strategic essentialism’ (Spivak, 1994), making Beauvoir a proto-strategic essentialist. Stavro (2007) uses Beauvoir to argue that we do not need to wholly embrace identity politics to use identity. **Collectively creating new situations of freedom may entail what I have called elsewhere fostering new cultural resources through which to place oneself and read one another** (Nicholas and Clark, 2020). This means that the availability of new identities such as non-binary may well represent progress towards new ‘cultural resources’ for the self and other that allow for some relief from the immanence of binary gender. **But, heeding Beauvoir, I also caution that these are not inherently enabling. It is how they are used that is important** (Nicholas, 2014; Nicholas and Clark, 2020). **Indeed, a key tenet for Beauvoir’s discussions of strategy and realism is that ‘We have to respect freedom only when it is intended for freedom’** (Beauvoir, 1976: 90). In this context, then, the GCF freedom to claim that diverse gender identities are ‘false’ does not need to be respected. Additionally, the charges that GCFs make about trans people reifying gender and capitulating to stereotypes are unfounded. Like all people, trans peo- ple’s relationships with norms are ambiguous, given that norms are both enabling and limiting for everybody. Indeed, rejecting either a wrong-body essentialism or a crude deconstructivism, Chu argues that ‘The most powerful intervention scholars working in trans studies can make, at this juncture within the academy, is to defend the claim that transness requires that we understand, as we never have before, what it means to be attached to a norm—by desire, by habit, by survival’ (in Chu and Harsin Drager, 2019: 108). Additionally, Hines’s empirical research found that most of the trans women interviewed ‘aligned themselves with feminist politics and sought to construct gendered expressions in contrast to stereotypical models of femininity’ (2019: 145). Davy also found in her empirical research that ‘trans- sexual and genderqueer people, regardless of their desire for particular bodily aesthetic interventions and gender recognition, productively flee, elude, flow, leak and disappear from categorising legal statutes and healthcare protocols’ (2019: 180). The overly zealous policing of new gender categories that sometimes emerges in gender diverse communities identified by Fury (2017) and Roffee and Waling (2016) likewise does not represent a use of freedom intended for freedom. Intersectional coalitional: the ‘universal cause of freedom’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 90) I must . . . strive to create for men [sic] situations such that they can accompany and surpass my transcendence. (Beauvoir, 2004: 137) With this pragmatism in mind, then, what would a politics of reciprocity and freedom for all look like? Here I turn to Beauvoir’s proto-intersectional politics. The ideal of otherness alongside the need for political strategy presents ‘the dual task of productively accounting for difference and articulating modes of common- ality’ (Hines, 2020: 36). Alterity is fundamentally an intersectional concept (Stavro, 2007), allowing for the perspective that ‘oppression has more than one aspect’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 89). As argued elsewhere (Stavro, 2007; Nicholas, 2014), **Beauvoir’s ontological ethics can be used to argue for a politics of commonality and coalition based on ‘experience of subordination’** (Stavro, 2007: 453) **or of alterity, rather than identity**. Given Beauvoir’s ethical position, **‘Coalitions that emerge are not based upon identity, nor are they simply strategic; they evolve from our commitment to improving existing human relations and organisations’** (Stavro, 2007: 452). **If, for Beauvoir, freedom is to be found in collective, purposive projects with others, and our freedom is contingent on that of others, then coalitional politics with others in a state of alterity helps us to all transcend immanence**. In Marso’s reading, ‘collective political action towards enhancing freedom for others, and hence for ourselves, emerges as the best way to embrace human existence’ (2012: 4). For Beauvoir, this does not mean homogenisation, but what le Doueff calls ‘minimum consensus’ (cited in Marso, 2006: 84): we cannot ever completely know the other, but we must strive as best we can. For Beauvoir (2004: 107), solidarity is a myth, and so ‘solidarities are created’ (2004: 108), defined as ‘a higher reconciliation’ (2004: 108). **These solidarities are not permanent but are the very definition of the fleeting projects that Beauvoir characterises as giving existence meaning. However, they should be guided by a ‘lucid generosity’** (2004: 124) **for the other**. A key critique of some of the politics of GIF approaches is that they have depoliticised the concept of intersectionality, reducing it to a series of atomised subject positions that can be claimed rather than a structural analysis of power (Bilge, 2013; Downing, 2018; see Stavro, 2007, on historical materialist critiques). On the other hand, GCFs are the latest sub-category of feminism to be critiqued for the homogenising and exclusion that their fundamentally single-axis politics leads to, and their seeming ignorance of the many critiques of the homogenous use of the category woman by feminists, queer and trans people and people of colour for decades (Truth, [1851] 2020; Butler, 2008; Williams, 2020). **By maintaining a materialist account of power, alongside a radically non- foundational, situated ontology, Beauvoir’s ‘proto-intersectional’ position allows for strategic engagement in identity, but never at the cost of the recognition that our freedom is woven with that of others.** She says, ‘The cause which he [sic] serves must not lock itself up and thus create a new element of separation: through his own freedom he must seek to serve the universal cause of freedom’ (Beauvoir, 1976: 89–90). This position has since been reflected by many dedicated to coalitional politics: those second-wave radical feminists who always emphasised their shared struggle with trans women (Williams, 2020); queer thinker Cohen (1997) who proposes coalitions based on relationships to power rather than identity; non- binary thinker Dembroff (2020) who emphasises the shared political position and thus struggles of women, trans people and non-binary people; queer native thinkers like Murib (2018) who proposes coalitional politics based on sovereignty not identity; and feminists like Dollar (2017) who proposes that feminists dedicat- ed to the subject position of women and the ‘use of binary indicators’ work with those dedicated to degendering to overcome gender inequality and gender binarism. Conclusion **With Beauvoir’s ethical caveat that one person’s freedom should never be at the price of another’s, a new feminist ethos beyond identity commitments can be imagined that is dedicated not just to siloed single-axis struggle or the individualistic freedom of liberal identity, but to authentically transforming the conditions, institutions and relationships that allow for oppression and hierarchy in the first place.**

#### **Independently prefer:**

#### **[1] Performativity –**

#### Everything you do, including debate, involves use of the will to create relations with the world and self, and vice versa – this concedes alienation as it is the only moral theory that accounts for this.

#### **[2] Moral Accountability – If you are alienated from yourself you cannot be morally responsible for what you do because it wasn’t you rationally willing it. Thus, the only way to identify moral responsibility is to not be alienated.**

#### Impact Calc: a) The aff is based on how expression of the will is distanced from the self, i.e. whether or not subjects in general are in structures where they are able to appropriate, not *what it is* people want to appropriate b) Alienation is non consequentialist, it’s about our relationship to the external and self. There is no empirical set of consequences where you are guaranteed to be non-alienated, so you can’t look at consequences to determine alienation; rather, you have to look at structures.

## Contention

### Plan

#### Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I defend all strikes including secondary strikes and boycotts, and not allowing employers to replace workers to strike. I’ll clarify and spec anything to a reasonable extent in CX to avoid friv theory debates.

### Offense

#### [1] Without strikes, workers are powerless against the government and employers, and feel distanced from their labor, disrespecting their subjectivity. Strikes enable workers to feel empowered as a unit, to appropriate their will and ideas of labor onto their own labor, and generally appropriate their ideas onto society, all resisting alienation Lenin

Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich. “Lenin: On Strikes.” Marxists, 1924, www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/dec/strikes.htm.

What significance have strikes (or stoppages) for the struggle of the working class? To answer this question, we must first have a fuller view of strikes. The wages of a worker are determined, as we have seen, by an agreement between the employer and the worker, and if, under these circumstances, the individual worker is completely powerless, it is obvious that workers must fight jointly for their demands, they are compelled to organise strikes either to prevent the employers from reducing wages or to obtain higher wages. It is a fact that in every country with a capitalist system there are strikes of workers. Everywhere, in all the European countries and in America, the workers feel themselves powerless when they are disunited; they can only offer resistance to the employers jointly, either by striking or threatening to strike. As capitalism develops, as big factories are more rapidly opened, as the petty capitalists are more and more ousted by the big capitalists, the more urgent becomes the need for the joint resistance of the workers, because unemployment increases, competition sharpens between the capitalists who strive to produce their wares at the cheapest (to do which they have to pay the workers as little as possible), and the fluctuations of industry become more accentuated and crises[[1]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/dec/strikes.htm" \l "fwV04P313F01) more acute. When industry prospers, the factory owners make big profits but do not think of sharing them with the workers; but when a crisis breaks out, the factory owners try to push the losses on to the workers. The necessity for strikes in capitalist society has been recognised to such an extent by everybody in the European countries that the law in those countries does not forbid the organisation of strikes; only in Russia barbarous laws against strikes still remain in force (we shall speak on another occasion of these laws and their application). However, strikes, which arise out of the very nature of capitalist society, signify the beginning of the working-class struggle against that system of society. When the rich capitalists are confronted by individual, propertyless workers, this signifies the utter enslavement of the workers. But when those propertyless workers unite, the situation changes. There is no wealth that can be of benefit to the capitalists if they cannot find workers willing to apply their labour-power to the instruments and materials belonging to the capitalists and produce new wealth. As long as workers have to deal with capitalists on an individual basis they remain veritable slaves who must work continuously to profit another in order to obtain a crust of bread, who must for ever remain docile and inarticulate hired servants. But when the workers state their demands jointly and refuse to submit to the money-bags, they cease to be slaves, they become human beings, they begin to demand that their labour should not only serve to enrich a handful of idlers, but should also enable those who work to live like human beings. The slaves begin to put forward the demand to become masters, not to work and live as the landlords and capitalists want them to, but as the working people themselves want to. Strikes, therefore, always instil fear into the capitalists, because they begin to undermine their supremacy. “All wheels stand still, if your mighty arm wills it,” a German workers’ song says of the working class. And so it is in reality: the factories, the landlords’ land, the machines, the railways, etc., etc., are all like wheels in a giant machine—the machine that extracts various products, processes them, and delivers them to their destination. The whole of this machine is set in motion by the worker who tills the soil, extracts ores, makes commodities in the factories, builds houses, work shops, and railways. When the workers refuse to work, the entire machine threatens to stop. Every strike reminds the capitalists that it is the workers and not they who are the real masters—the workers who are more and more loudly proclaiming their rights. Every strike reminds the workers that their position is not hopeless, that they are not alone. See what a tremendous effect strikes have both on the strikers themselves and on the workers at neighbouring or nearby factories or at factories in the same industry. In normal, peaceful times the worker does his job without a murmur, does not contradict the employer, and does not discuss his condition. In times of strikes he states his demands in a loud voice, he reminds the employers of all their abuses, he claims his rights, he does not think of himself and his wages alone, he thinks of all his workmates who have downed tools together with him and who stand up for the workers’ cause, fearing no privations. Every strike means many privations for the working people, terrible privations that can be compared only to the calamities of war—hungry families, loss of wages, often arrests, banishment from the towns where they have their homes and their employment. Despite all these sufferings, the workers despise those who desert their fellow workers and make deals with the employers. Despite all these sufferings, brought on by strikes, the workers of neighbouring factories gain renewed courage when they see that their comrades have engaged themselves in struggle. “People who endure so much to bend one single bourgeois will be able to break the power of the whole bourgeoisie,”[[3]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/dec/strikes.htm" \l "fwV04E118) said one great teacher of socialism, Engels, speaking of the strikes of the English workers. It is often enough for one factory to strike, for strikes to begin immediately in a large number of factories. What a great moral influence strikes have, how they affect workers who see that their comrades have ceased to be slaves and, if only for the time being, have become people on an equal footing with the rich! Every strike brings thoughts of socialism very forcibly to the worker’s mind, thoughts of the struggle of the entire working class for emancipation from the oppression of capital. It has often happened that before a big strike the workers of a certain factory or a certain branch of industry or of a certain town knew hardly anything and scarcely ever thought about socialism; but after the strike, study circles and associations become much more widespread among them and more and wore workers become socialists. A strike teaches workers to understand what the strength of the employers and what the strength of the workers consists in; it teaches them not to think of their own employer alone and not of their own immediate workmates alone but of all the employers, the whole class of capitalists and the whole class of workers. When a factory owner who has amassed millions from the toil of several generations of workers refuses to grant a modest increase in wages or even tries to reduce wages to a still lower level and, if the workers offer resistance, throws thousands of hungry families out into the street, it becomes quite clear to the workers that the capitalist class as a whole is the enemy of the whole working class and that the workers can depend only on themselves and their united action. It often happens that a factory owner does his best to deceive the workers, to pose as a benefactor, and conceal his exploitation of the workers by some petty sops or lying promises. A strike always demolishes this deception at one blow by showing the workers that their “benefactor” is a wolf in sheep’s clothing. A strike, moreover, opens the eyes of the workers to the nature, not only of the capitalists, but of the government and the laws as well. Just as the factory owners try to pose as benefactors of the workers, the government officials and their lackeys try to assure the workers that the tsar and the tsarist government are equally solicitous of both the factory owners and the workers, as justice requires. The worker does not know the laws, he has no contact with government officials, especially with those in the higher posts, and, as a consequence, often believes all this. Then comes a strike. The public prosecutor, the factory inspector, the police, and frequently troops, appear at the factory. The workers learn that they have violated the law: the employers are permitted by law to assemble and openly discuss ways of reducing workers wages, but workers are declared criminals if they come to a joint agreement! Workers are driven out of their homes; the police close the shops from which the workers might obtain food on credit, an effort is made to incite the soldiers against the workers even when the workers conduct themselves quietly and peacefully. Soldiers are even ordered to fire on the workers and when they kill unarmed workers by shooting the fleeing crowd in the back, the tsar himself sends the troops an expression of his gratitude (in this way the tsar thanked the troops who had killed striking workers in Yaroslavl in 1895). It becomes clear to every worker that the tsarist government is his worst enemy, since it defends the capitalists and binds the workers hand and foot. The workers begin to understand that laws are made in the interests of the rich alone; that government officials protect those interests; that the working people are gagged and not allowed to make known their needs; that the working class must win for itself the right to strike, the right to publish workers’ newspapers, the right to participate in a national assembly that enacts laws and supervises their fulfilment. The government itself knows full well that strikes open the eyes of the workers and for this reason it has such a fear of strikes and does everything to stop them as quickly as possible. One German Minister of the Interior, one who was notorious for the persistent persecution of socialists and class-conscious workers, not without reason, stated before the people’s representatives: “Behind every strike lurks the hydra [monster] of revolution.”[[4]](https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1899/dec/strikes.htm" \l "fwV04E119) Every strike strengthens and develops in the workers the understanding that the government is their enemy and that the working class must prepare itself to struggle against the government for the people’s rights. Strikes, therefore, teach the workers to unite; they show them that they can struggle against the capitalists only when they are united; strikes teach the workers to think of the struggle of the whole working class against the whole class of factory owners and against the arbitrary, police government. This is the reason that socialists call strikes “a school of war,” a school in which the workers learn to make war on their enemies for the liberation of the whole people, of all who labour, from the yoke of government officials and from the yoke of capital.

#### [2] The strike symbolizes worker power against force from the state and enables the masses to appropriate their ideas onto the state – removing it alienates the worker by intrinsically condemning this struggle, Palme

Dutt, R. Palme. “The Meaning of the General Strike.” *Marxists*, 21 June 1926, www.marxists.org/archive/dutt/pamphlets/strike.htm.

Not the masses were defeated, but the old leadership, the old reformist trade unionism, parliamentarism, pacifism and democracy. The masses stood solid: these broke down; these were the real casualties of the fight; and the masses will learn to fling them aside when it comes to the future struggle. The driving home of this lesson, the shattering of the old traditions and leadership, the tireless preparation for the future struggle, and above all the building up of an iron revolutionary vanguard of the workers and kernel of new leadership—these are the tasks that follow or the collapse of the general strike. The general strike has brought the British working class face to face with the political issue of power, with the legal and armed force of the State. The old trade union tradition has been brought to its highest culminating point, only to have its complete impotence shown unless it can pass into this higher plane. The masses have entered into the full highway of mass struggle, and shown a solidarity, courage, tenacity and class-will, which affords the guarantee of future revolutionary victory. This time they entered the struggle with the old traditions, apparatus, leadership, all fundamentally opposed to the struggle, and only dragged along with them by the force of their mass-will; their limbs were shackled by the myriad trade union-economic-pacifist-legalist-constitutional-democratic traditions; and under these conditions defeat in the first shock was inevitable. But the positive lessons of the struggle are stronger than all the treacheries of the reformist leadership. The class-character of the State has been exposed. The trappings of parliament, democracy, trade union legalism and economism have been torn aside, and laid bare the naked class-power opposition with its ultimate weapon of armed force. The future struggle in Britain can henceforth only be the revolutionary mass struggle with an open political aim. The bourgeoisie have themselves shown the way forward to the proletariat.