# TOCs r5

## 1

#### Their scholarship is hateful and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated for pedophilic content.

Moen 15 [Moen, O. M. (Professor of Ethics at Oslo Metropolitan University). “The ethics of pedophilia”. Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics, 9(1), 111-124. 2015-05-09. Accessed 2/2/2022. <https://www.ntnu.no/ojs/index.php/etikk_i_praksis/article/view/1718> //CHO]

If my arguments in this article are sound, then being a pedophile—in the sense of having a sexual preference for children—is neither moral nor immoral. Engagement in adult-child sex is immoralbecause it exposes children to a significant risk of serious harm, butit is perhaps not always blameworthy to the extent that we intuitively assume. Finally, the enjoyment of fictional stories and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content is, in and of itself, morally acceptable. If these conclusions are correct, what practical implications follow? A central implication is that in dealing with pedophilia, our aim should not be to find outlets for our disgust and outrage, but rather, to minimize what is the real problem: harm to children. On the least revisionist side, the aim of reducing harm provides us with a good justification for upholding current bans on adult-child sex and child pornography. There are, however, also a number of more revisionist implications. One revisionist implication is that we should stop the outright condemnation of pedophiles. Condemning pedophiles for being pedophiles is unjust, and non-offending pedophiles, rather than deserving condemnation for their pedophilia, deserve praise for their admirablewillpower.4 Possibly, today’s condemnation also prevents pedophiles from telling health professionals about their attraction to children, and insofar as detection and counseling can help prevent abuse, this is very unfortunate. To prevent harm to future children, we would also be well advised to start teaching high school students not just what to do in case they are victims of sexual abuse (which, thankfully, we have started telling them over the last few decades), but also what to do in case they themselves are pedophiles. A certain percentage of high school students either are or will become pedophiles, and currently they are not given any advice on how to handle their sexuality. The production, distribution, and enjoyment of texts and computer-generated graphics with pedophilic content should almost certainly be made legal. Until or unless it can be shown that such texts and graphics lead to more adult-child sex, the justification for today’s widespread ban is weak.

#### Drop the debater—academic spaces have way too many sympathizers who ignore violence against children, and every act must be challenged in the most unflinching terms because anything else reinforces the epistemic bias in favor of rationalizing disgusting behavior.

#### Grant 18 **[**Alec Grant (Independent Scholar, retired from the Uiversity of Brighton where he was a Reader in Narrative Mental Health). “Sanitizing Academics and Damaged Lives” Mad In The UK, 12 April 2018. https://www.madintheuk.com/2018/12/sanitizing-academics-and-damaged-lives/ //WWDH]

Academics who sympathize with paedophilia constitute its intellectual public relations arm. Their role is to make child-adult sex presentable, more acceptable to the public, fit for polite society, sugar-coated, glossed with a scholarly veneer, sanitized. Snapshots of sanitizing academic activity from the last 40 years show how this seeps into and contaminates public policy, education and practice in insidious ways. This is done via the workings of power, privilege, perverse cronyism, and, as Pilgrim (2018) argues, as a result of widespread moral stupor and denial. It’s astonishing that this happens in the face of the psychological and development features of complex post-trauma which are often a consequence of child sexual abuse. By pathologizing adult survivors, often with the ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) tag, mainstream psychiatric business-as-usual plays out its role in suppressing the truth about the consequences of paedophilia among adult survivors. Pilgrim (2018) reminds us that care and mutuality are core ethical features of all sexual practices. As someone who was for many years associated with cognitive therapy, I’m interested in ‘cognitive, or thought distortions’, which are used by people in rationalising their behaviour in self-serving ways. We know from Pilgrim and many other writers, researchers and practitioners about the rationalisations of perpetrators of child sexual abuse and exploitation. They include: Children are not victims but willing participants; They want it; They enjoy it; It’s about friendship; It’s about love; It helps children develop and mature. According to Pilgrim (2018), the ‘heyday’ period of academic versions of such rationalisations was the 1970s. 1977 was the year of an unsuccessful lobby by French intellectuals to defend intergenerational sex. Included among these were the otherwise well-respected philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Jaques Derrida, Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. These figures were at the forefront of the use of academic authority to lobby governments to liberalise and decriminalise adult-child sexual contact. In 1978, Foucault took part in a France-Culture broadcast with two other gay theorists, Hocquengham and Danet, to discuss the legal aspects of sex between adults and children. They wanted a repeal of the law preventing this because they took the view that in a liberal (they really meant libertarian) society, sexual preferences generally should not be the business of the law. Foucault, Hocquengham and Danet made the following assertions: that children can, and have the capacity to, consent to such relations without being coerced into doing so; that abuse and post-abuse trauma isn’t real; that the law is part of an oppressive and repressive heteronormative social control discourse which unfairly targets sexual minorities; that children don’t constitute a vulnerable population; that children can and are capable of making the first move in seducing adults (they introduced here the category of ‘the seducing child’); that the laws against sexual relations between children and adults actually function to protect children from their own desires, making them an oppressed and repressed group; that – in the language of the sociologist Stanley Cohen – international public horror about sexual relations between adults and children is a form of moral panic which feeds into constructing the ‘paedophile’ as a folk devil, in turn provoking public vigilantism; that sex between adults and children is actually a trivial matter when compared with ‘real crimes’ such as the murder of old ladies; that many members of the judiciary and other authority figures and groups don’t actually believe paedophilia to be a crime; and that consent should be a private contractual matter between the adult and the child. Fast forward to 1981. The Paedophile Information Exchange (PIE) has been active for seven years. This was a pro-paedophile activist group, founded in the UK in 1974 and officially disbanded in 1984. The group, an international organisation of people who traded in obscene material, campaigned for the abolition of the age of consent. Dr Brian Taylor, the research director and member of PIE, and sociology lecturer at the University of Sussex produced the controversial book Perspectives on Paedophilia, which had the aim of enlightening social workers and youth workers about the benefits of paedophilia. Taylor, who identified as gay, advocated ‘guilt-free pederasty’ (sexual relations between two males, one of whom is a minor). He argued that people generally are hostile to paedophilia only because they don’t understand it, and If they did wouldn’t be so against it. So it was simply a matter of clearing up prejudice and ignorance.

## 2

#### The aff is an act of ideological fantasy creation – ideology is created by the initial illusion of our mental beliefs and concepts representing something real followed by the secondary illusion of forgetting the first was an illusion at all, allowing for ideology to inform reality and not the reverse – Zizek 09:

Zizek, Slavoj. [Slavoj Zizek is a Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic. He is a professor at the European Graduate School, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, Birkbeck College, University of London, and a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His books include Living in the End Times, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, In Defense of Lost Causes, four volumes of the Essential Zizek, and many more. Slavoj Žižek, the maverick philosopher, author of over 30 books, acclaimed as the “Elvis of cultural theory”, and today’s most controversial public intellectual. His work traverses the fields of philosophy, psychoanalysis, theology, history and political theory, taking in film, popular culture, literature and jokes—all to provide acute analyses of the complexities of contemporary ideology as well as a serious and sophisticated philosophy. His recent films The Pervert’s Guide to the Cinema and Žižek! reveal a theorist at the peak of his powers and a skilled communicator. Now Verso is making his classic titles, each of which stand as a core of his ever-expanding life’s work, available as new editions. Each is beautifully re-packaged, including new introductions from Žižek himself. Simply put, they are the essential texts for understanding Žižek’s thought and thus cornerstones of contemporary philosophy.] The Sublime Object of Ideology. Verso Books, 2009. // LHP BT Recut LHP PS

If we want to grasp this dimension of fantasy, **we must return to the Marxian formula 'they do not know it, but they are doing it', and pose ourselves a very simple question: where is the place of ideological illusion**, in the 'knowing or in the 'doini in the reality itself? **At first sight, the answer seems obvious**: ideological illusion lies in the 'knowing'. It is a matter of a discordance between what people are effectively doing and what they think they are doing - **ideology consists in the very fact that the people 'do not know what they are really doing'**, that they have a false representation of the social reality to which they belong (the distortion produced, of course, by the same reality). Let us take again **the classic Marxian example of so-called commodity fetishism: money is in reality just an embodiment**, a condensation, a materialization of a network **of social relations** - the fact that it functions as a universal equivalent of all commodities is conditioned by its position in the texture of social relations. **But to the individuals themselves**, this function of **money** - to be the embodiment of wealth - **appears as** an immediate, **natural** property of a thing called 'money', as if money is already in itself, in its immediate material reality, the embodiment of wealth. Here, we have touched upon the classic Marxist motive of'reification': behind the things, the relation between things, we must detect the social relations, the relations between human subjects. **But such a reading of the Marxian formula** **leaves out** an illusion, an error, **a distortion which is already at work in the social reality** itself, at the level of what the individuals are doing, and not only what they think or know they are doing. **When individuals use money, they know very well that there is nothing magical about it** - that money, in its materiality, is simply an expression of social relations. The everyday spontaneous ideology reduces money to a simple sign giving the individual possessing it a right to a certain part of the social product. So, on an everyday level, the individuals know very well that there are relations between people behind the relations between things. **The problem is that in their social activity itself, in what they are doing, they are acting as if money, in its material reality, is the immediate embodiment of wealth as such**. They are fetishists in practice, not in theory. **What they ' do not know', what they misrecognize, is the fact that in their social reality itself, in their social activity - in the act of commodity exchange - they are guided by the fetishistic illusion.** To make this clear, **let us again take the classic Marxian motive of the speculative inversion of the relationship between the Universal and the Particular. The Universal is just a property of particular objects which really exist, but when we are victims of commodity fetishism it appears as if the concrete content of a commodity (its use-value) is an expression of its abstract universality (its exchange-value) - the abstract Universal, the Value, appears as a real Substance which successively incarnates itself in a series of concrete objects**. That is the basic Marxian thesis: **it is already the effective world of commodities which behaves like a Hegelian subject**substance, **like a Universal going through a series of particular embodiments**. Marx speaks about 'commodity metaphysics', about the 'religion of everyday life'. The roots of philosophical speculative idealism are in the social reality of the world of commodities; it is this world which behaves 'idealistically' - or, as Marx puts it in the first chapter of the first edition of Capital: This inversion through which what is sensible and concrete counts only as a phenomenal form of what is abstract and universal, contrary to the real state of things where the abstract and the universal count only as a property of the concrete - such an inversion is characteristic of the expression of value, and it is this inversion which, at the same time, makes the understanding of this expression so difficult. If! say: Roman law and German law are both laws, it is something which goes by itsel£ But if, on the contrary, I say: THE Law, this abstract thing, realizes itself in Roman law and in German law, i.e. in these concrete laws, the interconnection becomes mystical.20 The question to ask again is: where is the illusion here? We must not forget that **the bourgeois individual, in his everyday ideology, is definitely not a speculative Hegelian: he does not conceive the particular content as resulting from an autonomous movement of the universal Idea**. **He is**, on the contrary, **a good Anglo-Saxon nominalist, thinking that the Universal is a property of the Particular - that is, of really existing things**. Value in itself does not exist, there are just individual things which, among other properties, have value. **The problem is that in his practice, in his real activity, he acts as if the particular things (the commodities) were just so many embodiments of universal Value**. To rephrase Marx: He knows ve!J' well that Roman law and Genan law arejust two kinds oflaw, but in his practice, he acts as (the Law itself, this abstract end!)!, realizes itseffin Roman law and in German law. So now we have made a decisive step forward; we have established a new way to read the Marxian formula 'they do not know it, but they are doing it': **the illusion is not on the side of knowledge, it is already on the side of reality itself, of what the people are doing.** What they do not know is that their social reality itself, their activity, is guided by an illusion, by a fetishistic invers ion. What they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they did not know. **The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship to reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion is what may be called the ideological-fantasy.** If our concept of ideology remains the classic one in which the illusion is located in knowledge, then today's society must appear post-ideological: the prevailing ideology is that of cynicism; people no longer believe in ideological truth; they do not take ideological propositions seriously. **The fundamental level of ideology , however, is not that of an illusion masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itsel**£ And at this level, we are of course far from being a post-ideological society. **Cynical distance is just one way - one of many ways - to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them**. It is from this standpoint that we can account for the formula of cynical reason proposed by Sloterdijk: 'they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it'**. If the illusion were on the side of knowledge, then the cynical position would really be a post-ideological position, simply a position without illusions: 'they know what they are doing, and they are doing it'. But if the place of the illusion is in the reality of doing itself, then this formula can be read in quite another way: 'they know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still, they are doing it'.** For example, they know that their idea of Freedom is masking a particular form of exploitation, but they still continue to follow this idea of Freedom.**The lesson to be drawn from this concerning the social field is above all that belief, far from being an 'intimate', purely mental state, is always materialized in our effective social activity: belief supports the fantasy which regulates social reality**. Let us take the case of Kafka: it is usually said that in the 'irrational' universe of his novels, Kafka has given an 'exaggerated', 'fantastic', 'subjectively distorted' expression to modern bureaucracy and the fate of the individual within it. In saying this we overlook the crucial fact that it is this very 'exaggeration' which articulates the fantasy regulating the libidinal functioning of the 'effective', 'real' bureaucracy itsel£ The so-called 'Kafka's universe' is not a 'fantasy-image of social reality' but, on the contrary, the mise-en-scene of the fantasy which is at work in the midst ofsocial reali9' itself. we all know very well that bureaucracy is not all-powerful, but our 'effective' conduct in the presence of bureaucratic machinery is already regulated by a beliefin its almightiness . . . In contrast to the usual 'criticism of ideology' trying to deduce the ideological form of a determinate society from the conjunction of its effective social relations, the analytical approach aims above all at the ideological fantasy efficient in social reality itselE **What we call 'social reality' is in the last resort an ethical construction**; it is supported by a certain as if(we act as ffwe believe in the almightiness of bureaucracy, as ffthe President incarnates the will of the People, as if the Party expresses the objective interest of the working class . . . ). **As soon as the belief**(which, let us remind ourselves again, is definitely not to be conceived at a 'psychological' level: it is embodied, materialized, in the effective functioning of the social field) **is lost, the very texture of the social field disintegrates**. This was already articulated by Pascal, one ofAlthusser's principal points of reference, in his attempt to develop the concept of'Ideological State Apparatuses'. According to Pascal, the interiority of our reasoning is determined by the external, nonsensical 'machine' - automatism of the signifier, of the symbolic network in which the subjects are caught: For we must make no mistake about ourselves: we are as much automaton as mind . . . proofs only convince the mind; habit provides the strongest proofs and those that are most believed. It inclines the automaton, which leads the mind unconsciously along with it.22 Here Pascal produces the very Lacanian definition of the unconscious: 'the automaton (i.e. the dead, senseless letter), which leads the mind unconsciously [sans Ie savoi􀅼 with it'. I t follows, from this constitutively senseless character of the Law, that we must obey it not because it is just, good or even beneficial, but simply because it is the law - this tautology articulates the vicious circle of its authority, the fact that the last foundation of the Law's authority lies in its process of enunciation: Custom is the whole of equity for the sole reason that it is accepted. That is the mystic basis of its authority. Anyone who tries to bring it back to its first principle destroys it. '3 The only real obedience, then, is an 'external' one: obedience o u t of conviction is not real obedience because it is already 'mediated' through our subjectivity - that is, we are not really obeying the authority but simply following our j udgement, which tells us that the authority deserves to be obeyed in so far as it is good, wise, beneficent . . . Even more than for our relation to 'external' social authority, this inversion applies to our obedience to the internal authority of belief it was Kierkegaard who wrote that to believe in Christ because we consider him wise and good is a dreadful blasphemy - it is, on the contrary, only the act of belief itself which can give us an insight into his goodness and wisdom. Certainly we must search for rational reasons which can substantiate our belief, our obedience to the religious command, but the crucial religious experience is that these reasons reveal themselves only to those who already believe - we find reasons attesting our belief because we already believe; we do not believe because we have found sufficient good reasons to believe. **'External' obedience to the Law is thus not submission to external pressure, to so-called non-ideological 'brute force', but obedience to the Command in so far as it is 'incomprehensible', not understood; in so far as it retains a 'traumatic', 'irrational' character: far from hiding its full authority, this traumatic, non-integrated character of the Law is a positive condition ofit. This is the fundamental feature of the psychoanalytic concept of the superego: an injunction which is experienced as traumatic, 'senseless' - that is, which · cannot be integrated into the symbolic universe of the subject**. **But for the Law to function 'normally', this traumatic fact that 'custom is the whole of equity for the sole reason that it is accepted' - the dependence of the Law on its process of enunciation or, to use a concept developed by Laclau and Mouffe, its radically contingent character - must be repressed into the unconscious, through the ideological, imaginary experience of the 'meaning' of the Law,** of its foundation in Justice, Truth (or, in a more modern way, functionality): It would therefore be a good thing for us to obey laws and customs because they are laws . . . But people are not amenable to this doctrine, and thus, believing that truth can be found and resides in laws and customs, they believe them and take their antiquity as a proof of their truth (and not just of their authority, without truth).'4 It is highly significant that we find exactly the same formulation in Kafka's Trial, at the end of the conversation between K. and the priest: 'I do not agree with that point of view,' said K., shaking his head, 'for if one accepts it, one must accept as true everything the door-keeper says. But you yourselfhave sufficiently proved how impossible it is to do that.' 'No,' said the priest, 'it is not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary.' 'A melancholy conclusion,' said K. 'It turns lying into a universal principle.'25 What is 'repressed' then, is not some obscure origin of the Law but the very fact that the Law is not to be accepted as true, only as necessary - the fact that its authonjy is without t1th.

#### The first fantasy is the naïve belief in limiting private property being equivalent to counteracting private ideology. The true ideology underlying the public/private distinction is not simply about the state but rather about the nature of the position from which you reason. Presuming the state escapes the private and using it to limit that private fails and replicates the exclusion society is predicated on. ZIZEK.

Zizek, Slavoj. [Slavoj Zizek is a Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic. He is a professor at the European Graduate School, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, Birkbeck College, University of London, and a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His books include Living in the End Times, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, In Defense of Lost Causes, four volumes of the Essential Zizek, and many more. Slavoj Žižek, the maverick philosopher, author of over 30 books, acclaimed as the “Elvis of cultural theory”, and today’s most controversial public intellectual. His work traverses the fields of philosophy, psychoanalysis, theology, history and political theory, taking in film, popular culture, literature and jokes—all to provide acute analyses of the complexities of contemporary ideology as well as a serious and sophisticated philosophy. His recent films The Pervert’s Guide to the Cinema and Žižek! reveal a theorist at the peak of his powers and a skilled communicator. Now Verso is making his classic titles, each of which stand as a core of his ever-expanding life’s work, available as new editions. Each is beautifully re-packaged, including new introductions from Žižek himself. Simply put, they are the essential texts for understanding Žižek’s thought and thus cornerstones of contemporary philosophy.] In defense of lost causes. Verso Books, 2009.

A further qualification should be added here: the solution is not to limit the market and private property by direct interventions of the state and state ownership. **The domain of the state itself is also in its own way "private": private in the precise Kantian sense of the "private use of Reason" in state administrative and ideological apparatuses: The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men**. **The private use of one's reason, on the other hand, may often be very n a r r o w l y restricted without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment. By public use of one's reason I understand the use w h i c h a person makes of it a s a scholar before the r e a d i n g public**. **Private use I call that w h i ch one may make of it in a particular civil post or office w h i c h is entrusted to him.** **What one should add here, moving beyond Kant, is that there is a privileged social group which, on account of its lack of a determinate place in the "private" order of the social hierarchy, in other words, as a "part of no-part" of the social body, d i r e c t l y stands for universality: it is only the reference to those Excluded, to those who dwell in the blanks of the space of the state, that enables true universality.** **There is nothing more " private" than a state community which perceives the Excluded as a threat and worries how to k e e p the Excluded at a proper distance.** In other words, as w e have a l r e a d y seen, in the series of the four antagonisms, the one between the Included and the Excluded is the crucial one, the point of reference for the others; without it, all others lose their subversive edge: ecology turns into a "problem of sustainable development," intellectual p r o p e r t y into a "complex legal c h a l l e n g e , " biogenetics into an "ethical" issue. **One can sincerely fight for ecology, defend a broader notion of intellectual property, oppose the copyrighting of genes, while not questioning the antagonism between the Included and the Excluded—what is more, one can even formulate some of these struggles in terms of the Included threatened by the polluting Excluded. In this way, we get no true universality, only "private " concerns in the Kantian sense of the term.** **Corporations such as Whole Foods and Starbucks continue to enjoy favor among liberals even though they both engage in anti-union activities; the trick is that they sell products that claim to be p o l i t i c a l ly progressive acts in and of themselves.** One buys coffee made w i t h beans bought from the growers at fair prices, one drives a hybrid vehicle, one buys from companies that provide good benefits for their employees (according to the corporation's own standards), and so on. **Political action and consumption become fully merged. In short, without the antagonism between the Included and the Excluded, we may well find ourselves in a world in which Bill Gates is the greatest humanitarian fighting against poverty and diseases, a n d Rupert Murdoch the greatest environmentalist mobilizing hundreds of millions through his media • 9 empire.** **And, one should be clear at this point, the political expression of this radical antagonism, the w a y the pressure of the Excluded is experienced within the established political space, always has a flavor of terror**. The lesson is thus the one rendered long ago b y Athena towards the end of Aeschylus's Euinenides: As for terror, don't banish it completely from the city. What mortal man is t r u l y righteous without being afraid? Those who sense the fear UNBEHAGEN IN DER NATUR revere vi'hat's right. With citizens hke these y o u r country and y o u r city will be safe, stronger than anything possessed by men.'" How are w e to read these famous Unes? Do they r e a l l y point towards the manipulation of the politics of fear we know t o d a y ? " The first obstacle to such a reading is the obvious fact that Athena does not evoke the fear of an external enemy whose threat justifies the disc i p l i n e d u n i t y and possible "defensive m e a s u r e s " of the city-state: **the fear is here the fear of divine J u s t i c e itself, of its b l i n d i n g authority; from the perspective of modern subjectivity (which is our perspective h e r e ) , the object of this fear is the abyss of subjectivity itself, its t e r r i f y i n g power of self-relating negativity; it is the terrifying encount e r of this t r a u m a t i c core** that H e i d e g g e r h a d in mind when he claimed that terror {Schrecken) was necessary if "modern man" was to be awakened from his metaphysico-technological slumber into a new beginning; we must p r i n c i p a l l y concern ourselves w i t h preparing for man the v e ry basis and dimension upon which and within which something like a mystery of his Deuteln could once a g a i n be encountered. We should not be at all s u r p r i s e d if the contemporary man in the street feels disturbed or perhaps sometimes d a z e d and clutches all the more stubbornly at his idols when confronted with this challenge a n d w i t h the effort required to approach this mystery. It would be a mistake to expect anything else. We must first call for someone capable of instilling terror into our Ucuem a g a i n . Heidegger thus opposes wonder as the basic disposition of the first (Greek) beginning to terror as the basic disposition of the second new beginning: "In wonder, the basic disposition of the first beginning, beings first come to stand in their form. Terror, the basic disposition of the other beginning, reveals behind all progress and all domination over beings a d a r k emptiness of irrelevance." (The thing to note here is that Heidegger uses the word "terror" and not " a n x i e t y . ") Hegel said something similar in his a n a l y s i s of the master and servant (bondage), when he emphasized that, since the bondsman is also a selfconsciousness. 431 IN DEFENSE OF LOST CAUSES 432 the master is t a k e n to be the essential r e a l i ty for the state of bondage; hence, for it, the truth is the independent consciousness existing for itself, although this t r u th is not taken y e t as inherent in bondage itself Still, it does in fact contain within itself this truth of pure negativity and self-existence, because it has experienced this reality' w i t h i n it. **For this consciousness w a s not in peril a n d fear for this element or that, nor for this or that moment of time, it w a s afraid for its entire being; it felt the fear of death, the sovereign master.** It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its e v e r y fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it**. This complete perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its s t a b i l i ty into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple, ultimate nature of self-consciousness, absolute negativity, pure self-referrent existence, which consequently is involved in this type of consciousness.** This moment of p u r e self-existence is moreover a fact for it; for in the master it finds this as its object. Further, this bondsman's consciousness is not only this total dissolution in a general w a y ; in serving and toiling the bondsman a c t u a l l y c a r r i e s t h i s out**. B y serving he cancels in e v e r y p a r t i c u l a r aspect his dependence on and attachment to natural existence,** and by his w o r k removes this existence away.''\* The servant is t h u s in-himself a l r e a d y free, his freedom being embodied outside himself in his master. It is in this sense that Christ is our master and simultaneously the source of our freedom. Christ's sacrifice set us free —how? Neither as the payment for our sins nor as legalistic ransom, but as w h e n w e are afraid of something (and fear of death is the ultimate fear that makes u s slaves), a n d a t r u e friend says: "Don't be afraid, look, I will do it. W h a t are y o u so a l r a i d of? I w i l l do it, not because I h a v e to but out of my love for y o u . I am not afraid! " He does it a n d in this w a y sets us free, demonstrating in acta that it can he done, that w e too can do it, that we are not slaves . . . Recall, from Ayn Rand's Tl^e Fountainhead, the description of the momentary impact Howard Roark makes on the members of the audience in the courtroom where he is standing trial: Roark stood before them as each man stands in the innocence of his own mind. But Roark stood like that before a hostile crowd —and they knew suddenly that no hatred w a s possible to him. For the flash of an instant, they grasped the manner of his consciousness. Each asked himself: do I need anyone's a p p r o v a l ? —does it matter? —am I t i e d ? — UNBEHAGEN IN DER NATUR And for that instant, each man was free —free enough to feel benevolence for every other man in the room. It w a s only a moment; the moment of silence when Roark w a s about to speak.''^ This i s t he w a y Christ brings freedom: when confronting him, w e become aware of our own freedom. And does not, mutatis mutandis , the same hold for Che Guevara? The photos showing him under arrest in Bolivia, surrounded by government soldiers, have a w e i r d Christological a u r a , as if w e see a t i r ed but defiant Christ on his w a y to crucifixion — no wonder that, when, moments prior to his death, the executioner's pistol a l r e a dy aimed at him, the hand holding it trembling, Guevara looked at h im and said: "Aim well. You are about to kill a man" —his version of ecce homo . . . And, Indeed, is the basic message of Guevara not p r e c i s e l y this: the message of how, in a n d through all his failures, he persisted, he went on? One can imagine h im thinking in the desperate last d a y s in Bolivia a version of the last words of Samuel Beckett's The VnnameahU: "in the silence y o u don't know, y o u must go on, I can't go on, I'll go on."'^ **In an unsurpassable irony of history, after the triumph of the Cuban revolution, everything he did was a failure** ^—the dismal failure of his economic policies as the Cuban minister of economy (after a y e a r , food had to be rationed. . . ) , t h e failure of his Congo adventure, the failure of his last mission in Bolivia; **however, all these "human, all too human" failures somehow fade into the -background, the backdrop against which the contours of his properly over-human (or, why not, inhuman) figure appear**, confirming Badiou's motto that the only w a y to be t r u l y human is to exceed ordinary humanity, tending towards the

#### The second fantasy is their manic disavowal of the reality of nukes that nullifies reality through a creation of a constant state of crisis. Their political psychosis creates the catastrophe that it fears.

Nixon 17 (Mignon Nixon is a Professor of Modern and Contemporary Art History at University College London, “Crazy”, MIT Press, 3/6/17) AqN

The baby king (a usually masculine despot) licenses a departure from reality and, in particular, a denial of our own badness. To put this another way, the mania of a mad president relieves us of the responsibility to mourn. For Segal, the failure to mourn the effects of our own destructiveness is a defining feature of modern American politics. In her writings on “nuclear mentality culture,” Segal observes that all groups resist assuming collective responsibility for war, but the history of the United States from Hiroshima to the Cold War to Vietnam to the First Gulf War to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is one of manic disavowal.13 The psychic legacy of the denial of guilt is, in psychoanalytic parlance, a pathological mourning. It is not only that we do not face up to the death and destruction we have caused, but also that our energies are consumed in denying their significance by manically declaring our own omnipotence.14 Every time we begin to mourn the destruction we have authored, it is morning, or infancy, in America again.15 And the broader implication of this perpetual recourse to historical amnesia of our own destructiveness in war is a negation of reality itself. In the spring before the election of the mad president, his predecessor performed a symbolic act, assuming a measure of collective responsibility for past destruction. In May 2016, after visiting Vietnam, Barack Obama became the first sitting US president to make an official visit to Hiroshima. After touring the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, he laid a wreath at the cenotaph in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, met survivors of the atomic bomb US forces dropped on the city in 1945, and made a speech in which he called for the elimination of nuclear weapons. This simple, long-deferred action, taking place over seventy years after the event but still during the lifetime of some survivors, marked a shift from an enduring triumphalist rationalization of the atomic bombings of Japan (mania) to a more hopeful stance (mourning). The annihilation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki might still, the president observed, occasion “a moral awakening.”16 Here was a different vision of mo(u)rning in America, one in which we might finally be able to acknowledge and grieve for the losses we have caused as well as for those we have endured. Following his election in November 2016, months after Obama’s visit to Hiroshima, the president-elect moved swiftly to stock his cabinet with former generals. Days before Christmas, he would announce, with his trademark studied casualness, that he was toying with the idea of restarting the nuclear arms race. The nonfake news over the festive period was filled with speculation about the possibility that nuclear testing would be resumed under the watchful eye of a secretary of energy who had, as a presidential candidate, called for the elimination of the Department of Energy. There was still some uncertainty about the target of this new nuclear buildup, given the president-elect’s personal regard for the leader of the historical archenemy, but there was a certain logic to his tweet that the nuclear show must go on. For if, as Segal had argued, nuclear politics is a form of mass psychosis in which the prospect of annihilation arouses mania—makes us crazy—then the enemy might truly be a secondary concern. What is crazy about the nuclear attitude, the psychoanalyst explained, is that it actively creates the conditions for what it most fears, the end of the world, while also—and this is crucial—denying the catastrophic reality it risks. To the extent that the president-elect himself represents a kind of political nuclear option, which the group has now exercised, the corollary of a reinvigorated nuclear arms race is a logical extension of that radical act. Writing in the 1960s, at the height of the Cold War and the American war in Vietnam, about the psychical implications of the nuclear threat, the Italian psychoanalyst Franco Fornari framed the problem as “a collective delusion of negation of reality.”17 The reality Fornari had in mind was the “pantoclastic prospect” of nuclear annihilation, a catastrophic possibility so overwhelming as to arouse our most primitive manic defense, a denial of reality. In this situation, the psychoanalyst observed, we urgently require some “instrument of verifying reality.”18 That instrument, he speculated, might be another, contrasting form of madness, namely, melancholia. The possibility exists, Fornari observed, that the melancholic, “while insane,” is still “closer to the catastrophic reality of our times” than “the unsuspecting victims of a collective delusion of negation of reality.”19 In a climate of reality negation, the melancholic vision of doom has the potential to enlighten. Perhaps this is our opening. Afflicted as we are by a manic negation of reality—the realities of climate change, nuclear armaments, the pain of others—we also, and not coincidentally, live in a time of mass melancholia.20 Under the headings of an epidemic of opiate addiction and economically induced despair, mass melancholia was a significant, if unheralded, theme of the 2016 campaign. The selection of the maddest member of the group as our leader might be seen as a radical response to this morbid state, or as the psychical equivalent of the nuclear option that risks self-annihilation in a frenzy of energizing paranoid-schizoid destructiveness. “Love trumps hate,” Clinton’s swan song to the 2016 campaign, attempted to salve the anxiety of the group but also risked a negation of psychic reality to rival the negation of objective reality promoted by her nemesis. For the individual, love has in some circumstances the power to overcome hatred, but love between groups, as Fornari observed, is far rarer. A principal psychic function of the group, he argued, is to pool our terror and hatred and to export those emotions elsewhere—as onto our enemies in war. Today, our group is split, and this divide can seem to replicate the psychical conditions of war. Yet, even this intensifying war at home cannot discharge the destructive reserves of nuclear mentality culture, a destructiveness that, as Fornari warned, has precipitated us into a prolonged state of crisis. By resorting immediately and reflexively to the rhetoric of nuclear escalation, the mad president has laid bare the underlying and persistent predicament of our group: that our failure or refusal to mourn demands an unending and unexpendable accumulation of destructiveness to ward off melancholia. This might be crazy, but it reveals a psychical reality we may be forced to confront for our own survival.

#### The alternative is to reject the ‘big other’ and embrace the act. People run from responsibility by casting their decisions onto external metrics they claim to have no control over or relation to, but this historically back-fires and makes achieving any change impossible. We must accept ourselves as decision-makers who make the final call on what is important to us when we act – Zizek 12:

Zizek, Slavoj. [Slavoj Zizek is a Slovenian philosopher and cultural critic. He is a professor at the European Graduate School, International Director of the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, Birkbeck College, University of London, and a senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. His books include Living in the End Times, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, In Defense of Lost Causes, four volumes of the Essential Zizek, and many more. Slavoj Žižek, the maverick philosopher, author of over 30 books, acclaimed as the “Elvis of cultural theory”, and today’s most controversial public intellectual. His work traverses the fields of philosophy, psychoanalysis, theology, history and political theory, taking in film, popular culture, literature and jokes—all to provide acute analyses of the complexities of contemporary ideology as well as a serious and sophisticated philosophy. His recent films The Pervert’s Guide to the Cinema and Žižek! reveal a theorist at the peak of his powers and a skilled communicator. Now Verso is making his classic titles, each of which stand as a core of his ever-expanding life’s work, available as new editions. Each is beautifully re-packaged, including new introductions from Žižek himself. Simply put, they are the essential texts for understanding Žižek’s thought and thus cornerstones of contemporary philosophy.] Less than nothing: Hegel and the shadow of dialectical materialism. Verso Books, 2012.

**It is only against this background of the fall of the big Other that one can properly grasp Lacan's famous formulation of the basic ethical axiom implied by psychoanalysis: It is because we know better than those who went before how to recognize the nature of desire, which is at the heart of our experience, that a reconsideration of ethics is possible, that a form of ethical judgment is possible, of a kind that gives this question the force of a Last Judgment: Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in you**?;; **This is Lacan's maxim of the ethics of psychoanalysis: "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire:** , ,6 This maxim, simple and clear as it appears, becomes elusive the moment one tries to specify its meaning. **For Lacan, properly ethical acts are rare: they occur like "miracles" which interrupt the ordinary run of things; they do not "express" the entire "personality" of the subject, but function as a break in the continuity of "personal identity**:' **Take the case of Maximilian Kolbe**, which confronts us with a weird but crucial ethical dilemma. **Kolbe was a Polish Franciscan monk who, during the 1920S and 1930S**, **was involved in writing and organizing mass propaganda for the Catholic Church, with a clear anti-Semitic** and anti-Masonic **edge**. **With the outbreak of World War II, he helped people threatened by the Nazis, among them many Jews, and for this he was arrested and sent to Auschwitz.** **When, in the summer of '94', after the escape of a prisoner, the Germans selected ten others to be starved to death as a punishment, one of them broke down in tears, claiming he had a family which needed him; Kolbe voluntarily offered himself in the man's stead and died three weeks later of starvation.** For this, he was later beatified by Pope John Paul II. **How to fit these two aspects of Kolbe's life together? Most commentators take one of the many easy ways out. Some simply try to deny or minimize Kolbe's anti-Semitism** (even dismissing the rumors about it as a KGB plot). **Some insist on the scholastic distinction between anti-Semitism proper and anti-Judaism**-a "mere" prejudice against Jews, not a murderous hatred of them-claiming that Kolbe's error was of the second, minor sort. **Others interpret his helping the Jews and final sacrifice as acts of repentance: having witnessed the suffering of the Jews under the Nazi occupation, Kolbe changed his view and tried to assuage his guilt**. **Still others take the risky step of minimizing not his anti-Semitism, but his final self-sacrificial gesture, pointing out that the man he saved was not a Jew but a Catholic Pole**. **All these versions are desperate attempts to avoid the embarrassing fact that the two attitudes (and activities) can easily coexist: a person who is anti-Semitic can also be capable of a dignified act of ethical self-sacrifice􀄉and, even more embarrassingly, the (explicit) motivation for Kolbe's noble self-sacrifice may well have been the very conservative-Catholic ideology \,vhich had sustained his anti-Semitism.** **An ethical act is one that does not comprise or express the entire person, but is a moment of grace, a "miracle" which can occur also in a non-virtuous individua**l. **This is why such acts are diffkult to imagine, and why, when they do OCCllr, one often tends to invent a narrative which normalizes them.** Recall the "Assassins;' the Ismaili sect, part of the Shia orientation of Islam, that fascinated the Western gaze from the twelfth century on: according to myth they were ruthless murderers who obeyed their master's orders unconditionally, without regard for their own lives; after they had killed their target (always in public and with a dagger), they did not run away, but waited to be apprehended and punished. They were able to perform these ruthless acts because they were under the influence of hashish. In the mysterious mountain fortress of Alamut in northern Iran, they were manipulated by their leader, who first drugged them and then, while they were comatose, moved them to a secluded garden decked out with all the features of the Muslim paradise, including beautiful girls ready for sex. On being returned to ordinary life, they were convinced they had experienced a heavenly episode-so when their leader told them that, if they succeeded in assassinating the designated target, they would return to paradise, they willingly complied. A closer historical study, however, qUickly dispels the myth: the name hashishi is local to Syria only, where it functions as a general term of popular abuse; it was applied to "Assassins" as "an expression of contempt for the wild beliefs and extravagant behaviour of the sectaries-a derisive comment on their conduct:'57 The standard explanation (they were called "assassins" because they used hashish to ready themselves for their ruthless acts) has thus to be inverted: "it was the name that gave rise to the story, rather than the reverse . . . For Western observers in particular, such stories may also have served to provide a rational explanation for behavior that was otherwise totally inexplicable:',s The story about the recreated paradise was thus a fantasy concocted to rationalize the traumatically "incomprehensible" fact that the Ismaiii followers were ready to fUllction as perfect killing machines, willing to sacrifke their own lives in the accomplishment of the task-a fantasy, in short, that enabled Westerners to re-translate a pure "ethical" act into an act determined "pathologically" (in the Kantian sense of the term). How, then, does such an ethics stand with regard to the panoply of today's ethical options? It seems to fit three of its main versions: liberal hedonism, immoralism, and "Western Buddhism:'" Let us run through these positions one by one. The first thing to state categorically is that Lacanian ethics is not an ethics of hedonism: whatever "do not compromise your desire" means, it does not mean the unrestrained rule of what Freud called "the pleasure principle," the functioning of the psychic apparatus that aims at achieving pleasure. For Lacan, hedonism is in fact the model of postponing desire on behalf of "realistic compromises": it is not only that, in order to attain the greatest amount of pleasure, I have to calculate and economize, sacrificing short-term pleasures for more intense longterm ones; what is even more important is that jouissance hurts. So, first, there is no break between the pleasure principle and its counterpart, the "reality principle": the latter (compelling us to take into account the limitations that thwart our direct access to pleasure) is an inherent prolongation of the former. Second, even (Western) Buddhism is not immune to the lures of the pleasure principle; the Dalai Lama himself wrote: "The purpose of life is to be happy" -not true for psychoanalysis, one should add." It was Nietzsche who observed that "human beings do not desire happiness, only the Englishmen desire happiness" -today's globalized hedonism is thus merely the obverse of the fact that, in the conditions of global capitalism, we are ideologically "all Englishmen" (or, rather, AngloSaxon Americans . . . ). So what is wrong with the rule of the pleasure principle? In Kant's description, ethical duty functions like a foreign intruder that disturbs the subject's homeostatic balance, its unbearable pressure forcing the subject to act "beyond the pleasure principle:' ignoring the pursuit of pleasures. For Lacan, exactly the same description holds for desire, which is why enjoyment is not something that comes naturally to the subject, as a realization of his or her inner potential, but is the content of a traumatic superegoic injunction. If hedonism is to be rejected, is Lacanian ethics then a version of the heroic immoralist ethics, enjoining us to remain faithful to ourselves and persist on our chosen way beyond good and evil? Think of don Giovanni in the last act of Mozart's opera, when the Stone Guest confronts him with a choice: he is near death, but ifhe repents of his sins, he can still be redeemed; if, however, he does not renounce his sinful life, he will burn in hell forever. Don Giovanni heroically refuses to repent, although well aware that he has nothing to gain, except eternal suffering, for his persistence. Why does he do it? Obviously not for any profit or promise of pleasure to come. The only explanation is his utmost fidelity to the dissolute life he has chosen. This is a dear case of hnmoral ethics: don Giovanni's life vvas undoubtedly ilnmoral; however, as his fidelity to himself proves, he was immoral not for pleasure or profit, but out of principle, ading the way he did in accordance with a fundamental choice. Or, to take a feminine example also frorn opera: George Bizet's Carmen. Cannen is, of course, irnn10ral (ruthlessly promiscuous, ruining men's lives, destroying families), but nonetheless thoroughly ethical (faithful to her chosen path to the end, even when this means certain death) Along these lines, Lee Edelman has developed the notion of homosexuality as involving an ethics of "now;' of unconditional fidelity to jouissance, of following the death drive by totally ignoring any reference to the future or engagement with the practical complex of worldly afhirs. Homosexuality thus stands for the thorough assumption of the negativity of the death drive, of withdrawing from reality into the real of the "night of the world:' Along these lines, Edelman opposes the radical ethics of homosexuality to the predominant obsession with posterity (i.e., children) : children are the "pathological" moment which binds us to pragmatic considerations and thus compels us to betray the radical ethics of jouissance.6t (Incidentally, does this line of thought􀄉the idea that homosexuality at its most fundamental involves the rejection of children-not justify those who argue that gay couples should not be allowed to adopt children 1) The figure of an innocent and helpless child is the ultimate ethical trap, the emblem-fetish of betraying the ethics of jouissance. Friedrich Nietzsche (a great admirer of Carmen) was the great philosopher of immoral ethics, and we should always remember that the title of Nietzsche's lnasterpiece is "genealogy of morals;' not "of ethics": the two are not the same. Morality is concerned with the symmetry of my relations to other humans; its zero-level rule is "do not do to me what you do not want Ine to do to yoU:'6Z Ethics, in contrast, deals with my consistency in relation to myself, my fidelity to my own desire. On the back flyleaf of the 1939 edition of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Stalin made the following note in red pencil: 1) Weakness 2) Idleness 3) Stupidity These are the only things that can be called vices. Everything else, in the absence of the aforementioned, is undoubtedly virtue. NB! If a man is 1) strong (spiritually), 2) active, 3) clever (or capable), then he is good, regardless of any other "vices"! ,) plus 3) make 2)." This is as concise as ever a formulation of immoral ethics; in contrast, a weakling who obeys moral rules and worries about his guilt stands for unethical morality, the target of Nietzsche's critique of resentment. It is a supreme irony (and one of the greatest cases of poetic justice) that, among American writers, the one who provided the most precise formulation of the same immoral ethics was none other than the rabidly anti-Communist Russian emigrant Ayn Rand, in her first (still moderate) US success, the play Night of January 16th. Although written in a traditional realist mode, this courtroom (melo )drama engages its spectators in a very contemporary, almost Brechtian, manner: at the beginning, the twelve jury members are randomly selected from among the theater audience; they are seated on the stage and, at the play's end, they briefly withdraw before returning to deliver the verdict of guilty or not guilty-Rand proVided different final lines depending on which it was. The decision they have to make is not only about the murder of Bjorn Faulkner, a ruthless Swedish tycoon: did Karen Andre, his devoted mistress and secretary, do it or not? It is also about two opposed ethics-to quote the play itself: if you value a strength that is its own motor, an audacity that is its own law, a spirit that is its own vindication-if you are able to admire a man who, no matter what mistakes he may have made in form, had never betrayed his essence: his selfesteem- if, deep in your hearts, you've felt a longing for greatness and for a sense of life beyond the lives around you, if you have known a hunger which gray timidity can't satisfy . . . 64 In short, if you advocate immoral ethics, you will find Karen not guilty; if, however, you believe in social respectability, in a life of service, duty, and unselfishness, etc., then you will flnd Karen guilty. **There is, however, a limit to tbis Stalinist immoral ethics: not that it is too immoral, but that it is secretly too moral, still relying on a figure of the big Other. In what is arguably the most intelligent legitimization of Stalinist terror, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Humanism and Terror Ii'om 1946, the terror is justified as a kind of wager on the h,future**, almost in the mode of Pascal: **if the final result of today's horror turns out to be a bright communist future, then this outcome will retroactively redeem the terrible things a revolutionary has to do today.** Along similar lines, even some Stalinists themselves-when forced to admit (mostly in private) that many of the victims of the purges were innocent, that they were accused and killed because "the Party needed their blood to fortify its unity"imagined a future moment of final victory when all the victims would be given their due, and their innocence and sacrifice for the Cause would be recognized. **This is what Lacan, in his seminar on Ethics, refers to as the "perspective of the Last Judgment;' a perspective even more clearly discernible in two key terms of the Stalinist discourse, "objective guilt" and "objective meaning": while you can be an honest individual who acts with the most sincere intentions, you are nonetheless "objectively guilty" if your acts serve reactionary forces-and it is, of course, the Party that decides what your acts "objectively mean."** Here, again, we get not only the perspective of the Last Judgment (from which the "objective meaning" of your acts is formulated), but also the agent in the present who already has the unique ability to jndge today's events and acts from this perspective.65 The name of Raskolnikov (the hero of Dostoyevsky's Crime and Punishment) evokes a split ( raskol); Raskolnikov is "the split one"bnt split between what and what? The standard answer is that he is "torn between the 'Napoleonic idea; the notion that all is permitted to a strong person, and the 'Russian idea' of selfless devotion to humanity"66-however, this version misses the properly "totalitarian" coincidence of the two ideas: it is my very selfless devotion to humanity, my awareness that I am an instrument of Humanity, which justifies my claim that all is permitted to me. The paradox is thus that what Raskolnikov lacks is the split itself, the distance between the two ideas, the "Napoleonic" and the "Russian:' **We can see now why Lacan's motto "i/ ny a pas de grand Autre" (there is no big Other) takes us to the very core of the ethical problematic: what it excludes is precisely this "perspective of the Last Judgment:' the idea that somewhereeven if as a thoroughly virtual reference point, even if we concede that we can never occupy its place and pass the actual judgment-there must be a standard which would allow us to take the measure of our acts and pronounce on their "true meaning:' their true ethical status.** Even Derrida's notion of "deconstruction as justice" seems to rely on a utopian hope which sustains the specter of "infinite justice:' forever postponed, always to come, but nonetheless here as the ultimate horizon of our activity. **The harshness of Lacanian ethics lies in its demand that we thoroughly relinquish this reference to the big Other-and its further wager is that not only does this renunciation not plunge us into ethical insecurity or relativism (or even sap the very fundamentals of ethical activity), but that renouncing the guarantee of some big Other is the very condition of a truly autonomous ethics**. Recall that the exemplary dream Freud used to illustrate his procedure of dream analysis was a dream about responsibility (Freud's own responsibility for the failure of his treatment of Irma)-this fact alone indicates that responsibility is a crucial Freudian notion. But how are we to conceive of this responsibility? How are we to avoid the common misperception that the basic ethical message of psychoanalysis is, precisely, that we should relieve ourselves of responsibility and instead place the blame on the Other ("since the Unconscious is the discourse of the Other, I am not responsible for its formations, it is the big Other who speaks through me, I am merely its instrument") ? **Lacan himself pointed the way out of this deadlock by referring to Kant's philosophy as the crucial antecedent of psychoanalytic ethics.**

#### The role of the judge is to be an analyst—vote neg to prefer not to adjudicate the aff in terms of their obsession with the last judgment, and their reintrenchment of ideology. The analysis is enough---the fantasy will reveal itself as long as we continue asking questions to expose their concealment of the lack---in other words, it’s your job to confuse and frustrate them via a refusal to partake in their politics – Dean 06:

Dean 6 Jodi, Prof of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, 2006, Zizek’s Politics. Xviii-xx Recut LHP PS

Žižek emphasizes that Lacan conceptualized this excessive place, this place without guarantees, in his formula for “the discourse of the analyst” (which I set out in Chapter Two). In psychoanalysis, the analyst just sits there, asking questionsfrom time to time. She is some kind of object or cipher onto which the analysand transfers love, desire, aggression, and knowledge. The analysand, in other words, proceeds through analysis by positing the analyst as someone who knows exactly what is wrong with him and exactly what he should do to get rid of his symptom and get better. But, really, the analyst does not know. Moreover, the analyst steadfastly refuses to provide the analysand with any answers whatsoever. No ideals, no moral certainty, no goals, no choices. Nothing. This is what makes the analyst so traumatic, Žižek explains, the fact that she refuses to establish a law or set a limit, that she does not function as some kind of new master.7 Analysis is over when the analysand accepts that the analyst does not know, that there is not any secret meaning or explanation, and then takes responsibility for getting on with his life. The challenge for the analysand, then, is freedom, autonomously determining his own limits, directly assuming his own enjoyment. So, again, the position of the analyst is in this excessive place as an object through which the analysand works through the analytical process. Why is the analyst necessary in the first place? If she is not going to tell the analysand what to do, how he should be living, then why does he not save his money, skip the whole process, and figure out things for himself? There are two basic answers. First, the analysand is not self-transparent. He is a stranger to himself, a decentered agent “struggling with a foreign kernel.”8 What is more likely than self-understanding, is self-misunderstanding, that is, one’s fundamental misperception of one’s own condition. Becoming aware of this misperception, grappling with it, is the work of analysis. Accordingly, second, the analyst is that external agent or position that gives a new form to our activity. Saying things out loud, presenting them to another, and confronting them in front of this external position concretizes and arranges our thoughts and activities in a different way, a way that is more difficult to escape or avoid. The analyst then provides a form through which we acquire a perspective on and a relation to our selves. Paul’s Christian collectives and Lenin’s revolutionary Party are, for Žižek, similarly formal arrangements, forms “for a new type of knowledge linked to a collective political subject.”9 Each provides an external perspective on our activities, a way to concretize and organize our spontaneous experiences. More strongly put, a political Party is necessary precisely because politics is not given; it does not arise naturally or organically out of the multiplicity of immanent flows and affects but has to be produced, arranged, and constructed out of these flows in light of something larger. In my view, when Žižek draws on popular culture and inserts himself into this culture, he is taking the position of an object of enjoyment, an excessive object that cannot easily be recuperated or assimilated. This excessive position is that of the analyst as well as that of the Party. Reading Žižek as occupying the position of the analyst tells us that it is wrong to expect Žižek to tell us what to do, to provide an ultimate solution or direction through which to solve all the world’s problems. The analyst does not provide the analysand with ideals and goals; instead, he occupies the place of an object in relation to which we work these out for ourselves. In adopting the position of the analyst, Žižek is also practicing what he refers to as “Bartleby politics,” a politics rooted in a kind of refusal wherein the subject turns itself into a disruptive (of our peace of mind!) violently passive object who says, “I would prefer not to.”10 Thus, to my mind, becoming preoccupied with Žižek’s style is like becoming preoccupied with what one’s analyst is wearing. Why such a preoccupation? How is this preoccupation enabling us to avoid confronting the truth of our desire, our own investments in enjoyment? How is complaining that Žižek (or the analyst) will not tell us what to do a way that we avoid trying to figure this out for ourselves?11 Reading Žižek in terms of an excessive object also means seeing his position as analogous to the formal position of the Party. Here it tells us that rather than a set of answers or dictates, Žižek is providing an intervention that cuts through the multiplicity of affects and experiences in which we find ourselves and organizes them from a specific perspective. As we shall see, for Žižek, this perspective is anchored in class struggle as the fundamental antagonism rupturing and constituting the social. So again, he does not give us an answer; he does not know what we should do, but his thought provides an external point in relation to which we can organize, consider, and formalize our experiences as ideological subjects.

## Case

#### No uniqueness – most of Chinese militarization isn’t private

Lee-Singer, 21, “China’s Space Program Is More Military Than You Might Think”, 7/16/21, Defense One, P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and securityTaylor A. Lee is an analyst with BluePath Labs, a DC-based consulting company that focuses on research, analysis, disruptive technologies, and wargaming. URL <https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/07/chinas-space-program-more-military-you-might-think/183790/>, KR

The militarized tilt of the Chinese space program complicates these plans. Space planning and directing organizations, the ground infrastructure supporting its space programs, and the taikonauts themselves are all under the purview of the People’s Liberation Army. Understanding these connections is important for any plans to cooperate with China in space, whether governmental or commercial.

On the organizational side, China’s equivalent to NASA is the civilian China National Space Administration, which has a focus on the space program’s international exchanges. It falls under the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which handles defense-related science and technology, including China’s state-owned defense conglomerates. However, unlike NASA, the CNSA doesn’t oversee China’s astronauts. The organization actually in charge of China’s manned space program is the China Manned Space Engineering Office, which is under China’s Central Military Commission Equipment Development Department.

Likewise, the infrastructure of China’s space program is also heavily militarized. The launch sites, control centers, and many of the satellites are directly run by the PLA. Taikonauts lift off from the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center (aka Base 20 of the PLA’s Strategic Support Force, its space and cyber arm); directed by the PLASSF’s Beijing Aerospace Flight Control Center, with Telemetry, Tracking and Control support from the Xi’an Satellite Control Center (aka the PLASSF’s Base 26); and land at one of two sites in Inner Mongolia operated by the two bases.

#### Circumvention - No separation between private/public in China – China would just take over its private space, making them public – Wei 20:

Wei, Lingling. 12/10/20. “China’s Xi Ramps Up Control of Private Sector. ‘We Have No Choice but to Follow the Party.’” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-xi-clampdown-private-sector-communist-party-11607612531>

**Xi** Jinping, **long distrustful of the private sector, is moving** assertively **to bring it to heel**. China’s most powerful leader in a generation wants even greater state control in the world’s second-largest economy, with **private firms** of all sizes **expected to fall in line**. **The government is installing more Communist Party officials inside private firms**, starving some of credit and demanding executives tailor their businesses to achieve state goals. **In some cases, it is taking charge entirely of companies** it regards as undisciplined, absorbing them into state-owned enterprises.

#### Chinese presence in space essential to prevent escalation and inevitable security conflict – Fabian 22:

[Fabian, Christopher David](https://www.proquest.com/indexinglinkhandler/sng/au/Fabian,+Christopher+David/$N). “A Neoclassical Realist's Analysis of Sino-U.S. Space Policy “ The University of North Dakota. ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2019. 13880083. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2581550024?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true DOA: 2/20/22

Morgan points out that the nature of space deterrence has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War. First, a decoupling of space and nuclear warfare has destroyed the tacit red lines that guaranteed an attack on space systems would result in nuclear retaliation.60 Furthermore, **technologies have been developed that allow for incremental escalation and nonlethal functional kills of space assets.61 A paradigm is created where escalation is probable**, but the extent to which it will happen is unknown. **This is a problem for Sino-U.S. space relations because China is a nuclear capable power who believes itself to have achieved nuclear deterrence with the United States, yet does not have the implied strategic understanding that it took the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. four decades to build.** The rules of the game have changed, but the danger of nuclear apocalypse is still real and a risk of miscalculation has increased. Morgan echoes Johnson-Freese’s assertion that the dual-use phenomenon complicates deterrence and extends the reasoning on offensive dominance by adding valuable insight on the state of first-strike stability. In short, first-strike stability is difficult to maintain because the disproportionate gain from a first strike outweighs any cost a recipient can impose in response. **The United States’ overwhelming reliance on and comparative advantage from space based effects gives a prospective attacker very high payoff and satellites being relatively soft targets increases the likelihood of success and further adds to the benefit of a first-strike.62 Conversely, the emphasis on system based warfare means that an effective attack on space assets drastically reduces the ability of the U.S. to impose costs. Also, its overreliance on space and the fragility of the space environment require an asymmetric response to both avoid a tit-for-tat spiral and protect the continued use of the domain**. Furthermore, a lack of space situational awareness (SSA) prevents a rapid response.63 **Chinese military planners are acutely aware of the asymmetric advantage to be gained from a first-strike in space and have integrated it into military doctrine.** **This further strengthens the argument of space warfare as a flash point in East Asia.** The structural factors examined in the literature thus far paint a bleak picture for a peaceful restructuring of East Asia. However, **a bipartisan grand strategy that preempts conflict, is sustained and refined over decades, and has an acute sense of both a competitor and one’s own culture and history may be able to subvert structural determinism**.64 When imperfect rationality and miscalculation results in deterrence failure it is difficult to underestimate the importance of understanding a competitor’s decision making apparatus. Strategic culture, political climate, and soft power interactions are the core of this apparatus. Joan Johnson-Freese, who is equal parts East Asia policy and space policy expert, asserts that, “it might be generally possible to grasp the mechanics of the Chinese space program without the benefits of historical information, but the likelihood of truly understanding the policy aspects without this contextual information is slightly less, and attempts at analysis and extrapolation become superficial at best.”65 Likewise, competitive strategy will be ineffective absent an understanding of one’s own limitations. Resources such as latent military capacity, budget, political capitol, strategic culture, and soft power/international prestige should be easy to calculate, but many times within the space program’s short history the failure to grasp internal limitations has been a stumbling block. Henry Kissinger’s On China is a nuanced examination of Chinese strategic culture that benefits from the author’s understanding of Chinese history and the nation’s role in late20th/early-21st century global power politics. He conveys a unified message through On China, that continual diplomatic engagement between the two powers is the key to peace and develops two motifs throughout the work. First, misapprehension of Chinese intent by western powers has repeatedly resulted in conflict, which could be avoided with better understanding of Chinese strategic culture. Traditional Chinese strategic culture, shaped for millennia by geography and Confucian principals, was not destroyed by Mao and the communist revolution as many assert. Kissinger uses the traditional martial games of wei qi (go) and chess to exemplify Chinese and western strategic cultures respectively. Where wei qi teaches the art of strategic flexibility by emphasizing encirclement, protracted and asymmetric warfare, generating unperceptively small advantages, and momentum; chess teaches total victory achieved by attrition, decisive moves, centers of gravity, and symmetry. Carl von Clausewitz teaches that war is policy by other means, inferring war as a distinct phase of politics; while Sun Tsu emphasizes victory before fighting by achieving psychological advantage with military means as a small part of overall strategy. The ideal Chinese military conflict is geographically limited and easily contained; the American way of war concludes only upon total victory.66 Kissinger then describes the feedback loop that results from conflicting strategic perspectives. **The western desire for control threatens Chinese freedom of maneuver and exacerbates their siege mentality. In response, China assumes a policy of active defense (preemption) in order to maintain the strategic initiative.** This, in turn, is seen as hostile by the west and typically results in escalation in order to establish deterrence through cost imposition. The western idea of deterrence is incompatible with ambiguity and flexibility while Chinese preemption demands it.67 This results in a distinguishable pattern. **First, a state consolidates power on China’s peripher**y, surrounding China and threatening its structural integrity on both physical and psychological levels. **Second**, ever aware of shi, **Chinese strategists employ measures to maintain their strategic flexibility and prevent total encirclement**. **Third, the peripheral power** misinterprets preemption for aggression and **escalates the conflict**. **At this point, China is either able to contain the threat and achieve its geopolitical aims or it is too weak to do so and is thrown into existential crisis**. In the 20th century, this pattern has been exemplified by Chinese involvement in the Korean War and its continued support of an independent state to buffer the U.S. alliance bloc from a historical ingress point to the Chinese mainland; its own Vietnam War to prevent the emergence of a competitive power bloc led by Vietnam in Southeast Asia; and Chinese political maneuvering against the Soviet Union to prevent its consolidation of power over the Eurasian landmass. Disregarding the similarities between these disputes and the current Sino-U.S. position in East Asia is impossible.68 Second, the Sino-centric worldview is rising in China as she emerges from a century of humiliation to become an economic and military superpower. The over-proselytized American belief that the implementation of democracy should be the end goal of global politics and unapologetically moralist positions conflict with Sino-centrism. It is seen by China as an extension of colonial interventionism and a threat to their fiercely held autonomy. U.S. diplomacy is often contingent on the improvement of China’s human rights record. Widespread support for China’s various separatist movements and public outcry over the Tiananmen Square incident has exacerbated this problem. American reluctance to recognize the legitimacy of a communist government, give up democratization as long term policy goals, or give China its due in international relations has weakened Sino-U.S. relations. America’s moralist rather than pragmatic approach to policy threatens China’s delicate social order and undermines CCP legitimacy, resulting in missed diplomatic opportunities. Other policy analysts are certainly influenced by Kissinger, but add their own insight into Chinese Strategic culture. Kenneth Johnson and Andrew Scobell writing for the Strategic Studies Institute both attribute the apparent cognitive dissonance in Chinese policy to a curious blend of Confucian ideals and realpolitik thought, supporting Kissinger’s assertion that Confucianism is not dead. There is a cult of defense within China, accompanying a deeply held belief that China’s strategic culture is overwhelmingly pacifist.69 However, preemptive action is permissible as long as it can be a justifiable “defense” of Chinese strategic interests.70 In addition, China bemoans aggressive territorial expansion and hegemony by force. This historical sensitivity has only been exacerbated by the “century of humiliation” at the hands of European powers.71 However, the benevolent expansion of influence and the use of force for Chinese national unification is just. **Furthermore, the Chinese fear of encirclement could cause a disproportionate reaction to the U.S. force realignment and restructuring of alliances in East Asia.72 This could exacerbate the worsening of the security dilemma that alliance forming typically causes**. Joan-Johnson Freese emphasizes the influence of Confucianism in internal decision making and the penchant for isolationism. Confucianism emphasizes peace, order, and knowing one’s place within society. This invites authoritarianism and the Chinese people have little experience with participation in the political process. Rather, there is an instability lurking beneath the calm surface of society that leaders must constrain and satisfy in order to maintain their mandate to rule.73 The social contract has a simple results based nature where political stability and prosperity is exchanged for the continued political power. The Chinese Communist Party then is less beholden to communist ideology than it is to continued prosperity.74 Also, despite the negative connotation of nepotism in the West, it is an institution of Chinese culture (known as Guan Xi).75 From the outsider, the familial ties, importance of relationships, compartmentalization, and ambiguity in the Chinese bureaucracy are confusing and frustrating. This research paints the picture of the U.S. and China as diametrically opposed cultures that are almost designed to create misunderstanding between the two. Therefore, being aware of cultural and political sensitives is necessary to create sound strategy. Michael Pillsbury identifies 16 psycho-cultural pressure points where, if correctly considered in reassurance, cost imposition, or dissuasion strategies, will yield disproportionately effects whether they be positive or negative. Each of these factors are referred to as “fears”. 76 Eleven of the sixteen fears are linked to the ability of the U.S. military to project power into East Asia and the strategic sea lines of communication from the Strait of Malacca to the Bohai Gulf, which is contingent on the ability to deliver space effects in support of U.S. military operation. Pillsbury identifies the fear of attack on their anti-satellite capabilities as a specific Chinese fear, but warfighting in the space domain is intrinsically linked to the other 11. Another of the sixteen fears is the fear of escalation and loss of control. This is particularly important because the **Chinese view ASAT** weaponry **as** a legitimate cost imposition option **designed to limit conflict**. Contrast that with the American strategy of threatening escalation in order to prevent the spread of the conflict into space and implicit red lines that fail to account for limited conflict in a strategic domain. **Space’s role in soft power links it to two final fears, the fear of regional competitors and the fear of internal instability. Space technology development is essential to the CCP’s techno-nationalist narrative as it is assigned great importance internally to strengthen CCP’s mandate to rule and externally to legitimize China as a regional leader**. According to Sun Tzu, “if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.”77 While studying a competitor’s strategic culture is useful to avoid mirroring; understanding one’s own strategic culture is vital to effectively utilizing national resources and avoiding bias.78 This thesis benefits from being able to perform a thick analysis of American strategic culture using a panoply of English language sources. Russell Howard describes American strategic culture as that of a traditional sea power with moralistic overtones. The American military is highly constrained by legal and moral considerations, meaning that in order for the U.S. to enter a war there must be an existential threat to its national security or a crusade of good versus evil.79 This results in national mobilization so that the U.S. can “bear the burden of a long twilight struggle against the common enemies of man,” to borrow from John F Kennedy’s inaugural address. 80 America’s history is punctuated with these struggles from the Civil War to WWII. This ideology has become more prominent since the Vietnam War, which entrenched the view that, “when America uses force in the world, the cause must be just, the goal must be clear, and the victory must be overwhelming.”81 Max Boot in his three books provides excellent analysis of how the global wars of the 20th century, the rise of technology, and casualty aversion has impacted American strategic thought in the 21st century.82 American space power doctrine has shown itself to be a microcosm of its strategic culture rather than an exception to it. In his influential work, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age, Walter McDougall asserts that the space age did not usher in a new era of cooperation, nor was it disconnected from the geopolitical mechanisms of earth-bound policy. Rather, it simply extended business as usual to a new realm.83 The American technocracy that the genesis of the space age solidified and the international legal framework that U.S.-Soviet competition created persist in the 21st century.