# Harvard r6

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must not defend a non-status quo policy option. To clarify, the affirmative may not fiat.

#### Violation: They do, they fiat states ratifying the moon treaty that haven’t.

#### Vote neg:

#### 1] Precision – the resolution doesn’t entail an actor nor does it an action – they are definitionally not topical or even a subset of the resolution –

#### Definition of ‘is’ – Webster ND

Merriam Webster, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/is>

#### is Definition of is (Entry 1 of 4) present tense third-person singular of BE **dialectal present tense** first-person and third-person singular **of BE** dialectal present tense plural of BE

#### Outweighs – Dialectical present tense means logical coherence which implies no implementation

Your Dictionary ND, "Dialectical Meaning," No Publication, <https://www.yourdictionary.com/dialectical> Cho

The definition of dialectical is a discussion that includes logical reasoning and dialogue, or something having the sounds, vocabulary and grammar of a specific way of speaking. An example of something dialectical is a Lincoln Douglass style of debate, where both parties argue a point in a logical order. Of, or pertaining to dialectic; logically reasoned through the exchange of opposing ideas.

#### Precision outweighs –

#### A] stasis point – the topic is the only reasonable focal point for debate – anything else destroys the possibility of debate because we will be two ships passing –

#### B] internal link turn – violating semantics justifies the aff talking about whatever with zero neg prep or prediction which is the most unfair and educational –

#### C] Jurisdiction – you can’t vote for them because the ballot and the tournament invitation say to vote for the better debater in the context of the resolution –

#### D] objectivity – only semantics are objective whereas pragmatics are subjective which means intervention

#### 2] Limits – they explode them – they are super Extra T and justify an infinite possible number of affirmatives and different actors – none of which are part of the resolution which means there is no prediction ground. Multiple Impacts – A] Stable Ground – they deck neg preparation ability and impose an infinitely reciprocal research burden on the negative to have to guess the infinite policy options and possible permutations and to cut specific disads to those - B] Predictability – no actor or action means its impossible to have a way to predict affs on this topic which decks quality engagement and education – C] Infinite Abuse – being non-topical justifies picking a trivially true aff which means they always win

#### 3] TVA – don’t defend an action and use ideal theory to explain why appropriation is bad - That’s better – it promotes in-depth philosophical clash over law that’s constitutive to LD

#### Vote on fairness because A] debate is a game that needs rules and B] the round is already skewed so it’s the only thing you can accurately evaluate. Competing interps because reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention. Drop the debater A] to deter future abuse B] dropping the aff advocacy is functionally the same C] abuse precludes evaluation of substance. No RVIs, A] Logic – I’m fair vote for me makes no sense, outweighs since logic frames all args, B] it incentivizes abuse to bait theory, C] norms setting – if I realize in the 1ar the interp is bad RVIs force me to defend bad norms which outweighs because theory’s purpose is to create good debate norms

## 2

#### Permissibility negates – unjust is defined as morally prohibited or bad which means permissibility is definitionally negative ground as proving the affirmative would require proving a prohibition which permissibility denies

#### The meta-ethic is practical reason.

#### A] Bindingness – Any obligation must not only tell us what is good, but why we ought to be good or else agents can reject the value of goodness itself. That means ethics must start with what is constitutive of agents since it traces obligations to features that are intrinsic to being an agent – as an agent you must follow certain rules. Only practical agency is constitutive since agents can use rationality to decide against other values but the act of deciding to reject practical agency engages in it.

#### B] Action theory – every moral analysis requires an action to evaluate, but actions are infinitely divisible into smaller meaningless movements. The act of stealing can be reduced to going to a house, entering, grabbing things, and leaving, all of which are distinct actions without moral value. Only the practical decision to steal ties these actions together to give them any moral value.

#### That justifies universalizability.

#### A] The principle of equality is true since anything else assigns moral value to contingent factors like identity and justifies racism, and the principle of non-contradiction is true since 2+2 can’t equal 4 for me and not for you meaning ethical statements true for one must be true for all.

#### B] Ethics must be defined a priori because of the is ought gap – experience only tells us what is since that’s what we perceive, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises to make a moral theory. Applying reason to a priori truth results in universal obligations.

#### Prefer universalizability additionally,

#### An intrinsic feature to any action is the acceptance of the goodness of universal freedom, Gewirth 84 bracketed for grammar and gendered language

[Alan Gewirth, () "The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative" American Journal Of Jurisprudence: Vol. 29: Iss. 1 Article 5, 1984, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol29/iss1/5/, DOA:9-10-2018 // WWBW Recut LHP AV]

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes [t]he[y] regards as good.** Hence, **[t]he[y] must regard as necessary goods the freedom** and well being **that [is]** are the generic features and **necessary conditions of** his **action** and successful action in general. From this, it follows that **every agent logically must hold or accept** that he has **rights to these conditions**. For if he were **to deny** that he has **these rights**, then he **would** have to **admit that it is permissible** for other persons **to remove** from him the very **conditions** of freedom and well-being **that**, as **an agent**, he **must have**. But **it is contradictory** for him **to hold both that [t]he[y] must have these conditions and also that he may not have them.** Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, **every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency** on which he must ground his own right-claims. What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action.

#### That justifies a minimalist libertarian state – Otteson 09

James R. Otteson, 2009, “Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism,” The Independent Review, v. 13, n. 3., Winter 2009, available at [https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir\_13\_03\_4\_otteson.pdf //](https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_13_03_4_otteson.pdf%20//) LHP PS

**The link between Kantian agency and the limited libertarian state is plausible, and indeed the former explains the latter;** moreover, **the evidence suggests that Kant himself believed that the former implied the latter**. That conclusion leaves us, however, with the final question of how exactly to characterize Kant’s position. To approach this question, consider two claims. **First, Kant believes that people create a state in order to protect their rational, autonomous agency and that this state is justified insofar as it protects that agency.** **Moreover, coercive state action can also be justified if it serves only to secure the conditions necessary for continued or more effective protection of this agency**. A plausible extension of this argument is that the **conditions of morality themselves are possible only within the protections of a Kantian minimal state**. Given that extension, Kant’s endorsement of limited, state-based welfare measures might have been motivated by a belief that they exemplify **state coercion necessary to secure the conditions of agency**. For the reasons explained earlier, I deny that such institutions can be defended successfully on these grounds, but the particular application notwithstanding, we may be able to endorse—consistently and rationally—Kant’s principle of granting the state those, and only those, coercive powers necessary for the protection of “right.” Second, Kant may not have been as convinced as one might be today of intermediary “civil” institutions’ ability to do the work of foundling hospitals and so on. Substantial evidence now attests, however, to the perhaps surprisingly effective scope and reach of civil society’s private institutions to find and meet the needs of society’s most destitute (for a recent treatment, see Beito, Gordon, and Tabarrok 2002). Kant might well have been unaware of such institutions, or—for reasons owing to his particular time and place—he might have been positively suspicious of them, including organized churches. I believe these two points absolve Kant of the claim of contradiction. He can claim consistently that the state’s purpose is to protect individual free agency and that it is justified in using coercion to secure the conditions that allow such protection—but not in any other circumstances. If this account correctly represents Kant’s position, then **we may properly describe him as a political libertarian, though one sensitive to libertarianism’s limitations. Thus, we might aptly call his position constrained libertarianism.**

#### Vote neg –

#### 1] Injustice requires someone wronged, but initial acquisition doesn’t violate any entity’s rights– therefore, private appropriation of outer space cannot be unjust, Feser 05:

Edward Feser, [Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College] “THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION,” 2005 //LHP AV

The reason **there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition** of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of **justice**, that is to say, simply **does not apply** to initial acquisition. **It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place**. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose** **an individual** **A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R**. **For it to be** the case that A commits an **injustice** in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that **there is some individual** **B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice**. **But for B to have been wronged** by A’s acquisi- tion of R, **B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** **a right to R**. By hypothesis, **however**, **B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all**. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, **the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R**. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer**. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

#### 2] The aff violates the rights of private entities – a] no one owns space and can exclude them on legitimate grounds, and they want to go to space so stopping them is a contradiction in will b] private entities expend and have expended resources to claim things in space like making rockets or rocket fuel, preventing that is a violation of property rights since you are not allowing them to use what they own as they want

## Case

### util

#### 1] infinite consequences 2] induction fails, practical reason solves 3] Aggregation fails – there is no one for whom aggregate good is good-for, only individual reasoners. Korsgaard:

Christine Korsgaard, “The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature” Harvard, n.d. RE

According to the second view I will consider, hedonism, the good just is pleasurable experience or consciousness and the absence of painful experience or consciousness. What makes a being capable of having a final good is simply that the being is conscious. Otherwise, its good is not relative to its nature. As is often noticed, on this theory it is a real question whether some of the other animals might not have a better life, or at least be capable of having a better life, than human beings, given their apparent enthusiasm for simple and readily available joys. Although I’ll treat it as a separate theory, hedonism, I believe, has an inherent tendency to collapse either into a version of the intrinsic value theory, or into a version of the third view I am about to describe. Obviously, it is possible to regard hedonism simply as a particular instance of the intrinsic value theory, one that singles out conscious experience as the only possible bearer of intrinsic value. But I think this way of looking at hedonism does not do justice to the intuition that has made hedonism seem plausible to so many thinkers, which is precisely the idea that the final good must have an irreducibly subjective or relational element. That is, what makes hedonism seem plausible is precisely the idea that the final good for a sensate being must be something that can be felt or experienced as a good by that being. It is something that can be perceived or experienced as welcome or positive from the being’s own point of view, and that is therefore relative to the being’s own point of view.9 The intrinsic value version of hedonism tries to capture the essentially subjective element of the final good by attaching objective intrinsic value to a subjective experience, but when this move is made the essentially relational or relative character of subjectivity tends to drop out. The goodness of the experience is detached from its goodness for the being who is having the experience, and instead is located in the character of the experience itself. This defect shows up most clearly in utilitarian versions of hedonism, which allow us to add the goodness of pleasant experiences across the boundaries between persons or between animals. There is no subject for whom the total of these aggregated experiences is a good, so the aggregate good has completely lost that relational character: the goods are detached from the beings from whom they are good. This relational element of value, I believe, is better captured by the third theory I am about to describe.

### Debris

#### Zero link to the advantage:

#### 1] Asteroid mining would occur on asteroids, which are literally in the asteroid belt. They have ZERO internal link about how space dust would affect satelites that are around Earth. The Asteroid Belt is quite far, Williams 16

AUGUST 10, 2016 BY MATT WILLIAMS, “How Far is the Asteroid Belt from Earth?” <https://www.universetoday.com/130136/far-asteroid-belt-earth/> //LHP AV

Distance from Earth: The distance between the Asteroid Belt and Earth varies considerably depending on where we measure to. Based on its average distance from the Sun, the distance between Earth and the closest edge of the Belt can be said to be between 1.2 to 2.2 AUs, or 179.5 and 329 million km (111.5 and 204.43 million mi). But of course, at any given time, part of the Asteroid Belt will be on the opposite side of the Sun relative to us as well. From this vantage point**, the distance between Earth and the Asteroid Belt ranges from** 3.2 and 4.2 AU – 478.7 to 628.3 million km (**297.45 to 390.4 million mi**). To put that in perspective, **the distance** between Earth and the Asteroid Belt **ranges from being slightly more than the distance between the Earth and the Sun** (1 AU), to being the same as the distance between Earth and Jupiter (4.2 AU) when they are at their closest.

#### And, Jupiter is our savior, Louise 21:

Nickie Louise, NOVEMBER 7, 2021,“Here is how Jupiter protects Earth from asteroids and saves us from destruction,” <https://techstartups.com/2021/11/07/jupiter-protects-earth-asteroids/> //LHP AV

**Have you ever wondered why asteroids have not hit our planet?** **Asteroids are small**, rocky, or metallic objects orbiting the Sun. Most Asteroids are usually a little over 1 meter in diameter. The largest asteroid is Ceres, which has a diameter of 965 kilometers (600 miles). But most asteroids, including Ceres, are located in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter, but some come near to or cross Earth’s orbit. So how is **our planet protected from these asteroids**? **The answer lies in Jupiter’s gravity**. We all know that Jupiter is the largest planet in our solar system. Jupiter is also a gaseous beast of a planet 318 times more massive, 11 times larger than Earth, and 2.5 times bigger than all the other planets combined. Surprisingly, most planetary systems don’t have a gas giant like ours; only about 15 percent of planetary systems appear to. For a long time, scientists haven’t exactly known what lies beyond the violent swirling clouds in the atmosphere. As it turns out, Jupiter is more than just an enormous ball of gas spinning a few hundred million miles farther out in the solar system–**Jupiter protects Earth and the other inner planets from destruction by deflecting comets and asteroids**. According to a paper published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in May 2015, two scientists are suggesting that the inner solar system once played host to a bunch of “super-Earths” — planets that were larger than our own but smaller than Neptune. Jupiter, however, put an end to those early occupiers of the inner orbits, bulldozing in and sweeping them into the sun. The two scientists suggested that the inner solar system once played host to a bunch of “super-Earths” — planets that were larger than our own but smaller than Neptune. The planet is so vast that its gravity helps to pull and interrupt most potential asteroids from hitting Earth. There is more gravity on Jupiter than on Earth. Someone who weighs 100 pounds on Earth would weigh about 240 pounds on Jupiter. Konstantin Batygin of Caltech, one of the authors of the paper said: “Our work suggests that Jupiter’s inward-outward migration could have destroyed the first generation of planets and set the stage for the formation of the mass-depleted terrestrial planets that our solar system has today.” Jupiter, however, put an end to those early occupiers of the inner orbits, bulldozing in and sweeping them into the sun, according to a paper published this week in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Jupiter’s epic, the planet-shattering journey toward the sun and back out again laid the foundations for the creation of Earth and the other smaller planets nearby — Mercury, Venus, and Mars. So next time when you look at the sky, take a moment to thank Jupiter. Below is a video of how Jupiter saves Earth from destruction.

#### If it can deflect asteroids, it would obviously pull space dust.