# Glenbrooks r7

## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater must not specify a government that is not just.

#### Violation: They specify the Brazil.

[**Brazil**](https://en.granma.cu/mundo/2019-12-31/brazilian-inventory-a-nation-as-rich-as-it-is-unjust) **is not just. Betto 19,**

informacion@granmai.cu, Author: Frei Betto |, and Frei Betto. “Brazilian Inventory: A Nation as Rich as It Is Unjust.” Responsive Image, 31 Dec. 2019, https://en.granma.cu/mundo/2019-12-31/brazilian-inventory-a-nation-as-rich-as-it-is-unjust.

**Since the military dictatorship** (1964-1985), **there have never been so many setbacks in the field of human rights in Brazil as there are now, with Bolsonaro**. **We are governed by authorities who insist on impunity for the repressive forces**, providing a green light for the summary elimination of suspects, even innocent citizens, like the nine young men murdered by the Sao Paulo Military Police, in the favela of Paraisópolis, during the early hours December 1. In Rio alone, in 2019, six children were killed by "stray bullets.”Mining, logging and agricultural companies invade protected lands. **Indigenous leaders are murdered,** including Paulo Paulino Guajajara, in Maranhão, on November 1, for defending his people's reserve from illegal logging activities. Cases of femicide are multiplying; while, every four minutes a woman is raped, in the country.The president of the Palmares Foundation, Sérgio Camargo, whose appointment is being challenged in court, sullies the memory of Zumbi, the hero of Quilombola, when he declares that there is no racism in Brazil, and that "slavery was beneficial for its descendants"... In Paraná, journalist Aluízio Palmar is prosecuted for denouncing that torture is a regular practice in the First Border Battalion garrison in Foz de Iguazú. The country has more than 12 million unemployed, and the government has twice reduced the 2020 minimum wage.Around Brazilian farms and beside roads, 80,000 families are camping. Former President Lula is convicted without evidence. **Media that criticize the government are sabotaged with the cancellation of official announcements, and private companies are threatened if they advertise their products on these outlets. Students are encouraged to inform on teachers who do not follow the Planalto agenda.** The government has never condemned paramilitaries who, disrespecting the law, promote the weapons and ammunition market fueled by territorial disputes among drug traffickers. **In addition to violating human rights the rights of nature are also trampled**. The Amazon rainforest is criminally burned to make way for cattle and soybeans, while Bolsonaro declares that burning is "a cultural problem." Justice proceeds slowly and leniently to punish those responsible for the tragedies caused by the rupture of the Mariana (MG) dam in 2015 and the Bramadinho (MG) dam in 2019, which claimed 382 lives. The oil spilled on the Brazilian coast is not being cleaned up with the urgency or rigor that the situation demands. According to Marcelo Neri of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, in ten years Brazil was been able to lift 30 million people from poverty. But between 2015 and 2017, 6.3 million fell back into misery. In the last three years, poverty increased by 33%. According to the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), 58.4 million people now live below the poverty line, with monthly incomes of less than R$406. The list of those excluded is only increasing: between 2016 and 2017 the figure grew from 25.7% to 26.5%, which means the exclusion of almost two million people. According to this data, 55 million Brazilians, 40% of whom live in the Northeast, suffer from deprivation. The average income of the rich increased by 3%, while that of the poor declined 20%. Diseases that had been eradicated have returned, and infant mortality is advancing among the poorest families. **We are a rich nation, very rich. But extremely unjust**. Brazil's GDP is 6.3 trillion real, which is enough to guarantee 30,000 per capita annually, for each of its 210 million inhabitants. Or R$10,000 per month for every family of four. Human rights are not "the stuff of criminals," as those who never think about the rights of the poor boast. This framework is legally and normatively key to our civilizing progress. **Although human rights are systematically violated by those who claim to be democrats and Christians, there is no remedy**. It is now up to the UN to call on countries to draft and sign the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Nature, our "common home," in the words of Pope Francis.

#### Vote neg –

#### 1] Precision –

#### A] stasis point – the topic is the only reasonable focal point for debate – anything else destroys the possibility of debate because we will be two ships passing

#### B] internal link turn – violating semantics justifies the aff talking about whatever with zero neg prep or prediction which is the most unfair and uneducational

#### C] Jurisdiction – you can’t vote for them because the ballot and the tournament invitation say to vote for the better debater in the context of the resolution

#### 2] Limits – there are almost 200 national governments in the world which is an unmanageable burden, especially for a 3 week camp. Only imposing restrictions via the word just can ensure debates are limited and full of clash

#### 3] TVA – use ideal theory instead. That’s better – a] promotes in-depth philosophical clash over labor law that’s constittuive to LD b] solves your offense because you can indicate you would solve these problems in an ideal world too – no reason you need the US in particular

## 2

#### Bolsanero going to lose 2022 in the status quo because the Brazilian economy is bad. Reuters 21,

Person. “Lula Retains Solid Lead over Bolsonaro for 2022 Brazil Race, Poll Shows.” *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 17 Sept. 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/lula-retains-solid-lead-over-bolsonaro-2022-brazil-race-poll-shows-2021-09-17/?scrlybrkr=fc8b4d04.

BRASILIA, Sept 17 (Reuters) - Brazil's leftist former President Luiz Inacio **Lula** **da Silva** **remains ahead of far-right President Jair Bolsonaro** by a significant margin **in voter preferences for the 2022 elections**, a survey by pollster Datafolha showed on Friday.

Voter support for Lula slipped to 44% from 46% in July, and Bolsonaro gained a percentage point to 26%, according to the poll, which asked voters to chose as if the election were now.

In a simulated runoff between the two, Lula would win 56% of votes versus 31% for the incumbent, compared to a 58%-31% advantage in the last poll. The variation since July fell within the poll's margin of error.

Other polls also show **Lula's clear advantage as Bolsonaro's popularity slips due to rising inflation, high unemployment** and his handling of the world's second-deadliest COVID-19 outbreak.

#### But it’s close—if he wins enough votes to force it to a runoff, the outcome flips. Bnamericas 11-21,

“BNAMERICAS - Spotlight: Brazil's Presidential Candidates.” *BNamericas.com*, Nov. 2021, https://www.bnamericas.com/en/features/spotlight-brazils-presidential-candidates.

**The incumbent’s approval rating has fallen over his handling of the pandemic to which added an economic slowdown and rising inflation.** According to recent surveys, Bolsonaro would win enough votes to make it to the second round, which could flip his chances. **“A president who runs for reelection can never be considered a card out of the deck**, because due to his position he has much power to change de game,” Creomar de Sousa, CEO of consulting firm Dharma Political Risk and Strategy, told BNamericas. **Bolsonaro is acting accordingly. Earlier this month, he made headway after the lower house approved a constitutional amendment that enables 90bn reais (US$16.4bn) to be added to the budget. Most of the resources are planned to go to a new social program called Auxílio Brasil, which replaces the popular Bolsa Familia program implemented by Lula. Auxílio Brasil involves monthly payments of up 400 reais for low-income families, which could improve support for Bolsonaro and represent an achievement he will highlight.** In addition, Bolsonaro is negotiating PL party membership. Currently without a party, he must join one to be eligible to run. PL is a powerful centrist force, and accepting Bolsonaro would send a strong sign of support.

#### Bolsanero in power means deforestation in the Amazon will never end. His supporters hate the amazon. Steunkel and Anderson

Stuenkel, Oliver, and Paul Anderson. “Bolsonaro Can't End Deforestation in the Amazon – Even If He Wants To.” *New Statesman*, 19 Nov. 2021, https://www.newstatesman.com/world/2021/11/bolsonaro-cant-end-deforestation-in-the-amazon-even-if-he-wants-to.

Brazil gave climate activists a reason to cheer at Cop26 in Glasgow. Astoundingly, Jair Bolsonaro’s government announced that it would [reduce](https://twitter.com/Itamaraty_EN/status/1455230465745563656?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1455230465745563656%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.bloomberg.com%2Fnews%2Farticles%2F2021-11-01%2Fmethane-super-emitter-brazil-signs-pledge-to-cut-emissions) methane emissions and – perhaps even more importantly – [end illegal deforestation by 2028](https://www.newstatesman.com/environment/cop26/2021/11/how-significant-is-world-leaders-pledge-to-end-deforestation). This marked a stark contrast to the president’s systemic weakening of environmental protections since taking office three years ago, which has contributed to the [highest deforestation rates](https://www.gov.br/inpe/pt-br/assuntos/ultimas-noticias/divulgacao-de-dados-prodes.pdf) in more than a decade. Yet such promises amount to little more than window dressing meant to assuage international critics. **The Brazilian government’s pledges made in Glasgow cannot be taken seriously** for a simple reason: they would hurt Bolsonaro’s chances to win re-election next year. The October 2022 election already promises to be an epic battle against Lula da Silva, who governed the country from 2003 to 2010, and who is leading most polls. Loosening restrictions against deforestation and weakening Ibama, Brazil’s environmental watchdog, was one of Bolsonaro’s key campaign promises in 2018. Breaking it would risk eroding his support among a key constituency: illegal miners and loggers, land-grabbers and small to medium-scale farmers who, contrary to Brazil’s corporate *agronegócio*, care little about climate change and the growing risk of consumer boycotts and [restrictions on imports](https://www.fitchratings.com/research/corporate-finance/cop26-deforestation-plan-is-neutral-to-brazilian-meatpacker-ratings-08-11-2021) of Brazilian products. These groups are represented in Brazil’s Congress by the highly influential “cattle caucus”. Angering them would be the equivalent of Donald Trump announcing, less than a year prior to an election, that he would tear down the wall along the Mexican border: confusing his supporters, while hardly swaying voters left of the centre. So far, **Bolsonaro has been willing to accept the cost of courting these supporters, from displeasing powerful investors concerned about soaring deforestation rates to international villain status** and the suspension of large-scale payments such as the Amazon Fund, financed by Norway and Germany. As Bolsonaro’s former foreign minister **Ernesto Araújo proudly**[**declared**](https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/opiniao/2020/10/paria-com-orgulho.shtml)**, if Brazil’s strategy turned it into a pariah, then “we shall be that pariah”.\** Those hoping that Bolsonaro will stick to Cop26 pledges fail to take into account that, in an extremely polarised society like Brazil, issues such as climate change and deforestation have become identity-defining questions where compromise can be labelled as treason. **That explains why the president, whose resolute scepticism of the science of climate change is a key element of his anti-establishment narrative, has preferred to exploit that polarisation rather than accepting international payments to help protect the forest.** “Let them keep their money and let them help Angela Merkel reforest Germany,” [Bolsonaro said](https://www.france24.com/en/20190819-bolsonaro-takes-on-norway-for-whaling-but-bungles-it) after Berlin cut payments in 2019. His depiction of international NGOs and foreign governments concerned about deforestation as outsiders plotting to undermine Brazil’s sovereignty over the Amazon reliably mobilises followers of pro-Bolsonaro WhatsApp and Telegram groups. At times, even moderates are forced to side with Bolsonaro when Western observers use rhetoric that, while mostly well intentioned, sounds paternalistic and interventionist to Brazilian ears. When Emmanuel Macron suggested, in 2019, that the Amazon should have an “[international status](https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/should-the-international-community-protect-the-amazon-rainforest/story-GpdO1VBfISdi680K0YaZ7J.html)“, or when international observers [argue](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-10-19/climate-crisis-international-order-isnt-ready) that Brazil should be seen as the Amazon’s “custodian” rather than its “owner”, Bolsonaro has been able to stir up “rally-around-the-flag” support. Making meaningful progress on ending deforestation in Brazil would require both a radical U-turn by Bolsonaro in environmental politics – such as massively strengthening Ibama, which he despises – as well as a profound change in the government’s overall relationship with the rest of the world. The government would need to deal with deforestation data in a transparent manner – the opposite of what happened at Cop26, where the government [withheld](https://www.gov.br/inpe/pt-br/assuntos/ultimas-noticias/divulgacao-de-dados-prodes.pdf) information that deforestation had increased 22 per cent over the past year. At home, it would require working with civil society, anathema to a president who dreams of concentrating power in the executive and who regards the likes of Trump and Viktor Orbán as his role models.  **If Bolsonaro loses the election next year to a climate-conscious candidate (and, indeed, accepts the transfer of power), ending deforestation in Brazil by the end of the decade would still be an extraordinary challenge. If he wins, it becomes an impossible dream.**

## Case

#### Recognizing a right to strike reduces revolutionary potential and fractures class organizing – turns the perm and both advantages and is a link.

Crépon 19 Mark Crépon (French philosopher), translated by Micol Bez “The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin’s ‘Toward the Critique of Violence,’” Critical Times, 2:2, August 2019, DOI 10.1215/26410478-7708331

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for Walter Benjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­ tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains. Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­ tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that law’s interest in monopolizing violence vis­à­vis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself. [This is the possibility] that violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law, not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.”1 In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class struggle. To begin with, the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the recognizable forms that this violence can take. However, this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is, in fact, the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike. Thus, the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within (and via) the law the relative violence of class struggles. We might consider this to be the per­ fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of ques­ tioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider. First, is it legitimate to present the strike as a form of violence? Who has a vested interest in such a representation? In other words, how can we trace a clear and unequivocal demarcation between violence and nonviolence? Are we not always bound to find residues of violence, even in those actions that we would be tempted to consider nonviolent? The second line of questioning is just as important and is rooted in the distinction established by Georges Sorel, in his Reflections on Violence, between the “political strike” and the “proletarian general strike,” to which Benja­ min dedicates a set of complementary analyses in §13 of his essay. Here, again, we are faced with a question of limits. What is at stake is the possibility for a certain type of strike (the proletarian general strike) to exceed the limits of the right to strike— turning, in other words, the right to strike against the law itself. The phenomenon is that of an autoimmune process, in which the right to strike that is meant to protect the law against the possible violence of class strugles is transformed into a means for the destruction of the law. The diference between the two types of strikes is nevertheless introduced with a condition: “The validity of this statement, however, is not unrestricted because it is not unconditional,” notes Benjamin in §7. We would be mistaken in believing that the right to strike is granted and guaranteed uncondi­ tionally. Rather, it is structurally subjected to a conflict of interpretations, those of the workers, on the one hand, and of the state on the other. From the point of view of the state, the partial strike cannot under any circumstance be understood as a right to exercise violence, but rather as the right to extract oneself from a preexisting (and verifiable) violence: that of the employer. In this sense, the partial strike should be considered a nonviolent action, what Benjamin named a “pure means.” The interpretations diverge on two main points. The first clearly depends on the alleged “violence of the employer,” a predicate that begs the question: Who might have the authority to recognize such violence? Evidently it is not the employer. The danger is that the state would similarly lack the incentive to make such a judgment call. It is nearly impossible, in fact, to find a single instance of a strike in which this recognition of violence was not subject to considerable controversy. The political game is thus the following: the state legislated the right to strike in order to con­ tain class strugles, with the condition that workers must have “good reason” to strike. However, it is unlikely that a state systematically allied with (and accomplice to) employers will ever recognize reasons as good, and, as a consequence, it will deem any invocation of the right to strike as illegitimate. Workers will therefore be seen as abusing a right granted by the state, and in so doing transforming it into a violent means. On this point, Benjamin’s analyses remain extremely pertinent and profoundly contemporary. They unveil the enduring strategy of governments confronted with a strike (in education, transportation, or healthcare, for example) who, afer claiming to understand the reasons for the protest and the grievances of the workers, deny that the arguments constitute sufcient reason for a strike that will likely paralyze this or that sector of the economy. They deny, in other words, that the conditions denounced by the workers display an intrinsic violence that jus­ tifies the strike. Let us note here a point that Benjamin does not mention, but that is part of Sorel’s reflections: this denial inevitably contaminates the (socialist) lef once it gains power. What might previously have seemed a good reason to strike when it was the opposition is deemed an insufcient one once it is the ruling party. In the face of popular protest, it always invokes a lack of sufcient rationale, allow­ ing it to avoid recognizing the intrinsic violence of a given social or economic situ­ ation, or of a new policy. And it is because it refuses to see this violence and to take responsibility for it that the left regularly loses workers’ support.

#### Permissibility negates –

#### 1] ought means obligation

#### 2] safety

#### Util triggers permissibility

#### 1] induction

#### 2] calc regress bc time

#### 3] infinite consequences

#### 4] after the fact

#### 5] can’t aggregate