**Interpretation: Affirmatives must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution**

**Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by law**

**Words and Phrases 1964** Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “**to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;**” It is of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is **defined** by Bouvier **as** meaning “**to establish by law**”.

#### Resolved” in front of the resolution mandates a policy action. Parcher

(Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, <http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.  (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Violation: they don’t

**Prefer:**

**1] Ground: I can’t go for disads, CPs, solvency turns or even defense in order to answer the aff, you’ll just delink my offense in the 1ar by claiming implementation is irrelevant – also means I can’t read generics because any aff would have to be a topical action**

#### 2] Limits: they are not bound by the resolution, this creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Limits are key to fairness bc it’s impossible to prep

#### 3] Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters.

#### 4] TVA: read the aff as a thought experiment under the resolution, solves all your offense and allows you to go for critical theory

#### 5] Switch side debate solves --- criticism of the resolution functions as negative ground and allows for the advocacy to be heard

**Vote on fairness, can’t determine the better debater if rounds are skewed and without being able to prep in advance we don’t start the round on a level playing field and we cant access education. Don’t grant them an impact turn to fairness --- they want to present their own model of fairness using accepted definitions their model is just “reject them” which means they want it both ways**

**Drop the debater to: A. Set a positive norm, B. Deter future abuse, C. Rectify time lost reading theory**

**Prefer Competing interps since Reasonability causes race to the bottom and collapses to competing interps-you use an offense-defense paradigm to determine reasonability.**

**No RVIs. 1. Illogical. Just because you are fair doesn’t mean you should win, 2. Chilling effect. Either I read theory and you beat me with your prep out or I don’t read theory and abusive practices prevail-both kill fairness.**

### 2---Presumption

#### Frame the 1AC through solvency, not impacts – any attempt to filter offense through the RotB or the speech act of the aff is an arbitrary goalpost that only serves to insulate it from criticism and nuanced testing – forcing us to negate the efficacy of personal strategies is at best impossible and at worst violent – the aff can’t change the material structures that produce anti-black violence – no warrant for how the aff spills up to impact structures of politics writ large or out of debate means you vote neg on presumption.

#### Negate on presumption---Inherency---scholars and activists already affirm the 1AC. Their affirmation does not change the impacts they described and has no mechanism to spill up.

#### Using the ballot for solvency is bad:

#### 1 -- It zeroes the potential for transformative change -- stats prove.

Ritter 13. (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually incapable of creating any social change, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with nonapplicable rhetorical theory that fails to account for the unique aspects of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: “Can debate cause social change?” Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen not to prove this fundamental assumption, which—as this article argues—is merely a fiction that is harmful in most, if not all, respects. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterize5d as a fiction than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is not provable by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be incredibly critical of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes

#### 2 -- It fosters worse hostility and exclusion.

Ritter 13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The fiction of social change through debate abuses the win--loss structure of debate and permits debaters to otherize, demonize, dehumanize, and exclude opponents. The win--loss structure of debate rounds requires a judge to vote for one side or the other, as judges generally cannot give a double win. This precludes the possibility of compromise on any major position in the debate when the resolution of the position would determine the ultimate issue of “which team did the better debating.” Thus, the fiction of social change through debate encourages debaters to construct narratives of good versus evil in which the other team is representative of some evil that threatens to bring about our destruction if it is endorsed (e.g. capitalism). The team relying on the fiction of social change through debate then paints themselves as agents of the good, and gives the judge a George W. Bush-like “option”: “You’re either with us or you’re against us.” The fiction of social change through debate—like Bush’s rhetorical fear tactics and creation of a false, polarizing, and exclusionary dichotomy to justify all parts of the War on Terror—enables the otherization, demonization, dehumanization, and exclusion of the opposing team. When the unfairness of this tactic is brought to light—particularly in egregious situations when a team is arguing that the other team should lose because of their skin color—all can see that the debate centers on personal attacks against opposing debaters. This causes tensions between debaters that frequently result in debaters losing interest or quitting. By alienating and excluding members of the competitive interscholastic debate community for the purpose of winning a debate, it also makes the reaching of any compromise outside of the debate—the only place where compromise is possible—much less likely. By bringing the social issue into a debate round, debaters impede out-of round progress on the resolution of social issues within and outside the debate community by prompting backlash.

#### 3 -- Symbolic affirmation divorced from material advocacy re-entrenches power.

Rigakos and Law, 9—Assistant Professor of Law at Carleton University AND PhD, Legal Studies, Carleton University (George and Alexandra “Risk, Realism and the Politics of Resistance,” Critical Sociology 35(1) 79-103, dml)

McCann and March (1996: 244) next set out the ‘justification for treating everyday practices as significant’ suggested by the above literature. First, the works studied are concerned with proving people are not ‘duped’ by their surroundings. At the level of consciousness, subjects ‘are ironic, critical, realistic, even sophisticated’ (1996: 225). But McCann and March remind us that earlier radical or Left theorists have made similar arguments without resorting to stories of everyday resistance in order to do so. Second, everyday resistance on a discursive level is said to reaffirm the subject’s dignity. But this too causes a problem for the authors because they:

query why subversive ‘assertions of self’ should bring dignity and psychological empowerment when they produce no greater material benefits or changes in relational power … By standards of ‘realism’, … subjects given to avoidance and ‘lumping it’ may be the most sophisticated of all. (1996: 227)

Thus, their criticism boils down to two main points. First, everyday resistance fails to tell us any more about so-called false consciousness than was already known among earlier Left theorists; and second, that a focus on discursive resistance ignores the role of material conditions in helping to shape identity.

Indeed, absent a broader political struggle or chance at effective resistance it would seem to the authors that ‘powerlessness is learned out of the accumulated experiences of futility and entrapment’ (1996: 228). A lamentable prospect, but nonetheless a source of closure for the governmentality theorist. In his own meta-analysis of studies on resistance, Rubin (1996: 242) finds that ‘discursive practices that neither alter material conditions nor directly challenge broad structures are nevertheless’ considered by the authors he examined ‘the stuff out of which power is made and remade’. If this sounds familiar, it is because the authors studied by McCann, March and Rubin found their claims about everyday resistance on the same understanding of power and government employed by postmodern theorists of risk. Arguing against celebrating forms of resistance that fail to alter broader power relations or material conditions is, in part, recognizing the continued ‘real’ existence of identifiable, powerful groups (classes). In downplaying the worth of everyday forms of resistance (arguing that these acts are not as worthy of the label as those acts which bring about lasting social change), Rubin appears to be taking issue with a locally focused vision of power and identity that denies the possibility of opposing domination at the level of ‘constructs’ such as class.

Rubin (1996: 242) makes another argument about celebratory accounts of everyday resistance that bears consideration:

[T]hese authors generally do not differentiate between practices that reproduce power and those that alter power. [The former] might involve pressing that power to become more adept at domination or to dominate differently, or it might mean precluding alternative acts that would more successfully challenge power. … [I]t is necessary to do more than show that such discursive acts speak to, or engage with, power. It must also be demonstrated that such acts add up to or engender broader changes.

In other words, some of the acts of everyday resistance may in the real world, through their absorption into mechanisms of power, reinforce the localized domination that they supposedly oppose. The implications of this argument can be further clarified when we study the way ‘resistance’ is dealt with in a risk society.

Risk theorists already understand that every administrative system has holes which can be exploited by those who learn about them. That is what makes governmentality work: the supposed governor is in turn governed – in part through the noncompliance of subjects (Foucault, 1991a; Rose and Miller, 1992). For example, where employees demonstrate unwillingness to embrace technological changes in the workplace, management consultants can create:

a point of entry, but also a ‘problem’ that their ‘packages’ are designed to resolve. … In short, consultants readily constitute certain forms of conduct as ‘resistance to technology’ as this gives them some purchase on its reform by identifying a space in which expertise can be brought to bear in the exercise of power. Resistance consequently plays the role of continuously provoking extensions, revisions and refinements of those same practices which it confronts. (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994: 80)

This appears to be a very different kind of resistance from that contemplated by Rubin, but perhaps not so different from that of the authors whom he and McCann and March critique: those whose analysis ends at the discursive production of noncompliance. Instead, the above account is of a resistance that almost invariably helps power to work better. A conclusion in the present day that ominously foreshadows the futuristic, dystopic risk assemblage described by Bogard (1996).

Another example of the ‘resolution’ of resistance proposed above is the institution of a tool library described by Shearing (2001: 204–5). In this parable, a business deals with the issue of tool theft on the part of workers by installing a ‘lending library’ of tools instead of engaging in vigorous prosecution and jeopardizing worker morale. While the parable is meant to indicate a difference between actuarial and more traditional (moral) forms of justice, it also demonstrates how an act that may be considered ‘resistant’ is incorporated without conflict into the workplace loss-prevention scheme – an eminently preferable, ‘forward-looking’ solution within the logic of risk management. The same is possible in the case of more discursive forms of resistance. If I do not see myself as a Guinness man, for example, market researchers will do their best to adapt Guinness to the way I do see myself (Miller and Rose, 1997). The end result, of course, is that I purchase the beer. As manifested in a form of justice (Shearing and Johnston, 2005), it always consolidates, tempers emotions, cools the analysis, reconciles factions, and always relentlessly moves forward, assimilating as it grows. In this sense, therefore, Bogard’s ‘social science fiction’ actually pre-supposes and logically extends Shearing’s (2001) rather cheery and benevolent rendering of risk thinking. In this context of governmentality theory – as self-described and lauded for its political non-prescription by its own pundits – the acts or attitudes described as resistant are, in the end, absorbed by those who govern. Resistance as an oppositional force – that pushes against or has the potential to take power – is theoretically and politically neutralized. In the neutralization process, power is reproduced.

So, along with McCann and March’s observations that everyday resistance adds little to our understanding of false consciousness and that it denies the role of material factors in shaping identity, we can add Rubin’s two main criticisms of everyday resistance: it relies on an inaccurate understanding of power, and acts of resistance which supposedly emancipate actually may reinforce domination. All four of these criticisms demand the same thing: to know what is really going on, to get an adequate grasp of the social.

### Case

#### Their tags say people of color in general so where do we stop for Indian-Latina women debaters, trans people or my queer autistic Latino coach this is not a competition to decide who is more oppressed it’s a debate to decide what a better method to solve is and our argument is that you need a stasis point to divide ground

#### Their argument that Black debaters are presumed to lose is empirically disproven, a trend that started in college debate has successfully spilled over to high school LD and policy the TOC champ who literally hasn’t lost a round this year is a Black debater and they have closed out 2 major bid tournaments with another Black debater – the demand for a space to exist shouldn’t mean I as a woman of color have no ability to engage and should lose or concede every round

#### They say too many framework debates but first there’s no impact second the idea that stasis points should exist IS engagement with the aff thesis that history only goes in one direction and third even if we read cards indicting their theory they’ll claim it’s defense with no alternative but antiblackness and we’ll still be left with no offensive ground

**The alternative: epistemic disobedience first theres no impact second it’s a perf con they want us to unlearn norms of debate to create new norms of debate that prefer their method of debating third doesn’t make sense we both engage in knowledge production regarding debate and it’s nonunique because they’re following a norm that has already been created they said themselves people have been reading this argument for 12 years and they don’t solve anything except making a ballot demand**

**And it’s nonunique they say psych violence inevitable which means even if you affirm you don’t solve anything**

**And if debate is insular and meant to embed white structures then the existence of this round between a woman of color and a Black debater is the only rupture you need let the ballot be dictated by which one of us more effectively advances our method, thus the role of the ballot is to vote for the better debater**

#### Anti-Blackness isn’t historically calcified, and their reading runs counter to the Black radical tradition.

Kelley, 17—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE>, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

#### And this is important in the context of THIS resolution, Black struggle intersects with labor. They miscut their own author who specifically argues that Black organization developed as a revolutionary response to racism in unions and is worth discussing Cassedy their 1ac evidence recut

#### The formation of American trade unions increased during the early Reconstruction period. Black and white workers shared a heightened interest in trade union organization, but because trade unions organized by white workers generally excluded blacks, black workers began to organize on their own. In December 1869, 214 delegates attended the Colored National Labor Union convention in Washington, D.C. This union was a counterpart to the white National Labor Union. The assembly sent a petition to Congress requesting direct intervention in the alleviation of the "condition of the colored workers of the southern States" by subdividing the public lands of the South into forty-acre farms and providing low-interest loans to black farmers.4 In January 1871, the Colored National Labor Convention again petitioned Congress, sending a "Memorial of the Committee of the National Labor Convention for Appointment of a Commission to Inquire into Conditions of Affairs in the Southern States."5 Congress evidently showed little interest in either petition. Five years later the disputed presidential election of 1876 led to the Compromise of 1877 and the selection of Rutherford B. Hayes as President of the United States, the end of Reconstruction, and the beginnings of "Redeemer Rule" and "Jim Crow." When the Supreme Court handed down the Plessy v. Ferguson decision in 1896, giving official recognition to the "separate but equal" doctrine, the official relegation of blacks to second-class status was complete. A systematic review of the records and reports of the Bureau of the Census (RG 29), the Bureau of Labor Statistics (RG 257), the U.S. House of Representatives (RG 233), and the U.S. Senate (RG 46) will reveal volumes of information concerning the lives of African Americans during this period. A small sampling of these reports and publications includes the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Bulletin No. 8, Negroes in the United States (1905); the U.S. Bureau of Labor, Sixteenth Annual Report of the Commissioner (1901); and the U.S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, Forty-ninth Congress, second session, Testimony Before the Committee to Investigate the Relations Between Capital and Labor (1885). W.E.B. Du Bois provided some of the statistical data on black labor to the Bureau of Labor and wrote reports for the Census Bureau.6 The decline in the relative position of African Americans vis à vis organized labor can also be seen in the railroad industry. During the Great Strike of 1877, for instance, rallies and marches in St. Louis, Louisville, and other cities brought together white and black workers in support of the common rights of workingmen. By 1894 Eugene Debs, leader of the American Railway Union in a strike against the Pullman Company, was unable to convince members of his union to accept black railroaders. Blacks in turn served as strikebreakers for the Pullman Company and for the owners of Chicago meatpacking companies against whom stockyard workers struck in sympathy with the Pullman Company employees.7 In 1909 white employees of the Georgia Railroad, represented by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, walked off their jobs, demanding that lower-paid black firemen be replaced by higher-paid whites. A Federal Board of Arbitration, appointed under the provisions of the Erdman Act of 1898, ruled two to one against the Brotherhood, stating that blacks had to be paid equal pay for equal work, thereby eliminating the financial advantage of hiring blacks. Erdman docket file 20, the Georgia Railroad Co. v. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, is found in the Records of the National Mediation Board (RG 13).8 The National Mediation Board was created by the amended Railway Act of June 21, 1934, to mediate railroad and, later, airline disputes. The board inherited the functions of an assortment of boards and panels created to mediate railroad disputes. The records of the National Mediation Board and its predecessors date from 1934 to 1965 and consist of 1,362 cubic feet of records. The creation of the various federal railroad arbitration boards is significant, for it marks the beginning of federal efforts during the Progressive Era to stabilize and rationalize labor relations. An act of March 4, 1913, upgraded the U.S. Department of Labor to cabinet rank and authorized the secretary of labor, William Wilson, to act as a mediator or to appoint commissioners of conciliation in labor disputes. This conciliation function was assumed by the United States Conciliation Service, which became the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. The Records of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (RG 280), 1913-1948, contain approximately 1,300 cubic feet of information. This material includes an index with four sections: a subject index with perhaps seven hundred topics; a geographic index; a name index arranged by name of person, organization, or firm; and a name index to the conciliators and arbitrators. Approximately 180,000 dispute and arbitration case files are indexed. The files may range in size from one to several thousand pages and include intermediate and closing reports, agreements and other documentation of settlement, awards, and related correspondence (which may include union and company documents, transcripts of testimony, and newspaper articles). A reasonable estimate of the total number of extant Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service files pertaining to African American labor is nine thousand to eighteen thousand.9 During the Great Migration of 1916-1930, over one million blacks moved from the south to the north in search of better lives. It is conservatively estimated that 400,000 left the South during the two-year period of 1916-1918 to take advantage of a labor shortage created in the wake of the First World War.10 African Americans made significant gains in industrial employment, particularly in the steel, automobile, shipbuilding, and meatpacking industries. Between 1910 and 1920 the number of blacks employed in industry nearly doubled from 500,000 to 901,000. 11 The U.S. government, under pressure from African American leaders who demanded representation in the policymaking and administrative councils of government, established special offices concentrating on the mobilization of the black community. One such office, set up by Labor Secretary Wilson in 1918, was the Office of the Director of Negro Economics. The office, originally designed to help mobilize the black work force for the war effort, developed into a rudimentary economic employment opportunity agency. Except for the postbellum Freedmen's Bureau, the division was the first agency of its kind in the nation. 12 Records concerning the office are found in the Chief Clerks Files and the records of the Division of Negro Economics, both part of the General Records of the Department of Labor (RG 174). Other sources of information concerning African American labor during World War I may be found in the Records of the Council of National Defense (RG 62), the Records of the U.S. Shipping Board (RG 32), the Records of the United States Food Administration (RG 4), and the Records of the National War Labor Board (NWLB)— World War I (RG 2). During the NWLB's brief existence (April 1918-June 1919), 1,251 controversies were presented for settlement. The U.S. government set up an intense security apparatus during World War I to monitor, detain, and prosecute those suspected of hampering the war effort. These offices included the Department of Justice (RG 60), the (Federal) Bureau of Investigation (RG 65), and the War Department General and Special Staff—Military Intelligence Division (RG 165). The security apparatus watched over the African American labor situation and kept tabs on individuals such as A. Philip Randolph, Ben Fletcher (president of the IWW-associated Marine Workers Association), and Marcus Garvey, leader of the "Back to Africa Movement." Information concerning Fletcher and Garvey is also in the Records of the Office of the Pardon Attorney (RG 204). The Records of the United States Coal Commission (RG 68), 1922-1923, document the efforts of the federal government to control upheavals in the coal mining industry caused by the end of the war. The United Mine Workers of America Union was light years ahead of other AFL unions in its organization of black miners, but white miners and employers, however, more often than not shared fundamental ideas of black inferiority. Despite the uneven relationship between black and white coal miners, a substantial degree of solidarity arose among miners of all colors and nationalities. The Public Health Sanitary Surveys and the Mining Community Schedules prepared by the Living Conditions Section of the Coal Commission provide an opportunity to glimpse the lives of African American mining families living in Alabama and West Virginia during the early twenties. The Records of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (RG 280) contain a substantial amount of information regarding black and white miners during these postwar years.13 In 1925 A. Philip Randolph began his twelve-year fight to gain recognition of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters by the Pullman Car Company, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), and the U.S. government. Randolph ultimately succeeded in his quest in 1937 and in the process became a leader in the fight against racism in the workplace and the nation. The Records of the National Mediation Board (RG 13) and the Records of the U.S. Railroad Administration (RG 14) document the efforts of African American railroad workers and their unions to procure satisfactory compensation and job security.14 The Roaring Twenties came to a crashing halt with the Great Depression. Seeking ways to alleviate the massive unemployment, President Franklin Roosevelt and his New Deal advisers sought ways to put people back to work and to increase purchasing power. Among the alphabet soup of federal agencies created during the New Deal were the Civilian Conservation Corps (RG 35), the Work Projects Administration (RG 69), the National Youth Administration (RG 119), and the National Recovery Administration (RG 9). The Division of Negro Affairs of the National Youth Administration was headed by the noted educator and African American leader Dr. Mary McLeod Bethune. The Records of the Women's Bureau (RG 86), founded in 1920, and the Records of the Bureau of Employment Security (RG 183) also provide researchers with extensive coverage of labor issues and African Americans. These records span the depression, World War II, and postwar eras. Another agency created during the Great Depression was the United States Housing Authority, established in the Department of Interior by the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. The act authorized a system of loans, grants, and subsidies to assist local housing authorities develop low-rent housing projects. Local Housing Authority boards from across the nation sent in reports detailing their progress toward setting aside a portion of the public housing construction work for African Americans. The portion was to be based on the size of the black population in a particular locale. Included among these twenty thousand pages of records are a number of letters from local labor unions providing information concerning black laborers in skilled and nonskilled positions or attempting to explain the lack thereof.15 The Housing Administration generally observed local racial customs, and neither the administration nor the Housing Authority proposed, advocated, or supported legislation to specifically assist blacks. New Dealers sought to institute the collective bargaining process by guaranteeing labor the right to organize and to designate representatives for collective bargaining purposes under the auspices of the National Labor Relations Board.16 African American leaders were disappointed that the Wagner Act of 1935 did not contain prohibitions against union race discrimination. In 1930 no more than 50,000 out of 1,500,000 black workers engaged in transportation, extraction of minerals, or manufacturing were members of any trade union. Furthermore, the AFL remained a conservative organization. A large number of member unions did not permit African Americans to join their ranks, and the AFL leadership showed little apparent interest in organizing black and white laborers in mass-production industries.17 The organization in 1935 of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), which sought to organize industrial workers regardless of race or ethnic background, contributed to an alleviation of the historic conflict between African Americans and trade unions. Thousands of African American workers joined unions, and much of this growth is documented in the Records of the National Labor Relations Board (RG 25, approximately 5,140 cubic feet).18 These records include formal and informal case files as well as transcripts of hearings and exhibit files. Protective labor legislation of the 1930s, such as the Social Security Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, did not extend to agricultural workers, although 31.8 percent of the African American population in 1940 was employed in agriculture (40.4 percent in the South). A 1945 Bureau of Labor Statistics survey of American agricultural unionism noted that "labor unionism in agriculture has been a rather anomalous and transitory development in the American economy. It has been composed of literally hundreds of organizations that were sporadic, scattered, and short lived." 19 The reasons why most labor unions failed in the 1930s were "the same reasons that made them vulnerable to agitation and strikes . . . [T]heir extreme mobility, the high seasonality of their work, and the low wage rates all combined to make unionization among them costly."20 Agricultural workers were further hampered in their efforts at unionization because of their low social status and political impotence, public perception of the traditional family farm, and agriculture laborers who had more "solicitude of their employers" than industrial workers had.21 The survey noted that the "more obvious hardships which periodically led to conflict were mitigated to some degree by appropriate Government action" including the work performed by the Farm Security Administration (RG 96).22 Although one piece of New Deal legislation, the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA), adversely affected agricultural workers, it contributed to the rise of a remarkable agricultural labor union: the Southern Tenant Farmers Union (STFU).23 The STFU was founded in 1934 in eastern Arkansas, an area of large cotton plantations worked by sharecroppers and owned in many cases by absentee owner-investors. Immediately after World War I, the collapse of cotton prices led to strained landlord-tenant relations as planters sought to shift some losses to tenants by manipulating accounts and, in some cases, outright fraud. A group of African Americans organized the Progressive Farmers and Householders Union to protect themselves against exploitation and "advanc[e] the intellectual, material, moral, spiritual, and financial interests of the Negro race." The union was destroyed in the "Elaine Massacre" of 1919 in Phillips County, Arkansas, when white law enforcement officials and vigilantes from neighboring counties and states attacked union officials and members, killing up to one hundred African Americans.24 Economic conditions for the sharecroppers of eastern Arkansas did improve slightly during the 1920s, but with the depression of the 1930s, conditions were again ripe for agricultural labor revolt. Sharecroppers were faced with declining earnings, increased farm mechanization, and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which worked against their interests. One way the AAA sought to raise the income of farmers was through a series of allotments and subsidies prescribing the amount of land that could be placed in production and paying farmers not to farm additional land. The Agricultural Adjustment Administration, which administered the act, worked with local AAA committees. In Arkansas, these committees were dominated by white plantation owners. These owners often used the local committees to circumscribe the common law rights of tenants and sharecroppers, did not pay sharecroppers their fair share of government compensation payments, and altered the sharecroppers' status to wage hands to disqualify them from receiving government payments.25 The STFU, ostensibly inspired by Socialist Norman Thomas and founded by Henry L. Mitchell and Henry Clay East in Tyronza, Arkansas, was an interracial union from its very beginning. Posing a direct challenge to the established order in Arkansas, in two years the union boasted twenty-five thousand members, which included former Ku Klux Klansmen as well as survivors of the "Elaine Massacre," and by the end of 1936 claimed thirty-one thousand members in seven states.26 With the assistance and support of individuals such as Secretary of the NAACP Walter White, Norman Thomas, and A. Phillip Randolph, and through the strategic use of strikes and public demonstrations under the leadership of Harry L. Mitchell, the STFU was able to directly alleviate some of the oppressive living and working conditions of its members. Perhaps more important, however, was the attention it focused on the living and working conditions of tenant farmers and sharecroppers. Due to the efforts of the STFU, Franklin Roosevelt established the President's Committee on Farm Tenancy soon after his 1936 reelection. The efforts of this committee helped lay the foundations for the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, which established the Farm Security Administration and the Resettlement Administration, agencies that developed programs to assist migrant workers and authorized low-interest loans to farm tenants, sharecroppers, and farm laborers.27 By World War II, however, the STFU's day had passed. Mechanism within the cotton industry continued to increase, decreasing the need for tenant farmers. Approaching war clouds at the end of the 1930s shifted the focus of the U.S. government from domestic problems toward a more international outlook. Although the STFU was never fully integrated (most of its locals were all black or all white), it did leave an indelible mark upon the United States and symbolized for many what labor could accomplish if racial identity could be ignored.28 The improvement in the status of African American workers in American society on the eve of World War II should not be overstated. The 1940s would be a decade, however, when African Americans would achieve their greatest economic gains, in terms of real advances and in relation to whites, since the Civil War. The advance of African Americans in American industry during World War II was the result of the nation's wartime emergency need for workers and soldiers. In 1943 the National War Labor Board issued an order abolishing pay differentials based on race, pointing out, "America needs the Negro . . . the Negro is necessary for winning the war." Early in 1941, A. Philip Randolph announced the creation of a March on Washington Committee, promising that unless President Roosevelt issued an executive order ending racial discrimination in hiring by unions and employers and eliminating segregation in the armed forces, ten thousand Americans would march through Washington demanding an end to segregation. The number of threatened marchers grew from 10,000 to 50,000, and then to 100,000. Despite the entreaties of Roosevelt and his intermediaries, Randolph made it clear that nothing less than a presidential executive order would stop the march. Roosevelt gave in and issued Executive Order 8802.29 After asserting that national unity was being impaired by discrimination, the executive order declared it to be the "duty of employers and of labor organizations to provide for the full and equitable participation of all workers in defense industries, without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or national origin." All federal agencies concerned with defense production were ordered to administer such programs without discrimination, and all defense contracts were to include a provision "obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race, creed, color, or national origin." Executive Order 8802 also established the Committee on Fair Employment Practice (FEPC). The Records of the Committee on Fair Employment Practice (RG 228) document its activities from June 25, 1941, to June 28, 1946. The committee formulated and interpreted policies to combat racial and religious discrimination in employment; received, investigated, and adjusted complaints of such discrimination; and assisted government agencies, employers, and labor unions with the problems of discrimination. The committee handled fourteen thousand complaints of discrimination from all regions of the country, 80 percent of which were filed by African Americans. Executive Order 8802 was Roosevelt's compromise with Randolph, and as such it had some inherent weaknesses. For instance, the executive order did not mention military segregation. Nor could the FEPC require compliance with its decisions and directives. To obtain compliance, it depended on its own powers of persuasion or the prestige of other government agencies concerned with manpower and labor relations. Despite its weaknesses, the FEPC had some notable successes. Its own investigations and directives against discriminating corporations, unions, and government agencies helped to increase the African American presence in the nation's defense industry from 3 to 8 percent. For the first time, the federal government admitted that blacks suffered from discrimination and that government had a responsibility to remedy it. The National War Labor Board for World War II was established in the Office for Emergency Management by an executive order of January 12, 1942. The board was to act as the final arbiter of wartime labor disputes and to pass on adjustments in certain wages and salaries. There are approximately 3,187 linear feet of record material in Record Group 202, of which approximately 2,486 feet is case file material. Among those records are dispute case files, accompanying transcripts, and transcripts of executive sessions of the National Defense Mediation Board (1941-1942), the predecessor agency to the World War II NWLB; the board's headquarters dispute case files and transcripts; a complete set of case files from the twelve regional NWLB offices; and case files for some of the board's commissions and panels on industries. At least ten cases in these files concern racial discrimination. Moreover, the number of individual files from all regions of the United States, and the presence of records of special commissions on industries in which blacks were particularly concentrated (for instance, shipbuilding and meatpacking), suggests that the records of the National War Labor Board may well be an underused source of information on African American workers during World War II.30 Other record groups of interest to researchers of the World War II period include the General Records of the Department of Justice (RG 60), which contain files concerning the Fair Labor Standards and Civil Rights; the Records of the Office of Labor of the War Food Administration (RG 224), which contain extensive information concerning African American farm laborers and migrants; the Records of the Federal Maritime Commission (RG 178), which contain information concerning labor and discrimination in the shipbuilding industry; the Records of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (RG 100), formerly the Bureau of Standards; the Records of the Wage and Hour and Public Contracts Divisions (RG 155), which contain information on black workers in the tobacco, paper, lumber, and other industries; and military record groups such as the Records of the Army Staff (RG 319) and the Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs (RG 165).31 Black labor unionism became part of a wider campaign for civil rights after World War II. After the merger of the CIO and the AFL in 1955, it seemed that the AFL had placed a conservative pall over the entire organization, dividing white and black unionists. It was also the era of the civil rights movement, and black union officials such as Ed Nixon and A. Philip Randolph were among the leaders during the Montgomery bus boycott and the 1963 March on Washington. African Americans were to continue to press their demands for justice within unions in the 1960s and 1970s through internal union organizations such as the Ad Hoc Committee of Steel Workers and the Dodge Revolutionary Union Movement. Confronting continued union and corporate discrimination, African American civil right groups sought redress through a number of court cases under Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A number of record groups document the intersection of the civil rights and labor movements. General Records of the Department of Labor (RG 174) include numerous files of concern to African Americans and the civil rights movement among the records its secretaries, 1953-1976. Records of Temporary Committees, Commissions, and Boards (RG 220) include the records of the President's Committee on Migratory Labor, the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, and the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. Records of Agencies for Economic Opportunity and Legal Services (RG 381), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (RG 403), and the Commission on Civil Rights (RG 453), as well as the Records of the United States District Courts (RG 21), the Records of the U.S. Court of Appeals (RG), and the U.S. Supreme Court (RG 267) present a number of opportunities for the student of African American and trade labor relations.

#### They don’t assume debate as a competition for us while demanding the ballot for them-- there’s an inherent need to be skeptical of your opponents’ arguments -- oversimplifying disagreement as respectability politics is reductionist AND turns case by making internal community debates impossible.

#### The aff shuts down debate -- all disagreement is taken as blaming.

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This investigation attempts to describe the complex relationship between the diverse and complementary roles that perpetrators and victims in general and men and women in particular assume in the dynamics of violence. It does not seek to blame, but rather to apply systems analysis to increase our understanding of the dynamics and origins of victimhood and the different types of victims. It concentrates on adult victims and on patterns of victimhood established early in life, rather than on the effects of a single trauma. It focuses on intimate violence and not on random incidents among parties who have no past relationship to each other. A likely response to this paper might be to think that the intent is to blame the victims. I would like to state from the outset that the aim of this paper is to help victims and victimizers end their abusive relationships. Blame is counter-productive, but the politically correct attitude of non-blame, when it produces a climate that forbids exploration of the role of victims in systems of violence, is dangerous as well. Fear of blaming preserves and perpetuates the systems of abuse and victimization. It is my hope that this paper will be of benefit to victims and perpetrators, and to the professionals who help those in violent systems.

#### On wake work: Abiding in the wake is not politically generative or an effective survivance strategy.

Reed 18 [Adolph Reed Jr., professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania, “Antiracism: a neoliberal alternative to a left,” *Dialectical Anthropology*, June 2018, Volume 42, Issue 2, p. 105–115]

In the current political context that interpretive pathology is pernicious politically because the claim of continuity demands ignoring historical specificities of both past and present that are crucially important for making adequate sense of either. The point of analogizing current conditions to slavery or earlier regimes of openly white supremacist hierarchy is to subordinate consideration of the discrete, complex mechanisms through which contemporary inequalities are reproduced in quotidian life to the meta-historical contention that generic white supremacy, or racism, most significantly explains disadvantages and injustices that black Americans suffer today. But even in the nineteenth century, at the nadir of the defeat of Reconstruction and imposition of disfranchisement and the Jim Crow order, black politics was not adequately reducible to a unitary struggle against white supremacy; differences of perspective, agendas, and programs pertained among blacks and determined strategic directions, including pursuit of allies (Stein 1974). In addressing another racially charged issue—how we should regard Rachel Dolezal’s embrace of a transracial identity in relation to Caitlyn Jenner’s embrace of a transgender one—historian Susan Stryker neatly describes the appeal and limitations of argument by analogy: Analogy is a weak form of analysis, in which a better-known case is compared to one that is lesser known, and thereby offered as a model for understanding something that is not yet well understood…Analogy’s rhetorical strength is to be found precisely in its ability to condense complicated forms of similarity into singularly powerful linguistic gestures and acts of speech, while its analytical weakness lies precisely in the non-identity of the things being compared (Stryker 2015). Even if we were to accept “racism” as a label summarizing the various factors involved, noting those apparent similarities does not tell us how inequalities are reproduced today and has nothing to say practically about how to combat them. And it is important to interrogate why it is paramount within the antiracist framework that we understand the present through analogy to the past. In the antiracist political project white supremacy/racism is—like “terrorism”—an amorphous, ideological abstraction whose specific content exists largely in the eyes of the beholder. Therefore, like antiterrorism, antiracism’s targets can be porous and entirely arbitrary; this means that, also like antiterrorism, the struggle can never be won. Clint Smith’s romantic assessment of Take ‘Em Down NOLA’s contribution indicates as much and makes clear, as does everything that Ta-Nehisi Coates has ever written (e.g., Coates 2014, 2016a, b, 2017), that winning anything concrete is not the point. The “politics” that follows from this view centers on pursuit of recognition and representation on groupist terms—both as symbolic depiction in the public realm and as claims to articulate the interests, perspectives, or “voices” of a generic black constituency or some subset thereof, e.g., “youth” or “grassroots.” It is not interested in broadly egalitarian redistribution. Notwithstanding its performative evocations of the 1960s Black Power populist “militancy,” this antiracist politics is neither leftist in itself nor particularly compatible with a left politics as conventionally understood. At this political juncture, it is, like bourgeois feminism and other groupist tendencies, an oppositional epicycle within hegemonic neoliberalism, one might say a component of neoliberalism’s critical self-consciousness; it is thus in fact fundamentally anti-leftist. Black political elites’ attacks on the Bernie Sanders 2016 presidential nomination campaign’s call for decommodified public higher education as frivolous, irresponsible, or even un-American underscores how deeply embedded this politics is within neoliberalism (Richardson 2016; Sheinin 2016; Johnson 2016).