### T

#### Interpretation: debaters must specify an actor in their advocacy text that can be limited to an entity, person, or limitable subset of people

#### Violation: they spec tactical leaders which can be anyone

#### Vote neg: To be clear this is not a framework shell it’s an actor shell that calls on the aff to tell us specifically who enacts the aff. Prefer our interp: 1)ground, there’s no way for the neg to read generic OR case-specific arguments if we don’t know who does the aff. This is made even clearer by the fact that they cant pin down the internal link to aff solvency we don’t know who actually does the aff method which means they theoretically don’t link to anything. Equal aff and neg ground is key to debate education – we can’t have a legitimate discussion about the merits and disadvantages of the aff if we don’t know what the aff is outside of “empire is bad”

**Prefer Competing interpretations: first they cant claim reasonability because they aren’t reasonable second it causes a racer to the bottom**

#### Drop the debater to punish unique in round abuse and deter future abuse.

#### Look: we aren’t requiring the aff to be topical or to implement anything. We are asking for a way to understand and engage with their discussion by knowing how the aff works

### CP – Health Care Workers

#### Counterplan text: Tactical leaders ought to condition the right to strike on the enactment of minimum service agreements for health care workers

#### MSAs are a necessary condition to avoid the potential impacts of healthcare worker strikes and doctor unions agree Chima 13 Chima, S.C. Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike?. BMC Med Ethics 14, S5 (2013). <https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-14-S1-S5> //AHS

This analysis shows that the right to strike is so important to the functioning of modern democratic societies that its suppression would be unjustified. The right to strike is now accepted as an indispensable component of collective bargaining and perhaps a fundamental human right. However **minimizing the impact of doctor and HCW strikes** **will require** improved organizational ethics and the **recognition by both employees and employers**, especially elected officials **that they are equally morally obligated to serve the interest of society**. In other words they are two sides of the same coin. For the incidence of strikes to decrease both employers and employees must be ethical in their approach to resolving labour disputes. For example, legitimate collective bargaining agreements must be respected and honored in a timely manner. Similarly, employees including doctors and other workers must resist the impulse to make economic demands which are beyond the capacity of the employer or which could hamper the provision of other social services, such as education and public utilities. Furthermore **when HCWs embark on a strike action,** **they must** endeavor to **provide** a certain level of **minimum service, e.g.** continue providing **emergency medical services, thereby minimizing the impact of strikes on the general public.** In this regard, **it is imperative that** agreements such as the **minimum service** level **agreements** which are being **advocated by doctors unions as a means of assuring minimum coverage** during strikes **should be speedily agreed upon**. Governments as employers should also resist the urge to arbitrarily designate certain groups as "essential services", outside of established international law, simply in order to deny such employee groups the right to strike. Arbitrary actions such as mass firing of striking doctors or threats of unjustifiable disciplinary action by regulatory authorities, will not encourage speedy resolution of HCWs, and may lead to undesirable consequences such as brain drain. If some workers or employees are considered 'essential', then society should endeavor to treat such employees as such, by devising mechanisms to pay appropriate wages which justify such 'essentiality'. It may be useful to appoint an independent mediator or administrative body to advice on special salary packages and conditions of service for essential workers rather than grouping every worker together under the rubric of public service employees. Finally, it has been observed following strikes by HCWs in some jurisdictions, that while the public is generally supportive of HCW strikes which are designed to improve the quality of healthcare service delivery for all, society is generally unsupportive of strikes where the sole purpose is the increment of wages and improved conditions for HCWs alone.

#### It competes: it’s mutually exclusive it puts conditions on the RTS and solves all the impacts of the aff while avoiding material impacts that happen to people in low income countries, who are key to the revolutionary action the aff wants

#### HCW strikes cause exploding mortality rates and push thousands into poverty--- empirics from Kenya prove Waithaka et al. 20 Waithaka et al. International Journal for Equity in Health (2020) 19:23 <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-020-1131-y> //AHS

Also, important in the nature and length of the strikes, particularly the nurses’ strike, was the timing coinciding with national and local elections. Elections were already expected to be associated with unrest and to undermine the fragile public healthcare system [65]. While the timing may have been a strategy intended to add pressure on the government to meet the nurses demands, in fact it led to national and county leaders being distracted from the strike and its’ effects on patient and public safety. Our findings suggest a wide range of negative experiences. **Disruptions to services** and reduced admissions have also been documented by other studies by our group: one documented that the strikes **resulted in marked reductions in admissions** with 4 out of 13 county hospitals having almost no admissions throughout the strikes another found that the nurses strike **severely affected immunization services** in government-run referral health facilities across the country [27, 30]. Our finding of no obvious dip in outpatient service utilization during the doctors’ strike specifically is potentially linked to the presence of nurses **and** other cadres (such as clinical officers) in outpatients, but a forthcoming paper will characterize further the effect of both the nurses’ and doctors’ strikes on in-patient admission. Our interviewees highlighted the **devastating effects** of service disruption on staff morale and on households, particularly **for the poorest households**. Given that about **620,000 Kenyans are** **pushed below the** national **poverty line** every year **due to** transport costs and **health care** payments even **under ‘normal’ conditions** [33], **the impoverishing effect of the strike** for the poorest households **is** likely to have been **enormous**. As with other sudden shocks to the health system [66], our findings support that the impoverishing effects of the strike are disproportionately felt by the poorest and most vulnerable. Beyond impoverishment, interviewees talked in dramatic terms about negative health-outcomes linked to the strikes, including deaths, with the poor again being the worst affected. A recent analysis of **the effects** of six previous nation-wide Kenyan strikes on mortality data in Kilifi County (before the 100 days doctors and the 150 days nurses strike) **found a 75% increase in mortality among children** aged 12–59 months during the strike period, but no change in overall mortality [24]. The authors noted that the lack of change in overall mortality could have been because the strikes between 2010 and 2016 were relatively short, with only one lasting for more than a month (42 days). Evidence from other settings suggests that the effects of strikes on health outcomes are increased where emergency services are not available or the affected populations are not able to access viable (available and affordable) alternate healthcare services [1, 3, 19, 67, 68]. In Kenya, the Irimu et al (2018) study reviewing admissions in 13 public hospitals during the 2017 doctors’ and nurses strikes noted that ‘**preventable deaths** likely occurred **on a massive scale’**, particularly for the poor [27]. We identified similar perceptions in our study, but this may be in contrast with the more modest effects reported for prior strikes [24] . Given that the Kenyan public health system has faced a series of shocks and stressors over the decades, additional research that can provide more detailed data on the impact of the prolonged strikes on mortality over time is important

#### And MSAs avoid the impacts Waithaka et al 2 Waithaka et al. International Journal for Equity in Health (2020) 19:23 <https://doi.org/10.1186/s12939-020-1131-y> //AHS Recognising that strikes remain a real possibility, there needs to be adequate planning and preparedness in advance of a potential crisis [71]. Given their key intermediary roles, and the challenges they faced in the prolonged 2017 strikes, middle level managers should be better supported by managers higher up the system to design and implement effective and sustainable responses to sudden shocks, including strikes. Responses to shocks should not only seek to preserve core services but also to ensure that the poorest households and communities are protected from health-related and financial losses. This would support a move towards more ‘ethical’ strikes where at a minimum emergency and essential services are sustained throughout a strike, threats and intimidation of striking and non-striking health workers are minimized, demands by workers are reasonable, and governments respect and honor agreements.

#### And it's not just one country---HCW strikes disproportionately affect healthcare in LDCs Chima 13 Chima, S.C. Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike?. BMC Med Ethics 14, S5 (2013). <https://doi.org/10.1186/1472-6939-14-S1-S5> //AHS

**Doctor and HCW strikes** have become a global phenomenon with increasing incidence in many countries [1, 2] and the potential to **impact negatively on the quality of healthcare** service delivery and the doctor-patient relationship which is based primarily on the fiduciary duty of trust [3, 4]. HCW strikes are not limited to any society, group, or country regardless of their level of socio-economic development. In most democratic societies, strikes are a legitimate part of collective bargaining during labour negotiations [2–4]. Doctor and HCW strikes have been reported in highly developed countries such as USA [2, 5–7], UK [8]; New Zealand [9–11], Germany and France [2, 12]; middle income countries such as Israel [13, 14], India [15], Czech Republic [16], and South Africa [17–19]. Also in less developed countries such as Nigeria [20–22], Malawi [23] and Zambia [24] to name but a few. While HCW strikes occur globally, it appears **the impact of strikes are more severely felt in less developed countries because of** the **poorer socio-economic** circumstances **and** embedded **infrastructural** **deficiencies. Such countries are** generally **confronted by issues** **of** inadequate manpower, poor wages and working conditions [25], poor organizational ethics [26–28], and **lack of viable alternative means of obtaining healthcare for the general population** [29], thereby fulfilling the international criteria for vulnerability as defined by UNAIDS and other authorities [29, 30].

#### And quality healthcare in developing countries would prevent 6 million deaths per year---turns case and outweighs Goldschmidt and Pate 19 hGabriel Goldschmidt and Muhammad Ali Pate, November 25, 2019, World Economic Forum. <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/11/effects-and-costs-of-poor-quality-healthcare/> //AHS

What is the **number one cause of death** for sick people seeking treatment **in developing countries**? If you think it is lack of access to healthcare, think again. A recent report by The Lancet Global Health Commission on High Quality Health Systems found that **5.7 million people die** in low and middle-income countries **every year from poor quality healthcare** compared with the 2.9 million who die from lack of access to care. In other words, in many countries, **a person has a greater chance of dying from receiving poor quality care than from going without care entirely**. At the UN General Assembly in September, heads of states and governments adopted a high-level declaration committing to achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC) by 2030. This was an important political moment for global health and most welcome development. As we head down the path of UHC, we at the World Bank Group believe that **now, more than ever, we must** translate this commitment to concrete actions and **place** the issue of **quality at the** front and **centre** of our efforts.

### On Case

**We’re straight turning the advantage**

#### Capitalism solves war on a massive scale – it creates lock-in mechanisms that bind countries together and economically dampens conflict – robust studies

Dafoe 14, Political Science and International Economics (Allan & Nina Kelsey; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions. T

#### Space - only private corporations solve.

Zimmerman 3/10/17 (Robert, award-winning independent science journalist and historian, "Capitalism in Space", CNAS, 3-10-2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/capitalism-in-space, DOA: 7-29-2017) //Snowball

All of these goals require a prosperous U.S. aerospace industry, which in turn requires above all a viable space-launch industry, capable of placing payloads, both unmanned and manned, into orbit cheaply and efficiently. Unfortunately, since the beginning of the 21st century the U.S. government has struggled to create and maintain a viable launch industry. Even as the government terminated the Space Shuttle program, with its ability to place and return humans and large cargoes to and from orbit, NASA’s many repeated efforts since the mid-1980s to generate a replacement have come up empty.1 In addition, in the 1990s the Department of Defense instituted a new program, the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV), to guarantee itself launch services that – though successful in procuring those services – have done so at a very high cost, so high, in fact, that the expense now significantly limits the military’s future options for maintaining its access to, and assets in, space. Even as the federal government struggled with this problem, a fledgling crop of new American private launch companies have emerged in the past decade, funded initially by the vast profits produced by the newly born internet industry. These new companies have not been motivated by national prestige, military strength, or any of the traditional national political goals of the federal government. Instead, these private entities have been driven by profit, competition, and in some cases the ideas of the visionary individuals running the companies, resulting in some remarkable success, achieved with relatively little money and in an astonishingly short period of time. Because of these differing approaches – the government on one hand and the private sector on the other – policymakers have an opportunity to compare both and use that knowledge to create the most successful American space effort possible.

#### Becoming a multi-planetary species allows us to avoid existential risks.

Bates 5/8/17 (Jordan, Executive Editor at HighExistence LLC, "In Order to Ensure Our Survival, We Must Become a Multi-Planetary Species", Futurism, 5-8-17, https://futurism.com/in-order-to-ensure-human-survival-we-must-become-a-multi-planetary-species/, DOA: 7-28-2017) //Snowball

We possess thousands of nuclear warheads capable of occasioning an existential catastrophe, and we are at the liberty of a fairly fragile global ecosystem with limited resources. Beyond that, our being confined to this single planet means that a single asteroid collision or some other unforeseen cataclysmic event could wipe out our entire species and potentially all intelligent life on Earth. There are numerous other theorized existential risks (e.g. risks arising from advances in artificial intelligence, biotech, nanotech, etc.) as well. In his pioneering 2002 paper, Dr. Nick Bostrom defined “existential risk” as follows: “Existential risk – One where an adverse outcome would either annihilate Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. An existential risk is one where humankind as a whole is imperiled. Existential disasters have major adverse consequences for the course of human civilization for all time to come.” If it sounds far-fetched to consider earthly extinction scenarios, it shouldn’t. Many intelligent people are discussing this topic, and many are even devoting their lives to attempting to avert crisis situations that could decimate earthly intelligent life. The Future of Life Institute, Future of Humanity Institute, Global Catastrophic Risk Institute, and Centre for the Study of Existential Risk are a few prominent organizations specifically dedicated to this cause. According to Muller and Bostrom (2014), a sample of the top 100 most-cited authors on artificial intelligence ascribed a 10% chance of existential catastrophe when and if AI reaches human-level intelligence. In 2008, a group of experts at the Global Catastrophic Risk Conference at Oxford estimated a 19% chance of human extinction before 2100. If you’re curious to know more about existential risk, Bostrom’s landmark 2002 paper is the place to start. You may also want to follow this list I compiled on Twitter of the best sources of information related to existential risk. HOW TO ENSURE THE CONTINUATION OF OUR EVOLUTIONARY BRANCH The various existential risks that threaten to decimate humanity and the entire earthly biosphere in the coming decades and centuries have, as I said, compelled a multitude of very smart people to consider how best to avoid the potential catastrophes we’ve identified and how best to identify potential catastrophes that we have yet to notice. Other smart folks have begun asking a similar question: If a catastrophe does occur, how can we at least ensure that our evolutionary branch will persist? One popular answer, in certain circles, is that we must become a multi-planetary species as soon as possible.

#### Existential risk outweighs – any risk of any type of extinction means we need to get off the rock

Bostrom 12 [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]

Many factors conspire against the study and mitigation of existential risks. Research is perhaps inhibited by the multidisciplinary nature of the problem, but also by deeper epistemological issues. The biggest existential risks are not amenable to plug-and-play scientific research methodologies. Furthermore, there are unresolved foundational issues, particularly concerning observation selection theory and population ethics, which are crucial to the assessment of existential risk; and these theoretical difficulties are compounded by psychological factors that make it difficult to think clearly about issues such as the end of humanity.31 If more resources were to be made available to research existential risks, there is a danger that they would flow, with excessive preponderance, to the relatively minor risks that are easier for some established disciplinary community to study using familiar methods, at the expense of far more important risk areas — machine superintelligence, advanced molecular nanotechnology, totalitarianism, risks related to the simulation-hypothesis, or future advances in synthetic biology — which would require a more inconvenient shift in research focus. Another plausible diversion is that research would mainly be directed at global catastrophic risks that involve little or no existential risk. Mitigation of existential risk is hampered by a lack of understanding, but also by a deficit of motivation. Existential risk mitigation is a global public good (i.e., non-excludable and non-rivalrous), and economic theory suggests that such goods tend to be undersupplied by the market, since each producer of existential safety (even if the producer is a large nation) could capture only a small portion of the value (Feldman 1980; Kaul 1999). In fact, the situation is worse than is the case with many other global public goods in that existential risk reduction is a strongly transgenerational (in fact, pan-generational) public good: even a world state may capture only a small fraction of the benefits — those accruing to currently existing people. The quadrillions of happy people who may come to exist in the future if we avoid existential catastrophe would be willing to pay the present generation astronomical sums in return for a slight increase in our efforts to preserve humanity's future, but the mutually beneficial trade is unfortunately prevented by the obvious transaction difficulties. Moral motivations, too, may fail to measure up to the magnitude of what is at stake. The scope insensitivity of our moral sentiments is likely to be especially pronounced when very large numbers are involved: Substantially larger numbers, such as 500 million deaths, and especially qualitatively different scenarios such as the extinction of the entire human species, seem to trigger a different mode of thinking—enter into a "separate magisterium." People who would never dream of hurting a child hear of an existential risk, and say, "Well, maybe the human species doesn't really deserve to survive." (Yudkowsky 2008, p. 114) Existential risk requires a proactive approach. The reactive approach — to observe what happens, limit damages, and then implement improved mechanisms to reduce the probability of a repeat occurrence—does not work when there is no opportunity to learn from failure. Instead, we must anticipate emerging dangers, mobilize support for action against hypothetical future harm, and get our precautions sufficiently right the first time. That is a tall order. Few institutions are capable of operating consistently at such a level of effective rationality, and attempts to imitate such proactive behavior within less perfect institutions can easily backfire. Speculative risk-mongering could be exploited to rationalize self-serving aggressive action, expansion of costly and potentially oppressive security bureaucracies, or restrictions of civil liberties that keep societies free and sane. The result of false approximations to the rational ideal could easily be a net increase in existential risk.32 Multidisciplinary and epistemological challenges, academic distractions and diversions, cognitive biases, free-rider problems, moral lethargy and scope-insensitivity, institutional incompetence, and the political exploitation of unquantifiable threats are thus some of the barriers to effective mitigation. To these we can add the difficulty of achieving required levels of global cooperation. While some existential risks can be tackled unilaterally — any state with a space industry could build a global defense against asteroid impacts — other risks require a joint venture between many states. Management of the global climate may require buy-in by an overwhelming majority of industrialized and industrializing nations. Avoidance of arms races and relinquishment of dangerous directions of technological research may require that all states join the effort, since a single defector could annul any benefits of collaboration. Some future dangers might even require that each state monitor and regulate every significant group or individual within its territory.33 We may note, first, that many of the key concepts and ideas are quite new.34 Before the conceptual and theoretical foundations were in place, support for efforts to research and mitigate existential risk could not build. In many instances, the underlying scientific, technological, and methodological ideas needed for studying existential risks in a meaningful way have also only recently become available. The delayed start helps explain the still primitive state of the art. It is arguably only since the detonation of the first atomic bomb in 1945, and the subsequent nuclear buildup during the Cold War, that any significant naturalistic (i.e., non-supernatural) existential risks have arisen — at least if we count only risks over which human beings have some influence.35 Most of the really big existential risks still seem to lie many years into the future. Until recently, therefore, there may have been relatively little need to think about existential risk in general and few opportunities for mitigation even if such thinking had taken place. Public awareness of the global impacts of human activities appears to be increasing. Systems, processes, and risks are studied today from a global perspective by many scholars — environmental scientists, economists, epidemiologists, demographers, and others. Problems such as climate change, cross-border terrorism, and international financial crises direct attention to global interdependency and threats to the global system. The idea of risk in general seems to have risen in prominence.36 Given these advances in knowledge, methods, and attitudes, the conditions for securing for existential risks the scrutiny they deserve are unprecedentedly propitious. Opportunities for action may also proliferate. As noted, some mitigation projects can be undertaken unilaterally, and one may expect more such projects as the world becomes richer. Other mitigation projects require wider coordination; in many cases, global coordination. Here, too, some trend lines seem to point to this becoming more feasible over time. There is a long-term historic trend toward increasing scope of political integration — from hunter-gatherer bands to chiefdoms, city states, nation states, and now multinational organizations, regional alliances, various international governance structures, and other aspects of globalization (Wright 1999). Extrapolation of this trend might seem to indicate the eventual creation of a singleton (Bostrom 2006). It is also possible that some of the global movements that emerged over the last half century—in particular the peace movement, the environmentalist movement, and various global justice and human-rights movements — will increasingly take on board more generalized concerns about existential risk.37 Furthermore, to the extent that existential-risk mitigation really is a most deserving cause, one may expect that general improvements in society's ability to recognize and act on important truths will differentially funnel resources into existential-risk mitigation. General improvements of this kind might come from many sources, including developments in educational techniques and online collaboration tools, institutional innovations such as prediction markets, advances in science and philosophy, spread of rationality culture, and biological cognitive enhancement. Finally, it is possible that the cause will at some point receive a boost from the occurrence of a major (non-existential) catastrophe that underscores the precariousness of the present human condition. That would, needless to say, be the worst possible way for our minds to be concentrated — yet one which, in a multidecadal time frame, must be accorded a non-negligible probability of occurrence.38

#### It’s sustainable, and the transition away wrecks the environment

Mead, 12 --Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College (7/28/2012, Walter Russell, “The Energy Revolution 4: Hot Planet?” <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2012/07/28/the-energy-revolution-4-hot-planet/>, JMP)

Capitalism is not, Monbiot is forced to admit, a fragile system that will easily be replaced. Bolstered by huge supplies of oil, it is here to stay. Industrial civilization is, as far as he can now see, unstoppable. Gaia, that treacherous slut, has made so much oil and gas that her faithful acolytes today cannot protect her from the consequences of her own folly. Welcome to the New Green Doom: an overabundance of oil and gas is going to release so much greenhouse gas that the world is going to fry. The exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, warn leading environmentalists, is a tipping point. William McKibben put it this way in an interview with Wired magazine in the fall of 2011: I think if we go whole-hog in the tar sands, we’re out of luck. Especially since that would doubtless mean we’re going whole-hog at all the other unconventional energy sources we can think of: Deepwater drilling, fracking every rock on the face of the Earth, and so forth. Here’s why the tar sands are important: It’s a decision point about whether, now that we’re running out of the easy stuff, we’re going to go after the hard stuff. The Saudi Arabian liquor store is running out of bottles. Do we sober up, or do we find another liquor store, full of really crappy booze, to break into? A year later, despite the success of environmentalists like McKibben at persuading the Obama administration to block a pipeline intended to ship this oil to refineries in the US, it’s clear (as it was crystal clear all along to anyone with eyes to see) that the world has every intention of making use of the “crappy liquor.” Again, for people who base their claim to world leadership on their superior understanding of the dynamics of complex systems, greens prove over and over again that they are surprisingly naive and crude in their ability to model and to shape the behavior of the political and economic systems they seek to control. If their understanding of the future of the earth’s climate is anything like as wish-driven, fact-averse and intellectually crude as their approach to international affairs, democratic politics and the energy market, the greens are in trouble indeed. And as I’ve written in the past, the contrast between green claims to understand climate and to be able to manage the largest and most complex set of policy changes ever undertaken, and the evident incompetence of greens at managing small (Solyndra) and large (Kyoto, EU cap and trade, global climate treaty) political projects today has more to do with climate skepticism than greens have yet understood. Many people aren’t rejecting science; they are rejecting green claims of policy competence. In doing so, they are entirely justified by the record. Nevertheless, the future of the environment is not nearly as dim as greens think. Despairing environmentalists like McKibben and Monbiot are as wrong about what the new era of abundance means as green energy analysts were about how much oil the planet had. The problem is the original sin of much environmental thought: Malthusianism. If greens weren’t so addicted to Malthusian horror narratives they would be able to see that the new era of abundance is going to make this a cleaner planet faster than if the new gas and oil had never been found. Let’s be honest. It has long been clear to students of history, and has more recently begun to dawn on many environmentalists, that all that happy-clappy carbon treaty stuff was a pipe dream and that nothing like that is going to happen. A humanity that hasn’t been able to ban the bomb despite the clear and present dangers that nuclear weapons pose isn’t going to ban or even seriously restrict the internal combustion engine and the generator. The political efforts of the green movement to limit greenhouse gasses have had very little effect so far, and it is highly unlikely that they will have more success in the future. The green movement has been more of a group hug than a curve bending exercise, and that is unlikely to change. If the climate curve bends, it will bend the way the population curve did: as the result of lots of small human decisions driven by short term interest calculations rather than as the result of a grand global plan. The shale boom hasn’t turned green success into green failure. It’s prevented green failure from turning into something much worse. Monbiot understands this better than McKibben; there was never any real doubt that we’d keep going to the liquor store. If we hadn’t found ways to use all this oil and gas, we wouldn’t have embraced the economics of less. True, as oil and gas prices rose, there would be more room for wind and solar power, but the real winner of an oil and gas shortage is… coal. To use McKibben’s metaphor, there is a much dirtier liquor store just down the road from the shale emporium, and it’s one we’ve been patronizing for centuries. The US and China have oodles of coal, and rather than walk to work from our cold and dark houses all winter, we’d use it. Furthermore, when and if the oil runs out, the technology exists to get liquid fuel out of coal. It isn’t cheap and it isn’t clean, but it works. The newly bright oil and gas future means that we aren’t entering a new Age of Coal. For this, every green on the planet should give thanks. The second reason why greens should give thanks for shale is that environmentalism is a luxury good. People must survive and they will survive by any means necessary. But they would much rather thrive than merely survive, and if they can arrange matters better, they will. A poor society near the edge of survival will dump the industrial waste in the river without a second thought. It will burn coal and choke in the resulting smog if it has nothing else to burn. Politics in an age of survival is ugly and practical. It has to be. The best leader is the one who can cut out all the fluff and the folderol and keep you alive through the winter. During the Battle of Leningrad, people burned priceless antiques to stay alive for just one more night. An age of energy shortages and high prices translates into an age of radical food and economic insecurity for billions of people. Those billions of hungry, frightened, angry people won’t fold their hands and meditate on the ineffable wonders of Gaia and her mystic web of life as they pass peacefully away. Nor will they vote George Monbiot and Bill McKibben into power. They will butcher every panda in the zoo before they see their children starve, they will torch every forest on earth before they freeze to death, and the cheaper and the meaner their lives are, the less energy or thought they will spare to the perishing world around them.But, thanks to shale and other unconventional energy sources, that isn’t where we are headed. We are heading into a world in which energy is abundant and horizons are open even as humanity’s grasp of science and technology grows more secure. A world where more and more basic human needs are met is a world that has time to think about other goals and the money to spend on them. As China gets richer, the Chinese want cleaner air, cleaner water, purer food — and they are ready and able to pay for them. A Brazil whose economic future is secure can afford to treasure and conserve its rain forests. A Central America where the people are doing all right is more willing and able to preserve its biodiversity. And a world in which people know where their next meal is coming from is a world that can and will take thought for things like the sustainability of the fisheries and the protection of the coral reefs. A world that is more relaxed about the security of its energy sources is going to be able to do more about improving the quality of those sources and about managing the impact of its energy consumption on the global commons. A rich, energy secure world is going to spend more money developing solar power and wind power and other sustainable sources than a poor, hardscrabble one. When human beings think their basic problems are solved, they start looking for more elegant solutions. Once Americans had an industrial and modern economy, we started wanting to clean up the rivers and the air. Once people aren’t worried about getting enough calories every day to survive, they start wanting healthier food more elegantly prepared. A world of abundant shale oil and gas is a world that will start imposing more environmental regulations on shale and gas producers. A prosperous world will set money aside for research and development for new technologies that conserve energy or find it in cleaner surroundings. A prosperous world facing climate change will be able to ameliorate the consequences and take thought for the future in ways that a world overwhelmed by energy insecurity and gripped in a permanent economic crisis of scarcity simply can’t and won’t do. Greens should also be glad that the new energy is where it is. For Monbiot and for many others, Gaia’s decision to put so much oil into the United States and Canada seems like her biggest indiscretion of all. Certainly, a United States of America that has, in the Biblical phrase, renewed its youth like an eagle with a large infusion of fresh petro-wealth is going to be even less eager than formerly to sign onto various pie-in-the-sky green carbon treaties. But think how much worse things would be if the new reserves lay in dictatorial kleptocracies. How willing and able would various Central Asia states have been to regulate extraction and limit the damage? How would Nigeria have handled vast new reserves whose extraction required substantially more invasive methods?

#### Their sweeping criticism of international norms is wrong – they are in constant contestation and can be hijacked by colonized subjects

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(Laura, “Questioning universalism, devising an ethics without foundations: An exploration of international relations ontologies and epistemologies,” Journal of International Political Theory 11(3):277-295, accessed 5-26-16 //Bozzles the Bozz-Dawg Bozz Bozz)

Thus, instead of hoping that rules will achieve the results they formally prescribe (i.e. eliminate torture), it is necessary to turn to “practices” and “contexts” and explore “what social and political context supports the practice of torture in the current war on terror” (Lang, 2009: 9). Pace Finnemore, norms are not self-contained, fixed, and transparent. They are instead understood, interpreted and applied in specific contexts and their meaning is therefore, continuously re-worked. As Nicholas Onuf has argued, deciding whether or not socially institutionalized practices and the rules that govern them are morally defensible depends on moral principles that are themselves contestable and socially constructed (Onuf, 2009: 26). Assumptions about the transparency of rules and norms in IR have been challenged by authors who explored the political rationality of liberal interventionism. For instance, Oliver Richmond (2011) and Roger Mac Ginty (2011) have shown that the “liberal peace” is not a coherent script or a transparent system of norms and rules, but a hybrid discursive formation that encompasses at the same time universal normative claims, postcolonial trajectories, and bottom-up aspirations to emancipation. In my own work, I have shown that United Nations peacekeeping operations’ attempts at disciplining local politics on the ground of universal normative claims offer local constituencies the framework for negotiating and hijacking internationally established agendas (Zanotti, 2011). In the meantime, David Kennedy (2004, 2006) has critically scrutinized “rules of engagement” in war as well as the prescriptions of what he calls the human rights scholars and practitioners’ “invisible college.” The anodyne rhetoric of a just jus in bellum intends to provide standardized criteria regarding the number of acceptable civilian casualties (conveniently called collateral damage). In doing so, it also produces the effect of appeasing the consciousness of those who conduct war by diverting responsibility for civilian killings. Furthermore, Kennedy argues, universal human rights discourses and the practices they elicit have too often avoided careful consideration for the effects and trade-offs they produce and for the political and distributive consequences they entail. In criticizing Just War theories, Amoureux and Steele (2014) argued the evaluation of political choices needs not to be limited to “intentions” but must rely upon “competent” assessment of the means through which any given action will be carried out and of how a situation would “look like” as a result. As they aptly put it, “if Just War, as both thought and practice, fails to deal with the political, it will ring hollow as an ethical guide for foreign policy, as it already does for many, particularly among the ‘unintended’ objects of its violence” (Amoureux and Steele, 2014: 68).

#### Depicting hegemony as malicious is counter-factual and hinders efforts to maintain primacy and a stable world. Your primary obligation is to reject the alt and affirm hegemony.

Dunn 7

(JR, editor of the International Military Encyclopedia and contributor to the American Thinker, 1/5, “Breaking the hold of hegemonist doctrine”, http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/01/hegemonism.html)

We do know that the impulse behind it is the hegemonist doctrine. No other force is keeping the U.S. from playing its international role. No outside element could possibly succeed in holding the country back. Only internal pressure from the media, the educational establishment, the universities, the Democrats. They call themselves idealists, and we can give them that. But American left-wing idealism is hollow, creating not the conditions for a global utopia, but for more wars, more brutality, more genocides, more bloodshed. It follows that the hegemonist doctrine has to go. This is a dogma that has no beneficial aspect. It presents itself as infinitely virtuous while enabling the most evil aspects of the era. (The majority of its adherents - the kind of leftists who have adopted the label of "liberal" - would no doubt be deeply offended to hear that they are supporters of the Khmer Rouge and the Rwandan murderers -- but there's no ducking this.) It is accepted without thought or consideration, as simply the way educated people think. It is a doctrine that inveigles decent individuals to turn their backs on grotesque suffering, to shut the blinds and close their ears when they hear screams of pain and terror out in the darkness, in the conviction that the police are, if anything, worse than the rapists and murderers. It is also a doctrine held - if not very seriously or very deeply - by a vast number of people, which raises the question of how such a thing can be challenged. In past decades, the center right has all too often allowed leftist premises to stand unchallenged. The reasons are varied - concentration on easier issues, a sense of hopelessness, an inability to recognize such ideas when they appear - and are not important. What is important is realizing that this stance is always an error. It has allowed the left to set the terms of debate, to define the issues, to prepare the ground before the fight even begins. The result has been much more effort and frustration in conservative efforts than has been strictly called for. This is nowhere more true than of hegemonist doctrine. In debates concerning foreign policy, it has been treated as an axiom, something inarguable and untouchable. In going along with this charade, conservatives have effectively relegated all their own arguments to the "yes, but..." category. Such a consistent and long-lived tendency to undercut their own premises would be difficult to credit if it wasn't true of many other conservative positions as well. Three methods would prove effective in breaking the hold of hegemonist doctrine: identifying it for what it is; discrediting its contentions; and replacing it with a healthy, serious conception of national feeling. Identification - most people have no idea anything like hegemonism exists as a distinct concept, attributing its effects to the general climate of opinion. Since the collapse of Stalinism, the radical left has been very careful not to closely associate itself with the spread of its own ideas, instead depending on sympathetic or naive outsiders (in a previous epoch known as "transmission belts"), a tactic that has proven quite successful. Identifying hegemonism as leftist in its origins, methods, and aims would go a long way toward undermining it. Most people do not care to be intellectually manipulated, which is what this doctrine amounts to. Identifying it as a distinct doctrine will also force the left to defend it as a doctrine, rather than simply acting as if it's what any sane person believes. (It's amazing, when you think about it, how many aspects of left-wing ideology are defended in those terms, and none other. Amazing, and frustrating, in that they've been able to get away with it for so long.) Disparagement - This should be easy enough. In truth, few dogmas have been more discredited in recent years than this one. As we have seen, it was discredited first by the aftermath of the Vietnam War, as the world at large careened down the road to Hell without any assistance from the United States. It was discredited once more at the end of the Cold War, when the U.S., at its peak moment of triumph, turned away from any form of imperialist design. It was discredited again during the 90s, when many of the pathologies of the 70s reappeared in limited form due to American sloth. It needs to be pointed out - over and over again, as many times as is necessary - that the hegemonist "backstory" is pure mythology, that the U.S., far from acting as an imperial state, has walked out of the global arena time and again in the past century, on each occasion leaving abject chaos behind. Human instinct is on our side - nobody cares to believe that they live in a psychopathic country, and the facts back us up on this. They should be reiterated constantly. At least as often as the left repeats their little yarns. Replacement - The form of patriotism disdained by the left as "my country, right or wrong" is long gone, if it ever existed in the first place. What is needed to put up against hegemonic nihilism is a new form, in which skepticism of acting government is balanced by love of country, faith in its ideals, and both pride and understanding of its history, embracing both triumphs and errors. In other words, a style of patriotism much as it exists in the center right today. The left is commonly allowed to dismiss the patriotism of conservatives as the howling of Strangelovian maniacs. They need to be corrected, as firmly as the situation calls for. We must keep in mind how easily Ronald Reagan overturned the doctrine when it was at its most powerful, only a few years after the collapse of Vietnam. Reagan achieved this because he believed in his vision of America, and was able to communicate that belief. As in so much else, we need to look back on how the Gipper did it. Above all, we need to keep in mind what has been done before, can be accomplished again. There's a great irony involved in all this in that even as the hegemonist viewpoint became the consensus, the U.S. was correcting domestic faults and achieving international victories that would have been impossible if the doctrine had any basis in truth. The odious institution of legal segregation was overthrown with no serious bloodshed, a social revolution in the role of women was encompassed in less than a generation, and new industries unimaginable in the last century transformed first the American, and then the global economy. Internationally, the U.S. brought about the collapse of communism, the most efficient system for human degradation ever devised, oversaw the rise of a new Europe that in large part left behind the abattoir politics responsible for the deaths of millions within living memory, and aided in establishing a network of young democracies across the Asian littoral. Yet despite all this - a record unmatched by any other state in the modern era, perhaps any state in history -- we're supposed to turn our backs and instead brood over ancient wrongs and phantasms dreamed up by fearful, isolated academics ignorant of the very society that supported them. In fact, the U.S. is pioneering a new method by which a great power relates to the world - as a combination of trading partner, lifeguard, and sheriff. There has been nothing quite like it before, although the British Empire pioneered some aspects (particularly those having to do with trade). Whether it succeeds is the core question of our era. If it does not... the example of Rome lies in reserve. "Where there is no vision, the people perish." Americans - many of them - have been deprived of a vision of their country for many decades by an ideological construct designed to make patriotism and love of country appear malignant. No society can thrive, much less fight a war, under such a burden of cynicism and self-doubt. None of these dogmas last forever, and this form of inverted patriotism, this dispensable survival of the heyday of American leftism, has lived past its time, kept alive by misfits who had nothing else to sustain them. Dispensing with it should be at the top of our agenda. It may be more important than tactics, more important than strategy, more important than anything that happens overseas, since without it being accomplished, nothing else can possibly work.

#### US hegemony solves extinction – decline causes it

Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 13

(Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Winter 2012/13), pp. 7–51)

A core premise of deep engagement is that it prevents the emergence of a far more dangerous global security environment. For one thing, as noted above, the United States’ overseas presence gives it the leverage to restrain partners from taking provocative action. Perhaps more important, its core alliance commitments also deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and make its partners more secure, reducing their incentive to adopt solutions to their security problems that threaten others and thus stoke security dilemmas. The contention that engaged U.S. power dampens the baleful effects of anarchy is consistent with influential variants of realist theory. Indeed, arguably the scariest portrayal of the war-prone world that would emerge absent the “American Pacifier” is provided in the works of John Mearsheimer, who forecasts dangerous multipolar regions replete with security competition, arms races, nuclear proliferation and associated preventive war temptations, regional rivalries, and even runs at regional hegemony and full-scale great power war. 72 How do retrenchment advocates, the bulk of whom are realists, discount this benefit? Their arguments are complicated, but two capture most of the variation: (1) U.S. security guarantees are not necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries and conflict in Eurasia; or (2) prevention of rivalry and conflict in Eurasia is not a U.S. interest. Each response is connected to a different theory or set of theories, which makes sense given that the whole debate hinges on a complex future counterfactual (what would happen to Eurasia’s security setting if the United States truly disengaged?). Although a certain answer is impossible, each of these responses is nonetheless a weaker argument for retrenchment than advocates acknowledge. The first response flows from defensive realism as well as other international relations theories that discount the conflict-generating potential of anarchy under contemporary conditions. 73 Defensive realists maintain that the high expected costs of territorial conquest, defense dominance, and an array of policies and practices that can be used credibly to signal benign intent, mean that Eurasia’s major states could manage regional multipolarity peacefully without the American pacifier. Retrenchment would be a bet on this scholarship, particularly in regions where the kinds of stabilizers that nonrealist theories point to—such as democratic governance or dense institutional linkages—are either absent or weakly present. There are three other major bodies of scholarship, however, that might give decisionmakers pause before making this bet. First is regional expertise. Needless to say, there is no consensus on the net security effects of U.S. withdrawal. Regarding each region, there are optimists and pessimists. Few experts expect a return of intense great power competition in a post-American Europe, but many doubt European governments will pay the political costs of increased EU defense cooperation and the budgetary costs of increasing military outlays. 74 The result might be a Europe that is incapable of securing itself from various threats that could be destabilizing within the region and beyond (e.g., a regional conflict akin to the 1990s Balkan wars), lacks capacity for global security missions in which U.S. leaders might want European participation, and is vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers. What about the other parts of Eurasia where the United States has a substantial military presence? Regarding the Middle East, the balance begins to swing toward pessimists concerned that states currently backed by Washington— notably Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia—might take actions upon U.S. retrenchment that would intensify security dilemmas. And concerning East Asia, pessimism regarding the region’s prospects without the American pacifier is pronounced. Arguably the principal concern expressed by area experts is that Japan and South Korea are likely to obtain a nuclear capacity and increase their military commitments, which could stoke a destabilizing reaction from China. It is notable that during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan moved to obtain a nuclear weapons capacity and were only constrained from doing so by a still-engaged United States. 75 The second body of scholarship casting doubt on the bet on defensive realism’s sanguine portrayal is all of the research that undermines its conception of state preferences. Defensive realism’s optimism about what would happen if the United States retrenched is very much dependent on its particular—and highly restrictive—assumption about state preferences; once we relax this assumption, then much of its basis for optimism vanishes. Specifically, the prediction of post-American tranquility throughout Eurasia rests on the assumption that security is the only relevant state preference, with security defined narrowly in terms of protection from violent external attacks on the homeland. Under that assumption, the security problem is largely solved as soon as offense and defense are clearly distinguishable, and offense is extremely expensive relative to defense. Burgeoning research across the social and other sciences, however, undermines that core assumption: states have preferences not only for security but also for prestige, status, and other aims, and they engage in trade-offs among the various objectives. 76 In addition, they define security not just in terms of territorial protection but in view of many and varied milieu goals. It follows that even states that are relatively secure may nevertheless engage in highly competitive behavior. Empirical studies show that this is indeed sometimes the case. 77 In sum, a bet on a benign postretrenchment Eurasia is a bet that leaders of major countries will never allow these nonsecurity preferences to influence their strategic choices. To the degree that these bodies of scholarly knowledge have predictive leverage, U.S. retrenchment would result in a significant deterioration in the security environment in at least some of the world’s key regions. We have already mentioned the third, even more alarming body of scholarship. Offensive realism predicts that the withdrawal of the American pacifier will yield either a competitive regional multipolarity complete with associated insecurity, arms racing, crisis instability, nuclear proliferation, and the like, or bids for regional hegemony, which may be beyond the capacity of local great powers to contain (and which in any case would generate intensely competitive behavior, possibly including regional great power war). Hence it is unsurprising that retrenchment advocates are prone to focus on the second argument noted above: that avoiding wars and security dilemmas in the world’s core regions is not a U.S. national interest. Few doubt that the United States could survive the return of insecurity and conflict among Eurasian powers, but at what cost? Much of the work in this area has focused on the economic externalities of a renewed threat of insecurity and war, which we discuss below. Focusing on the pure security ramifications, there are two main reasons why decisionmakers may be rationally reluctant to run the retrenchment experiment. First, overall higher levels of conflict make the world a more dangerous place. Were Eurasia to return to higher levels of interstate military competition, one would see overall higher levels of military spending and innovation and a higher likelihood of competitive regional proxy wars and arming of client states—all of which would be concerning, in part because it would promote a faster diffusion of military power away from the United States. Greater regional insecurity could well feed proliferation cascades, as states such as Egypt, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia all might choose to create nuclear forces. 78 It is unlikely that proliferation decisions by any of these actors would be the end of the game: they would likely generate pressure locally for more proliferation. Following Kenneth Waltz, many retrenchment advocates are proliferation optimists, assuming that nuclear deterrence solves the security problem. 79 Usually carried out in dyadic terms, the debate over the stability of proliferation changes as the numbers go up. Proliferation optimism rests on assumptions of rationality and narrow security preferences. In social science, however, such assumptions are inevitably probabilistic. Optimists assume that most states are led by rational leaders, most will overcome organizational problems and resist the temptation to preempt before feared neighbors nuclearize, and most pursue only security and are risk averse. Confidence in such probabilistic assumptions declines if the world were to move from nine to twenty, thirty, or forty nuclear states. In addition, many of the other dangers noted by analysts who are concerned about the destabilizing effects of nuclear proliferation—including the risk of accidents and the prospects that some new nuclear powers will not have truly survivable forces—seem prone to go up as the number of nuclear powers grows. 80 Moreover, the risk of “unforeseen crisis dynamics” that could spin out of control is also higher as the number of nuclear powers increases. Finally, add to these concerns the enhanced danger of nuclear leakage, and a world with overall higher levels of security competition becomes yet more worrisome. The argument that maintaining Eurasian peace is not a U.S. interest faces a second problem. On widely accepted realist assumptions, acknowledging that U.S. engagement preserves peace dramatically narrows the difference between retrenchment and deep engagement. For many supporters of retrenchment, the optimal strategy for a power such as the United States, which has attained regional hegemony and is separated from other great powers by oceans, is offshore balancing: stay over the horizon and “pass the buck” to local powers to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing any local rising power. The United States should commit to onshore balancing only when local balancing is likely to fail and a great power appears to be a credible contender for regional hegemony, as in the cases of Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union in the midtwentieth century. The problem is that China’s rise puts the possibility of its attaining regional hegemony on the table, at least in the medium to long term. As Mearsheimer notes, “The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves.” 81 Therefore, unless China’s rise stalls, “the United States is likely to act toward China similar to the way it behaved toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War.” 82 It follows that the United States should take no action that would compromise its capacity to move to onshore balancing in the future. It will need to maintain key alliance relationships in Asia as well as the formidably expensive military capacity to intervene there. The implication is to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan, reduce the presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia— just what the United States is doing. 83 In sum, the argument that U.S. security commitments are unnecessary for peace is countered by a lot of scholarship, including highly influential realist scholarship. In addition, the argument that Eurasian peace is unnecessary for U.S. security is weakened by the potential for a large number of nasty security consequences as well as the need to retain a latent onshore balancing capacity that dramatically reduces the savings retrenchment might bring. Moreover, switching between offshore and onshore balancing could well be difªcult. Bringing together the thrust of many of the arguments discussed so far underlines the degree to which the case for retrenchment misses the underlying logic of the deep engagement strategy. By supplying reassurance, deterrence, and active management, the United States lowers security competition in the world’s key regions, thereby preventing the emergence of a hothouse atmosphere for growing new military capabilities. Alliance ties dissuade partners from ramping up and also provide leverage to prevent military transfers to potential rivals. On top of all this, the United States’ formidable military machine may deter entry by potential rivals. Current great power military expenditures as a percentage of GDP are at historical lows, and thus far other major powers have shied away from seeking to match top-end U.S. military capabilities. In addition, they have so far been careful to avoid attracting the “focused enmity” of the United States. 84 All of the world’s most modern militaries are U.S. allies (America’s alliance system of more than sixty countries now accounts for some 80 percent of global military spending), and the gap between the U.S. military capability and that of potential rivals is by many measures growing rather than shrinking. 85

#### Their criticism of US influence contributes to a neo-isolationist ideology which threatens decline of primacy.

Kagan 98

(Robert, PhD, graduate of Yale and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, CFR member, US ambassador to NATO, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Weekly Standard, Summer 1998, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy)

Those contributing to the growing chorus of antihegemony and multipolarity may know they are playing a dangerous game, one that needs to be conducted with the utmost care, as French leaders did during the Cold War, lest the entire international system come crashing down around them. What they may not have adequately calculated, however, is the possibility that Americans will not respond as wisely as they generally did during the Cold War. Americans and their leaders should not take all this sophisticated whining about U.S. hegemony too seriously. They certainly should not take it more seriously than the whiners themselves do. But, of course, Americans are taking it seriously. In the United States these days, the lugubrious guilt trip of post-Vietnam liberalism is echoed even by conservatives, with William Buckley, Samuel Huntington, and James Schlesinger all decrying American "hubris," "arrogance," and "imperialism." Clinton administration officials, in between speeches exalting America as the "indispensable" nation, increasingly behave as if what is truly indispensable is the prior approval of China, France, and Russia for every military action. Moreover, at another level, there is a stirring of neo-isolationism in America today, a mood that nicely complements the view among many Europeans that America is meddling too much in everyone else's business and taking too little time to mind its own. The existence of the Soviet Union disciplined Americans and made them see that their enlightened self-interest lay in a relatively generous foreign policy. Today, that discipline is no longer present. In other words, foreign grumbling about American hegemony would be merely amusing, were it not for the very real possibility that too many Americans will forget —- even if most of the rest of the world does not —- just how important continued American dominance is to the preservation of a reasonable level of international security and prosperity. World leaders may want to keep this in mind when they pop the champagne corks in celebration of the next American humbling**.**

#### Heg prevents intervention there’s more of it post aff - American military power is key to prevent nuclear war and uphold the liberal order.

**Kagan, 18** — Robert Kagan; PhD, Senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. (9-18-2018; “The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World;” pg. 160-162; Published by *Alfred A. Knopf*; //GrRv)

What is likely to follow is a return to the **multipolar power struggles** that brought so much **devastation to the world**before the United States **redirected** the course of history. **That** is where the **deep ruts lead,** back to the state of the world prior to 1945. Only this time, the powers **competing** and **clashing** will be **armed with nuclear weapons**. It is ironic that some of those who spent the Cold War warning that America’s hawkish foreign policies would result in nuclear ~~holocaust~~ do not seem to fear nuclear war in the competitive multipolar world that may be our future. We have yet to test the question of whether nations with nuclear weapons can go to war, because so far the **United States** and the **liberal world order** have **prevented** such wars. **But** if history is any guide, to count on the **horror of new weaponry** alone to maintain the peace is a **most risky bet**. Had you cast that bet before the two world wars, you would have lost. These days some experts tell us it was the existence of nuclear weapons that prevented the United States and the Soviet Union from coming to blows, but few at the time had any confidence that nuclear weapons were a guarantor of peace. Throughout much of the Cold War there were those who simply assumed that the world was heading inevitably toward Armageddon. They were wrong that it would come as a result of American Cold War policies, but in the long run they may still prove right. These are the quandaries we cannot avoid no matter how hard we try. Reinhold Niebuhr believed that what he called “the world problem” **could not be solved** if America did not “accept its **full share of responsibility** in solving it.”187 To support a “world community beyond our own borders” he went on, both was virtuous and reflected a “prudent understanding of our own interests.” But he also predicted that Americans would be “**the poorer** for the global responsibilities which we bear.” And poorer not just in a material sense but also in a moral sense. It was impossible “to build a community without the manipulation of power,” and it was impossible “to use power and remain completely ‘pure.’ ”188 As Hans Morgenthau put it, “Whoever wants to retain ~~his~~ moral innocence must forsake action altogether.” Niebuhr did not want Americans to have an “easy conscience” about the things they were going to have to do, for there was always the danger that they would enjoy power too much and would use it to dominate others rather than to address the “world problem.” But he also did not want their “uneasy conscience” to “tempt us into irresponsibility.”189 Americans, it is fair to say, have not enjoyed power too much. These days, they would prefer to wield it less. Yet the struggle for power in the international system is eternal, and so is the struggle over beliefs and ideals. If it is not our system of security and our beliefs shaping the world order, it will be someone else’s. If we do not **preserve the liberal order**, it will be **replaced** by another kind of order, or more likely by **disorder and chaos** of the kind we saw in the twentieth century. That is what the world “as it is” looks like. That is what **history** and **human nature** have **led to in the** **past** and **will lead to in the future** if not continually shaped, managed, and resisted. This is a pessimistic view of human existence, but it is not a fatalistic view. **Nothing is determined**, not the **triumph** of liberalism **nor its defeat**. As we have seen these past seventy-five years, even in a dangerous world tremendous human progress and human betterment are possible. The “better angels” of human nature can be **encouraged** and the demons dampened. To know that the jungle will always be there is not to despair of keeping it at bay, as we have done for decades. In 1956 the German American historian Fritz Stern wrote that “the deepening of our historical experiences” should not lead us to abandon our faith in “the possibilities of human progress” but rather to “a stronger sense of the precariousness of human freedom and to a still greater dedication to it.”190 The **liberal order** is as **precarious** as it is **precious**. It is a garden that needs **constant tending** lest the **jungle grow back** and engulf us all.