# 1N vs Prospect ST

## 1

#### 1] Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source in an accessible format on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them in conjunction with a highlighted version.

#### 2] Violation: They only disclose a copy of their documents with “cut” cards where they read the parts of evidence they have highlighted.

#### Instructions are clearly given on my wiki as well as a demand for the formatting.

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

#### 3] Standard: Accessibility –

#### A] Digital magnification limits the amount of on-screen text and requires copious amounts of horizontal and vertical scrolling making it difficult to track when not reading some text and simultaneously looking for the next highlighted section. B] Screen reader users read documents audibly, but there is no way to read only the tags and highlighted parts due to their formatting. C] Their formatting is inaccessible for those with disabilities like me because the parts of evidence that are not being read distract them from the parts being read.

## 2

#### A] Interpretation – All theoretical paradigm issues must be contextual to their corresponding interpretations. *To clarify, arguments that frame the evaluation of a particular shell should have particular framing arguments. //Massa*

#### B] Violation –

#### C] Prefer –

#### Norming –

#### 1] 1ar theory sucks –

#### 2] Contestation –

#### 3] Recourse –

#### 4] Theoretical Abuse –

#### D] Norming is a voter – //Massa

#### Drop the debater –

#### Competing Interps –

#### No RVIs –

## 3

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

#### Affirming negates.

**Paraphrasing Mcnamara ‘06**, Paul, 2-7-2006, "Deontic Logic (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-deontic/index.html#4.3> //Massa

#### Premise 1—

#### Premise 2—

#### Thus, premise 3—

#### External world skep is true.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, **if you do have hands, then you are not merely a brain floating in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. **But how could you know that you are not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem exactly as it does now**; **you would** (by hypothesis) **have all the same sensory experiences that you’re having right now.** Since your **empirical knowledge of the world** around you **must somehow be based upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

## On Case

# Accessible Formatting

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa

Justice must not wait a decision is required immediately It cannot furnish itself with unlimited knowledge of conditions even if it did the moment of decision remains a moment of urgency since it marks interruption of deliberation that precedes it

#### External world skep is true.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

if you have hands, then you are not a brain floating in a vat But how could you know you are not everything would seem exactly as it does now you would have the same sensory experiences that you’re having now. empirical knowledge of the world must be based upon sensory experiences