# 1NC vs Walt Whitman EY

## 1

#### 1] Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source in an accessible format on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them in conjunction with a highlighted version.

#### 2] Violation: They only disclose a copy of their documents with “cut” cards where they read the parts of evidence they have highlighted.

#### Instructions are clearly given on my wiki as well as a demand for the formatting.

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

#### 3] Standard: Accessibility –

#### A] Digital magnification limits the amount of on-screen text and requires copious amounts of horizontal and vertical scrolling making it difficult to track when not reading some text and simultaneously looking for the next highlighted section. B] Screen reader users read documents audibly, but there is no way to read only the tags and highlighted parts due to their formatting. C] Their formatting is inaccessible for those with disabilities like me because the parts of evidence that are not being read distract them from the parts being read.

## 2

#### Presumption and permissibility negates –

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

#### External world skep is true.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, **if you do have hands, then you are not merely a brain floating in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. **But how could you know that you are not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem exactly as it does now**; **you would** (by hypothesis) **have all the same sensory experiences that you’re having right now.** Since your **empirical knowledge of the world** around you **must somehow be based upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

#### Truth properties – linguistic properties are indeterminate since every claim requires a factual definition and empirical verification, which is impossible given the arbitrariness of meaning. Kripke, Saul. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Harvard University Press. Cambridge MA, 1982. pg. 72 //Massa The simplest, most basic idea of the Tractatus can hardly be dismissed: a declarative sentence gets its meaning by virtue of its truth conditions, by virtue of [and] its correspondence to facts that must obtain if it is true. For example, [the sentence] ‘the cat is on the mat’ is understood by those speakers who realize that it is true if and only if a certain cat is on a certain mat; it is false otherwise. The presence of the cat on the mat is a fact or condition-in-the-world that would make the sentence true (express a truth) if it obtained.

#### **Even if it was possible to form sufficient reasons, those reasons are epistemically bankrupt in terms of their truth value because of the Gettier problem.** Chapman, Andrew. “The Gettier Problem.” *1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology*, 25 July 2018, 1000wordphilosophy.com/2014/04/10/the-gettier-problem//Massa

#### First, the thought is that a person must *believe*something to in order to know it. It would seem contradictory to claim that Max *knows*, but that Max doesn’t *believe*, that his tennis racquet is in the closet. Second, it would seem contradictory to claim to Max knows that his tennis racquet is in the closet while his racquet is actually back at the court. Max might believe that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might believe that he knows that his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. He might even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong. In none of these cases would we say that Max knows where his racquet is, since what he believes is false. Finally, it seems as though Max needs some justification, evidence, or good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet in order for him to know that it is.3 Suppose that Max has no good reason to believe that his racquet is in the closet. If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he serendipitously gets things right, it seems as though Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and hence, does not have knowledge.4

## On Case

# Accessible Formatting

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa

Justice must not wait a decision is required immediately It cannot furnish itself with unlimited knowledge of conditions even if it did the moment of decision remains a moment of urgency since it marks interruption of deliberation that precedes it

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if you have hands, then you are not a brain floating in a vat But how could you know you are not everything would seem exactly as it does now you would have the same sensory experiences that you’re having now. empirical knowledge of the world must be based upon sensory experiences

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a sentence gets meaning by its correspondence to facts if it is true. For example, ‘the cat is on the mat’ is true if only a certain cat is on a certain mat;

false otherwise.

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it would seem contradictory to claim Max knows his racquet is in the closet while his racquet is back at the court. Max might believe his racquet is in the closet and be wrong. even have good evidence that his racquet is in the closet and nonetheless be wrong In none of these would we say Max knows where his racquet is Suppose If Max just guesses that it’s in the closet, even if he gets things right Max, while having a true belief, has an unjustified true belief, and does not have knowledge.4