# 1NC vs Monta Vista KR

## 1

#### A] Interpretation: The affirmative may not defend a subset of workers – “workers” is a generic bare plural.

Jake **Nebel 14** [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. You know who he is – the shell is named after him lol], “Jake Nebel on Specifying “Just Governments””, VBriefly, 19 Dec 2014, https://www.vbriefly.com/2014/12/19/jake-nebel-on-specifying-just-governments/ // King CP

I believe that **debaters shouldn’t specify a government on the living wage topic. The standard argument for this is simple: “just governments” is a plural noun phrase, so it refers to more than one just government**. Most debaters will stop there. But there is much more to say. (Some seem not to care about the plural construction. I plan to address this view in a later article about the parametric conception of topicality.)¶ Some noun phrases include articles like “the,” demonstratives like “these,” possessives like “my,” or quantifiers like “some” or “all.” These words are called determiners. **Bare plurals, including “just governments,” lack determiners.** There’s no article, demonstrative, possessive, or quantifier in front of the noun to tell you how many or which governments are being discussed.¶ We use bare plurals for two main purposes. Consider some examples:¶ Debaters are here.¶ Debaters are smart.¶ In (1), “debaters” seems equivalent to “some debaters.” It is true just in case there is more than one debater around. If I enter a restaurant and utter (1), I speak truly if there are a couple of debaters at a table. This is an existential use of the bare plural, because it just says that there exist things of the relevant class (debaters) that meet the relevant description (being here). In (2), though, “debaters” seems to refer to debaters in general. **This use of the bare plural is generic. Some say that generics refer to kinds of things, rather than particular members of their kinds, or that they refer to typical cases. There is a large literature on understanding generics.** Here my aim is not to figure out the truth conditions for the generic reading of the resolution; I shall simply work with our pre-theoretical grip on the contrast between sentences like (1) and (2).¶ This distinction bears importantly on the resolution. If “just governments” is a generic bare plural, then the debate is about whether just governments in general ought to require that employers pay a living wage. If it is an existential bare plural, then the debate is about whether some just governments—i.e., more than one—ought to require that employers pay a living wage. Only the second interpretation allows one to affirm by specifying a few governments.

#### B] Violation: You only defend –

#### C] Standards –

#### 1] Semantics –

#### 2] Predictability –

#### 3] TVA –

#### D] Voters –

## 2

#### A. Interpretation: If the affirmative defends anything other than “Resolved: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike.,” then they must provide a counter-solvency advocate for their specific advocacy. *(To clarify, you must have an author that states we should not do your aff, insofar as the aff is not a whole res phil aff)*

#### B. Violation:

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Fairness – This is a litmus test to determining whether your aff is fair –

#### a) Ground –

#### b) Limits –

#### 2. Research –

## 3

#### Use a truth testing paradigm –

## 4

#### Presumption and permissibility negates –

#### Every reason is equally as violent in its creation.

**Derrida,** Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” //Massa But **justice,** however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait.· It **is that which must not wait.** To be direct, simple and brief, let us say this: **a just decision is always required immediately, "right away." It cannot furnish itself with** infinite information and the **unlimited knowledge of conditions,** rules or hypothetical imperatives **that could justify it.** And **even if it did** have all that at its disposal, even if it did give itself the time, all the time and all the necessary facts about the matter, **the moment of decision,** as such, **always remains a finite moment of urgency** and precipitation, since it must not be the consequence or the effectof this theoretical or historical knowledge, of this reflection or this deliberation, **since it always marks the interruption of the** juridico- or ethico- or politico-**cognitive deliberation that precedes it,** that must precede it. The instant of decision is a madness, says Kierkegaard. This is particularly true of the instant of the just decision that must rend time and defy dialectics. It is a madness. **Even if time** and prudence,the patience of knowledge and the mastery of conditions **were** hypothetically **unlimited, the decision would be structurally finite,** however late it came, decision of urgency and precipitation, **acting in** the night of **non-knowledge and non-rule**

#### External world skep is true.

**Neta**, Ram. “External World Skepticism.” The Problem of The External World, **2014**, philosophy.unc.edu/files/2014/06/The-Problem-of-the-External-World.pdf. //Massa

You take yourself to know that you have hands. But notice that, **if you do have hands, then you are not merely a brain floating in a vat of nutrient fluid and being electrochemically stimulated to have the sensory experiences** that you have now: such a brain does not have hands, but you do. So if you know that you do have hands, then you must also be in a position to know that you are not such a brain. **But how could you know that you are not such a brain? If you were such a brain, everything would seem exactly as it does now**; **you would** (by hypothesis) **have all the same sensory experiences that you’re having right now.** Since your **empirical knowledge of the world** around you **must somehow be based upon your sensory experiences, how could these experiences**—the very same experiences that you would have if you were a brain in a vat—**furnish you with knowledge that you’re not such a brain? And if you don’t know that you’re not such a brain, then you cannot know that you have hands.**

#### Abductivism disproves the best guess.

**Douven**, Igor, "Abduction", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer **2017** Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/abduction/>. //Massa

**You** happen to **know that Tim and Harry have recently had a terrible row that ended their friendship.** Now **someone tells you that she just saw Tim and Harry jogging together. The best explanation for this that you can think of is that they made up. You conclude that they are friends again.** One morning **you enter the kitchen to find a plate and cup on the table**, with breadcrumbs and a pat of butter on it, and surrounded by a jar of jam, a pack of sugar, and an empty carton of milk. **You conclude that one of your house-mates got up at night** to make him- or herself a midnight snack and was too tired to clear the table. **This, you think, best explains the scene you are facing. To be sure, it might be that someone burgled the house and took the time to have a bite while on the job**, or a house-mate might have arranged the things on the table without having a midnight snack but just to make you believe that someone had a midnight snack. But these hypotheses strike you as providing much more contrived explanations of the data than the one you infer to. Walking along the beach, you see what looks like a picture of Winston Churchill in the sand. It could be that, as in the opening pages of Hilary Putnam’s (1981), what you see is actually the trace of an ant crawling on the beach. The much simpler, and therefore (you think) much better, explanation is that someone intentionally drew a picture of Churchill in the sand. That, in any case, is what you come away believing. **In these examples, the conclusions do not follow logically from the premises.** For instance**, it does not follow logically that Tim and Harry are friends again from the premises that they had a terrible row** which ended their friendship and that they have just been seen jogging together; it does not even follow, we may suppose, from all the information you have about Tim and Harry. Nor do you have any useful statistical data about friendships, terrible rows, and joggers that might warrant an inference from the information that you have about Tim and Harry to the conclusion that they are friends again, or even to the conclusion that, probably (or with a certain probability), they are friends again. What leads you to the conclusion, and what according to a considerable number of philosophers may also warrant this conclusion, is precisely the fact that Tim and Harry’s being friends again would, if true, best explain the fact that they have just been seen jogging together. (The proviso that a hypothesis be true if it is to explain anything is taken as read from here on.) Similar remarks apply to the other two examples. The type of inference exhibited here is called abduction or, somewhat more commonly nowadays, Inference to the Best Explanation.

## On Case