# 1AC vs Scarsdale KS

## 1AC

### R5

#### Abled subjectivity is tied up in a two-tiered affective response that explains disabled life – primary pity which reflects disability upon the ego threatening its ability status, which invokes secondary pity to overcorrect for the shattered-ego necessitating disabled death.

Mollow 15 The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 //ACCS JM

Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look...but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s ‘normal’ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else’s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primary- secondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one’s own self undone?

#### Debate is a sphere of “fiat” and “futurism” which reifies rehabilitative futurism where the signifier of the fantasmatic child is placed forward to eradicate and cure disability. When the question of disability arises, communicative projects such as debate are centered around solely optimism and trying to create the ‘better future’ – this obsession with optimism pathologizes the disabled Child that cannot be in the better future – this 1AC serves as an ‘perspective shift’ that differs from the current form of how disability is presented – absent questioning the form of argumentation the content of argumentation becomes unethically flawed – thus, the role of the ballot is to disrupt biopolitical systems of productivity and futurity.

Mollow 2 The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 //ACCS JM

“Let us begin our reexamination of Tiny Tim with a discussion of No Future, a text in which Tiny Tim takes a prominent position. No Future is a text with a target: the book takes aim at “the Child whose innocence solicits our defense,” a trope that Edelman names as the emblem of an ideology that he terms “reproductive futurism” (2). According to Edelman, commonplace cultural invocations of the figure of the Child (“not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children”) uphold “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity” (11, 2). Defying pronatalist social imperatives, Edelman names queerness as “the side of those not fighting for the children‟” (3) and urges queers to accept the culture’s projection of the death drive onto us by saying explicitly what Law and the Pope and the whole of the Symbolic order for which they stand hear anyway in each and every expression or manifestation of queer sexuality: Fuck the social order and the Child in whose name we’re collectively terrorized; fuck Annie; fuck the waif from Les Mis; fuck the poor, innocent kid on the Net; fuck Laws both with capital ls and with small; fuck the whole network of Symbolic relations and the future that serves as its prop. (No Future 29) Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future’s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart. Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the ‘innocent’ Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists’ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You’re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman’s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman’s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.” (68-69)

#### Debate is a communicative sphere which is systematically structured to exclude disability – communicative spaces privilege those who can conform to marketable forms of affect by rewarding normality and conformity and excluding those who are deemed incompetent through perceiving disabled affect as parasitic due to literally slowing down information. The drive to perform means disability is always constituted by affective labor and regulated to the bottom of the communicative register causing violence and exclusion.

St. Pierre 17 (Becoming Dysfluent: Fluency as Biopolitics and Hegemony Joshua St. Pierre Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, Volume 11, Issue 3, 2017, pp. 339-356 (Article) Published by Liverpool University Press) [BRACKETED FOR ABLEIST RHETORIC] //Lex VM Recut by ACCS JM

“Given that compulsory able-bodiedness emanates from everywhere and nowhere, it is perhaps more fruitful to parse this consensus through the mode by which compulsory able-bodiedness circulates and is translated across different ideas, practices, and institutions rather than isolating the specific sites where this consensus, this hegemony, is produced. For McRuer, “the experience of the able-bodied need for an agreed-on common ground” is a common experience that “links all people with disabilities under a system of compulsory able-bodiedness” (8), and I suggest that this “common ground” of disability oppression is a how as much as a where or a what. That is, a common ground is never just found, but must be cleared away and maintained with effort through time. “Fluency” can accordingly be understood as a technology operating at the intersection of biopower and hegemony that smooths over and straightens discontinuous semiotics, temporalities, and materialities to eliminate frictions within productive, biopolitical systems and thus secure social order within the material realm. An attention to fluency moves beyond the orthodox focus on ideology as the essential vehicle of hegemony to locate, alongside Jon Beasley-Murray’s notion of “posthegemony,” the production of consensus and the security of social order not within the realm of representation but the governance of bodies and life itself. Fluency attempts to regulate and collapse not merely the time between encounters, but the embodied time of encounter and access and judgment. Fluency attempts to cover over political spaces—to mitigate (when it cannot eliminate) interruption and disruption—thus facilitating in one move the rationalization and naturalization of embodied difference that seems to emanate from everywhere and nowhere, as if everyone agrees. But whatever else it may be, fluency is first a process enacted and lived within the material and corporeal**.** Here I start from the semiotic and expand outwards. The vast array of rhythms, semiotic modes, tempos, dictions, and (racialized or disabled) accents that constitute practices of aural “communication” have become the objective domain of the biomedicalizing industry of Speech-Language Pathology. Barry Guitar, in his well-used textbook on speech impediments, offers an exemplary definition of fluency: “simply as the effortless flow of speech” (13). Yet there is hardly anything simple about this definition, which is offered amid caveats and backtracking. Guitar readily admits (12) that fluency is difficult to pin down and that researchers within Speech-Language Pathology often focus on what it is not—namely, dysfluency. There are a few characteristics: Fluent speech is marked by a lack of hesitation, and Speech-Language Pathology is forced to make (dubious and highly arbitrary) distinctions between “normal” and “abnormal” hesitations (Goldman-Eisler) since breaks and hesitations crop up in all speech. Fluent speech is marked by rhythmical (read: thoroughly normalized) patterning. Fluent speech is similarly marked by the lack of “extra sounds” interjected into culturally dominant phonetic patterns. Fluency is defined by the overall rate of speech, which includes not just the rate of vocal flow but of information flow (Starkweather). And lastly, fluency is often defined by a lack of “effort” on the part of the speaker; a conceit of mastery over language that highlights the twinned meaning of “fluency.” Transposing this definition into a critical register, the “effortless flow of speech” can be read as a coordinated—yet often strained—performance of bending the energies and capacities of bodies toward stable and univocal futures. [Those with Autism] ~~Autistics~~ are compelled to restrict stimming, to sit on their hands (to have “quiet hands,” Bascom), and thereby reroute bodily capacities to the smooth performance of so-called intelligible communication. Dyslexic bodies that process information piecemeal and slowly are forced out of social time (Cosenza 7). As Zach Richter has argued, the facial tics and erratic gestures of dysfluent speakers are likewise never communicative inflections, but are made abject and cast out of the communicative realm altogether by what I am here calling technologies of fluency. Tics of loud cursing and grunting from a public speaker with Tourette’s are imagined as an interruption to communication. Dysfluencies are erased from closed captions and courtroom transcripts. What is thus left is a univocal and fluid semiotic operation that instrumentalizes our relations with others. Or more precisely, if fluency is a type of Foucauldian technology, then the function of this biopolitical strategy is to regulate and focus the communicative event toward specific, technical ends through the logic of optimization and closure.” (342-344)

#### Vote affirmative as an endorsement of dysfluency and the failure of disability to be productive – this 1AC is a performative affective intervention by diverting from what is expected in a space that is meant to purposefully exclude disability in the name of productivity – this 1AC serves as a reminder of the failed ASL movement that the PRL instantly stopped in the name of productivity and efficiency. Only a refusal of this world addresses ableism as the basis of communication—we defend the 1AC’s affective pessimism as an example of a die-in within topic discussions, a refusal to breathe life into the resolution. Pessimistic die-ins break from institutional participation as a starting point for politics in favor of disrupting the circulation of discourses predicated upon optimism and disabled death. This hijacks communicative spheres by purposefully forefronting discussions of disabled killability.

Selck 16 [Selck, Michael L. "Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't." (Jan 2016) // WHSRS and Lex VM]

“The disabled are dying and with them dis/abled culture is being eradicated. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the disability studies dialogue is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism. The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely outside of intercultural communication programs like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what pushed me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting a collaborative performance titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. The larger purpose of this research report is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by autoethnographically analyzing the crip-pessimist performance art project Under The Mantle.” (1-2) This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. Theoretical approaches based in pessimism and skepticism are often necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment. Thus, a key question remains, what is regarded as progress and to whom does it count? The politics of progress call for the second tenet of CDT, which is a destabilization of neoliberal practices that strip power and agency from bodies with disabilities. Devlin and Pothier (2006) use the language of “anti-necessitarian” (p. 2), which refers to the efficacy of social organizations and an unflinching skepticism of liberalism. For Shildrick and Price (1999), “disabled bodies call into question the ‘giveness’ of the ‘natural body’ and, instead, posit a corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings” (p. 1). Anti-necessitarian logics ask questions that remain innocuous to the critical communication paradigm. Can the architectural proliferation of stairs and multiple levels on buildings be attributed to neoliberalism and active disablism? If stairs seem to focus too exclusively on physical impairments, then what about the sensitivity of the building’s lighting, acoustics, and spatiality? Finally, if neoliberalism fights to protect its grand narrative of progress then is the social exclusion of bodies with disabilities necessary for the day-to-day operation of our globalized world? As Donaldson (2002) posits: “theories of gendered, raced, sexed, classed, and disabled bodies offer us critical languages for ‘denaturalising’ impairment’” (p. 112) at the level of the subjective and inter-subjective. The third theme of CDT is to attend to the agency of bodies with disabilities in the struggle for recognition. One key element of extending agency to the disabled is the use of social experience. Experience is subjective “but experience remains intimately connected to political and social existence, and therefore individuals and societies are capable of learning from their experiences” (Siebers, 2008, p. 82). Though absolutely necessary, it is not enough to write treatises on the oppression of the disabled over time. Academics, theorists, intercultural trainers, and storytellers alike should be aware of the constant risks of representation. Representation and context are at the core of critical disability studies. The notion of agency is as unstable as the notions of dis/ability. There is no one-size-fits-all human rights based approach that will be suitable to address all disabled experiences, as the theoretical call for crip-pessimism will remind us. Instead of a universal abstract Rawlsian concept of social justice, CDS “attend(s) to the relational components of dis/ablism” (Goodley, 2011, p. 159). By a Rawlsian concept of social justice I mean a model that relies on distributive justice with utopist equality at its core. Where utopist equality projects highlight human sameness to the point of purity. CDT unavoidably invites a discussion about difference into the folds as postmodern and post-structural thinkers position the self as defined constantly in relation to others. Therein lies the difference between an equality model and a justice model of social identity. Often in the attempt to open up spaces for reconsidering self and other, CDS celebrates disability as a positive identity marker. This essay offers a strong argument of caution that the inclusion of CDS in critical communication studies might rely too heavily on celebrations of disabled identity. Nothing better demonstrates that reliance on celebrating identity than the myriad language choices used to describe a disabled identity including: differently-abled, special needs, person with disability, disabled person, temporarily able-bodied, and others. Often, able- bodied audiences have a tendency to sensationalize the presence of disability in a space that has not traditionally welcomed it. Examples of this are highlighted by the increasingly popular discussion of ‘inspiration porn’ (Young, 2014) and Hollywood’s representation of disability. The tendency is to inspirationalize the disabled for achieving tasks that would not be celebrated if they were accomplished by an unimpaired body. Crossing the street, showing up on time, entering a building by oneself are all tasks profoundly routine to the non-disabled and yet simultaneously cherished as markers of progress for the disabled. Philosophical pessimism is articulated next as a way to temper the risk of sensationalizing dis/ability. The theories ultimately fuse together like orchids and wasps to generate the larger theme of crip-pessimism. Philosophical Pessimism Throughout the 19th century pessimism was one of the most popular intellectual and philosophical strains, crossing countries and continents. Authors such as Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche overwhelmingly created and lead the spirit of pessimism. Contemporarily however, the word ‘pessimism’ is pejorative and describes a body’s emotional discontent rather than intellectual engagement with the world. Dienstag (2009) writes, “Since pessimism is perceived more as a disposition than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous alternative” (p. 3). Power is responsible for ontological shifts, and during shifts some populations benefit while others are harmed. The turn in thinking about pessimism from an intellectual position to an emotional state has been particularly gratuitous for bodies with disabilities. I come to pessimism because of my experience with disability. My anxiety disorder comes with an exteriority of anti-social behavior that has branded me pessimistic. The concern for my anxiety in public situations is often commented on as overly critical, negative, narcissistic, and most often pessimistic. I experience an anxious state of becoming different, and after years of failing to rehabilitate my sameness to able-bodied standards, I have come to a comfort with pessimism.

**Exclusionary conceptions of topical correctness are violent.**

**Conquergood 13** [Conquergood, Dwight. Cultural struggles: Performance, ethnography, praxis. University of Michigan Press, 2013. (a professor of anthropology and performance studies at Northwestern University)//Elmer

According to de Certeau, this scriptocentrism is a **hallmark of Western imperialism**. Posted above the gates of modernity, this sign: “‘Here only what is written is understood.’ Such is the internal law of that which has constituted itself as ‘Western’ [and ‘white’]” Only middle-class academics could blithely assume that all the world is a text because reading and writing are central to their everyday lives and occupational security. For many people throughout the world, however, particularly subaltern groups, texts are often inaccessible, or threatening, charged with the regulator)' powers of the state. More often than not, subordinate people experience texts and the bureaucracy of literacy as instruments of control and displacement, e.g., **green cards, passports, arrest warrants, deportation orders**—what de Certeau calls "intextuation": "Ever)' power, including **the power of law, is written first of all on the backs of its subjects"** (1984:140). Among the most oppressed people in the United States today are the "undocumented" immigrants, the so-called "il- legal aliens," known in the vernacular as the people "sin papeles," the people without papers, indocitmentado/as. They are illegal because they are not legible, they trouble "the writing machine of the law" (de Certeau 1984:141). **The hegemony of textualism needs to be exposed and undermined.** Transcrip- tion is not a **transparent or politically innocent model for** conceptualizing or **engaging the world**. The root metaphor of the text underpins the **supremacy of Western knowledge systems** by **erasing** the vast realm of human **knowledge and meaningful action that is unlettered,** "a history of the tacit and the habitual" (Jackson 2000:29). In their multivolume historical ethnography of colonialism/ evangelism in South Africa, John and Jean ComarofFpay careful attention to the way Tswana people argued with their white interlocutors "both verbally and nonverbally" (1997:47; see also 1991). They excavate spaces of agency and strug- gle from everyday performance practices—clothing, gardening, healing, trading, worshipping, architecture, and homemaking—to reveal an impressive repertoire of conscious, creative, critical, contrapuntal responses to the imperialist project that exceeded the verbal. The Comarofis intervene in an academically fashionable textual fundamentalism and fetish of the (verbal) archive where "text—a sad proxy for life—becomes all" (1992:26). "In this day and age," they ask, "do we still have to remind ourselves that many of the players on any historical stage **cannot speak at all? Or**, under greater or lesser duress, **opt not to** do so" (1997:48; see also Scott 1990)?

**Psychoanalysis is both falsifiable and accurate – studies prove.**

**Grant & Harari 5** (Don and Edwin, psychiatrists, “Psychoanalysis, science and the seductive theory of Karl Popper,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry)

**Attacks on psychoanalysis and the long-term therapies derived from it, have enjoyed a long history and much publicity [1-4]. Yet, the justification for such attacks has been challenged on many grounds, including their methodology [5] and the empirically demonstrable validity of core psychoanalytic concepts** [6,7]. Also, burgeoning **neuroscience** **research**, some of which is summarized below, **indicates likely neurological correlates for many key clinically derived psychoanalytic concepts such as self-coherence [8], repression [9] and projective identification [10].** Furthermore, **the effectiveness of psychoanalysis and its derivative therapies has been supported by empirical research** [11,12], particularly **for** patients with **DSM axis II pathology**. Despite this evidence, the attacks on psychoanalysis continue unabated, not only from some psychiatrists [13,14] but also from the highest levels of politics and health bureaucrats [15], although **what exactly is being attacked is often unclear**.

**Notions of competitive equity marginalize the out group and retrench power structures.**

**Delgado 92**, Law Prof at U. of Colorado, 1992 [Richard, “Shadowboxing: An Essay On Power,” In Cornell Law Review, May]

**We have cleverly built power's view of the appropriate standard of conduct into the very term fair. Thus, the stronger party is able to have his/her way and see her/himself as principled at the same time.** Imagine, for example, a man's likely reaction to the suggestion that subjective considerations -- a woman's mood, her sense of pressure or intimidation, how she felt about the man, her unexpressed fear of reprisals if she did not go ahead-- ought to play a part in determining whether the man is guilty of rape. Most men find this suggestion offensive; it requires them to do something they are not accustomed to doing. "Why," they say, "I'd have to be a mind reader before I could have sex with anybody?" "Who knows, anyway, what internal inhibitions the woman might have been harboring?" And "what if the woman simply changed her mind later and charged me with rape?" What we never notice is that women can "read" men's minds perfectly well. The male perspective is right out there in the world, plain as day, inscribed in culture, song, and myth -- in all the prevailing narratives. These narratives tell us that men want and are entitled  [\*820]  to sex, that it is a prime function of women to give it to them, and that unless something unusual happens, the act of sex is ordinary and blameless. We believe these things because that is the way we have constructed women, men, and "normal" sexual intercourse. Yet society and law accept only this latter message (or something like it), and not the former, more nuanced ones, to mean refusal. Why? **The "objective" approach is not inherently better or more fair. Rather, it is accepted because it embodies the sense of the stronger party, who centuries ago found himself in a position to dictate what permission meant. Allowing ourselves to be drawn into reflexive, predictable arguments about** administrability, **fairness, stability, and ease of determination points us away from what** **[\*821]  really counts: the way in which stronger parties have managed to inscribe their views and interests into "external" culture**, so that we are now enamored with that way of judging action. First, we read our values and preferences into the culture; then we pretend to consult that culture meekly and humbly in order to judge our own acts.

#### The 1AC method is compatible with a form of conspiratorial communism – it’s the only solution to neoliberalism.

**Culp 16** (Andrew Culp teaches in the MA Program in Aesthetics and Politics at the California Institute of Technology. He is interested in the afterlives of media technologies born out of the anti-globalization movement. He is currently completing a manuscript, Persona Obscura. He serves on the Governing Board of the Cultural Studies Association. His work has appeared in numerous venues, including Radical Philosophy, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Quarterly Journal of Speech, parallax, and boundary 2 online, “Dark Deleuze”, <https://track5.mixtape.moe/frhirn.pdf>) SJBE

“**Deleuze happily embraces a Marxism so anti-State that it refuses the project of democracy**. It is up to us to render his Marxism in darker terms than Rancière, who would rather break down the state through the democratic dissensus of aesthesis acting as “the power of an ontological difference between two orders of reality” (Dissensus, 180). Outright, **darkness begins by subverting Negri’s joyous celebration of democracy, which offers a productivist composition of forces as both the conditions of and resolution to capitalism** (Ruddick, “Politics of Affect”). If Negriism was true, the only thing left for us to do is to “dump the bosses off our backs” (Hardt, “Common in Communism”). **But the balance of power is far too ambivalent to make the epochal declaration that a revolutionary subject, such as the multitude, has already been produced and merely needs to be found.** **Our mad black communism is not a reworking of Marx’s universalism**, which is the seamless unity of thought and action that can be found in productivist appeals to immanence as immediate and unmediated, that is to say, automatic (PI, 29; DR, 29). On this account, **an a priori communism is too dangerously close to Kant** (DI, 60 “). **We have no use for the judgment of a communist natura, which comes from the Joyous Deleuzians’ confusion of metaphysics for politics**. **Neither automatic or automated, our communism is not tempted by the fully automated luxury communism of cybernetics, which is a temptation only from the perspective of control societies. Our communism is nothing but the conspiracy of communism (against ontology). It is the conspiracy to destroy the factory of production**. As a conspiracy, **communism is a war machine that turns the autoproductive processes of the Real into weapons for destroying any project built on metaphysical consistency. It targets the collusion between the creation of concepts and the reproduction of this world.** In this sense, **it wages a guerilla struggle against those who joyfully affirm “the ontology of Deleuze.”** It is a conspiracy for at least two reasons: first, **it has a penchant for negativity that makes its revolutionary force appear as a conspiracy against everything that the joyful take as a given; second, its inclination toward collective forms of asymmetric struggle sets it wholly at odds with scholarly common sense.** It dares any communism worth its name to wage a war of annihilation against God, Man, and the World itself.”

**Discussions of how we are not topical always privilege elitism in debate**

**Reid-Brinkley 08** [Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley 2008 “the harsh realities of “acting black”: how African American policy debaters negotiate representation through racial performance and style”] // SJ AME

**The stylistic norms of the** policy **debate community are inextricably attached to the social performance of identity**. In other words,if **the stylistic norms privilege the stylistic choices of white, straight, economically privileged males,** as is clearly indicated by their statistical representation at the heights of competitive success, then difference marks one as other unless the individual performs according to those stylistic and identity-based norms. Racially and/or ethnically different bodies must perform themselves according to the cultural norms of the debate community. **For UDL students it can often mean changing one’s appearance, standardizing language practices, and eschewing cultural practices at least while participating in debate. In essence, students of color are performatively “whitened” in order to have an opportunity for achieving in debate competitions.** “Acting black” or brown is problematicbecause those performative identities are not privileged in terms of successful participation. In fact, **they signify a difference, an opposite, a negative differential**. It is not that the debate community actively operates to exclude based on race, instead it is an exclusion based on racial performance, in other words, how the differentially colored body chooses to style itself.

**Put away your psychoanalysis indicts – we integrate intersection with feminist, queer, colonialist, and anti-white supremacist theorization that accounts for lacks in original psychoanalytic theories which accounts for and revises Freudian and Lacanian theorization.**

**Mollow 3** (The Disability Drive by Anna Mollow A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015) BL

The theoretical trajectory that I will trace, which begins with Dora‟s account of hysteria as a disorder afflicting a minority of disabled subjects, and ends with Beyond the Pleasure Principle‟s universalizing account of the death drive, is not explicitly articulated by Freud. Throughout his career, Freud held fast to his construction of hysteria; therefore, the death drive cannot be seen as supplanting hysteria in Freudian thought. But my reading of hysteria as both a precursor to the theory of the drive and a way for Freud to avoid naming and confronting the drive demonstrates that a rearticulation of Freud‟s concept of hysteria can be a starting point for a more universalizing approach, grounded in the concept of the disability drive. Departing from Freud‟s tendency to pathologize individual disabled people, such a model may yield more nearly universal insights about psychic life. **Questions about universalism are among the most compelling and difficult aspects of psychoanalysis, a discipline that posits a set of psychic structures that are said to govern the lives of all subjects. Does psychoanalysis‟ universalizing model mistake the psychological determinants of middle-class members of western capitalist societies for universal norms? This question can in part be answered by way of a distinction: although Freud specifies that the structure of the psyche that he delineates is universal, his model leaves room for the theorization of a great diversity of particular content that might fill that structure. Factors such as gender, queerness, race, class, colonialism, disability, and historical context can radically alter the ways in which constructs such as “the ego,” “the drive,” and “sexuality” come to be figured. The potential fluidity of Freud‟s paradigm has been the basis of important interventions by social theorists who, working within and beyond the discipline of psychoanalysis, have rethought Freud‟s arguments from the vantage points of feminist, antiracist, postcolonial, and queer criticism.**22 My project builds upon this work by bringing a critical disability studies perspective to bear upon Freud‟s concept of the death drive. In the chapters that follow**, I will examine the 9 ways in which cultural projections of the disability drive shape intersections of multiple modalities of oppression, including ableism, misogyny, homophobia, fatphobia, white supremacy, classism, and colonialism.** I also wish to emphasize that although my argument about the disability drive unfolds within a psychoanalytic framework, in which the structuring components of the psyche are said to be universal, **I am not suggesting that a psychoanalytic epistemology should be seen as trumping other ways of knowing human minds, bodies, and bodyminds.** Nonwestern models of mind and body, for example, may differ significantly from the frame within which I situate my analysis. For this reason, **I will neither assume nor attempt to establish that the psychoanalytic ways of thinking that I employ in this dissertation will be useful or meaningful to every subject and culture**. However, I will also not assume in advance that my elucidation of the disability drive does not apply to specific groups or individuals, as I am wary of the danger of effecting harmful and unnecessary exclusions by prematurely designating an argument as inapplicable to particular subjects or experiences**. It is for this reason that throughout this thesis I use the term “our culture” to reference the social world(s) in which I understand cultural manifestations of, and defenses against, the disability drive to take shape. I intend for the phrase “our culture” to signify expansively, issuing a deliberately open-ended and indeterminate invitation to any person to whom the language and concepts in this dissertation may be accessible and illuminating. The words “our culture” cannot, of course, reference every person in the world; but because the ableist social and psychic structures that I delineate in this project seem to me to potentially exceed the bounds of demarcations such as “US American culture,” “the West,” or “modern industrial societies,” I employ this “our” to leave open questions about the extent to which my analyses may or may not apply to particular geographies and cultural locations.** The problematic of universalism versus exclusions in this project can be illustrated by raising a set of questions regarding my arguments‟ relation to asexual people‟s experiences and identities. If this dissertation‟s opening assertion of disability‟s sexiness were taken to mean that sexiness is a quality that disabled people should aspire to embody—and conversely, that an absence of sexual desire is grounds for social discrediting—then this assertion would contribute to our culture‟s stigmatization of asexual people. Such a reading, however, would run directly counter to my project‟s central aim: the sexual model of disability is intended to complicate efforts to highlight sexualities as causes for pride or empowerment. In conceiving of sexuality as inextricable from failure, loss, and suffering, I hope to make visible sexuality‟s incompatibility with proud identity claims. Yet even this approach presents risks. As I will discuss in the next section of this chapter, some queer theorists‟ citations of sexuality‟s identity-disturbing effects have been articulated in ways that seem to imply that the more sex one has, or the more that one engages in particular sexual practices, the more effectively one can challenge heteronormative cultural imperatives. “The Disability Drive” will not forward such an argument. I emphasize the sexiness of disability to counter our culture‟s widespread desexualization of disabled people; this emphasis, however, is not meant to suggest that disabled people have, or should have, “more” or “better” sex than nondisabled people (whatever those comparatives might mean), or that we should aim to secure social legitimacy by establishing our “attractiveness” to sexual partners. The sexiness of disability that I highlight refers less to attributes of individual subjects than to aspects of disability as it is envisioned and sometimes experienced. Additionally, **although Freud assumed that sexuality was universal, I will not make this assumption,** since such a claim would contradict many asexual people‟s lived experiences. This 10 does not mean, though, that the sexual model of disability must be irrelevant to asexual people. The Asexual Visibility and Education Network (AVEN) defines an asexual person as someone “who does not experience sexual attraction”; however, AVEN‟s website notes that many (but not all) asexual people experience sexual arousal, have sexual fantasies, or masturbate.23 Even nonlibidoists, those asexuals who “have no sexual feelings at all,” may nonetheless have experiences that fall within the extremely broad rubric of what Freud designates as sexuality. According to Freud, intellectual work, strong emotion, illness, athletic activity, eating, swinging, warm baths, and train travel can all potentially be regarded as sexual.24 On the other hand, just because such activities and feelings can be described as sexual does not mean that they have to be, and to force the application of the label “sexual” would effect a discursive violence upon subjects who have determined that this term does not apply to their lives. Thus, although I postulate the sexual model as one means of theorizing the disability drive, I do not suggest that it is the only such method.

**Enforcing only to look with Fiat teaches us to “see like the state” – that’s a form of political manipulation that locks us into the preservation of the squo**

**Halberstam 11** Jack Halberstam, 2011, “The Queer Art of Failure,” Duke University Press, Durham and London, SJBE

In place of the Germanic ordered forest that Scott uses as a potent metaphor for the start of the modern imposition of bureaucratic order upon populations, **we might go with the thicket of subjugated knowl- edge that sprouts like weeds among the disciplinary forms of knowledge, threatening always to overwhelm the cultivation and pruning of the intel- lect with mad plant life. For Scott, to “see like a state” means to accept the order of things and to internalize them; it means that we begin to deploy and think with the logic of the superiority of orderliness and that we erase and indeed sacrifice other, more local practices of knowledge, practices moreover that may be less efficient, may yield less marketable results, but may also, in the long term, be more sustaining.** What is at stake in arguing for the trees and against the forest? Scott identifies “legibility” as the favored technique of high modernism for sorting, organizing, and profiting from land and people and for abstracting systems of knowledge from local knowledge practices. He talks about the garden and gardeners as representative of a new spirit of intervention and order favored within high modernism, and he points to the minimalism and simplicity of Le Corbusier’s urban design as part of a new commitment to symmetry and division and planning that complements authoritarian preferences for hierarchies and despises the complex and messy forms of organic profu- sion and improvised creativity. “**Legibility,” writes Scott, “is a condition of manipulation**” (1999: 183). He favors instead, borrowing from Euro- pean anarchist thought, more practical forms of knowledge that he calls metis and that emphasize mutuality, collectivity, plasticity, diversity, and adaptability. **Illegibility may in fact be one way of escaping the political manipulation to which all university fields and disciplines are subject.** While Scott’s insight about illegibility has implications for all kinds of subjects who are manipulated precisely when they become legible and visible to the state (undocumented workers, visible queers, racialized mi- norities), it also points to an argument for antidisciplinarity in the sense that knowledge practices that refuse both the form and the content of tra- ditional canons may lead to unbounded forms of speculation, modes of thinking that ally not with rigor and order but with inspiration and unpre- dictability. **We may in fact want to think about how to see unlike a state; we may want new rationales for knowledge production, different aesthetic standards for ordering or disordering space, other modes of political en- gagement than those conjured by the liberal imagination. We may, ulti- mately, want more undisciplined knowledge, more questions and fewer answers. Disciplines qualify and disqualify, legitimate and delegitimate, reward and punish; most important, they statically reproduce themselves and inhibit dissent.** As Foucault writes, “Disciplines will define not a code of law, but a code of normalization” (2003: 38). **In** a series of lectures on knowledge production given at the College de France and then published posthumously as a collection titled Society Must Be Defended, Foucault pro- vides a context for his own antidisciplinary thinking and declares the age of “all-encompassing and global theories” to be over, giving way to the “local character of critique” or “something resembling a sort of au- tonomous and non-centralized theoretical production, or in other words a theoretical production that does not need a visa from some common regime to establish its validity” (6). These lectures coincide with the writ- ing of **The History of Sexuality Volume 1,** and we find the outline of his cri- tique of repressive power in these pages (Foucault, 1998). I will return to Foucault’s insights about the reverse discourse in The History of Sexuality later in the book, especially to the places where he implicates sexual mi- norities in the production of systems of classification, but in Society Must Be Defended his target is academic legibility and legitimation, and he de- scribes and analyzes the function of the academic in the circulation and reproduction of hegemonic structures. In place of the “all-encompassing and global theories” that the uni- versity encourages, **Foucault exhorts his students to think about and turn to “subjugated knowledges,” namely those forms of knowledge produc- tion that have been “buried or masked in functional coherences or formal systematizations**” (2003: 7). **These forms of knowledge have not simply been lost or forgotten; they have been disqualified, rendered nonsensi- cal or nonconceptual or “insufficiently elaborated.”** Foucault calls them “naïve knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges, knowledges that are below the required level of erudition or scientificity” (7)—this is what we mean by knowledge from below. **In relation to the identification of “subjugated knowledges,” we might ask, How do we participate in the production and circulation of “sub- jugated knowledge”? How do we keep disciplinary forms of knowledge at bay? How do we avoid precisely the “scientific” forms of knowing that relegate other modes of knowing to the redundant or irrelevant?** How do we engage in and teach antidisciplinary knowledge? Foucault pro- poses this answer: “Truth to tell, if we are to struggle against disciplines, or rather against disciplinary power, in our search for a nondisciplin- ary power, we should not be turning to the old right of sovereignty; we should be looking to a new right that is both anti-disciplinary and eman- cipated from the principle of sovereignty” (2003: 40). **In some sense we have to untrain ourselves so that we can read the struggles and debates back into questions that seem settled and resolved.**

**Kant’s criteria for personhood violently excludes the disabled.**

Lucas G. **Pinheiro 17** [(Lucas G. Pinheiro, ) The Ableist Contract Intellectual Disability and the Limits of Justice in Kant’s Political Thought, Cambridge Core Online publication date: March 2017, pp 43-78] AT

With these theoretical considerations in mind, this chapter probes the political and moral spaces occupied by intellectually disabled subjects in the political, ethical, and moral thought of Immanuel Kant. To this end, I place particular emphasis on the ways in which **Kant’s “empirical” observations on disability** fundamentally **impact his political formulations** of justice, freedom, citizenship, personhood, and the human species. My approach to interpreting intellectual disability in Kant’s theory of justice begins with a close reading of his practical definitions of disability in lesser-known works on anthropology, physical geography, and natural history. I then deploy this reading as a source for contextualizing his political ideas and thus uncovering the meaning and political significance of his exclusionary terminology in the Metaphysics of Morals as it pertains to the treatment of intellectually disabled subjects in his theory of justice. It is important to note that, in the context of Kant’s political and moral philosophy, I use the term “contract” figuratively, since my argument applies broadly to contractarian ideas of rights, freedom, civil society, and justice in the history of modern political thought as a whole. So, with respect to Kant, “contract” operates as a placeholder for the totality of his political constituency which is composed by his moral laws, doctrines of rights and duties (private and public), theory of the state, scale of progress, and formulation of civil society. To be sure, Kant’s political ideas – including his definitions of justice, personhood, freedom, rights, duties, citizenship, and the state – are not limited to the Metaphysics of Morals, just as they are not exclusive to his writings on practical and transcendental philosophy. Much the contrary, in fact, Kant articulates his political theory through an expansive and eclectic array of sources, scattered across an impressively diverse range of fields and genres well beyond his strictly political writings and moral philosophy.8 Although perhaps unfamiliar to a contemporary political theory audience, Kant’s empirical works encompass a detailed, rich, and intricate sociopolitical system, whose relevance to his political ideas I attempt to recover by interpreting his onomasiology of intellectual disability. Indeed, as I will argue, Kant’s understanding of disability affects and informs his theory of justice in such constitutive ways that **its continual neglect has resulted in an insufficiently critical and accurate interpretation of Kant’s political thought** writ large. From a broader perspective, my interpretation of disability in Kant seeks to recast the political thrust of Kant’s theory by rearticulating its relationship to other strains of the Kantian corpus that, while less accepted, less philosophical, and undoubtedly less agreeable, are, on my account, no less politically and philosophically significant to his thought than the “strictly” political and philosophical works. As of late, a host of **scholars in disability studies** have vocally **contest**ed **Kant’s moral theory of personhood**. This burgeoning literature on Kant and disability is largely composed of critical responses to the works of Jeff McMahan (1995, 1996, 2002, 2005, 2009) and Peter Singer (1994, 2009), both of whom vindicate non-human moral standing by grounding the corporeal existence of animals within an ethically defensible, intra-species moral realm, akin to that of Kant’s person. In his work, McMahan (2009: 583–4) invokes cognitive disability as the premise of a reduction argument that figures the severely intellectually disabled as a rhetorical device tasked with exposing the logical contradiction of theories that grant moral status to the severely mentally disabled while denying it to non-human animals with commensurate cognitive capacities. Singer likewise argues that, since many non-human animals possess cognitive capacities that are often on a par with or superior to, those of severely intellectually disabled humans, it is altogether groundless and unjustifiable – that is, “speciesist” – to deny the former group (animals) moral standing while extending it to the latter (the disabled) (1994, 2009: 567–8). In building their philosophical arguments for intra-species moral standing, both Singer (2009: 573–4) and McMahan (2002: 245–6, 252–5) rely prominently on Kant’s personhood–animality split as a means to support their formulations of extra-corporeal moral status, grounded on intellectual predispositions and cognitive capacities. Yet, both philosophers part ways with Kant insofar as they believe human animality and species membership should play no role as criteria for determining moral life (Singer 2009: 572–3; McMahan 2002: 148, 209–17).9 McMahan’s (2009: 604) idea that “differences of moral status are grounded in differences of psychological capacity” prefigures Singer’s (2009: 575) suggestion to “abandon the idea of the equal value of all humans” and replace it with a “graduated view in which moral status depends on some aspects of cognitive ability.” As a result, both Singer and McMahan advocate integrating non-human animals to a moral community of “persons” at the expense of denying personhood to humans who fall below a Kantian moral threshold rooted entirely in cognitive capacity as opposed to human animality. Unsurprisingly, Singer and McMahan have received ample criticism from scholars seeking to include or maintain the cognitively disabled within the bounds of our moral community of persons. As I see it, the central and most politically salient aspect of these critiques resides in the Kantian discourse Singer and McMahan mobilize in support of their projects. Pushing back against rationalist conceptions of moral status, philosopher Eva Kittay (2001, 2005a, 2005b, 2009a, 2009b) has argued that species membership alone should suffice as a criterion for equal moral status among human beings. Licia Carlson (2009, 2010), who furthers Kittay’s critique of reason-centric moral theories, questions the political discourse through which these conceptions of personhood have been articulated. She recalls, for example, that viewing humans as animals “is precisely the basis on which the most horrific atrocities are justified” (2010: 160). Carlson also outlines important ways in which critiques of speciesism, such as Singer’s, “rely on ableist assumptions and arguments” (2010: 157). Although Kittay and Carlson do not comment directly on Kant’s specific formulation of moral personhood, they effectively highlight how and why elevating cognitive capacity to the role of arbiter for moral life, as is the case with Kant’s theory of personhood, has deeply problematic repercussions for the intellectually disabled.10 Other scholars writing on disability and political theory have also expressed profound skepticism toward rationalist formulations of moral personhood rooted in Kant’s categorical imperative.11 One notable critic of Kantian personhood from the standpoint of disability is Barbara Arneil (2009), whose key charge against Kant’s moral theory is his crowning of rational autonomy as the foundation for human dignity (2009: 224). **In its quest to “protect human dignity through** the mutual **recognition of others as rational** self-legislating ‘**persons**,’” Arneil remarks, **Kant’s moral theory consequently figures the “irrational” as “not ‘autonomous’** and strictly speaking not ‘persons’ **and therefore not due the dignity accorded to ‘rational beings’**” (2009: 224–5).12 Moreover, Arneil exposes how Kant’s formulation of personhood has pervasively found its way to the backdrop of influential political theories of justice by the likes of John Rawls and Charles Taylor. Because Kant locates personhood in the human ability to reason, Arneil argues that contemporary authors who draw on Kant (such as Taylor) are consequently “forced to define those incapable of ‘rationality’ as outside the ‘normal’ meaning of personhood,” as possessing an unrealizable potential to become human (2009: 225, 228). Together, these works by critical disability scholars illustrate how **Kant’s moral philosophy has sustained a political discourse that categorically exempts the disabled from the remits of justice.** Overall, three important conclusions can be drawn from the literature on Kant and disability. First, scholars working on intellectual disability and political theory have provided convincing arguments as to how **Kantian conceptions of personhood misrecognize the inherent humanity of the intellectually disabled**. Second, these scholars have compellingly identified why, from a political standpoint of justice, liberty, and equality, it is desirable to move away from such reason-centric formulations of moral status that privilege the able-minded over the intellectually disabled. Third, many of these commentators have conclusively outlined how **Kant’s moral philosophy is conceptually**, albeit indirectly, **implicated in the political marginalization of the disabled persons.** Notwithstanding the merits of their projects, the authors in question have limited their critiques of Kant’s political thought to his moral and practical philosophies, or what is colloquially known as the “pure” segment of his work. Take Tobin Siebers’ (2011: 89) following claim for instance: “Theories of rationality […] configure rationality itself in terms of the objective properties and identifying characteristics of those agents whom Kant called rational beings, and these characteristics do not allow for the inclusion of people with disabilities.” Siebers’ point here illustrates a general trend in critiques of Kant’s moral philosophy from the perspective of disability in which Kant’s empirical views on the disabled are persistently overlooked. Because of this oversight, discussions of Kant and disability are limited to speculative arguments that hinge on the impenetrability of Kant’s moral theory by the intellectually disabled. As such, Kant’s extensive definitions of cognitive disability and lively figurations of disabled subjects have yet to be weighed against the political arguments of his moral and practical philosophy in an effort to assess how these views may effectively, rather than merely potentially, impact the meaning of his ideas about justice and thus sway their political and theoretical significance. As I argue throughout this chapter, Kant’s empirical writings on disability are critical to this scholarly debate for two reasons. First, it is in these texts that Kant entertains political questions concerning the civil and moral standing of intellectually disabled subjects. Second, Kant’s empirical works are essential to our understanding of his transcendental philosophy and political system, especially regarding the categorical imperative, because it is here – in his construction of the intellectually disabled – that Kant outlines the identity of those exceptional, irrational beings barred from the political concessions of justice. By turning my attention to how, where, and why **Kant’s approach to justice fails with respect to the intellectually disabled**, I intend to cast light on what I consider to be the margins of his moral philosophy and, as a result, delineate the limits of his political theory of justice. This marginal space wherein the intellectually disabled are enclosed exemplifies what Uday Mehta (1999) describes as the explicit exclusion of the unfamiliar, along with the erasure of their “sentiments, feelings, sense of location, and forms of life” (1999: 20–1). Such occult “spaces” of exception are, in Mehta’s words, “places that when identified by the grid of Enlightenment rationality [become] only spots on a map or past points on the scale of civilizational progress, but not dwellings in which peoples lived and had deeply invested identities” (1999: 21).13 To the extent that it moves toward recasting the meaning of his theory of justice, my interpretation of disability in Kant endeavors to reaffirm the political and conceptual significance of disability to the history of political thought and contemporary politicized identity. Read as such, I intend for the reach of my argument to stretch beyond interpretations of Kant. By demonstrating just how problematic Kant’s conception of justice is with regards to intellectual disability, this chapter consequently interrogates contemporary political theories whose ambit of justice, in being bound by reason, effectively forecloses the intellectually disabled from freedom, citizenship, and personhood.

**Disability controls proximate cause to and explains all other violence – treating those as inferior is only justifiable through the guise of disability.**

**Siebers et al. 17** Tobin, et al. (2017): Culture – Theory – Disability: Encounters between Disability Studies and Cultural Studies, Siebers began his career at the University of Michigan in 1980. He has authored ten books, including field-defining Disability Aesthetics (UM Press, 2010) and Disability Theory (UM Press, 2008). In 2004 Siebers was named the V. L. Parrington Collegiate Professor. Siebers was a Chair of the LSA Comparative Literature Program (currently the Department of Comparative Literature). In 2009, the University of Michigan Council for Disability Concerns presented Siebers with the James T. Neubacher Award in recognition of extraordinary leadership and service in support of the disability community. Siebers has been selected for fellowships by the Michigan Society of Fellows, the Guggenheim Foundation, the Mellon Foundation, and the Institute for the Humanities at the University of Michigan. Tobin Siebers passed away in January 2015. In March 2015, the University of Michigan announced the establishment of the Tobin Siebers Prize for Disability Studies in the Humanities "for best book-length manuscript on a topic of pressing urgency to Disability Studies in the humanities.", DOI: 10.14361/9783839425336-002 SJCP//JG

**The use of disability identity as a prop to denigrate minority politics has a long and pernicious history on the right**, although it is bewildering to find the usage alive and well in Butler, Brown, and other cultural critics on the left.5 (This surprising agreement between the right and left gives one small clue to the tenacious hold that ability as an ideology exercises over political thinking today.6 ) **Indeed, the idea that the political claims made by people of color and women are illegitimate because their identities are disabled would be outrageous if it were not such a familiar and successful ploy**. **Historical opponents of political and social equality for women, Douglas Baynton shows, cite their supposed physical, intellectual, and psychological flaws, stressing irrationality, excessive emotions, and physical weakness, while similar arguments for racial inequality and immigration restrictions involving particular races and ethnic groups invoke their apparent susceptibility to feeble-mindedness, mental illness, deafness, blindness, and other disabilities** (see Baynton 33). **Moreover, disability remains today, Baynton explains, an acceptable reason for unequal treatment, even as other justifications for discrimination, based on race, ethnicity, sex, and gender, have begun to fall away. It is no longer considered permissible to treat minority people as inferior citizens, although it happens all the time, unless that inferiority is tied to disability.** As long as minority identities are thought disabled, **there is little hope for the political and social equality of either persons with these identities or disabled people, for there will always be one last justification for inferior treatment.** There will always be the possibility of proving the inferiority of any given human being at any given moment as long as **inferiority is tied to physical and mental difference. Moreover, that pain in itself leads to inferior identities, ones given to greater self-recrimination or frequent victimizing of others, relies on a fallacious psychological scenario prejudiced inherently against disability**.7 Once touching a person, pain is apparently transformative, to all intents and purposes serving as an organic and natural cause whose psychological formation evolves with little variation according to the internal logic of the psyche. First, the psychology of pain links mental and physical suffering inextricably, and, second, it names pain, opposed to all other causes, as transformative of individuals, compelling them to withdraw into selfish, narcissistic, and anti-social behavior. **Any attempt to sketch a political theory, especially of minority identity, based on this misleading psychology will produce the same predictable and deplorable results.**

**Disability is abject to modernity through emotional disgust and subject to psychogenesis and an irrational violence – through these processes, the fundamental antagonism is sustained and upheld by civil society.**

**Hughes 12** Bill (2012): Disability and Social Theory | Civilising Modernity and the Ontological Invalidation of Disabled People, Bill Hughes is professor of Sociology in the Glasgow School for Business and Society at Glasgow Caledonian University. He was awarded a BA (Hons) in sociology (1st Class) from the University of Stirling in 1979 and a PhD in political philosophy from the University of Aberdeen in 1985.Bill’s research interests include disability and impairment, social theory and the body and he has taught a number of courses over a thirty five year period on a variety of sociological subjects including theory, health, welfare, the body, disability, human rights and social exclusion. He is co-author (with several colleagues at Glasgow Caledonian University) of The Body, Culture and Society: An Introduction (Open University Press 2000) and is co-editor – with Dan Goodley and Lennard Davis of Disability and Social Theory (2012). He has published in the journals Sociology and Body and Society and is a regular contributor to and a member of the Editorial Board of Disability & Society. He is also Editor of the Scandinavian Journal of Disability Research. Bill is currently working on a book with the provisional title: Invalidation: A Social and Historical Ontology for Disability. DOI: 10.1057/9781137023001\_2 SJCP//JG

Disability and the civilising process The gods of Olympus showered heavenly mockery on deformity while those with earthly authority condoned infanticide for children born with impairments. The disabled pharmakos or scapegoat provided the communities of Antiquity with the opportunity to project their transgressions onto those who – by virtue of their physical or intellectual difference – existed on the margins of the polis. Such cultures of exclusion took new forms in the Christian Middle Ages. The Lord of the Old Testament feared that anomalous bodies might ‘profane his sanctuaries’. Flesh and sin became so inextricably bound that any waywardness of the former became a sign of the latter. Disability was positioned as a moral and ontological pollutant. Modernity brings a new set of challenges to the place of disabled people in the world. As cultures of superstition give way to the age of reason and rapid social change rips through the stasis of the long established courtly tradition, a cultural process marked by the march of ‘civilisation’ introduces new manners and technologies that slowly re-adjust Western self- consciousness, making anew, simultaneously, its personality, its emotional values and its organisational structures (Elias, 2000). Yet the refinement of morals and manners that marks the civilising process is not without barbaric consequences. Civility segregates, creates social distance between those who embody refinement and those who do not, creating a new binary of bodies and minds and a new ‘tyranny of normalcy’ (Davis, 1995) predicated on the articulation of disgust for physical and mental ‘inappropriateness’. As the quotidian demand for bodily delicacy and emotional refinement advanced, so too did the ‘threshold of repugnance’ (Elias, 2000: 98–9, 414–21) and so too did intolerance of impairment. ‘A characteristic’, wrote Elias (2000: 103), ‘of the whole process that we call civilization is this movement of segregation, this hiding “behind the scenes” of what has become distasteful’. The deepening of emotional control and new stricter demands around bodily comportment reduces the social distance between social classes but creates an underclass of outsiders, a new stratum of marginal men and women who were beyond the pale of polite communion. **In civilising modernity, the cultures of exclusion that taint disabled people’s lives begin with pronouncements on etiquette that condemn the ‘animalic’ element of humanity and proceed to the construction of stark, institutional spaces, camps of confinement and death. These become places of internment for disabled people. As civilising modernity plods along, it creates a new model of ‘cultural’ citizenship and, simultaneously, a framework for conduct that clarifies those who are eligible to embrace this cherished status.** To do what is fitting, to be fit and to be fit to do what is fitting with respect to the intricacies and intimacies of social interaction is, increasingly, tailored and constrained. The detail of appropriate conduct and emotional control is developed at the quotidian level of everyday behaviour. **Contempt and reserve is directed towards those who do not appear to represent the embodiment of the civilised citizen. The unfit fail the test of fitness for citizenship. Disabled people fail it every day, in the moralised environment where judgement of conduct takes place.** Elias (2000: 159) notes that ‘**The trend of the civilising movement towards the stronger and stronger and more complete “intimization” of all bodily functions, towards their enclosure in particular enclaves, to put them “behind closed doors”, has diverse consequences’. However, what these consequences might be for disabled people remains a mystery. Although Elias recognises that the civilising process is a charter for segregation, he pays scant attention to what life is like behind the doors that have been closed. He describes the production of a secret world, an escalation of taboo and the acquisition of techniques of emotional and physical self-control that are developed to expiate disgust, shame and embarrassment.** But what of those who live in the shadows of this secret world, forced by the intolerances of civility, to live behind its veil of righteousness? What of those who hide who and what they are because the dead weight of accumulated social convention will not let them be? What is life like for those who have been socially invalidated by the ever advancing ‘threshold of repugnance’? Elias does not tell their story. However, he gives some clues about how it might be told. The rest of this section gives examples of the ways in which the civilising process configures disability. As the idea of citizenship developed in modernity – particularly in the quotidian spaces of everyday conduct – disability played a crucial role. Garland-Thomson (1997: 42) argues that modern American citizenship is constructed on the fabled idea of self-governing individualism which implies a particular kind of body, one that is ‘a stable, neutral instrument of the individual will’. The ideal citizen of the thrusting mid-nineteenth century Republic – drawn in fine detail for example in Ralph Waldo Emerson’s work, particularly his portrait of Henry Thoreau (1862) – possesses the physical and intellectual capital that is conspicuously absent in the ‘cripple’ and the ‘idiot’. The distinction between the normal body and its broken counterpart is sharpened and naturalised by both literary representations – for example the disabled and non-disabled characters in Uncle Tom’s Cabin – and by certain cultural and social practices that draw the line between the dead world of the Rabelaisian grotesque and new civilised (yet as Elias points out, mythical and theoretically naive) world of homo clausus. Crucial among these cultural practices was the nineteenth-century ‘freak show’ which is based on the ‘cardinal principle of enfreakment’, that is, the abrogation of ‘the freak’s potential humanity’ (Garland-Thomson, 1997: 44). The emotion of disgust – repugnance is Elias’ preferred term – mediates the freak show. Not only does the emotion of disgust embody a ‘curious enticement’ but it also embodies ‘a certain low evaluation of its object, a feeling of superiority’ (Kolnai, 2004: 42–4). The ‘show’, of course, simultaneously serves the parallel ‘positive’ purposes of confirming the spectator’s normalcy and humanity: manifest, most compellingly in the difference between the civilised spectators and the baroque creatures on display. The freak shows and the ‘lunatic exhibitions’, common in early modern Germany, England and France in which asylum ‘inmates were shown as caged monsters to a paying populace’ (Winzer, 1997: 100), highlighted the difference between citizen/audience and exhibit/monster and consequently pushed the status of disability towards the animal. It is however, precisely, the drives of the body and the lowly impulses of nature that the civilising processes seek to subvert. Disability finds itself pushed away from the norms of conduct by the tide of civility, a tide that pushes ‘the more animalic human activities … behind the scenes of people’s communal and social life’ and colonises these activities, indeed, invests our ‘whole instinctual and affective life’ with ‘feelings of shame’ (Elias, 2000: 365). Medicine as it grew in power and prestige, during the nineteenth century, replaced this carnival of normalisation and dehumanisation with a science of much the same, introducing new categories, such as pathology and abnormality, to sustain the ontological boundaries that kept disabled and non-disabled people compartmentalised. The architecture of modern Western citizenship is defined against the background of the ruin of disability, the broken timber of humanity that become candidates for the spaces of exclusions, those whose rights were spelt out in a declaration of dependency that was never written down. Ableism and disgust: Psychogenesis and disability **The stratifying binary of disability/non-disability and the antagonism of the latter towards the former is mediated and maintained, principally, by the emotion of disgust**. Disgust is the bile carried in a discursive complex that Campbell (2008: 153) calls ‘ableism’: ‘a network of beliefs, processes and practices that produces a particular kind of self and body (the corporeal standard) that is projected as perfect, species-typical and therefore essential and fully human’. **The body produced by ableism is dequivalent to what Kristeva (1982: 71) calls the ‘clean and proper body’. It is the body of the ‘normate’, the name that Rosemarie Garland-Thomson (1997) gives to the body that thinks of itself as invulnerable and definitive**. It is the hygienic, aspirational body of civilising modernity. It is cast from the increasingly stringent norms and rules about emotional behaviour and bodily display that mark mundane social relations in the lebenswelt (lifeworld). **This curious non-disabled body/self has no empirical existence per se. On the contrary, the body of ableism is a normative construct, an invulnerable ideal of being manifest in the imaginary of ‘modernist ontology, epistemology and ethics’ as something ‘secure, distinct, closed and autonomous’** (Shildrick, 2002: 51). **It embraces ‘human perfectibility as a normative physical or psychological standard’ and involves ‘a curious disavowal of variation and mortality’ (Kaplan, 2000: 303). It is what we are supposed to aspire to, to learn to be but can never become**. It has no grounding in the material world. It is a ‘body schema, a psychic construction of wholeness that … belies its own precariousness and vulnerability’ (Shildrick, 2002: 79). It is a ‘body divorced from time and space; a thoroughly artificial affair’ (Mitchell and Snyder, 2000: 7), **the epitome of civilisation, closed off from any connection with the animal side of humanity and from the ways in which our bodily nature wallows in its carnal improprieties. It is a body aghast at the messiness of existence. Disability is the opposite of this ideal body, its ‘inverse reflection’** (Deutsch and Nussbaum, 2000: 13). The disabled body is or has the propensity to be unruly. In the kingdom of the ‘clean and proper body’, disability is the epitome of ‘what not to be’. **As a consequence the disabled body can be easily excluded from the mainstream ‘psychic habitus’ (Elias, 2000: 167). The ‘clean and proper’ – a normative body of delicacy, refinement and selfdiscipline – has powerful social consequences most manifest in its normalising dynamics**. It is the standard of judgement against which disabled bodies are invalidated and transformed into repellent objects. It is the emblem of purity that by comparison creates existential unease. It apportions the shame and repugnance that underwrite the civilising process (Elias, 2000: 114–19, 414–21). **Through ableism, modernity has been able to structure disability as uncivilised, outside or on the margins of humanity. One of the great books of the science of natural history published under the title Systema Naturae by Linnaeus in 1735 distinguishes between homo sapiens and homo monstrosus. In this classification impairment – at its extreme and highly visible end – is excluded from the human family. The distinction is, in itself, an act of violence and invalidation, an object lesson in transforming difference and ‘defect’ into the abominable. The distinction mobilises the aversive emotions of fear and disgust. Ableism is a cruel teacher. It embodies violence at many levels: ‘epistemic, psychic, ontological and physical’** (Campbell, 2008: 159). It is at its most bellicose when it is mediated by **disgust: a mediation invoked mostly in the social fabrication of taboo and most compellingly in a context when the human/animal boundary is under threat**. Ableism rests on the effort to eliminate from awareness, chaos, abjection, animality and death: all that civilisation seeks to repress. It encourages us to live in the false hope that we will not suffer and die, to adopt a perspective of invulnerability, to confuse morality with beauty and to see death, pain and disability as the repulsive woes of mortality rather than as the existential basis for community and communication. Kolnai (2004: 74) reminds us that, ‘in its full intention, it is death … that announces itself to us in the phenomenon of disgust’. **Disability, in modernity, has been produced in the ontological household of the abject, as the antithesis of communication and community, in a place that we might on occasion peer into only to ‘choke’ on the unsavoury sights that greet us**. Disability is put out, put away, hidden, segregated or transformed into its opposite, covered up by whatever medical or aesthetic techniques are available to achieve this end. **Any opportunity that disability might have to take its place at the heart of communication and community is thwarted by the ablest sensibilities that push it back down among the disgusting, the sick, the dead and the dying**. In fact, as Elias (2000) suggested, the making of ‘civilised’ community and communication in modernity proceeds by exclusion and interdiction, by cutting out and hiding away whatever causes or might come to inspire angar (choking) or anguista (tightness). **It is important to understand ableist disgust as an emotion that attests to the failure of non-disabled people to fully recognise their own vulnerabilities and imperfections particularly as these relate to their mortal selves and to the death and decay that is the fate of all. Although it appears as an aversion to ‘the other’, it is a form of self-aversion or a means by which we hide from the bodily basis of our own humanity** (Nussbaum, 2004). Indeed, disgust begins close to home and is derived from our discomfort with our own bodily functions, our oozy, sticky ‘leaky selves’ (Shildrick, 1997; Kolnai, 2004), the fact that we cannot contain ourselves within our own boundaries and the shame and embarrassment that the ‘civilising process’ brings to bear upon us if our leakiness is exposed to others. Because modernity is a charter for anal retentiveness, we cannot forgive ourselves for our physical impurities. We hold ourselves ransom to the myth of the ‘clean and proper’ body; the perfect body of ableist culture is a myth that we use to screen ourselves from the visceral realities of our own lives. **The ableist body ‘helps’ non-disabled people cope with their fears about their own corporeal vulnerability. It does so by invoking its opposite, the disabled body, a foreign entity that is anomalous, chaotic and disgusting. Modern history helps to make this object of disgust more tangible. Civilising processes clarify stigma and make biological differences into socio-moral categories. Disgust provokes the civilising sensibilities.** It warns them of the presence of possible contaminants (Miller, 1997). Consequently, psychological and social distance between disability and non-disability expands. **Disgust in ‘it’s thought- content’ is ‘typically unreasonable, embodying magical ideas of contamination, and impossible aspirations to purity, immortality, and non-animality, that are just not in line with human life as we know it’ (Nussbaum, 2004: 12). Disgust is an emotion that has a central role in our everyday relationships with our bodies**, our patterns of social interaction and – most pressingly from the perspective of this chapter – in processes of social exclusion. **Disgust is the emotional fuel of ableism**. The threat posed by ourselves to ourselves (and projected onto others), the threat of our ‘bodiliness’ and the shame and anxiety associated with it is a product of ableism, of the ‘tyranny of perfection’. Ableism makes the world alien to disabled bodies and, at the same time, produces impairment as an invalidating experience. It is manifest in our cultural inclination towards normalcy by way of correction, towards homogeneity by way of disparagement of difference. What this means for disabled people is that they are ‘expected to reject their own bodies’ and ‘adjust to the carnal norms of nondisabled people’ (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 608). **The ‘corporeality of the disabled body’ is, according to Campbell (2008: 157), ‘constantly in a state of deferral’ awaiting the affective response that will demean it or the travails of sociogenesis that will either do away with it or ‘make it better’.**

#### Disability controls proximate cause to justification of class-based inequality – monstrosity through disgust and dehumanization explains justification for exploitation and enforcing superiority over the working class.

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As numerous scholars have suggested, **disgust has become a prominent theme in neoliberal political debates**. In Britain [46], the USA [47] and Australia [44], **disgust has promulgated public discussions on people reliant on welfare and the ways in which they have been positioned in public discourse as the abject, the monstrous and the disgusting**