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#### Desire from lack projects identity which we can never fully reach which urges the political to determine which identities are legitimate. Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater with the best method of traversing the fantasy.

**Edelman 1** (Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, 2004, Duke University Press, p. 7-9) SJCP//JG

Politics, to put this another way, names the space in which Imaginary relations, relations that hark back to a misrecognition of the self as enjoying some originary access to presence (a presence retroactively posited and therefore lost, one might say, from the start), compete for Symbolic fulfillment, for actualization in the realm of language to which subjectification subjects us all. Only the mediation of the signifier allows us to articulate those Imaginary relations, though always at the price of introducing the distance that precludes their realization: the distance inherent in the chain of ceaseless deferrals and substitutions to which language as a system of differences necessarily gives birth. The signifier, as alienating and meaningless token of our Symbolic constitution as subjects (as token, that is, of our subjectification through subjection to the prospect of meaning); the signifier, by means of which we always inhabit the order of the Other, the order of a social and linguistic reality articulated from somewhere; the signifier, which calls us into meaning by seeming call us to ourselves: this signifier only bestows a sort of promissory identity, one with which we can never succeed in fully coinciding because we, as subjects of the signifier, can only, be signifiers ourselves, can only ever aspire to catch up to [be what] whatever it is we might signify by closing the gap that divides us and, paradoxically, makes us subjects through that act of division alone. This structural inability of the subject to merge with the self for which it sees itself as a signifier in the eyes of the Other necessitates various strategies designed to suture the subject in the space of meaning where Symbolic and Imaginary overlap. Politics names the social enactment of the subject's attempt to establish the conditions for this impossible consolidation by identifying with something outside of itself in order to enter the presence, deferred perpetually, of itself. Politics, that is, names the struggle to effect a fantasmic order of reality in which the subject's alienation would vanish into the seamlessness of identity at the endpoint of the endless chain of signifiers lived as history. If politics in the Symbolic is always therefore a politics of the Symbolic, operating in the name and in the direction of a constantly anticipated futurity, then the telos that would, in fantasy, put an end to these deferrals, the presence toward which the metonymic chain of signifiers always aims, must be recognized, nonetheless, as belonging to an Imaginary past. This means not only that politics conforms to the temporality of desire, to what we might call the inevitable historicity of desire- the successive displacements forward of nodes of attachment as figures of meaning, points of intense metaphoric investment, produced in the hope, however vain, of filling the constitutive gap in the subject that the signifier necessarily installs- but also that politics is name for the temporalization of desire, for its translation into a narrative, for its teleological determination.

#### Politics and futurism is built on the premise that any negation of the signifier of the child is essential in order to fulfill desire from lack which deems queerness out of the political.

**Edelman 2** (Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, 2004, Duke University Press, p. 10-13) SJCP//JG

Politics, then, in opposing itself to the negativity of such a drive, gives us history as the continuous staging of our dream of eventual self-realization by endlessly reconstructing, in the mirror of desire, what we take to be reality itself. And it does so without letting us acknowledge that the future, to which it persistently appeals, marks the impossible place of an Imaginary past exempt from the deferrals intrinsic to the operation of the signifying chain and projected ahead as the site at which being and meaning are joined as One. In this it enacts the formal repetition distinctive of the drive while representing itself as bringing to fulfillment the narrative sequence of history and, with it, of desire, in the realization of the subject's authentic presence in the Child imagined as enjoying unmediated access to Imaginary wholeness. Small wonder that the era of the universal subject should produce as the very figure of politics, because also as the embodiment of futurity collapsing undecidably into the past, the image of the Child as we know it: the Child who becomes, in Wordsworth's phrase, but more punitively, "father of the Man." Historically constructed, as social critics and intellectual historians including Phillipe Aries, James Kincaid, and Lawrence Stone have made clear, to serve as the repository of variously sentimentalized cultural identifications, the Child has come to embody for us the telos of the social order and come to be seen as the one for whom that order is held in perpetual trust. In its coercive universalization, however, the image of the Child, not to be confused with the lived experiences of any historical children, serves to regulate political discourse-to prescribe what will count as political discourse-by compelling such discourse to accede in advance to the reality of a collective future whose figurative status we are never permitted to acknowledge or address. From Delacroix's iconic image of Liberty leading us into a brave new world of revolutionary possibility- her bare breast making each spectator the unweaned Child to whom it's held out while the boy to her left, reproducing her posture, affirms the absolute logic of reproduction itself-to the revolutionary waif in the logo that miniaturizes the "politics" of Les Mis (summed up in its anthem to futurism, the "inspirational" "One Day More"), we are no more able to conceive of a politics without a fantasy of the future than we are able to conceive of a future without the figure of the Child. That figural Child alone embodies the citizen as an ideal, entitled to claim full rights to its future share in the nation's good, though always at the cost of limiting the rights "real" citizens are allowed. For the social order exists to preserve for this universalized subject, this fantasmatic Child, a notional freedom more highly valued than the actuality of freedom itself, which might, after all, put at risk the Child to whom such a freedom falls due. Hence, whatever refuses this mandate by which our political institutions compel the collective reproduction of the Child must appear as a threat not only to the organization of a given social order but also, and far more ominously, to social order as such, insofar as it threatens the logic of futurism on which meaning always depends. So, for example, when D. James, in her novel Children of Men, imagines a future in which the human race has suffered a seemingly absolute loss of the capacity to reproduce, her narrator, Theodore Faron, not only attributes this reversal of biological fortune to the putative crisis of sexual values in late twentieth-century democracies-"Pornography and sexual violence on film, on television, in books, in life had increased and became more explicit but less and less in the West we made love and bred children," he declares-but also gives voice to the ideological truism that governs our investment in the Child as the obligatory token of futurity: "Without the hope of posterity, for our race not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live," he later observes, "all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins."12 While this allusion to Eliot's "The Waste Land" may recall another of its well-known lines, one for which we apparently have Eliot's Wife, Vivian, to thank-"What you get married for if you don't want children?"-it also brings out the function of the child as the prop of the secular theology on which our social reality rests: the secular theology that shapes at once the meaning of our collective narratives and our collective narratives of meaning. Charged, after all, with the task of assuring "that we being dead yet live," the Child, as if by nature (more precisely, as the promise of a natural transcendence of the limits of nature itself), exudes the very pathos from which the narrator of The Children of Men recoils when he comes upon it in nonreproductive "pleasures of the mind and senses." For the "pathetic" quality he projectively locates in non-generative sexual enjoyment-enjoyment that he views in the absence of futurity as empty, substitutive, pathological-exposes the fetishistic figurations of the Child that the narrator pits against it as legible in terms identical to those for which enjoyment without "hope of posterity" is peremptorily dismissed: legible, that is, as nothing more than "pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins." How better to characterize the narrative project of The Children of Men itself, which ends, as anyone not born yesterday surely expects from the start, with the renewal of our barren and dying race through the miracle of birth? After all, as Walter Wangerin Jr., reviewing the book for the New York Times, approvingly noted in a sentence delicately poised between description and performance of the novel's pro-procreative ideology: "If there is a baby, there is a future, there is redemption."13 If, however, there is no baby and, in consequence, no future, then the blame must fall on the fatal lure of sterile, narcissistic enjoyments understood as inherently destructive of meaning and therefore as responsible for the undoing of social organization, collective reality, and, inevitably, life itself.

#### Rights discourse inevitably furthers dehumanization of queerness which normalizes and silences overkill.

Stanley 11 (Eric Stanley, Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture, 2011, p. 7-8) SJCP//JG

The problem of privatizing violence is not, however, simply one of the re-narration of the incidents. The law, and specifically “rights” discourse, which argues to be the safeguard of liberal democracy, is one of the other motors that works to privatize this structural violence. Rights are inscribed, at least in the symbolic, with the power to protect citizens of the nation-state from the excesses of the government and against the trespass of criminality. In paying attention to the anterior magic of the law, it is not so much, or at least not only, that some are granted rights because they are human, but that the performative granting of rights is what constitutes the promise of humanity under which some bodies are held. This is important in thinking about the murder of Brazell, and about antiqueer violence at large, because it troubles the very foundations of the notion of protection and the formative violence of the law itself. Accord- ing to the juridical logic of liberal democracy, if these rights are infringed upon, the law offers remedy in the name of justice. This necessary and assumptive formal equality before the law is the precursor for a system argued to be based on justice. In other words, for the law to lay claim to something called justice, formalized equality must be a precondition. The law then is a systematic and systematizing process of substitution where the singular and the general are shuttled and replaced to inform a matrix of fictive justice. Thus for the law to uphold the fantasy of justice and disguise its punitive aspirations, antiqueer violence, like all structural violence, must be narrated as an outlaw practice and unrepresentative of culture at large. This logic then must understand acts like the murder of Brazell in the singular. Through a mathematics of mimesis the law reproduces difference as similarity. By funneling the desperate situations and multiple possibilities into a calculable trespass kneading out the contours and the excess along the way, equality appears. To acknowledge the inequality of “equality” before the law would undo the fantastical sutures that bind the U.S. legal system. In the hope of being clear, for the law to read antiqueer violence as a symptom of larger cultural forces, the punishment of the “guilty party” would only be a representation of justice. To this end, the law is made pos- sible through the reproduction of both material and discursive formation of antiqueer, along with many other forms of violence. I too quickly rehearse this argument in the hope that it might foreclose the singular reliance on the law as the ground, and rights as the technology, of safety.23

#### The positionality of the worker requires queerness as its conceptual outside to be defined against – the 1ac reproduces the Child, accelerating the work of capital.

baedan 14 baedan, 2014, “Against the Gendered Nightmare: Fragments on Domestication,” The Anarchist Library, https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-against-the-gendered-nightmare

Active resistance to Leviathan often takes on an ecstatic character. Fredy Perlman will refer to the great dances spreading like fire throughout leagues of deserters. Inquisitors and witch hunters will be haunted by the image of nighttime orgies and sabbats. Elsewhere we’ve written that queer desire is the locus point of the dread of an entire social order’s self-annihilation. The most beautiful moments of insurgency are immanent to a decomposition of gendered and sexual roles. Ecstasy, from ekstasis, is to be outside one’s self. To flee from domestication is also to flee from the selves (in both their bodily and spiritual dimensions) to which we’ve been constrained. To be outside these selves is the initial break. These breaks are often couched in the language of their times: as animism, or renewal of long vanquished deities, the apocalypse as an immanent lived reality. What is consistent is the emphasis on direct and immediate joy. These eruptions of revolt are not limited to this or that historical period, but are universal throughout His-story. They happen in cities, in the countryside, amidst the peasantry, and in labor camps. The repression of this ecstatic revolt will always include a sexual dimension. This repression aims to reinscribe the body and spirit of the resisters into their domestic selves. The use of sexual violence as a repressive tactic or the almost universal conflation of criminal charges against homosexuality, heresy and witchcraft help to illustrate this.[[10]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-against-the-gendered-nightmare#fn10) Many witch hunters implied or explicitly accused witches of having sexual relations with their animal familiars, continuing the Christian tradition of separating humanity out of the rest of the living world, while marking the beastly as worthy of domination. Nudity, hallucinogens and unkempt hair all become sensual crimes of the body. Collective forms of sexuality and sociality are criminalized in order to maximize productive time. Rape is consistently used as a tactic of domination by conquering armies, torture by inquisitors, and division amidst rebel populations. The state, at various moments, institutionalizes and subsumes prostitution, both as a pressure valve against revolt, but also as a cure for deviant sexual practices. Non-reproductive sexualities are annihilated both for the challenge they pose to the emergent heterosexual matrix, but also for the conspiracies and escape plots implied in these relations. Indigenous resisters are always denounced by missionaries as lacking morality regarding sexuality and gender; this immorality is mobilized in expansive fantasies of colonialists and pioneers. The bodies of colonized resisters are marked for rape and execution. These operations lay the groundwork for the genocidal endeavors of witch hunts and holocausts. As we are alienated from the world, we are alienated from our bodies. In order to pre-empt this type of escape from ourselves, Leviathan must institute ever more complex Subjects for its constituents. These subjects are the end result of a litany of techniques aimed at mechanizing, disciplining , emotionally manipulating and controlling the human body. The reduction of certain bodies to baby-factories is a prime example, but also the scientific diagnostics of various sexual deviants or the disciplinary control of gender variant people. Those who willfully or instinctually resist these techniques must be classified as Other. This othering is often composed of racializing and gendering processes. Against these Others, no violence is excessive. The Other, whether Witch or Terrorist or Drapetomaniac or Faggot or whatever, is the legitimate recipient of all sorts of brutalities designed to either assimilate or annihilate the deviancy. These crimes become crimen exceptum. Once Leviathan has constructed its institutions and the corresponding machine-like bodies, its primary project becomes the movement of these tendencies toward infinity. All of our efforts to critique the The Child in the previous issue of this journal are in response to this project of uninhibited growth. Those who practice any form of resistance to this project must therefore be the Other worthy of annihilation. The Child functions as the fantastic future of the parent’s race. Any decline in the (civilized) population will be seen as a threat to the state, which in turn will ramp up the techniques of sexual repression described above. Workers and Slaves will be encouraged to produce more workers and slaves. In these moments, the sexual and abortive dimensions of heresy and witchcraft will come to the forefront of the inquisition trials. It is not a coincidence that witches and queer heretics were executed for having allegedly sacrificed children to the Devil. The demonization of birth control can also be understood through this lens. This fanatical desire to increase population lead even the most misogynist religious and state leaders to proclaim that women’s sole virtue was their natural capacity for childbirth. As Martin Luther said: “whatever their weaknesses, women possess one virtue that cancels them all: they have a womb and they can give birth.” Rationalism, Reason, Enlightenment (or any other lie told by Leviathan about itself) never lead to the abolition of these genocidal and bloodthirsty practices. Rather, these ideologies only lead to the institutionalization and increased technological sophistication of violence. These ideologies end up serving as justification for brutality against the irrational Other. There is no linear progress out of this brutality. While the good subjects are may be encouraged to infinitely reproduce, the actual children of the racial or colonized Other will often by slaughtered with impunity. Even while promoting the ideology of the Child, the state is constantly and discreetly acting to impose a scientific campaign of eugenics, extermination and forced sterilization upon those it deems to be a racial outside. These are only a few of an infinity of lessons we might extract from any constellation of stories—lessons which have as much relevance today as they would in centuries past. Rather than a narrative about Domestication as an Idea, we have a fragmentary and esoteric set of tales that each describes what domestication looks like in a particular moment. More excitingly they also describe how people chose to rebel against this process. To tell ourselves these stories is to connect to the individuals and moments which have attempted an escape from the nightmare of His-story. This connection becomes most meaningful when the stories enchant our own being and are given body through our own experiences. These stories only matter insofar as they produce a visceral understanding of flight from this ancient protocol of separation and capture. This is the dimension that must always be centered in a newfound reading of His-story as decomposition. Decomposition isn’t only a force of nature or accident; it is primarily the willful refusal of Leviathan by individuals and groups. Leviathan breaks down when those who maintain its springs and wheels refuse to do so—when they flee to the mountains, sing, dance and practice ecstatic ritual; when they scream, loot and burn; when they rip out the armor, tear off the mask and burn the beast to the ground. If these stories illustrate instances of domestication, they also illustrate the imposition of gender. The inherent decomposition which afflicts gender is what we call the queer; not this or that historically constituted subject category, but all the divergent bodily and spiritual expressions which escape their roles. In the first issue of the journal, we said that this was a queerness understood negatively. As rebellion/decomposition is intrinsic to stories about domestication, so is the outpouring of queer desire. For this reason, dogmatists (particularly of the Marxist variety), have accused us of being ahistorical and idealist. To the former, we have no rebuttal. We’d happily find ourselves outside of the Story of mass rapists, kings and industrialists. We certainly won’t cling to any of the Identities offered within it, nor trust any of the prescriptions laid out by its Scholars. Even worse would be to be organized by such a prescription of history. When our friends in Attentat described the recomposition and further decomposition which follows any decay of history, we read this as the Organization which follows moments of rupture, and the predictable falling-apart of all such political organizations. If we follow Rubin to say that all Organization is predicated on the exchange of gendered bodies, then we must also recognize inevitable rebellion of bodies against political organization. Radical or Feminist organizations are not exempt from this decomposition; it is routinely referred to as burnout or infighting, though we could understand it as an instinctual refusal to be captured and mobilized by this or that Organization. After all, the tendency of queerness against his-story has always been the ecstasy of life lived outside of time; without concern for whether the time is right, for the material conditions or for the Children. Queerness must always emerge as out of its time, deviant, irrational. To the latter charge, we can only shrug. The Socratic trick of Ideas doesn’t really concern us. We’ll leave the universals and the big stories to the His-storians. We’ll concern ourselves instead with the beautiful moments of heresy and revolt—the lived experiences, bodily practices and spiritual intensity—which hint toward our own. The resistance is the only human component of the entire His-story. All the rest is Leviathanic progress. Second Mythos: Lilith and Eve In the patriarchal mythology of Judeo-Christian civilization, Adam was the first man, and God gave him a wife. Most know about Eve, his second wife. Fewer tell of his first; Lilith. Lilith differed in that she refused to be subservient to Adam. She wouldn’t lay beneath him in the missionary position, and so she was expelled from Eden. Upon her expulsion, she became a demon, a succubus who travelled through night and through time, breeding with other demons and unleashing evil spirits. It is said that at night she still tempts women to leave their husbands, turns men into faggots, encourages all manner of non-reproductive sexuality, and even steals and eats children. God the father couldn’t make the same mistake twice, and so he fashioned Adam’s second wife, Eve, out of one of Adam’s own ribs, ensuring her obedience. And still she disobeyed, she ate the fruit from the forbidden tree of knowledge and both she and her husband were banished from Eden. Some, such as Walter Benjamin, will view this as the expulsion of humanity from primitive communism. All the subsequent stories of The Holy Book of this religion is largely a lament of civilized life. Its first chapter narrates the fall, and the following chapters tell of the miseries within and exodus from various civilizations. But what was this forbidden knowledge? What was the original sin? A certain heresy tells that the forbidden knowledge was the realization that a certain type of sex leads to reproduction. Once Adam and Eve knew this, they couldn’t unlearn it. From here, all of their activities were tied to an emerging symbolic order of domination. Whereas before they had simply indulged in utopia without a future, now their actions had consequences. From this knowledge stems the invention of the role of the Father, as well as the knowledge necessary for agriculture, and even the first form of the rational thought which would later become Science. Patriarchy, Civilization, Reproductive Futurism. All of it stems from this abominable discovery. The church’s misogynists will blame Eve for this discovery and expulsion, but as we well know, it is the fathers, herders, husbands, inquisitors and witch hunters who put these arcane secrets to use in the mechanization of the body. These same woman-haters will sentence countless women and faggots to burn for having fallen under the influence of the rebel demon Lilith. If we cannot unlearn these secrets, what would it mean to destroy the machinery which dominates us through them? Can we recall Lilith and fly with her at night? XII Of all these stories, there is one which occurs consistently in almost any worthwhile history of gender: the splitting of the mind from the body. Various accounts will attribute this split to different times and places, but its centrality and power are beyond question. Anti-civilization critiques will often locate this as a primary emergence of dualism in the world (Zerzan will say it stems immediately from the dualism of gender), whereas Federici will find it in the machinations of the witch hunts; Evans in the rise of industrialism. Again, the precise origins interest us less than its repeated and unending operation. Wherever it started, the split widens and continues to tear us away from ourselves. It is intuitive that such a split would be necessary in order to acclimate wild beings into those beings fit for labor in the world of work. If one is solely reliant on their own sensual perception of the world—the relation of their body to the bodies of other animals, plants and humans—then that bodily awareness is precisely what must be destroyed for the workers to be born. The disciplining of the body is the precondition of industrial existence. This disciplining of the body can be understood as an internalization of the warfare occurring outside of it. The battleground of social control becomes the body itself, the site of an eternal conflict between Reason and Passion; Enlightenment and Darkness. On the one side, there are the ‘forces of Reason’: parsimony, prudence, sense of responsibility, self-control. On the other, the ‘low instincts of the Body’: lewdness, idleness, systematic dissipation of one’s vital energies. The battle is fought on many front because Reason must be vigilant against the attacks of the carnal self, and prevent ‘the wisdom of the flesh’ (in Luther’s words) from corrupting the powers of the mind. In the extreme case, the person becomes a terrain for a war of all against all.’[[11]](https://theanarchistlibrary.org/library/baedan-against-the-gendered-nightmare#fn11) Others will call this Civil War, we will say it is part and parcel of the capture of the body in domestication. The body is a microcosm for this phenomena. The commodification of bodies and of their capacities leads to an estrangement from self; a disassociation from the majority of one’s activity and experience. The body is reified and reduced to an object. This separation and objectification of the body reaches arrives at its own self-realization through Cartesian philosophy. Hobbes will enact a related attack upon the body in reducing it to the functioning of a machine. In later times, this mechanized view will reach a new apex through the theory of genetics. More esoteric theorists of genetics will argue that body is a machine-vessel for sentient and selfish genes which deploy said bodies in an effort to eternally perpetuate themselves. The philosophical mechanization of the body becomes so total that it is projected back through history and into our very biology. In a strange paradox, science revives God as the ultimate refutation of free will: genetics. Genetic manipulation and nanotechnological methods of surveillance and control are only the most contemporary manifestations of this archaic split. But the projection of this invention onto the physical world is not done philosophically, it is done through bodily violence. The torture chambers of witch hunters, Nazi doctors and vivisectors are also the laboratories for the emergence of the mechanized body. This is also, of course, the violence of gendered domestication, as gender is that first dualism and remains the primary operation upon the body. The body is continuously dissected so as to identify and naturalize the biological differences which supposedly justify the entirety of the gendered world. The sex/gender dichotomy, but also the dichotomies of race are neatly mapped over the body/mind, and corresponds to an unending set of disciplinary measures and techniques of the self designed to maintain binary conformity. Black and feminine bodies are imagined as indocile and in need of disciplining, while white masculine bodies are believed to be rational and tame. Bodies viewed with any innate connection to animality can then justifiably be exposed to hard labor, sexual violence, and extermination.

#### The political relies on this negation in order to sustain itself which forces any sign of deviancy to a position of ontological damnation where queerness is condemned to overkill.

Stanley 3 (Eric Stanley, Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture, 2011, p. 8-10) SJCP//JG

To this end, the law is made pos- sible through the reproduction of both material and discursive formation of antiqueer, along with many other forms of violence. I too quickly rehearse this argument in the hope that it might foreclose the singular reliance on the law as the ground, and rights as the technology, of safety.23 “He was my son—my daughter. It didn’t matter which. He was a sweet kid,” Lauryn Paige’s mother, trying to reconcile at once her child’s mur- der and her child’s gender, stated outside an Austin, Texas, courthouse.24 Lauryn was an eighteen-year-old transwoman who was brutally stabbed to death. According to Dixie, Lauryn’s best friend, it was a “regular night.” The two women had spent the beginning of the evening “working it” as sex workers. After Dixie and Lauryn had made about $200 each they decided to call it quits and return to Dixie’s house, where both lived. On the walk home, Gamaliel Mireles Coria and Frank Santos picked them up in their white conversion van. “Before we got into the van the very first thing I told them was that we were transsexuals,” said Dixie in an interview.25 After a night of driving around, partying in the van, Dixie got dropped off at her house. She pleaded for Lauryn to come in with her, but Lauryn said, “Girl, let me finish him,” so the van took off with Lauryn still inside.26 Santos was then dropped off, leaving Lauryn and Coria alone in the van. According to the autopsy report, Travis County medical examiner Dr. Roberto Bayardo cataloged at least fourteen blows to Lauryn’s head and more than sixty knife wounds to her body. The knife wounds were so deep that they almost decapitated her—a clear sign of overkill. Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the post- mortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify? The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans or gay-panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans-panic defense and received a four-year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans-panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of time, out of History, and into that which comes before.27 In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the specificity of historical and politically located intersection. To this end, the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal democracy, names rights-bearing subjects, or those who can stand as subjects before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal democracy. Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of, but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another way, the spectacular material-semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing.

#### Ignore statistics regarding material progress for queerness – they’re geared at hiding the truth of the situation which means only our ontology claim explains the reality of overkill.

Stanley 4 (Eric Stanley, Near Life, Queer Death: Overkill and Ontological Capture, 2011, p. 5-6) SJCP//JG

Can one find what was not ever there—the missing head of a black queer or the identity of an unnamed transwoman whose body is never claimed? How do we measure the pain of burying generations of those we love or even those we never knew? Brazell’s bloody end asks these questions through its calculus of trauma. This kind of loss orders a precarious orga- nization, a kind of trace of that which was never there, a death that places into jeopardy the category of life itself. The numbers, degrees, locations, kinds, types, and frequency of attacks, the statistical evidence that is meant to prove that a violation really happened, are the legitimizing measures that dictate the ways we are mandated to understand harm. However, statistics as an epistemological project may be another way in which the enormity of antiqueer is disap- peared. Thinking only, or primarily, statistically about antiqueer violence is both a theoretical and a material trap. Although statistical evidence is important to make strong knowledge claims about the severity of violence, “statistics” seem to have a way of ensuring that the head of Brazell is never found. Ironically, because his head has yet to be recovered, the “actual” cause of death cannot be officially determined. Furthermore, this indeter- minate cause of death bars Brazell from being entered into hate crimes statistics. Not yet dead, Brazell has never been counted as a casualty of “hate violence.”13 Currently the FBI, through the Criminal Justice Information Ser- vices (CJIS) Division, collects the only national data on “hate violence.” These data on hate violence (or hate crimes, as they are more commonly called) contain categories for religious, racial, and disability “bias” and antihomosexual (male and female), antibisexual, and antiheterosexual incidents (in the 2008 statistics, 2 percent of reported hate crimes were antiheterosexual incidents, while 1.6 percent were antibisexual).14 This hate violence reporting is optional for local jurisdictions; the FBI collects no statistics on trans/gender variant incidents; and the 2008 statistics report that only ten “victims” experienced “multi-bias” incidents. The 2008 report also counted only 1,706 incidents based on “sexual orienta- tion,” which comprised infractions ranging from vandalism to murder. It would seem misguided at best to suggest that the number 1,706 can really tell us anything about the work of antiqueer violence. Reported attacks on “out” queer folks, such as these data, can of course only work as a swinging signifier for the incalculable referent of the actualized violence. This is not simply a numerical issue; it is a larger question of the friction between measures and effect. Not unlike the structuring lack produced by any representation that offers us, the viewers, the promise of the real, statistics can leave us with only a fragmented copy of what they might index. “Reports” on antiqueer violence, such as the “Hate Crime Statis- tics,” reproduce the same kinds of rhetorical loss along with the actual loss of people that cannot be counted. The quantitative limits of what gets to count as antiqueer violence cannot begin to apprehend the numbers of trans and queer bodies that are collected off cold pavement and highway underpasses, nameless flesh whose stories of brutality never find their way into an official account beyond a few scant notes in a police report of a body of a “man in a dress” discovered.15

#### The alternative is to embrace the death drive – a full affirmation of queer negativity in which we reject the 1AC in favor of traversing the fantasy and realizing the structural positionality of queer identity.

**Edelman 3** (Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive, 2004, Duke University Press, p. 4-7) SJCP//JG

“Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order-such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer-but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force, of negativity into some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible-to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism-I do not intend to propose some "good" that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we calI the "good," can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that's always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic's undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for "none of the above," for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law's foundational act, its self­constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself even if that order can access its constant access to jouissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer. In contrast to what Theodor Adorno describes as the "grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and substantial," the queerness of which I speak would deliberately sever us from ourselves, from the assurance, that is, of knowing ourselves and hence of knowing our "good."4 Such queerness proposes, in place of the good, something I want to call "better," though it promises, in more than one sense of the phrase, absolutely nothing. I connect this something better with Lacan's characterization of what he calls "truth," where truth does not assure happiness, or even, as Lacan makes clear, the good.5 Instead, it names only the insistent particularity of the subject, impossible fully to articulate and "tend[ing] toward the real."6 Lacan, therefore, can write of this truth: The quality that best characterizes it is that of being the true Wunsch, which was at the origin of an aberrant or atypical behavior. We encounter this Wunsch with its particular, irreducible character as a modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible form. The Wunsch does not have the character of a universal law but, on the contrary, of the most particular of laws-even if it is universal that this particularity is to be found in every human being.' Truth, like queerness, irreducibly linked to the "aberrant or atypical," to what chafes against "normalization," finds its value not in a good susceptible to generalization, but only in the stubborn particularity that voids every notion of a general good. The embrace of queer negativity, then,- can have no justification if justification requires it to reinforce some positive social value; its value, instead, resides in its challenge to value as defined by the social, and thus in its radical challenge to the very value of the social itself. For by figuring a refusal of the coercive belief in the paramount value of futurity, while refusing as well any backdoor hope for dialectical access to meaning, the queer dispossesses the social order of the ground on which it rests: a faith in the consistent reality of the social-and by extension, of the social subject; a faith that politics, whether of the left or of the right, implicitly affirms. Divesting such politics of its thematic trappings, bracketing the particularity of its various proposals for social organization, the queer insists that politics is always a politics of the signifier, or even of what Lacan will often refer to as "the letter." It serves to shore up a reality always unmoored by signification and lacking any guarantee. To say as much is not, of course, to deny the experiential violence that frequently troubles social reality or the apparent consistency with which it bears-and thereby bears down on-us all. It is, rather, to suggest that queerness exposes the obliquity of our relation to what we experience in and as social reality, alerting us to the fantasies structurally necessary in order to sustain it and engaging those fantasies through the figural logics, the linguistic structures, that shape them. If it aims effectively to intervene in the reproduction of such a reality-an inter­vention that may well take the form of figuring that reality's abortion­ then queer theory must always insist on its connection to the vicissi­tudes of the sign, to the tension between the signifier's collapse into the letter's cadaverous materiality and its participation in a system of refer­ence wherein it generates meaning itself. As a particular story, in other words, of why storytelling fails, one that takes both the value and the burden of that failure upon itself, queer theory, as I construe it, marks the "other" side of politics: the "side" where narrative realization and derealization overlap, where the energies of vitalization ceaselessly turn against themselves; the "side" outside all political sides, committed as they are, on every side, to futurism's unquestioned good.

#### Psychoanalysis is both falsifiable and accurate.

Grant & Harari 5 (Don and Edwin, psychiatrists, “Psychoanalysis, science and the seductive theory of Karl Popper,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry)

Attacks on psychoanalysis and the long-term therapies derived from it, have enjoyed a long history and much publicity [1-4]. Yet, the justification for such attacks has been challenged on many grounds, including their methodology [5] and the empirically demonstrable validity of core psychoanalytic concepts [6,7]. Also, burgeoning neuroscience research, some of which is summarized below, indicates likely neurological correlates for many key clinically derived psychoanalytic concepts such as self-coherence [8], repression [9] and projective identification [10]. Furthermore, the effectiveness of psychoanalysis and its derivative therapies has been supported by empirical research [11,12], particularly for patients with DSM axis II pathology. Despite this evidence, the attacks on psychoanalysis continue unabated, not only from some psychiatrists [13,14] but also from the highest levels of politics and health bureaucrats [15], although what exactly is being attacked is often unclear.

### OV

#### First, don’t allow AC offense weighing:

#### Your aff analysis starts from the wrong point, that’s an epistemological indict, all your offense just feeds back into futurism.

#### Solvency deficit- your aff does nothing but allow resistance strategies to become known and coopted which turns solvency. It’s actively bad because ruse of solvency means we focus on the wrong part.

#### Second, the role of the ballot precludes your standard for a few reasons.

#### The standard speaks to offense leveraged under a normative framework and thus a normative conception of reality. No one consistently abides by normative ethics because we all have subjectivity. The Role of the ballot on the other hand, speak to the judge’s obligation as an individual in the round and thus preclude examination of normativity.

#### My role of the ballot is a question of ontology – your framework presupposes both epistemology and ontology in the process of making its claims about ethics. If I win that even ONE of those presuppositions is bad, that’s enough to consider ontology first.

#### Traversing the fantasy as a method of deconstructing the symbolic is an epistemic prerequisite to engagement in any other framing – we need to deconstruct the reality of our world first in order to understand it.

#### First is reject their method:

#### Even if the state can be good in some instances, the links isolate reasons why the aff’s use of the state specifically is bad. Prefer the links on specificity

#### Working within the state and making progress might make it better for some but is always at the expense of deviant identities – i.e. queer people

#### Working within the state is always a solvency deficit to the perm – this allows the state to control what it wants us to understand and learn and means we’ll never learn how to resist and create radical change

#### We’re an impact filter to their framing – we explain how oppression operates and why it exists

### FW

1. **Prefer non-Ideal theory over ideal theory- a. ideal theory assumes a perfect world which we can strive to for the utmost moral conditions, but the logic of striving to the future for ideality is the logic through which futurism operates and excludes queer bodies. B. Ideal theory ignores the complexities of oppression that happens in the status quo such as queer overkill with the example of Brazell.**
2. **Evaluate structuralist claims such as queerpess over subjective theories such as Levinas. Even if we exist in relation to the world, we do so in a world which operates through the signifier of the child which excludes queer bodies.**