# 1NC

## 1

### Shell

#### Interp – the affirmative may not claim that extinction outweighs under all frameworks

#### Violation – they do

#### [1] Phil education – saying extinction outweighs means we never discuss the depth of the philosophy and always say extinction outweighs everything without engaging on the flow – phil debate is normative of LD

#### [2] Strat skew – it’s impossible for me to read any philosophy based arguments because extinction would automatically outweigh – two implications a) I’m forced to read other util advantages that completely moot phil debate or b) I read phil based offense and lose every round

#### Fairness – constitutive, game, all args

#### DTD – enforcement norming

#### No rvis – baiting, logic

#### CI bc reason arbitrary, collapses

## 2

### Framework

#### The meta ethic is practical reason-

#### Ethics must be derived a priori

#### 1] Uncertainty – experiences are locked within our own subjectivity and are inaccessible to others, however a priori principles are created in the noumenal world and are universally applied to all agents. Outweighs because founding ethics in the phenomenal world allows people to justify atrocities by saying they don’t experience the same.

#### 2] Is/Ought Gap – experience in the phenomenal world only tells us what is, not what ought to be. But it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premises within the noumenal world to make a moral theory.

#### Practical reason is inescapable - Any moral rule faces the problem of regress – I can keep asking “why should I follow this.” Regress collapses to skep since no one can generate obligations absent grounds for accepting them. Only reason solves since asking “why reason?” requires reason to do in the first place which concedes its authority.

#### Morality means we must treat others as ends in themselves.

Korsgaard ’83 (Christine M., “Two Distinctions in Goodness,” The Philosophical Review Vol. 92, No. 2 (Apr., 1983), pp. 169-195, JSTOR) // LEX JB [brackets for gendered language]

The argument shows how Kant's idea of justification works. It can be read as a kind of regress upon the conditions, starting from an important assumption. The assumption is that **when a rational being makes a choice or undertakes an action, [they] supposes the object to be good, and its pursuit to be justified**. At least, if there is a categorical imperative there must be objectively good ends, for then there are necessary actions and so necessary ends (G 45-46/427-428 and Doctrine of Virtue 43-44/384-385). **In order for there to be any objectively good ends, however, there must be something that is unconditionally good and so can serve as a sufficient condition of their goodness**. Kant considers what this might be**: it cannot be an object of inclination**, for those have only a conditional worth, "**for if the inclinations and the needs founded on them did not exist, their object would be without worth**" (G 46/428). It cannot be the inclinations themselves because a rational being would rather be free from them. Nor can it be external things, which serve only as means. So, Kant asserts, **the unconditionally valuable thing must be "humanity"** or "rational nature," which he defines as "the power set to an end" (G 56/437 and DV 51/392). Kant explains that **regarding your existence as a rational being as an end in itself is a "subjective principle of human action."** By this I understand him to mean that **we must regard ourselves as capable of** conferring **value upon the objects of our choice, the ends that we set, because we must regard our ends as good**. But since "every other rational being thinks of his existence by the same rational ground which holds also for myself' (G 47/429), **we must regard others as capable of conferring value by reason of their rational choices and so also as ends in themselves**. Treating another as an end in itself thus involves making that person's ends as far as possible your own (G 49/430). The ends that are chosen by any rational being, possessed of the humanity or rational nature that is fully realized in a good will, take on the status of objective goods. They are not intrinsically valuable, but they are objectively valuable in the sense that every rational being has a reason to promote or realize t hem. For this reason it is our duty to promote the happiness of others-the ends that they choose-and, in general, to make the highest good our end.

#### Practical reason means we must be able to universalize our maxims—our judgements are authoritative and can’t only apply to ourselves any more than 2+2=4 can be true only for me. The only constraint is noncontradiction.

**The standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. To clarify, consequences don’t link to the framework.**

#### Prefer additionally –

#### [1] Kantian theory has the best tools for fighting oppression through combatting ethical egoism and abstraction

Farr 02 [Arnold (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32 // LEX JB]

**One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s** moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the **universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required** for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that **I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. **It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence.** What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also**.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. **The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation.** For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents. … Whereas most criticisms are aimed at the formulation of universal law and the formula of autonomy, our analysis here will focus on the formula of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends, since we have already addressed the problem of universality. The latter will be discussed ﬁrst. At issue here is what Kant means by “kingdom of ends.” Kant writes: “By ‘kingdom’ I understand a systematic union of different rational beings through common laws.”32 The above passage indicates that Kant recognizes different, perhaps different kinds, of rational beings; however, the problem for most critics of Kant lies in the assumption that Kant suggests that the “kingdom of ends” requires that we abstract from personal differences and content of private ends. The Kantian conception of rational beings requires such an abstraction. Some feminists and philosophers of race have found this abstract notion of rational beings problematic because they take it to mean that rationality is necessarily white, male, and European.33 Hence, the systematic union of rational beings can mean only the systematic union of white, European males. I ﬁnd this interpretation of Kant’s moral theory quite puzzling. Surely another interpretation is available. That is, the implication that in Kant’s philosophy, rationality can only apply to white, European males does not seem to be the only alternative. The problem seems to lie in the requirement of abstraction. There are two ways of looking at the abstraction requirement that I think are faithful to Kant’s text and that overcome the criticisms of this requirement. **First, the abstraction requirement may be best understood as a demand for intersubjectivity or recognition. Second, it may be understood as an attempt to avoid ethical egoism in determining maxims for our actions.** It is unfortunate that Kant never worked out a theory of intersubjectivity, as did his successors Fichte and Hegel. However, this is not to say that there is not in Kant’s philosophy a tacit theory of intersubjectivity or recognition. The abstraction requirement simply demands that in the midst of our concrete differences we recognize ourselves in the other and the other in ourselves. That is, we recognize in others the humanity that we have in common. Recognition of our common humanity is at the same time recognition of rationality in the other. We recognize in the other the capacity for selfdetermination and the capacity to legislate for a kingdom of ends. This brings us to the second interpretation of the abstraction requirement. **To avoid ethical egoism one must abstract from (think beyond) one’s own personal interest and subjective maxims. That is, the categorical imperative requires that I recognize that I am a member of the realm of rational beings.** Hence, I organize my maxims in consideration of other rational beings. Under such a principle other people cannot be treated merely as a means for my end but must be treated as ends in themselves. **The merit of the categorical imperative for a philosophy of race is that it contravenes racist ideology to the extent that racist ideology is based on the use of persons of a different race as a means to an end rather than as ends in themselves.** Embedded in the formulation of an end in itself and the formula of the kingdom of ends is the recognition of the common hope for humanity. That is, maxims ought to be chosen on the basis of an ideal, a hope for the amelioration of humanity. This ideal or ethical commonwealth (as Kant calls it in the Religion) is the kingdom of ends.34 Although the merits of Kant’s moral theory may be recognizable at this point, we are still in a bit of a bind. It still seems problematic that the moral theory of a racist is essentially an antiracist theory. Further, what shall we do with Henry Louis Gates’s suggestion that we use the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime to deconstruct the Grounding? What I have tried to suggest is that instead of abandoning the categorical imperative we should attempt to deepen our understanding of it and its place in Kant’s critical philosophy. A deeper reading of the Grounding and Kant’s philosophy in general may produce the deconstruction35 suggested by Gates. However, a text is not necessarily deconstructed by reading it against another. Texts often deconstruct themselves if read properly. To be sure, the best way to understand a text is to read it in context. Hence, if the Grounding is read within the context of the critical philosophy, the tools for a deconstruction of the text are provided by its context and the tensions within the text. Gates is right to suggest that the Grounding must be deconstructed. However, this deconstruction requires much more than reading the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime against the Grounding. It requires a complete engagement with the critical philosophy. Such an engagement discloses some of Kant’s very signiﬁcant claims about humanity and the practical role of reason. With this disclosure, deconstruction of the Grounding can begin. **What deconstruction will reveal is not necessarily the inconsistency of Kant’s moral philosophy or the racist or sexist nature of the categorical imperative, but rather, it will disclose the disunity between Kant’s theory and his own feelings about blacks and women. Although the theory is consistent and emancipatory and should apply to all persons, Kant the man has his own personal and moral problems. Although Kant’s attitude toward people of African descent was deplorable, it would be equally deplorable to reject the categorical imperative without ﬁrst exploring its emancipatory potential.**

#### [2] Performativity – freedom is the key to the process of justification of arguments. Willing that we should abide by their ethical theory presupposes that we own ourselves in the first place. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify the aff standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### [3] Inclusion – analytical philosophy is most inclusive to all debaters especially small school debaters who don’t have big carded util files and big coaching staffs because all arguments under my framework can be made analytically – impacts to accessibility

### Offense

#### [1] The process of strike uses patients or beneficiaries of work as a means to an end

**Howard 20** [Danielle Howard,, Mar 2020, "What Should Physicians Consider Prior to Unionizing?," Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association, [https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03 //](https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03%20//) LEX JB]

* Written in the context of doctors, warrant can be used for all jobs

**The** possible **disadvantage to** patients highlights the crux **of** the moral issue of physician **strikes. In** Immanuel **Kant’s** *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, one formulation of **the categorical imperative is to “Act in such a way as to treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of anyone else, always as an end and never merely as a means**.”24 **When patient care is leveraged** by physicians during strikes, **patients serve as a means to the union’s ends**. Unless physicians act to improve *everyone’s*care, union action—if **it jeopardizes** the **care of some hospitalized patients**, for example—cannot be ethical. It is for this reason that, in the case of **physicians looking to form a new union**, the argument can be made that unionization should be used only as a last resort. Physician union **members must be prepared to utilize collective action and accept its risks to patient care, but every effort should be made to avoid actions that risk harm to patients.**

#### [2] Going on strike isn’t universalizable – a) if everyone leaves work then there will be no concept of a job b) everyone means the employer even leaves which is a contradiction in contraception

#### [3] No aff offense – no unique obligation of the state to give ability to strike – if a workplace is coercive you can use legal means or just find another job

#### [4] Neg contention choice – otherwise they can concede all of our work on framework and just read 4 minutes of turns which moots the four minutes of framework debate that the 1NC did giving them a massive advantage. It also kills phil education since it allows them to escape the framework lbl which outweighs since phil ed is unique to LD.

## Case

### UV

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells – 1AR theory is very aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line every 2NR standard with new answers that never get responded to

#### DTA on 1AR shells - They can blow up blippy 20 second shells in the 2AR but I have to split my time and can’t preempt 2AR spin which necessitates judge intervention

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 1AR being able to spend 20 seconds on a shell and still win forces the 2N to allocate at least 2:30 on the shell which means RVIs check back time skew

Go to framework

### FW

#### Reject Consequentialism – [A] consequentialism condemns end states which means all actions are permissible till there consequences are analyzed [B] Each type of pleasure is qualitatively different, so we can’t quantify and compare pleasures which answers calculations. [C] There is no bright line to where consequences end. Ends will always trigger more ends. [D] Inductive reasoning fails since you justify induction based on what happened in the past because you know inductive reasoning worked before so its circular. [E] Infinite consequences of any action, if I drop my pen it could do an infinite amount of things meaning we cant tell an action [F] Intent foresight fails because by the time I perceive all consequences and weigh them to see the most probable one it would be too late to take the action

#### Winning one of these points means you prefer my framework because it renders theirs incoherent and impossible to use

### Democracy

#### Democracy will catastrophically delay action on climate change---authoritarianism is necessary to ensure rapid state-led transformation

Mann & Wainwright ’18 (Geoff, teaches political economy and economic geography at Simon Fraser University, where he directs the Centre for Global Political Economy, Joel *Climate Leviathan: A Political Theory of Our Planetary Future*, pp. 38-40, ME)

Relative to the institutional means currently available to capitalist liberal democracy and its sorry attempts at “consensus,” this trajectory has some distinct advantages with respect to atmospheric carbon concentration, notably in terms of the capacity to coordinate massive political-economic reconfiguration quickly and comprehensively. In light of our earlier question—how can we possibly realize the necessary emissions reductions?—it is this feature of Climate Mao that most recommends it. As the climate justice movement struggles to be heard, most campaigns in the global North are premised on an unspoken faith in a lop-sided, elite-biased, liberal proceduralism doomed to failure given the scale and scope of the changes required. If climate science is even half-right in its forecasts, the liberal model of democracy is at best too slow, at worst a devastating distraction. Climate Mao reflects the demand for rapid, revolutionary, state-led transformation today. Indeed, calls for variations on just such a regime abound on the Left. Mike Davis and Giovanni Arrighi have more or less sided with Climate Mao, sketching it as an alternative to capitalist Climate Leviathan.35 We might even interpret the renewal of enthusiasm for Maoist theory (including Alain Badiou’s version) as part of the prevailing crisis of ecological-political imagination.36 Minqi Li’s is arguably the best developed of this line of thought, and like Arrighi he locates the fulcrum of global climate history in China, arguing that Climate Mao offers the only way forward: [U]nless China takes serious and meaningful actions to fulfill its obligation of emissions reduction, there is little hope that global climate stabilization can be achieved. However, it is very unlikely that the [present] Chinese government will voluntarily take the necessary actions to reduce emissions. The sharp fall of economic growth that would be required is something that the Chinese government will not accept and cannot afford politically. Does this mean that humanity is doomed? That depends on the political struggle within China and in the world as a whole.37 Taking inspiration from Mao, Li says a new revolution in the Chinese revolution—a re-energization of the Maoist political tradition—could transform China and save humanity from doom. He does not claim this is likely; one need only consider China’s massive highway expansions, accelerated automobile consumption, and subsidized urban sprawl.38 But he is right that if an anticapitalist, planetary sovereign is to emerge that could change the world’s climate trajectory, it is most likely to emerge in China.

### Drones

#### Democracy causes drone warfare.

Kaag, PhD, et. al, 14 - John Kaag, Ph.D. Chair of Philosophy, Professor @ Umass \*\*Scott Pratt, Executive Vice Provost for Academic Affairs, Professor of Philosophy @ U of Oregon \*\*\*Sujata K. Bhatia, Former Associate, Science, Technology, and Globalization; “Democracy and the Necessity of Drones,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/democracy-and-necessity-drones-0>

But a worry lingers in the back of our minds: perhaps, far from causing a disconnect, instead there might be a necessary connection between modern democracies and drone warfare. Most Americans hold that modern liberal democracies are worth defending. They are worth defending because these democracies, more than any other form of government, provide space for their individual citizens to pursue their own interests. Every citizen has the right to his or her own property, own form of worship, and own freedom of speech. And we recognize the intrinsic value of every individual in our democratic community. Such is the perk of being an American citizen—liberty and justice for all, each in our own particular way. In this ideal democracy, the interests of the individual are continuous with the interests of the nation as a whole. Every citizen also has the right to vote for leaders who are elected to protect the liberal democratic institutions that Americans, for good reason, hold so dear. And protection is, unfortunately, often required. There are, after all, countries and nonstate actors who have little respect for the joys of Western liberalism and who aim to undermine it at every turn. Protecting democracy has always been a tricky proposition. Leaders such as President Obama find themselves in a double bind. On the one hand, they must take defensive measures to guard the nation and its citizens' rights and interests from external threats. But on the other hand, leaders must develop and then adopt defensive military strategies that minimize, hopefully even eliminate, the costs that their citizens must face; it is impermissible to send [people] men and women off to die in wars that could be won without these citizens' direct and dangerous involvement. Every citizen, even soldiers, has intrinsic value. And so Obama and his predecessors ushered in the era drone warfare and a slew of other automated technologies that would both protect citizens and shield citizen-soldiers. Drone warfare—and its collateral damage—is a necessary consequent of a certain type of modern liberal democracy. If we are good liberal democrats, the development of drone warfare should neither surprise nor disturb us. Drones are democratic weapons. There are no other options. But drones do disturb us. The gruesome scenes of drone strikes—at funerals and birthdays and reunions half a world away—disturb us. When we have the rare misfortune of seeing these scenes, they keep us up at night. So why? Our intuition about the shortcomings and moral failings of drone strikes is not just a discomfort with robot warfare or carnage, but ought to be a sign that we are uncomfortable with a particular form of liberal democracy that necessitates drone warfare.

#### Drolif means every hotspot goes nuclear.

Zenko and Kreps, PhDs, 14

\*Micah - Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations, PhD in political science from Brandeis University; \*Sarah - Stanton nuclear security fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, assistant professor in the department of government and an adjunct professor at Cornell Law School, BA from Harvard University, MSc from Oxford University, and PhD from Georgetown University; “Limiting Armed Drone Proliferation," Council on Foreign Relations, June 2014, http://aspheramedia.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Limiting\_Armed\_Drone\_Proliferation\_CSR69.pdf

The inherent advantages of drones will not alone make traditional interstate warfare more likely—such conflicts are relatively rare anyway, with only one active interstate conflict in both 2012 and 2013.20 Nor will the probable type, quantity, range, and lethality of armed drones that states possess in coming decades make a government more likely to attempt to defeat an opposing army, capture or control foreign territory, or remove a foreign leader from power. However, misperceptions over the use of armed drones increase the likelihood of militarized disputes with U.S. allies, as well as U.S. military forces, which could lead to an escalating crisis and deeper U.S. involvement. Though surveillance drones can be used to provide greater stability between countries by monitoring ceasefires or disputed borders, armed drones will have destabilizing consequences. Arming a drone, whether by design or by simply putting a crude payload on an unarmed drone, makes it a weapon, and thereby a direct national security threat for any state whose border it breaches. Increased Frequency of Interstate and Intrastate Force For the United States, drones have significantly reduced the political, diplomatic, and military risks and costs associated with the use of military force, which has led to a vast expansion of lethal operations that would not have been attempted with other weapons platforms. Aside from airstrikes in traditional conflicts such as Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan—where one-quarter of all International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) airstrikes in 2012 were conducted by drones—the United States has conducted hundreds in non-battlefield settings: Pakistan (approximately 369), Yemen (approximately 87), Somalia (an estimated 16), and the Philippines (at least 1, in 2006).21 Of the estimated 473 non-battlefield targeted killings undertaken by the United States since November 2002, approximately 98 percent were carried out by drones. Moreover, despite maintaining a “strong preference” for capturing over killing suspected terrorists since September 2011, there have been only 3 known capture attempts, compared with 194 drone strikes that have killed an estimated 1,014 people, 86 of whom were civilians.22 Senior U.S. civilian and military officials, whose careers span the pre– and post–armed drone era, overwhelmingly agree that the threshold for the authorization of force by civilian officials has been significantly reduced. Former secretary of defense Robert Gates asserted in October 2013, for example, that armed drones allow decision-makers to see war as a “bloodless, painless, and odorless” affair, with technology detaching leaders from the “inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain” consequences of war.23 President Barack Obama admitted in May 2013 that the United States has come to see armed drones “as a cure-all for terrorism,” because they are low risk and instrumental in “shielding the government” from criticisms “that a troop deployment invites.”24 Such admissions from leaders of a democratic country with a system of checks and balances point to the temptations that leaders with fewer institutional checks will face. President Obama and his senior aides have stated that the United States is setting precedents with drones that other states may emulate.25 If U.S. experience and Obama’s cautionary words are any guide, states that acquire armed drones will be more willing to threaten or use force in ways they might not otherwise, within both interstate and intrastate contexts. States might undertake cross-border, interstate actions less discriminately, especially in areas prone to tension. As is apparent in the East and South China Seas, nationalist sentiments and the discovery of untapped, valuable national resources can make disputes between countries more likely. In such contested areas, drones will enable governments to undertake strike missions or probe the responses of an adversary—actions they would be less inclined to take with manned platforms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), there are approximately 430 bilateral maritime boundaries, most of which are not defined by formal agreements between the affected states.26 Beyond the cases of East Asia, other cross-border flashpoints for conflict where the low-risk proposition of drone strikes would be tempting include Russia in Georgia or Ukraine, Turkey in Syria, Sudan within its borders, and China on its western periphery. In 2013, a Chinese counternarcotics official revealed that his bureau had considered attempting to kill a drug kingpin named Naw Kham, who was hiding in a remote region in northeastern Myanmar, by using a drone carrying twenty kilograms of dynamite. “The plan was rejected, because the order was to catch him alive,” the official recalled.27 With armed drones, China might make the same calculation that the United States has made—that killing is more straightforward than capturing—in choosing to target ostensibly high-threat individuals with drone strikes. China’s demonstrated willingness to employ armed drones against terrorists or criminals outside its borders could directly threaten U.S. allies in the region, particularly if the criterion China uses to define a terrorist does not align with that of the United States or its allies. Domestically, governments may use armed drones to target their perceived internal enemies. Most emerging drone powers have experienced recent domestic unrest. Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and China all have separatist or significant opposition movements (e.g., Kurds, Chechens, the Taliban, Tibetans, and Uighurs) that presented political and military challenges to their rule in recent history. These states already designate individuals from these groups as “terrorists,” and reserve the right to use force against them. States possessing the lower risk—compared with other weapons platforms—capability of armed drones could use them more frequently in the service of domestic pacification, especially against time-sensitive targets that reside in mountainous, jungle, or other inhospitable terrain. Compared with typical methods used by military and police forces to counter insurgencies, criminals, or terrorists—such as ground troops and manned aircraft— unmanned drones provide significantly greater real-time intelligence through their persistent loiter time and responsiveness to striking an identified target. Increased Risk of Misperception and Escalation Pushing limits in already unstable regions is complicated by questions raised regarding rules of engagement: how would states respond to an armed drone in what they contend is their sovereign airspace, and how would opposing sides respond to counter-drone tactics? Japanese defense officials claim that shooting down Chinese drones in what Japan contends is its airspace is more likely to occur than downing manned aircraft because drones are not as responsive to radio or pilot warnings, thereby raising the possibility of an escalatory response.28 Alternatively, Japan might misidentify a Chinese manned fighter as an advanced drone and fire on it, especially if the aircraft’s radar signature is not sufficiently distinctive or if combat drones routinely fly over the disputed area. Thus, the additional risks associated with drone strikes, combined with the lack of clarity on how two countries would react to an attempted downing of a drone, create the potential for miscalculation and subsequent escalation. As U.S. Air Force commanders in South Korea noted, a North Korean drone equipped with chemical agents would not have to kill many or even any people on the peninsula to terrorize the population and escalate tensions.29 This scenario points to the spiraling escalatory dynamic that could be repeated—likely intensified in the context of armed drones—in other tension-prone areas, such as the Middle East, South Asia, and Central and East Africa, where the mix of low-risk and ambiguous rules of engagement is a recipe for escalation. Not all of these contingencies directly affect U.S. interests, but they would affect treaty allies whose security the United States has an interest in maintaining. Compared with other weapons platforms, current practice repeatedly demonstrates that drones make militarized disputes more likely due to a decreased threshold for the use of force and an increased risk of miscalculation. Increased Risk of Lethality The proliferation of armed drones will increase the likelihood of destabilizing or devastating one-off, high-consequence attacks. In March 2013, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) observed of drones: “In some respects it’s a perfect assassination weapon. . . . Now we have a problem. There are all these nations that want to buy these armed drones. I’m strongly opposed to that.”30 The worst-case contingency for the use of armed drones, albeit an unlikely circumstance, would be to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Drones are, in many ways, the perfect vehicle for delivering biological and chemical agents.31 A WMD attack, or even the assassination of a political leader, another troubling though unlikely circumstance, would have tremendous consequences for regional and international stability. Deterring such drone-based attacks will depend on the ability of the United States and other governments to accurately detect and attribute them. Technical experts and intelligence analysts disagree about the extent to which this will be possible, but the difficulties lie in the challenges of detecting drones (they emit small radar, thermal, and electron signatures, and can fly low), determining who controlled it (they can be programmed to fly to a preset GPS coordinate), or assigning ownership to a downed system (they can be composed of commercial, off-the-shelf components).32 It is equally noteworthy that civilian officials or military commanders have almost always used armed drones in ways beyond their initially intended applications. Drones do not simply fulfill existing mission requirements; they create new and unforeseen ones, and will continue to do so in the future. Furthermore, U.S. officials would be misguided to view future uses of armed drones solely through the prism of how the United States has used them—for discrete military operations in relatively benign air-defense environments. The potential for misperception is compounded by the fact that few governments seeking or acquiring armed drones have publicly articulated any strategy for how they will likely use them. Conversely, the uncertainty about how other countries will use drones provides the United States with an opportunity to shape drone doctrines, especially for U.S. allies interested in procuring drones from U.S. manufacturers.