# Inflation DA

#### inflation isn’t permanent now cowen ‘21

Cowen, T. (2021, October 27). Three Reasons Inflation Isn’t Here to Stay. Bloomberg.com. Retrieved November 11, 2021, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-10-27/inflation-isn-t-here-to-stay-and-here-are-three-reasons-why#:~:text=That%20the%20Fed%20wants%20to,the%20risk%20of%20a%20recession>.

**The case for Team Transitory is** not **about** whether the next pending inflation numbers will come in high or low. Instead it consists of **the following** two **propositions**:

* **The Fed**eral Reserve **can control the rate of** price **inflation.**
* **The Fed**eral Reserve **does not want inflation to be** very **high.**

**The first claim seems obviously true.** Central **banks aimed for** rates of **price inflation at 2%** or slightly below for many years. **They achieved them regularly** — even though, after the Great Recession, some academics insisted that the Western economies were stuck in liquidity traps.

But central banks have many policy instruments at their disposal, including the management of expectations, and it is usually a mistake to bet against them. And the implication of a [liquidity trap](https://archive.ph/o/IbsIZ/https:/marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2021/06/no-one-wants-to-talk-about-the-liquidity-trap-any-more.html) is that the Fed cannot increase the rate of inflation in deflationary times, not that the Fed cannot reduce it in inflationary times.

If there is a reason to take issue with Team Transitory, it is with the second claim. That the Fed wants to reduce inflation is true in the abstract, but the political price of doing so may be too high. After all, bringing down price inflation requires the Fed to engage in contractionary monetary policy, which runs the risk of a recession. Contractionary monetary policy lowers aggregate demand, and in a world of sticky wages and prices this can lead to lower output and employment, as indeed it did [in the early 1980s](https://archive.ph/o/IbsIZ/https:/www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/recession-of-1981-82).

The key question, then, is whether the Fed, at current margins, is more concerned with fighting inflation or lowering the chance of a recession. Admittedly there is uncertainty about the answer to this question, as there should be, but still I end up on Team Transitory.

**One way to view the Fed is as an independent institution with a mandate** (half of a [dual mandate](https://archive.ph/o/IbsIZ/https:/www.chicagofed.org/research/dual-mandate/dual-mandate%23note1)) **to maintain stable prices**. Chair Jerome Powell has made this goal more flexible, by instituting “average inflation targeting,” and this policy does give the Fed some leeway in deciding when the rate of price inflation should fall. But it doesn’t grant the Fed license to allow 5% annual inflation for the next five or 10 years. **If the Fed broke with its mandate, it would lose** much of **its credibility. So** from a policy and institutional standpoint, **it is in the Fed’s interest to control inflation.**

An alternative way to view the Fed is as a political entity, motivated by self-preservation or a desire to help the incumbent Democratic Party. Putting aside whether this is true, voters correctly perceive higher inflation as lowering their living standards. A marginal rise in unemployment might affect 5% of the electorate, and may disproportionately affect low-skilled individuals, who are also less likely to vote. In contrast, inflation affects all voters, and most of them [hate it](https://archive.ph/o/IbsIZ/https:/www.nber.org/system/files/chapters/c8881/c8881.pdf). So even a cynical calculus also suggests the Fed will bring down inflation rates.

Perhaps **most important,** there **is the market’s perspective** — and **the market expects the Fed to bring down inflation** rates. As I write, the 10-year Treasury [yield](https://archive.ph/o/IbsIZ/https:/www.bloomberg.com/markets/rates-bonds/government-bonds/us) is 1.64%. That yield has been rising, but it hardly seems to predict hyperinflation, or even 5% inflation for the next 10 years. The most negative piece of evidence so far is from the TIPS market, which [is predicting](https://archive.ph/o/IbsIZ/https:/www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/business/inflation-interest-rates-treasury-bonds.html) inflation of about 3% over the next five years.

#### Strikes lead to inflation peek ‘21

Liz **Peek**, O. C. Business analyst. (20**21**, October 22). *Biden's big labor policies will create next round of inflation*. TheHill. Retrieved November 2, 2021, from <https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/577933-bidens-big-labor-policies-will-create-next-round-of-inflation>

But it is Biden’s enthusiasm for Big Labor that is going to make matters worse. We are now entering a new phase of inflation pressures. A rising cost of living is pushing **workers** to **demand higher wages**, **which** in turn **prompts companies to raise prices** even more, **igniting an unholy cycle that penalizes everyone.**

Unions, cheered on by Biden’s White House, have decided to take advantage of this moment. Labor **strikes** are on the increase, which **will lead to higher wages**, take workers offline and make it even harder to get goods to customers. Those bare shelves popping up around the country may just be a teaser for what comes next.

**A wage-price spiral is the phenomenon that causes inflation to become “persistent**” and not “transitory.” This is what Democrats will bring to the 2022 midterm elections.

A recent [Morning Consult/Politico poll](https://morningconsult.com/2021/10/20/inflation-economy-biden-policies-poll/) found that 62 percent of registered voters, including 61 percent of independents and even 41 percent of Democrats, blame Biden’s policies for soaring inflation. With prices rising at the fastest rate in 13 years, less than half of those surveyed attribute the increase to Americans returning to pre-pandemic behavior.

Though the policies that contributed to price hikes on everything from rents to gasoline to chicken were not specified in this poll, other surveys have found voters pinning rising inflation on Democrats’ big spending programs, such as the $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan. That is one reason (along with a healthy survival instinct) that moderate Democrats are now slow-walking Biden’s $3.5 trillion “social infrastructure” bill.

Transportation Secretary [Pete Buttigieg](https://thehill.com/people/peter-pete-buttigieg) acknowledged the connection the other day, when he [shirked responsibility](https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/buttigieg-supply-chain-issues-continue-next-year) for port delays and trucker shortages by arguing that we don’t have just a supply problem but also a demand problem.

Buttigieg is correct. With Congress authorizing an unprecedented $5 trillion in “relief” spending over the past two years and with the Federal Reserve pumping trillions into the money supply, the country is awash with money.

Put most simply, there is too much money chasing too few goods.

As a consequence, prices in September [rose 5.4 percent from the year before](https://www.bls.gov/news.release/realer.t01.htm), faster that the growth in wages, which increased 4.6 percent. Over the past year, real average hourly wages are down almost one percent. Workers are falling behind, and they know it.

Unions have taken notice and decided that this is the time to begin rebuilding their ranks among private companies. Only 6.3 percent of private-sector workers today belong to unions, a massive drop from 12 percent in 1990. Clearly, labor leaders would like to reverse that trend. With the nation short of workers, this may be the perfect time to do so.

Just recently, 10,000 United Auto Workers at tractor manufacturer John Deere [went out on strike](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/14/john-deere-workers-strike/) for the first time in three decades, while 31,000 employees at Kaiser Permanente [are also staging a walkout](https://m.usw.org/news/media-center/releases/2021/thirty-one-thousand-health-care-workers-authorize-strike-at-kaiser-permanente). Some 1,400 workers at cereal-maker Kellogg [are striking](https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/06/business/kellogg-cereal-plants-strike/index.html).

All in, there have been [12 strikes](https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/10/17/strikes-great-resignation/) of 1,000 workers or more so far this year, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and a total of 178 work stoppages. Those figures are way above 2020 totals, but about the same as in 2018 and 2019.

My guess: We’re in the early innings. Workers are aware that they have leverage, and union leaders know there is a pro-Big Labor president in the White House.

Early in his tenure, Biden [posted a message](https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-amazon-com-labor/biden-urges-workers-to-make-your-voice-heard-as-amazon-employees-vote-on-union-idUSKCN2AT140) about workers’ right to organize and the virtues of collective bargaining on Twitter that many saw as encouraging employees at an Amazon facility in Alabama to vote in favor of forming a union. It was an unprecedented intrusion by a president into such contests. As it happened, Biden’s push failed when workers overwhelmingly defeated the organizing effort.

President Biden has gone further, inserting into his stimulus bills pro-union items like making union dues deductible and requiring that federal funds flow predominantly to union shops.

As important, he has packed the National Labor Relations Board with former union lawyers committed to advancing the cause. [Politico reports](https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/06/companies-brace-biden-labor-509516) that the agency’s expected rulings could “serve as a backdoor for enacting provisions … that would vastly expand workers’ ability to join unions in potentially the most important overhaul of U.S. labor law since the 1940s.” Organizing gig workers is one of the new board's top ambitions.

The Los Angeles Times [affirms](https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2021-06-02/biden-pro-union-can-he-reverse-labors-long-decline): “Biden has put unions at the center of policy — viewing them as vehicles not only to rebuild middle-class jobs but also to address climate change and racial and gender inequity.”

The John Deere workers [rejected a contract](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/14/business/economy/john-deere-strike.html) that would have awarded raises of 5 percent to 6 percent and offered another 3 percent wage hike in 2023 and 2025. Deere’s employees are emboldened by the company’s current profitability and the struggle to hire new employees.

Most likely, workers elsewhere will follow suit. We have not seen a wave of disruptive labor strikes for many years. For the past two decades globalization put a lid on the demands of workers who were wary of shipping jobs overseas, and the Great Recession crimped corporate profits

Biden’s pro-union efforts could win back some of those blue-collar workers who defected to [Donald Trump](https://thehill.com/people/donald-trump) in 2016, but the president’s encouragement of Big Labor will surely lead to higher wages. Those **pay hikes will spur even higher inflation; it will be hard to stop the merry-go-round.**

It will also be hard for Biden and his fellow Democrats to escape responsibility for what many voters consider the country’s number one problem: inflation.

#### Inflation causes a recession

**Pettinger**, T. (20**20**, January 19). *Can inflation cause a recession?* Economics Help. Retrieved November 13, 2021, from <https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/1128/economics/is-inflation-causing-recession/>.

Inflation is not the main cause of recessions. Usually, recessions are caused by factors such as high-interest rates, fall in confidence, fall in bank lending and decline in investment. However, it is possible that **cost-push inflation can contribute to a recession,** especially **if inflation is above** nominal **wage growth.** For example, **in 2008, inflation was higher than** nominal **wages (**leading to a fall in real wages) and **this contributed to lower** consumer **spending and was a** contributing **factor to the** 2008 **recession.** It is also possible inflation can indirectly cause a recession. If economic growth is too high, this can cause higher inflation and the growth can prove unsustainable and lead to a ‘boom and bust’ economic cycle. In other words, inflationary growth is often followed by a recession. Also, **if inflation is** too **high, the** Central Bank and/or **government may** respond by **tighten**ing **monetary** or fiscal **policy**. **This** reduces inflation but also **causes a fall in aggregate demand and lower economic growth. Therefore, a recession is** often **caused by policies to reduce inflation.**

#### Recession leads to economic crisis and war

**Liu**, Q. (20**18**, November 13). *The next economic crisis could cause a global conflict. here's why*. World Economic Forum. Retrieved November 11, 2021, from <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/11/the-next-economic-crisis-could-cause-a-global-conflict-heres-why>.

The next economic crisis is closer than you think. Butwhat **you should really worry about is** what comes after: in the current social, political, and technological landscape**, a prolonged economic crisis**, combined with rising income inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict. **The 2008-09** global **financial crisis almost bankrupted governments** and caused systemic collapse. **Policymakers managed to pull the global economy back from the brink, using** massive **monetary stimulus,** including quantitative easing and near-zero (or even negative) interest rates. But **monetary stimulus is** like an **adrenaline shot to** jump-start **a**n arrested **heart;** it can revive the patient, but **it does nothing to cure the disease**. **Treating a sick economy requires structural reform**s, **which can cover** everything from **financial** and **labor markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies.** **Policymakers** have utterly **failed to pursue** such **reforms**, despite promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now seems to take more time than actual governing. And Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely) above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses. Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8% [higher](https://www.zillow.com/home-values/) than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio, which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now [higher](http://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe/) than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great Depression in 1929. **As monetary tightening reveals** the **vulnerabilities in the** real **economy**, the c**ollapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger an**other **economic crisis** – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilize and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, **the consequences** of this mistake could **extend** far **beyond the economy.** According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, [prolonged **periods**](https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/bfriedman/files/the_moral_consequences_of_economic_growth_0.pdf) **of economic distress have been characterized** also **by public antipathy toward** minority groups or **foreign countries – attitudes that** can help to **fuel** unrest, terrorism, oreven **war**. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors; there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict. According to [research](http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674430006) by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality at historically high levels.

#### Inflation is synchronized globally because of international linkages Levchenko et al 17

Levchenko, A. A. (2017, March). *Nber Working Paper Series*. Retrieved November 20, 2021, from <https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23246/w23246.pdf>.

Inflation rates are highly synchronized across countries. In a dataset of PPI for 30 countries, the single common factor explains nearly half of the fluctuations in PPI inflation in the average economy. It is important to understand the reasons for this internationalization of inflation. This paper evaluates a particular hypothesis: international input linkages are synchronizing inflation rates.  Our main finding is that input linkages indeed contribute substantially to the observed PPI comovement. We undertake a number of additional exercises to better understand this result. The main conclusion is not sensitive to the assumption on the exchange rate pass-through or to the extent of pricing to market with demand complementarities. Both the average level of input linkages and their heterogeneity matter for generating the full extent of synchronization. Finally, the bulk of observed synchronization is due to common sectoral shocks.

## Cruel Optimism DA

#### Right to Strike Inherently Ineffective

Ahmed **White**, 20**18**, University of Colorado Law School https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2369&context=articles

As this all played out, it left in its wake a right to strike, but one whose power consists almost entirely of the ability of workers to pressure employers by withholding labor, while also maybe publicizing the workers’ issues and bolstering their morale. But while publicity and morale are not irrelevant, in the end they are not effective weapons in their own right. Nor are they generally advanced when strikes are broken. Moreover, the withholding of labor, unless it could be managed on a very large scale—something the law also tends to prohibit by its restrictions on secondary boycotts, by barring sympathy strikes and general strikes—is inherently ineffective in all but a small number of cases where workers remain irreplaceable. Of course, striking in such a conventional way accords with liberal notions of property and social order; but precisely because of this it is simply not coercive enough to be effective. And it is bound to remain ineffective, particularly in a context where workers far outnumber decent jobs, where mechanization and automation have steadily eaten away at the centrality of skill, where the perils that employers face in the course of labor disputes are as impersonal as the risks to workers are not, where employers wield overwhelming advantages in wealth and power over workers, where the state’s machinery for enforcing property rights and social order have never been more potent—where, in fact, capital is capital and workers are workers.

#### Right to Strike is Fantasy that Keeps Workers from Achieving True Political Change

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From this perspective, the quest for an effective right to strike emerges as a fantasy—an appealing fantasy for many, but a fantasy no less, steeped in a misplaced and exaggerated faith in the law and a misreading of the class politics of modern liberalism. The campaign to resurrect such a right appears, too, not only as a dead-end and a distraction, but an undertaking that risks blinding those who support viable unionism and the interests of the working class to the more important and fundamental fact that liberalism and the legal system are, in the end, antithetical to a meaningful system of labor rights. It is for this reason that the call for an effective right to strike should be set aside in favor of more direct endorsement of militancy and a turn away from the law and instead towards a political program that might advance the interests of the working class regardless of what the law might hold.

#### Encouraging Workers To Improve Conditions Leads to Cruel Optimism, Prevents Meaningful Change

John **Clarke**, Doctorate, **No Date** (?), https://theabolitionary.ca/author/theabolitionist618347819/

To see insecurity at the heart of wage labor (rather than a condition of its absence) is to complicate the current denunciatory discourse of precarity. Critiques of precarity—whether explicitly or as another element of what Thorkelson (2016) describes as its political unconscious—uphold full‐time, wage‐labor employment as an ideal. One problem with this politics of precarity is that it ignores how wage labor can itself be an experience of insecurity, degradation, exploitation, and abuse. For example, Franco Barchiesi (2011) makes this argument through his study of wage labor as a technique of governance in both colonial and postcolonial South Africa. He shows how colonial administrators emphasized the “dignity of work” as a way to use wage labor to discipline African populations seen as “uncivilized” and “unruly.” Many African workers refused waged employment, instead opting for various forms of subsistence labor or self‐employment that, while insecure, allowed them to avoid the discipline and indignity experienced when working in factories and mines. In this historical context, Barchiesi argues, “precarious employment was not a condition of disadvantage but enabled opposition to the labor‐centered citizenship of Western modernity” (15). Barchiesi goes on to show how today, the continued emphasis on “decent jobs” and “job creation” in postapartheid South Africa fuels the precariousness of workers by continuing to link social citizenship to full‐time wage labor at the same time that stable employment is increasingly scarce (see also Barchiesi, 2012b). The emphasis on decent jobs also reinforces forms of masculinity, nationalism, and inequality that a social order structured around wage labor produced. In short, the demand for decent jobs, as a solution to precarity, generates a conservative politics attached to the valorization of wage labor. It also precludes the “political potentials of precarity” (Barchiesi, 2012b, 248) or what I have described elsewhere as the possibility that forms of work beyond wage labor might open up other ways of fashioning work and life (Millar, 2014).

This brings me back to the question that began this article: what are we holding onto through the ubiquitous, denunciatory discourse of precarity? One answer to this question is certainly wage labor. Or more precisely, many critiques of precarity remain attached to what Kathi Weeks (2011) has described as the taken‐for‐granted valorization of waged work as an economic necessity, social duty, and moral practice. This attachment to waged work is part of a broader response to precarity that has reaffirmed normative modes of life. For example, Lauren Berlant (2011) argues that conditions of precarity have led to deepened aspirations for and reinvestments in the normative good life—a stable job, middle‐class home, guaranteed rewards for hard work, and the promise of upward mobility. These forms of attachment, she suggests, paradoxically become obstacles to fulfilling the very desires that are wrapped up with the aspiration for a good life. This produces what Berlant calls a “relation of cruel optimism” (170).

## T

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend whole resolution

#### Violation: they dont

#### Specific instances don’t affirm generics – past topics prove

**Nebel 19** (Jake Nebel, assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs, “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution” August 12 2019, vbriefly, <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14>) //triumph debate

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions. Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window. So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why. “Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons. First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural. Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals. Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universities generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### Standards –

#### 1 – precision – debating the topic as written is key to precise engagement Kills fairness because the neg can never link offense into the aff – gives the aff irreciprocal ballot access. Kills education because we never have good discussions if the neg can’t prep the aff.

#### 2 – limits – choosing to defend one government sets the norm for tiny country – kills neg ability to prep because there are infinite plans that can all no-link neg offense – topic  generics don’t solve because spec plans can no link them. kills fairness because underresourced debaters can’t keep up with thousands of tiny affs and kills education because we never get in depth engagement.

#### TVA – read your aff as an advantage of a wholeres plan

#### Voters –

#### 1 -- Fairness – you need fairness to evaluate debate rounds – the judge needs to vote for the better debater not the better cheater. Unfair advantages in debate rounds make decisions illegitimate and hurt our ability to access real world skills. If they try to go for “fairness bad” then just vote neg because it means you’re under no obligation to evaluate their arguments fairly.

#### 2 – education – it’s a voter because it’s the reason schools fund debate and the only portable skills we gain from debate are a result of education – knowing how to discuss the merits of broad policy options has more real world implications than knowing how to go for an rvi or knowing how to defend policies that are so obscure they’d never be passed.

#### Paradigm issues –

#### 1 – No RVIs

#### a] logic – you don’t get to win just for proving you’re topical

#### b] chilling effect – rvis disincentivize debaters from checking abuse

#### c] theory baiting – rvis incentivize affs to be as unnegatable as possible so they can bait t or theory and win

#### 2 – competing interpretations over reasonability

#### a] arbitrariness – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention

#### 3 – drop the debater

#### a] logic – drop the argument doesn’t make sense – the shell indics their entire advocacy

#### b] norm setting – negate on t to set a norm for being fair and topical – affirming incentivizes sketchy non-t affs and better t prepouts and less substantive debate – leads to worse and less educational debates

## Case

#### Protests without the right to strike have led to regime change in Egypt before - RTS is unneeded ‘Britannica 21

Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (2021, January 18). *Egypt uprising of 2011*. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved November 20, 2021, from <https://www.britannica.com/event/Egypt-Uprising-of-2011>.

Beginning in December 2010, unprecedented mass demonstrations against poverty, corruption, and political repression broke out in several Arab countries, challenging the authority of some of the most entrenched regimes in the [Middle East](https://www.britannica.com/place/Middle-East) and [North Africa](https://www.britannica.com/place/North-Africa). Such was the case in [Egypt](https://www.britannica.com/place/Egypt), where in 2011 a popular uprising forced one of the region’s longest-serving and most influential leaders, Pres. [Ḥosnī Mubārak](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Hosni-Mubarak), from power.

The first demonstrations occurred in [Tunisia](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tunisia) in December 2010, triggered by the self-immolation of a young man frustrated by Tunisia’s high unemployment rate and rampant [police](https://www.britannica.com/topic/police) [corruption](https://www.britannica.com/topic/corruption-law). Rallies calling for Pres. [Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Zine-al-Abidine-Ben-Ali) to step down spread throughout the country, with police often resorting to violence to control the crowds. As clashes between police and protesters escalated, Ben Ali announced a series of economic and political reforms in an unsuccessful attempt to end the unrest. Demonstrations continued, forcing Ben Ali to flee the country. The apparent success of the popular uprising in Tunisia, by then dubbed the [Jasmine Revolution](https://www.britannica.com/place/Tunisia/The-Jasmine-Revolution#ref298252), inspired similar movements in other countries, including Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. (*See also* [Libya Revolt of 2011](https://www.britannica.com/event/Libya-Revolt-of-2011).)

In Egypt, demonstrations organized by youth groups, largely independent of Egypt’s established opposition parties, took hold in the capital and in cities around the country. Protesters called for Mubārak to step down immediately, clearing the way for free elections and democracy. As the demonstrations gathered strength, the Mubārak regime resorted to increasingly violent tactics against protesters, resulting in hundreds of injuries and deaths. Mubārak’s attempts to placate the protesters with concessions, including a pledge to step down at the end of his term in 2011 and naming [Omar Suleiman](https://www.britannica.com/biography/Omar-Suleiman) as vice president—the first person to serve as such in Mubārak’s nearly three-decade presidency—did little to quell the unrest. After almost three weeks of mass protests in Egypt, Mubārak stepped down as president, leaving the Egyptian military in control of the country.