**Topical Government Action**

**A] Interpretation: The affirmative may only defend the implementation of a topical government action. To clarify, the affirmative may only garner offense from arguments advocating for govt action.**

**B] Violation: They don’t.**

**C] Standards**

**1. Ground**

**- The affirmative picks the topic ex post facto, which incentivizes arguments without a stable mechanism. The lack of a stasis point allows them to revise the affirmative and skew any links.**

**- The affirmative sets a precedent to construct cases the negative can respond to; kills ground.**

**- Ground is key to fairness because debaters need equal access to the ballot; key to education because clash is a prerequisite to argumentation/testing advocacy**

**2. Testing Advocacy**

**- To discuss the 1AC and its methodology it must be accessible by the negative; lack of prep or adequate engagement makes this impossible; that’s key to fairness.**

**- Testing advocacy is key to ensuring the 1AC’s harms are resolved through its solvency and to enact actual tangible change; that’s key to education.**

**- In order to have good engagement, we must be tied to a stable topic. It is impossible to generate offense against limitless affirmatives, and forces the same generic debate over and over**

**- Having a stasis point generates portable skills – abilities that are accessible outside of the round. Prefer our interpretation because it provides a stasis point that everyone expects.**

**- The untopicality of the affirmative creates a distaste within the debate community (judges, debaters, teams, etc.) that turns their impact. Their refusal to engage precludes any actual chance of solvency.**

**D] Voters**

**Vote off of fairness, it’s inherently good, otherwise debate would have no value because judges could vote whichever way they want. Debate requires some form of deliberation that is equal to both sides.**

**Vote off of education; to test the affirmative advocacy there needs to be substantive clash.**

**Topicality comes before the 1AC; we need to make sure it is topical before even evaluating it. If they’re winning the 1AC flow it’s likely because the negative couldn’t prep for it. Also, vote off of probability because you cannot resolve their impacts with the ballot but you can resolve the shell’s impact.**

**Drop the debater**

**No RVI’s:**

**-          RVIs disincentives theory because debaters would be scared to run theory against abusive cases in fear of the argument turning on themselves. This results in more abuse.**

**-          Topicality should only be a voter if it is used to check abuse against a debater. This maintains the purpose of theory, and prevents it from becoming just another argument type.**

**-          RVIs are illogical; they should not be rewarded for being topical**

**Prefer competing interpretations; only way to determine what is the best interpretation for debate.**

**Topicality is not violence, but rather a critique of their refusal to open their protest strategy to testing – I don’t have the power to impose a norm, only to persuade you that my methodology is best – every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time.**

**Anderson 6 [Amanda, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290]**

**Lets first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"-that is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument roughly, Habermass version-and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on-in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Lets leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody elses hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here. There is a way to make Robbins’s point more narrowly which would run something like this: Anderson has a very restricted notion of how argument should play out, or appear, within academic culture, given the heavy emphasis on logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness. This conception of argument is too narrow (and hence authoritarian). To this I would reply simply that logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness do not exhaust the possible forms, modes, and strategies of argumentation. There is a distinction to be made between the identification of moves that stultify or disarm argument, and an insistence on some sort of single manner of reasoned argument. The former I am entirely committed to; the latter not at all, despite the fact that I obviously favor a certain style of argument, and even despite the fact that I am philosophically committed to the claims of the theory of communicative reason. I do address the issue of diverse forms and modes of argument in the first and last chapters of the book (as I discuss above), but it seems that a more direct reflection on the books own mode of argumentation might have provided the occasion for a fuller treatment of the issues that trouble Robbins. Different genres within academe have different conventions, of course, and we can and do make decisions all the time about what rises to the level of cogency within specific academic venues, and what doesn't. Some of those judgments have to do with protocols of argument. The book review, for example, is judged according to whether the reviewer responsibly represents the scholarship under discussion, seems to have a good grasp of the body of scholarship it belongs to, and convincingly and fairly points out strengths and weaknesses. The book forum is a bit looser-one expects responsible representation of the scholarship under discussion, but it can be more selectively focused on a key set of issues. And one expects a bit of provocation, in order to make the exchange readable and dramatic. But of course in a forum exchange there is an implicit norm of argument, a tendency to judge whether a particular participant is making a strong or a weak case in light of the competing claims at play. Much of our time in the profession is taken with judging the quality of all manner of academic performance, and much of it has to do with norms of argument, however much Robbins may worry about their potentially coercive nature. From time to time I myself have wondered whether my book is too influenced by the modes of academe. But when I read a piece of writing like the one that Elspeth Probyn produced, I find myself feeling a renewed commitment to the evaluative norms of responsible scholarship, and to the idea that clearly agreed-upon genres and protocols of fair scholarship benefit from explicit affirmation at times. Probyn's piece does not conform at all to the conventions of the forum response. She may herself be quite delighted that it does not. Robbins may find himself delighted that she represents a viewpoint that does not agree on my (totalitarian) fundamentals of forum responses. But I would simply say that here we do not have fair or reasoned argument, which is one of the enabling procedures of forum exchanges. Indeed, I hear a different genre altogether: the venting phone call to a friend or intimate. In this genre, which I think we are all familiar with, one is not expected or required to give reasons or evidence, as one is in academic argument. Here's how the phone call might go: "Ugh. I have to write a response to this awful book. I agreed to this because I thought the book had an interesting title; it's called The Way We Argue Now. But I can't get through it; it isn't at all what I expected. I find myself alternately bored and irritated. It's so from the center—totally American parochial, and I just hate the style: polemical in a slam-bam-thank-you-ma'am way—really quite mean-spirited. She's so arrogant. And you wouldn't believe the so-called critique of Foucault. I don't know, I think I'm just sick of abstract theory—I mean, aren't we past this? It's so stultifying. I wish there were some way to get out of the commitment. I don't know how I'm ever going to get to it anyway, with all my journalism deadlines." The friend: "That sounds awful. But just use the occasion to write about something else, something you think is important. Write about yourself. Direct attention to a book that you do like. Whatever you do, don't spend too much time on it. And definitely call her out on the American centrism."**

**Set Col K**

**Summary:**

WTO IP protections lead to monopolies, which pushes capitalism into imperialism, which causes structural violence. To solve structural violence you must solve imperialism, and to solve imperialism you must solve capitalism.

**Framing**

Framing for this round is focusing on the discussion of the settler-colonial narrative and how to best address its impact within the world in order to address the consistent narrative. Descendants of colonizers who live on stolen lands have a responsibility to address the perpetual system of settler colonialism. Settler colonialism works to erase indigenous histories and cultures, normalizing their deaths and locking them into a system that perpetuates settlers’ usage of stolen land.

**Cox 17:**

Alicia Cox 26 July 2017. “Settler Colonialism.” *Oxford Bibliographies*, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml.

**Settler colonialism is an ongoing system of power that perpetuates the genocide and repression of indigenous peoples and cultures**. Essentially hegemonic in scope, settler colonialism **normaliz[ing]** the **continuous settler occupation, exploiting lands and resources to which indigenous peoples have genealogical relationships**. **Settler colonialism includes interlocking forms of oppression, including racism, white supremacy, heteropatriarchy, and capitalism**. This is because settler colonizers are Eurocentric and assume that European values with respect to ethnic, and therefore moral, superiority are inevitable and natural. However, these **intersecting dimensions of settler colonialism coalesce around the dispossession of indigenous peoples’ lands, resources, and cultures**. The evolving field of settler colonialism studies arose from scholarship in Native American and indigenous studies that engages with postcolonial studies and critiques the post- in “postcolonial” as inappropriate for understanding ongoing systems of domination **in such places as the United States**, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where **colonialism is not a thing of the past because the settlers have come to stay, displacing the indigenous peoples and perpetuating systems that continue to erase native lives, cultures, and histories.** Foundational theories in settler colonialism studies distinguish settler colonialism from classical colonialism through work that demonstrates that settler colonizers destroy indigenous peoples and cultures in order to replace them and establish themselves as the new rightful inhabitants. In other words, settler colonizers do not merely exploit indigenous peoples and lands for labor and economic interests; they displace them through settlements. In his groundbreaking theory of the “logic of elimination,” Patrick Wolfe shows that **settler colonialism is a system**, not a historical event, and **that** as such it **perpetuates the erasure of native peoples as a precondition for settler expropriation of lands and resources**, providing the necessary conditions for establishing the present-day ideology of multicultural neoliberalism.

**Link**

**The affirmation of the resolution continues to push the narrative of the “white man’s burden”, as well as perpetuating the United States as a legitimate government and owner of the land that it occupies, as the World Trade Organization originated through the push of the United States and other Western nations to create an international trading system.**

**Cimino-Isaacs et al. 20:**

Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, Coordinator Analyst in International Trade and Finance,  Rachel F. Fefer, Analyst in International Trade and Finance, and Ian F. Fergusson, Specialist in International Trade and Finance. “World Trade Organization: Organization and Future Direction.” *Congressional Research Service*, August 21 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45417.

Historically, **the United States’ leadership of the global trading system has ensured the United States** a seat at the table to **shape[s] the international trade agenda in ways that** both **advance and defend U.S. interests**. The evolution of U.S. leadership and the global trading system remain of interest to Congress, which holds constitutional authority over foreign commerce and establishes general and principal U.S. trade negotiating objectives through legislation. **Congress has recognized the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the “foundation of the global trading system”** within trade promotion authority (TPA) **and plays a direct legislative and oversight role over WTO agreements**. The statutory basis for U.S. WTO membership is the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (P.L. 103-465), and U.S. priorities and objectives for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO have been reflected in various TPA legislation since 1974. Congress also has oversight of the U.S. Trade Representative and other agencies that participate in WTO meetings and enforce WTO commitments.

The WTO is a 164-member international organization that was created to oversee and administer multilateral trade rules, serve as a forum for trade liberalization negotiations, and resolve trade disputes. **The United States was a major force behind the establishment of the WTO** in 1995, **and the rules and agreements resulting from multilateral trade negotiations** since 1947. The WTO encompassed and succeeded the GATT, established in 1947 among the United States and 22 other countries. **Through the** GATT and **WTO, the United States**, with other countries, **sought to establish a more open, rules-based trading system in the postwar era**, with the goal of fostering international economic cooperation and raising economic prosperity worldwide. Today, 98% of global trade is among WTO members.

Affirming perpetuates the establishment of the United States through the WTO, a government who forcefully colonized the land it rests upon, as the existence of the WTO is one of the things that helps the US to defend global trade interests, as well as being a result of the US taking on the “white man’s burden”, believing that they had a responsibility to raise the world’s economic prosperity and cooperation.

**Impact**

**By legitimizing the United States and helping to perpetuate its existence, the affirmative perpetuates a world of settler-colonialism, which in term continues a legacy of oppression, erasure, and genocide.**

**Wolfe 06:**

Wolfe, Patrick.“Settler Colonialism and the elimination of the native.” Journal of Genocide Research, Dec 21 2006, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240.

The logic of elimination not only refers to the summary liquidation of Indigenous people, though it includes that. In common with genocide as Raphaël Lemkin characterized it,[6](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) **settler colonialism** has both negative and positive dimensions. Negatively, it **strives for the dissolution of native societies**. Positively, **it erects a new colonial society on the expropriated land base**—as I put it, **settler colonizers come to stay: invasion is a structure not an event**.[7](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) In its positive aspect, **elimination is an organizing principal of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superseded) occurrence**. The positive **outcomes of** the logic of **elimination** can **include officially encouraged miscegenation, the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds, native citizenship, child abduction, religious conversion, resocialization in total institutions such as missions or boarding schools, and a whole range of cognate biocultural assimilations. All these strategies, including frontier homicide, are characteristic of settler colonialism.** Some of them are more controversial in genocide studies than others. **Settler colonialism destroys to replace.** As Theodor Herzl, founding father of Zionism, observed in his allegorical manifesto/novel, “If I wish to substitute a new building for an old one, I must demolish before I construct.”[8](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) In a kind of realization that took place half a century later, one-time deputy-mayor of West Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti recalled, “As a member of a pioneering youth movement, I myself ‘made the desert bloom’ by uprooting the ancient olive trees of al-Bassa to clear the ground for a banana grove, as required by the ‘planned farming’ principles of my kibbutz, Rosh Haniqra.”[9](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) Renaming is central to the cadastral effacement/replacement of the Palestinian Arab presence that Benvenisti poignantly recounts.[10](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) Comparably, though with reference to Australia, Tony Birch has charted the contradictory process whereby White residents sought to frustrate the (re-) renaming of Gariwerd back from the derivative “Grampians” that these hills had become in the wake of their original owners' forcible dispossession in the nineteenth century.[11](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14623520601056240) Ideologically, however, there is a major difference between the Australian and Israeli cases. The prospect of Israeli authorities changing the Hebrew place-names whose invention Benvenisti has described back to their Arabic counterparts is almost unimaginable. In Australia, by contrast (as in many other settler societies), the erasure of indigeneity conflicts with the assertion of settler nationalism. On the one hand, settler society required the practical elimination of the natives in order to establish itself on their territory. On the symbolic level, however, settler society subsequently sought to recuperate indigeneity in order to express its difference—and, accordingly, its independence—from the mother country. Hence it is not surprising that a progressive Australian state government should wish to attach an indigenous aura to a geographical feature that bore the second-hand name of a British mountain range. Australian public buildings and official symbolism, along with the national airlines, film industry, sports teams and the like, are distinguished by the ostentatious borrowing of Aboriginal motifs. For nationalist purposes, it is hard to see an alternative to this contradictory reappropriation of a foundationally disavowed Aboriginality. The ideological justification for the dispossession of Aborigines was that “we” could use the land better than they could, not that we had been on the land primordially and were merely returning home. One cannot imagine the Al-Quds/Jerusalem suburb of Kfar Sha'ul being renamed Deir Yasin. Despite this major ideological difference, however, Zionism still betrays a need to distance itself from its European origins that recalls the settler anxieties that characterize Australian national discourse. Yiddish, for instance, was decisively rejected in favour of Hebrew—a Hebrew inflected, what is more, with the accents of the otherwise derided Yemeni mizrachim. Analogously, as Mark LeVine has noted, though the Zionist modernization of the Arab city of Jaffa was intended to have a certain site specificity, “in fact Jaffa has had to be emptied of its Arab past and Arab inhabitants in order for architects to be able to reenvision the region as a ‘typical Middle Eastern city’.”

[...]

**The tide of history canonizes the fait accompli, harnessing the diplomatic niceties of the law of nations to the maverick rapine of the squatters' posse within a cohesive project that implicates individual and nation-state, official and unofficial alike**. Over the Green Line today, Ammana, the settler advance-guard of the fundamentalist Gush Emunim movement, hastens apace with the construction of its facts on the ground. In this regard, the settlers are maintaining a tried and tested Zionist strategy—Israel's 1949 campaign to seize the Negev before the impending armistice was codenamed Uvda, Hebrew for “fact.”29 As Bernard Avishai lamented of the country he had volunteered to defend, “settlements were made in the territories beyond the Green Line so effortlessly after 1967 because the Zionist institutions that built them and the laws that drove them … had all been going full throttle within the Green Line before 1967. To focus merely on West Bank settlers was always to beg the question.”30 In sum, then, **settler colonialism is an inclusive, land-centred project that coordinates a comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier encampment, with a view to eliminating Indigenous societies.** Its operations are not dependent on the presence or absence of formal state institutions or functionaries. Accordingly—to begin to move toward the issue of genocide—the occasions on or the extent to which settler colonialism conduces to genocide are not a matter of the presence or absence of the formal apparatus of the state.

**Alt**

**The alternative is decolonization, which allows us to reject prevailing narratives of settler colonialism.**

**Cox 17:**

Alicia Cox 26 July 2017. “Settler Colonialism.” *Oxford Bibliographies*, https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml.

**Decolonizing theories and narratives reject the notion of Western superiority. Decolonization remains an evolving concept that assumes we may transform current colonial conditions and work to build indigenous peoples’ futurity in the face of ongoing settler-colonial attempts to eliminate native peoples.** Haunani-Kay Trask ([Trask 1999](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml#obo-9780190221911-0029-bibItem-0046)) and other scholars define **decolonization as the theory and practice of working to achieve indigenous peoples’ empowerment and justice**. Some scholars contend that the de- in decolonization falsely suggests that we can undo the processes of colonization and return to a pure, authentic precolonial way of being indigenous. This fantasy is a dangerous one not only because it is impossible but because it excludes indigenous people who don’t meet traditional standards of native identity. [Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua 2013](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml#obo-9780190221911-0029-bibItem-0043) addresses the difficulties of putting decolonization theories into practice. [Arvin, et al. 2013](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml#obo-9780190221911-0029-bibItem-0041) and [Smith 2012](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml#obo-9780190221911-0029-bibItem-0045) argue that **decolonization involves indigenous peoples’ interventions in scholarship about native peoples and the creation of alliances to transform settler-colonial processes in the academy**. [Brooks 2008](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml#obo-9780190221911-0029-bibItem-0042) and [Silva 2004](https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0029.xml#obo-9780190221911-0029-bibItem-0044) highlight native peoples’ use of writing to provide revisionist histories of settler colonization.

**ROB/ROJ**

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best confronts the consequences of settler colonialism. This requires the neg’s approach of decolonization, since education of colonial ideologies is active decolonization. More ballots allow us to spread our advocacy, and this is inherently beneficial for education and the debate space. We seek to increase voices against structures such as the WTO that increase structural violence against native tribes.**