

OFF

Interp: Debaters may not use arguments from philosophers whose beliefs are founded off of racism, sexism, homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia, anti-semitism, ableism, etc.

Violation: They read Kant (see siyar 99 card and Westphal 97) without stating they reject Kant's racist ideologies. The damage has already been done. If they do it in their next speech it proves they only do so to win the round and not bc they care abt fighting racism in debate. If you really cared, you would have denounced it in your previous speech.

(Bracketed to avoid racist language) Kant himself admitted that non-white people cannot access his philosophy; reject the aff on-face for blatant racism. Warburton '17

Warburton, Nigel. "Why the Western philosophical canon is xenophobic and racist – Bryan W Van Norden | Aeon Essays." Aeon. 31 Oct. 2017. Web. 7 Mar. 2019. <<https://aeon.co/essays/why-the-western-philosophical-canon-is-xenophobic-and-racist>>

Kant himself was notoriously racist. He treated race as a scientific category (which it is not), correlated it with the ability for abstract thought, and – theorising on the destiny of races in lectures to students – arranged them in a hierarchical order: 1. 'The race of the whites contains all talents and motives in itself.' 2. 'The Hindus ... have a strong degree of calm, and all look like philosophers. That notwithstanding, they are much inclined to anger and love. They thus are educable in the highest degree, but only to the arts and not to the sciences. They will never achieve abstract concepts. [Kant ranks the Chinese with East Indians, and claims that they are] static ... for their history books show that they do not know more now than they have long known.' 3. [Africans] 'The race of Negroes ... [is] full of affect and passion, very lively, chatty and vain. It can be educated, but only to the education of servants, ie, they can be trained.' 4. 'The [Indigenous] American people are uneducable; for they lack affect and passion. They are not amorous, and so are not fertile. They speak hardly at all, ... care for nothing and are lazy.' Those of us who are specialists on Chinese philosophy are particularly aware of Kant's disdain for Confucius: 'Philosophy is not to be found in the whole Orient. ... Their teacher Confucius teaches in his writings nothing outside a moral doctrine designed for the princes ... and offers examples of former Chinese princes. ... But a concept of virtue and morality never entered the heads of the Chinese.' Kant is easily one of the four or five most influential philosophers in the Western tradition. He asserted that the Chinese, Indians, Africans and the Indigenous peoples of the Americas are congenitally incapable of philosophy. And contemporary Western philosophers take it for granted that there is no Chinese, Indian, African or Native American philosophy. If this is a coincidence, it is a stunning one.

Kant's racism mandated that non-white people lacked access to rationality and thus were not human; DTD on-face for blatant racism - Kant's notion says that non-white debaters literally can not engage debate in the round. Their reading of Kant denies their existence and excludes them from the debate space. Allais '16

Lucy Allais (2016) Kant's Racism, Philosophical Papers, 45:1-2, 1-36, DOI: 10.1080/05568641.2016.1199170

After a long period of comparative neglect, in the last few decades growing numbers of philosophers have been paying attention to the startling contrast presented between Kant's universal moral theory, with its inspiring enlightenment ideas of human autonomy, equality and dignity and Kant's racism. Against Charles Mills, who argues that the way to make Kant consistent is by attributing to him a threshold notion of moral personhood, according to which some races do not qualify for consideration under the categorical imperative, I argue that Kant cannot be made consistent on race, and that rather than trying to make him so, we should use the example of Kant's racism to tell us something about the nature of racism. I argue that

Kant's own moral philosophy and moral psychology in fact give some materials for thinking about his racism, and about racism.

Standards:

1. **Access:** Running these args means we endorse them and say they are good - that exacerbates oppressing minorities in and outside of the debate space, excluding people from debate and directly supporting real world violence
2. **Education:** Support of these worldviews without the debate exposing their racist beliefs tells everyone in the round that those are good - leads to us believing that racism and all other isms and phobias are good
3. **Jurisdiction:** You are a judge and an educator. You have a moral obligation to reject these arguments as you have a responsibility to combat these ideas since debate is a space meant for marginalized groups to use their voices. You literally can not vote for the aff.
4. **Academic integrity:** If debate is academic, then debaters must be held to the same standards as academics and be aware of their argument's background. It's the burden of the debater to know and denounce their argument's racist justifications.

Voters:

Accessibility is a voter and comes first since rejecting it is morally abhorrent and it's a prereq to debate - lowered access means less people in debate which is also inherently bad. This outweighs bc it's actual violence

Education is a voter - it's the only thing we get from debate and schools wont fund debate if it's teaching racist ideologies. Additionally educating that racism is good exacerbates neo colonialism and once again leads to real violence

Jurisdiction is a voter because it is your job to combat oppressive notions

No RVI's:

1. You don't get to win bc you proved you werent racist - that's completely illogical
2. They create a chilling effect where debaters run abusive arguments and bait theory and still win on the rvi - causes infinite abuse
3. You already have a 7-6 time skew in rebuttals

Just use philosophies that don't justify oppression of people

No, don't take anything from Kant even if it has nothing to do with his racism. You wouldn't take economic advice from the KKK and anything Kant says will always be interwoven with his racism bc that is literally how he views the world

Competing interps:

1. You can't be reasonable not racist
2. Reasonability invites judge intervention and a race to the bottom to see how much abuse can be done before debaters lose the round

Kantianism is tainted by racist assumptions. To Kant only Europeans count as fully human, all others must be forced to conform. According to Kant, I'm subhuman and should not be allowed to even be debating in this round

Eze 97 [Emmanuel Chukwudi, Prof. Philosophy DePaul University. Post Colonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader. "The Color of Reason." Pg. 130-31] "It should be...of human nature."

It should be obvious that what is at stake in our critique of Kant is, as Lucius Outlaw pointedly states, the "struggle over the meaning of man,"¹⁴⁰ or the project of defining what it means to be(come) human. In 1765 Kant wrote: "If there is any science man really needs, it is the one I teach, of how to fulfill properly that position in creation which is assigned to man, and from which he is able to learn what one must be in order to be a man." It is clear that what Kant settled upon as the "essence" of humanity, that which one ought to become in order to deserve human dignity, sounds very much like Kant himself: "white, European, and male."^{4*} More broadly speaking, Kant's philosophical anthropology reveals itself as the guardian of Europe's self-image of itself as superior and the rest of the world as barbaric. Behind Kant's anthropology is what Tsenay Serequeberhan characterizes as "the singular and grounding metaphysical belief that European humanity is properly speaking isomorphic with the humanity of the human as such. This universalist conjunction of metaphysics and anthropology is made possible by a philosophy which understands itself as the lieu of logos so that philosophical anthropology becomes the logocentric articulation of an ahistorical, universal, and unchanging essence of "man." The so-called primitives surely ought to be wary of such Kantian universalist-humanoid abstraction, which colonizes humanity by grounding the particularity of the European self as center even as it denies the humanity of others. And lest it be forgotten, nothing that I have said here is particularly new. Friedrich Gentz, who studied with Kant at Königsberg in between 1783 and 1786, pointed out that, if the goal of Kant's anthropological theories were realized, it would "compact the whole species into one and the same form," a dangerous situation which would destroy diversity and the "free movement of the spirit" for anyone who disagreed with Kant's compact would be treated as a rebel against fundamental principles of human nature.

The expectation is for me AND YOU to keep the education space safe. IT IS THE BURDEN of the debater to they themselves denounce parts of the literature. You can't denounce Kant in the 2NR because you prove you only do so to win the round, not because you actually care about doing so. This style of debate is harmful in is what normalizes reading trash philosophers like Kant over and over again.

If his theory is true / to be weighed, then his racism/white supremacy has to be considered, since Kant's ontology is meaningful only within the practical framework

OFF

Interpretation – Debaters must disclose their case and evidence they read 20 mins prior to the start of the round, either on the NDCA 2021-2022 LD wiki or via email/some sort of contacting method.

Violation --- I can share a screenshot of their lack of disclosure.



round 2



Krish Lal (@45KrishLal) · 945krilal@nhusd.k12.ca.us

to tripaarush

Hey, this is James Logan KL. What's the aff?

11:35 AM (21 minutes ago)

Reply

Forward



Vote neg to preserve education quality, which this tournament says it values. Having the evidence the opponent reads is key to see if my opponent's evidence is accurate, or at least to learn something about their case—that's an independent voter for education and fairness – otherwise debate is useless. This voter comes first in today's round

Standards:

1) Fairness 4 mins or however long the aff gave is inadequate to put together a 1nc. More time is needed to create a quality rebuttal. Key to fairness because it gives debaters equal playing ground. The interp is the best middle ground between keeping critical thinking in rebuttals for the neg and making sure the aff does not engage in sketchy evidence ethics and making sure it's a productive round

2) Research skills— Disclosure forces quality. If the aff is beat in a short amount of research time, it must lose. This forces debaters to make a powerful aff, not a flimsy case. Key to education since research skills are needed to learn

Impact: Drop the debater for harming education and fairness in debate

Voters: Schools won't fund debate if it's unfair or if it's not educational which is bad for the activity as a whole. Education is the only skill we get from debate, it's why debate matters which is why it's a voter. Fairness is critical debate schools won't fund debate if it's not fair which is bad for the activity as a whole.

Framing

Envisioning existential threats and potential solutions within debate iteratively fractures settler colonialism.

Weiss, 15—Ph.D. candidate, Anthropology, University of Chicago (Joseph, “UNSETTLING FUTURES: HAIDA FUTURE-MAKING, POLITICS AND MOBILITY IN THE SETTLER COLONIAL PRESENT,” Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Division of Social Sciences, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago, December 2015, 223-232, dml)

And yet, something has changed in this landscape from the initial erasures of Native futurity we drew out in the first chapter. In the narratives of colonial actors like Duncan Campbell Scott, it was absolutely clear that “Indians” were disappearing because their social worlds were being superseded by more “civilized” ways of living and being, ones that these Native subjects would also, inevitably, in the end, adopt (or failing that, perish outright). There was a future. It was simply a settler one. But the **nightmare futures** of that my Haida interlocutors ward against in their own future-making reach beyond Haida life alone. Environmental collapse, most dramatically, **threatens** the sustainability of **all life**; toxins in the land and the waters threaten human lives **regardless of their** relative indigeneity, **race**, or gender (e.g. Choy 2011; Crate 2011). Put another way, the impetus for non-Haida (and non-First Nations subjects more generally) to be “united against Enbridge” with their indigenous neighbours comes in no small part because an oil spill also profoundly threatens the lives and livelihoods of non-Aboriginal coastal residents, a fact which Masa Takei, among others, made clear in Chapter 3. Nor is the anxiety that young people might abandon their small town to pursue economic and educational advantage in an urban context limited to reserve communities. Instead, the compulsions of capitalist economic life compel such migrations throughout the globe. The **nightmare futures** that **Haida people** constitute alternative futures to **ward against are** not just future of indigenous erasure under settler colonialism. They are **erasures of settler society itself**.

There is thus an extraordinary political claim embedded in Haida future-making, a claim which gains its power precisely because Haida future-making as we have seen it does not (perhaps cannot) escape from the larger field of settler-colonial determination. Instead, in Haida future-making **we find the implicit assertion** that **Haida people can make futures that address** the **dilemmas** of Haida **and settler life** alike, ones that can at least “navigate,” to borrow Appadurai’s phrasing, towards possible futures that do not end in absolute erasure. If Povinelli and Byrd are correct and **settler liberal governance makes itself possible** and legitimate **through a perpetual deferral of the problems** of the present, **then** part of **the power of** Haida **future-making is to expose the threatening non-futures** that might emerge out of this bracketed present, to expose as lie the liberal promise of a good life always yet to come and to attempt to constitute alternatives.

It is no coincidence that we find this in the midst of a struggle over sovereignty. And this not just in the sense of the Council of the Haida Nation’s ongoing assertion of its sovereign right to govern the lands and waters of Haida Gwaii on behalf of all Haida people, as we saw in Chapter 5. Rather, as Joanne Barker has argued, over the course of the latter half of the twentieth century sovereignty has emerged as a:

particularly valued term within indigenous scholarship and social movements and through the media of cultural production. It [is] a term around which analyses of indigenous histories and cultures were organized and whereby indigenous activists articulate their agendas for social change (Barker 2005:18).

Through the assertion of sovereignty, indigenous political leaders, activists and scholars refute “the dominant notion that indigenous people [are] merely one among many ‘minority groups’ under the administration of state social service and welfare programs.” Instead, “sovereignty defines indigenous people with concrete rights to self-government, territorial integrity, and cultural autonomy under international law” (18). The trouble is, of course, that indigenous claims to sovereignty are always made within the context of colonial nation-states, ones whose own legitimacy is put at considerably risk both by the prospect of self-determining indigenous Nations (re-)emerging within

their boundaries and the troubling of their own historical narratives of sovereign rights (cf. Comaroff and Comaroff 2003b). (One of these narratives, which reinterpreted indigenous lands as terra nullius and thus open to occupation, we've encountered already in Chapter 3). Thus, while sovereignty might indeed "define" indigenous peoples with concrete rights to territorial Title and self-determination, in theory equal under international law to the states who also lay claim to their territories, that definition does not in and of itself make possible the practice of this sovereignty. In this regard settler states such as Canada have shifted in their response to First Peoples' sovereignty claims from outright rejection to a set of policies of selective recognition,⁵ but even the latter still positions Native nations as being subject to the authority and oversight (if not the structural forms) of the state.

This means, as we have seen in Chapter 5, that indigenous governments such as the Council of the Haida Nation are in a precarious position, attempting to constitute their own sovereign authority without access to many of the conventional means of sovereignty in Western political thought – e.g., the monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber 1946), decisive authority to make and enact law (Schmitt 2005), or exclusive territorial control (Brown 2010; cf. Hobbes 1994). Alongside this precarity is the equally anxious question of whether or not sovereignty is even an appropriate analytical to center indigenous rights around precisely because it is historically a Western concept, one that had been drawn on to dispossess indigenous peoples over the course of settler colonial history (Barker 2005:18–19). (Indeed, the very next essay in Barker's edited volume, by Mohawk scholar Taiake Alfred, categorically rejects sovereignty as an inappropriate tool for indigenous political assertions for these reasons and, also, because it draws attention away from developing and furthering "genuinely" Aboriginal political modes of thought (Alfred 2005; cf. Alfred 2009).

The fact that sovereignty remains such a preeminent concept in the struggle for indigenous rights even though it is both epistemologically problematic and politically constrained has meant that there has been a recent push in both anthropology and indigenous studies to "widen" the definition of sovereignty, so that it might encompass multiple forms of indigenous social, political and legal practice outside of the conventional purview of "sovereign power" (e.g. Cattellino 2008; Richland 2011; Simpson 2000; Simpson 2014). Or, as Joanne Barker puts it:

There is no fixed meaning for what sovereignty is – what it means by definition, what it implies in public debate, or how it has been conceptualized in international, nation, or indigenous law. **Sovereignty** – and its related histories, perspectives, and identities – **is** embedded within the specific social relations in which it is **invoked and given meaning**. How and when it emerges and functions are determined by the "located" political agendas and cultural perspectives of those who rearticulate it into public debate or political document to do a specific work of opposition, invitation, or accommodation. It is no more possible to stabilize what sovereignty means and how it matters to those who invoke it than it is to forget the historical and cultural embeddedness of indigenous peoples' multiple and contradictory political perspectives and agendas for empowerment, decolonization, and social justice (Barker 2005:21, emphasis original).

The opening up of sovereignty as flexible, multiple, and subject to all manner of diverse rearticulations carries particular weight (and, perhaps, ambiguity) since, as a historical concept in Western political theory, sovereignty was overwhelmingly concerned with closure. As Wendy Brown argues in her *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, the classic vision of sovereign power rests in the capacity to divide the inside from the outside, to make borders around a people – a "nation" – and separate that people from those outside it. Thus Schmitt's "friend-enemy" distinction, for instance, or even John Locke's consistent preoccupation with fences as a way of marking the existence of territory (Brown 2010; cf. Schmitt 1996; Locke 1988). The historical conditions of indigenous sovereignty claims in the context of settler colonialism make such absolute closures impossible for indigenous peoples.

We might add, though, that their persistent presence also challenges the closure of the settler nation-state. Indeed, this is part of Brown's point. The very fact that we see ever more spectacular performances of sovereign power on the part of contemporary nation-states – e.g., the titular "walls" that are being constructed along the borders of an increasing number of states – is a sign of the very insecurity of their political authority (Brown 2010).⁶ The conditions of settler colonial sovereignty, in other words, may be rather more "open," and thus closer to those of indigenous "nation-within-nations," then they may at first appear. If this means, in turn, that the future of settler political life is becoming as uncertain as the future for indigenous life has always been since the advent of settlement, then this means only what we have already begun to see: the dilemmas that Haida people confront in their future-making practices are also the dilemmas facing settler society. Take Chapter 4, in which the absence of any "one" definitive governing entity compels the constitution of an aspirational framework of accountability which could, were it realized, render navigable Haida relations to the many governments that claim their loyalties. As I hinted at there, such dilemmas are not restricted to the Haida sociopolitical world; rather, they may in fact be endemic to contemporary democratic societies and the multiple forms of governance (licit and otherwise) that emerge therein.

In suggesting that there are Haida ways of refiguring a shared Haida-settler set of contemporary problematics, **we might think of** Haida **future-making as** simultaneously **an instantiation of the** multiple, **flexible** and always **contingently located practices of sovereignty** to which Barker points **and a different way of thinking about indigenous political potentiality**. In the former sense, Haida future-making is **without doubt concerned with carving out**

spaces in which Haida existence can continue, expand, and change without losing the capacity to reproduce itself as, precisely, Haida existence. Thus the processes of homecoming we explored in Chapter 2, or Chapter 5's explicitly political attempts to establish control over the islands for future generations. If the absence of indigenous sovereignty is the absence of the capacity of an indigenous people to (self)-determine their own futures, then the constitution of Haida futures can be seen exactly as sovereign work, whether in the overt sense of the Council of the Haida Nation's assertions or the somewhat more implicit mode of Alice Stevens' proposed mass adoptions. Significant here, though, is the fact that these acts of future-making carry meanings beyond their status as "responses" to the social and political dilemmas of contemporary Haida life. Thus Alice Stevens' adoptions bring "hippie" children into the framework of Haida kinship relations, in one sense neutralizing their potential threat, but also constituting a complex new network of social relations between Haida and non-Haida whose potential significances go well beyond the protection of Haida territory and resources; thus the Council of the Haida Nation emerges as a "state-like" governing entity through its authorizing promise to "take care" of the islands, but in so doing takes on a series of new roles in Haida political life whose full consequences remain to be seen. If it is a sovereign action to envision an opening of possible futures for Haida people, then this very openness might also exceed the boundaries of sovereignty as a problematic for indigenous people even as it responds to them.

Which is also, perhaps, why Haida futures seem so consistently to sketch out social, ecological, and political fields that encompass non-Haida; more, that are futures for Canada as well as for the Haida people living within the nation-state's borders. Or, at least, futures that have the capacity to be so. What would it mean to figure an indigenous sovereignty that speaks beyond itself, one that promises to invert the order of settler domination through reconfiguring the shared futures of indigenous and settler peoples? This would not be a sovereignty premised on territorial closure, or even absolute political autonomy. It would, however, decisively overturn any settler colonial anticipations of the inevitable erasure of Native peoples. Quite the opposite, it would position indigenous practices of anticipation, aspiration, certainty, and anxiety at the forefront of contemporary modes of political imagination.

Unsettling Futures

A question remains, however. Could such a refiguring of the temporal and political horizon of settler and indigenous relationships remain possible even if the futures that indigenous people work to constitute remain unrealized in the settler colonial present? Or, put another way, we must always be careful not to conflate a capacity to form new futures for settler nation-states with the actual materializations of these futures. The Haida futures that I have discussed, even as they promise possible ways of navigating – of restructuring, even – the settler-Haida present, remain firmly bound by the colonial constraints of this present. But perhaps the stakes here have never been about overthrowing the Canadian colonial order outright. Rather, what I hope this dissertation has shown is that Haida future-making has the capacity to unsettle the settler colonial present, to challenge its received categories and demonstrate how, slowly, gradually, Haida people are reconfiguring its terms through the work of producing the future. Certainly, the sheer fact of Haida futurity should put to the lie any further notion that Haida people exist only to replicate their past or live only in the deferral of their eventual disappearance. The future is alive and well in Old Massett, although this does not mean that it is not also a site of profound anxieties.

In working to ward off those anxieties through the juxtaposition of nightmare futures against their more desirable alternatives, then, Haida people unsettle the epistemological foundations of the forms of settler colonialism and liberalism against which Byrd and Povinelli write. At the same time (if you'll pardon the pun), I think we can see the social work that futuremaking does iteratively, as a gradual reshaping of the actual conditions of Canadian society. Here I borrow Judith Butler's suggestion, following Foucault, that the regulatory norms of society function only through their consistent and unstable reiteration (and materialization) in everyday social life.⁷ From this perspective, the ways in which Haida people work within and even reiterate the constraints and demands of Canadian settler mainstream society can also slowly and strategically shift those very constraints and demands,

materializing a HaidaCanadian future that might in fact be quite different from the present even as it does not ever fully “escape” from its dilemmas. Perhaps the most unsettling potential of all here lies simply in the ways in which Haida people incorporate the conditions of the settler colonial present as being paths towards Haida futures. Not vanished, or vanquished. Ongoing.

Reducing existential risks is the top priority in any coherent moral theory

Plummer 15 (Theron, Philosophy @St. Andrews)

<http://blog.practicaethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/>

Theron Plummer is a Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. I specialize in ethical theory, and am particularly interested in problems about the nature, aggregation, and distribution of well-being, the relevance of numbers in ethics, and the normative significance of persons.

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did,

the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler's recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that **most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations** of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. **So obviously** if Scheffler were right I'd have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. **We should also take into account moral uncertainty.** What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the **moral facts?** I've just argued that there's agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even **those** (hedonistic egoists) **who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken**, and that one of the above views is correct. **Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one** (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), **they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.** Perhaps most disturbingly still, **even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters**, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, **reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.** Again, this is largely for the reason that **there are so many people who could exist in the future** – there are trillions upon trillions... upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). **Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives.** It's possible they'll be miserable. **It is enough** for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won't get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. **And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to.** I suspect that **most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.** Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: "We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy.... Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly." (From chapter 36 of *On What Matters*)

1] Ground

both debaters have ground underneath consequentialism because every action has a consequence that can be weighed fairly under the framing – others flow exclusively to one side.

2] Topic lit

Most articles are written through a consequentialist lens because they're crafted for policymakers and the public who believe consequences are important – key to fairness because topic lit is how we determine engagement.

3] Death outweighs

a) agents can't act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b) it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prereq which means it's a constraint since we can't reach the end goal of ethics without life

OFF - Brazil

Brazil's commercial space industry is flourishing.

Nakahodo 21 [Sidney Nakao Nakahodo, Sidney Nakao Nakahodo is a Lecturer at Columbia University where he specializes in Political, Social, and Economic Development in Brazil. In parallel to his academic responsibilities he is currently involved in a number of technology startups, both as co-founder and advisor. Previously he was based in Washington DC and worked in private sector development and low carbon projects at the World Bank. Prior to joining the Bank he served as senior researcher for a major think tank in Brazil and consulted for the United Nations Development Programme. Sidney holds a Master of International Affairs from Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs and a Bachelor of Materials Science and Engineering from the University of Sao Paulo (Brazil). He is also a graduate of the Advanced Studies Program in International Economic Policy at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy (Germany). 03-19-2021, "Should Space Be Part of a Development Strategy? Reflections Based Upon the Brazilian Experience," New Space, <http://doi.org/10.1089/space.2021.0002> accessed 12/14/21]

Lately, there has been a **surge of interest in commercial space in Brazil** due to institutional development, private sector engagement, and entrepreneurial activities. A Committee of Development of the Brazilian Space Program (CDPEB) was established in 2018 and comprises representatives of several Ministries. The CDPEB has the mandate to advise the President on the implementation of the Brazilian Space Program. Among its primary responsibilities is the **elaboration of the General Law of Space**, which is expected to provide the guidelines for commercial space activities.¹³ In May 2020, **Brazilian Space Agency (AEB) issued a public call inviting local and foreign companies to use its civilian launch facilities.**¹⁴ The private sector has been actively promoting commercial space. An industrial cluster now constitutes a "Space Valley" around the Sao Jose dos Campos Technology Park (PqTec), with spin-off companies impacting both space and nonspace sectors. **The Aerospace Industries Association of Brazil (AIAB) is a trade organization of traditional space companies and defense contractors** such as Avibras, Akaer (Opto), Atech, Fibraforte, Orbital, and SIATT. According to its website, **AIAB has 30 members working in small satellites, satellite structures, payloads, satellite equipment, ground systems, propulsion, sounding rockets, and launchers.**¹⁵ Braskem, the world's leading biopolymer producer, has partnered with Silicon Valley-born startup **Made in Space to produce recyclable plastic objects in the ISS.**¹⁶ Since 2017, **AEB has organized the Brazilian Space Industry Forum**, an annual event that congregates stakeholders, fosters the exchange of ideas, and promotes collaboration between domestic and international participants. The **U.S.-Brazil CEO Forum**, which brings together 12 U.S. and 12 Brazilian CEOs to develop joint recommendations for both governments on how to increase bilateral trade, proposed the development of a framework for joint space research programs in 2019. **A small but vibrant New Space startup**

community is rapidly forming. The Alliance of Brazilian Space Startups was launched in 2020. Although some companies target low earth orbit and beyond, others are creating solutions to our planet using space technologies. PION has commercial products focusing on space and education. CRON and EMSIS have developed software and hardware for CubeSat missions, whereas Alya Nanosatellites aims to launch a constellation and tap into the earth's observation market. DeltaV, a spin-off from INPE, specializes in propulsion systems. ACRUX and VSAT are working on small satellite launchers. Airvantis sent multiple educational experiments to the ISS and has partnerships with companies and space agencies worldwide. The startup is carrying out Brazil's first lunar mission.¹⁷ In parallel, Agrosmart, Solinftec, and Strider are harnessing the power of space assets to provide remote sensing, weather forecast, and image processing services to the agricultural sector.¹⁸ Data companies such as Storm have incorporated open source algorithms developed by NASA for security applications.¹⁹

Strong space sector cements Brazilian prestige and international influence

Dr. Robert C. **Harding 17**, Professor of Political Science at Valdosta State University, PhD in Political Science from the University of Miami, MA from the University of Louisville, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Development on the Final Frontier, Paperback Edition, p. 1-4

Change in the post-Cold War period has become the standard of our time. Whether it be the changing power structure of the international system, climate change, the speed of technological innovation, or changes within our societies, the current international situation is one of constant, accelerating transformation. One area that has certainly evolved is the importance and priority given to space-related programs by a growing number of countries around the world. As the various captains of Star Trek fame have somberly declared, space really is the final frontier. But while it has been the basis for engaging science fiction, outer space nonetheless has a very down-to-Earth feature—it has become the ultimate venue for the growth of national power and socioeconomic development among a number of the world's emergent states. This new paradigm of international relations has been evolving for over 50 years. From the Soviet Union's launch of Sputnik in 1957, many states began to include space-based security concerns in their foreign policies, which forced them to consider what the then-new operations in space meant for national security; they also began to integrate space-based assets into their approaches to a wide range of national development challenges, from agriculture to health improvement to the development of natural resources. Though the importance of space to national power, prestige, and potential has been less obvious in the intervening years since the heady days of the Cold War's space race, its significance has never waned and continues to increase as many states increase national space budgets. Space has, in fact, earned a permanent place at the table in matters of international conflict, peace, national and international development, and international law. Space was at one time the sole domain of the wealthiest developed countries. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, and to some extent the European Union, dominated the use of space and the associated technology in the first decades after World War II. But the last couple of decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first witnessed an increase in the number of countries with state-supported space programs. At this writing, no fewer than 25 developing states, including the rapidly emerging economic powers of Brazil (the sixth largest), China (second largest), and India (fourth largest), possess active national space programs with proven independent launch capability or concrete plans to achieve it soon. Space programs and their related technologies are now an integral part of the strategic and developmental policies of many relatively wealthy developing states that aspire to elevate their international status, security, and economic future. A multitude of other developing states as diverse as Mexico, Nigeria, and Malaysia have established and elevated their own space policy through the creation of national space agencies and the purchase and/or production of satellites and related space technology either through state, private, or joint efforts. For these smaller and rising middle powers, the acquisition of space capabilities is now an integral component of their national policies. Though commercial enterprise is not a focus of this study, it must be noted that as the cost of space-related technology has decreased dramatically, the expanding number of national state actors in space has been paced by the equally impressive expansion in the number of strictly commercial space companies. Communications, geospatial information, and a wide variety of other services provided by commercial satellites affect much of modern life, and also provide vital information to governments, their agencies, and business interests worldwide. This information covers many of the same areas that national governments find important to national well-being, such as weather and climate monitoring, water management, environmental observation, topographic mapping, natural disaster planning, and crop management. These services are provided commercially by a growing cadre of companies that build satellites, create the associated technologies, and are beginning to provide basic launch services, all areas that were previously the exclusive domain of state-owned space agencies. The growth of commercial space services has been a double-edged sword for states. By 2010, the global space industry was estimated to be worth US\$276.52 billion, an 18 percent increase over 2009.² Of this total, worldwide commercial satellite industry revenues rose 11 percent to US\$160.9 billion in 2010.³ Despite sporadic attempts to control its proliferation, commercial satellite imagery has become so good and so broadly disseminated that many national governments, for example Israel, have complained that its existence endangers national security because potential terrorists now have access to the detailed satellite imagery necessary to plan precise attacks. Until the 1990s, such high-resolution satellite imagery was almost exclusively the domain of the militaries of developed space powers, which, for national security reasons, did not generally make their data public. And since there were a limited number of states with the capability to launch surveillance satellites, the potential sources were likewise limited. Those civilian satellites that did operate before the 1990s provided imagery of a much lower spatial resolution than their military counterparts, typically not showing clear images of objects smaller than 10 meters across. However, that situation changed with the launch of the US company Lockheed Martin's Ikonos satellite in 1999. Its spatial resolution of one meter meant that for the first time, no country could depend on geographic distance and national borders to ensure state secrets. The situation became even more fluid through the 1990s and into the 2000s as the transfer of space technology—satellites and associated technology—became a commercially viable avenue for major satellite producers. Today, imagery services such as Google Earth have revolutionized access to satellite imagery in the same way that cell phones have changed communications access for hundreds of millions of people around the world—they have democratized it. Nonetheless, the growing actual importance of space policy stands in stark contrast to the popular perception of the significance of space in the modern world. Indeed,

more than 50 years after the launch of Sputnik, the exploration of near space via the moon-landings, and various robotic missions to the solar system's planets, surveys have shown that few people in the West still consider space as anything novel. The popular mindset has moved on to the wonders of the "information age" and the benefits (or detriments) of globalization. The generations of technology spawned by those earlier days of space exploration have been indispensable in the creation of our high-tech, instantaneous world, but space and its benefits are now so integrated into our daily infrastructure that most people do not give it a second thought. The reactions to the Challenger and Columbia space shuttle tragedies aside, public complacency toward the importance of space has become the rule, rather than the exception. Despite these popular sentiments, the recent expansion of space programs in the developing world demonstrates that national governments have never altered their view of the importance of space for achieving and expanding national power—militarily or socioeconomically. This expansion of space programs is especially noteworthy because it reflects an emergent democratization of space, which is one of the most important factors in the changing distribution of power in the current international arena. Many countries now use satellites for communications and obtaining weather data, through ownership or simply purchase of the data. In fact, this broadening and expansion of the usage of space and the attendant transformation of power distribution is seen by some observers as leading to a new space race, albeit one that has yet to gain the high profile that the previous contest had during the Cold War. This competition is emerging as the catalyst for a new generation of space-related policies and innovations in both established and emerging space-faring countries. Consider how one recent space-related event affected the dynamic of interstate relations. In January 2007, the news that China had successfully tested an anti-satellite ballistic missile sent shockwaves around the world's foreign policy community. By shooting down one of its own aging satellites from low Earth orbit, China—a country that only a generation before was seen as poor by most measures—demonstrated its intent to join the existing space powers, thus attracting attention, if not commanding respect as a potential world power. China plans to land a nuclear-powered unmanned rover on the moon by 2013, and to have in place an orbital military space station later in the second decade of this century.⁴ But while China's space policy is more ambitious and better funded than those of other developing states, it is by no means unique. The next year of this twenty-first century space race saw India following up on the Chinese success by launching its own successful probe to the moon. Around the world, increasing numbers of developing countries are investing in space-related technologies, seeking partners for space projects, and even constructing launch facilities that may one day rival the established space powers of the United States, Russia, the European Union, and more recently Japan. But what motivates a developing country, which by definition is relatively poor, to spend the comparatively large amounts of money required for these space adventures? The short answer is that, like the United States and the Soviet Union before them, developing countries pursue active space policies because of the recognition that space is, in many ways, the ultimate measure of national power, international prestige, and demonstrated national potential. Moreover, space-based assets allow states to more fully utilize their national resources and to expand the reach of domestic socioeconomic programs into areas as diverse as agriculture, education, medicine, and economic development. Thus a space program figures as an integral facet of any capable state's national security and developmental policies. The benefits of a successful space program include advanced communications, a platform for technology improvement, greatly enhanced geographic information, and, for some, expanded defensive and intelligence capabilities. Equally important, space programs can provide the host state with increased international prestige, which accrues both domestic and international advantages. Hence, developing countries are merely being rational state actors and following the path pioneered by those space-faring states that preceded them.

It's key to project success AND overcome historical domination

Dr. Robert C. **Harding 17**, Professor of Political Science at Valdosta State University, PhD in Political Science from the University of Miami, MA from the University of Louisville, Space Policy in Developing Countries: The Search for Security and Development on the Final Frontier, Paperback Edition, p. 23 Space programs bestow equally important soft power, especially those that involve human space flight. Every major space power has spent considerable funds to achieve the ability to put humans in space for both tangible and intangible benefits. Logsdon (2007) has argued that human space flight ranks among the most intensely patriotic symbols of modern times.²⁷ Some of the emerging space actors have pursued or are pursuing human space flight as a demonstration of their programs' sophistication, and their astronauts are held up by their governments as national patriotic icons. As will be discussed in Chapter 3, for the largest EMSAs—Brazil, China, and India—their space programs have been touted not only as national accomplishments but as a national catharsis to overcome histories of direct and indirect domination by outside powers and to project to others a sense of greatness.

Brazilian leadership solves every threat

Huck 20 [Luciano Huck, from the Law School of the University of São Paulo, Host of Rede Globo, Founder of Joá Investments 1/15/2020, "This country is vital to 'global survival'," World Economic Forum, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/01/what-happens-next-in-brazil-has-global-consequences-here>

[-are-three-priorities-for-the-next-decade/](#) accessed 12/14/21]

From spiralling geopolitical tensions in the Middle East to raging forest fires in Australia, 2020 certainly started with a bang. A shortlist of some of our biggest existential threats includes accelerating climate change, staggering inequalities and the failure of nation-states to cooperate to mitigate shared global risks. With all the bad news, it is hard to see the incredible possibilities on the horizon, not least advances in health, education and the boundless potential of new technologies. A growing number of businesses including huge asset managers like BlackRock are also becoming greener. All of these challenges and opportunities are apparent in Brazil, the world's fourth-largest democracy and its ninth biggest economy. Brazil will play a leading role in how the next decade unfolds. A big reason for this is its immense natural resources - including over 40% of the world's tropical forests and 20% of the planet's fresh-water supply. The Amazon is often described as the "lungs of the world" - for good reason. But the lungs are collapsing as a result of man-made fires and runaway deforestation. With more than 210 million citizens, Brazil also has an impressive stock of human resources. But it is also convulsed by breathtaking inequality and grinding poverty. Complicating matters, we are facing a crisis of political leadership and shirking our international responsibilities. What happens next in Brazil has far-reaching consequences for global survival. The decisions adopted by Latin America's largest country - whether in relation to protecting the Amazon, reducing inequality or strengthening multilateral cooperation - will help determine whether this is the world's best century or its last one. The sheer scope of the challenges facing Brazilians can feel overwhelming. Without a transformative vision and narrative, a renewal of political leadership, and tangible improvement, people feel rudderless and afraid. For the past 20 years, I've been taking the pulse of Brazil. I produce and present a popular television program reaching roughly 30 million Brazilians every week. Most of the time, I travel across the country listening to the inspiring and heartbreaking stories of my countrymen and women. They remind me every day why I need to contribute to building a better Brazil. So here are three challenges that I firmly believe Brazilians can turn into opportunities. Amazon 4.0 Dramatic fires and deforestation in the Amazon made global headlines in 2019. Despite the best efforts of the Brazilian authorities to conceal the problem, the Science Ministry's own satellite data showed that deforestation rates were at the highest levels in two decades. While falling out of the international news cycle, the destruction continues. If deforestation persists at current rates, irreversible die-off could convert the world's largest tropical forests into its largest savannah. This would release up to 140 billion tons of stored carbon into the atmosphere, effectively scuppering efforts to meet the Paris Agreement targets. A radical new paradigm is needed to ensure the sustainable stewardship of Brazil's stunning cultural and biodiversity. It must harness the Amazon's most powerful resource - the 25 million people who live there. For one, there has to be zero tolerance for deforestation and a concerted focus on improving the productivity of areas where forests have already been cut down. Roughly 90% of deforestation in the Amazon is illegal and at least two-thirds of the 80 million hectares of cleared land are under-used, degraded and abandoned. Just as important as sustainable agri-business, the expansion of eco-tourism, investment in biotechnology research and the development of fairly-traded rainforest products. In a survey conducted in August of 2019, the majority of Brazilians thought that the Amazon rainforest was a reason for national pride. At that time, up to 68 percent of respondents in Brazil strongly agreed with the sentence Reducing inequality Deepening social and economic inequality within countries is fundamentally reconfiguring domestic and international politics. In some cases, governments are retreating from multilateral cooperation and reverting to reactionary nationalism and protectionism. These dynamics are apparent in Brazil, among the world's most unequal countries. Although Brazil made important advances in reducing poverty since the 2000s, inequality remained stubbornly high. And in recent years, per capita income plunged and the gap between the rich and poor started rising, wiping out many social gains of the previous three decades. Today, the average monthly income of the wealthiest one per cent is more than 33 times the income of the poorest 50%. Inequality not only hinders economic growth, but it also fuels polarization and populism. Brazil needs to put inequality reduction at the top of the national agenda in 2020. A combination of common-sense interventions are required: ensuring the fairer collection of taxes, reducing subsidies for the wealthy, rolling-out more equal opportunity policies, and stimulating opportunities for the most vulnerable. Most important of all is dramatically improving the quality of basic public education, especially early childhood schooling. Brazil's education system is failing poorer families. Wealth inequality is reinforcing inequality of opportunity for the next generation. To win the war on inequality, Brazil needs an inclusive growth strategy, one that is not limited to growing income and smart deregulation but also ensures that quality public services delivering security, education, health, sanitation and transportation reach all citizens, not just those who pay a premium for them. Restoring leadership After years of corruption and stagnation, Brazil is suffering from sharp societal divisions and simmering tensions. In 2013, well before the street protests that flared up in Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Ecuador, Brazil experienced the largest demonstrations since the restoration of democracy in 1985. The impeachment of President Dilma in 2016, the unprecedented unpopularity of the Temer administration and the election of far-right Jair Bolsonaro in 2018 revealed the extent of dissatisfaction with the status quo. Bolsonaro was partly elected because the credibility of Brazil's political establishment was demolished by ongoing "Car Wash" investigations into government corruption. Exhausted by scandal and stagnation, Brazilians voted for change. To tackle the big challenges of the next decade, Brazil needs to restore and renew its political leaders from the top to bottom. Accountable, responsible and representative leadership and public service are fundamental to revitalizing the social contract. This won't happen spontaneously. It requires a conscious effort to attract and invest in talent. It also demands that each and every Brazilian gets involved. In 2017, I joined Agora, one of several dynamic civic movements investing in a new generation of leaders committed to a more inclusive and sustainable Brazil. And in 2018, I co-founded RenovaBR, attracting over 4,600 submissions from people who'd never been involved in politics for training in governance and ethics. Of the 120 successful applicants, 17 were elected to federal office that year. Brazil is a country of infinite possibility. It has achieved breathtaking gains over the last generation - bringing tens of millions of people out of poverty. But these

improvements were fragile. As we've seen in other parts of the world, when societies and living standards start moving backwards, social protest and unrest are not far behind. This is dangerous. Irresponsible leaders can take advantage of the fear and uncertainty that result. But we can also fight back. We will start rewriting the Brazilian story in 2020, first by acknowledging our most intractable problems and then by leveraging our tremendous creativity, scientific prowess and expertise. This means stepping out of our comfort zones. Powered by civic and social entrepreneurs from across the political spectrum, we can rebuild a positive vision for the future in Brazil.

On case

Even if there is miscalc, no one would escalate – official statements prove

Colby 16 (Elbridge, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, “From Sanctuary to Battlefield: A Framework for a U.S. Defense and Deterrence Strategy for Space”)SLAIR

But such a threat is of substantially decreasing credibility. In today's much different context, no one really believes that a limited space attack would necessarily or even plausibly be a prelude to total nuclear war. Would the United States respond with a major strategic strike if China or Russia, in the context of a regional conflict with the United States, struck discriminately at implicated U.S. space assets in the attempt to defang U.S. power projection, all while leaving the broader U.S. space architecture alone? Not only does such a massive response seem unlikely – it would be positively foolish and irresponsible. Furthermore, would other nations regard attacks on assets the United States was actively employing for a local war as off limits to attack? Indeed, any reasonable observer would have to judge that such discriminate attacks on U.S. space assets would not necessarily be illegitimate, as, by the United States' own admission, it relies greatly on its space architecture for conventional power projection. Moreover, official U.S. statements on how the United States would respond to attacks on its space assets – to the limited extent such statements exist and the degree to which those given are clear – offer no indication it would respond massively to such strikes.⁵³ Perhaps more to the point, senior responsible U.S. officials have telegraphed that the United States would indeed not necessarily respond massively to attacks against its space assets.⁵⁴ In light of these factors, any U.S. space deterrence strategy that is predicated on an all-or-nothing retaliation to space attacks will become increasingly incredible and thus decreasingly effective – and indeed might even invite an adversary's challenge in order to puncture or degrade U.S. credibility. In other words, since space assets can increasingly be attacked segmentally and discriminately rather than totally, this means that credibly and effectively deterring such attacks requires a less than total response. Since the threat is more like a rapier than a broadsword, the United States needs rapier-like ripostes of its own. Accordingly, the United States Any U.S. space deterrence strategy that is predicated on an all-or-nothing retaliation to space attacks will become increasingly incredible and thus decreasingly effective. needs a more discriminate deterrent for space. In particular, it needs a flexible deterrent capable of meeting the intensifying challenge of deterring an adversary – and particularly a highly capable potential opponent like China or Russia – from attacking (or attacking to a sufficient degree) those U.S. space assets needed for the United States to effectively and decisively project power and ultimately prevail in a conflict in a distant theater. At the same time, this flexible deterrent must contribute to dissuading such an enemy from striking at the nation's broader military and civilian space architecture, and in particular those core strategic space assets needed for central deterrence.