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#### The current formation of labor law is rooted in colonial and class violence. This makes it impossible for these laws to ever be sustainable because they are haunted by specters of the past

Ronconi 15[Lucas Ronconi, 11-30-2015, "Colonial history affects labor regulations," World Bank Blogs, https://blogs.worldbank.org/jobs/colonial-history-affects-labor-regulations]/ISEE

Enforcement matters: Going beyond the letter of the law When looking at labor regulation, what is important is effective regulation. That is, the combination of both de jure regulations and their enforcement. For example, labor demand depends not only on the letter of the labor code but also on the probability of being caught - and the expected fine in case of noncompliance. Most work, however, has generally focused on the letter of the labor code. This is due to a lack of enforcement data. But how can we credibly estimate the effects of labor regulation if we only consider the letter of the law, ignoring the possibility that enforcement may be weaker in those places where the regulation is more stringent? This is not a purely hypothetical question. Noncompliance with labor regulations is pervasive in less developed countries, and at the same time, those countries tend to have the most stringent laws. In a recent paper, I compiled data on labor inspection resources, activities and fines for almost every country in the world. Interestingly, the results show that countries that have the most protective labor codes tend to enforce less, and the negative relationship remains after taking into consideration differences in GDP per capita. For example, the letter of the labor law in Venezuela and Angola is quite protective, but enforcement and compliance are very low. The opposite occurs in Canada or New Zealand. A colonial origin hypothesis of effective labor regulation Why do a large number of countries have quite protective labor codes but very low levels of enforcement? Why do they choose that combination? If there is a dislike for private market outcomes, they should not only have stringent laws but also enforce them. I argue that this apparent paradox can be explained by considering the long-lasting effects of European colonization strategies and the actual distribution of enforcement across firm size. Let me explain. As shown by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and other economic historians, in those territories where the Europeans pursued an extractive strategy, they created an economy characterized by monopolies and the exploitation of labor. This situation led to social unrest, and ultimately to the introduction of stringent labor laws in an attempt to buy social peace. In Latin America, those reforms typically occurred a century after the countries gained independence. In Africa they were usually introduced at the end of the colonial period. But because the rent was focused in a few privileged firms and sectors, and because those who had the capacity to mobilize also worked there, the labor laws only applied in those sectors. Enforcing such a complex labor code on small production units was both unfeasible and economically disruptive. In North America and Oceania, on the other hand, Europeans were more interested in developing places where they, and their descendants, could live. They created more competitive markets, which led to higher wages, a smaller imbalance between capital and labor, less social unrest and demand for redistribution. Furthermore, more competitive markets produce more pressure on the government towards ensuring high levels of compliance across all firms to avoid unfair competition. In those countries where the Europeans pursued an extractive strategy as opposed to former settler colonies, we see more protective labor codes, lower overall enforcement, and different levels of enforcement between larger and smaller firms.

#### Right to strike serves an example of this haunting – making laws in the name of “employer security” rather that what is best

Mishel 20 [Lawrence Mishel,, 11-18-2020, "Explaining the erosion of private-sector unions: How corporate practices and legal changes have undercut the ability of workers to organize and bargain," Economic Policy Institute, https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/private-sector-unions-corporate-legal-erosion/]/ISEE

An increasing volume of research demonstrates that erosion of worker bargaining power and collective bargaining have led to wage suppression and the deterioration of labor’s share of income. At the same time, bold and robust policy proposals to strengthen workers’ bargaining power have risen to a new level of priority for the center-left. President-elect Joe Biden has produced an extensive proposal to strengthen workers’ ability to form unions, and a comprehensive reform of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives. Unequal Power Part of the Unequal Power project, an EPI initiative to reestablish the understanding in law, politics, economics, and philosophy, that equal bargaining power between workers and employers does not exist. Recognizing this inherent workplace inequality will bolster freedom, economic fairness, workplace protections and democracy. A full appreciation of the need for comprehensive labor law reform requires an understanding of the serious shortcomings in current law and how they have been exploited over the years by employers resisting efforts by their workers to form unions. Structural weaknesses in the law, exacerbated by anti-union amendments to the NLRA in 1947 and aided by a series of rulings by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and courts, have allowed employers to interfere in and defeat efforts by their workers to organize unions and to face no real consequences for doing so. The full effect of these trends can be seen by analyzing how dramatically new unionization fell in the 1970s—a trajectory from which the labor movement has never recovered. This paper explains what happened to private-sector unionization in the 1970s by examining data on union elections and workers’ ability to achieve an initial collective bargaining agreement. After showing that a dramatically smaller percentage of workers have been successful at forming a union and winning a first contract, the paper examines the changes in employer anti-union behavior that contributed to this result. Among its key findings, the paper shows that in the 1950s and 1960s more than 1% of those employed participated in an NLRA election each year. In the 1970s that share fell to 0.78% and in the 1980s to 0.29%. In addition, workers began to lose elections at a higher rate in the 1970s in the face of increased employer resistance. In the 1940s, workers won a union in 80 percent of NLRB representation elections, but by 1977 workers were losing more than half of these elections. And, while 86% of workers who chose a union were able to win a first contract in the 1950s, that share declined to less than 70% in the 1970s. By the 1990s, it was down to 56%. Putting these three pieces together—participation in elections, successful elections, and winning a first contract—we show that while 0.46% of the workforce was able to make it across the unionizing finish line in the 1966–1968 period, only 0.17% of the workforce was able to do so by 1978–1980. In addition, by the 1970s employers were charged with committing significantly more unfair labor practices (ULPs), such as firing union activists during organizing campaigns. ULP charges against employers rose sevenfold between 1950 and 1980. Starting in the 1970s, employers also made greater use of the “free speech” rights included in the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947, holding mandatory “captive audience” meetings to voice opposition to unions and make thinly veiled threats about what could happen if workers organized. Employers also began far more extensive use of a growing “union avoidance” industry of consultants. While there were just a handful of anti-union consulting firms in the beginning of the 1970s, by decade’s end there were hundreds, and a management consultant told Congress in the late 1970s that his industry had grown tenfold over the preceding decade. Employers were able to defeat unions so effectively because, over the years, labor law had become heavily tilted against workers and toward employers. Though these employer-friendly laws were on the books in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, it was not until the 1970s that employers began to take full advantage of their power. Several key sources set the stage for this 1970s unraveling of workers’ bargaining power under the law. First, a Republican Congress largely neutered workers’ leverage in passing the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act over President Truman’s veto. Second, Taft-Hartley forced the NLRB to prioritize litigation against unions for engaging in so-called secondary activity over all other cases, including cases involving illegal firings of union supporters. Third, the law’s ineffective remedies became obvious, and the NLRB’s efforts to hold employers accountable for violating the law were stymied in the courts. Fourth, employers increasingly found an ally in the U.S. Supreme Court, which issued a series of decisions restricting workers’ rights and limiting employers’ bargaining obligations. Finally, employers started making greater use of replacement workers during strikes—a trend that grew in the 1970s and 1980s and significantly undermined workers’ right to strike. The cumulative impact of these factors meant that by the 1970s the law did not effectively protect workers’ bargaining power and gave employers a wealth of tools to resist unionization. Legislative efforts to strengthen the law in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s were thwarted by an organized and united business community that stepped up to vigorously oppose and, through a filibuster by a minority of senators, defeat all attempts at legislative reform. By telling the story through statistics, labor history, and the law about the various factors that resulted in the decline of unionization, this paper provides a more accurate accounting of the decline of unionization than do the frequent assertions of globalization or automation as the driving forces. Our empirical assessment of the role of globalization and automation focuses on the impact of the shrinkage on manufacturing employment. We provide detailed statistical analyses showing that at most one-fifth of the decline is due to manufacturing’s erosion, and provide evidence of the severe declines in union coverage in nonmanufacturing sectors (e.g., utilities, transportation, construction, mining, and communications) and in many nonmanufacturing industries (e.g., grocery stores, bus transportation, newspapers, metal ore mining, and building services). A review of various analyses of wage determination also casts doubt on a dominant role of automation and globalization on private-sector union decline. Last, an examination of international comparisons of union erosion also confirms a minor role for manufacturing decline, finding that the pace, intensity, and timing of union decline does not correspond to manufacturing’s decline. Survey research confirms that working people want unions: Recent polling shows that nearly half of nonunion workers would vote to have union representation if given an opportunity to do so on their current job. Labor law has not kept pace with workers’ interests and needs and provides a classic example of “policy drift,” the failure to update the law to reflect changing external circumstances, with the result that and the outcomes of the policy start to shift. Labor law’s support for workers’ ability to pursue union organizing and collective bargaining has declined over many decades, and efforts to remedy this drift have been blocked by a minority of senators despite majority support in both houses of Congress and presidential support for reform. As policymakers and others concerned about the erosion of workers’ bargaining power and its impacts on today’s workforce debate measures to strengthen the ability of workers to organize, the background information and analysis in this paper should be of assistance in understanding the shortcomings in current law that need to be addressed if workers are to truly have the freedom to form and join unions.

#### Embracing these specters is key to solve for nationalist and authoritarian violence – anything other method justifies erasing all traces that disturb the self-enclosure of the present and turns all impacts.

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It often appears that a prolonged conflict unsettles the present. Although this is psychologically true,44 politically it is mostly the other way round. According to Derrida, ‘‘every authoritarian regime wants to eternalize its present in order to rule out the possibility of its future disintegration and to erase the barbarity from which it sprang. Such regimes fear ghosts.’’45 Settlers — such as the Turkish settlers in the occupied part of Cyprus46 — have been used by their authorities as a means to an end (against Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative, of course): to effect and consolidate demographic alterations that will erase the past relation of space and rightful (co)habitation. Settlement as a crime against humanity according to international law and settlement as arrangement of situations for purposes of realpolitik create a new, modern space that is disconnected from the past and hostile to a just future. The new ontology of space is haunted only by the memory of those who are in a position to know how the landscape once appeared. If the ‘‘present is unsettled no less by the return of the past than by the imminence of the future,’’47 then educational theory must defend a qualified preservation of memories and a preparation for the revival of unsettling futurity. ‘‘The founders of Israel spoke of making ‘facts on the ground.’ This term refers to shaping material reality in ways that institutionalize and make solid that which is, in fact, a recent innovation’’ (CD, 159). As facts on the ground, authoritarian strategies settle the present and block the advent of a desirable future perhaps far more than the emotional effects of any direct, personal loss (raising barriers to reconciliation) could ever do. ‘‘To reassure and perpetuate themselves, [authoritarian regimes] efface any spectral traces that threaten to disturb the self-enclosure of the present.’’48 As Saltman writes, ‘‘Israel eradicated Palestinian towns, removing all traces, all physical markers from which public memory of the history of the place could be conjured, invoked or referenced’’ (CD, 159). Such material production of faits accomplis creates ‘‘institutional and public memory while also working to conceal that which was there before. The longer it takes to rebuild schools and communities in New Orleans, the more powerful that wreckage becomes as new facts on the ground’’ (CD, 160). In turn, ‘‘the longer [created realities] become facts on the ground, the harder it becomes to remember what was there before’’ (CD, 160). This gives a new meaning to the Greek-Cypriot educational slogan ‘‘I do not forget and I struggle’’ that Zembylas unequivocally disparages as nationalism, pure and simple (PTE, 7). The educational demand for memory and for struggle to reclaim the rights that have been denied cannot be sweepingly dismissed without significant loss of commitment to international justice.

#### Oppressive regimes kill millions of people; preventing them should come first

Sebastian Farquhar 17, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

During the twentieth century, citizens of several nations lived for a time under extremely brutal and oppressive regimes.47 Between them, these states killed more than one hundred million people, and sought total control over their citizens. Previous totalitarian states have not been particularly durable chiefly due to the problem of ensuring orderly transition between leaders, and to external competition from other more liberal and successful states. However, there is a non-negligible chance that the world will come to be dominated by one or a handful of totalitarian states. If this were to happen, external competition would no longer threaten the durability of such states to the same extent.

Moreover, improvements in certain forms of technology may make it easier for totalitarian states to maintain control, for example by making surveillance much easier. Global totalitarianism could **exacerbate other existential risks** by reducing the quality of governance. In addition, a long future under a particularly brutal global totalitarian state could arguably **be worse than complete extinction**.

#### Thus I affirm A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike as a ghostly revolutionary tatic.

Eisner 15 [Eisner, Oriel 2015 (M.A., Comparative Literature) “History and Politics in the Work of Jacques Derrida” <https://scholar.colorado.edu/downloads/zk51vg99n>]/ISEE

In “Critique of Violence” Benjamin analyzes and discusses various types of political violence and how they function. One of the key examples Benjamin refers to in his discussion is the right to strike which Derrida argues introduces a thematization of history that is selflegitimating and ignorant of an indecipherability. Benjamin writes that the right to strike is “probably the only” instance of the law sanctioning the use of violence, and therefore it can become an internal resistance to the system of law because it leads the law into a contradiction. This occurs in the 'revolutionary general strike' where “the law meets the strikers, as perpetrators of violence, with violence” (CV 240). Benjamin writes that this comes about due to a difference of interpretation in which the strikers “will always appeal to [their] right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse (since the right was not 'so intended')” (CV 239). This abuse occurs because the state grants the right to strike as a form of non-violent escape from violence committed by an employer, but the strike is more than mere escape and it expresses certain demands. As Benjamin writes, “the moment of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion...if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain circumstances” (CV 239). Shortly thereafter he adds, “understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor...the right to use force in attaining certain ends” (CV 239). The strike is therefore a tool meant to change the current circumstances by force or violence. The state interprets this as an abuse once the strike becomes a general strike. Not only is the strike not non-violent or escapist once understood in this way, but in becoming a general strike it directs that force toward the state rather than toward a specific employer and therefore seeks to use force through extortion against the state; which the state refuses to accept. The state therefore comes into contradiction with itself in responding with violence because it is attempting to resist the force which it has declared to be a right and is therefore resisting its own laws. This brings about an internal contradiction in the law. Derrida writes that it is only an internal contradiction which makes a critique3 of violence possible; what he refers to as “an interpretative and meaningful evaluation of it” (FL 989). The violence of the state and the violence of the strike would not be comprehensible or interpretable if they did not occur within the limits of the law and thus the limits of understanding (decipherability); the terms of decipherability grant interpretation and evaluation. Derrida continues that, since it is internal to law, “this violence thus belongs in advance to the order of a droit (law) that remains to be transformed or founded” (FL 989). The general strike seeks to change the current circumstances of the state and its laws and is thus a part of a revolutionary discourse which seeks to change (or abolish) the state. It disrupts the law in order to found a new law. Derrida argues that the newfound law which will be founded will absolve the initial strike of its violence. He writes that “this law to come will in return legitimate, retrospectively, the violence that may offend the sense of justice, its future anterior already justifies it” (FL 991). The law which the revolution founds will serve to justify and legitimate the revolutionary act. The discourse of revolution therefore functions upon a system of retroactive justification which creates a hermeneutic circle (Derrida's term) between the present moment (the strike) and the future it will bring about; the new law which the strike will create will legitimize and justify the initial violent activity of the strike. Since it is internal to the law the strike is generally interpretable, and as revolutionary it partakes in a circular system of interpretation and legitimation. The coherency of the revolutionary general strike entails an interpretability of the strike and the revolutionary moment. However Derrida argues that the revolutionary moment is unintelligible and indecipherable. Even though it occurs from within the existing system it is a moment which suspends that system thereby disrupting the interpretable system. As Derrida writes, “This moment of suspense, this épokhè, this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law” (FL 991). The revolutionary moment is thus a gap between the event of the general strike and what comes after it. It is a suspended moment and what follows (either the founding of a new law or its dismantling) has not yet arrived. Derrida writes that the suspended revolutionary moment is a pure performative and “the supposed subject of this pure performative would no longer be before the law, or rather he would be before a law not yet determined, before the law as before a law not yet existing, a law yet to come” (FL 993). This subject differs from the subject of Benjamin's general strike in that it does not find legitimation in its future anterior, in the changed reality it will bring about; its future has not yet arrived and therefore has no significatory influence over the present. The future—once it arrives—will produce intelligibility or interpretability but this interpretability does not exist within the revolutionary moment (in fact, there is no within of the revolutionary moment; for Derrida it has always already passed). The interpretation yet to arrive exposes an “extraordinary paradox” of law which further complicates the coherent narrative of revolution read in Benjamin. The future interpretation must arrive in order to establish law, and yet, according to Derrida, the law will always exceed that future interpretation. This excess occurs because the law only exists if it is established by a performative act and it must therefore always be established in every moment5 . As Derrida writes, “The law is transcendent and theological, and so always to come, always promised, because it is immanent, finite and so already past” (FL 993). The law is produced by human creation yet the instance of that creation does not last and the law must be re-created in the future. Under legal systems this re-creation entails a confirmation of what is precedent, however this necessity of continual establishment also makes it so that the law can always be contested. Hence the significance of the revolutionary moment. The revolutionary moment suspends and contests the current system of law and authority, or said differently, the/an indecipherable moment disrupts or contests the current system, which opens the current law toward its future to come.

#### The aff is spectrality – only a critical interrogation of the present and the past as singular, totalizing, and complete can prevent the obstruction of possibility.

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One way of addressing the past and its representations is through the concept of the specter. In Specters of Marx, a book that initiates the perceived ‘‘ethical turn’’ in his work, Derrida argued that any rethinking of the past and any possibility of a just future depends on whether we can ‘‘learn to live with ghosts’’ (SM, xviii), the specters of the past, particularly the ghosts of victims of atrocities. The spectral is what haunts and returns in a society because the ghosts have unfinished business, something that needs to be corrected. However, the resolution of this unfinished business is not to abolish the specters — for example, through (uncritical) spectacle pedagogies — because, as Derrida warned, this would amount to eliminating the possibility of a different future.32 In addressing the issue of spectrality, Derrida introduced the term hauntology — a near homophone of ‘‘ontology’’ in French — to interrogate and replace the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost. Unlike ontology, which is fixed to the present and to what is representable (the traditional Western ontological and epistemological position), hauntology draws attention to specters that are neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive.33 Hauntology, then, occupies a peculiar ‘‘in-between’’ space that ‘‘reclaims the unspoken and neglected.’’34 For Derrida, specters are both ‘‘revenants’’ and ‘‘arrivants’’ (SM, xix), that is, spirits that come back and spirits that are to come, respectively; both of these temporal dimensions, as Ross Benjamin and Heesok Chang observe, are essential to spectrality.35 ‘‘Spectrality,’’ Fredric Jameson explains in his reaction to Derrida’s book, does not involve the conviction that ghosts exist or that the past (and maybe even the future they offer to prophesy) is still very much alive and at work, within the living present: all it says, if it can be thought to speak, is that the living present is scarcely as self-sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its destiny and solidity, which might under exceptional circumstances betray us.36 Spectrality denotes what is no longer or not yet living, which is not something present or absent, but something that is possibly everywhere, ‘‘bear[ing] traces of a lingering past and hover[ing] in suspense of an unforeseeable future.’’37 Being neither fully present nor fully absent, ghosts do not have an ontological status, but rather exceed all ontological oppositions between presence and absence, visible and invisible, living and dead.38 The concept of the spectral, then, has much to do with the concept of ‘‘trace’’ and thus time is always already spectral;39 in this sense, hauntology abolishes the concept of linear time as an ontological category of historical understanding. A society that has experienced disappearances — such as Argentina or Cyprus, for example — must come to terms with the specters of the disappeared, the traces left by them in the stories and images that are circulated, the societal habits of remembering and forgetting that are no longer noticed, and the public or private rituals that still take place to recognize the victims. The disappeared are ghosts whose stories and images reach from memory and absence; this is to say that ‘‘disappearance’’ as such — as a particular form of relationality between individuals within a society — reaches from a place and time that was and is no longer and records, recalls, and reinscribes remembrance in the aporetic of memory.40 A commonsense yet ideological response to the ghosts of the disappeared, as noted earlier, is a desire to remember and simultaneously a wish to ontologize the ghosts of the disappeared by categorizing them within what is representable — an action that aims at abolishing or reducing them to spectacles. Derrida argued, however, that a society can come to terms with specters without abolishing or reducing them to a spectacle, that is, to a kind of ontology. As he explained in a paragraph that concerns schools and educators in particular, The last one to whom a specter can appear, address itself, or pay attention is a spectator as such. At the theater or at school. The reasons for this are essential. As theoreticians or witnesses, spectators, observers, and intellectuals, scholars believe that looking is sufficient. Therefore, they are not always in the most competent position to do what is necessary: speak to the specter. (SM, 11) To come to terms with the specters of the past, there needs to be an engagement with the past that is not reduced to its totalizing representation and that does not fall into the delusion of a timeless understanding that is ever present. Derrida called on us to speak and listen to the specter not because the specter will reveal some kind of a secret; rather, speaking with and listening to the specter may open us to the experience of unknowing that underlies a productive engagement and a turning away from that which is supposedly determined content to be uncovered by representational practices.41 The ghost of the disappeared, then, pushes at the boundaries of language, thought, and emotion to open new possibilities for the future, possibilities that do not reduce the ghost’s ethical injunction to an object of knowledge.42 The specter signifies, therefore, a critical interrogation of the present and the past as singular, totalizing, and complete; the specter reminds us that the past is incomplete because there are always elusive remnants that cannot be articulated in the languages available to us. This is why it is suggested, for example, that commemorative or justice projects that rely too heavily on epistemological accounts or seek merely redemption become too totalizing to be open to the view that specters can be anything other than obscure forms of representation. Finally, it is important to point out how Derrida linked the specter to the theme of justice and advocated a politics of memory and responsibility that is directed not only to the living, but also to the dead and to the not yet born: No justice ... seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism. (SM, xix) Derrida chose, as noted earlier, to speak about ghosts in the name of justice because, he observed, ‘‘one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say ‘this is just’ and even less ‘I am just,’ without immediately betraying justice.’’43 Since justice entails ‘‘an experience of the impossible’’ and thus is aporetic — because it is implicated with law, although it cannot be reduced to it44 — spectrality becomes valuable in determining how to address justice demands. It is in this spectral sense that justice is the ‘‘experience of absolute alterity,’’45 an openness toward a radical otherness, to ‘‘the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice’’ (SM, 28). The specter’s ethical injunction is that we remain open to the radical otherness of the arrivant as arrivant, what remains to come — for example, a ‘‘democracy to come,’’ ‘‘hospitality without reserve,’’ and ‘‘alterity that cannot be anticipated’’ (SM, 65–66). As Derrida pointed out, ‘‘without this experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on both justice and the event’’ (SM, 65) — that is, the event to come. The responsibility of the haunted is this, then: to be open to justice as unrepresentable, as always to come, as a trace of directionality rather than as a fixed destination.46 Hence justice for disappeared victims, for example, is not a calculable and distributive justice that ends with trials and punishments but an agonistic justice that contests legalistic settlements. In this sense, justice is a critical force that helps to articulate an alternative vision that is motivated by the infinite obligation to the other — in this case, the ghost of a disappeared victim who cannot be assessed by a finite set of qualities, representations, or legal arguments.

#### The role of the ballot is to frontline reconciling with the past and the present

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**The task** here, then**, is to trace the political effects of haunting** and hauntings**, and acknowledge that** there may be **some bodies** and some ghosts that **are unknowable,** but that **this is** itself **a hauntological status with** political **significance and disrupts the** previously **accepted order of knowledge.** It is **an ethical practice** undertakenhere**: to find ghosts without rendering them visible** and knowable **within a logic that replicates the subjugation and marginalization** of specters and the construction of certain lives and bodies as ungrievable. Why Bodies? Bodies are not themselves exclusive from ghosts. As Kas Saghafi writes, ‘a “ghost” is a spectral apparition, a magic appearance. Yet, it is a body—the most abstract of bodies. It is a becoming-body, a prosthetic body, an artifactual body, a body without body, a spectral body. **This phantomatic body,** animproperbody **without property or flesh, has the most intangible tangibility.**’85 Derrida’s own work on spectrality similarly gestures to a focus on the body. He states, ‘for there to be a ghost, there must be a return to the body, but to a body that is more abstract than ever. The spectrogenic process corresponds therefore to a paradoxical incorporation.’86 Here we begin to see the role of corporeality in spectrality, the importance of the ‘corps’ in Derrida’s gesturing to ‘incorporation.’ In this sense, understanding corporeality, or a focus on bodies in memorialization, can help us understanding the logic of haunting. **A focus on bodies has** perhaps **come to the attention of scholars** ofpolitics through the work of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Giorgio Agamben, largely centered on the emergence of the concept of biopolitics. Agamben explores the centrality of the body in modern political thought through **the idea that democracy has come to be** considered **the presentation of the body**: hence the term ‘habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, “you will have to have a body to show”’.87 Corpus, he says, is **the bearer** both **of individual liberties and the ultimate subject of sovereign power.**88 This is also why we see the centrality of the body in philosophy and science of the Baroque age. He reads the emergence of the body in Leviathan through Hobbes’s distinction between man’s natural body and his political body: ‘the great metaphor of the Leviathan, whose body is formed out of all the bodies of individuals, must be read in this light. The absolute capacity of the subjects’ bodies to be killed forms the new political body of the West.’89 Foucault similarly has discussed the way in which the emergence of biopolitical technologies have placed the body at the center of political life, focused on ensuring the spatial distribution of individual bodies through separation, alignment, serialization, and surveillance.90 Foucault is one of the most influential thinkers in terms of theorizing how sovereign power acts on bodies, particularly in the form of disciplinary practices. As Foucault states, ‘**the body is** also **directly involved in a political field; power relations** have an immediate hold upon it; they **invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks,** to perform ceremonies, to emit signs.’91 Foucault emphasizes the importance of techniques of visibility in control over bodies, including his key theorization of the panopticon. One of the key features of this project as a whole will be in exploring the politics of visibility: what it might mean to display certain bodies in certain contexts and not others, why some spaces are rendered invisible and others hyper-visible. Monica Casper and Lisa Moore also emphasize the importance of visibility when it comes to bodies, arguing that not all bodies are equally visible. Some bodies are hyperexposed and magnified, others hidden or missing.92 Judith Butler has similarly focused on the body, specifically in terms of the relationships between gender and sex and bodies. She acknowledges that the body is material. But it is how some bodies and parts of bodies come to matter that renders bodies a focal point of an analysis based on social construction.93 As Lauren Wilcox characterizes Butler’s perspective: ‘the materialization of bodies is theorized as a product of discursive practices of gender, rather than gender being a social formation that is applied to pre-existing sexed bodies.’94 What she gestures at here is that while we can view bodies as material, this materiality is in fact produced by discourse in an iterative performative process. Bodies matter not simply because things happen to them, but also because they are themselves coconstitutive of the discourses within which they circulate. Like Butler, Casper and Moore argue that bodies are material entities, but ‘our interpretations and explanations of bodily processes give meaning to their materiality.’95 Butler thus explores the materialization of bodies, and how this is productive of a ‘domain of abjected bodies’ which sustains the normalization of other bodies. This articulation of bodies is productive of norms that qualify some bodies as ‘bodies that matter, ways of living that count as ‘life,’ lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving.’96 It bears exploring here why political inscription on the body is so important for understanding the politics of memory in the instances I explore, and how this relates to the field of international relations. Why the body? Why dead bodies? ‘Dead Bodies have enjoyed political life the world over’97, and embodied practices have recently come to the attention of scholars of international politics as well. Rosemary Shinko theorizes embodied practices by looking at the body as a surface for resisting power in the framework of autonomy. She theorizes bodily enactments as way to challenge ‘sovereign powers’ efforts to render certain forms of suffering invisible, meaningless and not worth troubling over’.98 She critiques the way in which International Relations has failed to theorize the body, specifically in ignoring the relational autonomy of bodies. By paying attention to relational autonomy, we can look at both the physiological materiality of bodies and the discursive materiality of bodies. Her emphasis on the way in which power is both inscribed on bodies, yet bodies can also offer resistance to power, emphasizes the way in which the body is not a fixed referent, but rather is both shaped by and shapes discourses of power and materiality.99 Lauren Wilcox identifies the body as the constituent outside to International Relations, in that it is not explicitly theorized yet it at the same time functions to define the parameters of the discipline in the sense that excluding the body from our theorizations maintains the status quo operations of international relations.100 She similarly explores the role of the body in international relations in a variety of contexts, including the force-feeding of prisoners at Guantanamo as a literal instantiation of a biopolitical ‘make live’ exercise of power. As she argues, ‘the production of bodies by regimes of sovereign/discipline/governmentality are never total—there may be no outside of power, but bodies are also capable of exceeding their production.’101 In this way, Wilcox emphasizes the way in which bodies are not simply to be considered as sites for political inscription of sovereign power; they are not simply victims of power, rather we can theorize bodily resistance and bodies as resistance as well. Anna Agathangelou has also explored the role of bodies in terms of the war in Iraq. She argues that liberal theory presupposes that the West is the subject of reason and those outside are considered to be mere corporeality.102 The strategy in Iraq was thus to decapitate the head while leaving the body in place. She focuses on the ways certain bodies are deemed structurally impossible and ontologically dead in order to sustain a certain (re)construction of the liberal order focused on these racial and gendered corporeal reconstructions. By doing so, she offers a framework for considering marginalized bodies through this notion of ontological death, those bodies that are not biologically dead but do not count as politically viable lives. I argue that by using the framework of hauntology we can start to consider the politics of visibility that render the ontologically dead as such. Renee Marlin-Bennett, Marieke Wilson, and Jason Walton specifically discuss the role of dead bodies by exploring commodified bodies and the politics of display.103 They explore the exhibition of plasticized human cadavers in museums for educational purposes, arguing that in these exhibits, dead bodies are being depoliticized and commodified in a morally troubling way. Though regulations exist for dead bodies and body parts, plasticized bodies are couched in discourses of specimens rather than human beings. The spectacle of their display in often provocative positions invokes scientific authority to legitimate a specific representation of these bodies which silences and depoliticizes their histories. Spectators walk through scenes in which the plasticized bodies enact a particular moral economy which is only possible with the base assumption that they are no longer considered to be human. Viewers are instructed not to engage emotionally with the bodies, and this, coupled with the disbelief that what is being exhibited is actually a human body, creates a cognitive dissonance which is coopted by the exhibit to condone objectification of things whose difference we cannot understand.104 Their analysis of the objectification and commodification of corpses gestures to the political importance governance of bodies, even dead ones, has in the contemporary biopolitical era. My project takes this basis as a starting point, and draws on this notion of a politics of display to look at bodies displayed for the purposes of memorialization rather than science or education. **All** of these international relations **scholars demonstrate in various ways and contexts the role bodies play** both **in being inscribed with sovereign power and in acting as resistance.** But they also all share the sentiment that the body is an under-theorized part of international politics and should be brought in to explore how power works. In short, bodies matter! Indeed, as Casper and Moore argue, ‘we live in an age of proliferating human bodies…bodies are made visible and seen…via a range of globalized practices.’105 They explore the emergence of globalized technologies such as MRIs and sonograms which render bodies both enhanced and amplified. But there are also ways in which traditional bodily and embodied practices such as death and burial are enhanced in a globalized age, not by emergent technologies, but by existent and emergent political and social practices which render these bodies a complex part of social and political identities and identity practices. This makes sense when we consider that bodies often serve as symbols of political order, where political transformation is symbolized by what is done to bodies, as in the expression ‘cutting off the head of the king’, pomp and circumstance regarding burial and reburial of political leaders, and even the idiom ‘body politic’.106 Dead bodies themselves are significant for politics, especially since as Henry Giroux lays out, ‘cadavers have a way of insinuating themselves on consciousness, demanding answers tto questions that aren’t often asked’.107 The idea here is that what is done with dead bodies is a key part of our identity, whatever that may be. In the case of Rwanda, dignified burial of the corpses of the victims of the genocide becomes essential to memorialization and reconciliation. Rwandan identity becomes dependent on the way they treat these dead bodies: the products of the genocide, and what they do with society: the other product of the genocide. In the case of undocumented immigrants who die crossing the US-Mexico border, their bodies themselves becomes sites of political practices and political contestation. Many believe that their bodies should not be buried on US soil, and thus their bodies themselves become the locus of contestation over the meaning of citizenship. This scenario also results from the increased mobility of bodies in the contemporary age.108 And in the case of 9/11, the disappearance of bodies and the creation of rubble and ruin become key to imagining national identity and concepts of power.

#### Epistemology comes first---their model of debate risks extinction and turns their framing arguments.

Heron 8. Taitu Heron, The Planning Institute of Jamaica. "Globalization, neoliberalism and the exercise of human agency." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 20.1-4 (2008): 85-101.

\*\*\* card edited for gendered language

While hunger and malnutrition haunts the poor, over nutrition imperils the affluent demonstrating the commonality of human misery of different types. The scale of human suffering in an increasingly technologically advanced, well-networked, informed world is made more disturbing by surmounting contempt for the poor and structural biases against women (Coronel and Dixit 2006, p. 17). Globalization and neoliberalism, being twin processes at both ideological and empirical levels, often overlap in terms of policy prescriptions that dominate the development agenda in this twenty-first century. With its emphasis on economic growth, it becomes evident that social development is not being enhanced; rather human dysfunctionality is increasingly more prevalent. The current international policy environment does not appear to recognise the weaknesses in deviating away from a socially oriented development model. As long as this environment is dominated by issues such as free trade, intellectual property rights, financial and capital liberalisation as well as investment protection, and the role of the state is continually relegated to the guardian of law and order in the midst of a socially hostile policy environment, there is great risk. A range of possibilities for resisting these changes exist and not all positive. This may take the form of social implosion or social explosion with increasing use of force as a method of solving problems. The implosion or explosion may be acted out against the state, whether directly or indirectly through sabotage. Alternatively, possibilities exist for the opening up of spaces for dialogue and transformative change. It will remain a risk as long as the neoliberal response to resistance to globalization is dismissive of inequalities and clamps down on law, order and civil liberties as an expression of power and control of the status quo. This dismissive approach toward humanity harbours resentment and promotes the resort to desperate measures and may not be sustainable or positive for any one. Human agency therefore, is expressed through the interactions which are fundamentally constructed through social and cultural structures and power relations; each comes with their own position, and is implicated by patterns of power predicated on structures of global injustice.

Heilbroner (1985, p. 46) argues, that the nature of capitalism will always rest on considerations of power especially where the possibility of wealth maximization resides, there will always be a drive to accumulate more. He argues that “the additional stimulus given to the drive for wealth by its generalization as capital does not supplant its unconscious meanings of personal pre-eminence and social domination but sharpens and intensifies its energies that must be devoted to its protection and to its accumulation” (Heilbroner 1985, p. 58). In this regard, is it pointless to question the use of this kind of agency which at its base is greed, especially if it entails a structural inequality of life conditions? Is it sustainable?

There is a need for the actors, who lead the process of globalization, to recognise and accept responsibility for their dysfunctional acts of agency. The blind transposition of economic, political and cultural structures harms people and affects their own agential capacity to chart their life course. When global actors exercise this kind of dysfunctional agency, be they the analysts at the World Bank and the IMF, officials of the WTO, CEOs of transnational corporations, trade and finance ministers at summits, make decisions to compel a nation to adopt Western economic systems and practices they should bear the responsibility of the outcome of those decisions. More so, high-ranking officials and advisers of the developing world need to question their own agency in agreeing to policies that exacerbating their countries' impoverishment; and their role in limiting the agency of their own populations.

The rhetoric of inevitability and the promise of profit if we leave the market to work its magical wonders, allows proponents to push aside the ethical responsibility for the consequences. The agency is misplaced and driven by greed; indeed the agency is not very humane. What it also indicates is the extent to which the West dominates and leads the process of globalization, the individualism which stands at their cultural core, which marks their manifestation of human agency, works to the detriment of the developing world. It also points to the possibility of excessive dependency on the part of the developing world, and their acts of agency, in certain quarters, where political elites may have the power to do otherwise. While it may be dependency, insofar as, political elites of developing countries cannot foresee any other way of relating to the developed world, we also have to consider greed and the financial benefits that may accrue to politico–economic elites if they sustain the status quo. This agency is distorted and ambivalent, for at the same time, we may also hear cries from some political elites of the developing world of unequal trade relations, and the wretchedness of globalization, and where many of their elites are not really interested in affecting, for the better, the relations of inequality and exploitation internally.

The complexity of exercising human agency also reflects the extent which, regardless the problems of capitalism, many have bought into it as a model. The controlling elites of this process of global capitalist development become more and more exploitative, constantly trying to find people (read: markets and untapped or ‘undertapped’ regions of the world). There is a lack of compassion in the model. Instead of using this as an opportunity to improve the social aspects of capitalism, the agency is being directed to deepen inequalities and relations of domination and exploitation. The dysfunctional forms of how human agency is manifested demonstrate a problem of dealing with the real reality, rather than the ideological one. The willingness of those who adhere to the model to more aggressively seek ways in which to discard life when it is not related to the business of accumulating capital demonstrates the urgency of addressing this absence of spiritual base for living and an absence of universal love for the diversity and value of human life in the capitalist model of development.

The raison d'etre of capitalism is purported to be profit generation and maximization. It is the continuous generation of profits that promotes this euphoric atmosphere often found in neoliberal dogma. From this perspective, there is no other way and is evidence that the regime is fulfilling its mission—namely to organize the world according to the principles and ends for which it exists. Heilbroner (1985, p. 76) succinctly gives the reminder that “profits are for capitalism the functional equivalent of the acquisition of territory or plunder for military regimes, or an increase in the number of believers for religious ones....” Thus while capitalism still functions as an economic system; albeit it's exploitative tendencies, it would be difficult to envision a radical overturning as possible or even practical. The model has been accepted by the exploiters and well as the exploited. But disgruntling will be there because of the absences of social justice, equity and compassion in the model, which, at the level of human development, are basic requirements; one has to have a love for humanity in order to develop it. This is the dilemma that needs to be addressed in capitalism at socio–economic, epistemological and political levels. We will have to reconsider the way in which human agency is exercised, while recognising the complexity of it.

We have to not only look at the outcomes of exercising human agency but also what produced the outcomes both internally and externally and the relationship between the two. Acting out agency is an independent act driven by decision-making capacities. Therefore, while the current international trade and financial system as adopted in most countries is severely limited in terms of opening up new policy spaces, policies are not fixed in stone. Girvan (2000, p. 84) suggests that universalistic neoliberal policies need to be replaced with policies that respect economic and cultural diversity as well as creating policies that seek to reduce social exclusion, marginalization and poverty. We therefore, have to question the ideological framework that gives power to globalisation as a model of development, and weakens and distorts the positive potentiality of human agency. In other words, one has to deconstruct the epistemological conditions that made neoliberalism possible and offer alternatives outside of mainstream thinking. Efforts offered by the World Social Forum and the “What Next Project” by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation are cases in point, where alternative proposals to the hegemonic model of globalization are put forward; and these emphasize equity, social justice structural transformation, self-reliant economic participation and ecological sustainability.3

Invariably an alternative policy environment has to not only question neoliberalism and its rules and terms of engagement, but it also has to deemphasize economic growth and embrace social policies that improve the agential capacity of human beings. Further more, such alternatives has to envision possibilities; ones that seek to make structural transformation of political and economic arrangements within and among states that are more equitable in nature; and most importantly has the political will to move from alternative ideas on development to implementation and social practice. Four core principles to guide policies and programmes for an alternative development are suggested here:

1. Agential capacity—enhancing basic agential capacity as measured by education, health and nutrition. These capabilities are fundamental to human well-being and are the means through which individuals access other forms of well-being. 2. Access to resources and opportunities—enhancing equality and equity in the opportunity to use or apply basic capabilities through economic assets (e.g. land and/ or housing) and resources (e.g. income and employment) as well as political opportunity (representation in parliament etc.). Without these opportunities, both political and economic, neither **~~[~~**~~women nor men] [~~people] will be able to employ their capabilities for their well-being and that of their families. 3. Human security—that is, freedom from violence and the threat of violence and conflict. Violence and conflict result in physical and psychological harm and lessen the ability of individuals, households and communities to fulfill their potential. 4. Rights facilitation—enhancing a basic legislative/judicial and programmatic framework that facilitates the granting of human rights as outlined by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Beijing Plan of Action, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and guided by other rights-based approaches, among others.

A policy or group of policies can be changed, if a country or group of countries want to alter the way in which their society addresses this technological era of capitalist development. It is clear that a new paradigm for development is necessary, one that aims to satisfy or facilitate basic human needs on the basis of independence, intergenerational equity, environmental sustainability, rights facilitation and adequate access to health, education and living conditions—the very things that facilitate the positive expression of human agency. It is not so clear how the transition will occur whether from people participating in social movements or from people within governments, or even a variety of combinations. The very nature of how new paradigms emerge for development transformation is structural, complex and tense as it speaks to the heart of interactions between people and nations and the social relations of power within and the way in which human agency is exercised. However, what is clear is that the neoliberalism and globalization as a model of development is unsustainable. So when “the centre” may no longer hold, the question is what will “the periphery” do?

#### Our offense turns policy making --- Our ontology is key to policymaking because it’s the baseline to the process --- they effect one another

**Sin 14** --- post-doctoral researcher, Centre for Research in Higher Education Policies (Cristina Sin, "The policy object: a different perspective on policy enactment in higher education," Proquest, 2/8/14, https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10734-014-9721-5.pdf)//lyss

Conclusions: relationship between policy, ontology and enactment

Bologna policy recommendations, envisaging convergence rather than harmonisation, act as broad-brush references which allow flexible interpretations and adaptations. The effectiveness of Bologna, construed as a linear policy process, to achieve intended outcomes has been questioned (Amaral et al. 2009; Gornitzka et al. 2005a), especially in light of its steering through soft law. A focus on its discrete elements—the policy objects—and how they are conceptualised and enacted reinforces further the difficulty of convergence. This paper has illustrated the wide variation in the ontology of one specific policy object— the master degree—on account of national and departmental idiosyncrasies, thus adding complexity to the policy process. Identifying absolute references to define the nature of the policy object, or its ‘reification’ (Berger and Luckmann 1967), becomes therefore problematic.

‘Ontology’ has been the term employed to designate what policy actors believe the policy object is and how they conceive of it. Using the post-Bologna master degree as a case in point, the analysis opened insights into the situated nature of ontology, despite common reference points meant to act as guidance for degree design and despite the choice of a convergent discipline. Except similar structural features in which the sampled degrees comply with Bologna guidelines (i.e. second-cycle qualification or credit range), variation in degree ontologies, both between countries and between levels of analysis, has been observed. In addition, learning and teaching regimes (i.e. their tacit assumptions and rules of appropriateness) conceive differently of knowledge codification, transmission and evaluation, suggesting the existence of departmental-level pedagogic ontologies.

The paper suggests that **public policy, ontology and enacted ontology mutually influence each other**. At national/political level, novel understandings shape policies imperatives. New ontologies find expression in new policy. Thus, legislation or recommendations could be seen as enacted ontologies at the national level of analysis. An example in this sense is the recent preoccupation with the change in pedagogic paradigm towards student centred learning in Portugal which has been encoded in the legal requirement that degrees should be described in terms of competences (or learning outcomes). **At institutional level, in turn, policy object ontologies exert influence on the interpretation and accommodation of new policies, hence on enacted ontologies**. Such an example is the continued persistence of the master as the university degree in Denmark. However, public policies as enacted ontology at national level have the power to shift institutional-level ontologies. The new political discourse and the inevitable compliance, even if formal, with regulations can act as catalysts and determinants of new academic practice (Trowler et al. 2012), as has been observed in the Portuguese degrees. The introduction of student-centred methods, although maybe experimental at the beginning, appears to gradually shape a new ontology as regards the pedagogic model to inform the degree’s delivery. That is, academic enactment, or practices, can trigger changes at the level of conceptualisations—so enacted ontology can, in an unusual way, precede ontology. Summing up, while it can be stated that ontology always influences enacted ontology irrespective of analysis level, enacted ontology at the national/political level—in the form of new public policy—can also cause changes in academic enactment, which in turn can influence ontologies at institutional level.

#### Utilitarianism causes genocide.

Santos 3 2003, Boaventura de Souza Santos is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63 , http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

#### The NEG mischaracterizes the root cause of native harms which reproduces the logics of the Empire and silenced histories---Question even their evidence because the Empire’s logic gets reproduced in that too---Hauntology solves settler colonial violence

Top of Form

Dankia Medak-Saltzman ’15 is assistant professor of ethnic studies at the University of Colorado, Boulder. https://doi.org/10.5749/jcritethnstud.1.2.0011 “Specters of Colonialism: Native Peoples, Visual Cultures, and Colonial Projects in the United States and Japan” //lrl

Theories of postcolonial haunting and the trace—although recuperative and valuable to analyzing the experiences and complexities of histories faced by other minoritized groups in North America—provide a perfect example of how the application and utility of popular theoretical frames for examining the experiences of marginalized groups, even in a strictly U.S. context, often does not work when simply extended to the situations faced by Indigenous populations. We cannot simply expect that theoretical frames that are useful in making sense of the experiences of other racialized groups will be equally relevant when applied to Indigenous peoples and contexts. Surely there are cases where this wholesale application works, but it is far more common to see such “inclusion” of Indigeneity as more of an attempt to fit an Indigenous round peg into an all-other-racialized-groups square hole, while avoiding actual engagement with how and why the Indigenous case complicates such theoretical frames. However, the desire to “make” a given theoretical frame “fit” rather than to engage with Indigeneity and all of its attendant complexities represents a settler colonial desire that functions to render the value of, and need for, complex engagement with Indigenous difference inconsequential and irrelevant. This is a line of thinking that relies on the false assumption that Native peoples are simply another minority group in North America—a belief that is not only inaccurate but also serves to blind non-Native peoples to how their presence (even as minoritized groups) on stolen Indigenous territories makes a delicate and complex engagement with questions about collective complicity in the continued dispossession of Indigenous peoples necessary. For this is a complicity that a reckoning with the very fact of that theft, and working toward manifesting the decolonial goals outlined by Indigenous communities and our allies, might go a long way toward addressing. It seems that due, at least in part, to the general recognition of the shameful history of slavery in the United States—a basic level of visibility denied to Native peoples—it has become possible for scholars, historians, and novelists, among others, to employ ghosts and haunting as theoretically compelling and socially empowering tools for historical examination. From Ralph Ellison’s illustration of how that which is hypervisible is also an invisible ghostly presence in Invisible Man to Toni Morrison’s haunted Sethe, who comes face-to-face with the ghost of the daughter she murdered to save her from slavery, this trope is used far beyond these celebrated literary examples, both within and far afield from African American studies. Yet the very nature of haunting has been useful precisely because, as Avery Gordon tells us, “to be haunted is to be tied to historical and social effects,”9 even when, or perhaps especially when, these social effects of the past are dismissed as irrelevant and ahistorical or attributed to bitterness that ought to be “gotten over.” Indeed, the notion of haunting, often appearing as immutable “traces,” has proven a useful device for many groups in North America as they have sought to reveal long-hidden and silenced histories. However, wholesale applications of postcolonial and cultural studies notions of haunting and the trace to the specificity of Native American and Indigenous peoples’ experiences presents a distinct problem: precisely because the “fact” of Native vanishing has become part of a “common-sense” belief that renders Indigenous peoples always already ghostly presences, postcolonial notions of haunting and the trace simply cannot serve as recuperative, or decolonial, strategies for Indigenous peoples. Instead, indiscriminate application of these theories to Indigenous contexts manages to reinforce, rather than dismantle, settler colonial logics that mandate, carry out, and insist upon Indigenous absence. Indian ghosts have been and remain an indelible trope in North American narratives and national mythologies: we see Indigenous “absence” taught in schools, supported by media, and reinforced by statistics that encourage seeing Native peoples and contexts as unworthy of inclusion in studies because our populations are so small. Blaming this absence, neglect, and perceived statistical inconsequence on our small numbers—instead of recognizing the significance of teaching about, reporting on, and including populations that have been intentionally reduced to single-digit percentages of national populations (on our own lands)—shifts responsibility for this continued ignorance away from those who have benefited from settler colonialism and onto the shoulders of the victims and survivors of great violence and invasion. This orchestrated absence and insisted-upon irrelevance is also often unquestioningly reproduced in scholarship—even when the scholarly subject at hand seems to otherwise have little to nothing to do with Indigenous subjects. This pervasive, public, scholarly, and media supported and encouraged manner of thinking about—or more tellingly not thinking about—Native peoples is part of the unseen fabric that binds settler colonial societies together, legitimating the presence of all non-Native peoples on stolen land, whether they arrived by choice or by force. For these reasons, any attempt to simply extend notions of postcolonial haunting to Native peoples is neither empowering nor generative; instead, it further entrenches settler colonial fantasies of Indigenous absence that operate to absolve non-Native peoples, living on stolen Native lands, of this original sin. Therefore, in order to conceive of a theoretically compelling concept of haunting that can better illuminate Indigenous experiences, we must invert the familiar directionality of postcolonial haunting that locates the source of ghostly agency as emanating from the experiential realities of racialized subjects and situates haunting as a consequence of these complicated histories. Indeed, for any theory of haunting to be useful to Indigenous and allied efforts toward decolonization, Indigenous ghosts simply cannot be conceived of as the source of this haunting. Instead, the ghosts that emerge from and haunt settler colonial contexts radiate from their roots in the moral, intellectual, and legal logics developed to legitimate, as necessity, the great violence of empire. Settler colonial societies are haunted by the need to keep these unpalatable truths and their human consequences hidden. This is a feat the ghosts I am describing accomplish by maintaining and reinforcing foundational “truths” and assumptions (e.g., patently false beliefs that Native peoples had no sophisticated forms of governance before the arrival of Europeans) that aid in determining whether, and how, Indigeneity is considered, if it is considered at all. Rendered another way, the logics of empire that haunt settler colonial societies are vestiges of the goals and spirit of colonialism that haunt in order to maintain the foundational narratives of Indigenous absence/inconsequence that justify settler colonial presence on Indigenous lands and manage to absolve guilty consciences in the process. I call these the “specters of colonialism,” and they are as pervasive as they are relentless as they work continually and nearly imperceptibly in their efforts to keep the violence, theft, and logics used to legitimate colonial endeavors neatly hidden from view Naming these haunted logics the specters of colonialism—a turn of phrase that conjures certain European ghosts of its own—as I call attention to the need to focus on, implement, and contribute to critical Indigenous and ethnic studies theory might seem an odd choice. But this continental intellectual genealogy offers a significant and worthwhile means of considering ghostliness and the nature of haunting and their application to Indigenous contexts. Rather than thinking of that which haunts as alternatively tangible, visible, or as spirits that can be sensed but not seen as they affect the living in a variety of ways, there is a less common, but more theoretically compelling, manner of thinking about haunting that can better lend itself to considerations of Indigenous experiences. That is, when what that which haunts is the very spirit of an idea: Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’s claim that a “specter of communism” was haunting Europe and Jacques Derrida’s discussions of the “specters of Marx” are prime examples of this kind of haunting.10 Adding to the challenges that arise when undertaking academic investigations of that which is both there-and-not-there is the fact that it is often difficult, and at times nearly impossible, to draw attention to that which haunts entire societies. This is precisely the point that Derrida is making regarding the specters of Marx when he coins the term hauntology; for the term itself in the original French is a homonym for ontology, literally replacing the study of existence with the study of that which does not exist yet wields considerable influence. These ghostly presences are deep seated and lingering, and they leave indelible traces of themselves that can be read—if we manage to free ourselves from the influence of these specters of colonialism, by learning to see them and resist their influence—to reveal seldom-considered perspectives on the past and present. While Marx and Engels reference ghosts of communism and Derrida the spirit of Marx and the Marxist inheritance, I assert that the specter haunting our world is our colonial inheritance made manifest. I locate the agents, ideologies, practices, and long-lasting effects of colonialism as the sites from which these myriad hauntings emerge, and contend that we are all more influenced by them than we are likely aware. After all, as the specters of colonialism exert their influence in carrying out the goals of the spirit of colonialism, they hold sway over the weight with which Indigeneity and Indigenous concerns are respected, engaged with, and investigated at the same time that they encourage the dismissal of certain questions and the blind acceptance of settler colonial foundational logics. In this way, the specters of colonialism help to justify and promote the very pattern of nonengagement with Indigenous intellectual traditions and Indigenous studies scholarship that this article seeks to trouble.