### OFF 1 - PIC

#### Keeling 2019 (Kara Keeling “Queer Times, Black Futures, “It’s after the End of the World (Don’t You Know That Yet?)”: Afrofuturism and Transindividuation, NYU Press, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv12fw90q.6>)

**Somewhere in the middle** of the 1974 film ***Space Is the Place***, Sun Ra’s band, The Arkestra, begins to play **a tune** called **“It’s after the End of the World**.” **That tune launches forth with a few bars of tentative tones and sounds. Then come lyrics—a refrain sung and shouted in a voice that we recognize today as feminine, if not female, by its quality. Over and again, this voice insists, “It’s after the end of the world. Don’t you know that yet?”**1 This refrain**—“It’s after the end of the world. Don’t you know that yet?”—asserts another temporality and coordinates, which exist within, but are incommensurate with, those taken as the dominant logics of ex- istence of a world (only one) characterized by statistical predictability, control, temporal continuity, and coherence.** **The feminine voice creates a “calming and stabilizing, calm and stable, center in the heart of chaos,” which insists that it is “after the end of the world.” This voice “jumps from chaos to the beginnings of order in chaos and is in dan- ger of breaking apart at any moment.**”2 This refrain opens a marvelous (im)possibility: “the world” does not cohere as such. If it once did, it no longer does. Already, it has ended. Whatever existence “we” can claim, wherever that can be claimed, and however it can be characterized, can- not take the continuity and stability of a world as axiomatic. **Soon after it begins, the refrain in *Space Is the Place*—“It’s after the end of the world. Don’t you know that yet?”—is overtaken by other sounds, another attempt to organize chaos. Perhaps the limited space organized by these sounds is not music but a wall of noise, loud yet fragile. It collapses and . . .**

#### This is an apocalyptic catastrophe. Homelessness is the home for blackness. The 1AC feeds into a logic of closing off access to finding new spaces for black folks to reside. The aff becomes the arbitrer of space banning all new futures from it. This is the abyss. The abyss is the place where blackness and space exist. The middle passage marks the end of the world for blackness.

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. . leaves “us” homeless. **Homelessness is our home**. We carry the abyss that Édouard Glissant characterized so well. For Glissant, the Middle Passage of the transatlantic slave trade and the formation of “the new world” mark an apocalyptic catastrophe. We are forged in its wake. With specific reference to those who can be identified as Caribbean, Glissant explains, “**The abyss is also a projection of and a perspective into the unknown. . . . This is why we stay with poetry . . . We know ourselves as part and as crowd, in an unknown that does not terrify. We cry our cry of poetry. Our boats are open, and we sail them for everyone**.”3 At home in open boats and spaceships launching for the unknown, we hum the refrain, “It’s after the end of the world. Don’t you know that yet?” Home- less at home. We improvise.4

#### Space should offer a unique site of possibility and hope for blackness. It offers a place to set up a planet. Space is the site where colonization ends and possibilities and/or altered destinies begin.

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In the opening sequence of *Space Is the Place*, *Sun Ra’s* character announces that he **wants to set up a colony for Black people on another planet to “see what they can do on a planet all their own, without any white people there.”** About that utopian aim, he states, “**Equation-wise, the first thing to do is to consider time as officially ended. We’ll work on the other side of time. We’ll bring them here through either isotopic tele- portation, transmolecularization or better still, teleport the whole planet here through music.**”8 The rest of the film involves Sun Ra’s character playing a game of cards with a character called “The Overseer” to win a bet for control over the destiny of Black people, and traveling between 1943 Chicago and 1969 Oakland, California, to convince Black people to travel to that planet with him. The film ends with Sun Ra defeating “The Overseer” and setting into motion an “altered destiny.” **As Sun Ra surveys the planet he discovered at the beginning of the film, he announces, “The music is different here. The vibrations are dif- ferent. Not like planet earth.” The idea that music might affect vibrations and energy patterns and, hence, consciousness aligns with the ideas of other avant-garde artists of the 1950s and 1960s, who used aesthetic techniques of “plastic dialogue” to articulate what was then perceived to be “a new relationship between individuals, society, and the environ- ment**.”9 Sun Ra’s innovations within jazz and Big Band improvisation were part of a larger subcultural preoccupation among avant-garde art- ists with then-emergent metaphors of “energy, spirituality, metaphysicality, and freedom” and “new definitions of improvisation.”10 Various conceptualizations of Afrofuturism have drawn on the temporality of, or the organization of time within, Sun Ra’s particular version of plastic dialogue and the politics it supports.

#### But space is a place where black folks have not been invited. Blackness is a myth that relies on the impossibility of being.

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**Sun Ra continues his conversation** with the Black youth, **reminding them that white people already have been on the moon and chiding them: “I noticed none of you have been invited. How do you think you are going to exist?”** A young man calls attention to the crystal ball in Sun Ra’s hand as the sound and image tracks segue into a refrain: June Tyson singing, “**Space Age. We are living in the Space Age**.” Through a dissolve from Sun Ra’s crystal to June Tyson’s face, the sequence’s logics of space and time are suspended in her voice and image, which appear in an entirely different mise-en-scène than the recreation center where Sun Ra delivered his message to the Black youth of America. Sun Ra appears there, too, operating an audio control board, and a different geographic location, presumably still on planet Earth, is framed onscreen.

I describe this sequence to call attention to the strategies through which it sonically and visually destabilizes assumptions about the logics of material reality in order to enhance Sun Ra’s proclamation, “**Black people are myths**.” In Sun Ra’s statements, we can hear echoes of earlier Afrofuturists, such as W. E. B. DuBois in his short story “The Comet,” which first appeared in his 1920 collection *Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil* and was later anthologized by Sheree Thomas in *Dark Matter: A Century of Speculative Fiction from the African Diaspora*. In “The Comet,” DuBois suggests, as Lisa Yaszek points out, “**not only that it will take a natural disaster to eradicate racism in America, but that without such a disaster there may be no future whatsoever for black Americans.”**24 In DuBois’s story, **a natural disaster precipitates a tem- porary suspension of the terms through which present reality congeals, thereby creating the conditions under which a Black man and a white woman might acknowledge a shared humanity.**

Sun Ra’s appeal to Black youth anticipates, in the realm of scholarly inquiry into Black existence, theories of social death such as Orlando Patterson’s analysis of the conditions characteristic of “New World” slavery (and Grace Kyungwon Hong’s corrective to it in her book *The Ruptures of American Capital*).25 The assertion that **Black people are not real, but myths**, also **resonates with** Frantz **Fanon**’s analysis **of the im- possibility of Black being when he writes**, for instance, **“The Black is not**.”26 Referencing the unreality of Black people, Sun Ra’s statements index the myths, beliefs, and social constructions—in short, the feats of the imagination—on which the **modern world relies for its coherence**. For Sun Ra, **an acknowledgment of the material force of the “myths” that animate modern life opens onto the possibility that things might be organized otherwise**. If the terms of modern life have been constructed as such, they also might be de-created, making another organization of things possible. Such a world exists in Sun Ra’s cosmology as an impossible possibility.

#### Civil society structures itself around that the black body exist in emptiness but is not an absolute condition. Denying blackness the right to a future tries to strip blackness of its meaning. Futurity is key to understanding the future of witness and why the future is good in the context of blackness

**Baldwin, 11** (Andrew, Co-Director of the Institute of Hazard at the University of Durham’s Department of Geography, “Whiteness and futurity: Towards a research agenda,” Progress in Human Geography 2012, originally published August 3, 2011, <http://phg.sagepub.com/content/36/2/172>, )

My argument is that **a past-oriented approach to accounting for geographies of whiteness often neglects to consider how various forms of whiteness are shaped by discourses of futurity**. This is not to argue that a historicist approach to conceptualizing white geographies is wrongheaded; the past continues to be a crucial time-space through which to understand whiteness. It is, however, to argue **that such a past-focused orientation obscures the way the category of the future is invoked in the articulation of whiteness.** As such, any analysis that seeks to understand how whitenesses of all kinds shape contemporary (and indeed past) racisms operates with only a partial understanding of the time-spaces of whiteness. My argument is that **we can learn much about whitenesses and their corresponding forms of racism by paying special attention to the ways in which such whitenesses are constituted by futurity**. I have offered some preliminary remarks on how we might conceptualize geographies of whiteness qua futurity, but these should only be taken as starting points. Much more pragmatically, what seems to be required is a fulsome investigation into the way the future shapes white geographies. What might such a project entail? For one, geographers would do well to **identify whether and how the practice of governing through the future inaugurates new and repeats old forms of whiteness**. It would also be worth comparing and contrasting how the future is made present in various dialectical accounts of whiteness. For instance, what becomes of whiteness when understood through the binary actual-possible as opposed to an actual-virtual binary, which has been my main concern? Alternatively, what becomes of the category of whiteness if it is shown to be constituted by a future that has no ontology except as a virtual presence? And, perhaps more pressing, how might whiteness be newly politicized? **Futurity provides a productive vocabulary for thinking about and challenging whiteness**. It does not offer a means of overcoming white supremacy, nor does it provide white people with a normative prescription for living with their whiteness guilt- or worry-free. Futurity is, however, a lacuna in the study of whiteness both in geography and outside the discipline, and this alone suggests the need to take it seriously. But equally, and perhaps more urgently, **there is the need to study whiteness and futurity given how central the future is to contemporary** governance and politics. Indeed, at a moment when the future features prominently in both political rhetoric – in his inaugural speech, Obama implores America to carry ‘forth that great gift of freedom and [deliver] it safely to future generations’ – and everyday life, how people orient themselves towards the future is indelibly political. The future impels action. For Mann (2007), it is central to interest. For Thrift (2008), ‘value increasingly arises not from what is but from what is not yet but can potentially become, that is fromthe pull of the future’. Attention to whiteness and futurity may at minimum enable us to see more clearly the extent to which the pull of whiteness into the future reconfigures what is to be valued in the decades ahead.

#### Space is an escape from the law that Black people must do something to change the world.

**Johnson 19** Johnson, Myles E., writer and artist living in Brooklyn. Named “One of the greatest writers of this generation” by Janelle Monáe, he is the author of children’s book, LARGE FEARS, that centers a Black queer child. His work has been featured on platforms like The New York Times, NPR, Vice, Buzzfeed, Out, and Essence. Johnson is the founder of countercultural digital zine, Queer Quarantine. Above all else, he is dedicated to spreading love. "Black Utopia: Reclaiming Outerspace". AFROPUNK, 2019, <https://afropunk.com/2019/04/black-utopia-reclaiming-outer-space/>

The Disney theme song, “It’s A Small World (After All)” is a Cold War-era lullaby of affirmation, a reminder that despite borders and missiles, we’re all global neighbors and citizens. For some, this depiction of the world as a quaint neighborhood (after all) brings solace. It has always disturbed me. The world is small — too small. Whereas our histories and traumas in this world feel too big to move beyond, while the planet feels too small to fit new worlds and ways of being inside of it. On “Down With The Clique,” Solange sings, “We were falling in the deep, bathe in the delight. We were rolling up the street, chasing the divine.” This lyric operates as a type of Negro spiritual for me, proof that I’m not alone with most of the work and delight I take part in here on Earth, being a journey to escape Earth rather than to reform Earth. I roll up the street with the intentions of chasing the divine, even if I am only met with a bodega and a stray cat. My Black imagination is often thinking about transcending this planet, more than revolutionizing people and convincing them that humans can’t be illegal or alien or slave or nigger. I daydream about leaving this small world and entering the big universe. Space has been the place for a lot of Black intellectual and creative thought, when billed with the task of imagining Black freedoms. It was Ray Bradbury — a celebrated white speculative fiction author — that first pushed me to think of Blackness as both a community of people and a culture that does not have to be tethered to planet Earth. Bradbury’s short story, “The Other Foot” from his classic book of stories, The Illustrated Man, tells the story of Black Americans going to Mars to start a better, less oppressed life — sans white people and whiteness. This plan has led to a peaceful life for Black people on Mars, until a spacecraft crash happens, and lands a white astronaut. Here is where the Black people on Mars must decide what to do with the white man: Do they integrate him into the society, do they kill him, or do they return the oppression they experienced on Earth on to this white man as a type of historical-intergalactic revenge? Without ruining the conclusion, the story opened my mind to the idea of Black people finding new life in spaces and places beyond this planet. Visionary jazz musician and afrofuturist, Sun Ra said, “If you can develop an atomic bomb, I’m sure you can develop an altered destiny.” This has been the greater duty of Black people on Earth, even when engaged in cosmic fantasy there has been a loyalty to Earth — namely America. There has been an unwritten law that the most oppressedand brutalized in history are saddled with the responsibility for assisting in changing the country for the better. In America, our ideas of freedom were borne out of the enslavement of African people. It was abolitionists like Fredrick Douglass and Harriet Tubman who articulated and demonstrated for America what freedom could be and look like, using their own lives as examples. Not just for those who were enslaved, but those doing the enslaving and those witnessing. The concept of togetherness was created out of the intentional separation of Black people from white people in the Jim Crow era. It was activists like Martin Luther King Jr. and Rosa Parks that forced us and conceptualized in real time what togetherness looks like — and what it costs. And to be clear: it costs lives. Not just lives taken, but lives that inherited a commitment to create togetherness instead of other things that a life can be dedicated to. It’s almost become foreign to believe that Black people have not been put on this Earth solely to be a pedagogy to those Americans who use domination as a way to experience “freedom.” These are tasks we inherited by proxy of wanting to reach a freedom where our lives are not overdetermined by violence and domination culture. This makes the reaction to transcend America — and truly this planet soaked in colonization and anti-Blackness — reasonable, and to the empathetic heart, that may not be Black, understandable and expected. Where cinematic and visual landscapes that artists who bend the realms of reality and often deal with the outer space like the album covers of Roy Ayers and the films by Sun Ra, soundscapes have filled those voids. As a teenager longing for something more, it was the literature of Octavia Butler and Samuel R. Delany that informed my concept of worlds where domination was broken and my Blackness’ sole purpose wasn’t to correct the toxicity borne from whiteness, but to take on my own heart’s mission — whatever that might be, but it wouldn’t be to fix the evils that are produced by living in the imperialist white supremacist capitalist-patriarchy. It was soundscapes created by artists like Alice Coltrane, Sun Ra and Rotary Connection that were my meditations on and soundtrack to my fascination with space. Sun Ra’s Arkestra cooing, “The sky is a sea of darkness when there is no sun to light the way,” was more a lullaby than “It’s A Small World.” It was an affirmation that the sky — the grander universe and everything it holds — would be a sea of darkness or Blackness, or a reflection of me, if the sun were to be dipped in Black or disappear. This was an affirmation that no matter how ostracized I might feel on Earth, we’re swimming in a sea Blackness. As we get closer to space and the phenomenons that exist there — including, this week, seeing a black hole with more clarity than ever before — the longing to space travel away from the things I inherited have only intensified. It might feel comforting for some to recognize that this is a small world, but it preserves my own sanity and radicalism to remember that this is a big black ass universe after all.

#### Aff is a universalized claim. It forecloses black people from determining their own destiny. Aff doesn’t get to determine that :).

#### Thus the counter plan: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust except for Black people.

#### The ROB is to vote for the debater who best resists of antiblackness

### OFF 2 China

#### China threat discourses are grounded in and productive of white supremacy. The fundamental being of American self-identity requires the specter of the Chinese other

Turner 2013 [Oliver, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, “‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” *Review of International Studies* 39.4, GDI-ATN]

The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self. ‘The mere existence of an alternative mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible . . . is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat.’19 As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China. Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth century racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21 Across the history of Sino-US relations then when ‘dangers’ from China have emerged, they have always been perceived through the lens of American identity. In consequence, they have always existed as dangers to that identity. In this analysis it is argued that a key purpose of depicting China as a threat has been to protect components of American identity (primarily racial and ideological) deemed most fundamental to its being. As such, representations of a threatening China have most commonly been advanced by, and served the interests of, those who support actions to defend that identity. The case study analyses which follow reveal that this has included politicians and policymaking circles, such as those within the administration of President Harry Truman which implemented the Cold War containment of the PRC. It also exposes the complicity of other societal individuals and institutions including elements of the late nineteenth-century American media which supported restrictions against Chinese immigration to the western United States. It is demonstrated that, twice before, this discursive process of separating China from the United States has resulted in a crisis of American identity. Crises of identity occur when the existing order is considered in danger of rupture. The prevailing authority is seen to be weakened and rhetoric over how to reassert the ‘natural’ identity intensifies.22 Case studies one and two expose how such crises have previously emerged. These moments were characterised by perceived attacks upon core assumptions about what the United States was understood to be: fundamentally white in the late nineteenth century and democratic-capitalist in the early Cold War. Case study three shows that while today’s China ‘threat’ to US security is yet to generate such a crisis, we must learn from those of the past to help avoid the types of consequences they have previously facilitated.

#### Historical and ideological understandings of China determine US “threat” assessments – policies manufacture and enable these representations

Turner 2013 [Oliver, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, “‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” *Review of International Studies* 39.4, GDI-ATN]

In March 2011 US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper informed the American Senate that, of all sovereign nations, China represented the most imminent ‘mortal threat’ to the United States. While China’s intentions were not necessarily malicious, he argued, it had the capacity to present such a danger. Russia was also cited but quickly dismissed as Clapper observed that China’s ‘strategic nuclear weapons’ arsenal in particular made it an issue of the foremost concern.1 China’s nuclear weapons stockpile is estimated at around 240 warheads. Russia’s stands at around 12,000.2 Yet, and despite the clear superiority of the latter’s nuclear armament, Clapper repeatedly emphasised that it was China’s capabilities and not its intent which were central in its elevation to such an extreme category of threat. Director Clapper’s assertions are reflective of the so-called China Threat Theory which now attracts considerable Western attention, especially within the United States. In the International Relations (IR) literature authors including John Mearsheimer examine US policy options towards a real or potential China threat. Mearsheimer argues that China’s growth will almost inevitably cause tensions with the United States, presenting a ‘considerable potential for war’.3 Warren Cohen predicts that China will continue to ‘brutaliz[e] the weak’, and follow great powers of the past by seeking regional dominance before expanding its influence further.4 Certainly, much of the recent literature is less foreboding of China’s ‘rise’ and authors question the extent to which it endangers international security. Gordon Chang, for example, argues that China’s economic model – and hence its capacity to become a true global superpower – is flawed.5 Brown et al. are broadly positive about China’s development, with engagement rather than containment the preferred US policy response.6 Others reject the conflation of a ‘rising’ China with a ‘dangerous’ China.7 What protagonists of both sides of the argument demonstrate in equal measure, however, is the tendency to assume that a single physical reality about China can be determined. This aim of classifying China as a threat (or indeed a non-threat) is a legacy of the historical dominance within IR of the overtly positivist neorealist and neoliberal schools.8 Positivist approaches to the discipline rely upon testable theory and empirical analysis with the expectation that the world can be definitively understood. The traditional influence of these approaches has precluded a more widespread appreciation of how, in fact, a single authoritative understanding about China is unachievable. The inherent contestability and subjectivity of judgments about that country was once noted by John King Fairbank who argued that ‘[a]t any given time the ‘‘truth’’ about China is in our heads’.9 From this understanding the existence (or absence) of a China threat cannot be satisfactorily explained with reference to material forces alone. The ‘threat’ described by Director Clapper can never be dispassionately observed through assessments of an external world, as he seemingly claimed to be able to do. The purpose of this article is not to speculate as to whether China ‘is’ or ‘is not’ a threat to the United States. It does not concern itself with China’s nuclear arsenal nor dispute the existence and expansion of its capabilities, or the possibility of there being a cause of future violence. It argues that while the material realities of China are important, the nature and extent of their importance is, and has always been, regulated by ideas. Of course, the understanding that international affairs are guided by more than the distribution of state capabilities is not original; it has long been a primary contestation of the ‘critical’, or post-positivist, IR movement that the world is mutually constitutive of material and ideational forces.10 Moreover, authors including Evelyn Goh emphasise the centrality of ideas within Sino-US relations and to the formulation of US China policy at key moments.11 Chengxin Pan specifically examines the China ‘threat’ as a discursive construction and its importance to Washington’s relations with Beijing.12 Beyond these important works the discipline remains relatively quiet on the salience of ideational forces in producing a fantasised China ‘threat’ and in enabling US policies in response.13 It also broadly fails to explain how those policies themselves reinforce the understandings which make them possible in the first place. This is the arena of enquiry towards which the article is directed. It contributes to a small but growing literature which challenges the contours of the modern day China Threat Theory, exposing it as fundamentally flawed and even potentially dangerous. It does this by demonstrating that, in many respects, today’s China ‘threat’ to US security conforms to those which have emerged before. It shows how, across the duration of Sino-US relations, China ‘threats’ have always emerged in part from representation and interpretation and thus how fears about that country today continue to be manufactured and engineered in a way not unique from those of the (sometimes distant) past. In late 2011 the Obama administration shifted its foreign policy focus from Afghanistan and Iraq to the Asia Pacific.14 To a significant extent this ‘pivot’, as it is commonly described, is motivated by the growth of China. Accordingly, as increasing concentrations of US political, economic, and military recourses are diverted to the Asian region, American perceptions of China and their significance to the enactment of Washington’s foreign policies there have once more become increasingly pertinent.

#### Double Bind---Either the “China Threat” is real and they pose a threat to other countries OR Threat Discourse doesn’t Turn China Violent and their Rise Will Be Peaceful

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By now, even causal Asia watchers know that the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore got a little testy. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel warned about China’s provocations and lack of respect for international law. China’s representative, deputy chief of the PLA general staff Wang Guanzhong, fired back, accusing the U.S. and Japan of coordinating their remarks to smear China.

While the accusations and counter-accusations on display at Shangri-La were predictable, they can still be useful in understanding an underlying problem — namely, China’s “China threat” theory. This idea, which is alluded to by Chinese officials throughout the Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense, suggests that nefarious forces in the U.S. and Japan are hyping the “China threat” to achieve their own political goals.

In the case of U.S. politicians, the motivation is assumed to be positioning candidates to win the next election, as one post-Shangri-La Xinhua commentary mentioned. Another theory goes that the “China threat” is an excuse to help defense industry insiders keep the power and prestige they gained during the Cold War by creating a new existential threat supposedly facing the U.S. Meanwhile, Chinese analysts assume that Shinzo Abe and his supporters have manufactured the “China threat” so that they can proceed with their long-held dream of remilitarizing Japan.

There may be some truth to these ideas, of course. But the problem with Beijing’s “China threat” theory is that is utterly discounts the possibility that other countries might actually feel threatened by China’s actions. Wang himself, speaking to Chinese reporters, dismissed the idea of a “China threat” as “completely baseless and completely without merit.” In other words, the “China threat” theory absolves the Chinese government of any and all blame for concerns stemming from the use of Chinese power, both economic and military.

To Chinese analysts, it’s self-evident that China’s rise will be a peaceful one (although with the caveat that China will defend “every inch” of its sovereignty territory). They look at China’s long history, one they see as devoid of invasions or imperialism, and believe it is inconceivable China could ever seek to abuse its power. Chinese officials apparently cannot imagine that other countries might not take this declaration of a “peaceful rise” at face value. The U.S. knows China is peaceful, the thinking goes, but it calls us “provocative” anyway. There must be political skullduggery afoot!

In actuality, there’s a far simpler explanation, albeit a much more uncomfortable one for Beijing: China’s message of a “peaceful rise” is no longer enough to reassure its nervous neighbors. While the domestic political advantages to be gained from hyping the “China threat” are real, Beijing should also acknowledge that at least some of the concerns are genuine. Faced with a rapidly growing China, the U.S. and regional players are uncertain about China’s ambitions. The uncertainty is real, as is the worry that it creates. But because Chinese analysts insist that the “China threat” is merely a political cover, they can avoid the heavy task of understanding and ultimately addressing the causes of regional concern.

#### The aff just leads to securitizing the US, Japan, and India as threats---makes the impact inevitable

William Callahan 05, Chair Professor of International Politics, University of Manchester, October 7 2005, How to understand China: the dangers and opportunities of being a rising power, Review of International Studies, Volume 31, Issue 4, pg 701-714

Hence by turning China threat into a theory, the discourse moves from merely responding to criticism in a negative way, actively producing positive meaning. Rather than simply ‘putting an end to ‘‘China threat theory’’ ’ as the first article on the topic advised in 1992,37 the discourse continually reproduces and circulates this set of images of a peacefully rising China that is the victim of criticism that only comes from abroad. Although Taiwan is a site of much discussion of a ‘China threat’, Taiwanese people are rarely criticised in the mainland’s ‘China threat theory’ texts. This underlines how the category ‘China threat theory’ is used to sort out the domestic from the foreign: Taiwanese are seen by Beijing as Chinese compatriots. Because Beijing frames ‘China threat theory’ as a ‘foreign fallacy’ and Cross-Straits relations as an issue of domestic politics, the large and vociferous cache of ‘China threat’ texts from Taiwan are erased by ‘China threat theory’ discourse.

Although Chinese premier Zhu Rongji sought to change the subject from China threat to China opportunity, many ‘China threat theory’ articles engage in a proliferation of foreign threats. As a former Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA reasons: ‘If we follow the logic of ‘‘China threat theory’’, who benefits from it, and who thus can be a threat to other countries’ security?’38 **The common response to China threat theory thus is that America is the real threat.3**9 Yet it is not just the sole superpower that is seen as a threat. ‘China threat theory’ articles also generate a ‘Japan threat theory’ and an ‘India threat theory’. Many articles tell us that real reason for Japanese scholars, politicians and officials warning of a potential China threat is to justify rearming Japan and reviving the imperial Japanese militarism of the early 20th century.40 This concern provided the back-story that motivated the mass anti-Japanese demonstrations that rocked China in April 2005. As Shih concludes about Sino-Japanese diplomacy more generally, ‘the perception of a threatening Japan serves to differentiate China from Japan and consolidate an otherwise shaky national identity in China’.41

Likewise, when India’s leaders stated that their reason for becoming a nuclear power in 1998 was not the threat from Pakistan so much as the threat from China, a Chinese response was to create an ‘India threat theory’. An anonymous author concludes that if India continues to be unfriendly, the PRC will have to contain India. This policy would encircle India with a network of hostile alliances and foment Islamic fundamentalism in Kashmir and beyond.42 The message is clear; if a country rejects China’s ‘peaceful overtures’, then China will fight diplomatically, militarily, and rhetorically, including spreading an ‘India threat theory’ in South Asia and beyond.

Although ‘China threat theory’ is ascribed to the Cold War thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to the PRC after 1960. **Refutations of ‘China threat theory’ do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of ‘threat’ as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics because they refute ‘Chinese’ threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat, a Japan threat, an India threat, and so on**. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms China’s national identity. Unfortunately, by refuting China threat in this bellicose way – that is by generating a new series of threats – the China threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are increasingly threatened by China’s protests of peace.43