### Off 1

#### Appeals to universal individual values paradoxically flatten difference by constructing a uniform human subject. This plays into neoliberal technologies of biopolitical control.

Narges Zahedipoor 19, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, “How Rights Claims Expand Carceral State,” Masters Theses, 12/15/2019, https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk\_gradthes/5516

As I illustrated in the second chapter, the new type of power was established based on the bourgeois ideology and under the “disciplinary power”. In fact, in modern society, power is no longer be transcribed to sovereignty. This new type of power is the foundation of industrial capitalist society (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). Theory of sovereignty tries establishing the subject to subject cycle. Individuals who are the only bearer of natural rights delegate these rights to sovereignty to rule them. Individuals who were the subjects of rights that they have by their nature now delegate this power to the state to govern them. In other words, sovereignty requires individuals to be governed and regulated by the rights that they gave them at a particular moment. (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). By rights, Foucault (Foucault and Ewald, 2003) means all apparatuses of it, from law and rules to all institutions related to it. Right in this point of view function as a means for domination, not only sovereignty relations but the whole of all domination relations (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). But the theory of sovereignty no longer lives as a theory of right. In fact, it is continued as an ideology and as the organized principles of juridical codes which superimpose on the mechanisms of discipline a system of rights that conceal the actual disciplinary power of the state and its domination (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). This new system of power guarantees everyone’s practicing of the sovereign right, which can be exercised by them. So, the right of sovereignty and the mechanisms of disciplinary power are inseparable in modern society. But this confrontation has its own discourses; under sovereignty, we have rights discourse, but the scientific or clinical knowledge is the disciplinary power’s discourse which operates through normalization and not a code of law. So, in our day, power is exercised through both right and discipline in a way that discipline and its techniques are invading rights (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). However, the only way to limit the exercise of disciplinary power is by invoking the old formal bourgeois right, which is, in reality, the right of sovereignty (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). But, using sovereignty against discipline does not enable us to limit disciplinary power. These two, sovereign and discipline- are the “two things that constitute the general mechanism of power in our society” (p. 39). Sovereign rights of individuals (juridical power) and disciplinary normalization bringing play together is “repression”. Repression today is used as a tool for coercive social control. Imprisonment is one these social control policies, especially in places that African-American, poor, and other minorities are deprived of their political and economic participation. Repression is used by the state both through the juridical system (right of sovereignty) and the disciplinary mechanisms. First, repression is applied through the prison mechanism, with all its institutions. It is justified by crime control and the right of security and safety- both the liberal rights; On the other hand, it functions through complex mechanisms of disciplinary normalization. Imprisonment (as a way to repress) operates through the scientific calculation in order to normalize, differentiate, hierarchize, and make a division between those who are the first degree citizens in terms of respecting the rules and those who are excluded. Liberalism, as the mentality of rules, creates an atmosphere in which market, civil society, and citizens have their own logic and intrinsic mechanisms of self- regulation. In this system of governing, sovereign tries to totalize its will across the national space (Burchell, 1991). However, rulers, on the one hand, confront with subjects who have rights and interest that should not be interdicted by politics and, on the other hand, they faced with the situation in which they cannot govern by the exercise of sovereign will because they do not have the prerequisite knowledge and capacities (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). So, they need to reformulate the objects, instrument, and tasks of rule based on the market, civil society and citizenship aiming to ensure that they serve the national as a whole and function to benefit it (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). However, discipline and bio-power- apparently illiberal- finally found their places within liberal mentalities of rule. These rules become practicable and understandable as a prerequisite condition for production and governing free citizens (Foucault, 2012). Disciplinary logic operates through mechanisms in prison aimed to produce subjective conditions, self-control, selfmastery, and self-regulation to govern free and civilized citizens. On the other hand, bio-political strategies, including censuses, statistical inquiries, reproduction control, and health programs, provide the related laws that liberal government must know and respect. That said, the legitimate government is not arbitrary, but it is based on the policies which are necessary for the wellbeing enhancement of those whose interests are mandatory to respect (Foucault, 1980a). These laws function through the good amount of knowledge of the areas that should be ruled, such as prison, family, economy, community. Liberalism tries to invest in the subjects of government. It means that in politics, law, morality and so forth, subjects are individuals whose freedom, rights and liberty are to be respected by setting limits to the legitimate political and legal regulation to regulate the particular and new type of individuality (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). Thus, the liberal strategy behind prisons is not to regulate individuals, but they are seeking to create individuals who do not need to be governed by others and be able to be governed, mastered and cared by themselves. In liberalism, the abstract subject of right takes a “universalistic” form (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). Or, as Marx (1843) asserts, liberalism is trying to eradicate the intrinsic distinctions of individuals under the shadow of abstract citizenship. Marx (1843) argues that these liberal rights and liberty, are nothing except the right of separation from others, the rights of self- interest, and all individuals are treated equally in the liberalism if they become isolated and severing. Thus, the liberal constitutional state is built upon depoliticized inegalitarian social powers and naturalizing egoistic civil society and rights are the form for securing and legitimizing these tendencies (Brown, 1995). The solution of Marx (1843) for depoliticized human beings and their isolation because of the liberal notions of rights and freedom is “every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man himself. Political emancipation is a reduction of man, on the one hand to a member of civil society, an independent and egoistic individual, and on the other hand, to a citizen, to a moral person” (p. 46). The liberal policies contribute both directly and indirectly to the carceral state. First, in the way that liberalism identifies the rights and second by its economic strategies. However, these two ways are integrated. The importance of these liberal notions of rights will be evident when we think how these rights are defined and whom they serve. Let us talk about the property right, for example, and its effects on racial minorities, poor, and people who are historically marginalized and the way these rights expand the carceral state. The rise of capitalism, the accumulation of wealth, the development of the bourgeois class determined many acts as illegal and criminal. These new areas of criminality tended to secure and maintain the capital, property, and wealth in the hand of the dominant, powerful, and capitalist class. This tendency requires the state to provide a safe place for upper and middle-class whites to maintain their properties, which result in the imprisonment for those who violate these liberal rights. On the other hand, liberalism can indirectly expand the carceral state by its economic and political principles. For example, the free market intensifies inequality to the extent that as those who are in the very top socio-economic status accumulate more wealth, those who are deprived of the resources tend to live in the urban, suburban area, and in general in streets. Since they work more hours for less wage, benefit, and security, they seek alternatives to pay for their living expenses. This situation is the basis for the first way that liberalism defines the rights. Thus, cleaning the streets of criminals serves the upper and middle-class interests to make and maintain their capital. Also, attracting local and foreign investment is a principle in a liberal and neoliberal economy which requires a “safe” place for an investment of companies. However, the way that liberalism handles this situation is situated in an intensified “individualism”. Individuals are selfregulated, self-controlled, and responsible for their action. As Margaret Thatcher (1978)- Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990- states, “rising crime is not due to “society” but to the steady undermining of personal responsibility and self-discipline”. In liberalism, everyone has an equal right without considering race, class, gender, religion, age, etc. Throughout this system, disciplines specify subjects not based on their inherent characteristics but based on the certain norms of civilization and divide subjects to a civilized member of society and those who fail to exercise their citizenship responsibility. Thus, in liberal governmentalities, the purpose is that free individuals fulfill the voluntarily assumed obligations to make their existence by conducting life responsibility (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). On the other hand, must make their decisions about their self-regulation and self- control surrounded by a web of norms and normativities. (make this part separe) As I illustrated before natural rights are universal in the sense that human rights can be applied on all human beings regardless of their intrinsic human characteristics. This notion of rights is fundamental for the foundation of liberalism where rights of citizens are distinct from the actual right of a man seeking to internalize and volunteer obligations and switch responsibility form state to individuals. What are the correctional policies for individuals who fail to be self- regulated, selfcontrolled, or fail to be self-realized in order to restore them to society as normal citizens who function properly according to the liberalism’s value and goals? Besides other disciplinary mechanisms to keeping citizen in the flow of making profit such as school, hospitals, and the intensified surveillance in the every corner of streets, workplace, etc, one of the policies that ensures that people who fail to fulfill the tendency of liberal disciplinary power to make selfregulated individuals, is through imprisonment as a tool for correction. As I illustrated in the second chapter, the first reforms that led to the production of the prison originated from the efforts of religious leaders toward spiritual cleansing. This purpose of imprisonment has turned at the rise of capitalism into correcting prisoners as the effort to make them productive human binges. This goal of imprisonment is argued by Bentham and his suggestion about the panopticon prison. The architecture of panopticon is designed to work on inmate souls in order to turn them to efficient workers. All the prison mechanism functions through a timetable to make inmates again efficient and productive citizens. Furthermore, the universalistic characteristic of liberal rights is paradoxical. Adorno (2006) shows a theoretical paradox of universal perspectives toward progressive rationality in which the universal aspects turn into the particular aspects which causes us who are likewise particular, to anguish. The dominant universality can no longer mean history or any positive value (Adorno, 2006). However, any form of consciousness is highly reluctant to admit that its assumed supremacy of objective power over human beings who are confident that they are in the full possession of self, is only a function of the universal (Adorno, 2006). So, our immediate sense or experience implies that what happens to us is universal, and there is nothing particular with our experiences. For example, if someone fails to find a job, or being ignored or discriminated, our immediate thought would be we are in full possession of our life and future. The paradox appears where science, with its magical tools, shows us whatever happens to us is not universal, and it is all about us. There is nothing universal, and all happenings are the result of spontaneous individuality. Universality is a metaphysical and abstract thing which does not exist in actual life (Adorno, 2006). How can we apply these arguments in the current phenomenon of rights claims and its role on the carceral state? Using Foucault and Adorno’s arguments to the question of this study, as I argued before, the disciplinary power - the foundation of the capitalist industrial society- is founded based on the scientific and clinical knowledge which is best suited to liberalism. The rights discourse in a liberal society is defined as the universal and inalienable rights which individuals have regardless of time, space, or their intrinsic features such as race, age, gender. These notions of rights has a paradoxical nature in the sense that, although they claim to be universal and a mechanism toward emancipation and even as individuals assume to have them regardless of their differences and conceive them as their first and immediate experiences – the universality creates a false consciousness in individuals. In actual life the disciplinary power which is seeking to normalize individuals tries to internalize certain obligations into the citizens and make them self-regulated, self- controlled and responsible for what happens in their lives or in short as Adorno (2006) states make everything particular and completely individual. Now we can see how this notion of rights functions through the criminal justice system in a liberal society. Historically, and especially after the civil right movements in the US, the human rights assumed to be universal with a sacred focus on equality for the different races, religions, genders, and ages leads individuals to believe and assume that they are in a full possession and domination of their lives and nature. But what happens in actual life or in the current criminal justice system is the fact that the liberal disciplinary power considers all individuals and especially prisoners or those who violate social norms to be responsible for their actions. Here is where the universal feature of rights can be paradoxical. These liberal policies are exist in different contexts and eras in contemporary liberal societies and apply to prisoners, addicts, students, or patients. Here, we can see why Marx (1843) criticizes the notion of universalism when the actual human being is eradicated in society and becomes an abstract citizen. When we are talking about the rights, we are talking about justice, freedom, and equality that are all universal concepts. But, in reality, what we have is intensified individuality. As I illustrated, the prison population in the US is disproportionately occupied by young, poor black men. This disproportionate amount is because of many liberal social and economic policies, which eventually impose many challenges in the minorities lives. The policies like War on Drug or Three Strike in California state are the examples of that in that these policies presupposed African- American responsible for the violation of the norms through the disciplinary mechanism and techniques like efficient litigation, prosecution, policing, and all other disciplinary institutions (school-to-prison pipelines, etc.). So, all these institutions are not at work to ensure universal human rights, but rather to normalized and self-regulate individuals in categorical ways. In summary, discipline, through its complicated institutions and based on universal norms, tries to normalize individuals. For example, through psychiatrists, prosecutors, police, therapists, and some universal instructions toward a better, efficient and more productive life, tries to internalize that the deviance, mental disorder, or crime are individual or personal problems which should be solved by these universal institutions. Therefore, the purpose of discipline is not to create a particularism that defends the actual rights of man. It neither aims to recognize all the intrinsic human differences nor different social circumstances. Instead, it seeks to specify, particularize individuals in a society based on their variation of following the rules and respecting citizen’s obligations.

#### The role of private entities in outer space serves as a disruption from the legitimate violence from the state --- the 1AC doesn’t prevent expansion it just solidifies control

Fredriksson and Arvanitakis 17 [Martin Fredriksson Linköping University James Arvanitakis Western Sydney University “Property, Place and Piracy” November 2017 Publisher: RoutledgeISBN: 9781138745131 Projects: Piracy UnboundCommons and Commodities]/ISEE

So, the Orphans rebellion might be closer to Disney’s Jack Sparrow than to ‘Calico Jack’ Rackham and figures like Tumlinson describe the invocation of piracy as tongue in cheek. Nontheless historical figure of the pirate remains a useful heuristic for approaching contemporary space mining. The pirate, as frontier libertarian of the colonial seas, was both anathema to and fundamentally constitutive of the international legal order that began to emerge alongside the ‘juridification of the oceanic commons’ (Policante, 2015, p. xii). A violent appropriator exploiting the ‘free’ spaces outside the sphere of state power, the pirate of the pre-modern world was hostis humani generis – the enemy of all humanity (see Chapter 6 in this volume for a detailed analysis). But, paradoxically, efforts to eradicate piracy solidified the role of European colonial powers as protectors of the oceanic commons and global commerce, simultaneously strengthening the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence on the frontier (Heller-Roazen, 2009; Policante, 2015, p. xii). Although the pirate’s capacity for unrestricted violence in plundering treasure from rival vessels may not resonate with space mining, this section considers whether extraterrestrial resource exploitation can be construed as an act of theft that similarly involves this state/ pirate dialectic. Central to the commingling of piratical lawlessness and the extension of state power onto the frontier is a transformation in the pirate’s legal standing that occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. During the European Wars of Religion, a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) became solidified in customary law and treaty agreements beginning with the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. ‘Amity lines’ were drawn to separate the emergent ‘law of nations’ between continental powers and an anomic space ‘beyond the line’,10 where ‘treaties, peace and friendship applied only to Europe, to the Old World, to the area on this side of the line’ (Schmitt, 2006, p. 92). It is within this 130 M. Johnson anomic space where the pirate became employed by the state: those who held a lettre des marques et de représailles (letter of marque and reprisal) were authorised to plunder enemy vessels and treasure without any limit on hostility. The pirate was transformed from lawless freebooter to state-sanctioned privateer: resources appropriated beyond the line were shared between privateers and state coffers, and the privateer became fundamental to European state-building (Policante, 2015, pp. 61–67). Might the frontier beyond the atmosphere comprise a similar state of exception, where the physical distance from the ‘concrete order’ (Schmitt 2006, p. 65) of terrestrial legal and political norms results in an extra-legal or anomic space, free for plunder? Despite the largely pre-emptive juridification of the space frontier via the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST), the legal status of outer space retains a degree of ambiguity. The OST was drafted at the height of Cold War geopolitical tension and subsequently focused more on the militarisation of outer space and undesirability of territorial claims on celestial bodies, as opposed to clarifying the role of non-state actors or providing a framework for commercial activity (Pop, 2000). The treaty established that outer space was res communis: a commons and ‘the province of all mankind’. Article 2 stated that ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.’ Crucially, the treaty has not explicitly forbidden private appropriation of celestial bodies. The clause ‘by any other means’ is possibly enough to prohibit appropriation by non-government actors (Pop, 2000). To more ardent supporters of space mining, however, the emphasis on national appropriation presents a loophole for private enterprise (Kfir, 2016; White, 1998), that ‘an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies’ (Gorove, 1969, p. 351). The US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (CSLCA) appears to take the latter interpretation, whereby the sovereign power of the US legislature endorses private enterprises to ‘act on their own behalf’. Title IV of the Act states: A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource … shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States. (US CSLCA, 2015, §402) These ‘international obligations’ are clearly in relation to the OST, and the CSLCA also includes the ‘Extraterritorial Sovereignty Disclaimer’: ‘the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body’ (US CSLCA, 2015, Privateering on the cosmic frontier? 131 §403). The ‘applicable law’ of the act only includes, but it is not limited to, international law: while the precise details regarding enforcement of any space property claims are unclear, such claims could also be protected under US law and competing claims arbitrated in US courts. While the CLSCA would not entail the American flag being planted on the surface of an asteroid, the US is tacitly claiming some level of jurisdiction via acts of corporate appropriation. And, if ‘international obligations’ represent more than just the OST’s nonappropriation principle, the general absence of recognition and endorsement from the international community means that the CSCLA is a largely unilateral assertion.11 The CSLCA effectively positions the US in opposition to other nations – spacefaring or otherwise – seeming to contradict the res communis nature of the OST. It imposes a res nullius legal interpretation of outer space resources by assuming that celestial bodies are free for exploitation, provided no direct territorial claims are made. The United States recognises and enforces its citizens’ resource claims on the space frontier in the name of ‘[developing] in the United States … economically viable, safe and stable’ space resource industries (US CSLCA, 2015, p. 44). This exploitation of the frontier as ‘state of exception’ is an act of economic competition, and the CSLCA then starts to resemble the letter of marque. Resources claimed in outer space will generate tax revenue and further political prerogatives of economic growth (jobs, infrastructure and so on), akin to the role of privateering in European state-building or the granting of royal charters to joint-stock companies like the East India Company. Outer space becomes the province of the United States economy rather than ‘all mankind’ a commercial vanguard enables an indirect form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2004; Dickens & Ormrod 2007, p. 59), pre-emptively stealing resources owned by all. As far as NewSpace’s yearnings for pirate space utopias are concerned, this fundamental reliance on the state’s legislative apparatus implies that the notion of a stateless space frontier is indeed a fantasy. As privateers and patriots, ‘[extending] our free-market values into space’ (Kerber, cited in Space Frontier Foundation, 2015), NewSpace mining firms effectively extend state influence onto the anomic frontier under the guise of entrepreneurial commerce.

#### Abstract theorization make ways to know unkowing violent territorial exploration of space

**Locking in terrains of biopolitical control results in catastrophe production – that poses a threat to all life**

**McLoughlin 10** (Daniel McLoughlin – PhD in philosophy from the University of New South Wales and Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law there, “Agamben’s Exception: Sovereignty, Ontology and the Politics of Crisis”, School of History and Philosophy of the University of New South Wales, August 2010, <http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:9163/SOURCE02?view=true>, MG)

\*ableist language connoted in brackets

Although a biopolitical perspective is absent from State of Exception, in the lecture “Security and Terror” (2001) Agamben does provide some reflection on the link between the use of emergency powers and the problem of biopolitics. He does so through a brief discussion of the “paradigm of security,” which he suggests in State of Exception (without detail) replaces the declaration of the state of exception in the latter half of the Twentieth Century. Agamben’s lecture opens by noting that the logic of security goes back to the theoretical origins of the modern state in the work of Hobbes, for whom the **protection of life from physical threat is an essential justification of the state**.166 “Security and Terror” goes on to develop the analysis, however, by drawing on Foucault’s work on the biopolitics of the population and governmentality.167 According to Foucault, the biopolitics of the population is a distinct mode of the “power over life” from discipline. Where discipline intervenes at the level of the body to normalise the individual, the object of biopolitical intervention is a multiplicity of people, as a “species body” or “population.” The aim of this intervention is to create of conditions under which the population can prosper, through the **optimal arrangement of people** in their relations with their social, environmental, and economic milieu.168 Foucault describes the mechanisms through which this biopolitical regulation is effected as “**apparatuses of security**.” These intervene in a population, not in order to eliminate a phenomena (such as disease or pollution) but rather to **control** **it** in a way that is optimal: “in a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.”169 Paul Patton points out that what is meant by security in this context is not “the life or safety of individuals but the achievement and maintenance of an overall equilibrium or regularity in a population.”170 Through his analysis of the state of exception, however, Agamben, however, blurs together the Hobbesian sense of security as the protection of life, together with the Foucauldian analysis of the “apparatuses of security.” Not only does State of Exception’s genealogy of the state of exception as a paradigm of government repeatedly cast it as a “technique of government,”171 but his approach to “Security and Terror” asserts that measures of security “require constant reference to a state of exception.”172 Agamben’s descriptions of the use of the state of exception as a technique of government also briefly cite the logic that Foucault sees as guiding the use of security mechanisms: the logic of law and discipline is that of ordering and restricting, such that “**security wants to regulate disorder**.”173 Agamben asserts that contemporary governance, instead of maintaining order, operates through the “the **administration of the absence of order**”;174 in this way, instead of preventing catastrophes, today “**politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies**.”175 Similarly, State of Exception casts the political form of the global police state as “**a new planetary order which is in truth the worst of all [~~disorders~~]**.”176 Here, he also explicitly links this governance through [~~disorder~~] to sovereignty and, in particular, the exploitation of the indeterminacy of the decision on the exception, arguing that since the Second World War, “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones.”177 It would appear, then, that for Agamben, the state of exception is one of the “apparatuses of security” that the contemporary state deploys in order to maintain equilibrium. However, **the “equilibrium”** that the state maintains through the use of the state of exception is a profoundly **unstable one**. Similar to his analysis of biopolitics and the concentration camp in Homo Sacer, Agamben’s account of the contemporary security asserts that the logic of the protection of life, upon which the modern state was justified, now **poses a threat to that very life**. In the previous chapter, I argued that the strength of Agamben’s work lies in his use of political problems as a departure point for a critique of a political tradition that seeks to render its political apparatuses inoperative. In Homo Sacer he achieves this by implicating the concepts of the modern political tradition in the development of the biopolitical catastrophe, thereby problematising a politics that would seek to restore the “original” meaning of concepts such as “nation,” “right”, and “democracy” as a response to their hollowing out by political nihilism. Although, in State of Exception he develops a critique of the crisis of the constitutional politics of liberal democracy, this lacks a corresponding immanent critique of the relationship between juridical nihilism and the liberal democratic state from which it emerged. The “paradigm of security” also provides a crucial link between **liberalism and the state of exception**, and has the potential to do the work that his critique of concepts such as “right” and “nation” does in Homo Sacer: that is, foreclosing the resort to a politics that would simply seek to restore the status quo of the modern political tradition, by illuminating the relationship between that tradition and the development of the political problems it attempts to combat.

**We should imagine a world where things aren’t what they seem – the desire of the 1ac is the opposite of the life guided by reason – return to immanence and embrace contingency**

**Gulli 16** (Bruno Gulli - teaches philosophy at Long Island University, “Sovereign Violence and the Power of Acting – (Imagining the Unsovereign Law)”, A Journal of the Social Imaginary, 2016, <https://cab.unime.it/journals/index.php/IMAGO/article/viewFile/1307/1024>, MG)

A critique of sovereign violence, therefore, cannot simply rest on the reality of affects and desire and the deterministic tendencies engendered by it. What must be taken into account by such a critique is the fact of contingency –as well as the awareness of it. **Being aware of contingency means imagining how things could be other than they are**. Obviously, this awareness and this imagination are not found in the detached place of a simple and unified subject, but rather in the multiple conditions of subjectification and in the process of individuation –and this is what determination amounts to. Yet, a vortex of original contingency and freedom must exist if we are to posit the possibility of change. Things can change –as John Duns Scotus notes— because they are possible, rather than necessary (Duns Scotus 1987: 44). Indeed, “**those who deny that some being is contingent should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented**” (9). Something different can be imagined only because it is possible –and possibility is part of reality. So when Lordon denies what he calls “the tense of regret” as “a retrospective illusion” and as “the Spinozist non-sense par excellence,” he is perhaps denying the reality, or actuality, of potentiality (Lordon 2014: 143). He says that “to be able to do and to do are one and the same thing: we could only have done what we did, neither more nor less” (143-144). But I find this unrealistic and false. For instance, I could have gone to the movies last night even though I didn’t. I believe that, even from a Spinozist point of view, the denial of ‘I could have,’ which I would not necessarily call “the tense of regret,” is a bit too strong. (Let us also note that the tense of regret is rather ‘I should have’ and admit that regret itself is in any case an important moment in human experience – and that we often learn from it.) That denial does in fact reduce reality to what is simply there, the merely given, by excluding potentiality. For it seems impossible to deny ‘I could have’ without at the same time also denying the ‘I could’ of transformation and change. To be sure, Lordon does not at all rule out change. But he inscribes it in a determinist –though he specifies, non-fatalist—ontology. For instance, he says, When the indignation that gets people moving prevails over the obsequium that makes them stay put, a new affective vector is formed, and individuals who used to be determined to respect institutional norms … are suddenly determined to sedition (140). But what accounts for this indignation? I would suggest that it is not at all a matter of determinism or free will. As far as I know, one of the most interesting takes on this issue is Jean-Paul Sartre’s denunciation of it as a false problem. At the outset of the chapter on freedom in Being and Nothingness, Sartre says, It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free will, to cite examples in favor of one or the other thesis without ever attempting first to make explicit the structures contained in the very idea of action (1956: 559). For Sartre, an action must be intentional: “The careless smoker who has through negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted” (ibid.). This intentionality is what makes agents (bodies) expend their freedom, their nothingness. But as Sartre famously says, there is no exit from it, “we do not choose to be free” (623). We are “thrown into freedom,” condemned to it (ibid.). Sartre provides the solution to the false problem mentioned above, the paradox of freedom, by means of the notion of ‘situation’: “there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom” (629). Situation means determination, but outside the logic of determinism. **Freedom means power to act, outside the illusion of a free will**. A critique of sovereignty also needs to posit something outside sovereignty. **However, this is not a moment of transcendence; rather, it is a return into immanence**. To say that there is a return to immanence seems to imply that there was an exit from it. In fact, there was no exit, but only the positing of a fictitious reality, **the illusion of sovereignty as a totality**. **The end of that illusion gives the sense of a return into what has always already been there**. In fact, it is sovereignty itself – sovereignty’s first and foremost expression of violence—that by positing itself as separate and distant creates a **metaphysical and fictitious paradigm of power** as potestas (authority) rather than potentia (potency). The fact that the paradigm is fictitious does not mean that it lacks real efficacy. What it lacks is **authenticity** and, if you will, **legitimacy**. Yet, it is a real and effective power. Lordon is absolutely right when he says, on the basis of Spinoza, that there “is no potestas that does not emanate from potentia(multitudinis) –but in the form of hijacking and to the advantage of the most powerful of master-desires, the desire of the sovereign” (160-161). **What must be shown is that the desire of the sovereign –a despotic desire—is the opposite of the life guided by reason, and closer to freedom, defining the desire of the multitude**. It is this reason that is neither private nor public, but something altogether different. In fact, it is common reason, that is to say, humanity.

#### **Contingency comes first – it shapes politics, acts as a precondition for liberal freedom, and counters dogmatic identities that otherwise threaten solvency**

Alt 16 (Suvi Alt - Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Groningen, “Beyond the Biopolitics of Development”, University of Laplap, 9 December 2016, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/79177315.pdf>, MG)

The French Revolution gave expression to the idea that truth is created rather than found.487 Instead of being of a transcendent origin, truth is made in the human world. The ontological proposition of contingency has thus been necessary for a modern account of freedom from transcendental rule.488 **Contingency is a precondition for liberal freedom**. The contemporary importance of contingency is also founded on its association with the biopolitical imaginary. As discussed in the previous chapter, contingency is not one property of emergent life; it is the property of emergent life.489 Furthermore, Foucauldian conceptions of power are also based on an understanding of both the origins and nature of power as contingent. Recognising the contingency of all forms of social and political order is arguably one of the core tenets of different forms of poststructuralist thinking. Likewise, poststructuralism has contributed to politics an understanding of humans as beings produced by contingent histories, events and practices. Foucauldian analyses of ourselves as historically determined beings are directed at ‘the contemporary limits of the necessary’, thus exposing the contingency of such truths and practices that produce subjects.490 Contingency is put forward as a **precondition for politics** in the works of a number of contemporary thinkers including William Connolly, Jacques Rancière and Michael Shapiro. Appreciation of our own contingency and of our indebtedness to difference provides, for Connolly, a **way of countering dogmatic identities and thus functions as the basis of his account of a pluralistic democratic ethos**.491 Likewise, Shapiro affirms the possibility of ‘a contingency-embracing order where new relations, based on de-identification with old imposed essences, can flourish.’492 For Rancière, democracy refers to the institution of politics as the system through which any order of distribution of bodies is ‘thrown back on its contingency.’493 According to Robert Nichols, a free relation to the world means ‘being attuned to the contingency and indeterminacy of world-disclosure, which, in turn, means accepting that “we” (our selfhood) are beholden to this contingency – that we are contingent beings who are “held” by ontological freedom.’494 The effectiveness of the political is arguably manifested wherever the necessity of subjectivities, relations and systems of governance is **exposed as a fiction** and replaced with a **recognition of contingency** as the formative principle of the political. The biopolitical problematisations of various practices and rationalities pertaining to ‘life’ that have proliferated within the past decade are also intimately **tied to the concept of contingency**. According to Thomas Lemke, the primary aim of an analytics of biopolitics is to reveal the contingency of the rationalities on which biopolitical governance is based.495 Biopolitical analysis ought to, therefore, be concerned with exposing contingency where none appears to exist. But how can this construction of contingency as the site of the political delineate itself from the neoliberal governing that relies on contingency for ts very functioning? This question is often left unaddressed by those pursuing biopolitical analysis. As contingency appears to have become the principal characteristic of neoliberal life and the primary site through which it is governed, how can we think of a politics that is capable of challenging such ‘governing through contingency’ without resorting to pre-conceived transcendental truths or simply settling for the existing ontology? If the referent of biopolitical governance is, indeed, no longer the human but contingency, then the challenge to biopolitical governance has to either come from **within that contingency** or give its **own account of the relation between life and contingency**. Politics that is internal to neoliberal contingency will **perceive contingency as the price that is to be paid for freedom**. The search for ways of being governed differently is arguably possible because all systems of governance are contingent, except, of course, for the governance implied by the neoliberal conception of life as contingent. Put differently, life is free to become anything but the ontology of becoming cannot be questioned.

off = uncondo

### Overview

#### REJECT all AC spikes, three reasons⁃               1.) I don’t know the implication of the spikes until the 1AR happens because they can read things like permissibility triggers, if I don’t know the implication I should be able to contest the link and implication⁃               2.) Is clash, obviously this incentivizes them to put a bunch of arguments into the 1AC that I have to respond to, the technicality of drops which means you should reject their theory spikes⁃               3.) At worst I have new 2NR responses because their application would be new, thats like reading a new impact or a link if I read like 30 disads with links and no impacts and the 1AR said you need impacts and the 2NR read a new impact to that disad it would be ridiculous⁃              1AR theory is not drop the debater its obviously context dependent things like condo could be drop the debater, things like font size theory obviously aren’t — fairness does not outweigh everything categorically, just cause fairness is an impact doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t have discussions and those discussions can be weighed and those educations can be weighed on a theory level and on a procedural flawed level⁃               Don’t vote on presumption or permissibility triggers even If they affirm/ negate because that would decrease clash, it would allow them to incentivize the arguments that trigger these things instead of actual engagement with material args — killing fairness and education when answering the neg

### Framing

#### no intent foresight distinction— governments can’t have intent since they’re made up of multiple actors with separate motivations, ie some congress people might vote for something to gain votes while other actually think the bill is good.

#### Probability checks action prevention – at some point probability becomes so small it doesn’t matter

#### Otherwise ethical theoryies –people can control what they are being punished for – foresight and action are the same

#### Induction is true—historical trends are the only way humans make decisions ie. You don’t walk into the street

#### Takes out and turns calc indicts, consequentialism might be hard but it’s not impossible, and the alternative is no action which is worse; and actor spec outweighs since different actors have different ethical standings.

#### Yes we can – we know murdering people is bad even though we have never done it

### Case

#### They say obligation – green – aliend don’t exist which proves there no reason to vote aff – they also have no ev that space col only occurs with private entities – very outcome orented – we might to damage to ET –based in consquennces

#### Afff cant resolve cordelli – privatization is inev the card is just about privitiziation in general not about the specificity of the aff

#### Yes universalizable –

#### veryone can leave earth – no warrant for why they cant

#### b. cant resolove ethics in space – capitalist policies in space are inevitable they have no reason why ethics in space are resoilved by private entities ---- which proves that intent is bad because they know their actuonw ill fail but chose to do nothing about it

**TURNS CASE – THEY CAN’T ACCESS THEIR FRAMEWORK IF THEY PARTICIPATE IN MARGINALIZING PRACTICES.**

**WHITEWASHING DISAD:** their attempt to explain racism via an abstract phil framework **PERPETUATES ACADEMIC COLONIALISM** – it means Black scholarship can only be legitimized through a White gaze.

**Curry 6:** Tommy J. [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244

, even while they rhetorically claim they reject such an orientation. Ensuring that young Black philosophers fear being labeled as too radical, or having their work designated as controversial or unsafe, is reason enough to self-censor and revise the original thinking of Black scholars. As such, **Black philosophy becomes a discipline accepted as philosophy** by the extent to which it mirrors, or Blackfaces, the insights of white thinkers and theories. Philosophy departments have ensured that conversations go unattended that concern the permanence of racism and the histories of trauma and bidirectional violence amongst Blacks (Hernandez et al. 1993; Cascardi and Avery-Leaf 2015; Curry and Utley 2018c). They have also ignored the imperialism and colonial heritage of feminism and the paternal benevolence that white women receive from patriarchal power and sexism, despite decades of research that documents the truth of such positions in the social sciences and history (Newman 1999, 2007; Glick and Fiske 2001). Black philosophy is forced to interpret the world in the most elementary terms of white theory. Ellen Pence, one of the founders of the Duluth model, admitted that she simply made up the idea that patriarchy and sexist attitudes are causally linked to intimate partner violence, but Black philosophy commits itself to propagating this theory despite countless studies showing this is not true in white culture, and has never been the case amongst Blacks (Pence 1999; Mills 2009; Caetano et al. 2005). The intellectual repression of Black philosophers is so severe that popularly held opinions and majority (white) consensus can dictate the interpretations of race, class, and gender amongst Blacks. Many of the theories proposed by Black philosophers concerning racism, intimate partner violence, classism and privilege, underrepresentation, and sexism are routinely found to be out of line with, if not outright rejected by, the scientific accounts of the very same social problems. The social sciences, history, and epidemiology have shown that **the causes of social problems in white communities often have very different causes when analyzed in Black or Brown communities. In philosophy, however, there are** no distinctions in causation. **All social ills stem from** ignorance, patriarchy, or **some incredibly general theory that often** lacks cultural specificity or racial nuance. To appear legitimate, these categories simply mimic the already established thinking of whites and in doing so gain the appearance of truth. No matter the empirical findings or authoritative literatures by experts in other disciplines, all conversations about racism and Black folk that run contrary to the endorsed whites are effectively banned by social stigma and punished through professional ostracism.

**TURNS AND OUTWEIGHS CASE –** they can’t access their framework if they engage in invisibility politics that render Black scholarship irrelevant.

#### VIEW FROM NOWHERE DISAD -- they assume everyone has equal access to practical reason; what about differently-abled people? What about people without the mental ability to universalize? People with disabilities can’t access practical reason -- their attempts at universalizing ethics is an INDEPENDENT REASON THEY SHOULD LOSE, since they make this space more exclusive and less accessible

#### The development of Kant’s Practical Philosophy in Towards a Perpetual Peace entertains genocide. Kantian Cosmopolitanism denies the desirability of racial intermixing, upholds the distinctiveness of the white race, and theorizes from the inevitable extermination of all non-whites.

**Bernasconi:** Robert Bernasconi—2002 (Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism in *Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays*, eds. Julie Ward and Tommy Lott [Malden: Blackwell Publishers]

The question arises as to what kind of cosmopolitanism Kant envisaged that would leave the races intact, especially given that each of the races was to a greater or lesser extent assigned a climate or part of the world to which they were best suited. In “Perpetual Peace” Kant had remarked that the desire of every state to dominate the whole world is frustrated by the fact that nature wills it otherwise. The intermixing (Vermischung) of peoples is prevented insofar as linguistic and religious differences remain intact (AA, VIII, p. 367; PW, pp. 113–14). Kant said nothing in this place about the fact that on his view nature also does not will mixing the races. Nevertheless, he was aware that through conquest mixing had taken place. Kant’s own model of cosmopolitanism seems to have been focused on trade rather than on conquest or colonialism, but a phrase from note 1,520 of the Reflexionen zur Anthropologie suggests another, more sinister, resolution. Kant wrote: “All races will be extinguished . . . only not that of the Whites” (AA, XV/2, p. 878). Kant, who had presented the races as products of the foresight of nature, and wanted them to retain their integrity, seems to have reversed himself by suggesting that only Whites would survive. It is a scenario opened up perhaps by the knowledge, already available to him, of how non-White civilizations collapsed, by conquest or disease, on contact with Whites. We should beware overdetermining the meaning of Kant’s note, but it suggests that, faced with two ways in which the foresight of Providence that had produced the races might be frustrated, Kant was more ready to contemplate the extinction of all the races except that of the Whites, rather than see the disappearance of all the races through race mixing. Kant himself did not explain how the races apart from the Whites would be extinguished, nor does he repeat this thought elsewhere to the best of my knowledge. Rather than finding an attempted resolution to the problems of reconciling cosmopolitanism with a philosophy of racial inequality, what one finds in Kant is a dead end that, contrary to the impulse governing his idea of a universal history, suggests the destructiveness of human affairs. This idea of the extinction of whole races would be used a century later to uphold White purity and comfort those who could not imagine a world in which people of all races could live in close contact together in peace. Kant’s note shows that as soon as the idea of race is juxtaposed with the new discipline of a philosophy of history, it invites “solutions” that involve wholesale extermination. The fact that Kant did not solve the problem of how, within the framework of a universal history, cosmopolitanism can be reconciled with a view of White superiority meant that he left to posterity a dangerous legacy. Kant’s note had no historical impact, but he was at very least an articulate spokesman for a framework that had disastrous consequences. One would expect both philosophical and political problems to arise from a view in which all human beings are divided into discrete groups, but where the members of one of the groups alone is in possession of all the qualities and talents necessary to flourish, so that the members of the other groups have no genuine contribution to make. If, as in this case, procreation between the allegedly superior group and any of the other groups leads to a loss of the qualities that distinguish the former group, then matters are much worse. But this was the view that Kant sought to legitimate from a scientific perspective.

#### First, MISDIAGNOSIS: their assertion of universal humanistic principles reduces systemic racism to a problem of recognition that prevents mobilization against White supremacy.

**Curry & Curry 1:** Curry, Tommy J. [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244 GC/CH

We begin with the first author’s reflections on philosophy and its recurring problem of denying the realities of race and racism, reflections that have arisen as a Black (male) philosopher whose life has been threatened for doing Black philosophy. The experience of confronting death, being fearful of being killed doing my job as a critical race theorist, and being threatened with violence for thinking about racism in America has a profound effect on concretizing what is at stake in our theories about anti-Black racism. Whereas my work on race and racism in philosophy earlier in my career was dedicated to the problems created by the mass ignorance of the discipline to the political debates and ethnological history of Black philosophers in the 19th and 20th centuries, I now find myself thinking more seriously about the way that **philosophy**, really theory itself—our present categories of knowledge, such as race, class, and gender, found through disciplines—actually **hastens the deaths of subjugated peoples in the U**nited **S**tates. **Academic philosophy routinely abstracts away from**—directs thought to not attend to the realities of death, dying, and despair created by—**antiBlack racism. Black, Brown, and Indigenous populations are routinely** rationalized as disposable flesh. The deaths of these groups launch philosophical discussions of social injustice and spark awareness by whites , while the deaths of white people direct policy and demand outrage. **Because racialized bodies are confined to inhumane living conditions that nurture violence** and despair **that become attributed to the savage nature of nonwhites and evidence of their inhumanity, the deaths of these** **dehumanized peoples are** often **measured against the dangers they are thought to pose to** others. The **interpretation of the inferior position that racialized groups occupy in the U**nited **S**tates **is grounded in how whites often think of themselves in relation to problem populations. This relationship is** often **rationalized by avoidance and by** the **denials** of whites **about being causally related to the harsh conditions imposed on nonwhites in the world. Philosophy, and its glorification of the rational individual, ignores the complexity of anti-Black racism by blaming the complacency**, if not outright hostility, **towards Blacks on the mass ignorance of white America**. To remedy this problem, Black philosophers are asked to respond by gearing their writings, lectures, and professional presence to further educate and dialogue with white philosophers in order to enable them to better understand anti-Black racism and white supremacy (Curry 2008, 2015). This therapy is often rewarded as scholarship. **Philosophical positions that analyze racism as a problem of miscommunication, misunderstanding, and ignorance** (philosophies predicated on the capacity of whites to change) **are rewarded and praised as the cutting edge and most impactful theories about race and racism. Reducing racism to a problem of recognition** and understanding **allows white philosophers to remain absolved of their contribution to the apathy that white America has to the death** and subjugation **Black Americans endure** at the hands of the white race.

To some readers, speaking about races as different groups with opposite, if not antagonistic, social lives seems to run contrary to the idea that there are no real races, just people, only the human race. This is the core of **race-neutral theory** in academic philosophy. Race neutrality **asserts that while race, class, and gender may** in fact **differentiate bodies, the capacity for reason—the human essence beneath it all—is what is ultimately at stake in the recognition of difference**. While **this mantra** has been offered to whites since the integrationist strategies of the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1950s under Chief Justice Earl Warren, it **has had little effect in restructuring the psychology of white individuals or remedying** the **institutional** practices of **racism that continue to exclude** or punish **Black Americans**. How are Black scholars to speak about racism, specifically the violence and death that seem to gravitate towards Black bodies if the rules of philosophy and the fragility of white Americans insist that racism is not the cause of the disproportionate death Black Americans suffer and race is not a significant factor in Black people’s lives? This article is an attempt to debunk the seemingly neutral starting point of academic philosophy. **For decades, Black philosophers have attempted to** educate white philosophers and **reorient the philosophical anthropologies of the discipline. Black, Brown, and Indigenous philosophers have dedicated their lives** and careers **to educating white philosophers** and students, **with little to no effect on the composition** and disposition **of the discipline**. While it is not uncommon for philosophy departments to say they support diversity, the reality is that many, if not most, Black philosophers continue to write about the problem of racism, their experiences of marginalization, and the violence they suffer from white colleagues, disciplinary organizations, and universities. **This article should be read as an attempt not to amend the Western metaphysical tradition but to reveal the obstacles that indicate its perennial** failure. It is the position of the authors that many of the demands for disciplinary change are often expressed as politics, when in reality **there are issues of metaphysics** (the concerns of being) **and philosophical anthropology** (the concerns about the (non)being capable of thinking) **that are unaddressed in much of the current literature**. Section I of this article describes what Black philosophy has taken to be the problem of racism in academic philosophy more broadly. Since the 1970s Black philosophers have criticized, attacked, and attempted to reform the discipline with little effect. This section interrogates why that is the case. Section II argues that the failure of philosophy to change is a problem of metaphysics or the illusion that Blackness is compatible with the idea of the white human. Section III presents the social scientific evidence demonstrating the seeming permanence of anti-Black racism and the dangerous nature of colorblind ideology, which does not recognize that societal organization and racism determine the life chances of Blacks. This article ends with a suggestion of what Black philosophy would look like if its primary mandate were not to persuade whites to remedy their own racist practices, but to diagnose and build strategies against the present problems of racism in philosophy before us.

**2. [Curry & Curry 2] Second, PERPETUATING RACISM:** their philosophy isactively used to rationalize Black deaths.

**Curry & Curry 2:** Tommy J. [Tommy, PhD, Prof. of Philosophy @ TAMU, Gwenetta, PhD, Ass. Prof. of Gender and Race Studies @ Alabama], “On the Perils of Race Neutrality and Anti-Blackness: Philosophy as an Irreconcilable Obstacle to (Black) Thought,” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 77, Nos. 3-4 (May-September 2018). DOI: 10.1111/ajes.12244 GC/CH

Whereas white philosophers often share a similar language with other whites, namely, that all people are human beings and rational individuals, Black philosophers who study race often speak in terms of their negations: non-being. Harris (2018) refers to this as “necro-being.” Curry (2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b) speaks of the Man-Not. Wilderson (2009) writes of the slave. **To be Black is to render the very grammar of the academy delusional. To speak of impending death and sub-personhood** and explain the experiences of violence and dehumanization that accompany this position to white individuals who only think of their existence in terms of always being human and persons is ineffable. **Perhaps** the theorist Calvin **Warren best captures this problem in his book Ontological Terror**: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation. Warren (2018: 2) argues: **The human being provides an anchor for the declaration, and since the being of the human is invaluable, then Black life must also matter, if the Black is a human** (the declaration anchors mattering in the human’s Being). **But we reach a point of terror with this syllogistic reasoning. One must take a step backward and ask the fundamental question: is the Black, in fact, a human being?** Or **can Black(ness) ground itself in the being of the human? If** it can**not, then** on what bases can we assert the mattering of Black existence? The consequence of attending to the problem of Blackness and the realities of death is that **the theories that emerge to account for what is taken to be the accidental positionality of whites who are thought to be human**, individuals, citizens, and persons **must make sense of a reality where to be Black is to be nonhuman, savage, alien, and reified and consequently subject to violence and wished dead. As** the late Critical Race Theorist, **Derrick Bell** (1997: 23) **once said**: **We have never understood that the essence of the racism we contended against was not simply that we were exploited in slavery**, degraded by **segregation, and** frustrated by **the unmet promises of equal opportunity. The essence of racism in America was the hope that we who were Black would not exist**. Instead of racism being defined as a set of attitudes or beliefs about racial groups held by biased individuals, the authors prefer to understand racism as a complex nexus, a cognitive architecture used to invent, reimagine, and evolve the presumed political, social, economic, sexual, and psychological superiority of the white races in society, while materializing the imagined inferiority and hastening the death of inferior races. Said differently, racism is the manifestation of the social processes and concurrent logics that facilitate the death and dying of racially subjugated peoples. (Curry 2017a: 4) **Racism is a social process that demands the extinguishing of Black life. Racism craves death**. It is constructed, then legitimized through cultural and individual complacency. **When a young Black boy is killed, the instruments of the state, the authority of the police, and the vulnerability of the Black male body converge in the ultimate expression of violence** that results in death. **The public then rationalizes this exercise of state violence** and the individual will of the police officer who killed the Black boy **through empathy**. The white individual who sees the dead Black male body understands the need to kill the Black boy because Blackness socially expresses criminality, danger, and the possible death of a white life. **This fear of Blackness creates empathy for the officer who killed the Black boy**. He is thought of by the white interpreter who is watching the dead Black male body as a corpse. The fear shared between the officer and white onlooker is legitimated by the state because the state offers its society security from this Black male threat. **This is how populations feared by the society are simultaneously constructed and destroyed**. This brief example describes the depth of the problem involved with racism. **Black philosophers are not simply objecting to the thoughts individuals hold about different groups of people, but how the thoughts that white individuals hold can be supported and expressed in violence against** Black men and women in the world. Because a white supremacist world supports the fears of the white racist, the individual racist’s anti-Blackness is aspirational. It is expressed as a will for there to be no Black bodies there. As such, the human becomes an untenable account of **Black life, given this disposability**. The world is simply not organized in such a way that allows Blackness to not be seen, perceived, and dehumanized in relation to whites. **No amount of evidence** or argument **seems to be able to displace the faith philosophers have in education, dialogue, and mutual understanding** between Blacks and whites as the remedies of racism (Curry 2008). Generations of nonwhite philosophers have spent their careers and research showing the discipline the horrors of racism, xenophobia, and ethno-nationalist thinking, but there has been little to no change in departments or the discipline at large. For many philosophers, the idea that racism is permanent is unthinkable. Despite the words and works of Black political theorists like the lawyer Robert F. Williams or Dr. Huey P. Newton, or even more canonically established Black figures like W. E. B. DuBois, Carter G. Woodson, Frantz Fanon, or Derrick Bell, philosophy as a discipline and **philosophers** more generally **refuse to acknowledge that racism** remains the core and most determining aspect of America’s social processes. Enamored by the stories of Blacks suffering, many scholarly conversations about Blackness and racism focus on the harm that Black individuals suffer at the hands of whites or the discipline of philosophy. Relatively few works actually analyze racism structurally or beyond identity at all. **Philosophical analyses do not revolve around death or the material consequences of anti-Blackness**. Instead, the fear and anxiety that Black philosophers and graduate students share with whites become more worthwhile topics.

**[**