### Off 1

#### Appeals to universal individual values paradoxically flatten difference by constructing a uniform human subject. This plays into neoliberal technologies of biopolitical control.

Narges Zahedipoor 19, The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, “How Rights Claims Expand Carceral State,” Masters Theses, 12/15/2019, https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk\_gradthes/5516

As I illustrated in the second chapter, the new type of power was established based on the bourgeois ideology and under the “disciplinary power”. In fact, in modern society, power is no longer be transcribed to sovereignty. This new type of power is the foundation of industrial capitalist society (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). Theory of sovereignty tries establishing the subject to subject cycle. Individuals who are the only bearer of natural rights delegate these rights to sovereignty to rule them. Individuals who were the subjects of rights that they have by their nature now delegate this power to the state to govern them. In other words, sovereignty requires individuals to be governed and regulated by the rights that they gave them at a particular moment. (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). By rights, Foucault (Foucault and Ewald, 2003) means all apparatuses of it, from law and rules to all institutions related to it. Right in this point of view function as a means for domination, not only sovereignty relations but the whole of all domination relations (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). But the theory of sovereignty no longer lives as a theory of right. In fact, it is continued as an ideology and as the organized principles of juridical codes which superimpose on the mechanisms of discipline a system of rights that conceal the actual disciplinary power of the state and its domination (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). This new system of power guarantees everyone’s practicing of the sovereign right, which can be exercised by them. So, the right of sovereignty and the mechanisms of disciplinary power are inseparable in modern society. But this confrontation has its own discourses; under sovereignty, we have rights discourse, but the scientific or clinical knowledge is the disciplinary power’s discourse which operates through normalization and not a code of law. So, in our day, power is exercised through both right and discipline in a way that discipline and its techniques are invading rights (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). However, the only way to limit the exercise of disciplinary power is by invoking the old formal bourgeois right, which is, in reality, the right of sovereignty (Foucault and Ewald, 2003). But, using sovereignty against discipline does not enable us to limit disciplinary power. These two, sovereign and discipline- are the “two things that constitute the general mechanism of power in our society” (p. 39). Sovereign rights of individuals (juridical power) and disciplinary normalization bringing play together is “repression”. Repression today is used as a tool for coercive social control. Imprisonment is one these social control policies, especially in places that African-American, poor, and other minorities are deprived of their political and economic participation. Repression is used by the state both through the juridical system (right of sovereignty) and the disciplinary mechanisms. First, repression is applied through the prison mechanism, with all its institutions. It is justified by crime control and the right of security and safety- both the liberal rights; On the other hand, it functions through complex mechanisms of disciplinary normalization. Imprisonment (as a way to repress) operates through the scientific calculation in order to normalize, differentiate, hierarchize, and make a division between those who are the first degree citizens in terms of respecting the rules and those who are excluded. Liberalism, as the mentality of rules, creates an atmosphere in which market, civil society, and citizens have their own logic and intrinsic mechanisms of self- regulation. In this system of governing, sovereign tries to totalize its will across the national space (Burchell, 1991). However, rulers, on the one hand, confront with subjects who have rights and interest that should not be interdicted by politics and, on the other hand, they faced with the situation in which they cannot govern by the exercise of sovereign will because they do not have the prerequisite knowledge and capacities (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). So, they need to reformulate the objects, instrument, and tasks of rule based on the market, civil society and citizenship aiming to ensure that they serve the national as a whole and function to benefit it (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). However, discipline and bio-power- apparently illiberal- finally found their places within liberal mentalities of rule. These rules become practicable and understandable as a prerequisite condition for production and governing free citizens (Foucault, 2012). Disciplinary logic operates through mechanisms in prison aimed to produce subjective conditions, self-control, selfmastery, and self-regulation to govern free and civilized citizens. On the other hand, bio-political strategies, including censuses, statistical inquiries, reproduction control, and health programs, provide the related laws that liberal government must know and respect. That said, the legitimate government is not arbitrary, but it is based on the policies which are necessary for the wellbeing enhancement of those whose interests are mandatory to respect (Foucault, 1980a). These laws function through the good amount of knowledge of the areas that should be ruled, such as prison, family, economy, community. Liberalism tries to invest in the subjects of government. It means that in politics, law, morality and so forth, subjects are individuals whose freedom, rights and liberty are to be respected by setting limits to the legitimate political and legal regulation to regulate the particular and new type of individuality (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). Thus, the liberal strategy behind prisons is not to regulate individuals, but they are seeking to create individuals who do not need to be governed by others and be able to be governed, mastered and cared by themselves. In liberalism, the abstract subject of right takes a “universalistic” form (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). Or, as Marx (1843) asserts, liberalism is trying to eradicate the intrinsic distinctions of individuals under the shadow of abstract citizenship. Marx (1843) argues that these liberal rights and liberty, are nothing except the right of separation from others, the rights of self- interest, and all individuals are treated equally in the liberalism if they become isolated and severing. Thus, the liberal constitutional state is built upon depoliticized inegalitarian social powers and naturalizing egoistic civil society and rights are the form for securing and legitimizing these tendencies (Brown, 1995). The solution of Marx (1843) for depoliticized human beings and their isolation because of the liberal notions of rights and freedom is “every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man himself. Political emancipation is a reduction of man, on the one hand to a member of civil society, an independent and egoistic individual, and on the other hand, to a citizen, to a moral person” (p. 46). The liberal policies contribute both directly and indirectly to the carceral state. First, in the way that liberalism identifies the rights and second by its economic strategies. However, these two ways are integrated. The importance of these liberal notions of rights will be evident when we think how these rights are defined and whom they serve. Let us talk about the property right, for example, and its effects on racial minorities, poor, and people who are historically marginalized and the way these rights expand the carceral state. The rise of capitalism, the accumulation of wealth, the development of the bourgeois class determined many acts as illegal and criminal. These new areas of criminality tended to secure and maintain the capital, property, and wealth in the hand of the dominant, powerful, and capitalist class. This tendency requires the state to provide a safe place for upper and middle-class whites to maintain their properties, which result in the imprisonment for those who violate these liberal rights. On the other hand, liberalism can indirectly expand the carceral state by its economic and political principles. For example, the free market intensifies inequality to the extent that as those who are in the very top socio-economic status accumulate more wealth, those who are deprived of the resources tend to live in the urban, suburban area, and in general in streets. Since they work more hours for less wage, benefit, and security, they seek alternatives to pay for their living expenses. This situation is the basis for the first way that liberalism defines the rights. Thus, cleaning the streets of criminals serves the upper and middle-class interests to make and maintain their capital. Also, attracting local and foreign investment is a principle in a liberal and neoliberal economy which requires a “safe” place for an investment of companies. However, the way that liberalism handles this situation is situated in an intensified “individualism”. Individuals are selfregulated, self-controlled, and responsible for their action. As Margaret Thatcher (1978)- Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990- states, “rising crime is not due to “society” but to the steady undermining of personal responsibility and self-discipline”. In liberalism, everyone has an equal right without considering race, class, gender, religion, age, etc. Throughout this system, disciplines specify subjects not based on their inherent characteristics but based on the certain norms of civilization and divide subjects to a civilized member of society and those who fail to exercise their citizenship responsibility. Thus, in liberal governmentalities, the purpose is that free individuals fulfill the voluntarily assumed obligations to make their existence by conducting life responsibility (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 2013). On the other hand, must make their decisions about their self-regulation and self- control surrounded by a web of norms and normativities. (make this part separe) As I illustrated before natural rights are universal in the sense that human rights can be applied on all human beings regardless of their intrinsic human characteristics. This notion of rights is fundamental for the foundation of liberalism where rights of citizens are distinct from the actual right of a man seeking to internalize and volunteer obligations and switch responsibility form state to individuals. What are the correctional policies for individuals who fail to be self- regulated, selfcontrolled, or fail to be self-realized in order to restore them to society as normal citizens who function properly according to the liberalism’s value and goals? Besides other disciplinary mechanisms to keeping citizen in the flow of making profit such as school, hospitals, and the intensified surveillance in the every corner of streets, workplace, etc, one of the policies that ensures that people who fail to fulfill the tendency of liberal disciplinary power to make selfregulated individuals, is through imprisonment as a tool for correction. As I illustrated in the second chapter, the first reforms that led to the production of the prison originated from the efforts of religious leaders toward spiritual cleansing. This purpose of imprisonment has turned at the rise of capitalism into correcting prisoners as the effort to make them productive human binges. This goal of imprisonment is argued by Bentham and his suggestion about the panopticon prison. The architecture of panopticon is designed to work on inmate souls in order to turn them to efficient workers. All the prison mechanism functions through a timetable to make inmates again efficient and productive citizens. Furthermore, the universalistic characteristic of liberal rights is paradoxical. Adorno (2006) shows a theoretical paradox of universal perspectives toward progressive rationality in which the universal aspects turn into the particular aspects which causes us who are likewise particular, to anguish. The dominant universality can no longer mean history or any positive value (Adorno, 2006). However, any form of consciousness is highly reluctant to admit that its assumed supremacy of objective power over human beings who are confident that they are in the full possession of self, is only a function of the universal (Adorno, 2006). So, our immediate sense or experience implies that what happens to us is universal, and there is nothing particular with our experiences. For example, if someone fails to find a job, or being ignored or discriminated, our immediate thought would be we are in full possession of our life and future. The paradox appears where science, with its magical tools, shows us whatever happens to us is not universal, and it is all about us. There is nothing universal, and all happenings are the result of spontaneous individuality. Universality is a metaphysical and abstract thing which does not exist in actual life (Adorno, 2006). How can we apply these arguments in the current phenomenon of rights claims and its role on the carceral state? Using Foucault and Adorno’s arguments to the question of this study, as I argued before, the disciplinary power - the foundation of the capitalist industrial society- is founded based on the scientific and clinical knowledge which is best suited to liberalism. The rights discourse in a liberal society is defined as the universal and inalienable rights which individuals have regardless of time, space, or their intrinsic features such as race, age, gender. These notions of rights has a paradoxical nature in the sense that, although they claim to be universal and a mechanism toward emancipation and even as individuals assume to have them regardless of their differences and conceive them as their first and immediate experiences – the universality creates a false consciousness in individuals. In actual life the disciplinary power which is seeking to normalize individuals tries to internalize certain obligations into the citizens and make them self-regulated, self- controlled and responsible for what happens in their lives or in short as Adorno (2006) states make everything particular and completely individual. Now we can see how this notion of rights functions through the criminal justice system in a liberal society. Historically, and especially after the civil right movements in the US, the human rights assumed to be universal with a sacred focus on equality for the different races, religions, genders, and ages leads individuals to believe and assume that they are in a full possession and domination of their lives and nature. But what happens in actual life or in the current criminal justice system is the fact that the liberal disciplinary power considers all individuals and especially prisoners or those who violate social norms to be responsible for their actions. Here is where the universal feature of rights can be paradoxical. These liberal policies are exist in different contexts and eras in contemporary liberal societies and apply to prisoners, addicts, students, or patients. Here, we can see why Marx (1843) criticizes the notion of universalism when the actual human being is eradicated in society and becomes an abstract citizen. When we are talking about the rights, we are talking about justice, freedom, and equality that are all universal concepts. But, in reality, what we have is intensified individuality. As I illustrated, the prison population in the US is disproportionately occupied by young, poor black men. This disproportionate amount is because of many liberal social and economic policies, which eventually impose many challenges in the minorities lives. The policies like War on Drug or Three Strike in California state are the examples of that in that these policies presupposed African- American responsible for the violation of the norms through the disciplinary mechanism and techniques like efficient litigation, prosecution, policing, and all other disciplinary institutions (school-to-prison pipelines, etc.). So, all these institutions are not at work to ensure universal human rights, but rather to normalized and self-regulate individuals in categorical ways. In summary, discipline, through its complicated institutions and based on universal norms, tries to normalize individuals. For example, through psychiatrists, prosecutors, police, therapists, and some universal instructions toward a better, efficient and more productive life, tries to internalize that the deviance, mental disorder, or crime are individual or personal problems which should be solved by these universal institutions. Therefore, the purpose of discipline is not to create a particularism that defends the actual rights of man. It neither aims to recognize all the intrinsic human differences nor different social circumstances. Instead, it seeks to specify, particularize individuals in a society based on their variation of following the rules and respecting citizen’s obligations.

#### The role of private entities in outer space serves as a disruption from the legitimate violence from the state --- the 1AC doesn’t solve it just recreates notions of utopia from the state

Fredriksson and Arvanitakis 17 [Martin Fredriksson Linköping University James Arvanitakis Western Sydney University “Property, Place and Piracy” November 2017 Publisher: RoutledgeISBN: 9781138745131 Projects: Piracy UnboundCommons and Commodities]/ISEE

So, the Orphans rebellion might be closer to Disney’s Jack Sparrow than to ‘Calico Jack’ Rackham and figures like Tumlinson describe the invocation of piracy as tongue in cheek. Nontheless historical figure of the pirate remains a useful heuristic for approaching contemporary space mining. The pirate, as frontier libertarian of the colonial seas, was both anathema to and fundamentally constitutive of the international legal order that began to emerge alongside the ‘juridification of the oceanic commons’ (Policante, 2015, p. xii). A violent appropriator exploiting the ‘free’ spaces outside the sphere of state power, the pirate of the pre-modern world was hostis humani generis – the enemy of all humanity (see Chapter 6 in this volume for a detailed analysis). But, paradoxically, efforts to eradicate piracy solidified the role of European colonial powers as protectors of the oceanic commons and global commerce, simultaneously strengthening the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence on the frontier (Heller-Roazen, 2009; Policante, 2015, p. xii). Although the pirate’s capacity for unrestricted violence in plundering treasure from rival vessels may not resonate with space mining, this section considers whether extraterrestrial resource exploitation can be construed as an act of theft that similarly involves this state/ pirate dialectic. Central to the commingling of piratical lawlessness and the extension of state power onto the frontier is a transformation in the pirate’s legal standing that occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. During the European Wars of Religion, a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) became solidified in customary law and treaty agreements beginning with the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. ‘Amity lines’ were drawn to separate the emergent ‘law of nations’ between continental powers and an anomic space ‘beyond the line’,10 where ‘treaties, peace and friendship applied only to Europe, to the Old World, to the area on this side of the line’ (Schmitt, 2006, p. 92). It is within this 130 M. Johnson anomic space where the pirate became employed by the state: those who held a lettre des marques et de représailles (letter of marque and reprisal) were authorised to plunder enemy vessels and treasure without any limit on hostility. The pirate was transformed from lawless freebooter to state-sanctioned privateer: resources appropriated beyond the line were shared between privateers and state coffers, and the privateer became fundamental to European state-building (Policante, 2015, pp. 61–67). Might the frontier beyond the atmosphere comprise a similar state of exception, where the physical distance from the ‘concrete order’ (Schmitt 2006, p. 65) of terrestrial legal and political norms results in an extra-legal or anomic space, free for plunder? Despite the largely pre-emptive juridification of the space frontier via the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST), the legal status of outer space retains a degree of ambiguity. The OST was drafted at the height of Cold War geopolitical tension and subsequently focused more on the militarisation of outer space and undesirability of territorial claims on celestial bodies, as opposed to clarifying the role of non-state actors or providing a framework for commercial activity (Pop, 2000). The treaty established that outer space was res communis: a commons and ‘the province of all mankind’. Article 2 stated that ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.’ Crucially, the treaty has not explicitly forbidden private appropriation of celestial bodies. The clause ‘by any other means’ is possibly enough to prohibit appropriation by non-government actors (Pop, 2000). To more ardent supporters of space mining, however, the emphasis on national appropriation presents a loophole for private enterprise (Kfir, 2016; White, 1998), that ‘an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies’ (Gorove, 1969, p. 351). The US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (CSLCA) appears to take the latter interpretation, whereby the sovereign power of the US legislature endorses private enterprises to ‘act on their own behalf’. Title IV of the Act states: A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource … shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States. (US CSLCA, 2015, §402) These ‘international obligations’ are clearly in relation to the OST, and the CSLCA also includes the ‘Extraterritorial Sovereignty Disclaimer’: ‘the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body’ (US CSLCA, 2015, Privateering on the cosmic frontier? 131 §403). The ‘applicable law’ of the act only includes, but it is not limited to, international law: while the precise details regarding enforcement of any space property claims are unclear, such claims could also be protected under US law and competing claims arbitrated in US courts. While the CLSCA would not entail the American flag being planted on the surface of an asteroid, the US is tacitly claiming some level of jurisdiction via acts of corporate appropriation. And, if ‘international obligations’ represent more than just the OST’s nonappropriation principle, the general absence of recognition and endorsement from the international community means that the CSCLA is a largely unilateral assertion.11 The CSLCA effectively positions the US in opposition to other nations – spacefaring or otherwise – seeming to contradict the res communis nature of the OST. It imposes a res nullius legal interpretation of outer space resources by assuming that celestial bodies are free for exploitation, provided no direct territorial claims are made. The United States recognises and enforces its citizens’ resource claims on the space frontier in the name of ‘[developing] in the United States … economically viable, safe and stable’ space resource industries (US CSLCA, 2015, p. 44). This exploitation of the frontier as ‘state of exception’ is an act of economic competition, and the CSLCA then starts to resemble the letter of marque. Resources claimed in outer space will generate tax revenue and further political prerogatives of economic growth (jobs, infrastructure and so on), akin to the role of privateering in European state-building or the granting of royal charters to joint-stock companies like the East India Company. Outer space becomes the province of the United States economy rather than ‘all mankind’ a commercial vanguard enables an indirect form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2004; Dickens & Ormrod 2007, p. 59), pre-emptively stealing resources owned by all. As far as NewSpace’s yearnings for pirate space utopias are concerned, this fundamental reliance on the state’s legislative apparatus implies that the notion of a stateless space frontier is indeed a fantasy. As privateers and patriots, ‘[extending] our free-market values into space’ (Kerber, cited in Space Frontier Foundation, 2015), NewSpace mining firms effectively extend state influence onto the anomic frontier under the guise of entrepreneurial commerce.

**Locking in terrains of biopolitical control results in catastrophe production – that poses a threat to all life**

**McLoughlin 10** (Daniel McLoughlin – PhD in philosophy from the University of New South Wales and Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Law there, “Agamben’s Exception: Sovereignty, Ontology and the Politics of Crisis”, School of History and Philosophy of the University of New South Wales, August 2010, <http://unsworks.unsw.edu.au/fapi/datastream/unsworks:9163/SOURCE02?view=true>, MG)

\*ableist language connoted in brackets

Although a biopolitical perspective is absent from State of Exception, in the lecture “Security and Terror” (2001) Agamben does provide some reflection on the link between the use of emergency powers and the problem of biopolitics. He does so through a brief discussion of the “paradigm of security,” which he suggests in State of Exception (without detail) replaces the declaration of the state of exception in the latter half of the Twentieth Century. Agamben’s lecture opens by noting that the logic of security goes back to the theoretical origins of the modern state in the work of Hobbes, for whom the **protection of life from physical threat is an essential justification of the state**.166 “Security and Terror” goes on to develop the analysis, however, by drawing on Foucault’s work on the biopolitics of the population and governmentality.167 According to Foucault, the biopolitics of the population is a distinct mode of the “power over life” from discipline. Where discipline intervenes at the level of the body to normalise the individual, the object of biopolitical intervention is a multiplicity of people, as a “species body” or “population.” The aim of this intervention is to create of conditions under which the population can prosper, through the **optimal arrangement of people** in their relations with their social, environmental, and economic milieu.168 Foucault describes the mechanisms through which this biopolitical regulation is effected as “**apparatuses of security**.” These intervene in a population, not in order to eliminate a phenomena (such as disease or pollution) but rather to **control** **it** in a way that is optimal: “in a word, security mechanisms have to be installed around the random element inherent in a population of living beings so as to optimize a state of life.”169 Paul Patton points out that what is meant by security in this context is not “the life or safety of individuals but the achievement and maintenance of an overall equilibrium or regularity in a population.”170 Through his analysis of the state of exception, however, Agamben, however, blurs together the Hobbesian sense of security as the protection of life, together with the Foucauldian analysis of the “apparatuses of security.” Not only does State of Exception’s genealogy of the state of exception as a paradigm of government repeatedly cast it as a “technique of government,”171 but his approach to “Security and Terror” asserts that measures of security “require constant reference to a state of exception.”172 Agamben’s descriptions of the use of the state of exception as a technique of government also briefly cite the logic that Foucault sees as guiding the use of security mechanisms: the logic of law and discipline is that of ordering and restricting, such that “**security wants to regulate disorder**.”173 Agamben asserts that contemporary governance, instead of maintaining order, operates through the “the **administration of the absence of order**”;174 in this way, instead of preventing catastrophes, today “**politics secretly works towards the production of emergencies**.”175 Similarly, State of Exception casts the political form of the global police state as “**a new planetary order which is in truth the worst of all [~~disorders~~]**.”176 Here, he also explicitly links this governance through [~~disorder~~] to sovereignty and, in particular, the exploitation of the indeterminacy of the decision on the exception, arguing that since the Second World War, “the voluntary creation of a permanent state of emergency (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic ones.”177 It would appear, then, that for Agamben, the state of exception is one of the “apparatuses of security” that the contemporary state deploys in order to maintain equilibrium. However, **the “equilibrium”** that the state maintains through the use of the state of exception is a profoundly **unstable one**. Similar to his analysis of biopolitics and the concentration camp in Homo Sacer, Agamben’s account of the contemporary security asserts that the logic of the protection of life, upon which the modern state was justified, now **poses a threat to that very life**. In the previous chapter, I argued that the strength of Agamben’s work lies in his use of political problems as a departure point for a critique of a political tradition that seeks to render its political apparatuses inoperative. In Homo Sacer he achieves this by implicating the concepts of the modern political tradition in the development of the biopolitical catastrophe, thereby problematising a politics that would seek to restore the “original” meaning of concepts such as “nation,” “right”, and “democracy” as a response to their hollowing out by political nihilism. Although, in State of Exception he develops a critique of the crisis of the constitutional politics of liberal democracy, this lacks a corresponding immanent critique of the relationship between juridical nihilism and the liberal democratic state from which it emerged. The “paradigm of security” also provides a crucial link between **liberalism and the state of exception**, and has the potential to do the work that his critique of concepts such as “right” and “nation” does in Homo Sacer: that is, foreclosing the resort to a politics that would simply seek to restore the status quo of the modern political tradition, by illuminating the relationship between that tradition and the development of the political problems it attempts to combat.

**We should imagine a world where things aren’t what they seem – the desire of the 1ac is the opposite of the life guided by reason – return to immanence and embrace contingency**

**Gulli 16** (Bruno Gulli - teaches philosophy at Long Island University, “Sovereign Violence and the Power of Acting – (Imagining the Unsovereign Law)”, A Journal of the Social Imaginary, 2016, <https://cab.unime.it/journals/index.php/IMAGO/article/viewFile/1307/1024>, MG)

A critique of sovereign violence, therefore, cannot simply rest on the reality of affects and desire and the deterministic tendencies engendered by it. What must be taken into account by such a critique is the fact of contingency –as well as the awareness of it. **Being aware of contingency means imagining how things could be other than they are**. Obviously, this awareness and this imagination are not found in the detached place of a simple and unified subject, but rather in the multiple conditions of subjectification and in the process of individuation –and this is what determination amounts to. Yet, a vortex of original contingency and freedom must exist if we are to posit the possibility of change. Things can change –as John Duns Scotus notes— because they are possible, rather than necessary (Duns Scotus 1987: 44). Indeed, “**those who deny that some being is contingent should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented**” (9). Something different can be imagined only because it is possible –and possibility is part of reality. So when Lordon denies what he calls “the tense of regret” as “a retrospective illusion” and as “the Spinozist non-sense par excellence,” he is perhaps denying the reality, or actuality, of potentiality (Lordon 2014: 143). He says that “to be able to do and to do are one and the same thing: we could only have done what we did, neither more nor less” (143-144). But I find this unrealistic and false. For instance, I could have gone to the movies last night even though I didn’t. I believe that, even from a Spinozist point of view, the denial of ‘I could have,’ which I would not necessarily call “the tense of regret,” is a bit too strong. (Let us also note that the tense of regret is rather ‘I should have’ and admit that regret itself is in any case an important moment in human experience – and that we often learn from it.) That denial does in fact reduce reality to what is simply there, the merely given, by excluding potentiality. For it seems impossible to deny ‘I could have’ without at the same time also denying the ‘I could’ of transformation and change. To be sure, Lordon does not at all rule out change. But he inscribes it in a determinist –though he specifies, non-fatalist—ontology. For instance, he says, When the indignation that gets people moving prevails over the obsequium that makes them stay put, a new affective vector is formed, and individuals who used to be determined to respect institutional norms … are suddenly determined to sedition (140). But what accounts for this indignation? I would suggest that it is not at all a matter of determinism or free will. As far as I know, one of the most interesting takes on this issue is Jean-Paul Sartre’s denunciation of it as a false problem. At the outset of the chapter on freedom in Being and Nothingness, Sartre says, It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free will, to cite examples in favor of one or the other thesis without ever attempting first to make explicit the structures contained in the very idea of action (1956: 559). For Sartre, an action must be intentional: “The careless smoker who has through negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted” (ibid.). This intentionality is what makes agents (bodies) expend their freedom, their nothingness. But as Sartre famously says, there is no exit from it, “we do not choose to be free” (623). We are “thrown into freedom,” condemned to it (ibid.). Sartre provides the solution to the false problem mentioned above, the paradox of freedom, by means of the notion of ‘situation’: “there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom” (629). Situation means determination, but outside the logic of determinism. **Freedom means power to act, outside the illusion of a free will**. A critique of sovereignty also needs to posit something outside sovereignty. **However, this is not a moment of transcendence; rather, it is a return into immanence**. To say that there is a return to immanence seems to imply that there was an exit from it. In fact, there was no exit, but only the positing of a fictitious reality, **the illusion of sovereignty as a totality**. **The end of that illusion gives the sense of a return into what has always already been there**. In fact, it is sovereignty itself – sovereignty’s first and foremost expression of violence—that by positing itself as separate and distant creates a **metaphysical and fictitious paradigm of power** as potestas (authority) rather than potentia (potency). The fact that the paradigm is fictitious does not mean that it lacks real efficacy. What it lacks is **authenticity** and, if you will, **legitimacy**. Yet, it is a real and effective power. Lordon is absolutely right when he says, on the basis of Spinoza, that there “is no potestas that does not emanate from potentia(multitudinis) –but in the form of hijacking and to the advantage of the most powerful of master-desires, the desire of the sovereign” (160-161). **What must be shown is that the desire of the sovereign –a despotic desire—is the opposite of the life guided by reason, and closer to freedom, defining the desire of the multitude**. It is this reason that is neither private nor public, but something altogether different. In fact, it is common reason, that is to say, humanity.

#### **Contingency comes first – it shapes politics, acts as a precondition for liberal freedom, and counters dogmatic identities that otherwise threaten solvency**

Alt 16 (Suvi Alt - Assistant Professor in International Relations at the University of Groningen, “Beyond the Biopolitics of Development”, University of Laplap, 9 December 2016, <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/79177315.pdf>, MG)

The French Revolution gave expression to the idea that truth is created rather than found.487 Instead of being of a transcendent origin, truth is made in the human world. The ontological proposition of contingency has thus been necessary for a modern account of freedom from transcendental rule.488 **Contingency is a precondition for liberal freedom**. The contemporary importance of contingency is also founded on its association with the biopolitical imaginary. As discussed in the previous chapter, contingency is not one property of emergent life; it is the property of emergent life.489 Furthermore, Foucauldian conceptions of power are also based on an understanding of both the origins and nature of power as contingent. Recognising the contingency of all forms of social and political order is arguably one of the core tenets of different forms of poststructuralist thinking. Likewise, poststructuralism has contributed to politics an understanding of humans as beings produced by contingent histories, events and practices. Foucauldian analyses of ourselves as historically determined beings are directed at ‘the contemporary limits of the necessary’, thus exposing the contingency of such truths and practices that produce subjects.490 Contingency is put forward as a **precondition for politics** in the works of a number of contemporary thinkers including William Connolly, Jacques Rancière and Michael Shapiro. Appreciation of our own contingency and of our indebtedness to difference provides, for Connolly, a **way of countering dogmatic identities and thus functions as the basis of his account of a pluralistic democratic ethos**.491 Likewise, Shapiro affirms the possibility of ‘a contingency-embracing order where new relations, based on de-identification with old imposed essences, can flourish.’492 For Rancière, democracy refers to the institution of politics as the system through which any order of distribution of bodies is ‘thrown back on its contingency.’493 According to Robert Nichols, a free relation to the world means ‘being attuned to the contingency and indeterminacy of world-disclosure, which, in turn, means accepting that “we” (our selfhood) are beholden to this contingency – that we are contingent beings who are “held” by ontological freedom.’494 The effectiveness of the political is arguably manifested wherever the necessity of subjectivities, relations and systems of governance is **exposed as a fiction** and replaced with a **recognition of contingency** as the formative principle of the political. The biopolitical problematisations of various practices and rationalities pertaining to ‘life’ that have proliferated within the past decade are also intimately **tied to the concept of contingency**. According to Thomas Lemke, the primary aim of an analytics of biopolitics is to reveal the contingency of the rationalities on which biopolitical governance is based.495 Biopolitical analysis ought to, therefore, be concerned with exposing contingency where none appears to exist. But how can this construction of contingency as the site of the political delineate itself from the neoliberal governing that relies on contingency for ts very functioning? This question is often left unaddressed by those pursuing biopolitical analysis. As contingency appears to have become the principal characteristic of neoliberal life and the primary site through which it is governed, how can we think of a politics that is capable of challenging such ‘governing through contingency’ without resorting to pre-conceived transcendental truths or simply settling for the existing ontology? If the referent of biopolitical governance is, indeed, no longer the human but contingency, then the challenge to biopolitical governance has to either come from **within that contingency** or give its **own account of the relation between life and contingency**. Politics that is internal to neoliberal contingency will **perceive contingency as the price that is to be paid for freedom**. The search for ways of being governed differently is arguably possible because all systems of governance are contingent, except, of course, for the governance implied by the neoliberal conception of life as contingent. Put differently, life is free to become anything but the ontology of becoming cannot be questioned.

### Off 2

#### Interpretation- the affirmative must not garner offense from anything except for the hypothetical implementation of private entities appropriating outerspace as unjust

#### Violation – they defend the epistemic solvency of spectrality as a method and explicitly said they garner prefiat offense off of psychoanalysis and our relationships to desire

#### 1. First is clash – having an agreed-upon stasis point is critical for left on left debates, key to creating an accessible point of clash to evaluate the efficacy of radical political engagement—predictable ground and clash are key to evaluating whether the method of the affirmative is good– the ability to defend a position against a knowledgeable opponent is key to export politics ---

#### 2. Predictable limits – they remove all topic limits by justifying any expansion of the topic beyond the resolutional wording, this is impossible for me to predict and desroys all semblance of in depth debate

#### 3. TVA – read evidence purely about medical intellectual property and defend that the resolutional mandate is in line with practical reason

#### 4. SSD solves all of their offense

#### 4. Fairness – a predictable limit is the only way to give the NEG a chance to win – radical AFF choice shifts the grounds for the debate and puts the AFF far ahead – anything other than a topical plan structurally favors the affirmative. And, fairness is an intrinsic good ­– debate is a game and requires effective competition - controls the internal link all their education claims.

#### Drop the Debater on T – they foreclose the ability to generate neg offense so they should lose

#### Vote on competing interps over reasonability:

#### a. no brightline for reasonability – forces judge intervention

#### b. incentivizes a race to the bottom –

#### No impact turns or RVIs – A~ Perfcon – if T’s bad and you vote for them on that arg, you’re voting on T. B~ Substance – if T’s bad then we should try debating on substance – impact turns force me to go for T since I need to defend my position. C~ Dead end – strategy guides debates so they’ll desire that people read T to beat them on the impact turn – that proves their strategy is reactive and can’t solve since they rely on the structures they critique.

## Case

### Underview

#### Permissibility Negates - ought is “used to express obligation”, things can be obligated, permissible, or prohibited, and proving the later 2 denies an obligation.

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought>

#### AT: sufficient - only we have a definition of ought - that answers it.

#### AT: Negation by contradiction - their logic is wrong: P and not P can both be false and proving the aff is permissible proves not P true - above.

#### Their util fails stuff is bad –

#### They use util – ie they say oppression is bad because of the consequence – they don’t have an alternative framing mechanism – consewuances are the only way to determine the fufilment of the lack

#### Their entire contention is premised on how looking to the future and envisioning a utopia is space is bad bc it forcloses the earth

⁃              1AR theory is not drop the debater its obviously context dependent things like condo could be drop the debater, things like font size theory obviously aren’t — fairness does not outweigh everything categorically, just cause fairness is an impact doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t have discussions and those discussions can be weighed and those educations can be weighed on a theory level and on a procedural flawed level

### ROB

#### The role of the ballot is to affirm weather or not the private appropriation of space is unjust

#### They cant solve their ROTB – they don’t performatively embrace the lack --- they still desire a ballot, want to win, exist in the space of death drive – which proves their ROTB – doesn’t function

#### Their rob is self serving

#### In quantifiable

### Psycho Wrong

#### Psychoanalysis has no empirical basis.

Paris 17 [Dr Paris is Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, and Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital. "Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?" https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5459228/]

In an era in which psychiatry is dominated by neuroscience-based models, psychological constructs tend to be neglected and may be taken seriously only when they have neural correlates.37 Some psychoanalysts have sought to link their model with neurobiological research and to claim that newer methods of studying the brain can validate their theories.5,6

Mark Solms, a South African neuropsychologist, is the founder of “neuropsychoanalysis.” This new field, with its own society and its own journal, proposes to use neuroimaging to confirm analytic theories. Its key idea is that subjective experience and the unconscious mind can be observed through neuroimaging.5 It is known that brain processes can be seen on brain imaging even before they have entered consciousness.38 However, claims that neuroimaging validate Freud’s model of the unconscious can be based only on “cherry-picking” the literature. The observed correspondences are superficial and hardly support the complex edifice of psychoanalytic theory.

Solms39 has also suggested that Freud’s ideas about dreams are consistent with neuroscience research based on rapid eye movement (REM) activity. This attempt to rescue a century-old theory met with opposition from dream researchers who consider Freud’s clinical speculations to be incompatible with empirical data.40,41

The proposal to establish a discipline of neuropsychoanalysis also met with a mixed reception from traditional psychoanalysts, who did not want to dilute Freud’s wine with neuroscientific water.42 Neuroscientists, who are more likely to see links to psychology as lying in cognitive science,43 have ignored this idea. In summary, neuropsychoanalysis is being used a way to justify long-standing models, without attempting to find something new or to develop an integration of perspectives on psychology.

However, Eric Kandel,44 influential in the light of his Nobel Prize for the study of the neurochemistry of memory, has taken a sympathetic view of the use of biological methods to study psychoanalytic theory. Kandel had wanted to be an analyst before becoming a neuroscientist.45 But Kandel, who does not actively practice psychiatry, may be caught in a time warp, unaware that psychoanalysis has been overtaken by competitors in the field of psychotherapy.

Another attempt to reconcile psychoanalysis with science has come from the literature on neuroplasticity.46 It is now known that neurogenesis occurs in some brain regions (particularly the hippocampus) during adulthood and that neural connections undergo modification in all parts of the brain. There is also evidence that CBT can produce brain changes that are visible using imaging.47 These findings have not been confirmed in psychoanalytic therapies. However, Norman Doidge, a Canadian psychoanalyst, has argued that psychoanalysis can change the brain.48 This may be the case for all psychotherapies. However, more recently, Doidge49 has claimed that mental exercises can reverse the course of severe neurological and psychiatric problems, including chronic pain, stroke, multiple sclerosis, Parkinson’s disease, and autism. While these books have been best-sellers, most of their ideas in the second volume,49 based on anecdotes rather than on clinical trials, have had little impact in medicine. This story underscores the difficulty of reconciling the perspectives and methods of psychoanalysis with scientific methods based on empirical testing.

Psychoanalysis and the Humanities

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities.

This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism.

One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power.

Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history.

#### Psychoanalysis isn’t universal and scaling it up to political conclusions is colonialist

Rogers, 17—Senior Lecturer in Criminology in the School of Political Sciences at the University of Melbourne and Adjunct Professor at Griffith Law School, Queensland (Juliet, “Is Psychoanalysis Universal? Politics, Desire, and Law in Colonial Contexts,” Political Psychology, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2017, dml)

The presumption of a universal form of desire is an important starting point for the analyst of any patient who arrives on the couch in the psychoanalytic clinic. The psychoanalyst can only offer certain parameters, with all their limitations. The patient, if the analyst allows for an interrogation of their own forms of resistance, however, can speak back to any frame of desire that the analyst presumes or proposes. And the analyst—if Jacques Lacan’s thoughts on resistance are taken seriously (Lacan, 2007, p. 497; Rogers, 2016, pp. 183–187)—must listen, attend, learn, and adapt. But when the desires of subjects are extended into the political realm, when the wants and needs of every subject are presumed to articulate with a psychoanalytic notion of universal desire, then something is lost. That something might be called the desire of the other, or it might not be called desire at all.

The desire of the other is not easily seen in the wake of European Enlightenment that has engulfed the imagination of psychoanalytic and political theorists and practitioners alike. It is not easily seen, and it is not easily conversed with when epistemological work presumes a trajectory of desire and then applies it. In this application, there is little space for a radically other performance of politics as action or imagination to appear. The subject who is subsumed into this imagination—the subject Gayatri Spivak (1996)1 describes as “the Other of Europe”—has little opportunity to do more than “utter” under the weight of its imagined subjectivity. As Spivak (1999) says:

[I]n the constitution of that Other of Europe, great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary—not only by ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. (p. 266)

Psychoanalysis is as guilty of exercising such a form of “great care” as many of the occupations of French intellectuals that Spivak has criticized for doing so. Psychoanalysis, with its attention to the many forms of the unconscious, can appear otherwise than guilty of this. It can appear more open, generous, and curious about the many forms that desire can take. In its later forms of attention to a politically constituted “symbolic order” under the guidance of Lacan (2007), it can also appear more attentive to the particularities of desires informed by a politics of the time. I argue here, however, that attention is already constituted by an imagination of a subject who wants, who needs, who desires objects, things, rights, in a mode which cannot not start from a point of origin, and a particular political form of origin which then precludes the recognition—in both the clinic and in political analysis2 —of other forms of desire, “with which such a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary.” When practices such as political psychoanalysis presume a particular form of desire, what is at stake in this constitution of desire is the political subject or the Other of Europe who cannot “speak,” in Spivak’s terms. What is lost might be called radical desire; it might be an itinerary which is cathected or invested otherwise, and, as such, it might not be recognizable in psychoanalysis or in contemporary political psychology at all.

The nonrecognition of the Other of Europe, in her many forms, is a consistent political problem—documented often and insistently by critical race and postcolonial analysts such as Spivak, but also Sanjay Seth, Leila Gandhi, Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Elizabeth Povinelli, Ashis Nandy, Christine Black, and Homi Bhabha. Such nonrecognition, however, when repostulated in political psychoanalysis has another effect. The trajectory of the symptoms of political practice—including desires for law, justice, particular election outcomes, rights, socioeconomic configurations, or even for the formation of political structures themselves (democracy being only one)— presume a form of desire that refers to, and endures in, its constitution. As Spivak (1999) notes in her critique of power and desire as universal:

[S]o is “desire” misleading because of its paleonomic burden of an originary phenomenal passion—from philosophical intentionality on the one hand to psychoanalytic definitive lack on the other. (p. 107)

The psychoanalytic definitive lack she speaks of refers to the Lacanian configuration of desire as always attempting to recover, to master, to instantiate an identity that is supposedly interminably lost as soon as language acts upon the subject. This lack is inaugurated through the subjects relation to what it cannot have, or, in Spivak’s terms, the “originary phenomenal passion” referring to the oedipal scene, which is presumed to be the origin of desire for all. This configuration of desire renders all subjects desiring of overcoming that lack. But it is a particular form of desire and a particular quality of lack. The presumption of this quality—the presumption about what and how people desire—I argue here, must be accountable to the politico-historical configurations which have produced it.

Politico-historical configurations, by definition, are not universal. That is, contra Zizek (2006), I argue that not all the world is a symptom, but that any psychoanalysis of a political symptom, of a political subject, or of the desires examined through psychoanalysis as they emerge in a political arena, assume a particular formation of desire. And that such an analysis operates within the parameters and employs the understandings of the oedipal scene, or, simply of a subjectivity split by language, including the language of law. As Lacan (2006) says “language begins along with law” (p. 225). While this split subjectivity may appear to be universal—and is convincingly employed as such by psychoanalytic and political theorists, and often philosophers (Butler, 1997; Epstein, 2013; Zevnik, 2016; Zizek, 2006), this splitting refers specifically to an oedipal lineage, as a particular instantiation of Oedipal Law, and, as I argue positive law as a liberal law concerned with rights and with what once can or cannot have from the polis as much as what one can take from the father. Thus the “originary phenomenal passion,” which a psychoanalysis of the political engages, always refers back as I will explain, to a (primal) father as a sovereign in a wrangle with his sons, a scene which itself cannot not be understood without its resonances to the French Revolution.

#### Death drive is not a good argument---prefer proximate causes.

Havi Carel 6, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of the West of England, “Life and Death in Freud and Heidegger”, googlebooks

Freud introduces the death drive in order to explain all behaviour that is not in accordance with the pleasure principle. He does so by offering a theoretical construct in the form of an aggressive drive but also posits the Nirvana principle as the aim of all organic systems to rid themselves of excitation and strive towards complete rest. This leads to contradictory formulations of the death drive. Part of the function of the death drive is to unify a variety of aggressive phenomena such as destructiveness, sadism, masochism and hate. But Freud is also proposing a more general metaphysical speculation about life as a conflict between life and death drives. This position raises serious problems: 1. Positing the death drive reduces all forms of aggression to one source. Could a single drive explain all types of aggression and destructiveness? Or are there vital details in the individual origins and characteristics of each aggressive phenomenon that are subsumed by the reductive hypothesis of the death drive? 2. Even if we were to accept such a reductive concept, its explanatory value is not clear. What does the notion of the death drive add to the already unifying concept of aggression? Assembling various forces under the auspices of the death drive makes it an unstable category whose meaning can only be derived from the specific context of its application. The death drive has no autonomous meaning. Since the death drive derives its meaning from the concrete situation, it does not contribute to an understanding of the given phenomenon (aggression or destructiveness). Rather, it is the death drive that gets explained by its instances, but it ultimately lacks autonomous content. Freud subsumes under the concept of the death drive two essentially contradictory tendencies: the Nirvana principle striving to eliminate all tension, and aggression creating tension. How can the death drive explain both the tendency towards elimination of tension and aggression that increases tension? A more specific problem is that of masochism (discussed in The Economic Problem of Masochism). If masochism is a manifestation of the death drive as self-directed aggression aiming at unpleasure, how does that square with Freud's view that the death drive is equivalent to the Nirvana principle, which aims to discharge all tension? Freud's attempts to posit a two-drive model arc unsuccessful both theoretically and empirically. Is there really a difference between Eros and Thanatos? If so, why do they keep collapsing into one another?

### If they win psycho right:

#### How do we know the 1AC is not the lack – we don’t vote them down they are just a manifestation of it

#### There is no brighline for contraining the lack

#### There is no method for constraining the lack

#### How can we communicate the 1AC is it is the lack – vote neg on presumption because it is – the 1AC is either a failure of communication OR the 1NC can be operated by communication no longer being contrained

#### The 1AC’s demand to be recognized as a form of political strategy is an investment into hegemonic order—their failure to theorize about their desire traps the 1AC in a cycle and turns it into an object from which we extract momentary pleasure. They don’t resolve desire but the aff is an impotent academic offering that is answered and alleviated by judges only to restart the cycle in the very next round. The aff and WTO protestors share a common refusal to surpass politics in order to maintain their structure of demand.

Lundberg 12 [Christian, Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies. “Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric” November 26, 2012]

In the run up to the 2003 World Trade Organization (WTO) talks in Cancun, the Mexican Government composed a list of the sixty most “globalophobic” leaders of antiglobalization groups. The document, subsequently leaked to the Mexican newspaper La Reforma, was met with predictable criticisms regarding the relationship between state security apparatuses, the institutions of global economic governance, and democratic protest. But there were less predictable responses: in addition to criticisms that the list chilled democratic dissent, some antiglobalization groups criticized the list for not being comprehensive enough, demanding its expansion. Activist Josef Schneider wrote: “What do we have to do to get a little credit? . . . In a not-very secret document . . . the Mexican government compiled a list of ‘globalophobic leaders’ who will be singled out for special scrutiny by the Mexican police. Despite the role that Portland activists played in the collapse of the WTO Ministerial meeting in Seattle, none of us made the list!”24 More than a passing lament, the remainder of the article analyzes the reasons why the Mexican government neglected to include any Portlanders, arguing that the Mexican state’s class bias prompted them to ignore the true threat that ordinary citizens posed to the WTO: “They can’t accept that a bunch of ordinary citizens are the ones who are the biggest threat to shut down the WTO. . . . How typical.”25 By this diagnosis, the Mexican response typifies institutional attempts to downplay protest. Here, the lack of recognition does not make the protest ineffective, instead the fact that the Mexican government and the WTO underestimate the danger posed by ordinary citizens animates this critique. Not to be outdone, the Mexico Solidarity Network created an online form letter for self-identified “dangerous antiglobalization groups”: Dear Government Agents Bent on Restricting Civil Liberties, I recently found out about the “watch list” prepared by Mexican authorities, purportedly to quell the voice of civil society at the upcoming WTO Ministerial in Cancun. . . . Please add my name to your “watch list” immediately!! Nothing less is acceptable.26 One might read such demands as parodic critiques of globalization and security, as ironic calls for mobilization, as a strategy of overidentification, or as any combination of these. Even though these demands represent a call for inclusion as a means of democratizing global governance, these demands are not simply for inclusion: they are also demands to be recognized as dangerous and in solidarity with other similarly dangerous global citizens. How is it possible to ground a reading of the rhetorical functions of the demand to be recognized as dangerous? For Laclau, such demands ought be read through their potential to activate relations of solidarity: the individual call to be recognized as dangerous and excluded opens the possibility for equivalential linkages between the subjects who lodge such demands and others who are similarly situated in relation to the hegemonic order. Here, all demands entail a split between the concrete particular conditions of their articulation and the more universal political possibility that they potentially ground. This split implies that demands are caught up in a formal logic of trope: metonymic connections between disparate demands are condensed in metaphors that figure a relation to and make claims on a political order. But in a Lacanian reading another split is at work in and underwrites the split identified by Laclau between the particular content and universal possibilities for affinity implied in the demand. This supplementary split inheres between the subject who enjoys the mere fact of affinity with a group as a mode of (mis)identification and the set of identitarian equivalences inaugurated by investing in the specific content of the demand. Specific political demands contain a universal commitment that authorizes equivalential linkages and are simultaneously sites of enjoyment that create ritually repeated relationships to a hegemonic order. Based on this Lacanian reading, it is not the change that the demand anticipates, nor the political potential of forging equivalential links that is significant, but the role demand plays for the one who utters it and the modes of interpassive political affinity entailed that are of primary analytical importance. Working through the complexity of demands requires reading the demand for recognition as a practice of enjoyment—as an affectively invested call for sanction and love by the governing order. Demands also entail a perverse dialectic of political agency as resistance and simultaneous interpassive political constraint. Demands empower forms of political agency by generating an oppositional relationship to hegemonic structures and by providing the equivalential preconditions for identity. As Žižek might have it, there is always the risk that the demands of protestors are the supplement that authorizes the functioning of capital.27 Enjoyment provides one particularly difficult stumbling block for a dedicated formal account, a dynamic that stands out in particularly stark relief in Laclau’s work. Although Laclau owes a significant debt to Freud and Lacan, his theory of demand is not explicitly crafted from psychoanalytic categories. As Glynos and Stavrakakis have argued, there is a “complete and conspicuous absence in Laclau’s work of Lacanian categories such as fantasy, and, perhaps more importantly, jouissance.”28 Glynos and Stavrakakis claim that there is “to [their] knowledge no reference in Laclau’s work to the concept of jouissance.”29 On Populist Reason contains a brief discussion of the concept of jouissance in Copjec’s work, which Laclau summarizes by saying: “There is no achievable jouissance except through radical investment in an objet petit a. But the same discovery (not merely an analogous one) is made if we start from the angle of political theory. No social fullness except through hegemony; and hegemony is nothing more than the investment in a partial object, of a fullness which will always evade us. The logic of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar, they are simply identical.”30 There is an elegance to Laclau’s point about enjoyment, provided that enjoyment is reducible to a set of logical forms. This presupposition makes the lack of talk about jouissance in Laclau’s work understandable. If jouissance and hegemony are identical, one does not need Lacan to say something that might be said more elegantly with Gramsci. But with Laclau’s insight on the formal similarities of enjoyment and hegemony come certain blind [blank] spots. To start with, enjoyment is never quite as “achievable” as the preceding quotation might suggest. Far from being the consummation of a logic of structure and investment, enjoyment is a supplement to a failing in a structure: for example, Lacan frames jouissance as a useless enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity that supplements the fundamental failings of a subject in either finding grounding or consummating an authoritative account of its coherence. This “uselessness” defines the operation of jouissance. When Lacan suggests that “language is not the speaking subject” in the seminar On Feminine Sexuality, lodging a critique of structural linguistics as a law governing speech, jouissance is understood as something excessive that is born of the failure of structures of signification. Language is not the speaking subject precisely because what is passed through the gristmill of speech is the result of a misfiring of structure as much as it is prefigured by logics of structure, meaning, and utility. Therefore the interpretive difficulty for a structuralist account of enjoyment: the moment that the fact of enjoyment is recoded in the language of structure, the moment that it is made useful in a logic of subjectivization, is precisely the moment where it stops being jouissance. Framing enjoyment as equivalent with hegemony, Laclau identifies the fundamental “split” in psychoanalytic theory between the universal and the particular demands of a group. Posing the split in this way, and as the privileged site of the political, Laclau occludes attention to another split: namely, the split within a subject, between the one who enters an equivalential relationship and the identitarian claim that sutures this subject into a set of linkages. This too is a site of enjoyment, where a subject identifies with an external image of itself for the sake of providing its practices of subjectivity with a kind of enjoyable retroactive coherence. The demand is relevant here but not simply because it represents and anticipates a change in the social order or because it identifies a point of commonality. The demand is also a demand to be recognized as a subject among other subjects and to be given the sanction and love of the Symbolic order. The implication of this argument about the nature of enjoyment is that the perverse dialectic of misfirings, failure, and surpluses in identity reveals something politically dangerous in not moving beyond demand. Put another way: not all equivalences are equally equivalent. Some equivalences become fetishes or points of identification that eclipse the ostensible political goal of the demand. To extend the line of questioning to its logical conclusion: can we be bound to our equivalential chains? Despite the tendency of some commentators to naturalize Freud’s tripartite schema of the human psyche, Freud’s account of the ego does not characterize the ego as preexistent or automatically given. The ego is not inevitably present in every human subject: the ego is a compensatory formation that arises in the usual course of human development as a subject negotiates the articulation and refusal of its needs as filtered through demand. Hypothetically a “subject” whose every need is fulfilled by another is never quite a subject: this entity would never find occasion to differentiate itself from the other who fulfills its every need. As a mode of individuation and subjectivization, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the Freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for the addressee to provide an automatic fulfillment of a need. The generative power of the demand relies on two things: the split between the demand and the need that it attempts to redress, and the fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because the refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfill all the subject’s needs, requiring a set of compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands. “Ego,” then, names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may I have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the parental “no.” In “The Question of Lay Analysis,” Freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function.... [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, and Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfillment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by extension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32 Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” Understanding the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and constraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at Freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the parent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the subject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes Freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification. As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-given subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective intentions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of accommodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing demands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As I have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal I. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduction to hegemony. This remainder may even be logically prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration.

### Contention

#### Space is not a Utopia – no one says that space is perfect that it is a necessary heuristic to solve for stuff

#### Try or die neg – even if they win that psycho is true – the aff doesn’t do anything to prevent it from being expanded – they are descriptive ---a risk that colonization prevents extinction means you vote neg bc the lack does not materially matter if we are dead

#### Colonization solves inevitable extinction.

Kovic '19 [Marko; March 2019; co-founder president of the Zurich Institute of Public Affairs Research; "The future of energy," https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/aswz9/download]

Existential risks are risks that might lead to the extinction of humankind [1]. Natural existential risks (such as asteroids that might crash into Earth) are basically constant. The risks of a giant asteroid crashing into Earth today is the same as it was 500 years ago. Anthropogenic, man-made existential risks, on the other hand, are growing in number and severity. They are a side-effect of technological progress: The more we develop technologically, the greater man-made existential risks become. Nuclear weapons, to name only one example, are a direct consequence of scientific and technological progress.

There are different approaches to existential risk mitigation. One approach is to develop targeted strategies for specific existential risks. If we want to reduce the existential risk posed by nuclear weapons, then we can and should develop specific strategies for that risk.

Another approach is to develop and pursue what can be called meta-strategies that target all existential risks at once. One of most effective meta-strategies for tackling existential risks in general is space colonization: If we manage to establish permanent and self-sustainable human habitats beyond Earth, then our proverbial existential eggs are not all in one basket anymore. For example, if disaster strikes on Earth, but there are billions of humans living on Venus and Mars, humankind would continue to exist even with Earth-humans gone.

Because of existential risks, a long-term future in which humankind still exists almost certainly has to be a future in which humankind has succeeded in colonizing space. Today, even though we regularly venture into space, we do not yet have space colonization capabilities. There are a number of technological challenges that we need to overcome in order to become capable of space colonization. One of those challenges is energy. There are several reasons why.

#### Space scenario planning –is valuable.

Albright, 12—M.A. candidate in China-U.S. Relations, University of Hawai’i (Scott, “Demilitarizing Space: How Media and Non-State Powers Can Restrain U.S. and PRC Military Activities in Outer Space,” Spring 2012, ProQuest, dml)

Global action networks, NGOs, social activists, small businesses, multinational corporations, and other groups and organizations who have a stake in how outer space is governed have the ability to reframe U.S. and PRC military agendas and project both hard and soft power that influence how decisions are made from the local level up. In turn, these stakeholders can crisscross throughout the regulated and unregulated areas of social, political, and military affairs in ways which interconnect the globe and question the traditional methods used to govern people’s activities. Advancements in new technologies help these individuals and organizations to communicate, travel, and coordinate in ways which were unimaginable just fifty years ago and further create new questions about the traditional ways of governing while reshaping the evolution of global affairs. Although the debate over what forms of government are best suited to manage cyberspace, outer space, or any other kind of space will probably continue for many years to come, there is no doubt that during the debate non-state actors will have a significant role in deciding the final outcome. Through protest and other forms of political participation organizations working outside of the state can help to develop strategies and goals for governments to prevent the type of weapons proliferation that make outer space less hospitable to human activities. It is important for these organizations to have common and specific goals that are acceptable for states who continue to see the value in using outer space for national security purposes. These organizations can push states to sign on to treaties that prohibit the placement of weapons in space such as the PPWT, or insist that governments establish better transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) that make outer space less militarized and more hospitable for all of humankind. Although both treaties and TCBMs are important, neither can address the problem of militarization if there is no way to enforce any agreements negotiated. This is why it is important for non-state organizations to reconsider their own role in the enforcement process for agreements that prevent or reduce the militarization of space. The U.S. has consistently been reluctant to sign on to any agreement that prohibits ASAT testing or the placement of weapons in outer space because, the U.S. argues, there is no way to verify that other countries are abiding by the terms of the agreement. There is no doubt that verification procedures are an extremely tricky business, but it is an area where non-state powers can help.83 There are already organizations working outside of government which provide monitoring and live tracking data for satellites orbiting the Earth. This data is published on websites like n2yo.com, which helps to increase transparency regarding government and commercial space activities, while also providing some security for those concerned about debris falling to Earth; however organizations like this can go even further in making governments more transparent and accountable for their actions. By teaming up with other organizations and networks like the GN, Reporters Without Borders, or the Union of Concerned Scientists new strategies can be developed to help make verification more plausible. When trying to come up with solutions as to how to better govern the commons Elinor Ostrom tells us in her book Governing the Commons that public-private partnerships which encourage agreed upon normative behavior and self-monitoring can be part of the solution.84 I agree with this assessment, but am wary of any type of partnership that prevents non-state powers from acting independently of the state. One reason the news media has failed in being objective is precisely because of its often cozy relationship with governments and corporate enterprise. Agreements can be made through legislation that allow for partnerships to exist where both non-state and state actors work together to enforce verification procedures, but when these partnerships grow too close it can be assumed that objectivity and the role of the non-state actor as a government watchdog will fall by the wayside. As GANs, NGOs, and other organizations fill the void where governments and corporations have failed they will realize that they alone cannot ensure the global space commons remains accessible to all, nor provide the assurance that it will be used only for providing global goods and maintaining international peace and stability. They can, however, help to ensure there are more means of ensuring that people and organizations in powerful positions can be held accountable for their actions within the space commons. In the long term it may not be a treaty or TCBM that safeguards outer space, but rather the restoration or creation of a collective moral imagination that views human activity in outer space, not from the narrow perspective of national security and defense, but through a ‘mental model’ which envisions each individual as part of a whole, yet diverse system that is much bigger than national borders or regional boundaries.85 By encouraging the development of a collective moral imagination non-state powers will better be in a position to provide suggestions as to how the rules of the road are created and enforced. Accidents will occur and rules will still be broken, but when new possibilities are created that allow for diversity within a set of expected normative behaviors there will be a greater chance that countries like China will accept civilian control of their space agency, while also making international cooperation between state and non-state actors more appealing. Instilling morality in the collective imagination is not enough to ensure that in the future outer space is not just another battle space environment. Rules of the road do have to be established and international treaties and national laws do have to be agreed upon and enforced, but before these rules can be set in stone it is necessary to first re-evaluate previous rules that have been abandoned or ignored. Before any treaty or code of conduct in outer space is negotiated non-state actors should encourage space-faring nations to revisit the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and question whether the international community is indeed abiding by the principles laid out in it. Article III says “States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding.”86 Is the use of space for military purposes really in the interest of maintaining international peace and security? The U.S. might argue that it is, but for those who are targets of satellite guided munitions, missiles, or electronic attack from the heavens, the answer is no. As other countries become more capable of using space for military purposes the U.S. may decide that the answer is also no, but the reality is that no matter how just one considers the use of force to be, the use of force is not the same as maintaining peace. Violence does not equal peace. There should be no argument against this, but humans tend to rationalize violence in a way that makes this argument somehow valid, and therefore it can be expected that violence will continue to be used so long as citizens accept the moral justification for the use of force. Article IV of the Outer Space treaty says, “States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.”87 Here the question is what constitutes a weapon of mass destruction? Is a chemical or biological weapon in outer space any more capable of causing mass destruction than a constellation of lasers or an orbiting electromagnetic pulse bomb? Probably not, which is why before states continue to agree to this article they may want to reconsider what the definition of a weapon of mass destruction is and how new technologies can continue to change that meaning from time to time. Also in Article IV it states, “The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.”88 Here one might ask how can the Chinese National Space Agency legally operate on the moon if the agency is militarily controlled? Also, how do dual-use technologies fit into this? Is the mining of helium-3 exclusively for peaceful purposes, and how will anyone know if it is not? These questions should be answered before any new treaty or international agreement can be made. Instead of only coming up with a new code of conduct the international community should also look at the treaties already in place and ask how those treaties can better be implemented, and how non-state actors can help to enforce their implementation. Also, there are other Earth-bound arms control agreements that may be useful for demilitarizing outer space. For instance the ABM treaty which the U.S. abrogated from deals specifically with missile defense which has been the cause of so much frustration and tension between the U.S., Europe, China, and Russia. What is prohibiting the U.S. from revisiting this treaty? How can non-state actors influence policymakers so this treaty comes back into the limelight? What can be done to ensure the deployment of missile defense systems does not increase asymmetric countermeasures to these defenses, and how does missile defense provide more security if the deployment of this defense causes other states to build and deploy more missiles and countermeasures to overwhelm the system? These are not easy questions to answer, and so far no one has been able to come up with a viable solution, but if humans truly want to make the world a safer place and the outer space environment more accessible and more hospitable for humans, than surely non-state actors should be welcomed by the international community to help make it happen. Conclusion Global action networks, NGOs, small businesses, social activists, multinational corporations, and other stakeholders in space security have a special role in creating an environment of cooperation between governments, as they are able to work both within and outside of the established system and are capable of bringing together individuals from different sectors of society who can make international projects succeed where governments fail. As global power becomes diffused these non-state actors will be more capable of investing in the types of projects that states refuse to participate in. While U.S. and Chinese officials debate over whether or not the two countries should cooperate in outer space, GANs, NGOs, activists, and firms can seep through the loopholes and begin cooperation before governments even have the opportunity to question whether cooperation is in a country’s best interest or not. Although it may be difficult for non-state actors to tackle the big projects that require cooperation both on Earth and in space, they can still take some small steps that move the level of cooperation up notch by notch. As non-state actors prove that cooperation between individuals from adverse nation-states is possible they will be more able to convince governments that large projects like the creation of an international space agency or a truly international space station or lunar research park is attainable. When governments begin to understand the type of mutual benefits international space projects can bring they may begin to work closer together in ways which not only reconsider how outer space is used by the military and intelligence communities, but in ways which integrate space systems so that destruction of such systems becomes a less viable option for all parties involved. For instance Russia, China, the U.S., and the European Union can integrate navigation satellites in ways which reduce redundancy and encourage the sharing of data and assets so that all parties have a stake in one another’s systems to the point that interfering, disrupting, or destroying a system or component of the system becomes self destructive and unnecessary. Soviet-American cooperation on the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in 1975 provide a good a example of how hostile countries can work together for peaceful purposes in outer space, and the continued cooperation between Russia and the U.S. after the fall of the Soviet Union on projects like the Mir Space and International Space Stations show that national rivalry and security concerns can be overcome in the long run.89 China, who seeks to be an ISS partner, will continue to develop and modernize its military-run space agency whether or not the U.S. is on board with this advancement. As China continues to carry a successful record in its outer space activities, while leapfrogging technologies and moving independently of the U.S., it may eventually find itself as a leader in outer space while the U.S. falls behind. Because the Obama administration has chosen to refocus its military efforts on the Asia-Pacific region China has even more of an incentive to continue pursuing military activities in outer space to counter these efforts. This in turn creates the type of environment that encourages the proliferation of space-based weapons systems by countries throughout the region and has the potential to become a conflict neither China nor the U.S. can afford. For this reason GANs, NGOs, and other non-state actors must be active in finding those areas in which cooperation between Chinese and American individuals, organizations, and corporations on civilian outer space projects is possible. By demanding states be more transparent in how they conduct space security and by encouraging more participation in the decision making process of space governance, non-state actors can pressure governments in ways that force them to reconsider further militarizing space or acting in unilateral nationalistic ways that have so far reduced security on Earth and outer space, rather than enhancing it. Small and large firms which encourage the commercialization and democratization of the space industry will help to increase access to outer space to more people who, when free from the often narrow and imaginatively constraining military mindset, can provide new creative and multibeneficial ways for utilizing the space commons and the global goods it has to offer. As more people are given more access to space it will become impossible for governments to not work with non-state actors to create a better system for governing it and ensuring it remains a peaceful place to work and even live. Traditional news media, grassroots and alternative news media, academic media, and science fiction and entertainment media can all be used to further ensure space is used for peaceful purposes by helping to reframe the agenda of the military and intelligence communities through continuous and persistent dissemination of content which encourages cooperation and civilian utilization of outer space. By doing so these and other media groups can help in the process of developing a morally injected collective imagination that envisions all of humankind working together without regard to the borders nation-states bind their citizens to. Throughout this thesis I argue that a more holistic and multi-faceted approach to arms control should be taken to not only demilitarize space, but to also create a more cooperative and peaceful international environment on Earth. This approach can be further broadened to include many more aspects that help to not just cure the symptom of weapons proliferation, but that also addresses the root cause of the problem. History has shown that powerful leaders are influenced by media and non-state actors who can and do impact their future actions, which in too many cases have led to conflict and war rather than peace and cooperation. It is time to take note of this history and ensure that the lessons learned from it are not lost so that humans do not continue to repeat the same mistakes that have lead generation after generation through the continuous cycle of war and weapons development. There are no winners to such a cycle, except perhaps for the weapons themselves which are becoming so powerful and dangerous that they not only threaten all of human existence, but also the ecosystems in and outside of Earth’s atmosphere which are necessary for all of the planet’s life forms. There may never be a permanent solution that ensures the space commons continues to be utilized for the global goods it offers, but as long as more people are educated about the problems militarization creates, the more access they have to information on how these problems can be resolved, and the more they are able to use those facts to influence defense policy through collaborative transnational efforts, the better they will be able to come up with a solution for future generations who may one day live, work, and play in outer space together as a global community that seeks to maintain a lasting and sustainable peace for all of humankind.

#### The aff can’t solve – psychoanalytic political theory is tautological and can’t be used to change public policy

Gordon, 1 – psychotherapist living and working in London (Paul, Psychoanalysis and Racism: The politics of defeat Race & Class v. 42, n. 4)

**The problem with the application of psychoanalysis to social institutions is that there can be no testing of the claims made**. **If someone says**, for instance, that **nationalism is a form of looking for and seeking to replace the body of the mother one has lost**, or that the popular appeal of a particular kind of story echoes the pattern of our earliest relationship to the maternal breast, **how can this be proved**? **The pioneers of psychoanalysis**, from Freud onwards, all **derived their ideas** **in the context of** their **work with individual patients** and their ideas can be examined in the everyday laboratory of the therapeutic encounter where the validity of an interpretation, for example, is a matter for dialogue between therapist and patient. **Outside of the consulting room, there can be no such verification process, and the further one moves from the individual patient, the less purchase psycho- analytic ideas can have.** **Outside the therapeutic encounter, anything and everything can be true, psychoanalytically speaking**. **But if every- thing is true, then nothing can be false and therefore nothing can be true**.An example of Cohen's method is to be found in his 1993 working paper, `Home rules', subtitled `Some reflections on racism and nation- alism in everyday life'. Here Cohen talks about taking a `particular line of thought for a walk'. While there is nothing wrong with taking a line of thought for a walk, such an exercise is not necessarily the same as thinking. One of the problems with Cohen's approach is that a kind of free association, mixed with deconstruction, leads not to analysis, not even to psychoanalysis, but to . . . well, just more free association, an endless, indeed one might say pointless, play on words. **This approach may well throw up some interesting associations along the way, connections one had never thought of but it is not to be confused with political analysis.** In `Home rules', anything and everything to do with `home' can and does ®nd a place here and, as I indicated above, even the popular film Home Alone is pressed into service as a story about `racial' invasion.