## Off

#### Interp: The affirmative may only garner offense from the legal recognition of the right to strike.

#### Violation they don’t that was cx – they defend that the workers

#### Resolved requires legislative action

Words and Phrases 64

Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Government

Oxford Lexico. Definition of government in English. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/government>

The governing body of a nation, state, or community. ‘an agency of the federal government’

#### Recognize

Oxford Lexico. Definition of recognize in English. <https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/recognize>

Acknowledge the existence, validity, or legality of. ‘the defense is recognized in Mexican law’

#### Unconditional

US Legal. Unconditional Law and Legal Definition. https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/unconditional/

Unconditional means without conditions; without restrictions; or absolute. For instance, unconditional promise is a promise that is unqualified in nature. A party who makes an unconditional promise must perform that promise even though the other party has not performed according to the bargain.

**Violation: You defend a revolutionary movement**

#### Revolutionary tactics are insufficient. The term “Right to strike” entails legal action—the plan must make strikes not just legal but legally protected, or else it’s the mere freedom to strike

Malebye 14

Cynthia Dithato Malebye (Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria). “The Right to Strike in Respect of Employment Relationships and Collective Bargaining.” Dissertation. University of Pretoria, April 2014. JDN. <https://repository.up.ac.za/bitstream/handle/2263/43163/Malebye_Right_2014.pdf?sequence=1>

Before the implementation of the new Constitution in South Africa, employees only enjoyed **the freedom to strike but not the right to strike.** This past situation implied that the employees who embarked on a strike, even if it was a legal strike **were not protected from dismissal** as in effect they were in breach of their employment contracts in terms of common law. A fundamental right contained in the Constitution is that workers will have “the right to strike for purposes of collective bargaining.” In other words, **the right must be functional** to collective bargaining.

#### 5 Standards:

#### 1] Fairness – their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. It allows someone to specialize in one area 4 years giving an huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months

#### 2] Clash – picking any grounds for debate precludes the only common point of engagement, which obviates preround research and incentivizes retreat from controversy by eliminating any effective clash. Only the process of negation distinguishes debate and discussion by necessitating iterative testing and effective engagement, but an absence of constant refinement dooms movement building and revolutionary potential

#### 3] SSD – a] their model that allows them to side-step the topic on both the Aff and Neg hurts debate as a site of role experimentation – choosing to individually engage both sides solves argument refinement and self-reflexivity breeding constantly evolving methodology which is key to activist resistance BUT side-stepping it ingrains ideological dogmatism by imposing artificial lines in the sand for what not to experiment replicating imperial ideologies about exclusion and b] that means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny.

#### 4] Real-world ed. Debate is imperfect, but only our interpretation can harness legal education to understand the law’s strategic reversibility paired with intellectual survival skills.

Archer 18, Deborah N. "Political Lawyering for the 21st Century." Denv. L. Rev. 96 (2018): 399. (Associate Professor of Clinical Law at NYU School of Law)//Elmer

Political justice lawyers must be able to break apart a systemic problem **into manageable components**. The complexity of social problems, can cause law students, and even experienced political lawyers, to become overwhelmed. In describing his work challenging United States military and economic interventions abroad, civil rights advocate and law professor Jules Lobel wrote of this process: “Our foreign-policy litigation became a sort of Sisyphean quest as we maneuvered through a hazy maze cluttered with gates. Each gate we unlocked led to yet another that blocked our path, with the elusive goal of judicial relief always shrouded in the twilight mist of the never-ending maze.”144 Pulling apart a larger, systemic problem into its smaller components can help elucidate options for advocacy. An instructive example is the use of excessive force by police officers against people of color. Every week seems to bring a new video featuring graphic police violence against Black men and women. Law students are frequently outraged by these incidents. But the sheer frequency of these videos and lack of repercussions for perpetrators overwhelm those students just as often. What can be done about a problem so big and so pervasive? To move toward justice, advocates must be able to break apart the forces that came together to lead to that moment: intentional discrimination, implicit bias, ineffective training, racial segregation, lack of economic opportunity, the over-policing of minority communities, and the failure to invest in non-criminal justice interventions that adequately respond to homelessness, mental illness, and drug addiction. None of these component problems are easily addressed, but breaking them apart is more manageable—and more realistic—than acting as though there is a single lever that will solve the problem. After identifying the component problems, advocates can select one and repeat the process of breaking down that problem until they get to a point of entry for their advocacy. 2. Identifying Advocacy Alternatives As discussed earlier, political justice lawyering embraces litigation, community organizing, interdisciplinary collaboration, legislative reform, public education, direct action, and other forms of advocacy to achieve social change. After parsing the underlying issues, lawyers need to identify what a lawyer can and should do on behalf of impacted communities and individuals, and this includes determining the most effective advocacy approach. Advocates must also strategize about what can be achieved in the short term versus the long term. The fight for justice is a marathon, not a sprint. Many law students experience frustration with advocacy because they expect immediate justice now. They have read the opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, but forget that the decision was the result of a decades-long advocacy strategy.145 Indeed, the decision itself was no magic wand, as the country continues to work to give full effect to the decision 70 years hence. Advocates cannot only fight for change they will see in their lifetime, they must also fight for the future.146 Change did not happen over night in Brown and lasting change cannot happen over night today. Small victories can be building blocks for systemic reform, and advocates must learn to see the benefit of short-term responsiveness as a component of long-term advocacy. Many lawyers subscribe to the American culture of success, with its uncompromising focus on immediate accomplishments and victories.147 However, those interested in social justice must adjust their expectations. Many pivotal civil rights victories were made possible by the seemingly hopeless cases that were brought, and lost, before them.148 In the fight for justice, “success inheres in the creation of a tradition, of a commitment to struggle, of a narrative of resistance that can inspire others similarly to resist.”149 Again, Professor Lobel’s words are instructive: “the current commitment of civil rights groups, women’s groups, and gay and lesbian groups to a legal discourse to legal activism to protect their rights stems in part from the willingness of activists in political and social movements in the nineteenth century to fight for rights, even when they realized the courts would be unsympathetic.”150 Professor Lobel also wrote about Helmuth James Von Moltke, who served as legal advisor to the German Armed Services until he was executed in 1945 by Nazis: “In battle after losing legal battle to protect the rights of Poles, to save Jews, and to oppose German troops’ war crimes, he made it clear that he struggled not just to win in the moment but to build a future.”151 3. Creating a Hierarchy of Values Advocates challenging complex social justice problems can find it difficult to identify the correct solution when one of their social justice values is in conflict with another. A simple example: a social justice lawyer’s demands for swift justice for the victim of police brutality may conflict with the lawyer’s belief in the officer’s fundamental right to due process and a fair trial. While social justice lawyers regularly face these dilemmas, law students are not often forced to struggle through them to resolution in real world scenarios—to make difficult decisions and manage the fallout from the choices they make in resolving the conflict. Engaging in complex cases can force students to work through conflicts, helping them to articulate and sharpen their beliefs and goals, forcing them to clearly define what justice means broadly and in the specific context presented. Lawyers advocating in the tradition of political lawyering anticipate the inevitable conflict between rights, and must seek to resolve these conflicts through a “hierarchy of values.”152 Moreover, in creating the hierarchy, the perspectives of those directly impacted and marginalized should be elevated “because it is in listening to and standing with the victims of injustice that the need for critical thinking and action become clear.”153 One articulation of a hierarchy of values asserts “people must be valued more than property. Human rights must be valued more than property rights. Minimum standards of living must be valued more than the privileged liberty of accumulated political, social and economic power. Finally, the goal of increasing the political, social, and economic power of those who are left out of the current arrangements must be valued more than the preservation of the existing order that created and maintains unjust privilege.”154 C. Rethinking the Role of the Clinical Law Professor: Moving From Expert to Colleague Law students can learn a new dimension of lawyering by watching their clinical law professor work through innovative social justice challenges alongside them, as colleagues. This is an opportunity not often presented in work on small cases where the clinical professor is so deeply steeped in the doctrine and process, the case is largely routine to her and she can predict what is to come and adjust supervision strategies accordingly.155 However, when engaged in political lawyering on complex and novel legal issues, both the student and the teacher may be on new ground that transforms the nature of the student-teacher relationship. A colleague often speaks about acknowledging the persona professors take on when they teach and how that persona embodies who they want to be in the classroom—essentially, whenever law professors teach they establish a character. The persona that a clinical professor adopts can have a profound effect on the students, because the character is the means by which the teacher subtly models for the student—without necessarily ever saying so— the professional the teacher holds herself to be and the student may yet become. In working on complex matters where the advocacy strategy is unclear, the clinical professor makes himself vulnerable by inviting students to witness his struggles as they work together to develop the most effective strategy. By making clear that he does not have all of the answers, partnering with his students to discover the answers, and sharing his own missteps along the way, a clinical law professor can reclaim opportunities to model how an experienced attorney acquires new knowledge and takes on new challenges that may be lost in smaller case representation.156 Clinical law faculty who wholeheartedly subscribe to the belief that professors fail to optimize student learning if students do not have primary control of a matter from beginning to end may view a decision to work in true partnership with students on a matter as a failure of clinical legal education. Indeed, this partnership model will inevitably impact student autonomy and ownership of the case.157 But, there is a unique value to a professor working with her student as a colleague and partner to navigate subject matter new to both student and professor.158 In this relationship, the professor can model how to exercise judgment and how to learn from practice: to independently learn new areas of law; to consult with outside colleagues, experts in the field, and community members without divulging confidential information; and to advise a client in the midst of ones own learning process.159 III. A Pedagogical Course Correction “If it offends your sense of justice, there’s a cause of action.” - Florence Roisman, Professor, Indiana University School of Law160 In response to the shifts in my students’ perspectives on racism and systemic discrimination, their reluctance to tackle systemic problems, their conditioned belief that strategic litigation should be a tool of last resort, and my own discomfort with reliance on small cases in my clinical teaching, I took a step back in my own practice. How could I better teach my students to be champions for justice even when they are overwhelmed by society’s injustice; to challenge the complex and systemic discrimination strangling minority communities, and to approach their work in the tradition of political lawyering. I reflected not only on my teaching, but also on my experiences as a civil rights litigator, to focus on what has helped me to continue doing the work despite the frustrations and difficulties. I realized I was spending too much time teaching my students foundational lawyering skills, and too little time focused on the broader array of skills I knew to be critical in the fight for racial justice. We regularly discussed systemic racism during my clinic seminars in order to place the students’ work on behalf of their clients within a larger context. But by relying on carefully curated small cases I was inadvertently desensitizing my students to a lawyer’s responsibility to challenge these systemic problems, and sending the message that the law operates independently from this background and context. I have an obligation to move beyond teaching my students to be “good soldiers for the status quo” to ensuring that the next generation is truly prepared to fight for justice.161 And, if my teaching methods are encouraging the reproduction of the status quo it is my obligation to develop new interventions.162 Jane Aiken’s work on “justice readiness” is instructive on this point. To graduate lawyers who better understand their role in advancing justice, Jane Aiken believes clinics should move beyond providing opportunities for students to have a social justice experience to promoting a desire and ability to do justice.163 She suggests creating disorienting moments by selecting cases where students have no outside authority on which to rely, requiring that they draw from their own knowledge base and values to develop a legal theory.164 Disorienting moments give students: experiences that surprise them because they did not expect to experience what they experienced. This can be as simple as learning that the maximum monthly welfare benefit for a family of four is about $350. Or they can read a [ ] Supreme Court case that upheld Charles Carlisle’s conviction because a wyer missed a deadline by one day even though the district court found there was insufficient evidence to prove his guilt. These facts are often disorienting. They require the student to step back and examine why they thought that the benefit amount would be so much more, or that innocence would always result in release. That is an amazing teaching moment. It is at this moment that we can ask students to examine their own privilege, how it has made them assume that the world operated differently, allowing them to be oblivious to the indignities and injustices that occur every day.165 Giving students an opportunity to “face the fact that they cannot rely on ‘the way things are’ and meet the needs of their clients” is a powerful approach to teaching and engaging students.166 But, complex problems call for larger and more sustained disorienting moments. Working with students on impact advocacy in the model of political lawyering provides a range of opportunities to immerse students in disorienting moments. A. Immersing Students in “Disorienting Moments”: Race, Poverty, and Pregnancy Today, I try to immerse my students in disorienting moments to make them justice ready and move them in the direction of political lawyering. My clinic docket has always included a small number of impact litigation matters. However, in the past these cases were carefully screened to ensure that they involved discrete legal issues and client groups. In addition, our representation always began after our outside co-counsel had already conducted an initial factual investigation, identified the core legal issues, and developed an overall advocacy strategy, freeing my students from these responsibilities. Now, my clinic takes on impact matters at earlier stages where the strategies are less clear and the legal questions are multifaceted and ill- defined. This mirrors the experiences of practicing social justice lawyers, who faced with an injustice, must discover the facts, identify the legal claims, develop strategy, cultivate allies, and ultimately determine what can be done—with the knowledge that “nothing” is not an option. This approach provides students with the space to wrestle with larger, systemic issues in a structured and supportive educational environment, taking on cases that seem difficult to resolve and working to bring some justice to that situation. They are also gaining experience in many of the fundamentals of political lawyering advocacy. Recently, my students began work on a new case. Several public and private hospitals in low-income New York City neighborhoods are drug testing pregnant women or new mothers without their knowledge or informed consent. This practice reflects a disturbing convergence between racial and economic disparities, and can have a profound impact on the lives of the poor women of color being tested at precisely the time when they are most in need of support. We began our work when a community organization reached out to the clinic and spoke to us about complaints that hospitals around New York City were regularly testing pregnant women—almost exclusively women of color—for drug use during prenatal check ups, during the chaos and stress of labor and delivery, or during post-delivery. The hospitals report positive test results to the City’s Administration for Children’s Services (“ACS”), which is responsible for protecting children from abuse and neglect, for further action.167 Most of the positive tests are for marijuana use. After a report is made, ACS commences an investigation to determine whether child abuse or neglect has taken place, and these investigations trigger inquiries into every aspect of a family’s life. They can lead to the institution of child neglect proceedings, and potentially to the temporary or permanent removal of children from the household. Even where that extreme result is avoided, an ACS investigation can open the door to the City’s continued, and potentially unwelcome, involvement in the lives of these families. These policies reflect deeply inequitable practices. Investigating a family after a positive drug test is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, ACS offers a number of supportive services that can help stabilize and strengthen vulnerable families. And of course, where children’s safety is at risk, removal may sometimes be the appropriate result. However, hospitals do not conduct regular drug tests of mothers in all New York City communities. Private hospitals in wealthy areas rarely test pregnant women or new mothers for drug misuse. In contrast, at hospitals serving poor women, drug testing is routine. Race and class should not determine whether such testing, and the consequences that result, take place. Investigating the New York City drug-testing program immersed the students in disorienting moments at every stage of their work. During our conversations, the students regularly expressed surprise and discomfort with the hospitals’ practices. They were disturbed that public hospitals— institutions on which poor women and women of color rely for something as essential as health care—would use these women’s pregnancy as a point of entry to control their lives.168 They struggled to explain how the simple act of seeking medical care from a hospital serving predominantly poor communities could deprive patients of the respect, privacy, and legal protections enjoyed by pregnant women in other parts of the City. And, they were shocked by the way institutions conditioned poor women to unquestioningly submit to authority.169 Many of the women did not know that they were drug tested until the hospital told them about the positive result and referred them to ACS. Still, these women were not surprised: that kind of disregard, marginalization, and lack of consent were a regular aspect of their lives as poor women of color. These women were more concerned about not upsetting ACS than they were about the drug testing. That so many of these women could be resigned to such a gross violation of their rights was entirely foreign to most of my students. B. Advocacy in the Face of Systemic Injustice Although the students are still in the early stages of their work, they have already engaged in many aspects of political justice lawyering. They approached their advocacy focused on the essence of political lawyering— enabling poor, pregnant women of color who enjoy little power or respect to claim and enjoy their rights, and altering the allocation of power from government agencies and institutions back into the hands of these women. They questioned whose interests these policies and practices were designed to serve, and have grounded their work in a vision of an alternative societal construct in which their clients and the community are respected and supported. The clinic students were given an opportunity to learn about social, legal, and administrative systems as they simultaneously explored opportunities to change those systems. The students worked to identify the short and long term goals of the impacted women as well the goals of the larger community, and to think strategically about the means best suited to accomplish these goals. And, importantly, while collaborating with partners from the community and legal advocacy organizations, the students always tried to keep these women centered in their advocacy. In breaking down the problem of drug testing poor women of color, the students worked through an issue that lives at the intersection of reproductive freedom, family law, racial justice, economic inequality, access to health care, and the war on drugs. In their factual investigation, which included interviews of impacted women, advocates, and hospital personnel, and the review of records obtained through Freedom of Information Law requests, the students began to break down this complex problem. They explored the disparate treatment of poor women and women of color by health care providers and government entities, implicit and explicit bias in healthcare, the disproportionate referral of women of color to ACS, the challenges of providing medical services to underserved communities, the meaning of informed consent, the diminished rights of people who rely on public services, and the criminalization of poverty. The students found that list almost as overwhelming as the initial problem itself, but identifying the components allowed the students to dig deeper and focus on possible avenues of challenge and advocacy. It was also critically important to make the invisible forces visible, even if the law currently does not provide a remedy. Working on this case also gave the students and me the opportunity to work through more nuanced applications of some of the lawyering concepts that were introduced in their smaller cases, including client-centered lawyering when working on behalf of the community; large-scale fact investigation; transferring their “social justice knowledge” to different contexts; crafting legal and factual narratives that are not only true to the communities’ experience, but can persuade and influence others; and how to develop an integrated advocacy plan. The students frequently asked whether we should even pursue the matter, questioning whether this work was client- centered when it was no longer the most pressing concern for many of the women we met. These doubts opened the door to many rich discussions: can we achieve meaningful social change if we only address immediate crises; can we progress on larger social justice issues without challenging their root causes; how do we recognize and address assumptions advocates may have about what is best for a client; and how can we keep past, present, and future victims centered in our advocacy? The work on the case also forced the clinic students to work through their own understanding of a hierarchy of values. They struggled with their desire to support these community hospitals and the public servants who work there under difficult circumstances on the one hand, and their desire to protect women, potentially through litigation, from discriminatory practices. They also struggled to reconcile their belief that hospitals should take all reasonable steps to protect the health and safety of children, as well as their emotional reaction to pregnant mothers putting their unborn children in harms way by using illegal drugs against the privacy rights of poor and marginalized women. They were forced to pause and think deeply about what justice would look like for those mothers, children, and communities. CONCLUSION America continues to grapple with systemic injustice. Political justice lawyering offers powerful strategies to advance the cause of justice—through integrated advocacy comprising the full array of tools available to social justice advocates, including strategic systemic reform litigation. It is the job of legal education to prepare law students to become effective lawyers. For those aspiring to social justice that should include training students to utilize the tools of political justice lawyers. Clinical legal offers a tremendous opportunity to teach the next generation of racial and social justice advocates how to advance equality in the face of structural inequality, if only it will embrace the full array of available tools to do so. In doing so, clinical legal education will not only prepare lawyers to enact social change, they can inspire lawyers overwhelmed by the challenges of change. In order to provide transformative learning experiences, clinical education must supplement traditional pedagogical tools and should consider political lawyering’s potential to empower law students and communities.

#### 5] Familiarity – their ideas aren’t stored in long-term memory, and can’t be easily recalled in future scenarios, so the effects of their method are short-lived and not retained as valuable information when opportunities to create real change present themselves. Not disclosing supercharges this link.

**Goodin and Niemeyer 03**

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf> -CAT

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal discussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of focusing attention on a topic, providing information about it and inviting people to think hard about it is **likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think** about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### TVA: read your offense in an aff that defends implementation of the resolution.

#### [e.g. topic specific advantage: covid, asymmetries, WTO bad, etc.] –

#### SSD solves offense

#### any DA to the TVA negates – proves that there’s workable clash under my model.

#### Proves T > K since a TVA means being topical is compatible with your AC framework.

#### Procedural fairness outweighs

#### (1) Evaluation – even if their arguments seem true, that’s only because they already had an advantage – fairness is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who best meets their ROB. Can’t weigh case since I couldn’t disprove it.

#### (2) Inescapable – every argument you make concedes the authority of fairness – if they win fairness bad vote neg because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments

#### (3) Quality of discussion – Debate’s unique value is that it forces engagement and contestation of issues – but this is impossible if I don’t even know what to prepare for.

#### (4) Tangibility – voting aff has no terminal impact- it doesn’t educate anyone or cause us to make some societal shift whereas theory norms are set all the time like nibs and brackets.

#### That turns the Aff – a] an unlimited topic hurts low-income and minority debaters by allowing big schools infinite capacity to break non-T Affs – for people who can’t afford to work on debate full-time due to income concerns, their interp says unless you prep out every possible Aff, you will always lose; and b] Scope, it’s the only impact you can solve for, voting for them doesn’t resolve inequalities in debate generally but voting for T remedies procedural inequalities caused by their aff in this round

#### Paradigm issues

#### 1] DTD, it’s the 1AC & abuse has already occurred

#### 2] Competing interps—you were either topical or you weren’t.

#### 3] NO RVIs a] you don’t win by meeting a prima facie burden b] going for RVIs prove the 1AC is non-T; if you were T you could just beat back the shell with a legit competing interp and then win on case offense

#### 4] Fairness is a voter and comes first— a] debate is fundamentally a game – if it’s not fair, people won’t play; that controls the internal link to education. b] that O/Ws because every argument implicitly concedes to the validity of fairness, meaning if they win fairness bad vote neg because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

## Case

#### ROB is to vote for the team that has best engagement with a resoutional question

### Offense

#### No weighing offense that is not predicated on the right to strike, anything else is inf regressive and destroys negative ground. They are a huge drop in the bucker and don’t access the offense they think they do.

#### Their offense on assemblage theory good is a massive double turn with their reading plan, assemblage theory is about how grids and grid lock is bad BUT the 1ac replicates that through prescriptive

#### Ivancheva DOES NOT make the reverse causal claim that they think it does, it justifies their analysis BUT dos not say the plan creates the conditions to improve it which is terminal defense

Cant solve their impacts

1. Either squo private sector strikes solve and public strikes don’t prove a brink
2. The aff cannot fiat that

Beller ’16 flows neg – they expand norms of work and provide a software update to capitalism without actually generating changes it means you vote neg

#### Zero reason their advocacy resolves the harms they outline –UQ o/w, the colonialism and capitalism they describe in the squo implies that workers striking wouldn’t get rid of it – neoliberal policies implicate basic intentional circumvention

Mecchia flows aff – 1ac forcloses imagination through prescription of specific policy action

ilitant creativity links to biopower:

* Militant creativity is an expansion of biopolitical control because it''s rooted in both an expansion of state power and logics of militaristic thought

[7:27](https://newmanforensics.slack.com/archives/C02E0A6TC2Z/p1636244824004900)

Also promotion of research doesn't spillover to production of research. Researchers don't change their expertises once they get tenure, and researchers only research what their interested in. Solvency is contigent on uncertainty

[7:30](https://newmanforensics.slack.com/archives/C02E0A6TC2Z/p1636245016005600)

I don't think you need to recut it. I would just read the woodcock evidence (ROB stuff) that's like "destroy the aff"

[7:30](https://newmanforensics.slack.com/archives/C02E0A6TC2Z/p1636245036005900)

Aff doesnt produce new or exciting research innovations

Case Overview —

DROP THEM FOR SHUTTING DOWN DISCOURSE ABOUT ANY CRITCAL IDENTITY— SOLELY FOCUSING ON CAP implies that we can’t talk about identity in round — that throws out literally ANY scholarship related to the intersection between race, sex, gender and cap — FUNCTIONS as a TERMAL SOLVENCY DEFICIT –don’t let them pivot and say they can be intersectional since that creates a footnoting DA where you only care about minorities once you’re called out on your bad practices

WHITE ANXIETY DA — affective relations that reorganize society often encourage violent and racist revolts against the government. The Jan 6th riot proves affective relations re entrench more white rage

#### Rejecting capitalism fails

Kliman 4 (Andrew, Economics Professor at Pace University, “Alternatives to Capitalism: What Happens After the Revolution?” http://akliman.squarespace.com/writings/)

We live at a moment in which it is harder than ever to articulate a liberatory alternative to capitalism.  As we all know, the collapse of state-capitalist regimes that called themselves “Communist,” as well as the widespread failures of social democracy to remake society, have given rise to a widespread acceptance of Margaret Thatcher’s TINA – the belief that “there is no alternative.”         Yet the difficulty in articulating a liberatory alternative is not mostly the product of these events.  It is an inheritance from the past.  To what extent has such an alternative ever been articulated?  There has been a lot of progress – in theory and especially in practice – on the problem of forms of organization – but new organizational forms by themselves are not yet an alternative.       A great many leftists, even revolutionaries, did of course regard nationalized property and the State Plan, under the control of the “vanguard” Party, as socialism, or at least as the basis for a transition to socialism.  But even before events refuted this notion, it represented, at best, an evasion of the problem.  It was largely a matter of leftists with authoritarian personalities subordinating themselves and others to institutions and power with a blind faith that substituted for thought.  How such institutions and such power would result in human liberation was never made clear.  Vague references to “transition” were used to wave the problem away.       Yet as Marxist-Humanism has stressed for more than a decade, the anti-Stalinist left is also partly responsible for the crisis in thought.  It, too, failed to articulate a liberatory alternative, offering in place of private- and state-capitalism little more than what Hegel (Science of Logic, Miller trans., pp. 841-42) called “the empty negative … a presumed absolute”:   The impatience that insists merely on getting beyond the determinate … and finding itself immediately in the absolute, has before it as cognition nothing but the empty negative, the abstract infinite; in other words, a presumed absolute, that is presumed because it is not posited, not grasped; grasped it can only be through the mediation of cognition … .         The question that confronts us nowadays is whether we can do better.  Is it possible to make the vision of a new human society more concrete and determinate than it now is, through the mediation of cognition?         According to a long-standing view in the movement, it is not possible.  The character of the new society can only be concretized by practice alone, in the course of trying to remake society. Yet if this is true, we are faced with a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape, because acceptance of TINA is creating barriers in practice.  In the perceived absence of an alternative, practical struggles have proven to be self-limiting at best.  They stop short of even trying to remake society totally – and for good reason.  As Bertell Ollman has noted (Introduction to Market Socialism:  The Debate among Socialists, Routledge, 1998, p. 1), “People who believe [that there is no alternative] will put up with almost any degree of suffering.  Why bother to struggle for a change that cannot be? … people [need to] have a good reason for choosing one path into the future rather than another.”       Thus the reason of the masses is posing a new challenge to the movement from theory.  When masses of people require reasons before they act, a new human society surely cannot arise through spontaneous action alone. And exposing the ills of existing society does not provide sufficient reason for action when what is at issue is the very possibility of an alternative.  If the movement from theory is to respond adequately to the challenge arising from below, it is necessary to abandon the presupposition – and it seems to me to be no more than a presupposition – that the vision of the new society cannot be concretized through the mediation of cognition.   We need to take seriously Raya Dunayevskaya’s (Power of Negativity [PON], p. 184) claim in her Hegel Society of America paper that “There is no trap in thought.  Though it is finite, it breaks through the barriers of the given, reaches out, if not to infinity, surely beyond the historic moment” (RD, PON, p. 184).  This, too, is a presupposition that can be “proved” or “disproved” only in the light of the results it yields.  In the meantime, the challenges from below require us to proceed on its basis.

Off the plan – they don’t have a solvency advocate which leads to a 🡪

#### [Aronson] white saviorism DA: your framing positions YOU as the person who can stop cultural domination – if you aren’t citing authors who make that argument, who the frick died and made you the arbiter of what marginalized people want?

Aronson: **Aronson, Brittany A. [Assistant Professor, Miami University] “The White Savior Industrial Complex: A Cultural Studies Analysis of a Teacher Educator, Savior Film, and Future Teachers.” *Journal of Critical Thought and Praxis*, Vol. 6, Issue 3, 2017. CH**

In 2012, Nigerian-American novelist Teju Cole coined the term white savior industrial complex (WSIC) in response to a popular video blowing up on YouTube – “Kony 2012.”1 The WSIC refers to the “confluence of practices, processes, and institutions that reify historical inequities to ultimately validate white privilege” (Anderson, 2013, p. 39). Essentially, as Cole explained, a WSIC involves a “big emotional experience that validates privilege.” Ultimately, people are rewarded from “saving” those less fortunate and are able to completely disregard the policies they have supported that have created/maintained systems of oppression (i.e. The U.S.’s exploitation in Haiti has contributed to poverty and corruption, yet Americans can feel good about their charity after the Earthquake). The rhetoric around how Americans often talk about Africa—as a continent of chaos, warthirsty people, and impoverished HIV-infected communities, situates these countries as places in need of heroism. This mindset perpetuates the need for external forces to come in and save the day, but what gets left out of this conversation are the roles settler colonialism and white supremacy have had in creating these conditions in the first place (Smith, 2012). 2 Distorted narratives that paint Africa and other developing countries in these ways allow for the hegemonic project of whiteness and white supremacy (Allen, 2001) to do exactly as intended: to create a need for white intervention for “emotional needs to be satisfied” so the opportunity for agency at the local or individual level becomes nonexistent (Cole, 2012). The argument is framed in such a commonsense manner that any opposition to a white savior coming in to save the day is deemed in a negative light.

**Turns and outweighs the aff on CYCLICAL HARMS – they CREATE THE CONDITIONS THEY TRY TO SOLVE.**