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#### Their techcentric approach to space fosters a new form of biopolitics that maintains a panoptic grasp over all forms of life – their ‘innovation’ becomes another tool of control

Damjanov 15 [Katarina Damjanov is a professor and lecturer in digital media and communication design at the University of Western Australia. Her current research considers the sociomaterial dimensions of media technologies in outer space., The matter of media in outer space: Technologies of cosmobiopolitics, Society and space, pub. 2015//AK]

Although they are to be found thousands and millions of kilometres away from the globe, these earth-born, human-made technologies are intimately tied to the gravities of their terrestrial origin. They are an integral part of global media capital, inseparable from the material and social contexts that frame them as technical objects, epistemic registers, indexes of governance and modes of cultural expression. Thrust into space to follow directives, conduct exploratory measurements and assessments, collect information and relay it to their reception nodes, they constitute an extra-planetary limb of the technological platform that sustains the human pursuit of power, knowledge and wealth. Their design and construction is an outcome of the substantial investments of military-industrial complexes in techno-scientific innovation. Their missions are propelled by the everincreasing demands for mediation systems and services with which to expedite the production and circulation of information, images and data that are considered crucial for securing the interests of the world’s governments, markets and communities. Despite their remote position, these technologies are closely interlinked with terrestrial space through the streams of signals that they exchange with their ground control and whose content is then embedded into the foundations of politics, economy, science, arts and everyday life. Even when they break up, or are abandoned, they remain cemented into the edifice of regulative frameworks, administrative procedures and management agendas, forever bound as property to the states, corporations and organisations on whose behalf they operate. Their presence in space extends the scale, scope and impact of global media apparatus out beyond the terrestrial confines of the earth, thus allowing a novel, ‘extraterrestrial’ perspective from which to rethink our mediatic condition. Media technologies occupy the earth’s exterior as extraterrestrial footprints of global capitalism and its contemporary ‘high-tech’ grasp over vital material and social processes. Their presence in space is at once a result and a resource of the technological evolution of politico-economic regimes grounded in exploitative control of the productive and reproductive ambits of life – what Michel Foucault introduced in contemporary intellectual thought as the order of biopolitics. Foucault’s (1990, 2004, 2007, 2008) work on the genealogy of power over life traced the advancement of its conceptual and operative framework from the principle of sovereign rule over a territory and subjects into a complex governmental platform of biopower whose twofold agenda strives to harness the conduct of human individuals and the life-processes of human populations. While the former, discipline, prescribes and enforces behavioural standards for maximising individual productivities, the latter, biopolitics, regulates the biological and social registers of life to strategically increase the overall productive potential of human living space by seizing, as Foucault (2004: 245) summarised it, ‘control over relations between the human race... and their environment, the milieu in which they live’. The unfolding of the biopolitical episteme in the era of technocentred capitalism subsumed the bounty of ‘life itself’ under the calculative procedures of informatics, logistics and strategic management – and media, communication and information technologies have come to play a fundamental role in its current practices. As works which extended Foucault’s thesis to contemporary techno-logic culture such as Gilles Deleuze’s (1992) ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ and Alexander Galloway’s (2004) Protocol have demonstrated, these technologies now determine the conditions in which any human action can occur. Media devices that reside in outer space are necessarily bound up with the question of biopolitics in its ‘high-tech’ era – what commenced with Sputnik as a military contest to secure states’ territorial and geopolitical interests now extends to an extra-territorial edifice of technical media mobilised to fortify global biopolitical regimes. From satellites sent to orbit the earth and collect and relay data to global communication networks, spatial positioning and navigation systems, weather and climate monitoring centres and surveillance grids, to spacecraft dispatched to measure, evaluate and report on other celestial environments and events, these technologies have become a decisive constituent of the security apparatus that underpins contemporary biopolitics. Today, when space-based media lie at the crux of global mechanisms of control, their extraterrestrial position requires us to reconsider the scale at which the currents of biopolitics assume their evolutionary course. The ever-increasing obsessions with advancing mediatic devices with which to inspect and direct the routes of life, from its molecular minutiae to the complex ecologies of the living, facilitate a continuous rescaling of the spectrum of the biopolitical: to govern ‘life itself’ involves, as Eugene Thacker (2009) suggests, encountering and overcoming a multiplicity of scalar restraints. With the possibility of media technologies in outer space, aspirations to strategically interfere with, and capitalise upon, life and the living are presented with a distinct window of opportunity: terrestrial constraints can be circumvented. While providing the essential means for sustaining biopolitical regimes, extraterrestrially situated media apparatus expedites both the micro and macro-scale of their implementation, permitting both their intensive, ubiquitous, terrestrially oriented assertion, and their potentially unlimited spatial expansion outwards. The extraterrestrial presence of media technologies thus impose the need to uncover global topologies of power and governance not only at their planetary level, but also to ‘un-earth’ them within the scale of their cosmic prospects. I describe this extra-planetary capacity of biopolitical progress conveyed by human media advances in space as a nascent order of what I call ‘cosmobiopolitcs’. I use the term in an attempt to both affirm its continuity with a research trajectory established by Foucault, but also to emphasise the radical transformations engendered by the extraterrestrial. I approach media technologies in outer space as a symptomatic register of this cosmobiopolitical leap, suggesting that they not only enable biopolitical gestures to be replicated off-world, but themselves have a decisive impact upon ways in which ‘life itself’ is conceptualised and subjected to technologic forms of control. Increasingly inflecting the human drive to be more and have more, they have become critical to the unfolding of biopolitical regimes.

#### Cosmobiopolilitics exploits life from the workforce, using the narrative of ‘a better future in space’ to extract productivity and erase non-technological aspects of humanity.

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Media technologies that reside in outer space demand site-specific analysis – unlike terrestrially bound devices, they inhabit what is external to earth. Both as a physical and as a discursive site, the location of outer space conditions their mediatic capacity to sculpt human societies. In 1967, the international law declared that outer space was a domain of global commons, placing it outside territorial and property rights and under international regimes of governance. Yet, while this legal provision framed outer space as a ‘common heritage’ of humanity, it remained essentially an inhuman environment; all our encounters with it are always mediated – from the astronaut suit that keeps the human body alive to the Hubble Telescope images of faraway galaxies that once existed before the dawn of our time. Positioned in outer space to overcome its fundamental incompatibility with humans, these devices perform their primary function of technical media, acting as ‘mediators between man and nature’ (Simondon, 1980: 1) and domesticating the unforgiving expanses of the extraterrestrial as a ‘living milieu’ onto which the human and its vital processes could be imprinted and subsequently governed. However, except for a few astronauts currently on roster in the International Space Station, outer space is generally empty of humans, and this absence brings our biopolitical bonds with media technologies into sharp relief: claiming and retaining outer space as a part of the human milieu entirely relies upon our ability to create, manage and control these objects. The biological imperatives of securing the desired modes of relationship between humans and their milieu necessarily involve governance of objects (Thacker, 2009), in particular those of a technical kind, which are, as Gilbert Simondon (1980) and Bernard Stiegler (1998) invite us to consider, historically inseparable from human life. But in the inhuman milieu of outer space, technologies are no longer only a means, or a side concern of governance, but its primary and central objects. Supported by an earthbound pyramid of elite scientific labour and sophisticated equipment, the human relationship with these remotely positioned technologies is indicative of the readjustment of the scope of the biopolitical. It necessitates shifting the governmental focus from living humans towards inanimate objects and their own life in space, and acknowledging the complexities produced in this interweaving of the human and the technological. A distinct stage of our techno-scientific endeavour to exceed our ‘natural’, human and terrestrial limitations, mediatic exploration of space fuels the vectors of technology and currents of life beyond the globe, entangling them into relations which might appear uncannily familiar yet utterly alien to us now. Ongoing media advances in outer space are a major means for shaping what the 2014 symposium at Parsons New School of Design invoked as the contours of ‘Post-Planetary Capital’, heralding a host of intersecting trajectories surrounding ways of thinking at a scale beyond the planetary.1 A critical focus upon the central role of media technologies appears as a crucial contribution to the various arcs of speculative inquiry into ‘post-planetary capital’; this is not least because the operations of these technologies are at the core of all political, scientific, economic and environmental conceptions of human ways of life outside the planet. Media technologies not only underwrite the spatial progress of capitalism, its re-scaling of the commons and the transmutation of its biopolitical rationalities, these objects themselves exert their own material and social effects, providing directional impetus to the idea of planetary and extra-planetary ‘capital’. In this sense, they are not merely artefacts of techno-scientific capability or markers of the assertion of property, nor are they just the scaffolding which supports the evolution of media cultures. They act as a fulcrum upon which the productive agencies of the human and the technological can reposition themselves within the arena of life, demanding continuous reappraisal and redesign of the scope and techniques of its control. This paper brings these diverse technologies together under the analytic rubric of ‘media’ to situate them within the conceptual framework of cosmobiopolitics. In the following sections, I first historicise their role in the articulation of governmental strategies that sustain capitalist expansion and biopolitical control of human ‘living space’. I then consider our mediatic relations with the ‘extra-planetary’ through two case studies; the first on satellites and their debris in earth’s orbital space and the second on steps towards the establishment of interplanetary Internet networks, exploring their potential to sculpt the material and social horizon of our futures on and beyond the globe.

#### The role of private entities in outer space serves as a disruption from the legitimate violence from the state --- the 1AC doesn’t prevent expansion it just solidifies control

Fredriksson and Arvanitakis 17 [Martin Fredriksson Linköping University James Arvanitakis Western Sydney University “Property, Place and Piracy” November 2017 Publisher: RoutledgeISBN: 9781138745131 Projects: Piracy UnboundCommons and Commodities]/ISEE

So, the Orphans rebellion might be closer to Disney’s Jack Sparrow than to ‘Calico Jack’ Rackham and figures like Tumlinson describe the invocation of piracy as tongue in cheek. Nontheless historical figure of the pirate remains a useful heuristic for approaching contemporary space mining. The pirate, as frontier libertarian of the colonial seas, was both anathema to and fundamentally constitutive of the international legal order that began to emerge alongside the ‘juridification of the oceanic commons’ (Policante, 2015, p. xii). A violent appropriator exploiting the ‘free’ spaces outside the sphere of state power, the pirate of the pre-modern world was hostis humani generis – the enemy of all humanity (see Chapter 6 in this volume for a detailed analysis). But, paradoxically, efforts to eradicate piracy solidified the role of European colonial powers as protectors of the oceanic commons and global commerce, simultaneously strengthening the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence on the frontier (Heller-Roazen, 2009; Policante, 2015, p. xii). Although the pirate’s capacity for unrestricted violence in plundering treasure from rival vessels may not resonate with space mining, this section considers whether extraterrestrial resource exploitation can be construed as an act of theft that similarly involves this state/ pirate dialectic. Central to the commingling of piratical lawlessness and the extension of state power onto the frontier is a transformation in the pirate’s legal standing that occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. During the European Wars of Religion, a ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 2005) became solidified in customary law and treaty agreements beginning with the 1559 Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. ‘Amity lines’ were drawn to separate the emergent ‘law of nations’ between continental powers and an anomic space ‘beyond the line’,10 where ‘treaties, peace and friendship applied only to Europe, to the Old World, to the area on this side of the line’ (Schmitt, 2006, p. 92). It is within this 130 M. Johnson anomic space where the pirate became employed by the state: those who held a lettre des marques et de représailles (letter of marque and reprisal) were authorised to plunder enemy vessels and treasure without any limit on hostility. The pirate was transformed from lawless freebooter to state-sanctioned privateer: resources appropriated beyond the line were shared between privateers and state coffers, and the privateer became fundamental to European state-building (Policante, 2015, pp. 61–67). Might the frontier beyond the atmosphere comprise a similar state of exception, where the physical distance from the ‘concrete order’ (Schmitt 2006, p. 65) of terrestrial legal and political norms results in an extra-legal or anomic space, free for plunder? Despite the largely pre-emptive juridification of the space frontier via the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (OST), the legal status of outer space retains a degree of ambiguity. The OST was drafted at the height of Cold War geopolitical tension and subsequently focused more on the militarisation of outer space and undesirability of territorial claims on celestial bodies, as opposed to clarifying the role of non-state actors or providing a framework for commercial activity (Pop, 2000). The treaty established that outer space was res communis: a commons and ‘the province of all mankind’. Article 2 stated that ‘Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.’ Crucially, the treaty has not explicitly forbidden private appropriation of celestial bodies. The clause ‘by any other means’ is possibly enough to prohibit appropriation by non-government actors (Pop, 2000). To more ardent supporters of space mining, however, the emphasis on national appropriation presents a loophole for private enterprise (Kfir, 2016; White, 1998), that ‘an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or a private association or an international organization could lawfully appropriate any part of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies’ (Gorove, 1969, p. 351). The US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 (CSLCA) appears to take the latter interpretation, whereby the sovereign power of the US legislature endorses private enterprises to ‘act on their own behalf’. Title IV of the Act states: A United States citizen engaged in commercial recovery of an asteroid resource or a space resource … shall be entitled to any asteroid resource or space resource obtained, including to possess, own, transport, use, and sell the asteroid resource or space resource obtained in accordance with applicable law, including the international obligations of the United States. (US CSLCA, 2015, §402) These ‘international obligations’ are clearly in relation to the OST, and the CSLCA also includes the ‘Extraterritorial Sovereignty Disclaimer’: ‘the United States does not thereby assert sovereignty or sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body’ (US CSLCA, 2015, Privateering on the cosmic frontier? 131 §403). The ‘applicable law’ of the act only includes, but it is not limited to, international law: while the precise details regarding enforcement of any space property claims are unclear, such claims could also be protected under US law and competing claims arbitrated in US courts. While the CLSCA would not entail the American flag being planted on the surface of an asteroid, the US is tacitly claiming some level of jurisdiction via acts of corporate appropriation. And, if ‘international obligations’ represent more than just the OST’s nonappropriation principle, the general absence of recognition and endorsement from the international community means that the CSCLA is a largely unilateral assertion.11 The CSLCA effectively positions the US in opposition to other nations – spacefaring or otherwise – seeming to contradict the res communis nature of the OST. It imposes a res nullius legal interpretation of outer space resources by assuming that celestial bodies are free for exploitation, provided no direct territorial claims are made. The United States recognises and enforces its citizens’ resource claims on the space frontier in the name of ‘[developing] in the United States … economically viable, safe and stable’ space resource industries (US CSLCA, 2015, p. 44). This exploitation of the frontier as ‘state of exception’ is an act of economic competition, and the CSLCA then starts to resemble the letter of marque. Resources claimed in outer space will generate tax revenue and further political prerogatives of economic growth (jobs, infrastructure and so on), akin to the role of privateering in European state-building or the granting of royal charters to joint-stock companies like the East India Company. Outer space becomes the province of the United States economy rather than ‘all mankind’ a commercial vanguard enables an indirect form of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey, 2004; Dickens & Ormrod 2007, p. 59), pre-emptively stealing resources owned by all. As far as NewSpace’s yearnings for pirate space utopias are concerned, this fundamental reliance on the state’s legislative apparatus implies that the notion of a stateless space frontier is indeed a fantasy. As privateers and patriots, ‘[extending] our free-market values into space’ (Kerber, cited in Space Frontier Foundation, 2015), NewSpace mining firms effectively extend state influence onto the anomic frontier under the guise of entrepreneurial commerce.

#### This biopolitical impulse in space reduces life to the question of survival, and enables the mobilization of the population for war, extinction

Kaye ‘16 (Bradley, Inst. @ Erie Community College and Niagara County Community College, “Biopolitics and the Infected Community: Foucault, Sartre, Esposito, and Butler,” *Fast Capitalism*, Vol. 13 No. 1, 2016, edited)

However, Foucault claims that this direct power to take lives has been sublimated and redirected externally elsewhere. Now, when the sovereign has an attack on power, where the sovereign’s life is in danger, it is within the state’s power to kill the subjects by redirecting their energy into war. It is not direct killing of the subjects by the sovereign, but a redirecting of libidinal energies into the fascism of total war. It was no longer considered that this power of the sovereign over his subjects could be exercised in an absolute and unconditional way, but only in cases where the sovereign’s very existence was in jeopardy: a sort of right of rejoinder. If he were threatened by external enemies who sought to overthrow him or contest his rights, he could then legitimately wage war, and require his subjects to take part in the defense of the state; without directly proposing their death, he was empowered to expose their life: in this sense, he wielded an indirect power over them of life and death. (Foucault, 1978, 135) The state is analogous to the paternalistic family structure, the Roman “Father” looking after its subjects for their own good, disposing of life at any time. There are also ways that the creeping state presence in a bureaucratic Western society creates repressive social modalities that eventually bring every aspect of society under its regulating gaze via the normative aspects of legal state apparatuses. The father’s no has become the yes of consumerism. I will try to construct a viable set of ideological alternatives by juxtaposing the differences between Michel Foucault and Jean-Paul Sartre. In bio-politics risk is spread out over the entire population as: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. (Foucault, 1978, 137) As life is exposed it becomes “bare life” increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. In the seventies there was a push towards nuclear disarmament a major question that still lingers, and Foucault presses the issue by saying: “The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence.” (ibid.) Now that his lectures have been published we can see in Society Must be Defended; Security, Territory, Population; The Birth of Biopolitics; and elsewhere how his research on this issue was shaped by textual references within the canonical traditions of philosophy, in particular by many of the Enlightenment Period political philosophers such as Hobbes and Bentham. His work also stems up to the Nazi thinkers and the American neo-liberal capitalist reactions to the rise of Fascism bred by a total and complete paranoia of any state intervention into daily life. All of that has been in the name of biopolitics. Is there an anti-essentialist dimension to even biopolitics? It is hard to pigeon hole Foucault as a philosopher of the institutional aspects of power when he says point blank: “One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society” (Foucault, History of Sexuality Volume 1, pg. 93). When I talk with even learned scholars about Foucault there is still a weird idea that he only talks of institutional aspects of power. Discipline and Punish was a political intervention at a particular moment in the early seventies when the prison population was spiraling out of control and my hypothesis is the state was criminalizing minor drug offenses and locking people away as a tactical maneuver to suppress the resistance that had gained popularity in the sixties and seventies which was when the Rockefeller Drug Laws began to take effect; this is also when the problem of prison overcrowding became a major problem which required a move towards prison abolition. History of Madness was written in the early sixties at the beginning of psychoanalysis as a serious medical discourse and psychiatry with talk therapy was starting to gain traction as a widely accepted social phenomenon. As Foucault points out though, these were all methods of creating spaces of incarceration and modes of surveillance on the criminal and mad populations that were deemed to be political threats to the state due to living by non-normative behaviors. The criminalization of madness was also a major tactic of repressive political discourses at that time, which still exist as tropes to this day. As a result of these social institutions the mental hospital and the prison gaining ascendancy as repressive apparatuses that incarcerate and create surveillance the result was a mass homogenization of experience and a total fear that lead to the post-modern surface level “fluffy” simulacrum life experience where every social interaction was an interaction at the level of superficiality. Digging into the depths of the psyche to do the hard inner work of self-transformation would lead to unleashing the negativity that pent up as a result of being harassed by these repressive political institutions. The age-regressions that occur when someone is made slightly uncomfortable when in the seventies capitalism was moving more towards a service economy, retail, office jobs, therapy, health fields, and this leads to the stroking of the bourgeois and petit bourgeois ego from all sides by capitalist consumerism that serves everyone and says “Yes” to any desire. Lower classes are being incarcerated in massive proportions especially racial minorities in the United States. But, in the midst of this, impatience with any subtlety has grown prevalent and the big issue now is that capitalism always says yes, even to the most perverse desires and horrific violent transgressions. Experiences can be bought at least as simulacrums in virtual or tele-visual forms. Acting out in a repressive society has taken the form of simulated acting out, actors acting out parts on television and in movies, but in reality workers (and especially women) are more repressed now than ever before. Now truth has become nothing more than accrued habits and whatever helps everyone feel comfortable and satisfied. For some reason the discourse of bio-politics is extremely seductive in garnering support for American imperialistic endeavors abroad, the subjects seem to [ignore] the violence inflicted by the US Military when it is conducted as a humanitarian “peace-keeping” mission. Or, as Roberto Esposito points out the way of garnering the alleged consent of the masses for a war effort is by positing the necessity to take life in order to preserve life. Often in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya, the US Government bombed the so-called enemies while they also air dropped medical supplies. The taking of life is problematically coupled with the desire for immunization, to create death and destruction while also trying to sanitize, clean up, and “fix” the broken situation. The Affordable Care Act is no such exception to the rule. It tries to offer healthcare to workers who will remain productive in an effort to maintain the working class as healthy subjects, but it is a prescriptive measure designed to put a band-aid on the problems of health that arise when the workers are worn down due to frenetic bodily activities of manual labor, and the stasis of intellectual immaterial office work which contributes to certain health risks such as obesity. It is the bio-political ethos in praxis, because the predominant political discourse surrounding the pro and con positions regarding the reforms was almost always economic in nature. Does the policy save consumers money? Does it save the government money? Nowhere in the discussion was there any analysis that perhaps capitalism contributes to these health related issues that need preventative care, or in the pseudo-debates about veterans’ health care that their health problems are a direct result of bio-political discourses that provoked wars over the last ten to twenty years. There is a certain matrix by which the bio-political conversation has continued unabated.

#### The role of the ballot is to embrace specific intellectualism, uncovering the weak points in regimes of knowledge production, you should weigh the power relations latent in each advocacy against each other

Owen 97. David Owen, professor of social sciences at Southampton University, 1997, “Maturity and Modernity: Nietszche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of reason,” Routledge publishers, published July 22, 1997

In our reflections on Foucault’s methodology, it was noted that, like Nietszche and Weber, he commits himself to a stance of value-freedom as an engaged refusal to legislate for others. Foucault’s critical activity is oriented to human autonomy yet his formal account of the idea of autonomy as the activity of self-transformation entails that the content of this activity is specific to the struggles of particular groups and individuals. Thus, while the struggle against humanist forms of power/knowledge relations denotes the formal archiectonic interest of genealogy as critique, the determination of the ‘main danger’ which denotes the ‘filling in’ of this interest is contingent upon the dominant systems of constraint confronted by specific groups and individuals. For example, the constitution of women as ‘hysterical,’ of blacks as ‘criminal,’ of homosexuals as ‘perverted’ all operate through humanist forms of power/knowledge relations, yet the specificity of the social practices and discourses engaged in producing these ‘identities’ entails that while these struggles share a general formal interest in resisting the biopolitics of humanism, their substantive interests are distinct. It is against this context that Foucault’s stance of value-freedom can be read as embodying a respect for alterity. The implications of this stance for intellectual practice became apparent in Foucault’s distinction between the figures of the ‘universal’ and ‘specific’ intellectual. Consider the following comments: In a general way, I think that intellectuals-if this category exists, which is not certain or perhaps even desirable- are abandoning their old prophetic function. And by that I don’t mean only their claim to predict what will happen, but also the legislative function that they so long aspired for: ‘See what must be done, see what is good, follow me. In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here is where I am.’ The greek wise man, the jewish prophet, the roman legislators are still models that haunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and writing. The universal intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth; of our being (e.g. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. *If*, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the figure of the ‘specific’ inellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow for he is too attentive to the present. The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, **leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing** attentiveness to the present **in terms of what is singular** and arbitrary **in what we take to be universal** and necessary. Following from this, **the intellectual does not seek to offer** grand theories **but** specific analyses**,** not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does not entail the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘ we are always in the position of beginning again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, ‘a hyper-and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and partiality of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ‘ideal’ critique and ‘real’ transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of critique ‘is not a matter of saying that things are not right as they are’ but rather ‘of pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought and practices we accept rest’ (PPC p. 154). This distinction is perhaps slightly disingenuous, yet Foucault’s point is unintelligible if we recognize his concern to disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that ‘criticism (and radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation’: A transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation. (PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible’ (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The ‘specificity’ of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for a reposing of the question, “who are we?” the role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) **but to** create the space **within which** their struggles become visible **such that these others** can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this critical activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

**We should imagine a world where things aren’t what they seem – the desire of the 1ac is the opposite of the life guided by reason – return to immanence and embrace contingency**

**Gulli 16** (Bruno Gulli - teaches philosophy at Long Island University, “Sovereign Violence and the Power of Acting – (Imagining the Unsovereign Law)”, A Journal of the Social Imaginary, 2016, <https://cab.unime.it/journals/index.php/IMAGO/article/viewFile/1307/1024>, MG)

A critique of sovereign violence, therefore, cannot simply rest on the reality of affects and desire and the deterministic tendencies engendered by it. What must be taken into account by such a critique is the fact of contingency –as well as the awareness of it. **Being aware of contingency means imagining how things could be other than they are**. Obviously, this awareness and this imagination are not found in the detached place of a simple and unified subject, but rather in the multiple conditions of subjectification and in the process of individuation –and this is what determination amounts to. Yet, a vortex of original contingency and freedom must exist if we are to posit the possibility of change. Things can change –as John Duns Scotus notes— because they are possible, rather than necessary (Duns Scotus 1987: 44). Indeed, “**those who deny that some being is contingent should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented**” (9). Something different can be imagined only because it is possible –and possibility is part of reality. So when Lordon denies what he calls “the tense of regret” as “a retrospective illusion” and as “the Spinozist non-sense par excellence,” he is perhaps denying the reality, or actuality, of potentiality (Lordon 2014: 143). He says that “to be able to do and to do are one and the same thing: we could only have done what we did, neither more nor less” (143-144). But I find this unrealistic and false. For instance, I could have gone to the movies last night even though I didn’t. I believe that, even from a Spinozist point of view, the denial of ‘I could have,’ which I would not necessarily call “the tense of regret,” is a bit too strong. (Let us also note that the tense of regret is rather ‘I should have’ and admit that regret itself is in any case an important moment in human experience – and that we often learn from it.) That denial does in fact reduce reality to what is simply there, the merely given, by excluding potentiality. For it seems impossible to deny ‘I could have’ without at the same time also denying the ‘I could’ of transformation and change. To be sure, Lordon does not at all rule out change. But he inscribes it in a determinist –though he specifies, non-fatalist—ontology. For instance, he says, When the indignation that gets people moving prevails over the obsequium that makes them stay put, a new affective vector is formed, and individuals who used to be determined to respect institutional norms … are suddenly determined to sedition (140). But what accounts for this indignation? I would suggest that it is not at all a matter of determinism or free will. As far as I know, one of the most interesting takes on this issue is Jean-Paul Sartre’s denunciation of it as a false problem. At the outset of the chapter on freedom in Being and Nothingness, Sartre says, It is strange that philosophers have been able to argue endlessly about determinism and free will, to cite examples in favor of one or the other thesis without ever attempting first to make explicit the structures contained in the very idea of action (1956: 559). For Sartre, an action must be intentional: “The careless smoker who has through negligence caused the explosion of a powder magazine has not acted” (ibid.). This intentionality is what makes agents (bodies) expend their freedom, their nothingness. But as Sartre famously says, there is no exit from it, “we do not choose to be free” (623). We are “thrown into freedom,” condemned to it (ibid.). Sartre provides the solution to the false problem mentioned above, the paradox of freedom, by means of the notion of ‘situation’: “there is freedom only in a situation, and there is a situation only through freedom” (629). Situation means determination, but outside the logic of determinism. **Freedom means power to act, outside the illusion of a free will**. A critique of sovereignty also needs to posit something outside sovereignty. **However, this is not a moment of transcendence; rather, it is a return into immanence**. To say that there is a return to immanence seems to imply that there was an exit from it. In fact, there was no exit, but only the positing of a fictitious reality, **the illusion of sovereignty as a totality**. **The end of that illusion gives the sense of a return into what has always already been there**. In fact, it is sovereignty itself – sovereignty’s first and foremost expression of violence—that by positing itself as separate and distant creates a **metaphysical and fictitious paradigm of power** as potestas (authority) rather than potentia (potency). The fact that the paradigm is fictitious does not mean that it lacks real efficacy. What it lacks is **authenticity** and, if you will, **legitimacy**. Yet, it is a real and effective power. Lordon is absolutely right when he says, on the basis of Spinoza, that there “is no potestas that does not emanate from potentia(multitudinis) –but in the form of hijacking and to the advantage of the most powerful of master-desires, the desire of the sovereign” (160-161). **What must be shown is that the desire of the sovereign –a despotic desire—is the opposite of the life guided by reason, and closer to freedom, defining the desire of the multitude**. It is this reason that is neither private nor public, but something altogether different. In fact, it is common reason, that is to say, humanity.

### Case

#### Listen – this Aff makes zero sense – three Top-Level Issues that should render a Neg Ballot on Presumption –

#### 1] Companies will just build Space Stations that aren't explicitly meant to “replace the ISS” – there’s no Brightline or way to verify meaning the Plan effectively does nothing cause companies have incentives to be sketch.

#### 2] The Plan ONLY effects Space Stations “replacing” the ISS - if Space Stations aren’t multilateral and used for government based research they’re not “replacing the ISS” which means the Plan wouldn’t affect them OR they ARE which means the Aff links to itself since those stations are used multilaterally.

#### 3] If Government’s hiring Private Companies isn’t private appropriation – then they can’t solve the ISS being replaced since the US is funding those Private Companies meaning it’s not Private entities.

#### 4] conceded in cx – if ISS goes down then only companies try to replace

#### No an I/L – they haven’t read a Reverse Causal Arg that a Commercial Replacement causes an Extension – NASA isn’t ending the ISS since it wasts Commercial Stations, its ending because it's falling apart – NASA is looking to other opportunities based on structural factors regarding the ISS.

#### 2] Doesn’t say Private forecloses opportunities – the only difference is Commercial Space Stations have paid customers from governments BUT that’s non-unique since Governments already pay to get to Space – the US literally pays Russia to get to the ISS – doesn’t stop multilateralism.

#### They say ISS resiliency

#### 1] ISS failure inevitable.

Foust 21 Jeff Foust 12-1-2021 "NASA inspector general warns of space station gap" <https://spacenews.com/nasa-inspector-general-warns-of-space-station-gap/> (Jeff Foust writes about space policy, commercial space, and related topics for SpaceNews. He earned a Ph.D. in planetary sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a bachelor’s degree with honors in geophysics and planetary science from the California Institute of Technology.)//Elmer

WASHINGTON — Concerns about the long-term viability of some existing International Space Station modules and the potential of delays in development of commercial space stations heighten the risk of a gap in low Earth orbit destinations, a new report warns. The Nov. 30 report by NASA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) said that any gap in LEO destinations between the retirement of the ISS and beginning of operation of commercial stations would heighten risk for future human missions beyond Earth orbit by halting research and threaten the collapse of the LEO commercial space economy. NASA’s current plans call for operating the ISS through the end of the decade, pending a formal authorization from Congress and approvals from international partners. At the same time, NASA is working to support development of commercial stations with the goal of having at least one in service in 2028, enabling a two-year transition before the ISS is retired. One threat to that schedule, the report concluded, is the health of the ISS itself. It noted in particular air leaks in the Zvezda service module, the third-oldest module and in orbit since 2000. Those leaks were first detected in September 2019 and, at one point, caused the rate of air loss on the station to increase by a factor of five to 1.35 kilograms per day. Those leaks were traced to a transfer tunnel between the module and a docking port, but repair work to seal a crack found there did not solve the problem, with the air loss rate still double the baseline rate of about 0.27 kilograms per day. “This elevated rate suggests that additional undiscovered leaks may still exist in the Service Module Transfer Tunnel,” the OIG report concluded. While efforts to locate the source of the leaks in that module continue, the report said that the cause of the cracks remains unclear, other than that impacts by micrometeoroids and orbital debris had been ruled out. “Potential causes of the cracks and leaks being explored include fatigue, internal damage, external damage, and material defects,” it stated. Those cracks are in a “low stress part” of the module, the report added, heightening concerns. “Notably, based on the models and design mission dynamic loads NASA used to characterize the structure, the cracks should not have occurred,” the OIG stated. “NASA engineers are also reviewing whether the analysis of other segments may need to be updated based on these observations because until the root cause of the cracks is identified the situation raises potential implications for the Station’s long-term structural health.” In an agency response included in the report, Kathy Lueders, NASA associate administrator for space operations, said that NASA and Roscosmos are continuing to study the cracks, including work on the station itself as well as ground-based testing. Preliminary results of that investigation should be done by the end of March, she said. At worst, that tunnel could be sealed off, halting the overall loss of air but also losing access to that docking port. Lueders said with that work to address the Zvezda air leak, “NASA is confident in moving forward with plans to extend the ISS, noting that we will continue to monitor and evaluate ISS health as we go forward.” The OIG report also raised questions about the ability of commercial stations to be ready by the end of the decade. NASA’s LEO commercialization efforts “show promise,” the report said, but highlighted issues about the viability of commercial markets for such stations, costs to develop those facilities, uncertain NASA funding, schedules and requirements. The report was particularly skeptical about schedules. “In our judgment, even if early design maturation is achieved in 2025 — a challenging prospect in itself — a commercial platform is not likely to be ready until well after 2030,” it stated, noting it took eight years for the commercial crew program to go from early design maturation to first crewed flight. “We found that commercial partners agree that NASA’s current timeframe to design and build a human-rated destination platform is unrealistic.” That means further extensions of the ISS beyond 2030 may be needed to avoid a gap, assuming the station is technically able to continue operations into the next decade. “However, the Agency faces significant challenges with executing its commercialization plan by 2028 or even 2030 — meaning that without further extension of the ISS, a gap in availability of a low Earth orbit destination is likely,” the report concluded.

#### Multilat in Space fails:

#### 1] Different Priorities

Hitchens 15 (Theresa Hitchens is a senior research scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, where she focuses on space security, cyber security, and governance issues surrounding disruptive technologies. Prior to joining CISSM, Hitchens was the director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva from 2009 through 2014. “Forwarding Multilateral Space Governance: Next Steps for the International Community.” CISSM Working Paper, August 2015. https://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/handle/1903/19733/ForwardingMultilateralSpaceGovernance%20-%20080615.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

As the number and diversity of space actors grows, the challenges to multilateral approaches to space governance are increasing. Established space powers have different priorities than do emerging space powers; military space powers have fundamentally conflicting goals (i.e. to do harm to each other if considered necessary) and different understandings of their legal constraints; and capacity to uphold international legal and political commitments varies widely. While there is widespread (if not universal) agreement on the problems facing the space domain, there is not consensus on what should be done or what should be done first. The explosion in the number of commercial space actors—who have less stake in (indeed even some antipathy to) current or future governance regimes—complicates interactions between states. A growing commercial presence will require states to put in place new or modified national laws, policies, and regulatory regimes to ensure against chaos. The priorities of commercial actors—such as would-be asteroid mining ventures and micro-sat operators—are already forcing states to re-examine existing regulatory and legal regimes (both national and multilateral) with an eye to potential adaptation. The stovepiped nature of multilateral fora and their sometimes-conflicting priorities and needs complicate addressing these challenges, which are by and large cross-cutting. Certain issues fall through the cracks, and others are debated through such a narrow lens that discussions fail to take into account potential second-order or cross-sectoral consequences. This is apparent, for example, in the Cold War-created mandates of COPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament, which seek to create a separation from issues of peaceful uses of space and military ones— despite the fact that those uses and functions have largely converged. Private and civil sector actors are also largely absent from these fora (with the exception of the ITU). Instead, these actors have sought and gained influence directly with their national governments regarding legal and regulatory regimes to support their own priorities, which may not coincide with international security needs. These factors in part account for the international community’s current focus on voluntary measures, norms of behavior, and transparency and confidence-building measures. The current environment is simply not ripe for the pursuit of legally binding treaties, nor, given the uptick in tensions among the three major space powers—China, Russia, and the United States—is it likely to be any time soon. Despite these growing tensions, there are still steps that states or groups of states could—and should—take to move toward improved multilateral governance of outer space activities. The first should be endorsing and enacting the already-agreed-upon recommendations of the UN GGE on transparency and confidence-building. Transparency and confidence-building measures are likely to be necessary precursors to an eventual multilateral accord. Unilateral actions by States would also create forward momentum and establish the foundation for future multilateral agreements. The joint meeting of the UNGA’s First and Fourth Committees (slated for October 2015) provides an opportunity for states to propose additional or follow-on initiatives. For starters, they could initiate a review of the implementation of the current space regime. States could commit to developing lists of contacts and focal points for space governance issues, in order to underpin transparency and provide avenues for discussion when worrisome situations arise. States can also commit to improving compliance with the Registry Convention, especially major space-faring states who have little excuse for failing in their obligations. The registry could also be expanded, or an ad hoc process could be developed, to broaden notification of specific space activities such as pre-launch notifications and notification of satellite maneuvers.

#### 2] Free-riding

Knopf 18 - professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies (Jeffrey, After diffusion: Challenges to enforcing nonproliferation and disarmament norms, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 39, Issue 3, February 9th, pages 367-398)

A second challenge that **complicates efforts to enforce** international **norms** is the well-known **collective action problem** (Olson, 1965). In many cases, effective enforcement will require the participation of more than one actor. Unless one state has unusual economic leverage, for example, economic sanctions usually **require multilateral enforcement** to be effective. Otherwise, the target state can evade sanctions by trading with those states that choose not to participate in the sanctions effort. **Even military enforcement** often **depends on** the involvement of **multiple states**. Take the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 for example. Although often seen as a case of U.S. unilateralism, this is not entirely accurate. The United States relied on earlier UN Security Council resolutions for legal justification, so at minimum the United States needed other members of the Security Council to have voted in favor of relevant resolutions. It also sought a so-called second resolution that would have explicitly authorized the use of force, and the U.S. failure to obtain Security Council passage of this authorization reduced international support for the U.S.-led operation (Thompson, 2009). In addition, the United States sought to enlist other partners in the “coalition of the willing” that conducted the military operation. The United States could have gone it alone if it chose to, but it clearly had a strong preference to obtain as much legitimacy as it could from the presence of coalition partners. In short, effective unilateral enforcement is likely to be **rare**; norm enforcement will typically be more effective as a multilateral enterprise. **Multilateral cooperation is not automatic** however. By the familiar logic of collective action, states will be tempted to **free ride** on the enforcement efforts of others. As long as others enforce the nonproliferation or disarmament norm in question, free riders still enjoy the benefits. But free riders do not have to pay the costs of enforcement, in trade forgone, in diplomatic frictions with the target or its friends, or in potential casualties should military force come into play. If all states give in to the temptation to free ride, however, then **effective enforcement will not happen.** In some cases, a lack of participation in collective action may arise less from states deliberately free riding than from a **lack of consensus** about whether or not a particular state is actually violating a particular norm. There can be ambiguity about the standards for ascertaining norm compliance or about the evidence of a violation. When this occurs, states can come to **different interpretations** of whether the situation even calls for an effort at enforcement (for examples involving NPT safeguards, see Goldschmidt, 2010) The end result will be similar to when free riding occurs, in that many **states will choose not to join in collective action**. The collective action problem is accentuated by **global power asymmetries**. The **U**nited **S**tates is so much more powerful than most other states, and has demonstrated such an obvious commitment to enforcing nonproliferation in certain cases, **that other states may hope that the** **U**nited **S**tates **will shoulder the entire burden** of enforcement. This creates an especially strong temptation to free ride. To the extent that the **U**nited **S**tates cannot on its own bring about **norm compliance**, however, the collective action problem will become a major barrier to enforcement of nonproliferation norms.

#### Group 1AC Ortega and Tisdall –

#### 1] Frame this thorugh U/Q – if the ISS works, then why are countries militarizing and making space forces…

#### 2] No space war – prefer data over political rhetoric

Klimas interviewing Weeden 18 [Brian Weeden, smart space guy. Is the space war threat being hyped? August 3, 2018. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/03/space-war-threat-hype-force-760781]

There’s been increasing rhetoric...about the militarization of space and the potential for conflicts on Earth to extend into space. That’s driven in part by reports about anti-satellite testing in Russia and China...The report really grew out of our frustration at the level of publicly available information on this topic. A lot of what you get are public statements from military leadership or politicians, or sometimes news articles talking about something and it’s really hard to get down to details and...sort through what might be real, what might be hype. Our goal was to dig into the open source material and see what we could determine from a factual standpoint was really going on -- what types of capabilities were being developed and how might they be used in a future conflict. Ultimately we hoped that would lead to a more informed debate about what U.S. strategy should be to address those threats. What sort of feedback have you gotten so far? A lot of the feedback has been either informal or private because a lot of the issues we talk about, people in the government research using classified materials. So it’s difficult for them to give detailed feedback. In general, the feedback we’ve gotten has been pretty positive. People have said they like the fact that this sort of stuff is being put in the public domain and encouraged us to continue. Were your findings better or worse than the picture public discourse paints? In general, it’s a little bit better. A lot of political rhetoric and news stories focus on the most extreme examples, so using kinetic weapons to blow up satellites. While there is research and development going on to develop those capabilities, what we found is there’s yet to be any publicly-known example of them being used. What is being used and what seems to be of the most utility are the non-kinetic things, like jamming and cyber attacks. The good news is we have yet to see the most destructive kinetic attacks that can cause really harmful long-term damage to the space environment, but unfortunately we are seeing non-kinetic attacks being used, and that’s likely to continue.

#### There isn’t an I/L to this Impact – no Mulitlat/ISS key Warrant – don’t let them spin out of no-where – Russia is literally an ISS partner which proves the ISS doesn’t solve counter-space capabilities

#### No leadership impact

Christopher Fettweis 20 (Christopher J. Fettweis is an adjunct scholar in the Cato Institute’s Defense and Foreign Policy Studies Department and a professor at Tulane University’s Department of Political Science, 6/3/20, accessed 11/14/21, “Delusions of Danger: Geopolitical Fear and Indispensability in U.S. Foreign Policy”, https://www.cato.org/publications/delusions-danger-geopolitical-fear-indispensability-us-foreign-policy)AGabay

Like many believers, proponents of hegemonic stability theory base their view on **faith alone**.41 There is precious little evidence to suggest that the United States is responsible for the pacific trends that have swept across the system. In fact, the world remained equally **peaceful**, relatively speaking, while the United States cut its **forces** throughout the 1990s, as well as while it **doubled** its **military spending** in the **first decade** of the new **century**.42 Complex statistical methods should not be needed to demonstrate that levels of U.S. military spending have been essentially unrelated to **global stability**. Hegemonic stability theory’s flaws go way beyond the absence of simple correlations to support them, however. The theory’s supporters have never been able to explain adequately how precisely 5 percent of the world’s population could force peace on the other **95 percent**, unless, of course, the rest of the world was simply not intent on fighting. Most states are quite free to go to war without U.S. involvement but choose not to. The United States can be counted on, especially after Iraq, to steer well clear of most **civil wars** and **ethnic conflicts**. It took years, hundreds of thousands of casualties, and the use of chemical weapons to spur even limited interest in the events in Syria, for example; surely internal violence in, say, most of Africa would be unlikely to attract serious attention of the world’s policeman, much less intervention. The continent is, nevertheless, more **peaceful** **today** than at any other time in its history, something for which U.S. hegemony **cannot** **take** **credit**.43 Stability exists today in many such places to which U.S. hegemony simply does not **extend**. Overall, proponents of the **stabilizing power** of U.S. hegemony should keep in mind one of the most **basic observations** from **cognitive psychology**: rarely are our actions as important to others’ calculations as we **perceive them to be**.44 The so‐​called **egocentric** **bias**, which is essentially ubiquitous in human interaction, suggests that although it may be natural for U.S. policymakers to interpret their role as crucial in the maintenance of world peace, they are almost certainly **overestimating** their own **importance**. Washington is probably not as central to the **myriad decisions** in **foreign capitals** that help maintain international stability as it thinks it is. The **indispensability fallacy** owes its existence to a couple of factors. First, although all people like to bask in the **reflected** **glory** of their country’s (or culture’s) unique, nonpareil stature, Americans have long been **exceptional** in their **exceptionalism**.45 The short history of the United States, which can easily be read as an almost uninterrupted and certainly unlikely story of success, has led to a (perhaps natural) belief that it is morally, culturally, and politically superior to other, lesser countries. It is no coincidence that the exceptional state would be called on by fate to maintain peace and justice in the world. Americans have always combined that feeling of **divine providence** with a sense of mission to spread their ideals around the world and **battle evil** wherever it lurks. It is that sense of destiny, of being the object of history’s call, that most obviously separates the United States from other countries. Only an American president would claim that by entering World War I, “America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world.“46 Although many states are motivated by humanitarian causes, no other seems to consider promoting its values to be a national duty in quite the same way that Americans do. “I believe that God wants everybody to be free,” said George W. Bush in 2004. “That’s what I believe. And that’s one part of my foreign policy.“47 When Madeleine Albright called the United States the “indispensable nation,” she was reflecting a traditional, deeply held belief of the American people.48 Exceptional nations, like exceptional people, have an obligation to assist the merely average. Many of the factors that contribute to geopolitical fear — Manichaeism, religiosity, various vested interests, and neoconservatism — also help explain American exceptionalism and the indispensability fallacy. And unipolarity makes hegemonic delusions possible. With the great power of the United States comes a sense of great responsibility: to serve and protect humanity, to drive history in positive directions. More than any other single factor, the people of the United States tend to believe that they are indispensable because they are powerful, and power tends to blind states to their limitations. “Wealth shapes our international behavior and our image,” observed Derek Leebaert. “It brings with it the freedom to make wide‐​ranging choices well beyond common sense.“49 It is quite likely that the world does not need the United States to **enforce peace**. In fact, if virtually any of the overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations for the current stability are **correct**, the trends in international security may well prove difficult to **reverse**. None of the contributing factors that are commonly suggested (**economic development**, complex **interdependence**, **nuclear weapons**, international **institutions**, **democracy**, shifting **global norms** on **war**) seem **poised to disappear** any time **soon**.50 The world will probably continue its peaceful ways for the near future, at the very least, no matter what the United States chooses to do or not do. As Robert Jervis concluded while pondering the likely effects of U.S. restraint on decisions made in foreign capitals, “It is very unlikely that pulling off the American security blanket would lead to thoughts of war.“51 The United States will remain fundamentally safe no matter what it does — in other words, despite widespread beliefs in its inherent indispensability to the contrary.