#### Space and technology are uniquely locked in a cycle of hauntological repetition—The Mayflower becomes the spaceship.

Catherine Emma Green 17, 4-2017, “Spectral Afterlife: Hauntology, Historical Memory, and Inheritance in Postmodernist Fiction,” <https://digitalcollections.wesleyan.edu/islandora/object/ir:723/datastream/PDF/view>. //ingp

Chapter Two. Worn Futures and Dead Inheritance Toward the end of Michael Cunningham’s Specimen Days, Simon, an android creature, watches the community around him prepare to board a spaceship for a new world, an event that recalls for him similar moments from history – the Mayflower, Columbus’ fleet, Viking ships. Recognizing these parallels, he reflects, “it had probably always been thus” – this time has been here before (Cunningham 293). The event is not new, born from a renewing heritage of accumulating struggles that reanimate the has-happened as a stillhappening. Set over a hundred years into the future, the story ends with a dream born from the past, an enduring faith in voyage as a means of reaching utopia, the act of fleeing as a process of finding. This returning urge “to learn to live finally” calls for a different kind of future that repeatedly has yet to find form (Derrida xvi). Such is the major concern of each protagonist across Specimen Days, a series of three short stories set in New York over a 250 year span of time. While the narratives feature different characters, genres, and premises, they reuse the same character names and motifs, linked most explicitly through their shared returns to the text of Walt Whitman, who provides a ghostly glue across Cunningham’s three worlds. And Whitman’s own poetic emphasis on the eternally recurring circulation of life forms and the connectedness of all 40 species, from past to future, offers purchase to the sense of continuity and genealogy across the novellas. These recursive literary devices literalize the culture of historical repetition that the stories of Specimen Days thematize, constantly imprinting the present with a living past. The self-referential spaces of narrative borrowing construct a palimpsestic overlay that imagines temporal processes of inheritance and haunting, nurturing a spectral ethos that refuses to give up the ghost. Specimen Days begins in the Industrial Age, New York of the late 19th century. After the death of his brother Simon in a freak factory accident, young, poor, “mishappen” Lucas, who uncontrollably recites Whitman’s verse in public, replaces his brother at the very machine that killed him (Cunningham 4). Machinery orbits around his family: his father lives with a breathing tube as a result of his tannery labor, and his mother, paralyzed by grief, depends on a music box to keep her company. Finding a sinister impulse in machines, Lucas wishes to save his brother’s girlfriend Catherine from the sewing machines at her job by staging his own factory accident and thereby forcing her to leave her workplace. Mutilated and in the process of dying, Lucas does manage to save Catherine; a tremendous fire burns her building down, and he and her watch women jump from the flaming windows, a haunting image that anticipates 9/11, the era of the subsequent novella. This second novella, The Children’s Crusade, shuttles the reader over a century into the future of the last episode. Cat, a black woman haunted by the 41 death of her young son, works with criminal deterrence in a dystopic Manhattan freshly terrified by 9/11. When she takes a call from a child suicide bomber who soon after hugs an innocent pedestrian until they blow up, she becomes haunted yet again, guilty over how she could have prevented it. Her job stipulates that she restore order from chaos, and yet the unfolding investigation into this “family” of child bombers only propels her frenzy and alienation. As the investigation gets solved – a woman modeling herself after Walt Whitman has convinced these children to kill as a means of returning time to a simpler age – Cat unexpectedly finds and cares for one of these bombers in secret, and the two impulsively escape Manhattan, heading on a train toward an unknown destination. The final story, Like Beauty, is set roughly 150 years into the future of the previous episode, a 22nd century wasteland of post-humanity where drones form terrorizing pageants of surveillance in the sky and evacuees take shelter in abandoned strip malls. New York has transformed into “Old New York” a theme park nostalgia industry that has “built its reputation on historical fidelity,” allowing wealthy tourists to enter synecdochic replicas of vintage New York societies (Cunningham 203). In this simulacrum, visitors test drive subway rides and capitalists pay to be mugged in Central Park. This world fits, all too literally, Lucas’ encounter of New York from In The Machine: “He was aware of a subtle wrongness, as if the most familiar of places…were altered, as if it had become, overnight, an imperfect copy of itself” (Cunningham 34). As this 42 imperfect copy, Old New York maddeningly captures the postmodern stagnancy of capitalism, approximating the squeezed, stretched, saturated market system, devoid of freedom and originality. This future, built on the recycled concepts of old cultures, is the landscape through which Simon, an experimental android creature programmed to deliver Whitmanian outbursts, performs professional muggings, and Catareen, a reptilian alien works as a nanny. When Simon’s friend Marcus is shot by government drones, Catareen and Simon initiate a chaotic escape from New York to Denver, the alleged home of Simon’s programming maker. Along the way they are joined by Luke, a young homeless boy, and the three of them meet Simon’s maker, who is preparing a voyage with his small community to another planet in the hopes of starting better lives there. At this time, Simon learns that Catareen has been slowly dying, and she has very little time left in her. As the spaceship ascends, Simon stays behind, remaining with Catareen until she dies. Simon’s choice to care for Catareen in her process of dying offers him opening, nurturing a burgeoning humanity and empathy within him. Rather than embracing the Derridean l’avenir - the future as open, the rigid worlds within Specimen Days all showcase a closing off of the future, an urge Jameson characterizes as “an attempt to colonize the future, to draw the unforeseeable back into tangible realities, in which one can invest and on which one can bank, very much in the spirit of stockmarket ‘futures’” (Jameson 228). In The Children’s Crusade, Simon’s shadowy position “trad[ing] futures” 43 appropriately literalizes this industry of control, which profits off of its artificial manipulations of time (Cunningham 107). Defying temporal properties, this treatment of the future as something that can be concretely determined suggests that the future has already happened, the moment of its determination already in the past. “This is the future prepared by the elimination of historicity” - which is not really a future at all so much as a relic piece of a prolonged present (Jameson 228). The cyclical states of eternal return characterizing each novella’s relationship to its predecessor/descendent become symptomatic reminders of this stagnancy, the present rendered detained. The specter becomes a valuable weapon against this self-containment, as its anachronistic condition activates a break from the present’s crisis in historicity, unsettling the violent erasure of the past. Investing in the ghost and supporting these lost histories become acts of resistance to the injustices that produced them. Already spectral and disavowed by their own presents –Lucas as an impoverished child of immigrants, Cat as a black woman, and Simon as an illegal creation – our protagonist specimens answer the call of the other across time through imagining alternative communities and modes of living for themselves. These figures, each haunted by loss, choose to run away from their communities to activate personal change, creating narratives that allegorize escape from the blind tautologies of each present. Cat decides to leave her boyfriend Simon and the linear, fixed futures of his characterization, opening 44 herself up to innumerable, refutured possibilities. This ‘”crazy rebirth” leaves Cat “hurtling forward on a train into the vast confusion of the world, its simultaneous and never-ending collapse and regeneration” (Cunningham 196). Fittingly, the episode ends in this haze of non-arrival, with the narrative’s unresolved ending supporting an ethos of unpredictable possibility. Cat’s train ride into unknowable futures anticipates Simon’s chosen “crazy rebirth,” his solitary trek into the unmapped Rockies, where he feels ready and compelled to “ride into” his future (Cunningham 305). Similarly unresolved, this ending recuperates the ethos of its predecessor, offering active spectral return in a social landscape steered by dead inheritance. Desertion becomes survival, as the deliberately drifting movement of these characters physicalizes their radical break with their social orders. Across the stories, the characters encounter the same anxieties and fears regarding industrialization and mortality, resurrecting the pathos of the past through the protagonist of each story’s present. The lack of each era’s serious, critical confrontation with the problems of the past accelerates a cultural amnesia to technology, in which the same dangers and monstrous events become reproduced still a century after each other. If earlier traumas were remembered and foregrounded in public memory, perhaps the future could avoid them. Aris Mousoutzanis finds these recurrences as articulations of a Freudian return of the repressed, in which the past we attempt to hide and deny resurfaces in unavoidable ways. This call of the other is “integral to 45 Cunningham’s attempt to rewrite ‘History’ from the perspective of the marginalized – his ‘exotic specimens’’ (Mousoutzanis 130). These repetitions of loss and trauma stage pronunciations of Freud’s uncanny, an estranging encounter within the realm of the familiar and intimate that disturbs an individual’s relationship to their known present. That the traumatic event of each story figures as “either repeating or related to the previous one and preparing the way for the next one only confirms the association between repetition and disaster” (Mousoutzanis 133).

#### **We control the root cause – all negative privatization good offense is haunted by manufactured risks**

Dickens 10, Peter Dickens, Affiliated Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Politics, Psychology, Sociology and International Studies, University of Cambridge, “The Humanization of the Cosmos – to what end?” Monthly Review, November 2010, Vol. 62, Issue 2, Start Page 13.

But even if it were desirable, the success of a galactic colonialism is by no means guaranteed. This is because the very venture of space colonization brings new risks. The fifteenth-century Renaissance and the Enlightenment placed great faith in science as a means of bringing "progress." Now such progress is regularly challenged. Furthermore, much scientific intervention today stems from the crises stemming from earlier intervention, or what some social scientists have called "manufactured risk.'"9 This kind of risk, for which no one agency or individual is usually culpable, is readily recognizable in space-humanization progress. Note, for example, that there are now around fourteen thousand tracked objects circling around the earth, known as "space debris" or "space junk." Improved tracking systems will increase the number of smaller, observable tracked objects to around thirty thousand, many of these causing potential damage. Even whole satellites may collide. Such collisions are estimated at millions or even billions to one. But on February 10, 2009, such a collision actually happened. A defunct Russian satellite crashed into an American commercial satellite, generating thousands of pieces of orbiting debris.20 Space junk poses a serious threat to the whole enterprise of space colonization, and plans are now afoot to launch even more satellites, designed to drag older satellites out of orbit in order to avoid collisions.21 Space colonization brings a number of other manufactured risks. The farther space vehicles penetrate the solar system, the more likely it is that they will be powered by nuclear, rather than solar, energy. It is not widely appreciated, for example, that the 1997 Cassini Mission to Saturn's moons (via Jupiter and Venus) was powered by plutonium. One estimate is that if something had gone wrong while Cassini was still circling the earth, some thirty to forty million deaths could have occurred.22 No plans were in place for such an eventuality. Yet, as early as 1964, a plutonium-powered generator fell to earth, having failed to achieve orbit. Dr. John Gofman, professor of medical physics at the University of California, Berkeley, then argued that there was probably a direct link between that crash and an increase of lung cancer on Earth. Both President Obama and the Russian authorities are now arguing for generating electricity with plutonium in space, and building nuclear-propelled rockets for missions to Mars.23 Some of the wilder plans for space colonization also entail major risk. These include proposals for "planetary engineering," whereby the climates of other planets would be changed in such a way as to support life. Dyes, artificial dust clouds, genetically engineered bacteria, and the redirecting of sunlight by satellite mirrors are all being advanced as means of "terraforming," or making parts of the cosmos more like earth. This and the Cassini example further demonstrate the nature of "manufactured risk." **Science and technology**, far from creating Renaissance or Enlightenment-style optimism and certainty, **are creating new problems that are unforeseen and extremely difficult to cope with**.

#### The aff is spectrality – only a critical interrogation of the present and the past as singular, totalizing, and complete can prevent the obstruction of possibility.

Zembylas 13 – Associate Professor of Educational Theory and Curriculum Studies at the Open University of Cyprus (Michalinos, “Pedagogies of Hauntology In History Education: Learning to Live with the Ghosts of Disappeared Victims of War and Dictatorship,” DOI: 10.1111/edth.12010, February 2013)//DD

One way of addressing the past and its representations is through the concept of the specter. In Specters of Marx, a book that initiates the perceived ‘‘ethical turn’’ in his work, Derrida argued that any rethinking of the past and any possibility of a just future depends on whether we can ‘‘learn to live with ghosts’’ (SM, xviii), the specters of the past, particularly the ghosts of victims of atrocities. The spectral is what haunts and returns in a society because the ghosts have unfinished business, something that needs to be corrected. However, the resolution of this unfinished business is not to abolish the specters — for example, through (uncritical) spectacle pedagogies — because, as Derrida warned, this would amount to eliminating the possibility of a different future.32 In addressing the issue of spectrality, Derrida introduced the term hauntology — a near homophone of ‘‘ontology’’ in French — to interrogate and replace the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost. Unlike ontology, which is fixed to the present and to what is representable (the traditional Western ontological and epistemological position), hauntology draws attention to specters that are neither present nor absent, neither dead nor alive.33 Hauntology, then, occupies a peculiar ‘‘in-between’’ space that ‘‘reclaims the unspoken and neglected.’’34 For Derrida, specters are both ‘‘revenants’’ and ‘‘arrivants’’ (SM, xix), that is, spirits that come back and spirits that are to come, respectively; both of these temporal dimensions, as Ross Benjamin and Heesok Chang observe, are essential to spectrality.35 ‘‘Spectrality,’’ Fredric Jameson explains in his reaction to Derrida’s book, does not involve the conviction that ghosts exist or that the past (and maybe even the future they offer to prophesy) is still very much alive and at work, within the living present: all it says, if it can be thought to speak, is that the living present is scarcely as self-sufficient as it claims to be; that we would do well not to count on its destiny and solidity, which might under exceptional circumstances betray us.36 Spectrality denotes what is no longer or not yet living, which is not something present or absent, but something that is possibly everywhere, ‘‘bear[ing] traces of a lingering past and hover[ing] in suspense of an unforeseeable future.’’37 Being neither fully present nor fully absent, ghosts do not have an ontological status, but rather exceed all ontological oppositions between presence and absence, visible and invisible, living and dead.38 The concept of the spectral, then, has much to do with the concept of ‘‘trace’’ and thus time is always already spectral;39 in this sense, hauntology abolishes the concept of linear time as an ontological category of historical understanding. A society that has experienced disappearances — such as Argentina or Cyprus, for example — must come to terms with the specters of the disappeared, the traces left by them in the stories and images that are circulated, the societal habits of remembering and forgetting that are no longer noticed, and the public or private rituals that still take place to recognize the victims. The disappeared are ghosts whose stories and images reach from memory and absence; this is to say that ‘‘disappearance’’ as such — as a particular form of relationality between individuals within a society — reaches from a place and time that was and is no longer and records, recalls, and reinscribes remembrance in the aporetic of memory.40 A commonsense yet ideological response to the ghosts of the disappeared, as noted earlier, is a desire to remember and simultaneously a wish to ontologize the ghosts of the disappeared by categorizing them within what is representable — an action that aims at abolishing or reducing them to spectacles. Derrida argued, however, that a society can come to terms with specters without abolishing or reducing them to a spectacle, that is, to a kind of ontology. As he explained in a paragraph that concerns schools and educators in particular, The last one to whom a specter can appear, address itself, or pay attention is a spectator as such. At the theater or at school. The reasons for this are essential. As theoreticians or witnesses, spectators, observers, and intellectuals, scholars believe that looking is sufficient. Therefore, they are not always in the most competent position to do what is necessary: speak to the specter. (SM, 11) To come to terms with the specters of the past, there needs to be an engagement with the past that is not reduced to its totalizing representation and that does not fall into the delusion of a timeless understanding that is ever present. Derrida called on us to speak and listen to the specter not because the specter will reveal some kind of a secret; rather, speaking with and listening to the specter may open us to the experience of unknowing that underlies a productive engagement and a turning away from that which is supposedly determined content to be uncovered by representational practices.41 The ghost of the disappeared, then, pushes at the boundaries of language, thought, and emotion to open new possibilities for the future, possibilities that do not reduce the ghost’s ethical injunction to an object of knowledge.42 The specter signifies, therefore, a critical interrogation of the present and the past as singular, totalizing, and complete; the specter reminds us that the past is incomplete because there are always elusive remnants that cannot be articulated in the languages available to us. This is why it is suggested, for example, that commemorative or justice projects that rely too heavily on epistemological accounts or seek merely redemption become too totalizing to be open to the view that specters can be anything other than obscure forms of representation. Finally, it is important to point out how Derrida linked the specter to the theme of justice and advocated a politics of memory and responsibility that is directed not only to the living, but also to the dead and to the not yet born: No justice ... seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some responsibility, beyond all living present, within that which disjoins the living present, before the ghosts of those who are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of wars, political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism. (SM, xix) Derrida chose, as noted earlier, to speak about ghosts in the name of justice because, he observed, ‘‘one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize justice, say ‘this is just’ and even less ‘I am just,’ without immediately betraying justice.’’43 Since justice entails ‘‘an experience of the impossible’’ and thus is aporetic — because it is implicated with law, although it cannot be reduced to it44 — spectrality becomes valuable in determining how to address justice demands. It is in this spectral sense that justice is the ‘‘experience of absolute alterity,’’45 an openness toward a radical otherness, to ‘‘the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice’’ (SM, 28). The specter’s ethical injunction is that we remain open to the radical otherness of the arrivant as arrivant, what remains to come — for example, a ‘‘democracy to come,’’ ‘‘hospitality without reserve,’’ and ‘‘alterity that cannot be anticipated’’ (SM, 65–66). As Derrida pointed out, ‘‘without this experience of the impossible, one might as well give up on both justice and the event’’ (SM, 65) — that is, the event to come. The responsibility of the haunted is this, then: to be open to justice as unrepresentable, as always to come, as a trace of directionality rather than as a fixed destination.46 Hence justice for disappeared victims, for example, is not a calculable and distributive justice that ends with trials and punishments but an agonistic justice that contests legalistic settlements. In this sense, justice is a critical force that helps to articulate an alternative vision that is motivated by the infinite obligation to the other — in this case, the ghost of a disappeared victim who cannot be assessed by a finite set of qualities, representations, or legal arguments.

#### **Thus I affirm the Resolved: The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.**

Dickens 10, Peter Dickens, Affiliated Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Faculty of Politics, Psychology, Sociology and International Studies, University of Cambridge, “The Humanization of the Cosmos – to what end?” Monthly Review, November 2010, Vol. 62, Issue 2, Start Page 13.

But humanizing outer space can be for good as well as for ill. It can either, as is now happening, be in a form primarily benefiting those who are already in positions of economic, social, and military power. Or humanization can be something much more positive and socially beneficial. What might this more progressive form of cosmic humanization look like? Most obviously, the technology allowing a human presence in the cosmos would be focused mainly on earthly society. There are many serious crises down here on Earth that have urgent priority when considering the humanization of outer space. First, there is the obvious fact of social inequalities and resources. Is $2 billion and upwards to help the private sector find new forms of space vehicles really a priority for public funding, especially at a time when relative social inequalities and environmental conditions are rapidly worsening? The military-industrial complex might well benefit, but it hardly represents society as a whole. This is not to say, however, that public spending on space should be stopped. Rather, it should be addressed toward ameliorating the many crises that face global society. Satellites, for example, have helped open up phone and Internet communications for marginalized people, especially those not yet connected by cable. Satellites, including satellites manufactured by capitalist companies, can also be useful for monitoring climate change and other forms of environmental crisis such as deforestation and imminent hurricanes. They have proved useful in coordinating humanitarian efforts after natural disasters. Satellites have even been commissioned by the United Nations to track the progress of refugees in Africa and elsewhere So outer space technology can be used for tackling a number of immediate social and political issues. But these strategies do not add up to a philosophy toward outer space and the form humanization should take. Here again, the focus should be on the development of humanity as a whole, rather than sectional interests. First, outer space, its exploration and colonization, should be in the service of some general public good. Toward this end, the original intentions of the 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty should be restored. Outer space should not be owned or controlled by any economic, social, and political vested interest. The cosmos should not, in other words, be treated as an extension of the global environment, one to be owned and exploited. We have seen enough of this attitude and its outcomes to know what the result would be. Spreading private ownership to outer space would only reproduce social and environmental crises on a cosmic scale.

#### **The role of the ballot is to frontline reconciling with the past and the present**

Auchter 12 [Jessica Auchter “Ghostly Politics: Statecraft, Monumentalization, and a Logic of Haunting” Jessica Auchter teaches UHON 3550/3590—Topics in Behavioral and Social Science and Topics in Non-Western Cultures: Global Humanitarianism. Her main research and teaching interests lie in the field of International Relations. She has published articles in Review of International Studies, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Journal of Global Security Studies, Hyperrhiz, Ethnicity Studies, Journal for Cultural Research, andCritical Studies on Security, and several chapters in edited volume projects. Her book, The Politics of Haunting and Memory in International Relations, was published by Routledge in 2014.]

**The task** here, then**, is to trace the political effects of haunting** and hauntings**, and acknowledge that** there may be **some bodies** and some ghosts that **are unknowable,** but that **this is** itself **a hauntological status with** political **significance and disrupts the** previously **accepted order of knowledge.** It is **an ethical practice** undertakenhere**: to find ghosts without rendering them visible** and knowable **within a logic that replicates the subjugation and marginalization** of specters and the construction of certain lives and bodies as ungrievable. Why Bodies? Bodies are not themselves exclusive from ghosts. As Kas Saghafi writes, ‘a “ghost” is a spectral apparition, a magic appearance. Yet, it is a body—the most abstract of bodies. It is a becoming-body, a prosthetic body, an artifactual body, a body without body, a spectral body. **This phantomatic body,** animproperbody **without property or flesh, has the most intangible tangibility.**’85 Derrida’s own work on spectrality similarly gestures to a focus on the body. He states, ‘for there to be a ghost, there must be a return to the body, but to a body that is more abstract than ever. The spectrogenic process corresponds therefore to a paradoxical incorporation.’86 Here we begin to see the role of corporeality in spectrality, the importance of the ‘corps’ in Derrida’s gesturing to ‘incorporation.’ In this sense, understanding corporeality, or a focus on bodies in memorialization, can help us understanding the logic of haunting. **A focus on bodies has** perhaps **come to the attention of scholars** ofpolitics through the work of Michel Foucault, Judith Butler, and Giorgio Agamben, largely centered on the emergence of the concept of biopolitics. Agamben explores the centrality of the body in modern political thought through **the idea that democracy has come to be** considered **the presentation of the body**: hence the term ‘habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, “you will have to have a body to show”’.87 Corpus, he says, is **the bearer** both **of individual liberties and the ultimate subject of sovereign power.**88 This is also why we see the centrality of the body in philosophy and science of the Baroque age. He reads the emergence of the body in Leviathan through Hobbes’s distinction between man’s natural body and his political body: ‘the great metaphor of the Leviathan, whose body is formed out of all the bodies of individuals, must be read in this light. The absolute capacity of the subjects’ bodies to be killed forms the new political body of the West.’89 Foucault similarly has discussed the way in which the emergence of biopolitical technologies have placed the body at the center of political life, focused on ensuring the spatial distribution of individual bodies through separation, alignment, serialization, and surveillance.90 Foucault is one of the most influential thinkers in terms of theorizing how sovereign power acts on bodies, particularly in the form of disciplinary practices. As Foucault states, ‘**the body is** also **directly involved in a political field; power relations** have an immediate hold upon it; they **invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry out tasks,** to perform ceremonies, to emit signs.’91 Foucault emphasizes the importance of techniques of visibility in control over bodies, including his key theorization of the panopticon. One of the key features of this project as a whole will be in exploring the politics of visibility: what it might mean to display certain bodies in certain contexts and not others, why some spaces are rendered invisible and others hyper-visible. Monica Casper and Lisa Moore also emphasize the importance of visibility when it comes to bodies, arguing that not all bodies are equally visible. Some bodies are hyperexposed and magnified, others hidden or missing.92 Judith Butler has similarly focused on the body, specifically in terms of the relationships between gender and sex and bodies. She acknowledges that the body is material. But it is how some bodies and parts of bodies come to matter that renders bodies a focal point of an analysis based on social construction.93 As Lauren Wilcox characterizes Butler’s perspective: ‘the materialization of bodies is theorized as a product of discursive practices of gender, rather than gender being a social formation that is applied to pre-existing sexed bodies.’94 What she gestures at here is that while we can view bodies as material, this materiality is in fact produced by discourse in an iterative performative process. Bodies matter not simply because things happen to them, but also because they are themselves coconstitutive of the discourses within which they circulate. Like Butler, Casper and Moore argue that bodies are material entities, but ‘our interpretations and explanations of bodily processes give meaning to their materiality.’95 Butler thus explores the materialization of bodies, and how this is productive of a ‘domain of abjected bodies’ which sustains the normalization of other bodies. This articulation of bodies is productive of norms that qualify some bodies as ‘bodies that matter, ways of living that count as ‘life,’ lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving.’96 It bears exploring here why political inscription on the body is so important for understanding the politics of memory in the instances I explore, and how this relates to the field of international relations. Why the body? Why dead bodies? ‘Dead Bodies have enjoyed political life the world over’97, and embodied practices have recently come to the attention of scholars of international politics as well. Rosemary Shinko theorizes embodied practices by looking at the body as a surface for resisting power in the framework of autonomy. She theorizes bodily enactments as way to challenge ‘sovereign powers’ efforts to render certain forms of suffering invisible, meaningless and not worth troubling over’.98 She critiques the way in which International Relations has failed to theorize the body, specifically in ignoring the relational autonomy of bodies. By paying attention to relational autonomy, we can look at both the physiological materiality of bodies and the discursive materiality of bodies. Her emphasis on the way in which power is both inscribed on bodies, yet bodies can also offer resistance to power, emphasizes the way in which the body is not a fixed referent, but rather is both shaped by and shapes discourses of power and materiality.99 Lauren Wilcox identifies the body as the constituent outside to International Relations, in that it is not explicitly theorized yet it at the same time functions to define the parameters of the discipline in the sense that excluding the body from our theorizations maintains the status quo operations of international relations.100 She similarly explores the role of the body in international relations in a variety of contexts, including the force-feeding of prisoners at Guantanamo as a literal instantiation of a biopolitical ‘make live’ exercise of power. As she argues, ‘the production of bodies by regimes of sovereign/discipline/governmentality are never total—there may be no outside of power, but bodies are also capable of exceeding their production.’101 In this way, Wilcox emphasizes the way in which bodies are not simply to be considered as sites for political inscription of sovereign power; they are not simply victims of power, rather we can theorize bodily resistance and bodies as resistance as well. Anna Agathangelou has also explored the role of bodies in terms of the war in Iraq. She argues that liberal theory presupposes that the West is the subject of reason and those outside are considered to be mere corporeality.102 The strategy in Iraq was thus to decapitate the head while leaving the body in place. She focuses on the ways certain bodies are deemed structurally impossible and ontologically dead in order to sustain a certain (re)construction of the liberal order focused on these racial and gendered corporeal reconstructions. By doing so, she offers a framework for considering marginalized bodies through this notion of ontological death, those bodies that are not biologically dead but do not count as politically viable lives. I argue that by using the framework of hauntology we can start to consider the politics of visibility that render the ontologically dead as such. Renee Marlin-Bennett, Marieke Wilson, and Jason Walton specifically discuss the role of dead bodies by exploring commodified bodies and the politics of display.103 They explore the exhibition of plasticized human cadavers in museums for educational purposes, arguing that in these exhibits, dead bodies are being depoliticized and commodified in a morally troubling way. Though regulations exist for dead bodies and body parts, plasticized bodies are couched in discourses of specimens rather than human beings. The spectacle of their display in often provocative positions invokes scientific authority to legitimate a specific representation of these bodies which silences and depoliticizes their histories. Spectators walk through scenes in which the plasticized bodies enact a particular moral economy which is only possible with the base assumption that they are no longer considered to be human. Viewers are instructed not to engage emotionally with the bodies, and this, coupled with the disbelief that what is being exhibited is actually a human body, creates a cognitive dissonance which is coopted by the exhibit to condone objectification of things whose difference we cannot understand.104 Their analysis of the objectification and commodification of corpses gestures to the political importance governance of bodies, even dead ones, has in the contemporary biopolitical era. My project takes this basis as a starting point, and draws on this notion of a politics of display to look at bodies displayed for the purposes of memorialization rather than science or education. **All** of these international relations **scholars demonstrate in various ways and contexts the role bodies play** both **in being inscribed with sovereign power and in acting as resistance.** But they also all share the sentiment that the body is an under-theorized part of international politics and should be brought in to explore how power works. In short, bodies matter! Indeed, as Casper and Moore argue, ‘we live in an age of proliferating human bodies…bodies are made visible and seen…via a range of globalized practices.’105 They explore the emergence of globalized technologies such as MRIs and sonograms which render bodies both enhanced and amplified. But there are also ways in which traditional bodily and embodied practices such as death and burial are enhanced in a globalized age, not by emergent technologies, but by existent and emergent political and social practices which render these bodies a complex part of social and political identities and identity practices. This makes sense when we consider that bodies often serve as symbols of political order, where political transformation is symbolized by what is done to bodies, as in the expression ‘cutting off the head of the king’, pomp and circumstance regarding burial and reburial of political leaders, and even the idiom ‘body politic’.106 Dead bodies themselves are significant for politics, especially since as Henry Giroux lays out, ‘cadavers have a way of insinuating themselves on consciousness, demanding answers tto questions that aren’t often asked’.107 The idea here is that what is done with dead bodies is a key part of our identity, whatever that may be. In the case of Rwanda, dignified burial of the corpses of the victims of the genocide becomes essential to memorialization and reconciliation. Rwandan identity becomes dependent on the way they treat these dead bodies: the products of the genocide, and what they do with society: the other product of the genocide. In the case of undocumented immigrants who die crossing the US-Mexico border, their bodies themselves becomes sites of political practices and political contestation. Many believe that their bodies should not be buried on US soil, and thus their bodies themselves become the locus of contestation over the meaning of citizenship. This scenario also results from the increased mobility of bodies in the contemporary age.108 And in the case of 9/11, the disappearance of bodies and the creation of rubble and ruin become key to imagining national identity and concepts of power.

#### Epistemology comes first---their model of debate risks extinction and turns their framing arguments.

Heron 8. Taitu Heron, The Planning Institute of Jamaica. "Globalization, neoliberalism and the exercise of human agency." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 20.1-4 (2008): 85-101.

\*\*\* card edited for gendered language

While hunger and malnutrition haunts the poor, over nutrition imperils the affluent demonstrating the commonality of human misery of different types. The scale of human suffering in an increasingly technologically advanced, well-networked, informed world is made more disturbing by surmounting contempt for the poor and structural biases against women (Coronel and Dixit 2006, p. 17). Globalization and neoliberalism, being twin processes at both ideological and empirical levels, often overlap in terms of policy prescriptions that dominate the development agenda in this twenty-first century. With its emphasis on economic growth, it becomes evident that social development is not being enhanced; rather human dysfunctionality is increasingly more prevalent. The current international policy environment does not appear to recognise the weaknesses in deviating away from a socially oriented development model. As long as this environment is dominated by issues such as free trade, intellectual property rights, financial and capital liberalisation as well as investment protection, and the role of the state is continually relegated to the guardian of law and order in the midst of a socially hostile policy environment, there is great risk. A range of possibilities for resisting these changes exist and not all positive. This may take the form of social implosion or social explosion with increasing use of force as a method of solving problems. The implosion or explosion may be acted out against the state, whether directly or indirectly through sabotage. Alternatively, possibilities exist for the opening up of spaces for dialogue and transformative change. It will remain a risk as long as the neoliberal response to resistance to globalization is dismissive of inequalities and clamps down on law, order and civil liberties as an expression of power and control of the status quo. This dismissive approach toward humanity harbours resentment and promotes the resort to desperate measures and may not be sustainable or positive for any one. Human agency therefore, is expressed through the interactions which are fundamentally constructed through social and cultural structures and power relations; each comes with their own position, and is implicated by patterns of power predicated on structures of global injustice.

Heilbroner (1985, p. 46) argues, that the nature of capitalism will always rest on considerations of power especially where the possibility of wealth maximization resides, there will always be a drive to accumulate more. He argues that “the additional stimulus given to the drive for wealth by its generalization as capital does not supplant its unconscious meanings of personal pre-eminence and social domination but sharpens and intensifies its energies that must be devoted to its protection and to its accumulation” (Heilbroner 1985, p. 58). In this regard, is it pointless to question the use of this kind of agency which at its base is greed, especially if it entails a structural inequality of life conditions? Is it sustainable?

There is a need for the actors, who lead the process of globalization, to recognise and accept responsibility for their dysfunctional acts of agency. The blind transposition of economic, political and cultural structures harms people and affects their own agential capacity to chart their life course. When global actors exercise this kind of dysfunctional agency, be they the analysts at the World Bank and the IMF, officials of the WTO, CEOs of transnational corporations, trade and finance ministers at summits, make decisions to compel a nation to adopt Western economic systems and practices they should bear the responsibility of the outcome of those decisions. More so, high-ranking officials and advisers of the developing world need to question their own agency in agreeing to policies that exacerbating their countries' impoverishment; and their role in limiting the agency of their own populations.

The rhetoric of inevitability and the promise of profit if we leave the market to work its magical wonders, allows proponents to push aside the ethical responsibility for the consequences. The agency is misplaced and driven by greed; indeed the agency is not very humane. What it also indicates is the extent to which the West dominates and leads the process of globalization, the individualism which stands at their cultural core, which marks their manifestation of human agency, works to the detriment of the developing world. It also points to the possibility of excessive dependency on the part of the developing world, and their acts of agency, in certain quarters, where political elites may have the power to do otherwise. While it may be dependency, insofar as, political elites of developing countries cannot foresee any other way of relating to the developed world, we also have to consider greed and the financial benefits that may accrue to politico–economic elites if they sustain the status quo. This agency is distorted and ambivalent, for at the same time, we may also hear cries from some political elites of the developing world of unequal trade relations, and the wretchedness of globalization, and where many of their elites are not really interested in affecting, for the better, the relations of inequality and exploitation internally.

The complexity of exercising human agency also reflects the extent which, regardless the problems of capitalism, many have bought into it as a model. The controlling elites of this process of global capitalist development become more and more exploitative, constantly trying to find people (read: markets and untapped or ‘undertapped’ regions of the world). There is a lack of compassion in the model. Instead of using this as an opportunity to improve the social aspects of capitalism, the agency is being directed to deepen inequalities and relations of domination and exploitation. The dysfunctional forms of how human agency is manifested demonstrate a problem of dealing with the real reality, rather than the ideological one. The willingness of those who adhere to the model to more aggressively seek ways in which to discard life when it is not related to the business of accumulating capital demonstrates the urgency of addressing this absence of spiritual base for living and an absence of universal love for the diversity and value of human life in the capitalist model of development.

The raison d'etre of capitalism is purported to be profit generation and maximization. It is the continuous generation of profits that promotes this euphoric atmosphere often found in neoliberal dogma. From this perspective, there is no other way and is evidence that the regime is fulfilling its mission—namely to organize the world according to the principles and ends for which it exists. Heilbroner (1985, p. 76) succinctly gives the reminder that “profits are for capitalism the functional equivalent of the acquisition of territory or plunder for military regimes, or an increase in the number of believers for religious ones....” Thus while capitalism still functions as an economic system; albeit it's exploitative tendencies, it would be difficult to envision a radical overturning as possible or even practical. The model has been accepted by the exploiters and well as the exploited. But disgruntling will be there because of the absences of social justice, equity and compassion in the model, which, at the level of human development, are basic requirements; one has to have a love for humanity in order to develop it. This is the dilemma that needs to be addressed in capitalism at socio–economic, epistemological and political levels. We will have to reconsider the way in which human agency is exercised, while recognising the complexity of it.

We have to not only look at the outcomes of exercising human agency but also what produced the outcomes both internally and externally and the relationship between the two. Acting out agency is an independent act driven by decision-making capacities. Therefore, while the current international trade and financial system as adopted in most countries is severely limited in terms of opening up new policy spaces, policies are not fixed in stone. Girvan (2000, p. 84) suggests that universalistic neoliberal policies need to be replaced with policies that respect economic and cultural diversity as well as creating policies that seek to reduce social exclusion, marginalization and poverty. We therefore, have to question the ideological framework that gives power to globalisation as a model of development, and weakens and distorts the positive potentiality of human agency. In other words, one has to deconstruct the epistemological conditions that made neoliberalism possible and offer alternatives outside of mainstream thinking. Efforts offered by the World Social Forum and the “What Next Project” by the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation are cases in point, where alternative proposals to the hegemonic model of globalization are put forward; and these emphasize equity, social justice structural transformation, self-reliant economic participation and ecological sustainability.3

Invariably an alternative policy environment has to not only question neoliberalism and its rules and terms of engagement, but it also has to deemphasize economic growth and embrace social policies that improve the agential capacity of human beings. Further more, such alternatives has to envision possibilities; ones that seek to make structural transformation of political and economic arrangements within and among states that are more equitable in nature; and most importantly has the political will to move from alternative ideas on development to implementation and social practice. Four core principles to guide policies and programmes for an alternative development are suggested here:

1. Agential capacity—enhancing basic agential capacity as measured by education, health and nutrition. These capabilities are fundamental to human well-being and are the means through which individuals access other forms of well-being. 2. Access to resources and opportunities—enhancing equality and equity in the opportunity to use or apply basic capabilities through economic assets (e.g. land and/ or housing) and resources (e.g. income and employment) as well as political opportunity (representation in parliament etc.). Without these opportunities, both political and economic, neither **~~[~~**~~women nor men] [~~people] will be able to employ their capabilities for their well-being and that of their families. 3. Human security—that is, freedom from violence and the threat of violence and conflict. Violence and conflict result in physical and psychological harm and lessen the ability of individuals, households and communities to fulfill their potential. 4. Rights facilitation—enhancing a basic legislative/judicial and programmatic framework that facilitates the granting of human rights as outlined by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Beijing Plan of Action, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and guided by other rights-based approaches, among others.

A policy or group of policies can be changed, if a country or group of countries want to alter the way in which their society addresses this technological era of capitalist development. It is clear that a new paradigm for development is necessary, one that aims to satisfy or facilitate basic human needs on the basis of independence, intergenerational equity, environmental sustainability, rights facilitation and adequate access to health, education and living conditions—the very things that facilitate the positive expression of human agency. It is not so clear how the transition will occur whether from people participating in social movements or from people within governments, or even a variety of combinations. The very nature of how new paradigms emerge for development transformation is structural, complex and tense as it speaks to the heart of interactions between people and nations and the social relations of power within and the way in which human agency is exercised. However, what is clear is that the neoliberalism and globalization as a model of development is unsustainable. So when “the centre” may no longer hold, the question is what will “the periphery” do?

#### Our offense turns policy making --- Our ontology is key to policymaking because it’s the baseline to the process --- they effect one another

**Sin 14** --- post-doctoral researcher, Centre for Research in Higher Education Policies (Cristina Sin, "The policy object: a different perspective on policy enactment in higher education," Proquest, 2/8/14, https://link-springer-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10734-014-9721-5.pdf)//lyss

Conclusions: relationship between policy, ontology and enactment

Bologna policy recommendations, envisaging convergence rather than harmonisation, act as broad-brush references which allow flexible interpretations and adaptations. The effectiveness of Bologna, construed as a linear policy process, to achieve intended outcomes has been questioned (Amaral et al. 2009; Gornitzka et al. 2005a), especially in light of its steering through soft law. A focus on its discrete elements—the policy objects—and how they are conceptualised and enacted reinforces further the difficulty of convergence. This paper has illustrated the wide variation in the ontology of one specific policy object— the master degree—on account of national and departmental idiosyncrasies, thus adding complexity to the policy process. Identifying absolute references to define the nature of the policy object, or its ‘reification’ (Berger and Luckmann 1967), becomes therefore problematic.

‘Ontology’ has been the term employed to designate what policy actors believe the policy object is and how they conceive of it. Using the post-Bologna master degree as a case in point, the analysis opened insights into the situated nature of ontology, despite common reference points meant to act as guidance for degree design and despite the choice of a convergent discipline. Except similar structural features in which the sampled degrees comply with Bologna guidelines (i.e. second-cycle qualification or credit range), variation in degree ontologies, both between countries and between levels of analysis, has been observed. In addition, learning and teaching regimes (i.e. their tacit assumptions and rules of appropriateness) conceive differently of knowledge codification, transmission and evaluation, suggesting the existence of departmental-level pedagogic ontologies.

The paper suggests that **public policy, ontology and enacted ontology mutually influence each other**. At national/political level, novel understandings shape policies imperatives. New ontologies find expression in new policy. Thus, legislation or recommendations could be seen as enacted ontologies at the national level of analysis. An example in this sense is the recent preoccupation with the change in pedagogic paradigm towards student centred learning in Portugal which has been encoded in the legal requirement that degrees should be described in terms of competences (or learning outcomes). **At institutional level, in turn, policy object ontologies exert influence on the interpretation and accommodation of new policies, hence on enacted ontologies**. Such an example is the continued persistence of the master as the university degree in Denmark. However, public policies as enacted ontology at national level have the power to shift institutional-level ontologies. The new political discourse and the inevitable compliance, even if formal, with regulations can act as catalysts and determinants of new academic practice (Trowler et al. 2012), as has been observed in the Portuguese degrees. The introduction of student-centred methods, although maybe experimental at the beginning, appears to gradually shape a new ontology as regards the pedagogic model to inform the degree’s delivery. That is, academic enactment, or practices, can trigger changes at the level of conceptualisations—so enacted ontology can, in an unusual way, precede ontology. Summing up, while it can be stated that ontology always influences enacted ontology irrespective of analysis level, enacted ontology at the national/political level—in the form of new public policy—can also cause changes in academic enactment, which in turn can influence ontologies at institutional level.

#### Notion of ethics is based on *linguistically structured truth claims* that reifies hegemonic violence.

Forte 7 – Ph.D. in Japanese Buddhism, ethics, and continental philosophy from Temple University, Philadelphia (Victor, “The Ethics of Attainment The meaning of the ethical in Dogen and Derrida,” From: *Deconstruction and the Ethical in Asian Thought*, Edited by Youru Wang, Routledge, 2007)//DD

Faced with the great breath of Derrida's written work, we shall attempt to focus on the ethical implications of his philosophy and evaluate important essays on this subject, including "The violence of metaphysics," an essay from the collection entitled Writing and Difference, and from essays included in the collection entitled The Gift of Death. We begin by briefly considering the ethical dimensions of his linguistic theory. Like Martin Heidegger and Friedrick Nietzsche, Jacques Derrida focused his philosophical efforts on uncovering the incongruence and inconsistencies of the Western philosophical canon. But unlike his predecessors, 12 he argues that the crux of these problems could be found in the assumption of decidability in linguistically structured truth claims. The finality of meaning suggested in philosophical assertions of truth invariably rests upon assumptions of presence, where an identifiable and singular truth somehow arises out of philosophical writings for all to witness. Truth claims are dependent, however, on a simultaneous marginalization or forgetfulness of other contradictory meanings that are nevertheless in relation with the preferred meaning. The marginalized supplements the preferred so that the supposed presence is, in actuality, left with traces of meaning that destabilize its centrality.' i Derrida's project is to bring out into the light, the other of language, which has been left in the shadows of the logocentric schemas of presence. In this sense, he shares with Levinas the concern for ethical possibility, in that he provides us with the opportunity for ~~hearing~~ [understanding] an otherwise ~~muted voice~~ [inexplicable concept] This possibility arises out of the "undecidability" of language in its differing/deferring functionality (differance), because it allows for a space to open up within assertions of truth. The meaning of any truth claim is therefore never closed off or terminated in a hegemonic fashion, but always remains open for the other to emerge.

#### Utilitarianism causes genocide.

Santos 3 2003, Boaventura de Souza Santos is a Professor of Sociology at the University of Coimbra, “Collective Suicide?”, Bad Subjects, Issue # 63 , http://www.ces.fe.uc.pt/opiniao/bss/072en.php

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was in Stalinism, with the Gulag and in Nazism, with the holocaust. And now today, this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion that is manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to its ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of the market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultra-conservative in that it aims to infinitely reproduce the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the State and international institutions in their favour. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is a mixture of market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism. Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage" , to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

### 1AR Cards

#### Their environmental apocalypticism is haunted by the specters of environmental destruction which allows elites to take over and mobilize solutions to sustain neoliberal capitalism.

Swyngedouw 13 – Professor of Geography at the University of Manchester (Erik, “Apocalypse Now! Fear and Doomsday Pleasures,” *Capitalism Nature Socialism*, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10455752.2012.759252>, 2013)//DD

Despite significant differences, both catastrophic narratives share an uncanny similarity, particularly if viewed from the place of enunciation. While the ecological Armageddon points at a universal, potentially species-wide destruction, the economic catastrophe is a particular one related solely to the threatened reproduction of, basically, capitalist relations. Yet, the discursive mobilization of catastrophe follows broadly similar lines. Imaginaries of a dystopian future are nurtured, not in the least by various political and economic elites, to invoke the specter of the inevitable if NOTHING is done so that SOMETHING WILL be done. Their performative gesture is, of course, to turn the revealed (ecological or political-economic) ENDGAME into a manageable CRISIS. While catastrophe denotes the irreversible radical transformation of the existing into a spiralling abyssal decline, crisis is a conjunctural condition that requires particular techno-managerial attention by those entitled or assigned to do so. The notion of crisis also promises the possibility to contain the crisis such that the dystopian revelation is postponed or deflected. Thus, the embrace of catastrophic language serves primarily to turn nightmare into crisis management, to assure that the situation is serious but not catastrophic. Unless you are from the cynical Left\*‘‘don’t panic now, we told you that crisis would come’’\* or from the doomsday preachers who revel in the perverse pleasures offered by the announcement of the end\*the nurturing of fear, which is invariably followed by a set of techno-managerial fixes, serves precisely to de-politicize. Nurturing fear also serves to leave the action to those who promise salvation, to insist that the Big Other does exist, and to follow the leader who admits that the situation is grave, but insists that homeland security (ecological, economic, or otherwise) is in good hands (Swyngedouw 2010a). We can safely continue shopping! What we are witnessing is a strange reversal whereby the specter of economic and/or ecological catastrophe is mobilized primarily by the elites from the global North. Neither Prince Charles nor Al Gore can be accused of revolutionary zeal. For them, the ecological condition is\*correctly of course\*understood as potentially threatening to civilization as we know it. At the same time, their image of a dystopian future functions as a fantasy that sustains a practice of adjusting things today such that civilization as we know it (neoliberal capitalism) can continue for a bit longer, spurred on by the conviction that radical change can be achieved without changing radically the contours of capitalist eco-development. The imaginary of crisis and potential collapse produces an ecology of fear, danger, and uncertainty while reassuring ‘‘the people’’ (or, rather, the population) that the techno-scientific and socio-economic elites have the necessary tool-kit to readjust the machine such that things can stay basically as they are. What is of course radically disavowed in their pronouncements is the fact that many people in many places of the world already live in the socio-ecological catastrophe. The ecological Armageddon is already a reality. While the elites nurture an apocalyptic dystopia that can nonetheless be avoided (for them), the majority of the world already lives ‘‘within the collapse of civilization’’ (The Invisible Committee 2009). The Apocalypse is indeed a combined and uneven one, both in time and across space (see Calder Williams 2011). A flood of literature on the relationship between apocalyptic imaginaries, popular culture, and politics has excavated the uses and abuses of revelatory visions (Skrimshire 2010; Calder Williams 2011). Despite the important differences between the transcendental biblical use of the apocalypse and the thoroughly material and socio-physical ecological catastrophes-to-come, the latter, too, depoliticize matters. As Alain Badiou contends: [T]he rise of the ‘‘rights of Nature’’ is a contemporary form of the opium for the people. It is an only slightly camouflaged religion: the millenarian terror, concern for everything save the properly political destiny of peoples, new instruments for control of everyday life, the obsession with hygiene, the fear of death and catastrophes...It is a gigantic operation in the depoliticization of subjects. (Badiou 2008, 139) Environmental problems are indeed commonly staged as universally threatening to the survival of humankind, announcing the premature termination of civilization as we know it and sustained by what Mike Davis (1999) aptly called ‘‘ecologies of fear.’’ Much of the discursive matrix through which the presentation of the environmental condition we are in is quilted systematically by the continuous invocation of fear and danger, the specter of ecological annihilation, or at least seriously distressed socio-ecological conditions for many people in the near future. The nurturing of fear, in turn, is sustained in part by a particular set of phantasmagorical imaginations that serve to reinforce the seriousness of the situation (Katz 1995). The apocalyptic imaginary of a world without water or at least with endemic water shortages; ravaged by hurricanes whose intensity is amplified by climate change; pictures of scorched land as global warming shifts the geo-pluvial regime and the spatial variability of droughts and floods; icebergs that disintegrate; alarming reductions in biodiversity as species disappear or are threatened by extinction; post-apocalyptic images of nuclear wastelands; the threat of peak-oil; the devastations raked by wildfires, tsunamis, spreading diseases like SARS, Avian Flu, Ebola, or HIV\*all these imaginaries of a Nature out of synch, destabilized, threatening, and out of control are paralleled by equally disturbing images of a society that continues piling up waste, pumping CO2 into the atmosphere, recombining DNA, deforesting the earth, etc . . . In sum, our ecological predicament is sutured by millennialism fears sustained by an apocalyptic rhetoric and representational tactics, and by a series of performative gestures signalling an overwhelming, mind-boggling danger\*one that threatens to undermine the very coordinates of our everyday lives and routines and may shake up the foundations of all we took and take for granted.

#### Attempts to solve the “quality of water” invoke the spectres of water and food insecurity, empirics flow neg---the 1AC’s decision to ignore these spectres causes massive pollution and natural disasters that turn the case

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Variously said to have the objectives of ending poverty, reducing inequality and protecting the planet, the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agreed at UN level in September 2015 (following on from the Millennium Development Goals), are linked with mitigating the effects of climate change, improving the quality of urban lifestyles, reducing biodiversity, fauna and flora losses, as well as improving the quality of water, the oceans and forest coverage through their 169 enunciated targets. Implicit in this vast menu of desires is the sword of Damocles hanging over the heads of all life on earth in terms of what could happen, if these SDGs are not implemented. Among other ecological and community consequences, the SDGs raise the spectres of water, hunger and food insecurity; desertification; unliveable cities choked with pollution from industry and energy emissions; increasing inequality and weak institutions, if the consequences of climate change and unsustainable consumption of resources are not halted. A world racked by disasters – hydro-meteorological, geologically derived as well as technical – would be the order of the day as ‘natural’ and human made disasters may increase in frequency and intensity. The SDGs implicitly bring together the science and social science research communities as potential pathways to overcoming the nightmare world of emerging Future Risk. The relationship of the SDGs to Disaster Risk Science needs to be examined in conjunction with the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 – 2030 (SFDRR) as its Seven Targets and Four Priorities for Action cannot be implemented without activating the integrated STEM-HASS expertise research communities identified therein. Aspects of these will be discussed below.