1
The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the
truth or falsity of the Resolution; the
affirmative must prove it true and the negative must prove it false. Prefer:
A) Text: Five dictionaries define negate as to deny the truth of and
affirm as to prove true which means the sole
judge obligation is to vote on the resolutionÕs truth or falsity. Constitutivism
outweighs because you donÕt have the
jurisdiction not to truth test. Jurisdiction is a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the
judge fulfilling their jurisdiction
to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary
B) Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property
i.e. if I say, ŌI am awakeĶ it is the same as Ōit is true that I am awakeĶ which means they are also a
question of truth claims because
itÕs inherent.
C) Ground: Any
offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific
role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for education because me engaging in a debate I know
nothing about doesnÕt help anyone.
D) Truth Testing is a prerequisite to other role of the ballots because without truth weÕre operating off of lies which is
what fuels propaganda and oppression.
1 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate, http://www.merriam
webster.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate, htt p://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.oxforddictionaries.co m/definition/english/negate
2 Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to
say that something is true, Vocabulary.com
– to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the
validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true
2
People own their own bodies and as a
result have rights to use their bodies.
Feser, Edward.
"Robert Nozick." Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021. ICW NW
Nozick takes his
position to follow from a basic moral principle associated with Immanuel Kant
and enshrined in KantÕs second formulation of his famous Categorical
Imperative: ŌAct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person
or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.Ķ The idea
here is that a human being, as a rational agent endowed
with self-awareness, free will, and the possibility of formulating a
plan of life, has an inherent dignity and cannot properly be treated as a mere thing,
or used against his will as an instrument or resource in the
way an inanimate object might be. In line with this, Nozick
also describes individual human beings as self-owners
(though it isnÕt clear whether he regards this as a restatement of KantÕs
principle, a consequence of it, or an entirely independent
idea). The thesis of self-ownership, a
notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just
the claim that individuals own themselves
– their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products of their exercise of
their talents, abilities and labor. They have all the prerogatives with
respect to themselves that a slaveholder claims
with respect to his slaves. But the thesis of self-ownership would in fact rule
out slavery as illegitimate, since each individual, as a self-owner, cannot properly be owned by anyone else. (Indeed,
many libertarians would argue that unless one accepts the thesis of
self-ownership, one has no way of explaining why slavery is evil. After all, it cannot be merely because
slaveholders often treat their slaves badly, since a kind-hearted slaveholder
would still be a slaveholder, and thus morally blameworthy,
for that. The reason slavery is immoral must be because it involves a
kind of stealing – the stealing of a person from himself.) But if
individuals are
inviolable ends-in-themselves (as Kant
describes them) and self-owners, it follows, Nozick says, that they have certain rights, in
particular (and here again following Locke) rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something, after all,
just is to have a right to it, or, more
accurately, to possess the bundle of rights
– rights
to possess something, to dispose of it, to
determine what may be done with it, etc. –
that constitute ownership; and thus to own oneself is to have such rights to the various elements
that make up oneÕs self. These rights function,
Nozick says, as
side constraints on the actions of others; they set limits on how
others may, morally speaking, treat a person. So, for
example, since
you own yourself, and thus have a right to yourself, others are
constrained morally not to kill or maim you (since this
would involve destroying or damaging your
property), or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of
your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else (since this would
involve stealing your property). They are also
constrained not to force you against your will to work for anotherÕs
purposes, even if those purposes are good ones. For if you own yourself, it follows
that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self owned
body and its powers, e.g. either to work or to refrain from
working.
Thus, the state ought not interfere
with people since that would violate their rights.
Feser 2, Edward.
"Robert Nozick." Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021.
So far this all might seem fairly
uncontroversial. But what follows from it, in NozickÕs
view, is the surprising and radical conclusion that taxation, of the redistributive sort in which modern states engage in
order to fund the various programs of the bureaucratic welfare state, is morally illegitimate. It amounts to
a kind of forced labor, for the state so structures the tax system that
any time you labor at all, a certain amount of your labor time –
the amount that produces the wealth taken away from you forcibly
via taxation – is time you involuntarily work, in effect,
for the state. Indeed, such taxation amounts to partial slavery, for in
giving every citizen an entitlement to certain benefits (welfare,
social
security, or
whatever), the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a right, to a
part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the
benefits; every citizen, that is, becomes in such a system a partial
owner of you (since they have a partial property right in part of you, i.e.
in your labor). But this is flatly inconsistent with the principle of
self-ownership.
The various
programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because
they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make
slaves of the citizens of such a state. Indeed, the only sort of state that can be morally justified is what Nozick calls a minimal state or
Ōnight-watchmanĶ state, a government which protects individuals, via police
and military forces, from force, fraud, and theft, and
administers courts of law, but does nothing
else. In particular, such a
state cannot regulate what citizens eat, drink, or smoke (since
this would interfere with their
right to use their self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot control
what they publish or read (since this would interfere with
their right to use the property theyÕve acquired with their self-owned
labor – e.g. printing presses and paper – as they wish),
cannot administer mandatory social insurance schemes or public education (since
this would interfere with citizensÕ rights to use the fruits of their
labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather
put their money into private education and private retirement plans), and
cannot regulate economic life in general via minimum wage and rent
control laws and the like (since such actions are not only economically suspect
– tending to produce bad unintended consequences like unemployment
and housing shortages – but violate citizensÕ rights to charge whatever
they want to for the use of their own property).
Thus, the
standard is consistency with libertarianism. This is the idea that the only moral state is one that protects peopleÕs
rights but is never morally justified in coercing its citizens.
Prefer:
1.
Culpability: If people didnÕt freely will an action they canÕt be said to be responsible for it because they couldnÕt have done
otherwise. I.e. if IÕm forced to slap a person,
no one would say IÕm culpable because I had no choice in the matter. This
means ethics canÕt exist without freedom because we wouldnÕt be
able to assign agents culpability.
2. Freedom
is a prerequisite to the use of other frameworks, because if we
canÕt choose our actions we canÕt make them consistent with the aff framework. This means I hijack the aff framework because even if they win
it's true, we have to have freedom to pursue it in the first
place.
Contention 1)
Private entities should have the
freedom to appropriate outer space.
It's
impossible for appropriation, or initial acquisition of property to be unjust, because if property was previously unowned injustice is not being committed against
anyone.
Feser 3, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge
University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING
AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy |
Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an
American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets
for gen lang]//phs st // ICW NW
There is a
serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick,
however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition
of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive
taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I
contradict not only NozickÕs critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible
for there to be injustices in acquisition,
whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or
not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive
taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side.
Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his
critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has
not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no
such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call
Ōthe basic argumentĶ for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of
this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu-
itions to the effect that certain specific instances
of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the
application of a Lockean proviso, or are
otherwise problematic. (A ŌLockean proviso,Ķ of
course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these
acquisitions do not leave Ōenough and as goodĶ
in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that
tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with
the argument of Section II. Section IV completes
the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the
thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property.
Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers
some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for
our under- standing of NozickÕs principles of
transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument
The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial
acquisition of resources is that there is no such
thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to
say, simply does not apply to initial
acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has
already taken place. In particular, it
applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the
rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear
implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example.Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that
A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some
individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against
whom A commits the injustice. But for B to
have been wronged by AÕs acquisi- tion
of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to
R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because
no
one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged
and could not have been. In fact, the very first
person who could conceivably be wronged by anyoneÕs use of R would be, not B,
but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the
nature of
the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from
A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially
acquired them that anyone could
unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then,
for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7
Contention 2)
Space exploration and
appropriation are inevitable; it's just a question of whether
it will be public or private. Public appropriation of outer space is unjust because it requires taxation.
Taxation is
unjust under libertarianism.
Feser 4, Edward.
"Robert Nozick." Internet Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021.
So far this all might seem fairly
uncontroversial. But what follows from it, in NozickÕs
view, is the surprising and radical conclusion that taxation, of the redistributive sort in which modern states engage in
order to fund the various programs of the bureaucratic welfare state, is morally
illegitimate. It amounts to a kind of forced labor, for
the state so structures the tax system that any
time you labor at all, a certain
amount of your labor time – the amount that produces the
wealth taken away from you forcibly via
taxation – is time you involuntarily work, in effect, for the state. Indeed, such
taxation amounts to partial slavery, for in giving every citizen an
entitlement to certain benefits (welfare, social
security, or
whatever), the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a right, to a
part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the
benefits; every citizen, that is, becomes in such a system a partial
owner of you (since they have a partial property right in part of you, i.e.
in your labor). But this is flatly inconsistent
with the principle of self-ownership.
The various programs of the modern liberal
welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and
incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of
the citizens of such a state. Indeed, the only sort of state that can be
morally justified is what Nozick calls a minimal
state or Ōnight-watchmanĶ state, a government which protects
individuals, via police and military forces, from force, fraud, and
theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else. In particular,
such a state cannot regulate what citizens eat,
drink, or smoke (since this would interfere with their right to use their
self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot control what they publish or read
(since this would interfere with their right to use the property theyÕve
acquired with their self-owned labor – e.g. printing presses and paper
– as they wish), cannot administer mandatory social insurance
schemes or public education (since this would interfere with citizensÕ rights
to use the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might
decide that they would rather put their money into private education and
private retirement plans), and cannot regulate economic life in general via
minimum wage and rent control laws and the like (since such actions are
not only economically suspect – tending to produce bad unintended
consequences like unemployment and housing shortages – but violate
citizensÕ rights to charge whatever they want to for the use of their own
property).
3
Interpretation: The affirmative must provide urls in the citations of cards for sources that are from the internet.
Violation:
The Watson card is from the internet and doesnÕt have a url.
Standards:
1. Evidence Ethics: Proper citation of a source requires a link to the source, itÕs also key to check if you misquoted the article. This outweighs on a) portability: in the real world if you donÕt provide a url in a citation itÕs not correct and violates academic integrity. B) objectivity of abuse: itÕs communally accepted that evidence ethics is important and violating it is problematic.
2. Strat Skew: You can read the entire original article but itÕs not quick and easy for the negative to access. This kills neg engagement.
Drop the Debater:
No RVIs:
Competing Interps:
Fairness:
4
Interpretation: The affirmative must garner all offense solely from the implementation of the resolution. To clarify, method offense bad.
Violation:
Standards:
1. Limits:
On Case
On Accessibility:
On Roche:
Roche
1. Non Falsifiable: To just presuppose IÕm problematic and should
a priori be voted down before IÕve even said anything is violent and prevents
actual discussion.
2.
This card just says denying racism is bad, it doesnÕt say anything about debate
or any of what your tag is talking about.
3.
Judges shouldnÕt intervene:
a)
b)
4.
Judges intervening aff doesnÕt do
anything:
On Watson:
Park
1.
Turn: this card is just an indictment of the U.S. governmentÕs space policy.
This proves private appropriation is better which is a negative offense.
2.
Klinger
1.
Turn: This card is about THE GOVERNMENT this is what the negative is
arguing is that government appropriation is bad space activities should be
turned over to the private sector.
2.
ThereÕs no internal link to appropriation being bad, the card just says
government rocket launches are bad which doesnÕt prove anything about the
resolution.
3.