The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or  falsity of the Resolution; the affirmative must prove it true and the negative  must prove it false. Prefer:  

A) Text: Five dictionaries define negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as  to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the  resolutionÕs truth or falsity. Constitutivism outweighs because you donÕt have  the jurisdiction not to truth test. Jurisdiction is a meta constraint since every  argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their  jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary  

B) Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because  every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, ŌI am awakeĶ it is  the same as Ōit is true that I am awakeĶ which means they are also a question  of truth claims because itÕs inherent. 

C) Ground: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your  specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for  education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesnÕt help  anyone. 

D) Truth Testing is a prerequisite to other role of the ballots because without  truth weÕre operating off of lies which is what fuels propaganda and  oppression. 

1 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate, http://www.merriam webster.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate, htt p://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate, http://www.oxforddictionaries.co m/definition/english/negate 

2 Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that  something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it  is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert  to be true 

People own their own bodies and as a result have rights to use their bodies. 

Feser, Edward. "Robert Nozick." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12  June 2021. ICW NW 

Nozick takes his position to follow from a basic moral principle associated with Immanuel Kant and enshrined in KantÕs second formulation of his famous Categorical Imperative:  ŌAct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.Ķ The idea here is that a human  being, as a rational agent endowed with self-awareness, free will, and the possibility  of formulating a plan of life, has an inherent dignity and cannot properly be treated as a  mere thing, or used against his will as an instrument or resource in the way an inanimate object might be. In line with this, Nozick also  describes individual human beings as self-owners (though it isnÕt clear whether he regards this as a restatement of KantÕs principle, a consequence of it, or an entirely independent 

idea). The thesis of self-ownership, a notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just the claim that individuals own  themselves – their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products of their exercise of their talents, abilities and labor. They have all the prerogatives with respect to  themselves that a slaveholder claims with respect to his slaves. But the thesis of self-ownership would in fact rule out slavery as illegitimate, since each individual, as a self-owner,  cannot properly be owned by anyone else. (Indeed, many libertarians would argue that unless one accepts the thesis of self-ownership, one has no way of explaining why slavery is  evil. After all, it cannot be merely because slaveholders often treat their slaves badly, since a kind-hearted slaveholder would still be a slaveholder, and thus morally blameworthy,  for that. The reason slavery is immoral must be because it involves a kind of stealing – the stealing of a person from himself.) But if individuals are  

inviolable ends-in-themselves (as Kant describes them) and self-owners, it follows, Nozick says, that they  have certain rights, in particular (and here again following Locke) rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something, after all, just is to have a right to it, or, more accurately, to  possess the bundle of rights – rights to possess something, to dispose of it, to determine what may be  done with it, etc. – that constitute ownership; and thus to own oneself is to have such rights to the  various elements that make up oneÕs self. These rights function, Nozick says, as side constraints on the actions of others; they set limits on how others may, morally  speaking, treat a person. So, for example, since you own yourself, and thus have a right to yourself,  others are constrained morally not to kill or maim you (since this would involve destroying or damaging your  

property), or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else (since this would involve stealing your property). They are also  constrained not to force you against your will to work for anotherÕs purposes, even if those purposes are good ones. For if you own yourself, it  follows that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self owned body and its powers, e.g. either to work or to refrain from working. 

Thus, the state ought not interfere with people since that would violate their  rights

Feser 2, Edward. "Robert Nozick." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed  12 June 2021. 

So far this all might seem fairly uncontroversial. But what follows from it, in NozickÕs view, is the surprising and radical conclusion that taxation, of the redistributive  sort in which modern states engage in order to fund the various programs of the bureaucratic welfare state, is morally illegitimate. It amounts  to a kind of forced labor, for the state so structures the tax system that any time you  labor at all, a certain amount of your labor time – the amount that produces the  wealth taken away from you forcibly via taxation – is time you involuntarily work,  in effect, for the state. Indeed, such taxation amounts to partial slavery, for in giving every citizen an entitlement to certain benefits (welfare, social  

security, or whatever), the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a right, to a part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the benefits; every citizen,  that is, becomes in such a system a partial owner of you (since they have a partial property right in part of you, i.e. in your labor). But this is flatly inconsistent with the principle of self-ownership. 

The various programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of  the citizens of such a state. Indeed, the only sort of state that can be morally justified is what Nozick calls a  minimal state or Ōnight-watchmanĶ state, a government which protects individuals, via police and military forces, from force, fraud, and theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else. In  particular, such a state cannot regulate what citizens eat, drink, or smoke (since this would  interfere with their right to use their self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot  control what they publish or read (since this would interfere with their right to use the property theyÕve acquired with their self-owned labor  – e.g. printing presses and paper – as they wish), cannot administer mandatory social insurance schemes or public education (since this would interfere with citizensÕ rights to use  the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather put their money into private education and private retirement plans), and cannot  regulate economic life in general via minimum wage and rent control laws and the like (since such actions are not only economically suspect – tending to produce bad unintended  consequences like unemployment and housing shortages – but violate citizensÕ rights to charge whatever they want to for the use of their own property).

Thus, the standard is consistency with libertarianism. This is the idea that the  only moral state is one that protects peopleÕs rights but is never morally  justified in coercing its citizens. Prefer: 

1. Culpability: If people didnÕt freely will an action they canÕt be said to be  responsible for it because they couldnÕt have done otherwise. I.e. if IÕm forced  to slap a person, no one would say IÕm culpable because I had no choice in the  matter. This means ethics canÕt exist without freedom because we wouldnÕt be  able to assign agents culpability. 

2. Freedom is a prerequisite to the use of other frameworks, because if we  canÕt choose our actions we canÕt make them consistent with the aff  framework. This means I hijack the aff framework because even if they win  it's true, we have to have freedom to pursue it in the first place. 

Contention 1) 

Private entities should have the freedom to appropriate outer space. 

It's impossible for appropriation, or initial acquisition of property to be  unjust, because if property was previously unowned injustice is not being  committed against anyone. 

Feser 3, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS  NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge  Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at  Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets for gen lang]//phs st // ICW NW 

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial  acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is,  to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only NozickÕs critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in  acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for  the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his  critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first  place. Giving what I shall call Ōthe basic argumentĶ for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves  unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean  proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A ŌLockean proviso,Ķ of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave Ōenough and as  goodĶ in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument  of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of  property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and  considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of NozickÕs principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic  Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is  that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of  resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial  acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it  applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by  Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example.Suppose an  individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the  case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case  that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the  injustice. But for B to have been wronged by AÕs acquisi- tion of R, B would have to  have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R,  because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the  very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyoneÕs use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of 

the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension,  will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired  them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible,  then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7 

 

Contention 2) 

Space exploration and appropriation are inevitable; it's just a question of  whether it will be public or private. Public appropriation of outer space is  unjust because it requires taxation. 

Taxation is unjust under libertarianism. 

Feser 4, Edward. "Robert Nozick." Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed  12 June 2021. 

So far this all might seem fairly uncontroversial. But what follows from it, in NozickÕs view, is the surprising and radical conclusion that taxation, of the redistributive  sort in which modern states engage in order to fund the various programs of the bureaucratic welfare state, is morally illegitimate. It amounts  to a kind of forced labor, for the state so structures the tax system that any time you  labor at all, a certain amount of your labor time – the amount that produces the  wealth taken away from you forcibly via taxation – is time you involuntarily work,  in effect, for the state. Indeed, such taxation amounts to partial slavery, for in giving every citizen an entitlement to certain benefits (welfare, social  

security, or whatever), the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a right, to a part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the benefits; every citizen,  that is, becomes in such a system a partial owner of you (since they have a partial property right in part of you, i.e. in your labor). But this is flatly inconsistent with the principle of self-ownership. 

The various programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of  the citizens of such a state. Indeed, the only sort of state that can be morally justified is what Nozick calls a minimal state or Ōnight-watchmanĶ state, a government which protects  individuals, via police and military forces, from force, fraud, and theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else. In particular, such a state cannot regulate what citizens  eat, drink, or smoke (since this would interfere with their right to use their self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot control what they publish or read (since this would interfere  with their right to use the property theyÕve acquired with their self-owned labor – e.g. printing presses and paper – as they wish), cannot administer mandatory social insurance  schemes or public education (since this would interfere with citizensÕ rights to use the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather  put their money into private education and private retirement plans), and cannot regulate economic life in general via minimum wage and rent control laws and the like (since such  actions are not only economically suspect – tending to produce bad unintended consequences like unemployment and housing shortages – but violate citizensÕ rights to charge  whatever they want to for the use of their own property). 

3

Interpretation: The affirmative must provide urls in the citations of cards for sources that are from the internet.

Violation:

The Watson card is from the internet and doesnÕt have a url.

Standards:

1.     Evidence Ethics: Proper citation of a source requires a link to the source, itÕs also key to check if you misquoted the article. This outweighs on a) portability: in the real world if you donÕt provide a url in a citation itÕs not correct and violates academic integrity. B) objectivity of abuse: itÕs communally accepted that evidence ethics is important and violating it is problematic.

2.     Strat Skew: You can read the entire original article but itÕs not quick and easy for the negative to access. This kills neg engagement.

Drop the Debater:

No RVIs:

Competing Interps:

Fairness:

4

Interpretation: The affirmative must garner all offense solely from the implementation of the resolution. To clarify, method offense bad.

Violation:

Standards:

1.     Limits:

 

 

 

On Case

On Accessibility:

 

On Roche:

Roche 

1. Non Falsifiable: To just presuppose IÕm problematic and should a priori be voted down before IÕve even said anything is violent and prevents actual discussion. 

2. This card just says denying racism is bad, it doesnÕt say anything about debate or any of what your tag is talking about. 

3. Judges shouldnÕt intervene: 

a)

b)

4. Judges intervening aff doesnÕt do anything:  

 

On Watson:

  1. TURN: Ruse of Solvency -The aff method does not tangibly solve for the impacts they identify. Changing our mindset for politics in the Pacific does not affect violence in debate. A) ItÕs a mindset shift which is problematic because accessibility is a tangible impact, B) Pacific politics is not the issue making debate inaccessible. Issues such as microaggressions, discrimination, the model minority myth, and other forms of racism are making debate inaccessible and the aff does not solve. This turns case because the AC takes action on the wrong issue, makes us thing we solve and takes resources and energy. 
  2. TURN: you want me to contest your method of ŌTranspacific ReimaginingsĶ but also say in this card that itÕs violent to view Asia in any other way besides your method. Which means I either contest your method and engage in violence or I donÕt contest your method and just lose which is an impossible binary. Turns the aff, the entire aff is predicated on why asserting Asia is different than what you posit is bad, which you force the neg to do. 
  3. COUNTER METHOD: Use the NC libertarian framework when crafting foreign policies. This competes A) Net benefits: the turns are competition, B) This is a methods debate, in the real world in does not make sense to perm methods, C) the neg contentions are competition, you canÕt be libertarian and prevent the private apporiation of outer space. Libertarian government foreign policies solve. Staying out of other countries means we arenÕt invading, colonizing, or doing other bad things. Solves their impacts and outweighs on tangibility. This provides action we can take to solve techno imperialism, is not just a mindset shift. 
  4. No cross apps: If I beat back the Watson card, the method goes away. If I win the method do not let them weigh case against the offs because they only access the impacts of case cross apps if they win solvency.



Park 

1. Turn: this card is just an indictment of the U.S. governmentÕs space policy. This proves private appropriation is better which is a negative offense. 

2. 

Klinger 

1. Turn: This card is about THE GOVERNMENT this is what the negative is arguing is that government appropriation is bad space activities should be turned over to the private sector. 

2. ThereÕs no internal link to appropriation being bad, the card just says government rocket launches are bad which doesnÕt prove anything about the resolution. 

3.