**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who links the most contention level offense to the winning normatively justified framework. Prefer:**

**1. Constitutivism: This is the way the event of LD was designed as distinct from other events, i.e. why we have frameworks. Proven by the fact that if no one reads a role of the ballot, but it was a Kant AC v a Util NC you would evaluate the round by seeing who has the most offense to the winning framework. This non uniques benefits to other role of the ballots because we can get them in policy debate or outside of the round.**

**2. Phil Ed: My role of the ballot emphasizes the importance of philosophy and normatively justifying our philosophical beliefs. It also gives us the benefit of *comparing* different theories.**

**3. Inclusion: My role of the ballot lets you read whatever framework you want and by extension talk about whatever impacts you want, you just have to justify your framework and compare it to mine. Any other role of the ballot arbitrarily excludes my offense which moots the AC.**

**4. Voting on another role of the ballot collapses to mine because by voting neg for something like “they won the role of the ballot debate and linked the most offense back to it” concedes my structure of debate that we should vote for whoever links offense to a winning system of framing.**

**People own their own bodies and as a result have rights to use their bodies.**

**Feser,** Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021. ICW NW

Nozick takes his position to follow from a basic moral principle associated with Immanuel Kant and enshrined in Kant’s second formulation of his famous Categorical Imperative: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” The idea here is that **a human being, as a rational agent endowed with self-awareness, free will, and the possibility of formulating a plan of life, has an inherent dignity and cannot** properly **be treated as a mere *thing*, or *used* against his will** as an instrument or resource in the way an inanimate object might be. In line with this, Nozick also describes individual human beings as *self-owners* (though it isn’t clear whether he regards this as a restatement of Kant’s principle, a consequence of it, or an entirely independent idea). The thesis of self-ownership, a notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just the claim that **individuals own themselves – their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the** fruits or **products of their exercise of their talents, abilities and labor.** They have all the prerogatives with respect to themselves that a slaveholder claims with respect to his slaves. But the thesis of self-ownership would in fact rule out slavery as illegitimate, since each individual, as a self-owner, cannot properly be owned by anyone else. (Indeed, many libertarians would argue that unless one accepts the thesis of self-ownership, one has no way of explaining *why* slavery is evil. After all, it cannot be merely because slaveholders often treat their slaves badly, since a kind-hearted slaveholder would still be a slaveholder, and thus morally blameworthy, for that. The reason slavery is immoral must be because it involves a kind of stealing – the stealing of a person from himself.) But **if individuals are inviolable ends-in-themselves** (as Kant describes them) **and self-owners, it follows**, Nozick says, **that they have certain *rights*, in particular** (and here again following Locke) **rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something,** after all, just **is to have a right to it,** or, more accurately, to possess the bundle of rights – **rights to possess something, to dispose of it, to determine what may be done with it,** etc. – that constitute ownership; and **thus to own oneself is to have such rights to the various elements that make up one’s self. These rights function, Nozick says, as *side-constraints* on the actions of others; they set limits on how others may, morally speaking, treat a person.** So, for example, **since you** own yourself, and thus **have a right to yourself, others are constrained morally not to kill or maim you** (since this would involve destroying or damaging your property), or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else (since this would involve stealing your property). They are also constrained not to force you against your will to work for another’s purposes, even if those purposes are good ones. For **if you own yourself, it follows that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self-owned body and its powers,** e.g. either to work or to refrain from working.

**Thus, the state ought not interfere with people since that would violate their rights.**

**Feser 2,** Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021.

So far this all might seem fairly uncontroversial. But what follows from it, in Nozick’s view, is the surprising and radical conclusion that ***taxation*,** of the redistributive sort in which modern states engage in order to fund the various programs of the bureaucratic welfare state, **is morally illegitimate. It amounts to a kind of *forced labor*, for the state so structures the tax system that any time you labor at all, a certain amount of your labor time – the amount that produces the wealth taken away from you forcibly via taxation – is time you involuntarily work, in effect, for the state.** Indeed, such taxation amounts to partial *slavery*, for in giving every citizen an entitlement to certain benefits (welfare, social security, or whatever), the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a *right*, to a part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the benefits; every citizen, that is, becomes in such a system *a partial owner of you* (since they have a partial property right in part of you, i.e. in your labor). But **this is** flatly **inconsistent with the principle of self-ownership.**

The various programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of the citizens of such a state. Indeed, **the only sort of state that can be morally justified is** what Nozick calls **a *minimal state***or “night-watchman” state, **a government which protects individuals**, via police and military forces, **from force, fraud, and theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else.** In particular, **such a state cannot regulate what citizens eat, drink, or smoke** (**since this would interfere with their right to use their self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot control what they publish or read** (since this would interfere with their right to use the property they’ve acquired with their self-owned labor – e.g. printing presses and paper – as they wish), cannot administer mandatory social insurance schemes or public education (since this would interfere with citizens’ rights to use the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather put their money into private education and private retirement plans), and cannot regulate economic life in general via minimum wage and rent control laws and the like (since such actions are not only economically suspect – tending to produce bad unintended consequences like unemployment and housing shortages – but violate citizens’ rights to charge whatever they want to for the use of their own property).

**Thus, the standard is consistency with libertarianism. This is the idea that the only moral state is one that protects people’s rights but is *never* morally justified in coercing its citizens. Prefer:**

**1. Culpability: If people didn’t freely will an action they can’t be said to be responsible for it because they couldn’t have done otherwise. I.e. if I’m forced to slap a person, no one would say I’m culpable because I had no choice in the matter. This means ethics can’t exist without freedom because we wouldn’t be able to assign agents culpability.**

**2. Freedom is a prerequisite to the use of other frameworks, because if we can’t choose our actions we can’t make them consistent with the aff framework. This means I hijack the aff framework because even if they win it's true, we have to have freedom to pursue it in the first place.**

**Contention)**

**Private entities should have the freedom to appropriate outer space.**

**It's impossible for appropriation, or initial acquisition of property to be unjust, because if property was previously unowned injustice is not being committed against anyone.**

**Feser 3,** (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st // ICW NW

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: **There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources;** therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument **The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place.** In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that e**xternal resources are initially unowned.** Consider the following example. **Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B** (or perhaps a group of individuals) **against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R**, a right to R. By hypothesis, **however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned**, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them,** via unjust transfer. **It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7**

**This impacts back to my framework because it means a) the appropriation of property no one owns, i.e. outer space is not unjust under libertarianism and b) means interference with this permissible action is coercive.**

**Contention 2)**

**Space exploration and appropriation are inevitable; it's just a question of whether it will be public or private. Public appropriation of outer space is unjust because it requires taxation.**

**Taxation is unjust under libertarianism.**

**Feser 4,** Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021.

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**Thus, space activities like NASA should be privatized.**

**Hudgins**, Edward. "Time to Privatize NASA." *Cato Institute*, 26 Jan. 19**98**, www.cato.org/commentary/time-privatize-nasa. Accessed 6 Jan. 2022.

**The government has had many opportunities to turn over** civilian **space activities to the private sector. In the** 19**70s, American Rocket Co. was one of the private enterprises that wanted to sell launch services to NASA** and private businesses. But NASA was moving from science to freight hauling, and planned to monopolize government payloads on the shuttle and subsidize launches of private cargo as well. The agency thus turned down American Rocket. **In the late** 19**80s, Space Industries of Houston offered**, for no more than $750 million, **to launch a ministation that could carry** government and other **payloads** at least a decade before NASA’s station went into operation. (NASA’s station currently comes with a price tag of nearly $100 billion for development, construction and operations.) **NASA, not wishing to create its own competition, declined Space Industries’ offer**. In 1987 and 1988, a Commerce Department‐​led interagency working group considered the feasibility of offering a one‐​time prize and a promise of rent to any firm or consortium that could deliver a permanent manned moon base. When asked whether such a base were realistic, private‐​sector representatives answered yes — but only if NASA wasn’t involved. That plan was quickly scuttled. Each shuttle carries a 17‐​story external fuel tank 98 percent of the distance into orbit before dropping it into the ocean; NASA could easily — and with little additional cost — have promoted private space enterprise by putting those fuel tanks into orbit. With nearly 90 shuttle flights to date, platforms — with a total of 27 acres of interior space — could be in orbit today. These could be homesteaded by the private sector for hospitals to study a weightless Mr. Glenn or for any other use one could dream of. But then a $100 billion government station would be unnecessary. **As long as NASA dominates civilian space efforts,** little progress will be made toward **inexpensive manned space travel.** The lesson of Mr. Glenn’s second flight is that space enthusiasts ignore economics at their peril.

**This impacts back to my framework because it means privatizing space exploration is better since it doesn’t require coercion.**

**3**

**Interpretation: The affirmative may not defend the implementation of the resolution via the enactment of a hypothetical policy action. To clarify, our interpretation is that the affirmative must defend and prove that it is unjust for corporations to appropriate outer space, not that there is an obligation for the government to prevent them from doing so.**

**Standards:**

**1. Phil Ed:**

**Talking about the broad philosophical implications of appropriation of outer space, instead of focusing on hyper specific policy actions and their implications is better for philosophical education. It allows us to talk about in the abstract whether or not the action in the resolution is immoral and learn about different philosophical views. Phil ed outweighs:**

**2. Strat Skew:**

**This arbitrarily shifts the terms of the debate away from the goodness or badness of the actions of corporations to the presence or absence of an obligation of governments. No where in the resolution does it mention state action ,it is a question of the actions of corporations. Impacts a) arbitrarily inflates aff ground because you can garner offense/solvency off of government action which is extratopical and b) shifts the terms of the debate i.e. you delink phil NCs that only link to individuals/corporations. Proven by the fact that you read an A-spec argument about an actor who’s not in the resolution.**

**Fairness is a voter because the ballot makes debate a game and without fairness you’re voting for the better cheater not the better debater.**

**Drop the debater to deter future abuse, and because if I prove abuse it means substance has already been skewed.**

**Competing interps because a) reasonability has broad and bidirectional brightlines that allow you to just keep shifting them to justify any abuse. b) competing interps sets the best norms because you have to justify your actual practice, so bad practices will lose.**

**No RVIs**

**a) an RVI would mean any time theory is introduced the entire debate comes down to it which kills substance eduation and all strategy because in a world where there’s an RVI the debate would just be is this theory shell true mooting everything else.**

**b) you don’t win for just being fair or educational.**

**Interpretation: The affirmative may not read both a role of the ballot and role of the judge.**

**Resolvability:**

**Strat Skew:**