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**The aff’s rejection of chaos constructs an unreal perfect world opposite reality that they order themselves to – this engenders ressentiment. They blame the chaos that is a part of them on their neighbor and try to eradicate it.**

Paul **Saurette**, PhD in political theory at John Hopkins U, in **96** "I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them': Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in INternational Relations Theory." Millenium Journal of International Studies. Vol. 25 no. 1 page 3-6

The Will to Order and Politics-as-Making The Philosophical Foundation of the Will to Truth/Order •. I mistrust all systematizers and avoid them. A will to a system is a lack .of ! integrity."  According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to , meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic thought. Nietzsche claims that **pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and .affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence**.6 However, this •incarnation of the will to power as tragedy weakened, and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life. Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. -Everywhere the : instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were.but five steps from excess: the monstrum-in-animo was a universal danger’. **No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which would soften the tragedy of life**, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates' thought became paramount. In the words of Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was no longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end—And Socrates understood that the world had need of him —his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation.  **Socrates realised that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society.** His expedient, his cure? An alternative will to power. **An alternate foundation that promised mastery and control not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic.** In response to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsche's words, '[rationality was divined as a saviour...it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek thought throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency: one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational....'9 Thus, Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. **The Socratic Will to Truth is characterised by the attempt to understand and order life rationally by renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealised Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a 'Real World\*** of eternal and meaningful forms, **in opposition to an 'Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and^ ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World.** Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealised order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, **this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely 'modern'10 understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically-induced condition ressentiment**. and argues that it signalled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved historically through the aggressive universalisation of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche,' ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. **Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World**, As Nietzsche wrote, **‘I suffer: someone must be to blame for it’** thinks every sickly sheep. But his shepherd, the ascetic priest tells him: ‘Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself,-you alone are to blame for yourself '-This is brazen and.false enough: but one thing, is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered."  Faced, with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, once again, 'one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.... '12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdiuin the Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection, the **Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action.** This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomised worlds creates the .Will to Order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. **Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for 'the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest. sleep, in short absence of suffering According to the ascetic model, however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World.** The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of the moral-Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, **ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this," however, the ascetic ideal also asserts that a 'truer', more complete knowledge of the Real World must be established creating an ever-increasing Will-to Truth. This self-perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World.** As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal—this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, petty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.''1  The very structure of the Will to Truth ensures that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time, this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that it creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent World. With this critical transformation, the Will to Order becomes .the fundamental philosophical principle of modernity.

**We should not impose order on chaos – suffering is inevitable; the only option is to affirm the value in that suffering and give it meaning**

**Kain 07** (Philip J., “Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence”, Journal of Nietzsche Studies, issue 33, Penn state University, Muse)//RSW

Nietzsche simply dismisses the designed cosmos, which few believe in anymore anyway (WP 12a). On the other hand, Nietzsche takes the perfectible cosmos very seriously. He resists it with every fiber of his being.5 For Nietzsche, **we must stop wasting time and energy hoping to change things**, improve them, make progress (see, e.g., WP 40, 90, 684)—the outlook of liberals, socialists, and even Christians, all of whom Nietzsche tends to lump together and excoriate. For [End Page 50] Nietzsche, **we cannot reduce suffering, and to keep hoping that we can will simply weaken us.** Instead, **we must conceal an alien and terrifying cosmos if we hope to live in it. And we must develop the strength to do so. We must toughen ourselves.** We need more **suffering**, not less. It **has "created all enhancements of man so far** . . ." (BGE 225, 44; WP 957; GM II:7). If we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror of existence, Nietzsche thinks we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act, because we will see that **action cannot change the eternal nature of things** (BT 7). We must see, Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion . . . first saw the light of the world in the person of Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought . . . can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct . . ." (BT 15). In Nietzsche's view, we cannot change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we] should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint" (BT 7; cf. TI "Anti-Nature," 6). Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action—which requires distance and illusion. **The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle. Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle.** So we give suffering a meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. **The Greeks constructed gods for whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be celebrated by the poets.** Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin (GM II:7; cf. D 78). One might find all this unacceptable. After all, isn't it just obvious that we can change things, reduce suffering, improve existence, and make progress? Isn't it just obvious that modern science and technology have done so? Isn't it just absurd for Nietzsche to reject the possibility of significant change? Hasn't such change already occurred? Well, perhaps not. Even modern environmentalists might resist all this obviousness. They might respond in a rather Nietzschean vein that technology may have caused as many problems as it has solved. The advocate of the perfectible cosmos, on the other hand, would no doubt counter such Nietzschean pessimism by arguing that even if technology does cause some problems, the solution to those problems can only come from better technology. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that this is merely a hope, not something for which we already have evidence, not something that it is absurd to doubt—not at all something obvious. Further technology may or may not improve things. The widespread use of antibiotics seems to have done a miraculous job of improving our health and reducing suffering, but we are also discovering that such **antibiotics give rise to even more powerful bacteria** that are immune to those [End Page 51] antibiotics. **We have largely eliminated diseases like cholera, smallpox, malaria, and tuberculosis, but we have produced cancer and heart disease.** We can cure syphilis and gonorrhea, but we now have AIDS. **Even if we could show that it will be possible to continuously reduce suffering, it is very unlikely that we will ever eliminate it.** If that is so, then **it remains a real question whether it is not better to face suffering, use it as a discipline, perhaps even increase it, so as to to by continually hoping to overcome it.ughen ourselves, rather than let it weaken us, allow it to dominate us,** But whatever we think about the possibility of reducing suffering, the question may well become moot. Nietzsche tells a story: "Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of 'world history,' but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die" (TL 1, 79). **Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental moment in biological time,** whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and meaninglessness of existence. The disagreement here is not so much about the quantity of suffering that we can expect to find in the world but, rather, its nature. For proponents of the designed cosmos, suffering is basically accidental. It is not fundamental or central to life. It is not a necessary part of the nature of things. It does not make up the essence of existence. We must develop virtue, and then we can basically expect to fit and be at home in the cosmos. For the proponents of a perfectible cosmos, suffering is neither essential nor unessential. The cosmos is neutral. We must work on it to reduce suffering. We must bring about our own fit. For Nietzsche, **even if we can change this or that, even if we can reduce suffering here and there, what cannot be changed for human beings is that suffering is fundamental and central to life. The very nature of things, the very essence of existence, means suffering.** Moreover, it means meaningless suffering—suffering for no reason at all. That cannot be changed—it can only be concealed.

**Ressentiment devalues life, causing radical nihilism and destructive violence that turns their extinction scenarios**

**Diken, 9** (Bulent, 1/10/9, *Nihilism*, Ph.D, senior lecturer at Lancaster University, Department of Sociology, former assistant professor at Rokslide University, p. 102-104)

\*Context: *Nihilism* is an intro to nihilism informative text that consistently uses Houellebecq’s fictional work as an example; Diken is not doing a critical review of Houellebecq’s work and criticizing his characters as resentful; he is describing the nature of ressentiment and providing examples through Houellebecq.

In a society in which everyone is determined to seek pleasure, the lack of pleasure takes the form of ressentiment and a thirst for revenge. What is interesting here is the bio-political form ressentiment takes. There is, in this context, a direct link between bare life and Houellebecq’s master/slave dialectic. It is against this background that becoming ‘master’ through revenge is the ‘only way’ left for the ‘abject hero’, even when this implies radically antisocial acts. Fiction­­­ often seems like a form of revenge on the world; Houellebecq’s is an extreme case. Read alongside his biography, his novels turn out to be filled with highly specific attacks on jobs, places and people that have, in one way or another, pissed him off. (Tait 2006: 4) As such, in Houellebecq, **ressentiment** ceases to remain a passive, powerless emotion but **gains an astonishing potential for** (fictive or real) **violence.** Thus, one of the central features of his characters is their sense of victimization and their compensatory urge to exert violence on others, which also explains their arrogant tendency constantly to switch from a resentful loser to a spiteful avenger and back again. But how can destructive desire emanate from the reactive forces of Houellebecq’s man of ressentiment? **In Houellebecq the protagonists are denied true action and thus are busy imagining revenge as compensation.** Their **emotions such as anger, hate, envy, etc. cannot find an outlet.** The feeling of such impotence and the awareness of it, perhaps the two most visible features of Houellebecq’s characters, are, in other words, necessary conditions for ressentiment. Or, in Houellebecq’s language: ‘Have a good laugh, my little cunts. Later I’ll be the one on the podium and I’ll give you all the finger’ (2005: 80). This does not, however, explain why there is so much aggression in Houellebecq’s work. After all, often building upon imaginary revenge, ressentiment is not necessarily aggressive in practice. What is crucial here is to recall how **ressentiment can transform itself into radical nihilism, an aggressive will to deny and destroy everything, including life.** Significantly, therefore, although the movement of desire in Houellebecq often is restricted to a hedonistic pleasure principle in many instances, it is pitched beyond it, towards drive and its consummation in death. In this, the obliteration of desire, instead of its mastering, becomes a promise of freedom. Thus, through a continuous anti-production of desire and an exploration of literary forms that can depict ‘indifference and nothingness’ (1998: 40), his radical nihilism comes into sight as an alternative to, or rather as an extension of commodity fetishism. At this point, radical nihilism ceases to be an attribute of an external ‘other’, of Islamic terror, only; and the disjunctive synthesis of passive and **radical nihilism becomes internalized** in Houellebecq’s protagonists themselves. Theirs is **a radical nihilism that calls for a spiteful carnival aiming at the destruction of practically everything in search for a real outside, for ‘the possibility of an island’.** In this regard Houellebecq’s work illustrates the difficulty of sublimation in a passive nihilist society. But what is at issue here is not only the difficulty of creating sublime art objects; an even more radical problem is that, in the contemporary society: the very fundamental matrix of sublimation, that of the central Void, the empty (‘sacred’) place of the Thing exempted from the circuit of everyday economy, which is then filled in by a positive object that is thereby ‘elevated to the dignity of the Thing’ (Lacan’s definition of sublimation), seems to be increasingly under threat; what is threatened is the very gap between the empty Place and the (positive) element filling it in. (Zˇ izˇ ek 2000: 26) In the face of this difficulty, Houellebecq’s strategy is either racism, that is, elevating Islam to the level of the sublime Evil, the Thing, or sustaining the void, the empty place of the sacred Thing, by turning everything into an abject, ‘so it is as if, paradoxically, the only way to sustain the (Sacred) Place is to fill it up with trash, with an excremental abject’ (Zˇ izˇek 2000: 27). Seen in this way, one could say that Houellebecq is perhaps trying to save the logic of sublimation. The problem, however, is that the collapse of the sublimated element, the abject, into the Void, that is, the destruction of the gap between the element and the void, brings with it a psychotic disintegration of the whole symbolic order into a post-Oedipal sociality of the infantilized, ‘dangerous monkeys’. In other words, desperately searching for an island, an outside, Houellebecq heads toward a total anti-production: the disappearance of the self, of society, of politics, of laughter, of tears, and even of species. The usual contention is that hate is a hatred of the other – hence the illusion one is opposing it by preaching tolerance and respect for difference – but in fact hate (racism, etc.) is not so much a rejection of the other as a fanatical desire for otherness. It seeks despairingly to compensate for the loss of the other by the exorcizing of an artificial other, which may, as a result, be anyone whatever. In a lobotomized world, where conflicts are immediately contained, it seeks to resuscitate otherness – if only to destroy it. [. . .] This is a culture of Ressentiment, then, but one in which**, behind the resentment of the other, one cannot but sense a resentment of self** . . . which may extend as far as self-destruction. (Baudrillard 2002: 94) Indeed, **nothing obsesses Houellebecq more than destruction, a total rejection of the world as it is.** Thus his novels instantiate many situations in which the self, the society, can seemingly never be reconstituted. No other civilization, no other society, Houellebecq (1998: 148) writes, has been capable of building up so much bitterness in its subjects. **He doesn’t ‘like this world’, the society in which he lives ‘disgusts’ him, and he finds ‘no meaning’ in it** (ibid. 82). **Consequently, he perceives no problem in destroying it, even though that implies his own destruction as well.** Here **everybody,** not only the scapegoat (the Muslim?), **is threatened with destruction.** Undoing the social is ‘the way forward’ (Houellebecq 2005: 116). Hence the Houellebecqian anti-hero’s destiny is ‘to spread unhappiness around himself by making other people’s existence as intolerable as his own’ (ibid. 43).

**The alternative is to vote neg to accept the chaos of the status quo. Voting negative symbolizes a Dionysian relationship with existence, accepting the “imperfections” of the status quo as products of chaos that are beautiful. This allows us to understand pain positively.**

**Nietzsche 78** The anti-christ Human, All too Human. Aphorism #284 1878

The means to real peace. — No government admits any more that it keeps an army to satisfy occasionally the desire for conquest. Rather the **army is supposed to serve for defense, and one invokes the morality that approves of self-defense. But this implies one's own morality and the neighbor's immorality;** for **the neighbor, must be thought of as eager to attack** and conquer if our state must think of means of self-defense. **Moreover, the reasons we give for requiring an army imply that our neighbor, who denies the desire for conquest just as much as does our own state, and who, for his part, also keeps an army only for reasons of self-defense, is a hypocrite** and a cunning criminal who would like nothing better than to overpower a harmless and awkward victim without any fight. Thus all states are now ranged against each other: they presuppose their neighbor's bad disposition and their own good disposition. **This presupposition**, however, is inhumane, as bad as war and worse. **At bottom,** indeed, **it is itself the challenge and the cause of wars, because, as I have said, it attributes immorality to the neighbor and thus provokes a hostile disposition and act.** We must abjure the doctrine of the army as a means of self-defense just as completely as the desire for conquests. And perhaps the great day will come when people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifices for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, **"We break the sword," and will smash its entire military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one had been the best-armed, out of a height of feeling**—that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace, as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. **One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared**—this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth. Our liberal representatives, as is well known, lack the time for reflecting on the nature of man: else they would know that they work in vain when they work for a "gradual decrease of the military burden." Rather, only when this kind of need has become greatest will the kind of god be nearest who alone can help here. The tree of war-glory can only be destroyed all at once, by a stroke of lightning: but lightning, as indeed you know, comes from a cloud—and from up high.

**Thus, the role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best deconstructs ressentiment. Prefer:**

**Ressentiment is a revengeful hatred of the status quo – this is the founding principle of psychology which outweighs every other impact.**

Gilles **Deleuze**, 19**83**, Nietzsche and Philosophy, pg. 34-36

Is this difference only psychological? A difference of mood or tone? Nietzsche's philosophy depends, in general, on the principle that ressentiment, bad conscience etc. are not psychological determinations. Nietzsche calls the enterprise of denying life and depreciating existence nihilism. He analyses the principal forms of nihilism, ressentiment, bad conscience, ascetic ideal; the whole of nihilism and its forms he calls the spirit of revenge. But, the different forms of nihilism are not at all reducible to psychological determinations, historical events or ideological currents, not even to metaphysical structures. 3 0 **The spirit of revenge is undoubtedly expressed biologically, psychologically, historically and metaphysically;** the spirit of revenge is a type, it is not separable from a typology, the key stone of Nietzschean philosophy. But the problem is: what is the nature of this typology? Far from being a psychological trait **the spirit of revenge is the principle on which our whole psychology depends. Ressentiment is not part of psychology but the whole of our psychology,** without knowing it, is a part of ressentiment. In the same way, when Nietzsche shows that Christianity is full of ressentiment and bad conscience he does not make nihilism a historical event, it is rather the element of history as such, the motor of universal history, the famous "historical meaning" or "meaning of history" which at one time found its most adequate manifestation in Christianity. And when Nietzsche undertakes the critique of nihilism he makes nihilism the presupposition of all metaphysics rather than the expression of particular metaphysics: **there is no metaphysics which does not judge and depreciate life in the name of a supra-sensible world**. We cannot even say that nihilism and its forms are categories of thought, for the categories of thought, of reasonable thought - identity, causality, finality - themselves presuppose an interpretation of force which is that of ressentiment. For all these reasons Nietzsche can say: "The instinct of revenge has gained such a hold on humanity over the centuries that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, history and above all morality bear its imprint. As soon as man began thinking he The Tragic 35 introduced the bacillus of revenge into things" (VP III 458). We must understand this as meaning that the instinct of revenge is the force which constitutes the essence of what we call psychology, history, metaphysics and morality. The spirit of revenge is the genealogical element of our thought, the transcendental principle of our way of thinking. Nietzsche's struggle against nihilism and the spirit of revenge will therefore mean the reversal of metaphysics, the end of history as history of man and the transformation of the sciences. And we do not really know what a man denuded of ressentiment would be like. A man who would not accuse or depreciate existence - would he still be a man, would he think like a man? Would he not already be something other than a man, almost the Overman? To have ressentiment or not to have ressentiment - there is no greater difference, beyond psychology, beyond history, beyond metaphysics. It is the true difference or transcendental typology - the genealogical and hierarchical difference. Nietzsche presents the aim of his philosophy as the freeing of thought from nihilism and its various forms. Now, this implies a new way of thinking, an overthrow of the principle on which thought depends, a straightening out of the genealogical principle itself, a "transmutation". **For a long time we have only been able to think in terms of ressentiment and bad conscience. We have had no other ideal but the ascetic ideal. We have opposed knowledge to life in order to judge life, in order to make it something blameworthy, responsible or erroneous. We turned will into something bad, something stricken by a basic contradiction: we have said that it must be rectified, restrained, limited and even denied and suppressed.** It was only any good at this price. There is no philosopher who, discovering the essence of will, has not groaned at his own discovery and, like the timid fortuneteller, has not immediately seen bad omens for the future and the source of all evils of the past. Schopenhauer pushed this old conception to its extreme limit; the penitentiary of the will, he said, and the wheel of Ixion. Nietzsche is the only one who does not groan at the discovery of the will, who does not try to exorcise it, or limit its effect. The phrase **"a new way of thinking" means an affirmative thought, a thought which affirms life and the will to life, a thought which finally expels the whole of the negative**; to believe in the innocence of the future and the past, to believe in the eternal return. What Nietzsche calls his glad tidings is that existence is no longer treated as blameworthy nor does the will feel guilty for existing. "Will, this is what the liberator and the messenger of joy is called" (Z II "Of Redemption"). 3 1 The glad tidings are tragic thought, for tragedy is not found in the recriminations of ressentiment, the conflicts of bad conscience or the contradictions of a will which feels guilty and responsible. The tragic does not even fight against ressentiment, bad conscience or nihilism. According to Nietzsche it has never been understood that the tragic = the joyful. This is another way of putting the great equation: to will = to create. We have not understood that the tragic is pure and multiple positivity, dynamic gaeity. Affirmation is tragic because it affirms chance and the necessity of chance; because it affirms multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity. The dice throw is tragic. All the rest is nihilism, Christian and dialectic pathos, caricature of the tragic, comedy of bad conscience.