

The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the affirmative must prove it true and the negative must prove it false. Prefer:

A) Text: Five dictionaries define negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution's truth or falsity. Constitutivism outweighs because you don't have the jurisdiction not to truth test. Jurisdiction is a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary B)

Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, "I am awake" it is the same as "it is true that I am awake" which means they are also a question of truth claims because it's inherent.

C) Ground: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn't help anyone.

D) Truth Testing is a prerequisite to other role of the ballots because without truth we're operating off of lies which is what fuels propaganda and oppression.

1 <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate>

2 Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true

**People own their own bodies and as a result have rights to use their bodies.**

Feser, Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021. ICW NW

Nozick takes his position to follow from a basic moral principle associated with Immanuel Kant and enshrined in Kant's second formulation of his famous Categorical Imperative: "Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." The idea here is that **a human being, as a rational agent endowed with self-awareness, free will, and the possibility of formulating a plan of life, has an inherent dignity and cannot properly be treated as a mere thing, or used against his will** as an instrument or resource in the way an inanimate object might be. In line with this, Nozick also describes individual human beings as *self-owners* (though it isn't clear whether he regards this as a restatement of Kant's principle, a consequence of it, or an entirely independent

idea). The thesis of self-ownership, a notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just the claim that **individuals own themselves – their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the fruits or products of their exercise of their talents, abilities and labor.** They have all the prerogatives with respect to themselves that a slaveholder claims with respect to his slaves. But the thesis of self-ownership would in fact rule out slavery as illegitimate, since each individual, as a self-owner, cannot properly be owned by anyone else. (Indeed, many libertarians would argue that unless one accepts the thesis of self-ownership, one has no way of explaining why slavery is evil. After all, it cannot be merely because slaveholders often treat their slaves badly, since a kind-hearted slaveholder would still be a slaveholder, and thus morally blameworthy, for that. The reason slavery is immoral must be because it involves a kind of stealing – the stealing of a person from himself.) But **if individuals are inviolable ends-in-themselves** (as Kant describes them) **and self-owners, it follows, Nozick says, that they have certain rights, in particular rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something, after all, just is to have a right to it,** or, more accurately, to possess the bundle of rights – **rights to possess something, to dispose of it, to determine what may be done with it,** etc. – that constitute ownership; and **thus to own oneself is to have such rights to the various elements that make up one's self. These rights function, Nozick says, as side constraints on the actions of others; they set limits on how others may, morally speaking, treat a person.** So, for example, **since you own yourself, and thus have a right to yourself, others are constrained morally not to kill or maim you** (since this would involve destroying or damaging your property), or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else (since this would involve stealing your property). They are also constrained not to force you against your will to work for another's purposes, even if those purposes are good ones. For **if you own yourself, it follows that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self owned body and its powers,** e.g. either to work or to refrain from working.

**Thus, the state ought not interfere with people since that would violate their rights.**

Feser 2, Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021.

So far this all might seem fairly uncontroversial. But what follows from it, in Nozick's view, is the surprising and radical conclusion that **taxation,** of the redistributive sort in which modern states engage in order to fund the various programs of the bureaucratic welfare state, **is morally illegitimate. It amounts to a kind of forced labor, for the state so structures the tax system that any time you labor at all, a certain amount of your labor time – the amount that produces the wealth taken away from you forcibly via taxation – is time you involuntarily work, in effect, for the state.** Indeed, such taxation amounts to partial *slavery*, for in giving every citizen an entitlement to certain benefits (welfare, social security, or whatever), the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a *right*, to a part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the benefits; every citizen, that is, becomes in such a system *a partial owner of you* (since they have a partial property right in part of you, i.e. in your labor). But **this is flatly inconsistent with the principle of self-ownership.**

The various programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of the citizens of such a state. Indeed, **the only sort of state that can be morally justified is** what Nozick calls **a minimal state** or "night-watchman" state, **a government which protects individuals,** via police and military forces, **from force, fraud, and theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else.** In particular, **such a state cannot regulate what citizens eat, drink, or smoke (since this would interfere with their right to use their self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot control what they publish or read** (since this would interfere with their right to use the property they've acquired with their self-owned labor – e.g. printing presses and paper – as they wish), cannot administer mandatory social insurance schemes or public education (since this would interfere with citizens' rights to use the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather put their money into private education and private retirement plans), and cannot regulate economic life in general via minimum wage and rent control laws and the like (since such actions are not only economically suspect – tending to produce bad unintended consequences like unemployment and housing shortages – but violate citizens' rights to charge whatever they want to for the use of their own property).

Thus, the standard is consistency with libertarianism. This is the idea that the only moral state is one that protects people's rights but is *never* morally justified in coercing its citizens. Prefer:

1. Culpability: If people didn't freely will an action they can't be said to be responsible for it because they couldn't have done otherwise. I.e. if I'm forced to slap a person, no one would say I'm culpable because I had no choice in the matter. This means ethics can't exist without freedom because we wouldn't be able to assign agents culpability.

2. Freedom is a prerequisite to the use of other frameworks, because if we can't choose our actions we can't make them consistent with the aff framework. This means I hijack the aff framework because even if they win it's true, we have to have freedom to pursue it in the first place.

### Contention 1)

Private entities should have the freedom to appropriate outer space.

It's impossible for appropriation, or initial acquisition of property to be unjust, because if property was previously unowned injustice is not being committed against anyone.

**Feser 3**, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California.  
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1>)[brackets for gen lang]//phs st // ICW NW

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: **There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources**; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick's critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt — unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intuitions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acquisition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our understanding of Nozick's

principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument **The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place.** In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that **external resources are initially unowned**. Consider the following example. **Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A's acquisition of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R,** a right to R. By hypothesis, **however, B did not**

**have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned,** after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone's use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of

the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. **The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them,** via unjust transfer. **It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.**<sup>7</sup>

**This impacts back to my framework because it means a) the appropriation of property no one owns, i.e. outer space is not unjust under libertarianism and b) means interference with this permissible action is coercive.**

## **Contention 2)**

**Space exploration and appropriation are inevitable; it's just a question of whether it will be public or private. Public appropriation of outer space is unjust because it requires taxation.**

**Taxation is unjust under libertarianism.**

**Feser 4,** Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021.

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## **3**

### **Interpretation:**

**Fairness is a voter because the ballot makes debate a game and without fairness you're voting for the better cheater not the better debater. Drop the debater:**

**a) To deter future abuse.**

- b) Drop the argument incentivizes abuse because it takes longer to check abuse than to commit it.
- c) If the round has already been skewed you can't fairly evaluate substance.

#### Competing Interps:

- a) Reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention. b) Reasonability leads to infinite abuse because you can shift the bright line to justify anything.
- c) Reasonability collapses because you have to use an offense defense paradigm to determine to use it.

#### No RVIs

- a) Leads to infinite abuse because you can just sit on a shell for 4 minutes and auto win.
- b) You don't win for just being fair or educational.
- c) Incentivizes debaters to be as abusive as possible to bait theory and win off the RVI, and since checking multiple abusive things requires multiple shells so I'd have to win both and split the 2N.

**Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the implementation of the resolution via the enactment of a hypothetical policy action.**

**Resolved means a policy action.**

**Louisiana State Legislature.** "Legislative Glossary." *Louisiana State Legislature*, [www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx](http://www.legis.la.gov/legis/Glossary.aspx). Accessed 29 Jan. 2022.

#### Resolution

**A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved".** Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

**Resolved with a colon means a policy action.**

**U.S. Army Institute for Professional Development.** "Principles of Word Usage, Punctuation, Capitalization, and Spelling." *Effective Army Writing Subcourse Number IS1460 Edition A*, <https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/5D2BDA88-E8E5-4119-89D1-3FC243778F94-1308929329079/is1460/ch4.htm>. Accessed 29 Jan. 2022.

**The colon.** The colon is a mark of anticipation. **The material which follows the colon illustrates, restates, or depends on that which precedes the colon.** (1) **Colons introduce** A list, but only after *as follows*, *the following*, or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each soldier will carry the following: MREs for three days, a survival knife, and a sleeping bag. The division had four new officers: Lieutenants Smith, Tucker, Fillmore, and Lewis. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In *The Killer Angels* Michael Shaara wrote: "You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the civil War]." The brackets indicate that the comment was added by the person quoting the author. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: What can we do about it? A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: he wants the assignment. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: or Dear Madam: The details following an announcement: For sale: Large lakeside cabin with dock. **A formal resolution, after the word resolved: Resolved: That this council petition the mayor** . . . . The words of a speaker in a play: Macbeth: She should have died hereafter.

**Standards:**

**1. Ground:** The resolution is a policy action asking whether *the government should prevent private entities* from appropriating outer space. This is core to most neg ground, i.e. phil NCs about coercion, disads about state interference in the private sector, etc. The aff just magically fiats that private corporations stay out of space, which kills neg ground because the neg is limited to only arguments that prove companies should proactively appropriate space.