**The standard is consistency with the categorical imperative. This is the idea that maxims must be universalizable without contradiction.**

**The meta ethics is practical reason, the ability to set and pursue ends, because practical reason is inescapable, since its constitutive of action and escaping practical reason is an action. This means practical reason is the most binding and determines morality.**

**Practical reason shows us morality must respect the equality of individuals.**

**1. All individuals are agents with practical reason. Even if people have different capacities for setting and pursuing ends, practical reason is still binding since every agent has some sort of action, even if this just means thinking etc. Because all people are agents it means there can’t be any morally relevant distinction between people.**

**Additionally:**

**a) It doesn’t make sense to say something’s a rule for you but not others, I.e. 2+2=4 to me but not other people.**

**b) Anything else means ethics is non binding since if certain people in certain positions don't have to follow rules, you can just put yourself in those positions whenever you don’t want to follow rules.**

**And, things can’t be both true and false:**

**1. Any claim against non contradiction presupposes it, since to say “noncontradiction is false” presupposes the coherence of that statement. Which means it's impossible to disprove noncontradiction because you have to presuppose the law of noncontradiction to argue against it.**

**2. It’s impossible to conceptualize of a thing that has two contradictory properties at once since for example, the definition of hot is “not cold”. We can’t think of a thing  that is hot and cold at the same time so contradictory properties can’t coexist.**

**Thus our actions must be able to be universalized because all people are equal, and still be possible when universalized since an action can’t be possible and not possible, I.e. an action must still be possible to take when everyone takes that action.**

**Prefer additionally:**

**1. Regress: Any framework allows you to infinitely ask why, only my framework stops the regress because once you get to the point of practical reason, questioning it doesn’t make sense, since to question practical reason concedes its validity.**

**2. Performativity: We need freedom to make any arguments in debate, this means answers to my framework prove it true because you exercise your practical reason to try and contest it.**

**I defend the whole resolution, The appropriation of outer space by private entities is unjust.**

**Offense:**

**1. If everyone appropriated outer space it would be publicly appropriated since everyone owned them which means they would be both publicly and privately appropriated which leads to a contradiction in conception.**

**2.  The categorical imperative justifies the “right to be somewhere”. What this means is people have a right to go anywhere on the earth or space they want and privatization of locations violates this right.**

**Huber**, Jakob. "Cosmopolitanism for Earth Dwellers: Kant on the Right to Be Somewhere." Kantian Review, 20**17**, eprints.lse.ac.uk/69536/1/Huber\_Cosmopolitanism%20for%20Earth%20dwellers\_author\_2017%20LSERO.pdf. Accessed 16 Dec. 2021.

We need to take a closer look at the more immediate context in which this passage occurs. The preceding paragraph provides a first hint why Kant would talk about something like a right to a place on earth in the context of his discussion of rightful acquisition. There he asserts that ‘first acquisition of a thing can only be acquisition of land’ (DoR 6: 261). This claim is no less puzzling. Is he saying that I need to own the land in order to possess something that is placed on it? That would be odd – while there may be a sense in which stable enjoyment of my property right in my car may depend on my ability to park it on a ground that I have secure access to, my ownership right in itself cannot be contingent on that. Yet, note that Kant is not talking here about ownership in the sense of private property (something which I can claim as mine regardless of whether I am physically connected to it) at all, but about mere physical possession or occupation. Consequently, he is not referring to land in the sense of a fenced-in plot of territory – described as ‘residence (sedes), a chosen and therefore an acquired lasting possession’ – but merely as ‘habitable ground’ (DoR 6: 261). I want to suggest that what Kant is doing here is reflecting on the circumstances of embodied agency. An embodied agent I take to be a morally accountable corporeal being capable 4 of acting in time and space. As beings of that kind, **humans inevitably make a particular kind of seizure: the piece of land that they take up in virtue of the very fact that they are spatially extended. Without a place on earth, we couldn’t act and hold others morally accountable for their actions,** let alone claim objects as ‘ours’. Cases like that of refugees or stateless persons illustrate how failing to have one’s place on earth secured, and hence being vulnerable to the arbitrary choices of others, essentially deprives humans of their moral agency (Ypi 2014: 294-5, Flikschuh 2000: 156-7). So **it is the very nature of human existence that entails that people’s relationship to the land precedes their relationship to other external things.** This gives us a sense why reflection on the circumstances of human agency might lead to something like the idea of a right to be somewhere. And it also provides a possible explanation for the right’s puzzling position in the text: Kant can be read to regress from reflections on the possibility of property rights to the more fundamental condition of raising anything like a claim to an object as ‘ours’ in the first place: being acknowledged a place on earth is a necessary presupposition of claiming rights in things. Yet, reading on from the pertinent passage, the picture gets more complicated. Kant goes on to introduce another fundamental material factor – besides our own embodiment – that conditions human existence: the earth’s spherical surface. The finitude of the globe, he explains unites all places on its surface, for if its surface were an unbounded plane, people could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one another, and community would not then be a necessary result of their existence on the earth. – The possession by all human beings on the earth which 5 precedes any acts of theirs that would establish rights (as constituted by nature itself) is an original possession in common... (DoR 6: 262) **Humans do not act in empty space, Kant reminds us here, but on the earth’s spherical surface. This makes it impossible for them to get out of each other’s ways** once and for all.5 Instead they stand, from the beginning, in a relation of ‘possible physical interaction’ (DoR 6: 352) with everyone else globally: where and how we pursue our ends necessarily impacts where and how others can do so. This leaves Kant in a puzzling situation: on the one hand, there is a sense in which original acquisition of land is, qua unavoidability, ‘blameless’: unlike any other acquisition, acquisition of a place on earth occurs without individual act or fault but merely by virtue of one’s physical entrance into the world (cf. Flikschuh 2000: 157). **We just are the kinds of beings that, in virtue of pursuing projects and holding each other morally accountable within time and space, need to be somewhere. On the other hand, while entering the world itself is not something we choose to do, the very fact that we enter the world with the capacity for choice and action has normative implications:** it implies that ‘the choice of one is unavoidably opposed by nature to that of another’ (DoR 6: 267). And what it is to be an embodied agent – not just a physical entity taking up space – is to be able to grasp, and account for, the normative implications of this fact**. Kant resolves this dilemma**, I want to claim, by attaching strings to the right to be somewhere, namely, **to conceive of our own legitimate possession of a place as a ‘possession in common’** (DoR 6: 262) with all others. To think of the earth’s surface as possessed in common, that is to say, is an a priori necessary condition of the unavoidable act of first acquisition in virtue of one’s coming into the world as an embodied agent. While we have a right to be somewhere (otherwise we could not act), 6 we also need to take into account that the piece of space we take up at every particular point in time cannot be taken up by any other person. And given that, as Kant explains elsewhere, **‘originally no one had more right than another to be on a place on the earth’** (PP 8: 358), **we can do so only by thinking of the earth’s surface as commonly owned.** Kant thus employs the idea of original common possession of the earth in order to visually express what it means to exist as an embodied moral agent, together with other such agents, within limited space, namely, to acknowledge that the corollary of one’s own right to be somewhere is one’s acknowledgement of others’ equal right.

**This impacts back to my framework since violating someone’s right to be somewhere isn’t universalizable without contradiction since a right to be somewhere is key to taking actions so if everyone appropriates everything no one has the ability to act and do so in the first place.**

**Part 2: Aliens are Real**

**If Aliens are real we should independently not appropriate outer space.**

**1. Taking their land is independently wrong under any framework:**

**a) It is violent logic to take people's land to justify some greater end, i.e. to say “someone else lived there but we took it because it had valuable resources, and prevents overcrowding here”.**

**b) Possession is a side constraint on property rights. If someone else owns a thing you can’t be justified in claiming property rights to it even if it would be pragmatic. I.e. if my neighbor had a lot of gold in their backyard but won’t use it, I can’t say I’m *justified* in taking it.**

**c) Aliens have the ability to set and pursue ends which means taking their land isn’t universalizable without contradiction since it uses another reasoner as a means to an end.**

**1. Aliens are real, science and overwhelming probability prove. Shostak 14** (Seth Shostak, Ph.D. in astrophysics from the California Institute of Technology and senior researcher at the SETI and Lord Martin Rees the president of Britain’s Royal Society and astronomer to the Queen of England being cited by News.com, FEBRUARY 12th 2014, <http://www.news.com.au/technology/science/seti-scientist-predicts-alien-civilisation-will-be-detected-within-25-years-because-there-are-so-many-habitable-planets-out-there/story-fnjwlcze-1226824408842>, “SETI scientist predicts alien civilisation will be detected within 25 years — because there are so many habitable planets out there”, AB)

A TOP scientist with SETI — the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence — is so convinced **we’re on the brink of finding ET** he’s even named a date by which first contact will have been achieved. And science is abuzz with excitement that possible confirmation of alien life — though not of intelligence — could come as early as this year. According to Seth Shostak, we’ll be phoning ET by 2040. And the address could be as close as next door — astronomically speaking. “I think we’ll find E.T. within two dozen years,” he told the 2014 NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts symposium at Stanford University. He says it’s a game of cards. So far **the search for extraterrestrial civilisations** has only focused on a few thousand star systems. As new technology continues to come online, that **search will** have **spread to encompass more than a million star systems by 2040.** Based on current calculations on the likelihood of intelligent life out there, **searching that number of stars produces high-odds of success.** His enthusiasm is also drawn from the staggering number of planets discovered in the past decade by new equipment such as the Kepler space telescope. A good number of these planets are within the “goldilocks zone” — an orbital distance from the parent star where liquid water can form. Eleven such planets have recently been assessed to be circling Alpha Centauri B — our Sun’s nearest neighbour at 4.3 light years away. “The bottom line is, like **one in five stars has at least one planet where life might spring up,**” he said. “That’s a fantastically large percentage. **That means in our galaxy, there’s** on the order of **tens of billions of Earth-like worlds.”** Shostak hopes that by focusing Earth’s radio-telescopes on stars known to hold planets which are prime contenders for life, we’ll hear the so-far elusive radio evidence of advanced civilisations sooner. Recent breakthroughs in pattern-analysis software will also improve the chances of recognising a signal from an alien intelligence once we find it. Astronomers have become convinced life is likely to be far more abundant than we have previously suspected. New research suggests habitable planets likely emerged shortly after the Big Bang, potentially producing civilisations billions of years older than our own. And in the early years of the universe, one study suggests the “leftover” heat of the Big Bang would have helped produce[d] a far greater range of habitable planets.Even the definition of “goldilocks zone” is being challenged, with the likelihood that frozen Earth-sized planets can produce and support life beneath their ice crusts becoming broadly accepted. Alpha Centauri B is again a top contender, with computer models suggesting it [Alpha Centauri B] has at least five planets with a “very high” potential for photosynthetic (plant-like) life. But with the excitement comes a problem we’re only beginning to grapple with: How do we recognise an ET when we spot one? “They could be staring us in the face and we just don’t recognise them,” the president of Britain’s Royal Society and astronomer to the Queen of England Lord Martin Rees said recently. “The problem is that we’re looking for something very much like us, assuming that they at least have something like the same mathematics and technology.” A study publishing in Acta Astronautica this month tackles just this problem. Not only is alien biology likely to be immensely different to our own, so too is their intellect, the study argues. “I suspect **there could be life and intelligence out there in forms we can’t conceive. Just as a chimpanzee can’t understand quantum theory, it could be there as aspects of reality that are beyond the capacity of our brains,”** Lord Rees said.. But it could all be blue-sky talk. SETI continues to struggle to raise enough cash to keep it searching the skies and needs to find new donors. A SETI project designed to point an array of 350 radio dishes skyward from northern California has so far seen only 42 funded.

**2. Pascal’s Wager: There could be aliens in forms we can’t conceive of, if aliens aren’t on other planets and we don’t appropriate them there’s a risk of marginal harm, but if Aliens *are* on other planets and we steal their land that’s infinitely and unconditionally bad.**

**3. The statement “Aliens aren’t real” is impossible to verify since the universe is infinite and ever expanding, thus it’s impossible to have any risk of proof that aliens don’t exist. This means any risk that aliens are real is sufficient to prove them real, since a miniscule risk of evidence is better than no evidence.**

**4. The Dark Forest Theory explains why we haven’t found aliens yet, and also proves that if we discover them extinction will immediately occur.**

Yasser, **Shehab**. "Aliens, the Fermi Paradox, and the Dark Forest Theory: A Game Theoretic View." *Towards Data Science*, 21 Oct. 20**20**, towardsdatascience.com/aliens-the-fermi-paradox-and-the-dark-forest-theory-e288718a808. Accessed 27 Mar. 2022.

**The Dark Forest theory states that our galaxy does contain civilizations in abundance described in the Drake equation. These civilizations have still intentionally forgone communicating with others out of fear that other civilizations might destroy them.** The theory also states that **civilizations that have not practiced this caution have already been destroyed** under such circumstances. The [Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence Institute (SETI)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SETI_Institute), previously a government body and now a nonprofit located in Mountainview in California, postulates that the theory is not implausible. The official policy within the SETI community is only to collect information and not respond to any signals or evidence of extraterrestrial intelligence out of fear that this could be the end of life on Earth.Here we verify Cixin’s conclusion using informal incentives-based reasoning starting with two axioms: **Any given civilization’s goal is survival. Civilizations continuously grow and expand, but resources in the universe are finite.** Given these axioms, and the physical nature of the universe in which stars are extremely distant from one another, **communication between civilizations would initially take place at a drastically slow rate** of tens to hundreds of years, since the speed of light limits us. Cixin describes a “chain of suspicion” that is created between any two civilizations as they cannot confidently evaluate an honest intention or a potential threat the other poses. **By the time a civilization has gathered enough information to consider another unnegotiable, that other civilization could be well underway to destroy them.** Furthermore, leaving a less technologically advanced — and thus less threatening — civilization alone is not necessarily a safe option due to the potential for exponential and unpredictable technological advancement rates a civilization can undergo. Even if a civilization’s technological progress never outpaces that of another’s, it could broadcast information about that civilization to other civilizations, who might themselves be more technologically advanced and decide to destroy it. **A game-theoretical explanation of the Dark Forest Theory** We explain the dark forest theory using two scenarios, and then we generalize them further to reach a game-theoretical model faithful to the Dark Forest Theory. **The First Scenario Two civilizations on two different planets already know the existence of one another. They are both advanced enough to destroy the other, and doing so would give them access to additional resources. Mathematically speaking, the payoff of being destroyed is -inf, and the payoff of doing nothing is zero.** However, **the payoff of destroying another civilization is some number** theta, where theta **> zero** since some of the finite resources in the universe have now become available. These newly-freed resources allow the destroyer to use them to expand, serving the Cixin’s second axiom. Thus, The first scenario is an [extensive-form](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extensive-form_game) game with two rounds and the following properties: There are two civilizations (C1, C2) that are aware of one another. C1 takes its turn first, then C2 takes its turn. Each civilization has the same two possible actions: Destroy (the other civilization) or Do Nothing. It is straightforward that **the** [**dominant strategy**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_dominance) **and** [**subgame perfect**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subgame_perfect_equilibrium) **for C1 is to destroy C2.** By choosing the destruction action, C1 ensures a payoff of theta > 0. If C1 were to choose “Do Nothing,” it would leave C1 under the mercy of C2. Using backward induction, “Destroy” is the only safe option for C1. Corollary: **If a civilization can destroy another, it will. The Second Scenario** A civilization could broadcast its existence to other civilizations. The second scenario is an extensive form game with two rounds and the following properties: **There are two civilizations (C1, C2) that are not aware of one another.** C1 takes its turn first, then C2 takes its turn. **Each civilization has the same three possible actions: Destroy a civilization: This action can only target civilizations if it knows their existence**. **Broadcast:** Let the other civilization know of its existence. **Do Nothing.** Note that C2 can’t destroy a civilization of which it hasn’t heard. It is the dominant strategy and sub-game perfect for C1 to Do nothing. Again **broadcasting puts C1 under C2’s mercy.** By backward induction, **Do nothing is the only safe option** for C1. Corollary: **A civilization will never share information about its presence with a civilization that can destroy it.** The Dark Forest Theory The Dark Forest Theory builds upon the previous scenarios with a few more generalizations: The games are infinitely repeated throughout time. There are many civilizations (more than two). Technology increases somewhat randomly through time. In repeated games, Civilization A can’t let Civilization B live just because Civilization B can destroy Civilization A in a future turn if its technological level increases. This is closely related to the first scenario. Civilizations can also broadcast other civilizations’ existence information to much stronger civilizations, threatening their demolition of the revealed civilizations by any other civilizations to which they are revealed. This gives no civilization any incentive to share the knowledge of its existence with any other, be it weaker or more potent in technological advancement. This is closely related to the second scenario. It becomes clear that **it’s** [Pareto Optimal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficiency) and even [**Nash Equilibrium**](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nash_equilibrium) **to destroy any civilizations, those one knows of, and not share existence information out of fear of being demolished by a more potent civilization** — or even a weaker one at a future turn of the game. We might also go further and say that **civilizations that shared their existence were destroyed.** It might sound gloomy somehow antisocial to not make friends across the vast universe. However, **with how little we know about other planets and systems, and in the absence of a common language and understanding, and with the presence of the chain of suspicion, it makes sense to stay silent or face demolition!**

**Underview**

**1. Presumption affirms:**

**a) We presume things true i.e. you believe me when I said my name was Nate.**

**b)To presume things false is impossible because then we would have to presume that presumption was false, and presume that presumption of that presumption was false and so on into infinity.**

**2. I get 1ar theory because otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive which**

**outweighs everything because that makes it impossible for the aff to win.**

**3. Paradigm Issues: Drop the debater a) to deter future abuse, b) if I prove**

**abuse it means substance has already been skewed. No RVIs, a) debaters**

**don’t win for just being fair or educational, b) it would encourage good**

**theory debaters to be abusive so they can bait theory and win off an RVI.**

**Competing interps because a) reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge**

**intervention b) it encourages getting as close to the brightline as possible and**

**4. Fairness is a voter because the ballot makes debate a game and without**

**fairness you’re voting for the better cheater not the better debater.**

**5. Interpretation: The negative must defend a world where space colonization is a permitted version of appropriation,**

**Standards:**

1. **Strat Skew:**
2. **Reciprocity:**

**6. Fear of death is silly:**

**a) Death can’t affect us or be bad to us when we’re alive since if we were alive we wouldn’t be dead. If we were dead it also wouldn’t be bad to us because we’re dead we don’t care.**

**b) Fear of death stems from thinking death deprives us of time we could have been alive. However, the same is true of when we were born, being born in 1990 would have given me 15 more years of life. However, it’s irrational to think being born in 2005 is a moral evil so it’s also irrational to think dying earlier is bad.**

**c) Consequentialism only cares about what happens after an action has occurred, i.e. once the consequences have occured. Also, to fear death means you don’t think we are agents after it. Thus, if we all die there is no one to prescribe culpability to because consequentialists don’t think you’re culpable for things after you die and everyone would be dead.**