**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the affirmative must prove it true and the negative must prove it false. Prefer:**

**A) Text: Five dictionaries define negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. Constitutivism outweighs because you don’t have the jurisdiction not to truth test. Jurisdiction is a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary**

**B) Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, “I am awake” it is the same as “it is true that I am awake” which means they are also a question of truth claims because it’s inherent.**

**C) Ground: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn’t help anyone.**

**D) Truth Testing is a prerequisite to other role of the ballots because without truth we’re operating off of lies which is what fuels propaganda and oppression.**

1 <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate>

*2 Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true*

**People own their own bodies and as a result have rights to use their bodies.**

**Feser,** Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021. ICW NW

Nozick takes his position to follow from a basic moral principle associated with Immanuel Kant and enshrined in Kant’s second formulation of his famous Categorical Imperative: “Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.” The idea here is that **a human being, as a rational agent endowed with self-awareness, free will, and the possibility of formulating a plan of life, has an inherent dignity and cannot** properly **be treated as a mere *thing*, or *used* against his will** as an instrument or resource in the way an inanimate object might be. In line with this, Nozick also describes individual human beings as *self-owners* (though it isn’t clear whether he regards this as a restatement of Kant’s principle, a consequence of it, or an entirely independent idea). The thesis of self-ownership, a notion that goes back in political philosophy at least to John Locke, is just the claim that **individuals own themselves – their bodies, talents and abilities, labor, and by extension the** fruits or **products of their exercise of their talents, abilities and labor.** They have all the prerogatives with respect to themselves that a slaveholder claims with respect to his slaves. But the thesis of self-ownership would in fact rule out slavery as illegitimate, since each individual, as a self-owner, cannot properly be owned by anyone else. (Indeed, many libertarians would argue that unless one accepts the thesis of self-ownership, one has no way of explaining *why* slavery is evil. After all, it cannot be merely because slaveholders often treat their slaves badly, since a kind-hearted slaveholder would still be a slaveholder, and thus morally blameworthy, for that. The reason slavery is immoral must be because it involves a kind of stealing – the stealing of a person from himself.) But **if individuals are inviolable ends-in-themselves** (as Kant describes them) **and self-owners, it follows**, Nozick says, **that they have certain *rights*, in particular** (and here again following Locke) **rights to their lives, liberty, and the fruits of their labor. To own something,** after all, just **is to have a right to it,** or, more accurately, to possess the bundle of rights – **rights to possess something, to dispose of it, to determine what may be done with it,** etc. – that constitute ownership; and **thus to own oneself is to have such rights to the various elements that make up one’s self. These rights function, Nozick says, as *side-constraints* on the actions of others; they set limits on how others may, morally speaking, treat a person.** So, for example, **since you** own yourself, and thus **have a right to yourself, others are constrained morally not to kill or maim you** (since this would involve destroying or damaging your property), or to kidnap you or forcibly remove one of your bodily organs for transplantation in someone else (since this would involve stealing your property). They are also constrained not to force you against your will to work for another’s purposes, even if those purposes are good ones. For **if you own yourself, it follows that you have a right to determine whether and how you will use your self-owned body and its powers,** e.g. either to work or to refrain from working.

**Thus, the state ought not interfere with people since that would violate their rights.**

**Feser 2,** Edward. "Robert Nozick." *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, iep.utm.edu/nozick/. Accessed 12 June 2021.

So far this all might seem fairly uncontroversial. But what follows from it, in Nozick’s view, is the surprising and radical conclusion that ***taxation*,** of the redistributive sort in which modern states engage in order to fund the various programs of the bureaucratic welfare state, **is morally illegitimate. It amounts to a kind of *forced labor*, for the state so structures the tax system that any time you labor at all, a certain amount of your labor time – the amount that produces the wealth taken away from you forcibly via taxation – is time you involuntarily work, in effect, for the state.** Indeed, such taxation amounts to partial *slavery*, for in giving every citizen an entitlement to certain benefits (welfare, social security, or whatever), the state in effect gives them an entitlement, a *right*, to a part of the proceeds of your labor, which produces the taxes that fund the benefits; every citizen, that is, becomes in such a system *a partial owner of you* (since they have a partial property right in part of you, i.e. in your labor). But **this is** flatly **inconsistent with the principle of self-ownership.**

The various programs of the modern liberal welfare state are thus immoral, not only because they are inefficient and incompetently administered, but because they make slaves of the citizens of such a state. Indeed, **the only sort of state that can be morally justified is** what Nozick calls **a *minimal state***or “night-watchman” state, **a government which protects individuals**, via police and military forces, **from force, fraud, and theft, and administers courts of law, but does nothing else.** In particular, **such a state cannot regulate what citizens eat, drink, or smoke** (**since this would interfere with their right to use their self-owned bodies as they see fit), cannot control what they publish or read** (since this would interfere with their right to use the property they’ve acquired with their self-owned labor – e.g. printing presses and paper – as they wish), cannot administer mandatory social insurance schemes or public education (since this would interfere with citizens’ rights to use the fruits of their labor as they desire, in that some citizens might decide that they would rather put their money into private education and private retirement plans), and cannot regulate economic life in general via minimum wage and rent control laws and the like (since such actions are not only economically suspect – tending to produce bad unintended consequences like unemployment and housing shortages – but violate citizens’ rights to charge whatever they want to for the use of their own property).

**Thus, the standard is consistency with libertarianism. This is the idea that the only moral state is one that protects people’s rights but is *never* morally justified in coercing its citizens.**

**Prefer:**

**1. People are unconditionally valuable given that they can place value on**

**other things. E.g. a water bottle has no feelings about other objects, but we**

**have the ability to say things like murder is bad, and freedom is good. This**

**means we are unconditionally valuable because we’re the source of value, and**

**as a result shouldn’t be used as a means to an end.**

**2. Contesting my framework concedes the validity of freedom because you have to use your freedom to contest the value of freedom.**

**3. A-Spec: Without a government we exist in a state of nature where anyone can do whatever they want. This is not ideal so people form a government, and in doing so give up their positive right to do whatever they want but gain negative rights to not have others violate their freedom. Thus, the government's only job is to protect negative rights, not promote positive rights. And if it prioritizes positive rights the people can just abolish the government and go to a state of nature where they have all the positive rights they want.**

**4. Freedom is a prerequisite to the use of other frameworks. This means I hijack every other framework because even if you win some theory like util is true we have to have the freedom to be a utilitarian in the first place.**

**5. Culpability: If people didn’t freely will an action they can’t be said to be responsible for it because they couldn’t have done otherwise. I.e. if I’m forced to slap a person, no one would say I’m culpable because I had no choice in the matter. This means ethics can’t exist without freedom because we wouldn’t be able to assign agents culpability.**

**Consequences Fail**

**1. We can’t predict the future which means we can’t predict the consequences of an action since things can happen during our actions that cause a completely different consequence.**

**2. Normativity: If people are held responsible for things they didn’t intend it means they have no control over their actions being immoral. This outweighs because people will give up on morality if they’re blamed for things they didn’t do.**

**3. Calculation freezes action: We have to calculate the results of every action yet calculation is itself an action, which means once we calculate we just keeping adding actions to calculate, and just spend our entire life calculating.**

**4. Trust Paradox: Consequentialism obligates changes in actions on a case by case basis which means every action is subject to calculation and thus people act sporadically, meaning we can’t predict what others will do. But consequentialism necessitates that we can make predictions which means it’s paradoxical and impossible to use.**

**5. Backlash Objection: Consequentialism would obligate atrocities if they cause net good societal backlash. E.g. If murdering a bunch of people in a very atrocious way got the public to decide gun control was good and that saved net more people, util would obligate you to do this. However, certain things like mass murder are unconditionally bad.**

**6. Consequentialism can’t provide proactive justifications because you only worry about what happens after an action. This means you can only say something was good or bad after the fact, thus, you can’t guide action.**

**7.  Humans are worse at making predictions than random chance.**

**Menand**, Louis [review of Tetlock’s “*Expert Political Judgement*, 2005]. Everybody’s an Expert. *The New Yorker*. 5 December 20**05**.

It is the somewhat gratifying lesson of Philip Tetlock[, a Professor of Psychology at UC Berkeley]’s new book, “Expert Political Judgment: How Good Is It? How Can We Know?” (Princeton; $35), [shows] that people who make prediction[s] their business—people who [and] appear as experts on television, get quoted in newspaper articles, advise governments and businesses, and participate in punditry roundtables—are no better than the rest of us. When they’re wrong, they’re rarely held accountable, and they rarely admit it, either. They insist that they were just off on timing, or blindsided by an improbable event, or almost right, or wrong for the right reasons. They have the same repertoire of self-justifications that everyone has, and are no more inclined than anyone else to revise their beliefs about the way the world works, or ought to work, just because they made a mistake. No one is paying you for your gratuitous opinions about other people, but the experts are being paid, and Tetlock claims that the better known and more frequently quoted they are, the less reliable their guesses about the future are likely to be. The accuracy of an expert’s predictions actually has an inverse relationship to his or her self-confidence, renown, and, beyond a certain point, depth of knowledge. People who follow current events by reading the papers and newsmagazines regularly [non-experts] can guess what is likely to happen about as accurately as the specialists whom the papers quote. Our system of expertise is completely inside out: it rewards bad judgments over good ones. “Expert Political Judgment” is not a work of media criticism. **Tetlock** is a psychologist—he teaches at Berkeley—and his conclusions are based on a long-term study that he began twenty years ago. He picked two hundred and eighty-four people who made their living “commenting or offering advice on political and economic trends,” and he started **ask[ed experts] to assess the probability that various things would or would not come to pass, both in the areas of the world in which they specialized and in areas about which they were not expert.** Would there be a nonviolent end to apartheid in South Africa? Would Gorbachev be ousted in a coup? Would the United States go to war in the Persian Gulf? Would Canada disintegrate? (Many experts believed that it would, on the ground that Quebec would succeed in seceding.) And so on. By the end of the study, in 2003, **the experts had made 82,361 forecasts.** Tetlock also asked questions designed to determine how they reached their judgments, how they reacted when their predictions proved to be wrong, how they evaluated new information that did not support their views, and how they assessed the probability that rival theories and predictions were accurate. Tetlock got a statistical handle on his task by putting most of the forecasting questions into a “three possible futures” form. **The respondents were asked to rate the probability of three alternative outcomes: the persistence of the status quo, more of something (political freedom, economic growth), or less of something (repression, recession).** And he measured his experts on two dimensions: how good they were at guessing probabilities (did all the things they said had an *x* per cent chance of happening happen *x* per cent of the time?), and how accurate they were at predicting specific outcomes. The results were unimpressive. On the first scale, the **experts performed worse than they would have if they had simply assigned an equal probability to all** three **outcomes**—if they had given each possible future a thirty-three-per-cent chance of occurring. **Human beings who spend their lives studying the state of the world**, in other words, **are poorer forecasters than dart-throwing monkeys**, who would have distributed their picks evenly over the three choices. Tetlock also found that specialists are not significantly more reliable than non-specialists in guessing what is going to happen in the region they study. Knowing a little might make someone a more reliable forecaster, but Tetlock found that knowing a lot can actually make a person less reliable. “We reach the point of diminishing marginal predictive returns for knowledge disconcertingly quickly,” he reports. “In this age of academic hyperspecialization, there is no reason for supposing that contributors to top journals—distinguished political scientists, area study specialists, economists, and so on—are any better than [others] journalists or attentive readers of the New York *Times* in ‘reading’ emerging situations.”

**8.  Because util focuses on trade offs it makes us infinitely do more and is impossible to fulfill. E.g. volunteering is obligated over playing video games all the time which means people can never do what makes them happy. This means in the goal of promoting net pleasure at all costs util makes happiness impossible.**

**I defend the whole resolution, I’ll clarify anything about my advocacy in cross, and change within reason if asked.**

**Contention 1) The right to strike is key to freedom, because otherwise workers are subject to arbitrary domination.**

**Gourevitch**, Alex. "Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike." *SSRN*, poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=365086110124000106031080013073119029031084070081044092070068064070126102105090068113057037031013031061114093094020084102066070015055013006080118011001088102116096095024042036093117121114001069085102071008005007070024088127103077000089001031121123026001&EXT=pdf&INDEX=TRUE. Accessed 12 Nov. 2021.

**The right to strike is a right of human liberty. It is justified as a way of resisting** two interconnected forms of unfreedom: **structural and personal domination.** Sympathetic critics might wonder why not argue for the elimination of these forms of domination altogether, perhaps by arguing for an egalitarian distribution of property and workplace democracy. The reason is that this is not an exercise in ideal theory. I am trying to explain what the conditions are under which the right to strike is justifiable. These are decidedly non-ideal conditions of deep inequality and unfreedom. The right to strike is not derived by establishing first principles in an ideal regime and then following a series of deductions to the right to strike. **It is justified against the background of radically imperfect conditions, and many of the right’s imperfections are a reflection of these conditions**. It is worth recalling at least two of the most interesting features of the foregoing analysis. The first is that the analysis of domination explains **the right to strike**’s peculiar structure: it **is a right to refuse to do work while maintaining a right to the job. This** conceptual structure **makes sense if we see the strike as a way of reversing the structural domination of workers at the most immediate,** concrete **point at which they experience** that **domination:** the threat of losing, or never acquiring, a job. The second interesting result is that the analysis explains the right to strike’s scope: **strikes may legitimately aim at a wide range of arbitrary exercises** of managerial prerogatives, rather than so-called ‘bread and butter’ issues. That is because **it is a form resistance to the domination created by the commodification of labor-power,** domination that shows up not just in the threat of being fired, but in the organization of work itself. I have not here said much about the distinction between primary strikes, sympathy strikes, general strikes, and the like. Another essay would be required, but I can say that the argument clearly points in the direction of saying that sympathy strikes and general strikes are justified because they are ways that workers protest and resist their subjection. Indeed, in certain ways, these solidaristic actions might be superior to workplace strikes because they are ways of holding not just an individual employer but a whole class of owners and even the state itself responsible. That is to say, they are way of getting at the background structure, of which any given employer is a relatively small part.

**This impacts back to my framework because domination is coercive, and a libertarian state owes you a right to not be coerced.**

**Contention 2) A right to strike arises from a right to private property, workers own their labor and as a result have a right to withdraw it.**

**Andelson 71,** Robert. "The Strike in a Laissez-Faire Society: A Libertarian View of Labor's Ultimate Strategy." American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Jstor, [www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3485383.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae95e4ea248ee1b5f3668fffde40ff2a8](http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3485383.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae95e4ea248ee1b5f3668fffde40ff2a8). Accessed 12 Nov. 2021.

 OVER THE PAST SEVERAL DECADES, organized labor in the United States has more and more come to reject the voluntaristic approach epitomized (although not consistently) by Samuel Gompers, chiefly because of the conviction that the cards are stacked against the union in an economic melieu not ordered by the State. Despite the demand for free collective bargaining, little faith in its efficacy has been displayed. Instead, labor has increasingly mobilized politically to bring about positive legislat regarded as favorable to its interests. Apologists for this phenomenon cite numerous historical examples to justify their argument that labor was hopelessly outmatched so long as it confined itself to purely economic techniques to gain its ends. The failure of most important American strikes in the years prior to the passage of the Wagner Act would seem, superficially, to validate this contention. Yet what is often overlooked is the fact that these **strikes did not occur in a context of laissez-faire.** They were not, for the most part, broken because of any natural superiority of strength on the part of capital. **They were mainly broken because of government intervention which made for a pat- tern of artificial inequality; especially by the use of the injunction for purposes other than the protection of personal freedom, property rights, and the public peace.'** The Wagner Act merely reversed the tables, substitut- ing one kind of favoritism for another. While this may have been in a sense temporarily justified in order to "even things up," such justification has long since vanished. The Taft-Hartley Law represents a slightly more equitable balance within the structure of intervention, but the justice and necessity of intervention remain unquestioned. Laissez-faire has this, if nothing else, in common with Christianity: both are widely believed to have failed; actually, neither has been given a real try. Would organized labor really be impotent if laissez-faire prevailed? In attempting to answer this question, I begin with a double premise the truth of which many libertarians are reluctant to concede, namely, that **collective bargaining and the strike are not,** in essence**, incompatible with a voluntaristic society.** I shall therefore discuss this premise before pro- ceeding to the question proper. In order to forestall misunderstanding, it might be well for me to emphasize that nothing in this essay should be construed as assuming that the interests of labor and of capital need be viewed as antithetical. What Marxists call the class struggle really is simply a reflection of the all-too- frequent failure of both elements to perceive their mutality of interest: the failure of workers to realize that capital is but "stored-up labor," **the failure of management to realize that it is actually labor which hires cap- ital, and the failure of both to realize that were it not for monopolies traceable to government there would be a larger economic pie for them to share between them.** Properly understood, neither the free labor market nor any other free market can be an arena for the clash of interests, for a market is by definition a mechanism whereby areas of reciprocal satisfac- tion are discovered and given contractual expression. While such expres- sion may not be wholly acceptable to each party to an agreement, it con- stitutes that which is mutually acceptable within a framework of supply and demand. The free market is thus the only mechanism for the ex- change of goods and services which is appropriate to free men who respect one another's freedom. No doubt the foregoing will appear naive to one who has considered that the parties to an exchange not infrequently include vast corporate entities possessing the advantages of pooled resources and sophisticated organization. The superior bargaining position engendered by these ad- vantages creates a presumptive disparity of satisfaction in favor of corpo- rate entities within the area of mutual agreement arrived at when they contract with isolated individuals. Capital, if corporate, can generally be the more readily withheld from those unwilling to hire it on its own terms. In other words, **the corporate entity has a greater market leverage due to its superior ability to control supply.** Therefore **labor may find it neces- sary to become corporate also, so as to achieve an equality of bargaining power** by a capacity for effective refusal to employ capital except on terms more agreeable to itself. The "higgling of the market" is not ob- structed by such factors; it has simply become on both sides a higgling between individuals in combination rather than in isolation. One way of defining a strike is as the concerted withdrawal of demand for capital, used as a bargaining lever by labor. **The collective cessation of work, when it does not occur in violation of contractual agreements honored by the other side, constitutes a perfectly natural and legitimate labor strategy.** From a libertarian standpoint, the use of political means (which inevitably imply ultimate physical coercion) for the attainment of labor's economic objectives is actually nothing other than a subtle (and sometimes not-so-subtle) mode of armed robbery, a predatory interference with the market, an abuse of the police power to implement privilege at the expense of the principle of voluntary contract. The same cannot be said of **the strike**, which **is**, at least in theory, **merely the** organized refusal to employ capital, or, from another frame of reference, the **organized with- holding by the workers of their labor, a commodity which indubitably belongs to them.**2 In short, **the right to strike is an aspect of the right to private property.**

**This impacts back to my framework because a libertarian state has an obligation to protect your property rights.**

**Underview**

**1.** **Presumption affirms. A) we presume things true until proven otherwise, I.e. you believed me when I said my name was Nate. B) It’s impossible to presume things false because then we presume that presumption is false but that also leads to a falsity, and it’s infinitely regressive.**

**2.** **Permissibility affirms, none of their arguments about the aff having to prove an obligation apply because my argument is permissible actions are obligatory A) it’s better for us to take okay actions than bad ones, and  B) Otherwise we would need a proactive justification to do things like drink water.**

**3.** **I get 1ar theory because otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive which outweighs everything because that makes it impossible for the aff to win.**

**4.** **Paradigm Issues: Drop the debater a) to deter future abuse, b) if I prove abuse it means substance has already been skewed. No RVIs, a) debaters don’t win for just being fair or educational, b) it would encourage good theory debaters to be abusive so they can bait theory and win off an RVI. Competing interps because a) reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention b) it encourages getting as close to the brightline as possible and**

**5.** **Fairness is a voter because the ballot makes debate a game and without fairness you’re voting for the better cheater not the better debater.**

**6.** **No 2N theory because that allows the neg to just go for 6 minutes of new game over issues which is impossible for a 3 minute 2ar to deal with.**

**7. Presumption and Permissibility should both affirm for fairness:**

a**)The aff reads the AC in the dark which means they don’t know which arguments will and will not be strategic. I.e. I could accidentally read a position that was too skeptical and autolose if permissibility negates.**

**b) The negative is reactive which means a) if they get presumption and permissibility they can just read seven minutes of permissibility arguments mooting the aff, and forcing me to answer seven minutes with four. b) they get to uplayer with cps, theory, ks, NCs, so the affirmative should also get methods to uplayer.**

**Generic negating harder arguments don’t apply because they don’t explain why presumption and permissibility rectify the specific side biases.**