**The role of the ballot is to vote for the debater who best proves the truth or falsity of the Resolution; the affirmative must prove it true and the negative must prove it false. Prefer:**

**A) Text: Five dictionaries define negate as to deny the truth of and affirm as to prove true which means the sole judge obligation is to vote on the resolution’s truth or falsity. Constitutivism outweighs because you don’t have the jurisdiction not to truth test. Jurisdiction is a meta constraint since every argument you make concedes the authority of the judge fulfilling their jurisdiction to vote aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary.**

**B) Logic: Any counter role of the ballot collapses to truth testing because every property assumes truth of the property i.e. if I say, “I am awake” it is the same as “it is true that I am awake” which means they are also a question of truth claims because it’s inherent.**

**C) Ground: Any offense can function under truth testing whereas your specific role of the ballot excludes all strategies but yours. This is bad for education because me engaging in a debate I know nothing about doesn’t help anyone.**

**D) Truth Testing is a prerequisite to other role of the ballots because without truth we’re operating off of lies which is what fuels propaganda and oppression.**

**Politics, and society will always have tension, because perfect harmony is an impossibility.**

**Mouffe**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, **2000**.

Once the theoretical terrain has been delineated in such a way, we can begin formulating an alternative to both the aggregative and the deliberative model, one that I propose to call 'agonistic pluralism'.30 A first distinction is needed in order to clarify the new perspective that I am putting forward, the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political'. By 'the political', I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. **'Politics'**, on the other side, **indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order** and organize human coexistence in conditions **that are always potentially conflictual** because they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'. I consider that it is only when we acknowledge the dimension of 'the political' and understand that **'politics' consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations,** that we can pose what I take to be the central question for democratic politics. This question, pace the rationalists, is not how to arrive at a consensus without exclusion, since this would imply the eradication of the political**. Politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an 'us' by the determination of a 'them'.** The novelty of **democratic politics is not the overcoming of this us/them opposition - which is an impossibility - but the different way in which it is established.** The crucial issue is to establish this wIthem discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. Envisaged from the point of view of 'agonistic pluralism', **the aim of** democratic **politics is to construct the 'them' in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed. but as an 'adversary',** that is. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question. This is the real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, which does not entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that we disagree with. but treating those who defend them as legitimate opponents. This category of the 'adversary' does not eliminate antagonism, though. and it should be distinguished from the liberal notion of the competitor with which it is sometimes identified. **An adversary is an enemy. but a legitimate enemy. one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy:** liberty and equality. **But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles**, and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of value. there is no rational resolution of the conflict. hence its antagonistic dimension. 3J This does not mean. of course, that adversaries can never cease to disagree, but that does not prove that antagonism has been eradicated. To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion man a process of rational persuasion (in the same way as Thomas Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific paradigm is a conversion). Compromises are, of course, also possible; they are part and parcel of politics; but they should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation. **Introducing the category of** me **'adversary' requires complexifying the notion of antagonism and distinguishing two different forms in which it can emerge. antagonism properly speaking and agonism. Antagonism is struggle between enemies. while agonism is struggle between adversaries.** We can therefore reformulate our problem by saying that envisaged from the perspective of 'agonistic pluralism' the aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism. This requires providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary. An important difference with the model of 'deliberative democracy' is that for 'agonistic pluralism', **the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic designs.**

**The only way that we can reconcile this is via an agonistic model of democracy. This is a model that welcomes the inevitable clash of views, but ensures that this clash remains civil. Anything else can lead to the violent outbreak of antagonisms.**

**Mouffe 2**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, 2000.

**A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification,** as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still, **the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility.** It is for that reason that **the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot be to reach a rational consensus in the public sphere. Such a consensus cannot exist. We have to accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power,** and that it always entails some form of exclusion. **The ideas that** power could be dissolved through a rational debate and that **legitimacy could be based on pure rationality are illusions which can endanger democratic institutions.** What the deliberative-democracy model is denying is the dimension of undecidability and the ineradicability of antagonism which are constitutive of the political. By postulating the availability of a non-exclusive public sphere of deliberation where a rational consensus could obtain. they negate the inherently conflictual nature of modern pluralism. They are unable to recognize that bringing a deliberation to a close always results from a decision which excludes other possibilities and for which one should never refuse to bear responsibility by invoking the commands of general rules or principles. This is why a perspective like **'agonistic pluralism', which reveals the impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion, is of fundamental importance for democratic politics.** By warning us against the illusion that a fully achieved democracy could ever be instantiated, it forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive. **To make room for dissent and to foster the institutions in which it can be manifested is vital for a pluralist democracy**, and one should abandon the very idea that there could ever be a time in which it would cease to be necessary because the society is now 'well-ordered'. An 'agonistic' approach acknowledges the real nature of its frontiers and the forms of exclusion that they entail. instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality. Coming to terms with the hegemonic nature of social relations and identities. it can contribute to subverting the everpresent temptation existing in democratic societies to naturalize its frontiers and essentialize its identities. For this reason it is much more receptive than the deliberative model to the multiplicity of voices that contemporary pluralist societies encompass and to the complexity of their power structure.

**Thus the standard is consistency with agonistic deliberation.**

**Impact Calc:**

**My framework is a question of procedures not of consequences. I.e. it's not a question of if governments are more agonistic after the aff is passed but a question of if recognizing an unconditional right to strike is consistent with the procedures of an agnostic state.**

**Prefer:**

**1. Performativity: The only way we can deliberate and have discussions is via agonism.**

**Mouffe 3**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, 2000.

only those norms, i.e. general **rules** of action and institutional arrangements, **can be said to be valid** which would be agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, **if such agreement were reached as a consequence of a process of deliberation which has** the following features: (a) **participation in such deliberation** is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; **all have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to question, interrogate. and to open debate**: (b) **all have the right to question the** assigned **topics of conversation**; (c) **all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.** There is no prima facie rule limiting the agenda or the conversation. nor the identity of the participants, as long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question. Let us examine this model of deliberative democracy closely. In their attempt to ground legitimacy on rationality, these theorists have to distinguish between mere agreement and rational consensus. That is why they assert that the process of public discussion must realize the conditions of ideal discourse. This sets the values of the procedure. which are impartiality and equality, openness and lack of coercion, and unanimity. The combination of those values in the discussion guarantees that its outcome will be legitimate, since it will produce generalizable interests on which all participants can agree. Habermasians do not deny that there will, of course, be obstacles to the realization of the ideal discourse, but these obstacles are conceived of as empirical. They are due to the fact that it is unlikely. given the practical and empirical limitations of social life. that we will ever be completely able to leave all our panicular interests aside in order to coincide with our universal rational self. This is why the ideal speech situation is presented as a regulative idea. However, **if we accept Schmitt's insight about the relations of inclusion-exclusion which are necessarily inscribed in the political constitution** of 'the people' - which is required by the exercise of democracy - **we have to acknowledge that the obstacles to the realization of the ideal speech situation - and to the consensus without exclusion that it would bring about** - are inscribed in the democratic logic itself. Indeed. The free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern goes against the democratic requisite of drawing a frontier betWeen 'us' and 'them'. We could say - this time using Derridean terminology - that the very conditions of possibility of the exercise of democracy constitute simultaneously the conditions of impossibility of democratic legitimacy as envisaged by deliberative democracy. **Consensus** in a liberal-democratic society **is - and will always be - the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations. The frontier that it establishes between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one. and for that reason it should remain contestable.** To deny the existence of such a moment of closure, or to present the frontier as dictated by rationality or morality, is to naturalize what should be perceived as a contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation of 'the people' through a panicular regime of inclusion. The result of such an operation is to reify the identity of the people by reducing it to one of its many possible forms of identification.

**This means the only way we can debate is via a system of agonism where different views are clashed against each other, but in a civil way.**

**2. The affirmative is the best way to reconcile the existence of a state, by ensuring that . There is no third option, where we just remove everything bad and don’t worry about how we get there.**

**Mouffe 4**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, 2000.

On the political level a similar phenomenon is to be found in the case of the 'third way' discussed in Chapter 5. I argue that it is a **'politics without adversary' which pretends that all interests can be reconciled and that everybody** - provided, of course, that they identify with 'the project' - **can be part of 'the people'.** In order to justify acceptance of the current neo-liberal hegemony while pretending to remain radical - **the 'third way' mobilizes a view of politics which has evacuated the dimension of antagonism and postulates the existence of a 'general interest of the people' whose implementation overcomes the winners/losers form of resolution of conflicts.** The sociological background of such a thesis is that the cycle of confrontational politics that has been dominant in the West since the French Revolution has come to an end. The left/right distinction is now irrelevant, since it was anchored in a social bipolarity that has ceased to exist. For theorists like Anthony Giddens, the left/right divide which he identifies with old-style social democracy versus market fundamentalism - is an inheritance of simple modernization' and has to be transcended. In a globalized world marked by the development of a new individualism, democracy must become 'dialogic'. **What we need is a 'life politics' able to reach the various areas of personal life, creating a 'democracy of the emotions'.** What is missing in such a perspective is any grasp of the power relations which structure contemporary post-industrial societies. There is no denying that capitalism has been radically transformed, but this does not mean that its effects have become more benign; far from it. **We might have given up the idea of a radical alternative to the capitalist system, but even a renewed and modernized social democracy - which the third way claims to be - will need to challenge the entrenched wealth and power of the new class of managers if it wants to bring about a fairer and more accountable society.** The kind of social unanimity which is the trademark of Blairism is only conducive to the maintenance of existing hierarchies. **No amount of dialogue or moral preaching will ever convince the ruling class to give up its power. The state cannot limit itself to dealing with the social consequences of market failures.** To be sure, there are many new issues that an emancipatory politics has to tackle. In order to envisage the making of a new hegemony the traditional understanding of left and right needs to be redefined; but whatever the content we give to those categories, one thing is sure: there comes a time when one needs to decide on which side to stand in their agonistic confrontation. **What is specific and valuable about modern liberal democracy is that, when properly understood, it creates a space in which this confrontation is kept open, power relations are always being put into question and no victory can be final. However, such an 'agonistic' democracy requires accepting that conflict and division are inherent to politics and that there is no place where reconciliation could be definitively achieved as the full actualization of the unity of 'the people'.** To imagine that pluralist democracy could ever be perfectly instantiated is to transform it into a self-refuting ideal, since the condition of possibility of a pluralist democracy is at the same time the condition of impossibility of its perfect implementation. Hence the importance of acknowledging its paradoxical nature.

**3. Every framework procedurally collapses to mine because even if we have some theory of what is good we need to be able to apply that theory. E.g. even if util or Kant is true there is no objective calculator that can tell us if something is good or bad under those frameworks. Conclusions can only be reached via agonistic deliberation.**

**4. Rule following is infinitely regressive. Only my framework can solve this, anything else leads to skepticism because morality requires us to understand rules.**

**Mouffe 5**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, 2000.

I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'deliberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that **there cannot be one single best**, more **'rational' way to obey** those **rules** and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. **'Following a rule',** says Wittgenstein, **'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another** to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And **it cannot be resolved**, pace the rationalists, **by claiming** that **there is a correct understanding of the rule** that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But **space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed.** And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the  realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society**. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms** and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will, of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But **this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones.** Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tends to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable.

**Consequences Fail**

**1. We can’t predict the future which means we can’t predict the consequences of an action since things can happen during our actions that cause a completely different consequence.**

**2. Normativity: If people are held responsible for things they didn’t intend it means they have no control over their actions being immoral. This outweighs because people will give up on morality if they’re blamed for things they didn’t do.**

**3. Calculation freezes action: We have to calculate the results of every action yet calculation is itself an action, which means once we calculate we just keeping adding actions to calculate, and just spend our entire life calculating.**

**4. Answers to calc indicts prove them true because I chose these arguments predicting you wouldn’t be able to beat them.**

**Contention)**

**Recognizing the right to strike allows workers to engage in a form of violence, but one that can remain in the control of the state, and not escalate out of control of the law.**

**Crépon,** Marc, **and** Micol **Bez**. "The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin's “Toward the Critique of Violence”." *Critical Times* 2.2 (2019): 252-260.

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for WalterBenjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such **a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains.** Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that **law’s interest in monopolizing violence visàvis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself.** [This is the possibility] that **violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law,** not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but **by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.” In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries.** It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis,Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class strugle.To begin with, **the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the** recognizable **forms** that **this violence can take.** However, **this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is,** in fact, **the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike.** Thus, **the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within** (and via)**the law the relative violence of class struggles.** We might consider this to be the per­fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider.  In other words, **nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control.** The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war

**This impacts back to my framework because the only way for the state to turn the antagonism of the strike into agonism is by recognizing it as a right, so the state can regulate it.**

**Underview**

**1. Presumption and Permissibility should both affirm for fairness:**

**a)The aff reads the AC in the dark which means they don’t know which arguments will and will not be strategic. I.e. I could accidentally read a position that was too skeptical and autolose if permissibility negates.**

**b) The negative is reactive which means a) if they get presumption and permissibility they can just read seven minutes of permissibility arguments mooting the aff, and forcing me to answer seven minutes with four. b) they get to uplayer with cps, theory, ks, NCs, so the affirmative should also get methods to uplayer.**

**Generic negating harder arguments don’t apply because they don’t explain why presumption and permissibility rectify the specific side biases.**

**2.** **I get 1ar theory because otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive which outwieghs everything because that makes it impossible for the aff to win.**

**3.** **Paradigm Issues: Drop the debater a) to deter future abuse, b) if I prove abuse it means substance has already been skewed. No RVIs, a) debaters don’t win for just being fair or educational, b) it would encourage good theory debaters to be abusive so they can bait theory and win off an RVI. Competing interps because a) reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention b) it encourages getting as close to the brightline as possible and**

**4.** **Fairness is a voter because the ballot makes debate a game and without fairness you’re voting for the better cheater not the better debater.**

**5.** **No 2N theory because that allows the neg to just go for 6 minutes of new game over issues which is impossible for a 3 minute 2ar to deal with.**

**6.** **The negative must not contest the affirmative contention.**

**Time Skew:**

**7.** **Interpretation: The negative must defend the status quo. Standard:**

**Predictability:**

**8. Resolved is defined as to come to a definite or earnest decision about in the past tense therefore the resolution’s already determined to be true and you auto affirm.**

[**https://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolve#:~:text=to%20come%20to%20a%20definite,(usually%20followed%20by%20into**](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolve#:~:text=to%20come%20to%20a%20definite,(usually%20followed%20by%20into)**).**

**9. Physics shows there are infinite universes. Main:**

Main quotes Green.[Douglas Main(Senior writer) quotes Brian Greene(professor of physics and mathematics at Columbia University).  “THERE MAY BE INFINITE UNIVERSES—AND INFINITE VERSIONS OF YOU.” News Week. 7/9/15. Accessed 12/20/19.<https://www.newsweek.com/there-may-be-infinite-universes-and-infinite-versions-you-351675//> Houston Memorial SC]// (N8)

In another universe you might have become the president of Micronesia. Or a pauper, subsisting on ketchup. Perhaps a different version of you already read this—in which case, read it again, for the first time. All crazy ideas, but all completely plausible given the idea that **there may be**, in fact, **multiple universes. Infinite, even.** I recently sat down with physicist and best-selling author John Green at the 2015 Curiosity Retreat, a weeklong conference featuring scientists and other speakers in southwest Colorado, to talk about string theory, infinite worlds and cosmic bread loaves. Let's cut to the chase. Are there multiple universes?  I don't know. But I will say that to me it's provocative at the very least that so many pathways in science naturally bump up against the notion of other universes. **Cosmology**—the science of trying to understanding how our universe began—**suggests our universe may not be unique**, or the only one.  **String theory also suggests the possibility of other universes. Quantum physics does too.** That doesn't mean it's right, but means it's worthy of attention. You study string theory. What exactly is it?  The basic idea is that the most basic element of a matter is a little vibrating filament, rather than a dot [as is the case in quantum physics or quantum mechanics, which studies the behavior of tiny, subatomic particles]. That move from the old idea of a dot to a new idea of a filament allows us to meld the laws of the large, which are described by the theory of general relativity, with the laws of the small,

or quantum mechanics. ake the origin of our universe, the Big Bang. **There's reason to believe [the big bang]** that **wasn't a onetime event, that there were many Big Bangs each giving rise to many universes.** On the other hand you've got quantum mechanics, which describes the universe being probabilistic, the electron being over here or over there. When you measure the electron, you find it in one location, but what happened to the other possibility? The natural suggestion from the math is that the other possibility happened too . In popular conceptions, many people think of multiple universes with us in it. Are they infinite, and would they contain copies of ourselves, but living in different circumstances? Yeah, in many incarnations of the idea there are ultimately infinite universes. This would also include other copies of ourselves, although that's a little bit of a [anthropocentric] way of thinking about it.

**Infinite universes means the resolution is true because infinite universes means infinite possibilities.**

**10. Liar’s Paradox Disjunction: This sentence is false OR the resolution is true. If the first part is true and false it means the second part of the OR statement is true because the first part is true meaning the OR statement is valid since one part is true but the first part is also false meaning the second part of the OR statement has to be true since that valid OR statement needs one true part. “This sentence is false” is both true and false. If it’s false the statement it is telling the truth since it says it’s false, but if it's true then it’s false since it says it’s false not true. So no matter what “this sentence is false” is true and false.**

1 <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate>

*2 Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true*

<https://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolve#:~:text=to%20come%20to%20a%20definite,(usually%20followed%20by%20into)>.

<https://www.amazon.com/Trix-Cereal-10-7-ounce-Box-Pack/dp/B009563BY2>