**Morality must be internally motivating because we must internalize and care about external claims, which means external motivation collapses.**

**Joyce 1**, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. [Bracketed for grammatical clarity] // (N8)

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. **Suppose it were claimed,** instead, that **I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu** and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. **[r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink** - l have a reason not to drink. But how could that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the external reason even explain my [action] from drinking? Clearly, in order to explain it the external reason must have some causally efficacious role [in] among the antecedents of the action (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. **The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason** claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the belief alone can[not] produce action, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain an action** the **belief must couple with desires** (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: **if I believe that the coffee is** [bad] **tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it.** So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but **in that case** the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

**Contracts solve this because people agree to certain constraints to better promote their self interest. People agree to channel their desires and in doing so, establish a set of moral agreements.**

**Gauthier 86** Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print. // (N8)

**Moral principles are introduced as the objects of** full **voluntary** ex ante a**greement among** rational **persons.** Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices. But the **parties to agreement are real,** determinate individuals, **distinguished by their capacities, situations, and concerns.** In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree to constraints on their choices, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.**  As rational persons understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize** for mutual constraint, and so for **a moral dimension in their affairs.**

**Thus, the standard is consistency with the contractarian principle of mutual restraint, this is when people agree to constrain their actions for their own self interest. To clarify, obligations arise from restraints we place on ourselves by entering contracts.**

**Prefer:**

**1. Bindingness: Contracts are binding since there are legal repercussions to not following them. This outweighs because if people don’t have any reason to follow ethics they can just not follow it the second they don’t want to and it loses all meaning.**

**2. Them contesting my framework concedes it’s validity since contracts were fundamental to any of their cards. For example, your authors needed publishing licenses, and your empirical studies needed permits.**

**Contention)**

**Workers agree in contracts not to strike, these contracts grant employers the right to fire people if they strike and has been upheld by the state.**

"Employer Sanctions for Violation of No-Strike Clause: Union Busting through Mass Discharge and Rescission." ***Yale Law Journal*,** digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8323&context=ylj. Accessed 23 June 2021.

**EMPLOYERS often secure no-strike clauses 1 in collective bargaining contracts** 2 with their employees' unions, 3 in order to ensure greater union responsibility for the maintenance of stable production schedules.4 **Under such clauses, the union promises not to authorize or sanction any strike during the term of its contract.' The employer is** usually **given power to discipline or discharge all the individual union members who strike in violation of the no-strike clause.0**

When confronted with a union-sponsored strike in violation of a no-strike clause, the employer may be forced to accede to the union's demands because of production requirements or the scarcity of replacement workers. 7 Alternatively, he may shut down his plant and wait out the strike, disciplining the strikers when they return to work, subject to an arbitrator's review.8 However, if he believes his bargaining position to be strong, he may discharge all the strikers, rescind the contract, and refuse thereafter to deal with the union.0 **The National Labor Relations Board has upheld such employer actions on the grounds that they are justified by the union's prior material breach of the contract,'** ° and that strikers in violation of contract are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act."1

**This impacts back to my framework because recognizing the right of the workers to strike goes against established contracts granting employers the ability to restrict the ability of workers to strike.**