## 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with highlighting on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – they didn’t disclose for a round in Apple Valley and a round in Badgerland ss in the doc prove

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated

#### This is what a good wiki looks like 😊

A screenshot of a computer

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#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs who can’t bypass paywalled articles.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### [1] DTD on 1ac theory and disclosure – a) disclosure cannot be drop the argument because it would just drop you because you’re the norm b) deterrence

#### [2] Reject all responses to disclosure – they selectively comply with our norm because they disclose some docs that meet our criteria which proves we can’t verify what norms they actually agree with.

#### [3] No RVI on ac theory – otherwise the neg would dump for 7 mins on a shell and moot the possibility of a 1ar out – any reason why they get an rvi is nonunique because you would have to respond to 6 minutes of the 1AC regardless of if its theory or a contention

#### [4] CI – 1] reasonability is arbitrary – impossible to know what is reasonable until you establish a brightline 2] bites judge intervention cuz they have to gut check what they think is good 3] reasonability collapses cuz u use offense defense to evaluate offense under the BL 4] norms – you can sidestep norms by selectively choosing a different brightline you meet every round.

#### [5] Disclosure outweighs – it’s key to assessing the honesty of the form of your argumentation and how you presented arguments which means it precludes 1nc claims.

#### [6] Fairness is a voter because debate is a game governed by rules and you can’t tell who actually won if the layer was skewed.

## 2

#### Interpretation: Debaters must provide sources for all evidence cited in the speech that the evidence was read

#### Violation: first card under offense “<https://www.ueunion.org/ue-policy/restore-the-right-to-strike>” not only takes you to another link but you cannot find the evidence anywhere on the page

-try putting the link into google, it forwards you to “<https://www.ueunion.org/ue-policy/labor-law-reform>” not restore the right to strike

-try cntrl f any of the sentences in the card its not on the website

#### 1] Evidence ethics- It’s impossible to verify in-round whether or not their evidence was fabricated because there’s no direct link to their evidence. We don’t know what page the highlighted section is on or how we can even get to their evidence otherwise – that’s a voter since it is an academic d-rule to not cheat which outweighs because of sequencing – it questions my ability to engage with their arguments

#### 2] Inclusion- Them not providing direct links to sources crowds out small school debaters since not providing sci-hub or pdf links that get you access to pay-walled articles put them at a disadvantage from the very beginning

## 3

#### Permissibility and presumption negate – [a] the resolution indicates the aff has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation [b] Statements are more often false than true because any part can be false. This means you negate if there is no offense because the resolution is probably false.

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being. Prefer it:

#### [1] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework-threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework.

#### [2] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### [3] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. Any standard is an interpretation of the words of the resolution-thus framework is functionally a topicality argument about how to define the terms of the resolution. My framework interprets ought as maximizing happiness. Prefer this definition:

#### [A] Ground: Both debaters are guaranteed access to ground to engage under util – ie Aff gets plans and advantages, while Neg gets disads and counterplans. Additionally, anything can function as a util impact as long as an external benefit is articulated, so all your offense applies. Other frameworks deny 1 side the ability to engage the other on both the impact and link level.

#### [4] Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 5] Reject calc indicts:

#### A] Empirically denied—both individuals and policymakers carry out effective cost-benefit analysis which means even if decisions aren’t always perfect it’s still better than not acting at all

#### B] Theory—they’re functionally NIBs that everyone knows are silly but skew the aff and move the debate away from the topic and actual philosophical debate, killing valuable education

## 4

**Counterplan text: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike, except doctors.**

**Strikes by doctors harm patients and are counter productive to the goal of the strike.**

Sarah **Boseley** "Senior Colleagues Condemn Junior Doctors' Plan For Five-Day Strikes". *The Guardian*, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/01/junior-doctors-row-medical-profession-split-latest-strikes?CMP=gu\_com. Accessed 13 Nov 2021.

**Senior doctors have voiced strong opposition to** [**the series of five-day** strikes planned by their junior colleagues](https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/01/patients-association-national-voices-condemn-planned-five-day-junior-doctors-strike)**,** warning that **the action will cause real problems for patients, the service and the profession.**

In a surprise statement on Thursday evening, the Academy of Medical Royal Colleges – which brings together doctors’ professional bodies – distanced itself from the doctors’ union, the British Medical Association, which has called the strike. The academy was “disappointed at the prospect of further sustained industrial action by junior doctors”, it said in a statement after several agonised hours of deliberation.

“We are acutely aware that the [**NHS**](https://www.theguardian.com/society/nhs) is under extreme pressure at the moment,” it said. **“Patient safety and quality of care must be the priority.** We know there are genuine concerns about the contract and working arrangements but we do not consider the proposed strikes are proportionate.

“Five days of **strike action, particularly at such short notice, will cause real problems for patients,** the service and the profession.”

On Wednesday it was announced that junior doctors will go on strike from 12 to 16 September – the longest period of action yet announced by doctors in their [**protracted dispute over terms and conditions**](https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/01/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-junior-doctors-strike) that the health secretary, Jeremy Hunt, would like to introduce. On Thursday the BMA announced additional dates for proposed walkouts, on 5, 6, 7, 10 and 11 October, 14-18 November and 5-9 December

However the BMA is split over whether to support the five-day strikes called by junior doctors, with many of its senior members considering the action unethical and fearful that patients will be harmed.

At a special meeting of the ruling council of the BMA on Wednesday some experts argued that the action was unethical because of the risk to patient safety, the Guardian has learned.

Such was the importance of the meeting that some council members changed their holiday plans to be there. Following a highly charged discussion, the BMA council voted by 16 to 12 to support the junior doctors’ industrial action.

The opposition of senior doctors raises questions over whether the industrial action can go ahead as planned. The opposition of the royal colleges may persuade some junior doctors not to take part and they may also lose the support of some senior doctors who were expected to cover for them during the strikes.

**The Patients Association’s** chief executive, Katherine Murphy, said the **organisation was “gravely troubled” at the “catastrophic impact this will have on so many patients and their families”** as winter approaches. “Many patients may be very unwell or vulnerable and so **we cannot predict the distress or pain this will cause to everyone this will affect,”** added Murphy.

Earlier in the day Hunt said in a series of broadcast interviews that [**junior doctors would be inflicting “the worst doctors’ strike in NHS history”**](https://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/sep/01/jeremy-hunt-five-day-doctors-strike-worst-in-nhs-history). The minister told Sky News: “Patients will be asking why it is that the BMA, who only in May said ‘this deal is a good deal for doctors, a good deal for patients, it’s good for the NHS, it’s good for equality’ are now saying it is such a bad deal that they want to inflict the worst doctors’ strike in [**NHS**](https://www.theguardian.com/society/nhs) history.”

Theresa May, accused the BMA of playing politics, reiterating her confidence in Hunt during a visit to the Jaguar Land Rover assembly plant in Solihull.

“Jeremy has been an excellent health secretary, he is an excellent health secretary and this deal is about a deal that is safe for patients and I think it’s crucial if you look at what we’re doing as a government with the NHS,” the prime minister said. “We’ve got record levels of funding into the NHS, we’ve got more doctors now in the NHS than we’ve seen in its history and this is a deal that is safe for patients.

“The government is putting patients first, the BMA should be putting patients first – not playing politics.”

Most senior doctors condemn Hunt for his continuing threat to impose a contract on them that they say does not recompense them for Saturday shifts and will jeopardise patient safety, because of the excessive hours they will be asked to work.

Earlier in the day, the president of the Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh, which has members across the UK, called on the government to negotiate but made it plain he opposed the strikes. “The safety of our patients and the wider NHS workforce remains paramount and this long-running dispute benefits no one,” said Prof Derek Bell.

“We are concerned that the **industrial action** proposed **will have a significant impact for patients and all healthcare professionals** in the NHS. The timing of the proposed industrial action – so soon after the August changeover with many junior doctors new in post and heading towards the winter months – and the sustained nature of the action will heap pressure on a health system that is already struggling to deal with existing pressures and rota gaps. The proposed notice will also make it extremely difficult for hospitals to arrange cover. We hope that this action can be avoided.”

-weighs under hegel