### 16

#### Interp: The affirmative must be topical – specifically they must defend the desirability of a policy where space appropriation is unjust.

#### “Resolved:” refers to a legislative debate.

Louisiana State Legislature 16, “Glossary of Legislative Terms,” http://www.legis.state.la.us/glossary2.htm

Resolution: A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. (Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11, 13.1, 6.8, and 7.4 and Senate Rules 10.9, 13.5 and 15.1)

#### Private company is defined as

Chen, 21, Learn about Private Companies, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/privatecompany.asp, Investopedia,

A private company is a firm held under private ownership. Private companies may issue stock and have shareholders, but their shares do not trade on public exchanges and are not issued through an [initial public offering](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/ipo.asp) (IPO). As a result, private firms do not need to meet the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) strict filing requirements for [public companies](https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/publiccompany.asp). In general, the shares of these businesses are less liquid, and their [valuations](https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/how-to-value-shares-in-private-company.asp) are more difficult to determine.

#### Meriam webster defines outer space

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/outer%20space>

: space immediately outside the earth's atmosphere broadly : interplanetary or interstellar space

#### Violaton: -----

#### First, Method Failure:

#### [A] The 1AC’s performance is hollow—hope that a forum structured not to create change can affect institutions invests hope in the oppressive other.

Lundberg 12 [Christian Lundberg (Associate Professor of Rhetoric at the UNC Department of Communication, Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, Ph.D.). “Lacan In Public” The University of Alabama Press, 2012. Pp. 175-177, I have a copy on my computer but there’s no openly available URL – feel free to email me if you want it!!! Note: I do not endorse the ableist language that is not included in the highlighted portion.//WWDH]

The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. “Danger” functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors’ imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand’s rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus’s interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state’s love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject’s marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation. First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state’s actions. Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the “politics of policy and public debate.”45 Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of “theory” and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state’s refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal “no.” Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition. These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds. Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: “demand in itself . . . is demand of a presence or of an absence . . . pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the ‘privilege’ of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied.”

#### [B] Your use of educational spaces as a sites of empowerment places the judge into the role of the authoritarian adjudicator who molds students in accordance to a particular political end. This kills any conception of critical citizenship and turns their performance.

**Rickert 1** Rickert, Thomas. ""Hands Up, You're Free": Composition in a Post-Oedipal World." JacOnline Journal

**“An example of the connection between violence and pedagogy is implicit in the notion of being "schooled" as it has been conceptualized by Giroux** and Peter Mclaren. They explain, "Fundamental to the principles that inform critical pedagogy is **the conviction that schooling for self- and social empowerment is ethically prior** to questions of epistemology or to a mastery of technical or social skills that are primarily tied to the logic of the marketplace" (153-54). A **presumption here is** that **it is the teacher who knows (best), and this orientation gives the concept of schooling a particular bite:** though it presents itself as oppositional to the state and the dominant forms of pedagogy that serve the state and its capitalist interests, **it nevertheless reinscribes an authoritarian model that is congruent with any number of oedipalizing pedagogies that "school" the student in proper behavior.** As Diane Davis notes, radical, feminist, and liberatory **pedagogies "often camouflage pedagogical violence in their move from one mode of 'normalization' to another**" and "function within a disciplinary matrix of power, a covert carceral system, that aims to create useful subjects for particular political agendas" (212).

#### [C] Detailed research over specific points of difference is necessary for activism.

**Iverson 9** [Joel; 2009; Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Montana, Ph.D in Communication from Arizona State University Relations at the University of Sydney; Debate Central, “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy,” https://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html; GR]

Mitchell (1998) provides a thorough examination of the pedagogical implication for academic debate. Although Mitchell acknowledges that debate provides preparation for participation in democracy, limiting debate to a laboratory where students practice their skill for future participation is criticized. Mitchell contends:

For students and teachers of argumentation, the heightened salience of this question should signal the danger that critical thinking and oral advocacy skills alone may not be sufficient for citizens to assert their voices in public deliberation. (p. 45)

Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "argumentative agency [which] involves the capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that debate can be an even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research. In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the research conducted for competition is a major catalyst to propel their action, change their opinions, and to provide a greater depth of understanding of the issues involved.

The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p. 55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions and energized to take action. Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world.

Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go beyond their front doors. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large.

Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate makes us good public advocates. The public sphere is the arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler and Pelias 1983, Nobles 19850 and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on students as they prepare to enter the public sphere.

The debaters who take active roles such as protesting sanctions were probably not actively engaged in the issue until their research drew them into the topic. Furthermore, the process of intense research for debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create, reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was developed. In this manner, exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence, hearing it as the opponent in a debate round (or as judge) acts as an initial spark of awareness on an issue. This process of discovery seems to have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report.

Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so. Even if students are not compelled to take direct action, research still changes opinions and attitudes.

Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year the college policy debate topic was,

Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea.

This topic spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in support ofvarious movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.

In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs.

The examples of debate and research impacting the opinions and actions of debaters indicate the strong potential for a direct relationship between debate research and personal advocacy. However, the debate community has not created a new sea of activists immersing this planet in waves of protest and political action. The level of influence debater search has on people needs further exploration. Also, the process of research needs to be more fully explored in order to understand if and why researching for the competitive activity of debate generates more interest than research for other purposes such as classroom projects.

Since parliamentary debate does not involve research into a single topic, it can provide an important reference point for examining the impact of research in other forms of debate. Based upon limited conversations with competitors and coaches as well as some direct coaching and judging experience in parliamentary debate, parliamentary forms of debate has not seen an increase in activism on the part of debaters in the United States. Although some coaches require research in order to find examples and to stay updated on current events, the basic principle of this research is to have a commonsense level of understanding(Venette, 1998). As the NPDA website explains, "the reader is encouraged to be well-read in current events, as well as history, philosophy, etc. Remember: the realm of knowledge is that of a 'well-read college student'" (NPDA Homepage,<http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/faq2.html>). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team.

Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues

#### [D] Affective politics fail to spill up or influence politics

Schrimshaw 12 [Will Schrimshaw, Ph.D. in Philosophy and Architecture at Newcastle University, is an artist and researcher from Wakefield based in Liverpool. January 28th, 2012, "Affective Politics and Exteriority"willschrimshaw.net/subtractions/affective-politics-and-exteriority/#]

The affective turn in recent politics thereby becomes auto-affective and in remaining bound to an individual’s feelings and emotions undermines the possibility of its breaking out into collective action and mobilisation. Yet, referring back to Fisher’s article, it is where this affective orientation is inscribed into the social circuits of musical use and sonorous production that it perhaps begins to break out of the ideology of individualism through tapping into a transpersonal or `machinic’ dimension of affective signals that never find a voice yet remain expressive and hopefully inch towards efficacy. What is important to express here is that **much of this affective content is inscribed in the use of music as much as its composition**. As little of the Grime and Dancehall that Fisher and Dan Hancox catalogued towards a playlist of the riots and uprisings expresses in explicitly linguistic and lyrical content the sentiments of political activism, it is in the use of music and sound as a carrier of affects at the point of both playback and composition that its importance lies.2 Where music is deployed as a more affective than symbolic force in resistance, its significance becomes obscure and ambiguous from the perspective and expectations of symbolic coherence. This noted lack of coherence and communicable message marks, as Fisher points out, a certain exhaustion of recognised channels of musical resistance: the protest song seems worn out, lacklustre, its own disempowerment, apparent obsolescence and displacement in pop culture a symptom compounding the apathy and estrangement that has characterised much of the still fairly recent discourse on youth and `political engagement’.

#### Second is limits – aff gets to choose anything they want, which justifies infinite variations of affirmatives that are impossible to prep against. Key to fairness since predictability is needed to make viable responses.

#### In round competitive equity first:

#### [1] Evaluation – their arguments only seem true because they have an advantage – equity is a meta constraint on your ability to determine who’s better under the aff method, if one debater had 10 minutes to speak and the other had 1 it alters the ability to judge the affs truth value so they don’t get to weigh their aff and presume their arguments false since we couldn’t engage with it to start

#### [2] Ballot proximity – the ballot can’t solve their offense since the arguments we read have no effect on our subjectivity, but the judge can determine the direction of equitable practices so a risk our interp is good means you negate

#### [3] exclusion’s inevitable since you can exclude my offense with your ROB so I shouldn’t be punished for excluding the way your advocacy’s presented -

#### [4] Quality of discussion – A] Debate’s unique value is that it forces contestation of issues and clash which controls the internal link to critical education – but this is impossible if I don’t even know what to prepare for which turns the tangible benefit of their method, so even if the scholarship they bring is good there’s no point if I couldn’t engage

#### [5] Switch Side Debate – read your stuff on the neg which non-uniques your offense and is net better since a Kritik on the neg has to be tailored to the aff– otherwise your discussion starts and ends at the 1AC.

#### [6] Fairness outweighs- It’s a meta-constraint, every argument they make presumes the validity of fairness since they expect them to evaluated

#### TVA solves:

#### 1] discuss how private entities in outer space have a negative impact on the disabled body, historic ties of eugenics to space + exploration, etc.

#### Drop the debater. A] deters future abuse B] the round is already skewed so this is the only way to rectify it – also means neg theory first – I’m only reacting to your strategy C] Drop the arg is severance since you jump ship from your advocacy which perpetuates abuse since it allows you to restart the round.

#### Competing interps: A] Competing interps leads to a race to the top to set the best possible norms B] Collapses- reasonability collapses to competing interps since it becomes a battle between two competing Brightlines

#### No RVIs: 1. Illogical- being topical doesn’t mean you should win, it’s just a burden. 2. Baiting- debaters will just bait theory and prep it out leading to maximally abusive practices. No impact turns- it’s a perfcon since if T is bad and the judge votes on impact turns, they are voting on T

## Academy 1NC

#### Link---- extemp

#### Vote negative to refuse the affirmative’s project solely within debate and embrace it everywhere else– storytelling within the academy dooms decolonial movements

Tuck & Yang 14 (Eve; K. Wayne “R-Words: Refusing Research” pp. 232-235) NIJ

Like the previous axiom’s question—Why collect narratives of pain?—we ask nonrhetorically, what knowledges does the academy deserve? Beyond narratives of pain, there may be language, experiences, and wisdoms better left alone by social science. Paula Gunn Allen (1998) notes that for many Indigenous peoples, “a person is expected to know no more than is necessary, sufficient and congruent with their spiritual and social place” (p. 56). To apply this idea to the production of social science research, we might think of this as a differentiation between what is made public and what is kept sacred. Not everything, or even most things, uncovered in a research process need to be reported in academic journals or settings. Contrasting Indigenous relationships to knowledge with settler relationships to knowledge, Gunn Allen remarks, In the white world, information is to be saved and analyzed at all costs. It is not seen as residing in the minds and molecules of human beings, but as—dare I say it?— transcendent. Civilization and its attendant virtues of freedom and primacy depend on the accessibility of millions of megabytes of data; no matter that the data has lost its meaning by virtue of loss of its human context . . . the white world has a different set of values [from the Indigenous world], one which requires learning all and telling all in the interests of knowledge, objectivity, and freedom. This ethos and its obverse—a nearly neurotic distress in the presence of secrets and mystery—underlie much of modern American culture (p. 59) As social science researchers, there are stories that are entrusted to us, stories that are told to us because research is a human activity, and we make meaningful relationships with participants in our work. At times we come to individuals and communities with promises of proper procedure and confidentiality-anonymity in hand, and are told, “Oh, we’re not worried about that; we trust you!” Or, “You don’t need to tell us all that; we know you will do the right thing by us.” Doing social science research is intimate work, worked that is strained by a tension between informants’ expectations that something useful or helpful will come from the divulging of (deep) secrets, and the academy’s voracious hunger for the secrets. This is not just a question of getting permission to tell a story through a signature on an IRB-approved participant consent form. Permission is an individualizing discourse—it situates collective wisdom as individual property to be signed away. Tissue samples, blood draws, and cheek swabs are not only our own; the DNA contained in them is shared by our relatives, our ancestors, our future generations (most evident when blood samples are misused as bounty for biopiracy.) This is equally true of stories. Furthermore, power is protected by such a collapse of ethics into litigation-proof relationships between individual and research institution. Power, which deserves the most careful scrutiny, will never sign such a permission slip.3 There are also stories that we overhear, because when our research is going well, we are really in peoples’ lives. Though it is tempting, and though it would be easy to do so, these stories are not simply y/ours to take. In our work, we come across stories, vignettes, moments, turns of phrase, pauses, that would humiliate participants to share, or are too sensationalist to publish. Novice researchers in doctoral and master’s programs are often encouraged to do research on what or who is most available to them. People who are underrepresented in the academy by social location—race or ethnicity, indigeneity, class, gender, sexuality, or ability—frequently experience a pressure to become the n/ Native informant, and might begin to suspect that some members of the academy perceive them as a route of easy access to communities that have so far largely eluded researchers. Doctoral programs, dissertations, and the master’s thesis process tacitly encourage novice researchers to reach for low-hanging fruit. These are stories and data that require little effort—and what we know from years and years of academic colonialism is that it is easy to do research on people in pain. That kind of voyeurism practically writes itself. “Just get the dissertation or thesis finished,” novice researchers are told. The theorem of lowhanging fruit stands for pretenured faculty too: “Just publish, just produce; research in the way you want to after tenure, later.” This is how the academy reproduces its own irrepressible irresponsibility. Adding to the complexity, many of us also bring to our work in the academy our family and community legacies of having been researched. As the researched, we carry stories from grandmothers’ laps and breaths, from below deck, from on the run, from inside closets, from exclaves. We carry the proof of oppression on our backs, under our fingernails; and we carry the proof of our survivance (Vizenor, 2008) in our photo boxes, our calluses, our wombs, our dreams. These stories, too, are not always ours to give away, though they are sometimes the very us of us. It needs to be said that we are not arguing for silence. Stories are meant to be passed along appropriately, especially among loved ones, but not all of them as social science research. Although such knowledge is often a source of wisdom that informs the perspectives in our writing, we do not intend to share them as social science research. It is enough that we know them. Kahnawake scholar Audra Simpson asks the following questions of her own ethnographic work with members of her nation: “Can I do this and still come home; what am I revealing here and why? Where will this get us? Who benefits from this and why?” (2007, p. 78). These questions force researchers to contend with the strategies of producing legitimated knowledge based on the colonization of knowledge. Indigenous and non-Indigenous scholars of Native education have queried the dangers of appropriation of Native knowledge by mainstream research and pedagogical institutions (e.g., Castagno & Brayboy, 2008; Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006; Richardson, 2011). Lomawaima and McCarty (2006) describe the “safety zone” as ways in which Indigenous knowledges are included into even overtly antiIndian spaces such as boarding schools designed to assimilate Native children. Indigenous knowledge is made harmless to settler colonial pedagogies by relegating it to the safety zone of the margins. Troy Richardson extends this analysis by discussing “inclusion as enclosure” (2011, p.332), the encircling of Native education as part of a well-intentioned multiculturalist agenda. Such gestures, he contends, reduce the Indigenous curriculum to a supplement to a standard curriculum. Moreover, some narratives die a little when contained within the metanarrative of social science. Richardson (2011) theorizes Gerald Vizenor’s concept of trickster knowledge and the play of shadows to articulate a “shadow curriculum” that exceeds the material objects of reference—where much meaning is made in silence surrounding the words, where memories are not simply reflections of a referent experience but dynamic in themselves. “The shadow is the silence that inherits the words; shadows are the motions that mean the silence” (Vizenor, 1993, p.7). Extending Richardson’s analysis of Vizenor’s work, beneath the intent gaze of the social scientific lens, shadow stories lose their silences, their play of meaning. The stories extracted from the shadows by social science research frequently become relics of cultural anthropological descriptions of “tradition” and difference from occidental cultures. Vizenor observes these to be the “denials of tribal wisdom in the literature of dominance, and the morass of social science theories” (Vizenor, 1993, p. 8). Said another way, the academy as an apparatus of settler colonial knowledge already domesticates, denies, and dominates other forms of knowledge. It too refuses. It sets limits, but disguises itself as limitless. Frederic Jameson (1981) writes, “[H]istory is what hurts. It is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis” (p. 102). For Jameson, history is a master narrative of inevitability, the logic of teleos and totality: All events are interconnected and all lead toward the same horizon of progress. The relentlessness of the master narrative is what hurts people who find themselves on the outside or the underside of that narrative. History as master narrative appropriates the voices, stories, and histories of all Others, thus limiting their representational possibilities, their expression as epistemological paradigms in themselves. Academic knowledge is particular and privileged, yet disguises itself as universal and common; it is settler colonial; it already refuses desire; it sets limits to potentially dangerous Other knowledges; it does so through erasure, but importantly also through inclusion, and its own imperceptibility.

#### Embracing rhizomatic thought in the academy to disrupt identity categories allows settlers to erase indigenous experience and attempt to ‘become indigenous’

Julie **Wuthnow, 02** (Julie Wuthnow [University Of Canterbury, New Zealand], Deleuze in the postcolonial: On nomads and indigenous politics, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1177/1464700102003002344, 8-1-2002)//iLake-💣🍔

Questions of ‘voice’ and ‘experience’ are important in this context as well. Patton does not include indigenous voices within his writings, and it is difficult to imagine how those voices might function for him. I am **not suggesting here that Patton should simply add ‘authentic’ indigenous voices or an indigenous ‘presence’** to his own voice in order to remedy a perceived imbalance in representation; I will go on to explore at some length why this approach is neither justifiable nor desirable. Nonetheless, his inattention to the absence of any form of indigenous self-representation is what concerns me here. There is no invitation within Patton’s work to investigate what might constitute important issues for indigenous peoples or to debate which approaches to those concerns might best suit their needs. While indigenous peoples might engage with Patton as theoretical interlocutors in the same manner as any other theorists,9 there is no discursive space within Patton’s work for the experiences of indigenous peoples to inform or ground his project. Indeed, within a Deleuzian framework, it would be difficult to see how he could include such voices or experiences. If nomad thought ‘does not ally itself with a universal thinking subject but, on the contrary, with a singular race. . . . A tribe in the desert instead of a universal subject within the horizon of all-encompassing Being’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 379), and if ‘the self is only a threshold, a door, a 192 Feminist Theory 3(2) 04 wuthnow (jk/d) 19/6/02 3:30 pm Page 192 becoming between two multiplicities’ (1987: 249), **where could one locate a coherent subject empowered to speak at all**? Within Deleuzian understandings, such a self could only be part of a binary apparatus of the state, a defender of logos and identity, and thereby a destroyer of difference and multiplicity. Thus, within this framework, claims to authentic experience on the part of the **self-identical subject,** either on her own behalf or as a representative of a larger group, become **politically suspect** rather than useful testimony to an individual’s or group’s legitimate concerns. There is much to be said for this form of analysis. Critiques of essentialized identities and authenticity in relation to western models of subjectivity raise a number of important and highly political questions, for instance, who is the arbiter of what counts as authentic? What kind of violence must be done to difference in order to construct a stable identity for the authentic subject, whether within the context of a collectivity or within the individual subject herself? Yet, must statements of experience authorized by such models of subjectivity be banished from our political vocabulary entirely? What is lost by adhering to such a comprehensive deconstruction of the coherent subject? Alexander and Mohanty raise an important point by explaining how **deconstructing the categories** that define the subject **does not** automatically **dispel their significance** within the context of lived experience. Postmodernist discourse attempts to move beyond essentialism by **pluralizing and dissolving the stability** and analytic utility of the categories of race, class, gender, and sexuality. This strategy often forecloses any valid recuperation of these categories or the social relations through which they are constituted. If we dissolve the category of race, for instance, it becomes difficult to claim the experience of racism. (Alexander and Mohanty, 1997: xvii) In other words, poststructuralist deconstruction of modernist notions of identity, as proposed by models such as nomad thought, does not necessarily release the marginalized from what they perceive as their experiences of oppression. Indeed, this imperative, when taken as a central analytical and political gesture, serves to enact the disappearing act that I alluded to at the beginning of this article: the experience of oppression within contexts that could be defined as ‘local’ simply cannot be spoken. Given that Deleuzian influenced theory adheres to just such an imperative, the following comments from Smith are well taken and could easily be applied to Patton’s postcolonial deployment of Deleuze: ‘the field of “post-colonial” discourse has been defined in ways which can still leave out indigenous peoples, our ways of knowing and our current concerns’ (1999: 24). To follow on from Smith’s comment, how might poststructuralist, feminist or postcolonial discourses be defined differently in order to enhance rather than disappear indigenous ‘ways of knowing and . . . current concerns’? How might models of subjectivity or identity be constructed in ways that do not reproduce the colonizing gestures of nomad thought or nomadic subjectivity?

## Case Overview

#### Negate

#### (1) they generate cruel optimism since it creates a feel good solution that places disability in a not yet but maybe to come social order

#### 2] Reform may not be perfect, but they improve the material conditions of disabled life – 1AR spin that ableist violence is evolving is a neg argument since disabled relation to the world has changed. THIS is OFFENSE against the Aff would say no to policies to decrease workplace violence, allow voting rights and increases employment for disabled folk.

#### 3] The disability drive is NOT logical, think of it’s application in debate if the OVERALL psyche claim was true then how do they get non-disabled ballots.

#### 3] Disability can’t be ontological, and progress is possible

#### 4] It’s not static – conceptions of disability aren’t concrete but fluid over time – ex. ADHD wasn’t diagnosed as disability until more recent medicine, and there’s no clear brightline or definition of disability & the disabled child may take on the perception of being the enhanced child in different spaces

#### 5] Disability not ontological – only reform can resolve societal prejudices against disabled people.

Hudak ’11 (GLENN M., PhD, is a professor at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro. “On the Commerce of Disability and the Advocacy of Philosophy for Educators.” PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 2011. Robert Kunzman, editor © 2011 Philosophy of Education Society  Urbana, Illinois.)-JJN

In his essay on the equality of difference, Michael Surbaugh asks us to consider what philosophy of education can offer special education, particularly an education revolving around “someone with severe cognitive deficits.” In an effort to accomplish this task and make his discussion more concrete, he constructs a “composite case study:” “Sarah.” Sarah is a “disabled” young female living in a group home. The rub: “Sarah has no voice, even as many social institutions have arisen to protect her rights and confer entitlements on her because of her disability. In the eyes of many, she is taken care of, and that is the end of the issue.” For Surbaugh, this is not the end of the issue. Drawing from John Dewey, Surbaugh claims, “all live creatures share a similar educational ‘task’ and ‘purpose,’ in asserting themselves in the context of their environment, weaving complex relations and richer forms of experience” (original emphasis). From Hannah Arendt he claims that, regardless of one’s abilities or disabilities, all children are “newcomers to the world, with unforeseen possibilities for the relationships they enter into and sustain.” Taken together, he wants us to grasp the “phenomenological” moment: “Sarah is a live creature.” As a live creature, she is endowed with task and purpose in the world; her relationships to the world are open rather than closed and, like a “newborn” — open to new unforeseen possibilities. The foreclosures to possible actions for Sarah, then, are not ontological in nature; rather, they are the result of societal prejudices and misunderstandings that close off Sarah’s possibilities, limiting her potential, curtailing who she is. While Surbaugh rightly advocates for Sarah — advocates that caregivers realize her humanity and respond accordingly — if we are to grasp the societal prejudices that foreclose Sarah’s possible actions then, the educative experience of the caregiver needs to be included and developed. Why? Because if we take the pragmatist perspective that Sarah’s actions and intentions can never be fully understood in isolation — as Sarah is never out of contact with her world, nor out of relation with the caregivers — then, as Surbaugh argues, Sarah’s education “should encourage her commerce with the world that envelops her, developing her understanding of her own causal impact on it and in it.” That is, Sarah’s education requires that she come to some “understanding of her causal impact” on others, and perhaps by extension the role she plays in determining the outcome of the situation at hand. Further, if there is to be an educative experience for Sarah, then, “for Dewey,” as Alison Kadlec points out, “experience is not a matter of knowing, rather it is a matter of doing in which we undergo, endure, and suffer the consequences of our actions.”1 Sarah’s experience is not a private matter; rather it is constituted within her interactions with the world. At minimum, if Sarah’s experiences are to be educative, Sarah will need to work through the consequences of her actions with the hope that through this process she will develop skills and habits to adapt, cope, and thereby restructure her relationship to the caregivers.

#### C] Disability isn’t ontological – social context determines disability discrimination.

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V. Disabilities in Social Context Proponents of a social model seem to support the idea that disability is a product of wrong interpretation of impairments (Reindal, 1995) related to disabling social structures. Our question is very simple: Assuming that we have an ideal, perfect, caring society, will disabilities no longer exist? If we followed the arguments of the social model, in an ideal society we would have only impairments but not disabilities! Unfortunately, we do not think that it would be possible to eradicate disabilities by changing only the sociopolitical context. Why? Because the dichotomy between impairment and disability is methodological; it is not ontological. The names we give to physical or mental conditions do not create disabilities or turn disabilities into abilities (Kauffman et al., 2008; Kauffman, 2011). Of course, names have their importance, because they circulate in a social context and turn back on the named people. Also, a much better social context can substantially improve the quality of life of people with disabilities, and this is not a trivial matter. But whatever names we use in our societies, the most profound restrictions related to intrinsic factors will remain for the vast majority of people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the discussion about social context is an important issue. Disabilities should be viewed as embedded in their social context in many different ways. First, a certain disability is conceptualized within a specific social context and characterized by a discrepancy between the individual’s performance and the expectations or demands of the social group to which the person belongs. This brings social values into the appreciation of disabilities. Any conceptualization of disability, whether physical or mental, is inevitably value-laden. Disabilities naturally arouse children’s curiosity, but social perceptions can change. The recognition of disabilities can take different directions according to social values. Zola, an American sociologist, has eloquently described it: “Children spontaneously express an interest in wheelchairs and leg braces, but as they grow older they are taught that . . . it’s not nice to ask [about] such things” (1982, 200). Values and attitudes exert profound influence on the way nondisabled people perceive others with disabilities, as Zola stated: When the “able-bodied” confront the “disabled,” they often think with a shudder, “I’m glad it’s not me” . . . The threat to be dispelled is the inevitability of one’s own failure. The discomfort that many feel in the presence of the aged, the suffering, and the dying is the reality that it could just as well be them. (1982, 202) Second, social decisions about the border between disability and normality are difficult because of the statistical phenomena involved. In many cases, the border is both vague and rather arbitrary (Kauffman and Hallahan, 2005; Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011; Kauffman and Lloyd, 2011 ). Defining the qualitative differences we call disabilities by making binary decisions (yes or no, has or does not have) requires making judgments about people, even though the quantitative data are continuous statistical distributions. The identification of a disability depends on judgment, and judgment means that one arrives at a cutpoint on continuously distributed abilities. Inevitably social values are linked to the judgmental identification of disabilities. However, not making such a judgment precludes the kind of assistance we consider necessary for social justice (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2011). Third, although categorizing and labeling have become major issues in disability and special education debates, the debate is often misguided. Kauffman (2002, 2011) and Kauffman et al. (2008) have argued analytically for the inevitability of labeling, given that we really want to offer special services and benefits to specific individuals. We simply cannot offer extra or better services to individuals without speaking about difference or special needs, and this is as true for disabilities as it is for economic assistance or any social program. For this reason, an individual-based perspective is necessary for identifying people with special needs for certain services (Reindal, 1995). Without a definition based on individual criteria of disability, the rights of people with disabilities cannot be fully guaranteed (see Kauffman and Landrum, 2009). Even in Norway, a country with an extended safety net of social welfare services, the identification of benefits to be received is based on judgment of individual need (Reindal, 1995). Antilabelists imagine services without labels. But even in an ideal communitarian society with enough resources, we cannot offer excellent services according to the old socialistic principle “from each according to his/her ability, to each according to his/her needs” without any need identification process. Perhaps the process is more obvious in an antagonistic society with a plurality of interests and unequal distribution of power, status, and wealth. Those who want to avoid all labels commit a great mistake in confusing the relationship between education and social change. Public education, by its nature, is a rather conservative institution that reflects the mainstream values of society and represents an adopted social agenda. It is a trailer and not a leader in political, economic, and social change. Historically great social changes precede important educational changes. Imagining the opposite relationship and neglecting today’s predominant sociopolitical forces is a political fallacy. The danger is that without labels the needs of individuals with disabilities will be ignored (see Kauffman, 2011). Surely labeling is not trivial, because labels are used to describe human beings as well as things. Labels often carry unintended stigma to receivers of services. And in many cases, the experiences of being disabled are socially constructed, mirroring the thoughts, feelings, and values of the social milieu. Indeed, the institutional response to disabilities is difficult. The “dilemma of difference” has been underlined in special education’s literature. If we emphasize existing differences (including disabilities), then we are in danger of unjustified discrimination; if we ignore the existence of disabilities or pretend that they do not exist, then we are in danger of leaving critical humans’ needs untreated (Hallahan and Kauffman, 1994; Kauffman and Badar, forthcoming). Fourth, disabilities are defined in a specific sociopolitical context and a system of social relations. Many dimensions of disabilities are part of the social process by which the social meanings of disability are negotiated (Zola, 1989). Public policy has a great impact on the lives of people with disabilities, and the formulation of disability strategy in education and public arena is of huge importance (Anastasiou and Kauffman, 2010, 2011). In summary, disabilities are sealed within their social context. And many concepts about disabilities, whether involving low-incidence disabilities (e.g., severe intellectual disabilities) or high-incidence disabilities (e.g., mild intellectual disabilities, specific learning disability), have socially constructed aspects. It is not accidental that they have been classified and reclassified, defined and redefined according to the status of scientific knowledge and social values (e.g., Bruno Bettelheim’s theory of “refrigerator mothers” as a cause of autism—that autism was caused by cold, distant, and unconsciously rejecting mothers). Using the reasoning of Hacking (1999), we could make a distinction between the idea of autism (and the surrounding conceptual context) as socially constructed and autistic behaviors, which are real. Social construction does not give us insight into the severely restricted communication and social interaction of children with autism. Recognizing the influence of social context does not mean that there are no other viable ideas about disabilities. Social factors such as biomedical technology and special education can interact with biological factors, codetermining the evolution of disabilities as atypical predicaments. Thus, social and individual explanations of disabilities should be seen not as mutually exclusive but as codeterminants of development of people who have disabilities (Williams, 1999).

#### Reject psychoanalysis –

#### A] Psychoanalysis is not empirical and has no explanatory power --- prefer social science because it can explain events based on causal relationships

Slava Sadovnikov 7, York University, "Escape from Reason: Labels as Arguments and Theories", Dialogue XLVI (2007), 781-796, philpapers.org/archive/SADEFR.pdf

The way McLaughlin shows the rosy prospects of psychoanalytical social theory boils down to this: there are people who labour at it. He reports on Neil Smelser’s lifelong elaborations of psychoanalytical sociology, which prescribed the use of Freudian theories. Then he presents a “powerful” psychoanalytical theory of creativity of Michael Farrell, commenting on how the theorist “usefully utilizes psychoanalytic insights,” though McLaughlin does not specify them. He correctly expects that I might not view his examples as scientiﬁc. Their problems begin well before that. First, due to their informative emptiness, or tautological character, all they amount to is rewordings of everyday assumptions. Second, due to their vagueness these accounts are compatible with any outcomes; in other words, they lack explanatory and predictive power. The proposed ideas are too inarticulate to subject to intersubjective criticism, and to call them empirical or scientiﬁc theories would be, no matter how comforting, a gross misuse of words.¶On the constructive side, a psychoanalytic theorist may be challenged to unambiguously formulate her suppositions and specify conditions of their disproof, to leave out what we already well know and smooth out internal inconsistencies, and revise the theories in view of easily available counter-examples and competing accounts. Only after having done this can one present candidate theories to public criticism and thus make them part of science, and fruitfully discuss their further reﬁnements. Another suggestion is not to label them “powerful theories,” “classics,” or anything else before their real scrutiny begins. ¶That criticism and disagreement are indispensable for science is not a “Popperian orthodoxy,” although Popper does champion this idea; it is the pivot of the tradition (which we owe to the Greeks) which identiﬁes rationalism with criticism. 4 McLaughlin ostensibly bows to the critical tradition but does not put it to use. Instead of critical evaluation of the theories in question he writes of “compelling case,” “powerful analytic model,” and “useful conceptual tool.” ¶On the methodological side of the issue, we should inquire into the mode of thinking common to Fromm and all adherents of conﬁrmation-ism. The trick consists in mere replacement of familiar words with new, more peculiar ones; customary expressions are substituted by “instrumental intimacy,” “collaborative circles,” and “idealization of a self-object.” Since the new, funnier, and pseudo-theoretical tag does the job of naming just as well, it “shows how” things work. The new labels in the cases criticized here do not add anything to our knowledge; nor do they explain. We have seen Fromm routinely abuse this technique. The vacuity of Fromm’s explanations by character type was the central point in my analysis of Escape , yet McLaughlin conveniently ignores it and, like Fromm, uses the method of labelling as somehow supporting his cause. ¶The widely popular practice of mistaking new labels for explanations has been exposed by many methodologists in the history of philosophy, but probably the most famous example of such critique comes from Molière. In the now often-quoted passage, his character delivers a vacuous explanation of opium’s property to induce sleep by renaming the property with an offhand Latinism, “virtus dormitiva.” The satire acutely points not only at the impostor doctor’s hiding his lack of knowledge behind foreign words, but also at the emptiness of his alleged explanation. (Pseudo-theoretical literature is boring precisely because of its “dormitive virtue,” its shufﬂing of labels without rewarding inquiring minds.) ¶Let me review notable criticisms of this approach in the twentieth century by Hempel, Homans, and Weber leaving aside their forerunners. This problem was discussed in the famous debate between William Dray and Carl Hempel. Dray argues, contra the nomological account of explanation, that historians and social scientists often try to answer the question, “What is this phenomenon?” by giving an “explanation-by-concept” (Dray 1959, p. 403). A series of events may be better understood if we call it “a social revolution”; or the appropriate tag may be found in the expressions “reform,” “collaboration,” “class struggle,” “progress,” etc.; or, to take Fromm’s suggestions, we may call familiar motives and actions “sadomasochistic,” and any political choice save the Marxist “escape from freedom.”¶ Hempel agrees with Dray that such concepts may be explanatory, but they are so only if the chosen labels or classiﬁcatory tags refer to some uniformities, or are based on nomic analogies. In other words, our new label has explanatory force if it states or implies some established regularity