### 1

#### Interpretation – the Affirmative must present a delineated enforcement mechanism for the Plan.

#### Partial right to strike exists now – enforcement is the core question of the topic and there's no consensus on normal means so you must spec

Marley S. Weiss [Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law], 2000, “The Right To Strike In Essential Services Under United States Labor Law”, https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2189&context=fac\_pubs

2. Strikes, Lockouts, and Other Lawful Primary Weapons under the NLRA The parties, both labor and management, are under a duty to bargain in good faith with each other, “but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession”. The essential idea here is that both sides must genuinely try to reach mutual agreement. However, this simple concept is extremely difficult to enforce, and employers too often resort to bad faith bargaining, bargaining on the surface with no real intention of concluding an agreement, as part of a strategy to eliminate union representation from the workplace. In addition, the duty to bargain is limited to matters falling within the Section 8(d) statutory phrase, “wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment”, and the right to strike is similarly limited to issues falling within the scope of mandatory bargaining as defined by that phrase. Although the phrase has been broadly construed in many respects, as to certain issues, the contrary has been the case. Capital redeployment, that is, relocation of operations, disinvestment in unionized plants, subcontracting, and plant closure decisions, provide employers with a potent set of weapons against unions. While bargaining over the effects of such decisions is plainly mandatory, the extent to which bargaining is required over the decisions themselves have been hotly contested

#### Violation: they don’t

#### Standards

#### 1] Shiftiness- They can redefine the 1AC’s enforcement mechanism in the 1AR which allows them to recontextualize their enforcement mechanism to wriggle out of DA, NC and K links since all links are predicated on type of enforcement i.e. Cap K, violent strikes NC, contracts NC, – independently lets settlers shift out of discussing their relationality

#### 2] Real World - Policymakers will always specify how the mandates of the plan should be endorsed. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, governments can circumvent the Aff’s movement since there is no delineated way to enforce the affirmative which means there’s no way to actualize any of their solvency arguments – absent spec we can’t take resistance strategies into the real world which leaves people exploited by capitalism out to dry

#### ESpec isn’t regressive or arbitrary- it’s central to any advocacy about strikes since the only uniqueness of a right to strike is how effective its enforcement is – their lack of uniqueness ev on the 1AC proves the need to spec

#### Fairness and education are voters – its how judges evaluate rounds and why schools fund debate

#### DTD – it’s key to norm set and deter future abuse

#### Neg theory is DTD - 1ARs control the direction of the debate because it determines what the 2NR has to go for – DTD allows us some leeway in the round by having some control in the direction

#### Competing interps – Reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation – it also collapses since brightlines operate on an offense-defense paradigm

#### No RVIs – A – Going all in on theory kills substance education which outweighs on timeframe B - Discourages checking real abuse which outweighs on norm-setting C – Encourages theory baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly D – its illogical for you to win for proving you were fair – outweighs since logic is a litmus test for other arguments

### 2

#### Man, or homo-oeconomicus is born from an auto-poesis obscured by the labor focus of the resolution. Instead of relationships to production, we need to focus on the means of signification which causes internalized oppression and unending colonial exploitation.

Demetrius L. **Eudell 16**

Demetrius L. Eudell, 3-1-2016, "From Mode of Production to Mode of Auto-Institution: Sylvia Wynter's Black Metamorphosis of the Labor Question," No Publication, https://read.dukeupress.edu/small-axe/article-abstract/20/1%20(49)/47/33398/From-Mode-of-Production-to-Mode-of-Auto

Yet despite acknowledging the inescapable, indeed interdependent, relation of the issues of slavery and race to those of labor and class formation, Wynter is nonetheless compelled to rethink the earlier assertion made in the monograph, in which she “accepted the theory that the economic tended to determine the ‘superstructure’ ” (430). In the latter part of the text, Wynter calls this analytic framework into question, as, for instance, with the instituting of the stereotyped image of the figure of Sambo. Whereas earlier Wynter describes the Sambo figuration as serving “in the last instance an economic function” (162), it would subsequently be interpreted as a mechanism “far more central to capitalism’s functioning as a mode of domination” and, thereby, “extracting surplus value” became “secondary to its functioning of permitting a mode of domination to be generalized at all levels of the system” (429). Wynter asserts that, **like capital, power can be “accumulated and redistributed, at different relative levels of gratification” (429–30), which implies that even the so-called disempowered exert power as it is asserted against them:** “By being allowed to terrorize the freed slave, the poor whites are induced to accept the relatively milder forms and modalities of social repression exercised by the bourgeois[ie] against them. The slave too used his vicarious identification with the rich masters to look down on the poor whites [511]. As Fanon says, the Negro too wants to be master. **The proletariat wants to be the bourgeoisie, as the middle class black wants to be the white master”** (430; page citation in original but not footnoted). This mode of argumentation, in which it becomes increasingly **challenging to invoke victims and oppressors**, reflects a shift toward a theorization of the psychic dimensions not only of being black but more fundamentally of being human. And the invocation of Frantz Fanon in this context is indeed pointed, since he illustrates in Black Skin, White Masks how the colonized often internalize the negative self-images disseminated by the dominant system of knowledge, a mechanism of mimetic aversion that, Wynter insists, necessarily accompanies the mimetic desire that René Girard has argued defines all human behavior.22  
Wynter ascribes Marxism’s inability to “account for the radically different quality of the black experience even in those areas where the parallels between the condition of the proletariat and the conditions of the Negro were clear” to its reliance on the “factory model of exploitation” as the explanatory key (562). Although Marx himself seemed to have contradicted his earlier formulation that consciousness was produced by the social conditions, this “materialist theory of the mind” would remain central to the theoretical framework on which labor politics and organizing were based (562). By minimizing, when not completely overlooking, the historical precedent of the slave plantation, “the first large scale site of the mass-production of man as interchangeable production units—i.e. pieza, labelled ‘negroes’ ” (564), the factory model of exploitation became “an analysis only of the core form of exploitation” (574; original emphasis in all caps). Thus, **this model of analysis disregards not only the colonial origins of capitalism but also its continued dependency on colonialism.** Indeed, Wynter asserts, **capitalism, when understood as a world system** rather than as “capitalist enclaves and tendencies within European society,” is only “made possible by the sudden acquisition by European countries of a **new frontier which psychologically transformed all Europeans into actual or potential settlers”** (563).

On the basis of the foundational conditions of settler colonialism and slavery in the Americas, Wynter proposes an alternative paradigm to counter the factory mode of explanation, which she terms “the nigger-breaking model.” Characterized as being “the more universal model,” this analytic framework “gives insights into what we can call the ideological niggerbreaking **mechanisms that produce the worker as always eternally proletariat, the woman as eternally female, the black as negro, the white as norm**” (566). Using the archetypal scene of Frederick Douglass’s slave narrative in which the slave driver and overseer Edward Covey has to devastate Douglass’s psyche in order to force him into accepting his subordinate status, Wynter offers a theory of the role of the plantation as site of convergence for the creation of the structure of identities that would institute and reproduce the societies of the Americas: “The secret of capitalism is to be found not in the factory but in the plantation” (582).

In this context, one could revise U. B. Phillips’s assertion that slavery “was less a business than a life” because it made “fewer fortunes than men.” By emphasizing that the plantation was “at once factory, family, and social site on which multilayered levels of identities confronted each other,” Wynter’s analysis suggests that the plantation was indeed a form of life that produced many fortunes (à la Capitalism and Slavery) as well as “men” (591). And, not only men but also women, in both the plantation mistress modality of a Lady Nugent throughout the Americas and that of working-class women of the US North.23 Indeed, in adopting the bourgeois “mode of symbolization” in which the prescribed gender roles entailed “cosy domesticity” for the woman in the private sphere and the male proletariat laboring in the public sphere of the factory, Marxism separated the family from the factory, an ironic move when we consider the role of the young women of the textile factories in Lowell, Massachusetts, the site of the first factory town and a central location of the birth of industrialization in the United States.24 Indeed, several decades before academic discourses of intersectionality became more common, Wynter had already insisted (though still somewhat within terms of political economy) that the “capitalist system can only be seized by and through its interrelationships” where “fixed coefficients of exchange need to be established” (591).

In such a frame, no issue should be singled out of a wider interacting context, since “the autonomization of the unit of analysis be it factory or the plantation, leads to ideology” (591). With the example of the phenomenon of race, Wynter notes that the Black Muslims “found the mechanism to de-nigger break the lumpen-outcasts of the society,” doing so “by constituting them as the new Norm.” Yet, like Garveyism, these “counter systems of symbolization” that delegitimated the hegemony of the dominant order could at the same time produce “the fascist temptation which resides in any system of exclusivity based on a Single Norm, its totalitarian nature which calls for subjection to the hegemonic Cause.” The contradiction, or logical consequence, of this mode of explanation led Malcolm X, in his challenge to the “narrow imprisoning recoding that institutionalized the Black Muslim movement,” to break with the group, just as in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952) the “fictional Narrator would break with the fictional representation of the Communist Party, the Brotherhood, for whom history had replaced manifest destiny; and for whom the destiny of the Symbolic Proletariat had replaced the Great/White and Single Race” (722–23).

Dissecting the intellectual strategy of the “Single Norm” explanatory principle goes to the heart of Wynter’s reconceptualization, her “black metamorphosis” of the labor question. Although the paradigms of Marxism and Cultural Nationalism began to delegitimize the economic and social power of the hegemonic bourgeoisie, by inverting “one, the Economic Norm, the other, the Racial Norm,” instead of “deconstructing the category of the Norm,” these models of analysis “translated the bourgeois law of value” that, in the end, would change only “who was to occupy the place of the norm” (723). Moreover, both these theoretical and political approaches reflected a deterministic understanding of culture, which Wynter asserts “is not a substance which has a fixed nature” (843). Consciousness, she then proposes, “emerges from interrelationships that constitute social life” with culture dialectically existing “as the expression both of these interrelationships and its negation” (562). Such an understanding implies that “the social constructs of Black and White groups” are categories “constituted not so much by their places of origin—Europe/Africa—as by the social interrelation between them” (821). It can therefore be argued that with respect to the question of **labor, class and racial consciousness are “not determined by one’s relationship to the means of production,** but rather [determined] by one’s relative placing in the global structures of production.” Just as Wynter demonstrates, with respect to the pieza classification, **that an underlying ontological structure assigns one’s place in the system, such a structure could be generalized to all subordinated peoples**: “It is the institution of a mode of social relations that marks, inscribes, the groups that are to be exploited by different attributes, attributes which then become the condition of possibility of the varying forms of exploitation” (564). In her seminal study of West Indian slave laws, Elsa Goveia notes that “before slave laws could be made, it was necessary for the opinion to be accepted that persons could be made slaves and held as slaves,” and thereby necessarily calling into question an understanding of the enslavement of peoples from the continent of Africa as having resulted from, in Winthrop Jordan’s somewhat naturalizing terms, “an unthinking decision.”25

Employing what she later defines as a “deciphering practice,” which examines literature in order to reveal “the dynamics of desire at the deep structural level of the order’s symbolic template,” Wynter forges an original analysis of the racial and class dynamics using the idea of inscription as a conceptual framework.26 Once again rethinking some earlier assertions in the manuscript, Wynter redefines the plantation system by noting that in Douglass’s example “nigger-breaking is not an exercise undertaken only for an economic purpose” (589) but as well “to get him to accept his prescribed ego-identity, and therefore getting him, freely, to stay in his place.” This equally compelling motivation leads Wynter to conclude, “Nigger-breaking reveals itself as an initiation rite in which the task of social inscription was at least as important as the task of economic extraction” (590).

Thus, the forced labor of the enslaved served in brutal terms not only to subordinate the population group physically and metaphysically but, in so doing, to produce, verify, and legitimate an understanding of being human that enables the realization of the society in culture-specific (in Wynter’s contemporary vernacular), auto-poetic, auto-instituting terms: “With theologization of material life, its production of the economic as its sole reality principle, its reduction of man to his productive capacity” (439), in which labor “is inscribed as a commodity” (620), remain the central strategies by means of which the bourgeoisie “controls and regiments the multiple layers of its world system” (439). Such control could not be effected without controlling the terms through which the social reality should be interpreted: “Political economy of our times has been produced as the reality principle of our society and as [Jean] Baudrillard points out, words like profit, surplus value, class struggle have been strung together to form a discourse of reference” (624).

In effect, “Black Metamorphosis” offers a productivist analysis of our present social order based on the metaphysics of production and within whose logic the division of labor must be inscribed as the factor that gives rise not only to the economic system but also to the wider social system as a whole. Without denying the centrality of labor to human orders, the particular form that it began to take during the industrial revolution cannot be separated from a completely new understanding of the self and world that occurred in the wake of the intellectual transformations of the late eighteenth century, most centrally the idea of the human as a purely natural organism that could be defined by labor. Such an understanding, while a progression of the specifically Western epistemology stemming from Renaissance/lay humanism (with its shift to politics and reasons of state against those of the church and its interpretations of nature), nonetheless began to break with all previous ideas that still sought explanation in supernatural/divine principles.

This new vision also called for a reconceptualization of the human past—one now represented as being defined according to modes of subsistence. Despite the changes it would undergo, this interpretation was paradigmatically expressed within the Scottish (and French) Enlightenment’s stadial theory of human societies progressing/evolving from nomadic huntergatherer modes of existence to pasturage, subsequently to agriculture, and finally to a commercial/industrial organization of society.27 Marx’s theory of the evolution of societies from primitive communism and slavery to feudalism, capitalism, and finally to socialism also presumes a similar progressive schema based on a history of modes of production, and notably so with a beginning not that distinct from Adam Smith’s “lowest and rudest state of society,” which also seemed to have existed prior to “any social organization of production.”28 The central consequence remains that in the contemporary context references to developed, developing, and underdeveloped societies are indeed generated from the matrix of thought surrounding the narrative of human origins initially asserted during the Scottish Enlightenment.

Such a thesis prompts Wynter to pose the question, “Is development a purely empirical concept or also teleological?” A clear instance of this problem occurs with **the utopian concept of ever-increasing economic growth, an idea that must be discursively produced in the most rigorous manner in order to give it empirical life**, which then enables it to “lay down the prescriptive behavioral pathways instituting of our present world system.”29 In other words, despite forging a profound rupture at the level of the human species, Wynter insists, at the same time, that the secular West has not broken from the process by means of which humans come to know and experience our narratively instituted worlds as reality. In such a frame, then, **capitalism forms a part of the governing symbolic code in which all human groups/societies must necessarily come to know their social reality in adaptively advantageous terms, which then enable the realization of specific modes or genres (to which gender role allocations remain central) of being human** and thereby the realization of our specific sociohuman orders as living systems—in our case, that **of Homo oeconomicus, Economic Man.**

As humans, **we cannot preexist our narratives of origins**, be they myths, legends, or, in the post-Enlightenment context, the disciplinary discourse of history (a secular reoccupation of the former two), **since the indispensable condition of our existence remains in what Wynter identifies as the laws of human auto-institution**. On the basis of Fanon’s redefinition of the human as a hybrid being, phylogenic and ontogenic, on the one hand, and sociogenic, on the other, Wynter argues that the sociogenic principle, as the analogue of the genomic principle that determines how organic forms of life adaptively perceive and classify their respective social worlds, remains **the explanatory key**, both to what David Chalmers has identified as “the puzzle of consciousness” as well as **to the laws that govern human behaviors.**

The implications here are indeed significant. Rather than the Marxian concept of modes of production, it is the modes of auto-institution, according to Wynter, that determine human behaviors. The specific mode of material provisioning, or in our present auto-instituting terms, economic production, is an indispensable but only proximate mechanism, since capitalism serves the central function of instituting our present specific (though globally hegemonic) genre of being human, of Homo oeconomicus. Although she does not fully articulate it in these terms, Wynter already broaches this line of thinking in “Black Metamorphosis” when she notes that what capitalism expropriates “is not merely labour power” but “far more comprehensively . . . social power,” which is effected through the control of “the means of socialization and signification” (394). In this regard, “the ritual of work” also “functions as a central means of socialization” (925). Hence, given that such “control can take the form of ownership,” it “allows the ruling class not only to legitimate its hegemony, but to appropriate the right to self-definition, and to self-expression by all other groups in the society, as well as to subordinate these groups to the purpose of its own self-expression and definition” (565).

For this reason, arguments that focus (especially to the exclusion of other aspects) on the transformation of the relations of production as the pathway toward emancipation remain incomplete: “The control over the means of production is a central factor, but only one factor, in [the ruling class’s] strategy of socialization.” This conclusion can also illustrate the limitations of “the factory model of exploitation” that “reveals the mechanism of one of the forms of exploitation” but “cannot extend into a revelation of the mode of socialization by which the ruling class—in this case, the bourgeoisie—carries out its strategies of domination” (565), and therefore cannot “extend into these other areas, to reveal the extent of the qualitative social and symbolic exploitation” (567). As was made clear by the incident with Pease and Reynolds in Richard Wright’s Black Boy, and in his Native Son (1940), in which criminal activities “are the only creative acts permitted Bigger by the social order, the only opportunity to actualize his human power,” the materialism of “official Marxism” remains “unable to comprehend the social claim for recognition.” For this reason, during the 1960s, the black social movements became “the first form of revolt directed explicitly not at the bourgeois mode of production, which is only a partial aspect—but at its cultural signification system” (914; italics in original).

#### Devalued black labor is essential in the construction of the man – the 1AC cant create inclusion –that collapses movements

Demetrius L. **Eudell 16**

Demetrius L. Eudell, 3-1-2016, "From Mode of Production to Mode of Auto-Institution: Sylvia Wynter's Black Metamorphosis of the Labor Question," No Publication, https://read.dukeupress.edu/small-axe/article-abstract/20/1%20(49)/47/33398/From-Mode-of-Production-to-Mode-of-Auto

Amplifying this point, and doing so before studies more systematically addressed the “wages of whiteness,” Wynter argues that not only were blacks during and after slavery the more “degraded form of labor” but the very realization of white working-class identity was made possible by the devaluation of the existence of blacks.14 Hence, the “race prejudice” expressed by the white worker toward the black “was not due to some inherent sickness” but rather constituted an “economically logical” response as “the existence of more devalued labor made the white worker more of a man. His being came to depend on the lesser being of black” (157–58; original emphasis in all caps). In such a structure of social relations, any measures of keeping the blacks in their socially and conceptually defined space assured the “relative superiority” of the white working classes, even “at the expense of accepting [their] own relative exploitation by the bourgeoisie” (158).

To illustrate this point, Wynter utilizes an evocative scene from Richard Wright’s Black Boy in which this dynamic is depicted in a most heartrending manner. Trying to find work so that he can move out of the suffocating social strictures of the South, Wright landed an opportunity, through his friend Griggs, to be an apprentice in an optical shop run by a Northerner, Mr. Crane. The employer instructed his two white workers, Pease and Reynolds, to train Wright in the necessary skills. But Pease and Reynolds had no intention of following the orders of their employer, and Wright was relegated to custodial work as well as subjected to verbal taunts, including commentary regarding the size and use of the sexual organs of blacks. Having the temerity to ask about the training that he was not receiving provoked the response that he was trying to “get smart” and that he was thinking and acting as though he were white. The situation rose to a climax “at noon one summer day,” when Reynolds accused Wright of calling Pease by only his last name, without using the epistemologically mandated, racially honorific title of “Mr.” As a consequence Wright was trapped in a classic Sartrean huis clos: “If I had said: No, sir, Mr. Pease, I never called you Pease, I would by inference have been calling Reynolds a liar; and if had said: Yes, sir, Mr. Pease, I called you Pease, I would have been pleading guilty to the worst insult that a Negro can offer to a southern white man.” In the end, Wright begged them not to hit him, since he knew exactly why they were intimidating and threatening him: “They wanted me to leave the job.”15

Explicating this scene, Wynter maintains that Pease and Reynolds wanted “above all, recognition of their absolute unquestioned mastery,” but that their “emotional terrorism” was equally “matched by their subservience to the Yankee employer” (406). By seeing themselves as master, they remained “unable to apprehend the reality of their own form of servitude” and would “feel no compulsion . . . to decode the cypher of social reality as Richard Wright was impelled to do” (422). It is precisely this dynamic, whereby the white workers could experience themselves as the norm as opposed to the conceptual other at the level of labor, that sets the black labor question apart from the white.

Indeed, such experiences certainly informed Wright’s disavowal of communism, which he openly declared in 1944 in his two-part essay in the Atlantic, “I Tried to Be a Communist.” Despite attempts like those of Wright and others, such as the valiant efforts of communists in Alabama so compellingly rendered by Robin D. G. Kelley, it often remained difficult, conceptually and, by extension, politically, to incorporate the experiences of blacks into the theoretical models and organizing efforts of the white-dominated labor movement.16 C. L. R. James, who remained committed throughout his life to the tenets of Marxism and socialism, acknowledged “this difficult relationship between the independent Negro movement and the revolutionary proletariat,” lamenting that in the past “and by some very good socialists too,” the black struggle was interpreted as having only “episodic value” and, moreover, could “constitute a great danger not only to the Negroes themselves, but to the organized labor movement.”17 Along these lines, Wright posed the following questions, after being warned by a black communist “comrade” against holding the incorrect ideological position: “Why was I a suspected man because I wanted to reveal the vast physical and spiritual ravages of Negro life, the profundity latent in these rejected people, the dramas as old as man and the sun and the mountains and the seas that were taking place in the poverty of black America? What was the danger in showing the kinship between the sufferings of the Negro and the sufferings of other people?”18

#### Status quo understandings individualist rights and governance are incorporated into whitewashed multicultural narratives and leveraged to decry anti-colonial movements

Karishma **Desai et.al 15**

8-1-2015, "Towards decolonial praxis: reconfiguring the human and the curriculum," Taylor &amp; Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09540253.2016.1221893?journalCode=cgee20

**A multicultural curricular approach framed by Eurocentrism fails to acknowledge the insidious presence of global capitalism**. Eurocentrism is ingrained in the European colonial project in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Americas, and is part of larger interrelated global processes, two of which are important for our argument: first the establishment of **capitalist accumulation through enslaved, free or cheap labour, leading to the control of economic markets**; and second, the **control of knowledge centres based on the ‘Western Idea of Man’ (Wynter 2003), by ascribing rationality/humanity to Westerners and irrationality/savagery to non-Westerners**. Consequently, Eurocentrism (implicitly read as superiority) is not simply historical, but rather **a sustained racial-economic ideology reinforced in modern and contemporary configurations of race and racism.** Wynter pushes for a humanism that is critically aware of these difficult histories, and centres Black ontologies. Wynter reminds us, that it is not that curriculum completely ignores colonialism and racial enslavement; rather the **inclusion interprets colonialism and slavery as processes that were left in a dark chapter**. The persistent violences and reverberations of these processes that were not shaken off with emancipation, or political independence are occluded. When **Native American dispossession or enslavement of Africans** is treated as a dark moment that **ends with the obtainment of legal citizenship**, continued structural violences are often obscured. Furthermore, textbooks confine these histories into small sections that fulfil the ‘multicultural lesson.’ Multicultural curriculum, in this form, conceals the knowledges, ideologies, and privileges that abide. These forms of **‘multicultural inclusion’ are treated as a solution to critiques of Eurocentric curriculum**

**This kind of multicultural approach distracts from the more important conversation**, one that moves from history depicted as marginalised groups demanding representation (Wynter 1992), towards clearer rubrics to understand globalisation when manifested in the imprisonment, suffering, and death of migrants at the hands of nation-states, and the internal strife witnessed in state force used against marginalised populations. For instance, Wynter describes how **the Civil Rights Movement was an example of a sustained push for reorganisation of systems of knowledge** (Wynter 1992, 11). However, this restructuring can be re-interrogated through the lens of the much-publicised state violence. While the Civil Rights Movement successfully demanded political rights (e.g. voting rights), and brought some reprieve from state violence, it also led to the rise of ideas about cultural difference. Also **elided in most curricula on ‘civil rights’ is that the limited conception of ‘rights’ fails to address:** **what are these rights? What epistemic foundation are these rights based on?** **who has these rights and who should be afforded them? What tension exists between the de facto and de jure allocation of these rights? These questions provide gaps that limit the significance of the movement and its representation in curriculum.**

During the 1930s and 1940s, African-American leaders collaborated with anticolonial allies in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America to pursue an expansive set of human rights.4 This turn to human rights provided a collaborative groundwork for the resistance to complex ‘global intimacies’ (Lowe 2006, 192) seen in the ‘sometimes overlapping, struggles for freedom, full citizenship, and self-determination’ that were galvanised at the 1955 Asian-African Conference of Nonaligned Nations held in Bandung, Indonesia. The 1950s saw a rise in transnational collaborations located at the interstices of political struggle articulated at Bandung, where ‘the so-called darker races of the world sought to attain juridical independence’ (Kelley 2002; Wilkins 2006, 192–193; Iton 2008). These actions had reverberating implications on the African and Asian continents. And as Lorraine Hansberry argued, ‘the sweep of national independence movements globally was inextricably linked to the political initiatives of Black Americans engaged in similar, and sometimes overlapping, struggles for freedom, full citizenship, and self-determination’ (Wilkins 2006, 192). The documented histories in textbooks and the mediated historical memories of the Civil Rights Movement represent a fraction of the broad organising principles that took decades to build, and were global in their reach. As such, **the broader conception of global ‘human rights’ was replaced by a limited conception of ‘civil rights,’** which **we read as a turning away from ‘the human’ in favour of an even more limited category: ‘American’ or the national citizen**. Furthermore, **the political solidarities cultivated between African-Americans and anticolonial struggles in the global South are hardly explored in curriculum about the Civil Rights Movement.**

This perspective represents an example of how ‘major conflicts and compromises among groups with **competing visions of “legitimate” knowledge and what is a “just” society inform curriculum’.** Curriculum theorist Apple continues, noting ‘ … such conflicts have deep roots in conflicting views of racial, class, and gender justice in education and the larger society … ’ (2000, 230). **These debates persist and are part of the whitewashed, inclusive, multicultural histories that pick and choose aspects of the Civil Rights Movements as tools to dismantle present movements for liberation that are of the same historical trajectory.** Aspects of historical liberation movements (such as what means and processes led to certain outcomes) get elided in these selective ‘civil rights’ curricula, and these histories are then **deployed in the service of either erasing or actually demonising contemporary movements.** One can only imagine how different civil rights curricula would if they started out with questions about what it means to be human and not as a moment in history, with a movement whose work is complete. However, multi-culturalism became the response and as Wynter explains,

Multiculturalism can seem to be an attractive answer to the particularism of the Euro-Immigrant perspective from which the present textbooks are written … Rather than seeking to reinvent our present cultural native model, **the multi-culturalism alternative seeks to ‘save’ the nation model by multiculturalizing it. It does not move outside the conceptual field of our present EuroAmerican cultural model.** (Wynter 1992, 16)

Scholars like Weheliye, following Wynter, see the reimagining of the terms of the human as a struggle against the way in which ‘structures, discourses, and institutions … detain black life and thought within the strictures of particularity’ (2008, 332). **This revisioning is neither a call not to include the excluded other from traditional universalising concepts of humanism** nor is it a call to dismantle humanism.

#### Problems aren’t mistakes of our current system but constitutive of humanism itself – we need to become something more

Gumbs 19 (Alexis Pauline Gumbs is a self-described Queer Black Troublemaker and Black Feminist Love Evangelist and an aspirational cousin to all sentient beings and is currently in residence as a National Humanities Center Fellow.; Being Ocean as Praxis: Depth Humanisms and Dark Sciences. Qui Parle 1 December 2019; 28 (2): 335–352. mahintha)

Sylvia Wynter teaches us that what is commonly called the human is not a merely biological species. The exclusions and systems of scarcity we create in the name of survival are not impulses that come from a “natural” response to our “natural” circumstance. Wynter calls the species we are a part of (or excluded from, as the case may be) Homo narrans, meaning that we tell ourselves a story about being purely biological, governed by science, and then we believe that we are going to scientifically die if we don’t keep reproducing that story. So Wynter reminds us of Aimé Césaire’s call for something he calls sociogeny, “a new ‘science of the Word,’” a poetics of possibility based on the hope that we can tell ourselves (and believe) a story that allows our species to continue to live on this planet before it’s too late.2 I am inspired by Wynter’s critical hope, her ongoing conversations with Katherine McKittrick’s theorizations about science and their shared belief in the experiment of being human as praxis. This is a meditation, a poetic experiment on a new science of the word brought into my consciousness by some years spent writing in conversation with Wynter’s words, the writing of blood, the songs of whales, the outcry of coral, and the persistence of bacteria. It documents a species-unraveling encounter with the bottom of the ocean I experienced when I tried to listen to my ancestors. Drawing on Wynter’s invocation of Césaire; her interpretations of the idea of menstrual blood and the production of ocher paint in Africa; the work of McKittrick, Michelle M. Wright, and Kriti Sharma on science; and the persistent haunting of Jamaica Kincaid, this is a journey into a black scientia of depth and unnaming. A partial accounting of the story the transatlantic slave trade continues to tell. A reckoning with the story the ocean is telling us about climate change. An attempt to untheorize the global systems that lead to countless deaths and near-deaths at sea for migrants every day and night. A divestment in being human. An experiment in being ocean, as praxis. At bottom, this essay is an opportunity for me to explain some things that I have been thinking about that I had to push aside so they would not overcrowd my forthcoming book Dub: Finding Ceremony. I think of them as what the sea weed holds, what ends up with Dionne Brand’s Blue Clerk, the spirals I had to go through to release whatIletgoofonthosepages. Whatisunderneathwhathappened? At the bottom there is blackness. What do I mean by that? Wright opens her book Becoming Black with a passage from Kincaid’s At the Bottom of the River. The first sentence that Wright quotes is “The blackness is visible and yet it is invisible, for I see that I cannot see it.” The same could be said for my motivations for taking Wynter’s invitation to unpack and unlearn our origin stories so personally. This is why I want to dwell on the difference between being (dis) placed, or what I am calling being mistaken for an ocean, and being ocean as praxis. Being missed. Taken. An ocean away. For the length of an ocean intime. Taken the width of the ocean(if you live).Taken the depth of the ocean(if you die). Being mistaken is being part of the mistake, the tactical error that Wynter points out, the story that Kincaid reads again and again hoping for a different ending. To the extent that colonialism, the slave trade, the unsustainable extraction of resources, the leaching of natural environments, toxic emissions, the creation of whole islands of garbage, continual acts of displacement and war, the dominance of systems that impoverish people and communities could be understood as a mistake, a network of decisions based on a false narration of what it is to be (human), the kidnapping of my ancestors and the multiple forms of oppression I experience, and (among other violences) the drowning today of uncounted people fleeing persecution and extreme poverty are all mistakes. To the extent that **these systems and violences are doing exactly what they must do to construct the human and the nonhuman**, “man” and nature, as categories that make this state of things cohere, none of this is a mistake. These are simply cruel efficiencies occurring in consecutive models across time.

#### Vote neg for kinship beyond taxonomy – refusing the categories and separations imposed on us – simply occupying the seat of the human isnt enough we need to destroy it

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What if we are on the edge of another leap, both like and different from the Copernican leap that Wynter examines in her work? As McKittrick explains in her essay “Axis, Bold as Love,” the transformation that took place in European thought during the colonial era also transformed the intellectual trajectory of the colonizers as they colonized.9 The encounter with indigenous cultures on the plane and the understanding that the earth itself was not the center around which other planets and the sun revolved were coterminous. And it is not only that European thought evolved to create a category of the human through which it could understand itself in opposition to the category of the less-than-human people they encountered all over the world through sciences; it is that the existence of indigenous and Black people all over the world and their knowledge practices and cosmologies pushed Europeans to think of themselves in a completely different way, and to create an evolutionary scientific narrative of humanness that would have been unnecessary in the absence of the challenges that indigenous knowledges offered and continue to offer. And we are still dealing with this destructive defensive universalized European definition of the human right now. But what if it is time for another leap? Right now, as ocean levels rise around the planet, those of us who are clinging to, resisting, or opposing the dominant definition of the human are under pressure. How does oceanic knowledge, combined with our increasingly impossible-to-ignore knowledge of our dependence on the ocean and its literally rising role in our lived experiences, shift our definitions of the world we are constructing and our place within it? While playing a key role in the development of Black studies and ethnic studies in the United States more broadly and at Stanford University in particular, Wynter laments how those fields of study that could be heretical because they ostensibly come from the position of the excluded, beyond humankind, ultimately reify the insidious definitions of humankind in their practices. Inclusion comes at the cost of the necessary alternative possibilities that we need to create so urgently. This is how McKittrick describes it: The left and other political positionalities, whether battling or embracing Man, often stage this within our present liberal humanist model as classed members of this social system, and thus actually profit from replicating this system, rather than being co-human and existentially with those who are logically excluded from this knowledge system (excluded because they inhabit spaces conceptually imperceptible from the point of origin, reside at the bottom of the barrel, are too alien to comprehend).10But I wonder, if Man is reified in what Wynter calls the insurgent studies in the humanities, is not human also reified even in the call to approach “being human as praxis”?11 Wynter finds the uniqueness in humans to be related to our poetic possibilities, but what if whales are equally if not more poetic? Isn’t coral cultural? What if the bottom of the barrel is the bottom of the ocean? How might we theorize and practice this idea of “being . . . existentially with” each oceanic other? If McKittrick asks for “what Sylvia Wynter describes as a ‘hybridly organic’ and ‘languaging existence,’” would we not need to be in collaboration with the stories being written and told by all life on the planet?12 I see coral as another narrating life-form, similar in some ways to the life-forms that tell themselves a story about being human, but with crucial revisions to that story. Coral, like us, build on a massive scale. Coral reefs become the size of cities in the ocean; they are the only other organisms that build on such a large scale. And their dead stay with them; they live atop the skeletons of their ancestors. Or their skeletons are their ancestors? And this is part of the poetic importance of coral, and their connection to the possibility of a new science of the word. Scientists can’t seem to describe coral. The collectivity of coral (corals) exceeds the language. Is there such a thing as one coral? Aren’t coral inherently collective? Would we think of them as multiple animals with one stomach? Or one animal with many many many many mouths? And what about us, living on the same matter, with multiple hungers and resources that we pretend are not shared, so many of us making cities that we pretend are not always built on the dead—is there such a thing as one person? To attempt to describe coral, scientists in English have used two telling strategies: they describe coral as either colonies or polyps. I’m not Sylvia Wynter, and I won’t offer here the first uses of the term colony in the Romance languages or in the intellectual history of marine biology. I think that would be interesting, and I hope someone does it. (Thank goodness Wynter is alive and writing right now.) I am just pointing out that the description of coral as colonial in its formation and multiplicity does a lot to repress the possible meanings of its intergenerational example. If coral, growing on top of its former generations, could be understood in the same terms as the work of an empire to extract resources from a place where it must displace, dominate, and subjugate the preexisting life in or on that place, then either coral begins to seem rather self-hating and divided from itself, or colonialism begins to seem more natural than it ever could be. Of course, coral, for the most part, has been described in the science literature by people who have been taught to say that colonialism is natural and who have an inescapably complex theory of ancestry, being self-understood humans, whose ideas about kinship, Wynter teaches us, are already shaped in the historical moment of colonialism and by the contours of its results. I simply want to assert that the word colony ultimately fails to describe the collectivity, oneness, interconnected being of coral. Or, if it succeeds, it succeeds in a way that is complicit with the human-compelled environmental relation that is causing the mass death of coral at this time. The use of the term polyp to describe coral—or, more directly, the conscription of the term polyp, used initially to describe coral, into the dominant narrative of human cancer—might tell on us as well. There is more to say, but here I just want us to think about how the impossible best chance for coral individuality, the polyp, is now mostly associated with the physical reaction we have most in common with the coral that are dying due to industrially caused climate changes: the ubiquity of cancer, the way our own bodies are writing protest exponentially, the ways the idea of our own individuality lies and kills, the way we are all realizing too late (like as soon as someone we love dies of cancer) that neither we nor they were as individual as we had been taught to think. Biologist, philosopher, and my dear friend Kriti Sharma offers some key challenges to biology and subjectivity in her book Interdependence. “What does life depend on?” Sharma asks.14 Can we imagine that we—and by we she means all life—are not individual units with the potential to collaborate? Can we imagine that we are not merely interconnected while our inherent difference stays intact? What if instead we co-constitute everything? That is her argument, that we do not exist separately but are so deeply cocreated by the complexity of perception that the idea that you, or I, or a flower, or a coral is actually you, or I, or still a flower or a coral from moment to moment is a fiction useful for some things but in other ways useless and even inhibitive to life. The argument is intricate, but that’s not why I can barely describe it here. The reason I struggle to find words for this is that it so deeply challenges what we’ve used language to do. Homo narrans. Who and how we say we are related. Why we cannot decide whether coral is one or many. So we say cancer, we say colony, we say what we know how to say. But Sylvia Wynter would love Kriti Sharma. Please let me be there when they meet each other. Wynter gets us to go right to why we know how to say only what we know how to say and asks for an unlearning and a new poetics conducive not to individuality, colonial kinship, reification of an idea of the human across time, but to life. What do we, coral, what do we, perceptive in chorus, know how to say right now? While watching the 2017 film Chasing Coral (dir. Jeff Orlowski), I was astounded as coral divers observed and documented the death of coral.15 And to their surprise, before bleaching white, losing all their color, and dying (in our species we call that gentrification), a huge swath of coral in the Great Barrier Reef somehow turned neon purple before it died. The many scientists in the film couldn’t explain it. Maybe coral has something to say, visible from the sky. Maybe it can describe itself better than we can. But what I know for sure is that if we can’t let go of the systems tied to the colonial reproduction of individuality, all the coral will die and so will we. There must be something else to say. What if coral are not only using their bodies to write on the planet but also using us? What if I am copoetic with coral, the material it uses to write beyond its breathing? What if I am listening? What if my actions in solidarity with the ocean are a writing of the future, a visible myth unfolding? What if we are not the only authors of this story? Might we become humble tools for the ocean that unleashed us? What if there is another meaning of writing on the wall? For example, the coral that the filmmakers in Chasing Coral saw turn neon purple before they, and/as great segments of the Great Barrier Reef, died makes me think about the planetary scale of a message visible from space. We are not the only beings sending messages from this planet. Are we the only ones receiving and believing them? I thought about what scientific historians of earth call “the rusting of the planet.”16 Two hundred fifty million years ago cyanobacteria (once called blue-green algae because we so often name other beings without grasping the complexity of their/our relations) made the world unbreathable for most of the organisms on the planet other than themselves. Do we feel a kinship with cyanobacteria, which used the ocean to create more oxygen than the beings that had evolved on the planet up to that point could bear? The cyanobacteria changed the lives of those old oxygen-allergic beings that now are found in deep sulfuric caves hiding from what we call fresh air. Are they like us, cyanobacteria, growing themselves at the scale of the ocean, breathing at a rate that changed the sky? Or are we a backlash, putting carbon back on top through corporate and vehicle emissions, never mind the lungs of our children? Make the planet hot again. Like the good old days when we were impossible. Are we angry about how oxygen decays our cells and everything we need? Are we outraged by the need itself? Do cyanobacteria register regret for all the species that they used to share the earth with? Are we their silly heirs, emulating everything but their self-preservation? What is the story we tell ourselves that lets us fill the air with something we ourselves do not know how to breathe? Or are we just that hungry for another life story? Are we angry that oxygen has made itself seem as necessary and inevitable as individuality, subjectivity, colonialism, capitalism? Do we intuit that we would tell a more useful story as fossils than we are telling right now? What if our bones are the necessary alphabet? How hungry are we for an original writing? Depth Relation. Who are our relatives? As I train myself to be with and breathe with depth, I have become obsessed with whales. With how fat they can be and how old they can get (bowhead). With how they’ve offered themselves to Shinnecock listeners (right whale). With how they trailed slave ships, were whaled to death by the same boats (right whales again and also the now-extinct North Atlantic gray whale). With how no one has seen them have sex (humpback). With how scientists have barely ever seen them at all (most beaked whales). With how they are caged and criminalized and called killers when they are black unless they can put on a show (orca). And how they live in an unbreathable world that they breach to find breath. I have been experimenting with a practice I call “Black feminist breathing,” inspired by Ntozake Shange’s interpretation of the combat breathing Frantz Fanon witnessed during the Algerian War.18 It is also inspired by Laurie Carlos, who created a language of breath and gesture to heal herself from a serious nerve disease caused by a car accident.19 What makes the world unbreathable for us? State violence; corporate air pollution; the vehicle emissions that are right now being loosed at federal and state levels by politicians who don’t believe we have changed the climate; a culture of sexual violence. Many factors make this world unbreathable for me. And yet. There are stories that say that whales once walked the land and then evolved to live in the ocean. There are other stories that say that we were once whales who grew feet and walked onto the shore. I tend to imagine whales (especially Atlantic right and gray whales) training captured Africans in the bottoms of ships how to breathe out the top of their heads.20 I am not finished learning about whales. In the past few years two competing origin stories for whales have captured my imagination. The first is the first. I began researching Akan spiritual cosmology because my father’s cousin Hutson Gumbs told me that our Anguillian ancestor who survived the Middle Passage was Ashanti and her name was Boda. Akan spiritual cosmology describes the practices and beliefs of the Ashanti people. And I wonder what the Middle Passage meant to her as someone impacted by the role of the whale, the huge living oceanic presence in the Akan origin story. Among other deities, Totorobonsu has a role in how the Ashanti and Akan practitioners in the New World imagine the origin of the planet. In the Akan language the word Totorobonsu, one of the multiple names of God, is its own small poem about power and blessings. Bonsu, meaning whale, is also used to refer to someone who has victory and power in the water. Totoro is meant to mimic the sound of the falling rain, the source of the water itself. Totorobonsu is a story about how God blesses or waters the lives of the living and flows through everything with majesty and power and size. In the horror of the Middle Passage, what might Boda or anyone else have thought about the blessing power of water? While moving through water on ships also used to hunt whales, accompanied on parts of the journey by whales and by sharks, kidnapped by people who used ships as a major tool of domination and control, what did she learn about power and water and torture and blessing and prayer and origin and her own life and possibility? How would this be connected to and different from the prayers in many languages of the people drowning today as they flee from persecution and find more and deeper dangers all around? Totorobonsu in a sea shaped by European markets sounds like torture. It sounds like everything. It is still a prayer. It is also an abyss. Akan practitioners today in the New World sometimes claim ties, as my family does, to ancestors who may have practiced an older version of the same religion. However, most Akan practitioners I have met more often note that those who were moved across the ocean from West Africa to the Americas most likely came through the area controlled by the Ashanti: the coast of present-day Ghana. Akan practice in the United States preceded the current possibility of genetic speculation, but it was used to reach for an alternate understanding of power, divinity, and being.22 However, that desire, like the desire for a genetic origin story, is shaped by the dominant system of commerce and trade. It is an unnaming that means most new names will do. Akan practice and its rigorous training has now been used for generations in the United States as alternate science, a reaching back, a reclaimed narration of who and also of how. In the meantime, another cosmology, proffered by leading evolutionary researchers at the Smithsonian and the Museum of Natural History, is that though most life started in the ocean, whales started out on land, as something like a cow that then evolved to eat fish out of the river and then evolved to have no limbs but fins and to live mostly in the ocean, though some cetaceans can still be found in rivers. Of course, this story of origin, like the stories of population genetics, betrays itself. Did whales start out on land? Did any living being? Wasn’t the evolution into the ocean a return? Any evolutionary story, like any narrative at all, requires a decision about when the beginning was. And it is always a lie. And it is always too late. Does the imagining of an origin for whales on earth reveal the land-animal bias of even the marine biologists? Is it impacted by the internalization of land relation as a property, leaking into their work on the descriptive properties of sea creature ancestors? Can we imagine beyond the binary between land and sea? Maybe we should, and soon. The ocean is rising. The complicated poetics of taxonomy offers not a new science of the word but some repeatable clues about old violences in the speakability of biology. How could so-called humans, so caught in a relation of domination to the living world, be trusted to name not only the life around us and within us but also our relationships to each other, our family lineages? Soap opera genealogists, sentimental and biased with kinship trauma and desperate agendas—how could any of us be trusted to name the life we pretend to be separate enough from to observe? As I pointed out earlier, for a significant amount of observational time cyanobacteria were blue-green algae. But now they are not algae; they are bacteria. We noticed that. But the noticing that takes place among marine biologists, who have fleeting opportunities to observe anything in the ocean at its depth in its effective hiding place, is contingent and often debated within the field. Speculative taxonomies come and go, especially when one of the largest segments of the planet is also the least observable by so-called humans. As I was researching the names of species of coral and bacteria and whales, I started to think that maybe these taxonomies were exactly as exact, fully as accurate, as the racial classifications and technologies governing our imagination of the human, the truly human, the subhuman, the other-than-human that Wynter accounts for in her intellectual histories of colonial thought. Which is to say, I began to think that these taxonomies were not demonstrative of anything but the human imagination of difference and relation, a deep dark place indeed. Here I will look specifically at what marine biologists call black coral because I am still interested (along with Wright and Kincaid and so many others) in what blackness is, and how it is imagined. I used the passive voice there. Let me say instead that I am interested in the excesses of what blackness can be and how a field of mostly white male scientists refer to it underwater. Black coral, the name of a group of multiple species of coral, has the scientific name Antipatharia. What these corals all have in common is their inner blackness, their black or dark brown skeletons. They are covered with tiny spines. They are among the oldest animals on the planet. They are traded. They are endangered. They are mentioned in the convention on the international trade of endangered species. Their order’s name literally means “remedy for suffering.” Or the antidote for suffering. Or against suffering. They have been used for healing by multiple coastal communities. Antipatharia. These corals are accompanying me right now in the ocean ceremonies I am creating for my own grief. I too want to use them for healing, if not physically then poetically. A blackness that protects itself with spines, that is black under everything. So old that it doesn’t need us, might not recognize us at all. Black coral that branches out like a tree and can heal what ails. That can end the suffering. Could there be as many species of black coral as there are genres of suffering in my life? Or, as McKittrick asks (citing Nas), could creative texts be “another system that poetically attends to the pain in the brain, the fact of blackness, the poems of illness and incarceration”?24 This is what I want to attend to. McKittrick again: “The science of the word feels and questions the unsurvival of the condemned, thus dislodging black diasporic denigration from its ‘natural’ place.”25 Yes. This is what I am trying to do. To participate with Sharma in what McKittrick is calling the “creative labor [of] recoding science.”26 For example, there is a species of black coral called Antipathes atlantica. The remedy for Atlantic suffering? Another multivocal Black Atlantic? Of course, the naming here becomes geographic. This is a black coral that they have noticed only in the Atlantic so far. It is also the favorite home of the black coral barnacle, black by association, or maybe by commitment. And Cirrhipathes contorta is a species of black coral also known as whip coral or wire coral because commonly it looks like a whip or like barbed wire, but to scientists it looks like wispy but twisted hair, so they name it a wispy suffering twisted, the curl of suffering contorted, the punishing problem of hair. Or the species they think is one of the very oldest black corals, Leiopathes glaberima, a smooth suffering bald rhyme. Etymologically related to Leiotrichy, a name for smooth hair in racist ethnology. Also etymologically related to Orzya glaberrima, a sacred rice used in ceremonies by the Diola priestesses in Senegal, and therefore not for sale. Or what about Abyssopathes, the depth of suffering, a species of coral in the family Schizopathidae (split suffering?). Abyssopathes, suffering at so great a depth it was identified only in 2002, because it lives so deep in the ocean that humans have barely developed the technology to notice it, let alone research its properties and behaviors. In 1985, in the fifteenth-anniversary issue of Essence, crafted by my aforementioned mentor, Cheryll Y. Greene, Toni Morrison writes about “a knowing so deep it’s like a secret.”27 That’s how I think of the black coral that hides in the deep. And what to make of the fact that as the taxonomy continues of black coral across scientific time, sometimes the root of suffering remains but the antidote disappears. The healing potential is no longer referenced, just the forms of the suffering. The paths. Should I admit now that not all suffering can be healed? That some of it is just too old, too deep, too well hidden to even name? The abyss? Wynter writes about the abyss with longing. In her talk at a conference on the future of “development” in the African context, she pointed out that development is teleological, a new religion, a taken-for-granted good of Homo economicus, the definition of the human that naturalizes a particular capitalist economic relation that, as she notes, is destroying the planet.28 The abyss, which she brings in from Hamidou Kane’s novel Ambiguous Adventure, is a name for all the else there is, beyond the enlightened march of capitalism, an opening where all the myriad forms of resource relationship and organization constructed by groups of people in different physical environments still exist as possibilities. Dangerous heresies threatening the evangelism of the new priests, the economists. Dangerously black. What aspects of that abyss can claim me if I acknowledge how poetic and strange so-called scientific language already is, how related to every form of bias and longing and mystery? And what if, instead of the posture of the objective observer, we practiced a deep black science of the word, shaped by grief and longing, attending to the histories of blackness and suffering, keyed into what we’ve noticed from here, and also what we don’t want to see? Under all of it. This is why I am still underwater. This is why I know that where I want to see an origin there is actually an abyss. A dangerous space. Black. Where something else is possible

### 3

#### The meta ethic is motivationalism – people need to decide on their own any other starting point begs the question of why we follow the framework in the first place.

#### Other frameworks fail. Motivational externalism collapses into internalism.

Joyce Joyce, Richard. “Richard Joyce - The Myth of Morality (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy) (2002).” www.docme.ru/doc/1269345/richard-joyce---the-myth-of-morality--cambridge-studies-i...

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. Suppose it were claimed, instead, that I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. [r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink - l have a reason not to drink. But **how could** that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the **external reason** even **explain** my **[action]** from drinking**?** Clearly, in order to explain it **the** external **reason must have some causal**ly efficacious **role [in]** among the antecedents of **the action** (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the **belief alone can[not] produce action**, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain** an **action** the **belief must couple with desire**s (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: if I believe that the coffee is [bad] tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it. So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but in that case the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

#### Agents can only be motivated their own desires; not the external desires of another because A) one can’t access the desires of others and B) because there are infinite desires of others that aren’t communicated and thus accounted for.

#### Only contractarianism’s foundation in the empirical fact that individuals have desires provides a non-circular origin for the ability to form a moral obligation.

Gauthier**,** Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print.

**“A contractarian theory** of morals, developed as part of the theory of rational choice, has evident strengths. It enables us to **demonstrate[s] the rationality of impartial constraints on the pursuit of individual interest to persons who** may **take no interest in others'** interests**.** Morality **is** thus **given a** sure **grounding in a** weak and widely accepted **conception of practical rationality. No alternative account** of morality **accomplishes this. Those who claim that** moral **principles are objects of rational choice in special circumstances fail to establish the rationality of actual compliance** with these principles. Those who claim **to establish the rationality of such compliance appeal[s] to a** strong and controversial **conception of reason that** seems to **incorporate[s] prior** moral **suppositions**. No alternative account generates morals, as a rational constraint on choice and action, from a non-moral, or morally neutral, base.”

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with contractual obligations.

#### Consequences aren’t relevant. Contractual obligations are a question of the inherent action not aggregating violations.

#### Prefer additionally

#### A] Actor spec: States are formed through contracts. Policymakers have a plurality of changing views, but the only static characteristic of a government it’s legal structure. Absent contracts, it’s impossible to generate obligations since each policymaker has their own view of morality that can’t be resolved.

#### B] Prereq: Only contracts dictate action without begging the question of why actors ought to comply since they brought the expectations upon themselves and can’t justify disobeying.

#### Now Negate

#### A] Right to strike violates Labor contracts – no normal means multi-actor fiat and non-governmental agreements

**Aronowitz, 11** (Stanley, a professor of sociology, cultural studies, and urban education at the CUNY Graduate Center. No-Strike Clauses Hold Back Unions, Labor Notes, https://labornotes.org/blogs/2011/12/no-strike-clauses-hold-back-unions, 12-13-2011)//iLake-💣🍔

When leaders of the Occupy movement’s most reliable labor ally, the Longshore Union (ILWU), declared the union would not participate in Monday’s shutdown of West Coast ports, they illustrated a great weakness plaguing our unions.

Labor is confined by contract unionism, whose core is the no-strike clause.

Recall that during the 1999 mass protests against the World Trade Organization, the ILWU used its power to shut down all West Coast ports for a day, a stroke of exemplary solidarity.

The decision not to support the current call was influenced by the fact that, like almost all unions that sign collective bargaining agreements, the ILWU is bound by a clause barring strikes during the life of the contract. The last time ILWU supported a shutdown of the Oakland port, it suffered a fine of $65,000.

For more than 75 years, the labor movement has been enclosed by law and custom by collective bargaining, whose goal is to achieve a contract that seals in wages, benefits, a grievance procedure, and work rules. In return, workers and their union agree, crucially, to surrender their right to withhold their labor.

The penalties for violation are often severe: stiff fines and imprisonment of union officials. After the three-day walkout by New York City transit workers in 2005, a court order barred check-off of union dues, levied $2.5 million in penalties, and handed the union president a 10-day jail sentence.

Even when unionists and their allies flooded Madison, Wisconsin, last winter with huge protests, there was little debate about the limits of contract unionism.

HOLD US BACK

Why do contracts hold back unions?

1. The contract has the force of law. It is a compromise between labor and the employer, private or public. The workers agree to suspend most of their demands for as long as the contract lasts. In the past decade that period has grown, sometimes to as much as six years. Even if conditions change, the union cannot reopen the contract unless the employer consents.

2. The union is responsible for enforcing the contract, including disciplining the workers. Of course, management regularly bypasses or brazenly violates the contract. To remedy these infractions, the union can grieve and finally arbitrate. Although arbitration is heavily weighted on the employers’ side, workers have no other recourse, under the law of the contract.

If they (rarely, these days) resort to a wildcat walkout or other job action, their union is obliged to renounce the strike and “order” workers back to the job.

3. Under these conditions, the union tends to become conservative, at best, or, at worst, an agent of shop floor workers’ subordination. The weight of the law mostly prevails.

With the employers’ offensive of the last generation, collective bargaining is now mostly a form of collective begging. Yet collective bargaining remains a sacred cow. Few are willing to advocate that, at the minimum, contracts leave the strike weapon unrestricted.

The labor movement has forgotten its own traditions: Until the 1930s, labor contracts were fairly rare. Workers—and not only IWW members—used to fight for their demands continuously and agree to return to work only when they were met.

Skeptics ask why employers should sign contracts if they cannot buy labor peace. But European unions do not, typically, agree to limitations on strikes.

The main factor underlying labor relations is the power of workers and their unions. Until they re-examine the trap of collective bargaining, the downward slide will accelerate.