### 1NC – CP

#### CP Text: States, except the United States, should ban the appropriation of outer space for asteroid mining by private entities. The United States should fund the appropriation of outer space for the mining of rare earth metals from asteroids by private entities.

#### Asteroids have REMs

AP 21 “Mining A $10,000 Quadrillion Asteroid.” AP News, Feb 1, 2021, <https://apnews.com/press-release/accesswire/technology-business-science-utilities-electric-utilities-7bb32ecaac33bebef6e4b97ade588c57> TG

There are several million asteroids. They fall into three main types: carbonaceous asteroids, metallic asteroids, and mixed salicaceous-mineral-metallic asteroids. Many of the metallic asteroids are composed mainly of nickel and iron, but also contain sizeable quantities of important rare earth elements and precious metals including platinum and gold. A metallic asteroid just 25 meters across could contain as much as 30 tons of platinum valued around $1 billion. 16 Psyche is a staggering 226 kilometers (140 miles) wide and the most mineral rich asteroid so far detected. It is speculated that 16 Psyche could be worth about $10,000 quadrillion (or €8,240 quadrillion euros). To explore 16 Psyche in greater detail, NASA has approved the Psyche mission, which is scheduled to launch in August 2022. The spacecraft will orbit around 16 Psyche for 21 months while studying the asteroid using a number of different scientific instruments. Twenty four percent of all asteroids are thought to be composed of metals and rare minerals. While it is quite difficult to analyze asteroid composition from here on the earth’s surface, there are another 10 asteroids have been identified as likely cost-effective mining targets to date.

#### The PIC is key to beat China and protect against Chinese REM gatekeeping

Stavridis 21 [(James, retired US Navy admiral, chief international diplomacy and national security analyst for NBC News, senior fellow at JHU Applied Physics Library, PhD in Law and Diplomacy from Tufts) “U.S. Needs a Strong Defense Against China’s Rare-Earth Weapon,” Bloomberg Opinion, March 4, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-03-04/u-s-needs-a-strong-defense-against-china-s-rare-earth-weapon] TDI

You could be forgiven if you are confused about what’s going on with rare-earth elements. On the one hand, news reports indicate that China may increase production quotas of the minerals this quarter as a goodwill gesture to the Joe Biden administration. But other sources say that China may ultimately ban the export of the rare earths altogether on “security concerns.” What’s really going on here?

There are 17 elements considered rare earths — lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium — and while many aren’t actually rare in terms of global deposits, extracting them is difficult and expensive. They are used across high-tech manufacturing, including smartphones, fighter aircraft and components in virtually all advanced electronics. Of particular note, they are essential to many of the clean-energy technologies expected to come online in this decade.

I began to focus on rare-earth elements when I commanded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence in Afghanistan, known as the International Security Assistance Force. While Afghans live in an extremely poor country, studies have assessed that they sit atop $1 trillion to $3 trillion in a wide variety of minerals, including rare earths. Some estimates put the rare-earth levels alone at 1.4 million metric tons.

But every time I tried to visit a mining facility, the answer I got from my security team was, “It’s too dangerous right now, admiral.” Unfortunately, despite a great deal of effort by the U.S. and NATO, those security challenges remain, deterring the large foreign-capital investments necessary to harvest the lodes. Which brings us back to Beijing.

China controls roughly 80% of the rare-earths market, between what it mines itself and processes in raw material from elsewhere. If it decided to wield the weapon of restricting the supply — something it has repeatedly threatened to do — it would create a significant challenge for manufacturers and a geopolitical predicament for the industrialized world.

It could happen. In 2010, Beijing threatened to cut off exports to Japan over the disputed Senkaku Islands. Two years ago, Beijing was reportedly considering restrictions on exports to the U.S. generally, as well as against specific companies (such as defense giant Lockheed Martin Corp.) that it deemed in violation of its policies against selling advanced weapons to Taiwan.

President Donald Trump’s administration issued an executive order to spur the production of rare earths domestically, and created an Energy Resource Governance Initiative to promote international mining. The European Union and Japan, among others, are also aggressively seeking newer sources of rare earths.

Given this tension, it was superficially surprising that China announced it would boost its mining quotas in the first quarter of 2021 by nearly 30%, reflecting a continuation in strong (and rising) demand. But the increase occurs under a shadow of uncertainty, as the Chinese Communist Party is undertaking a “review” of its policies concerning future sales of rare earths. In all probability, the tactics of the increase are temporary, and fit within a larger strategy.

China will go to great lengths to maintain overall control of the global rare-earths supply. This fits neatly within the geo-economic approach of the One Belt, One Road initiative, which seeks to use a variety of carrots and sticks — economic, trade, diplomatic and security — to create zones of influence globally. In terms of rare earths, the strategy seems to be allowing carefully calibrated access to the elements at a level that makes it economically less attractive for competitors to undertake costly exploration and mining operations. This is similar to the oil-market strategy used by Russia and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries for decades.

Some free-market advocates believe that China will not take aggressive action choking off supply because that could precipitate retaliation or accelerate the search for alternate sources in global markets. What seems more likely is a series of targeted shutdowns directed against specific entities such as U.S. defense companies, Japanese consumer electronics makers, or European industrial concerns that have offended Beijing.

The path to rare-earth independence for the U.S. must include: Ensuring supply chains of rare earths necessary for national security; promoting the exploitation of the elements domestically (and removing barriers to responsibly doing so); mandating that defense contractors and other critical-infrastructure entities wean themselves off Chinese rare earths; sponsoring research and development to find alternative materials, especially for clean energy technology; and creating a substantial stockpile of the elements in case of a Chinese boycott.

This is a bipartisan agenda. The Trump administration’s strategic assessment of what needs to be done (which goes beyond just 17 rare earths to include a total of 35 critical minerals) is thoughtful, and should serve as a basis for the Biden administration and Congress.

#### REM access key to military primacy and tech advancement – alternatives fail

Trigaux 12 (David, University Honors Program University of South Florida St. Petersburg) “The US, China and Rare Earth Metals: The Future Of Green Technology, Military Tech, and a Potential Achilles‟ Heel to American Hegemony,” USF St. Petersberg, May 2, 2012, https://digital.stpetersburg.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=honorstheses] TDI

The implications of a rare earth shortage aren’t strictly related to the environment, and energy dependence, but have distinct military implications as well that could threaten the position of the United States world’s strongest military. The United States place in the world was assured by powerful and decisive deployments in World War One and World War Two. Our military expansion was built upon a large, powerful industrial base that created more, better weapons of war for our soldiers. During the World Wars, a well-organized draft that sent millions of men into battle in a short amount of time proved decisive, but as the war ended, and soldiers drafted into service returned to civilian life, the U.S. technological superiority over its opponents provided it with sustained dominance over its enemies, even as the numerical size of the army declined. New technologies, such as the use of the airplane in combat, rocket launched missiles, radar systems, and later, GPS, precision guided missiles, missile defense systems, high tech tanks, lasers, and other technologies now make the difference between victory and defeat.

The United States military now serves many important functions, deterring threats across the world. The United States projects its power internationally, through a network of bases and allied nations. Thus, the United States is a powerful player in all regions of the world, and often serves as a buffer against conflict in these regions. US military presence serves as a buffer against Chinese military modernization in Eastern Asia, against an increasingly nationalist Russia in Europe, and smaller regional actors, such as Venezuela in South America and Iran in the Middle East. The U.S. Navy is deployed all over the world, as the guarantor of international maritime trade routes. The US Navy leads action against challenges to its maritime sovereignty on the other side of the globe, such as current action against Somali piracy. Presence in regions across the world prevents escalation of potential crisis. These could result in either a larger power fighting a smaller nation or nations (Russia and Georgia, Taiwan and China), religious opponents (Israel and Iran), or traditional foes (Ethiopia and Eretria, Venezuela and Colombia, India and Pakistan). US projection is also key deterring emerging threats such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation. While not direct challenges to US primacy, both terrorism and nuclear proliferation can kill thousands.

The US Air Force has a commanding lead over the rest of the world, in terms of both numbers and capabilities. American ground forces have few peers, and are unmatched in their ability to deploy to anywhere in the world at an equally unmatched pace.

The only perceived challenge to the United States militarily comes from the People’s Republic of China.76 While the United States outspends all other nations in the world put together in terms of military spending, China follows as a close second, and has begun an extensive modernization program to boot.77 The Chinese military however, is several decades behind the United States in air power and nuclear capabilities.78 To compensate, China has begun the construction of access-denial technology, preventing the US from exercising its dominance in China’s sphere of influence.79 Chinese modernization efforts have a serious long-term advantage over the United States; access to rare earth metals, and a large concentration of rare earth chemists doing research.80 This advantage, coupled with the U.S. losing access to rare earth metals, will even the odds much quicker than policymakers had previously anticipated. 81

The largest example is US airpower. With every successive generation of military aircraft, the U.S. Air Force becomes more and more dependent on Rare Earth Metals.82 As planes get faster and faster, they have to get lighter and lighter, while adding weight from extra computers and other features on board.83 To lighten the weight of the plane, scandium is used to produce lightweight aluminum alloys for the body of the plane. Rare Earth metals are also useful in fighter jet engines, and fuel cells.84 For example, rare earths are required to producing miniaturized fins, and samarium is required to build the motors for the F-35 fighter jet.85 F-35 jets are the next generation fighter jet that works together to form the dual plane combination that cements U.S. dominance in air power over the Russian PAK FA.86

Rare earth shortages don’t just affect air power, also compromising the navigation system of Abrams Tanks, which need samarium cobalt magnets. The Abrams Tank is the primary offensive mechanized vehicle in the U.S. arsenal. The Aegis Spy 1 Radar also uses samarium.87 Many naval ships require neodymium. Hell Fire missiles, satellites, night vision goggles, avionics, and precision guided munitions all require rare earth metals. 88

American military superiority is based on technological advancement that outstrips the rest of the world. Command and control technology allows the U.S. to fight multiple wars at once and maintain readiness for other issues, as well as have overwhelming force against rising challengers. This technology helps the U.S. know who, where, and what is going to attack them, and respond effectively, regardless of the source of the threat.

Rare Earth Elements make this technological superiority possible.

To make matters worse, the defense industrial base is often a single market industry, dependent on government contracts for its business. If China tightens the export quotas further, major US defense contractors will be in trouble.89 Every sector of the defense industrial base is dependent on rare earth metals. Without rare earths, these contractors can’t build anything, which collapses the industry.90

Rare Earth shortages are actually already affecting our military, with shortages of lanthanum, cerium, europium and gadolinium happening in the status quo. This prevents us not only from building the next generation of high tech weaponry, but also from constructing more of the weapons and munitions that are needed in the status quo. As current weapon systems age and they can’t be replaced, the US primacy will be undermined. Of special concern is that U.S. domestic mining doesn’t produce “heavy” rare earth metals that are needed for many advanced components of military technologies. Given the nature of many military applications, substitutions aren’t possible. 91

#### US leadership in this decade solves global war and results in a peaceful end to Chinese revisionism **Erickson and Collins 10/21** [(Andrew, A professor of strategy in the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute)(Gabriel, Baker Botts fellow in energy and environmental regulatory affairs at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy) “A Dangerous Decade of Chinese Power Is Here,” Foreign Policy, 10/18/2021] **U.S. and allied policymakers are facing the most important foreign-policy challenge of the 21st century. China’s power is peaking; so is the political position of Chinese President Xi Jinping and the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic strength. In the long term, China’s likely decline after this peak is a good thing. But right now, it creates a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals.**

Within the next five years, China’s leaders are likely to conclude that its deteriorating demographic profile, structural economic problems, and technological estrangement from global innovation centers are eroding its leverage to annex Taiwan and achieve other major strategic objectives. As Xi internalizes these challenges, his foreign policy is likely to become even more accepting of risk, feeding on his nearly decadelong track record of successful revisionist action against the rules-based order. Notable examples include China occupying and militarizing sub-tidal features in the South China Sea, ramping up air and maritime incursions against Japan and Taiwan, pushing border challenges against India, occupying Bhutanese and Tibetan lands, perpetrating crimes against humanity in Xinjiang, and coercively enveloping Hong Kong.

The relatively low-hanging fruit is plucked, but Beijing is emboldened to grasp the biggest single revisionist prize: Taiwan.

Beijing’s actions over the last decade have triggered backlash, such as with the so-called AUKUS deal, but concrete constraints on China’s strategic freedom of action may not fully manifest until after 2030. It’s remarkable and dangerous that China has paid few costs for its actions over the last 10 years, even as its military capacities have rapidly grown.

Beijing will likely conclude that under current diplomatic, economic, and force postures for both “gray zone” and high-end scenarios, the 2021 to late 2020s timeframe still favors China—and is attractive for its 68-year-old leader, who seeks a historical achievement at the zenith of his career.

U.S. planners must mobilize resources, effort, and risk acceptance to maximize power and thereby deter Chinese aggression in the coming decade—literally starting now—and innovatively employ assets that currently exist or can be operationally assembled and scaled within the next several years. That will be the first step to pushing back against China during the 2020s—a decade of danger—before what will likely be a waning of Chinese power.

As Beijing aggressively seeks to undermine the international order and promotes a narrative of inevitable Chinese strategic domination in Asia and beyond, it creates a dangerous contradiction between its goals and its medium-term capacity to achieve them. China is, in fact, likely nearing the apogee of its relative power; and by 2030 to 2035, it will cross a tipping point from which it may never recover strategically. Growing headwinds constraining Chinese growth, while not publicly acknowledged by Beijing, help explain Xi’s high and apparently increasing risk tolerance. Beijing’s window of strategic opportunity is sliding shut.

China’s skyrocketing household debt levels exemplify structural economic constraints that are emerging much earlier than they did for the United States when it had similar per capita GDP and income levels. Debt is often a wet blanket on consumption growth. A 2017 analysis published by the Bank for International Settlements found that once the household debt-to-GDP ratio in a sample of 54 countries exceeded 60 percent, “the negative long-run effects on consumption tend to intensify.” China’s household debt-to-GDP ratio surpassed that empirical danger threshold in late 2020. Rising debt service burdens thus threaten Chinese consumers’ capacity to sustain the domestic consumption-focused “dual circulation” economic model that Xi and his advisors seek to build. China’s growth record during the past 30 years has been remarkable, but past exceptionalism does not confer future immunity from fundamental demographic and economic headwinds.

As debt levels continue to rise at an absolute level that has accelerated almost continuously for the past decade, China also faces a hollowing out of its working-age population. This critical segment peaked in 2010 and has since declined, with the rate from 2015 to 2020 nearing 0.6 percent annually—nearly twice the respective pace in the United States. While the United States faces demographic challenges of its own, the disparity between the respective paces of decline highlights its relative advantage compared to its chief geopolitical competitor. Moreover, the United States can choose to access a global demographic and talent dividend via immigration in a way China simply will not be able to do.

Atop surging debt and worsening demographics, China also faces resource insecurity. China’s dependence on imported food and energy has grown steadily over the past two decades. Projections from Tsinghua University make a compelling case that China’s oil and gas imports will peak between 2030 and 2035. As China grapples with power shortages, Beijing has been reminded that supply shortfalls equal to even a few percentage points of total demand can have outsized negative impacts.

Domestic resource insufficiency by itself does not hinder economic growth—as the Four Asian Tigers’ multi-decade boom attests. But China is in a different position. Japan and South Korea never had to worry about the U.S. Navy interdicting inbound tankers or grain ships. In fact, the United States was avowedly willing to use military force to protect energy flows from the Persian Gulf region to its allies. Now, as an increasingly energy-secure United States pivots away from the Middle East toward the Indo-Pacific, there is a substantial probability that energy shipping route protection could be viewed in much more differentiated terms—with oil and liquefied natural gas cargoes sailing under the Chinese flag viewed very differently than cargoes headed to buyers in other regional countries.

Each of these dynamics—demographic downshifts, rising debts, resource supply insecurity—either imminently threatens or is already actively interfering with the CCP’s long-cherished goal of achieving a “moderately prosperous society.” Electricity blackouts, real estate sector travails (like those of Evergrande) that show just how many Chinese investors’ financial eggs now sit in an unstable $52 trillion basket, and a solidifying alignment of countries abroad concerned by aggressive Chinese behavior all raise questions about Xi’s ability to deliver. With this confluence of adverse events only a year before the next party congress, where personal ambition and survival imperatives will almost drive him to seek anointment as the only Chinese “leader for life” aside from former leader Mao Zedong, the timing only fuels his sense of insecurity. Xi’s anti-corruption campaigns and ruthless removal of potential rivals and their supporters solidified his power but likely also created a quiet corps of opponents who may prove willing to move against him if events create the perception he’s lost the “mandate of heaven.” Accordingly, the baseline assumption should be that Xi’s crown sits heavy and the insecurity induced is thereby intense enough to drive high-stake, high-consequence posturing and action.

While Xi is under pressure to act, the external risks are magnified because so far, he has suffered few consequences from taking actions on issues his predecessors would likely never have gambled on. Reactions to party predations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong have been restricted to diplomatic-signaling pinpricks, such as sanctioning responsible Chinese officials and entities, most of whom lack substantial economic ties to the United States. Whether U.S. restraint results from a fear of losing market access or a belief that China’s goals are ultimately limited is not clear at this time.

While the CCP issues retaliatory sanctions against U.S. officials and proclaims a triumphant outcome to its hostage diplomacy, these tactical public actions mask a growing private awareness that China’s latitude for irredentist action is poised to shrink. Not knowing exactly when domestic and external constraints will come to bite—but knowing that when Beijing sees the tipping point in its rearview mirror, major rivals will recognize it too—amplifies Xi and the party’s anxiety to act on a shorter timeline. Hence the dramatic acceleration of the last few years.

Just as China is mustering its own strategic actions, so the United States must also intensify its focus and deployment of resources. The United States has taken too long to warm up and confront the central challenge, but it retains formidable advantages, agility, and the ability to prevail—provided it goes all-in now. Conversely, if Washington fails to marshal its forces promptly, its achievements after 2030 or 2035 will matter little. Seizing the 2020s would enable Beijing to ~~cripple~~ [destroy] the free and open rules-based order and entrench its position by economically subjugating regional neighbors (including key U.S. treaty allies) to a degree that could offset the strategic headwinds China now increasingly grapples with.

Deterrence is never certain. But it offers the highest probability of avoiding the certainty that an Indo-Pacific region dominated by a CCP-led China would doom treaty allies, threaten the U.S. homeland, and likely set the stage for worse to come. Accordingly, U.S. planners should immediately mobilize resources and effort as well as accept greater risks to deter Chinese action over the critical next decade.

The greatest threat is armed conflict over Taiwan, where U.S. and allied success or failure will be fundamental and reverberate for the remainder of the century. There is a high chance of a major move against Taiwan by the late 2020s—following an extraordinary ramp-up in People’s Liberation Army capabilities and before Xi or the party state’s power grasp has ebbed or Washington and its allies have fully regrouped and rallied to the challenge.

So how should policymakers assess the potential risk of Chinese action against Taiwan reaching dangerous levels by 2027 or possibly even earlier—as emphasized in the testimonies of Adms. Philip Davidson and John Aquilino? In June, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified to the House of Representatives that Xi had “challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate their modernization programs to develop capabilities to seize Taiwan and move it from 2035 to 2027,” although China does not currently have the capabilities or intentions to conduct an all-out invasion of mainland Taiwan.

U.S. military leaders’ assessments are informed by some of the world’s most extensive and sophisticated internal information. But what’s striking is open-source information available to everyone suggests similar things. Moving forward, a number of open-source indicators offer valuable “early warning lights” that can help policymakers more accurately calibrate both potential timetables and risk readings as the riskiest period of relations—from 2027 onward—approaches.

Semiconductors supply self-sufficiency. Taiwan is the “OPEC+” of semiconductors, accounting for approximately two-thirds of global chip foundry capacity. A kinetic crisis would almost certainly disrupt—and potentially even completely curtail—semiconductor supplies. China presently spends even more each year on semiconductor imports (around $380 billion) than it does on oil, but much of the final products are destined for markets abroad. Taiwan is producing cutting-edge 5-nanometer and 7-nanometer chips, but China produces around 80 percent of the rest of the chips in the world. The closer China comes to being able to secure “good enough” chips for “inside China-only” needs, the less of a constraint this becomes.

Crude oil, grain, strategic metals stockpiles—the commercial community (Planet Labs, Ursa Space Systems, etc.) has developed substantial expertise in cost-effectively tracking inventory changes for key input commodities needed to prepare for war.

Electric vehicle fleet size—the amount of oil demand displaced by electric vehicles varies depending on miles driven, but the more of China’s car fleet that can be connected to the grid (and thus powered by blockade-resistant coal), the less political burden Beijing will face if it has to weather a maritime oil blockade imposed in response to actions it took against Taiwan or other major revisionist adventures. China’s passenger vehicle fleet, now approximately 225 million units strong, counts nearly 6.5 million electric vehicles among its ranks, the lion’s share of which are full-battery electrics. China’s State Council seeks to have 20 percent of new vehicles sold in China be electric vehicles by 2025. This target has already basically been achieved over the last few months, meaning at least 3.5 to 4 million (and eventually many more) new elective vehicles will enter China’s car fleet each year from now on.

Local concentration of maritime vessels—snap exercises with warships, circumnavigations, and midline tests with swarms of aircraft highlight the growing scale of China’s threat to Taiwan. But these assets alone cannot invade the island. To capture and garrison, Beijing would need not only air, missile, naval, and special operations forces but also the ability to move lots of equipment and—at the very least—tens of thousands of personnel across the Taiwan Strait. As such, Beijing would have to amass maritime transport assets. And given the scale required, this would alter ship patterns elsewhere along China’s coast in ways detectable with artificial intelligence-facilitated imagery analysis from firms like Planet Labs (or national assets).

Only the most formidable, agile American and allied deterrence can kick the can down the road long enough for China’s slowdown to shut the window of vulnerability. Holding the line is likely to require frequent and sustained proactive enforcement actions to disincentivize full-frontal Chinese assaults on the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Chinese probing behavior and provocations must be met with a range of symmetric and asymmetric responses that impose real costs, such as publishing assets owned by Chinese officials abroad, cyber interference with China’s technological social control apparatus, “hands on” U.S. Navy and Coast Guard enforcement measures against Maritime Militia-affiliated vessels in the South China Sea, intensified air and maritime surveillance of Chinese naval bases, and visas and resettlement options to Hong Kongers, Uyghurs, and other threatened Chinese citizens—including CCP officials (and their families) who seek to defect and/or leave China. U.S. policymakers must make crystal clear to their Chinese counterparts that the engagement-above-all policies that dominated much of the past 25 years are over and the risks and costs of ongoing—and future—adventurism will fall heaviest on China.

Bombastic Chinese reactions to emerging cohesive actions verify the approach’s effectiveness and potential for halting—and perhaps even reversing—the revisionist tide China has unleashed across the Asian region. Consider the recent nuclear submarine deal among Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Beijing’s strong public reaction (including toleration of nuclear threats made by the state-affiliated *Global Times*) highlights the gap between its global information war touting China’s irresistible power and deeply insecure internal self-perception. Eight nuclear submarines will ultimately represent formidable military capacity, but for a bona fide superpower that believes in its own capabilities, they would not be a game-changer. Consider the U.S.-NATO reaction to the Soviet Union’s commissioning of eight Oscar I/II-class cruise missile subs during the late Cold War. These formidable boats each carried 24 SS-N-19 Granit missiles specifically designed to kill U.S. carrier battle groups, yet NATO never stooped to public threats.

With diplomatic proofs of concepts like the so-called AUKUS deal, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and hard security actions like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative now falling into place, it is time to comprehensively peak the non-authoritarian world’s protective action to hold the line in the Indo-Pacific. During this decade, U.S. policymakers must understand that under Xi’s strongman rule, personal political survival will dictate Chinese behavior. Xi’s recreation of a “one-man” system is a one-way, high-leverage bet that decisions he drives will succeed.

If Xi miscalculates, a significant risk given his suppression of dissenting voices while China raises the stakes in its confrontation with the United States, the proverbial “leverage” that would have left him with outsized returns on a successful bet would instead amplify the downside, all of which he personally and exclusively signed for. Resulting tensions could very realistically undermine his status and authority, embolden internal challengers, and weaken the party. They could also foreseeably drive him to double down on mistakes, especially if those led to—or were made in the course of—a kinetic conflict. Personal survival measures could thus rapidly transmute into regional or even global threats.

If Xi triggered a “margin call” on his personal political account through a failed high-stakes gamble, it would likely be paid in blood. Washington must thus prepare the U.S. electorate and its institutional and physical infrastructure as well as that of allies and partners abroad for the likelihood that tensions will periodically ratchet up to uncomfortable levels—and that actual conflict is a concrete possibility. Si vis pacem, para bellum (“if you want peace, prepare for war”) must unfortunately serve as a central organizing principle for a variety of U.S. and allied decisions during the next decade with China.

Given these unforgiving dynamics and stakes, implications for U.S. planners are stark: Do whatever remains possible to “peak” for deterrent competition against China by the mid-to-late 2020s, and accept whatever trade-offs are available for doing so.

Nothing we might theoretically achieve in 2035 and beyond is worth pursuing at the expense of China-credible capabilities we can realistically achieve no later than the mid-to-late 2020s.

#### Pursuit inevitable – decline causes global war

Beckley 15 (Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security Program at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs., “The Myth of Entangling Alliances Michael Beckley Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts”, http://live.belfercenter.org/files/IS3904\_pp007-048.pdf)

The finding that U.S. entanglement is rare has important implications for international relations scholarship and U.S. foreign policy. For scholars, it casts doubt on classic theories of imperial overstretch in which great powers exhaust their resources by accumulating allies that free ride on their protection and embroil them in military quagmires.22 The U.S. experience instead suggests that great powers can dictate the terms of their security commitments and that allies often help their great power protectors avoid strategic overextension.

For policy, the rarity of U.S. entanglement suggests that the United States’ current grand strategy of deep engagement, which is centered on a network of standing alliances, does not preclude, and may even facilitate, U.S. military restraint. Since 1945 the United States has been, by some measures, the most militarily active state in the world. The most egregious cases of U.S. overreach, however, have stemmed not from entangling alliances, but from the penchant of American leaders to define national interests expansively, to overestimate the magnitude of foreign threats, and to underestimate the costs of military intervention. Scrapping alliances will not correct these bad habits. In fact, disengaging from alliances may unleash the United States to intervene recklessly abroad while leaving it without partners to share the burden when those interventions go awry.

#### We get 2 condo –

1. **Neg flex – condo is key to allowing the neg to test the aff from multiple perspectives – that outweighs aff strategy – the aff gets infinite prep, but the neg is purely reactionary**

## 1NC – Case

#### Aff didn’t read a plan so vote neg on presumption because they don’t have an advocacy, so they can’t generate solvency for any of their offense.

#### Debris creates deterrence by raising the bar for conflict – international norms fail

Miller 7/31 [(Gregory, Chair of the Department of Space Power at the Air Command and Staff College, Ph.D. in Political Science from The Ohio State University) “Deterrence by Debris: The Downside to Cleaning up Space,” Space Policy, 7/31/2021] JL

The danger of kinetic strikes increasing orbital debris is a common theme in the literature, but the positive deterrent effects of some debris are often overlooked. The debris resulting from destroyed satellites, or other space objects, creates a deterrent effect on actors who might otherwise violate international norms and strike at objects in space, either to test their capabilities or as an act of hostilities. This is not deterrence in the traditional sense, of one actor publicly threatening punishment in response to another actor’s unwanted actions. It is not deterrence by denial since the attacker is not damaged and may even achieve its objective. Nor is it deterrence by punishment because the debris itself does not threaten to punish the attacker’s country. But debris can increase the future costs to the aggressor, even if their initial attack succeeds, and thus it has a similar restraining effect on certain behavior. Like the automated response of the U.S. tripwire in West Germany, the threat that debris can pose to state interests acts as a form of deterrence, at least to prevent some actors from taking certain types of actions. Removing the danger of debris will weaken that restraint and thus weaken deterrence, making ASAT tests and hostile actions in space more likely.

Several factors may deter a state from launching kinetic tests or striking against an adversary’s interests in space. For one thing, if a state’s adversary has similar capabilities to destroy objects in space, deterrence would be a function of not wanting to escalate tensions. Although international law only explicitly prohibits states from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit, international space law, like the Outer Space Treaty [30], does provide a framework for addressing the activities of one state that lead to the damage of another state’s property. Likewise, there are international norms (informal but expected rules of behavior) against the weaponization of space. But these norms seem to be in decline [31], and such norms only deter a state from engaging in certain types of behavior if the state cares about following norms, if it cares about how states perceive its behavior, or if it believes other states are willing to enforce the norms. The beauty of debris as a deterrent is that it does not rely on the enforcement of norms or the credibility of states to succeed.

#### Space debris creates existential deterrence and a taboo

Bowen 18 [(Bleddyn, lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester) “The Art of Space Deterrence,” European Leadership Network, February 20, 2018, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/] TDI

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

#### Alt cause – broad space privatization and existing debris.

Muelhapt et al 19 [(Theodore J., Center for Orbital and Reentry Debris Studies, Center for Space Policy and Strategy, The Aerospace Corporation, 30 year Space Systems Analyst and Operator, Marlon E. Sorge, Jamie Morin, Robert S. Wilson), “Space traffic management in the new space era,” Journal of Space Safety Engineering, 6/18/19, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsse.2019.05.007] TDI

The last decade has seen rapid growth and change in the space industry, and an explosion of commercial and private activity. Terms like NewSpace or democratized space are often used to describe this global trend to develop faster and cheaper access to space, distinct from more traditional government-driven activities focused on security, political, or scientific activities. The easier access to space has opened participation to many more participants than was historically possible. This new activity could profoundly worsen the space debris environment, particularly in low Earth orbit (LEO), but there are also signs of progress and the outlook is encouraging. Many NewSpace operators are actively working to mitigate their impact. Nevertheless, NewSpace represents a significant break with past experience and business as usual will not work in this changed environment. New standards, space policy, and licensing approaches are powerful levers that can shape the future of operations and the debris environment.

2. Characterizing NewSpace: a step change in the space environment

In just the last few years, commercial companies have proposed, funded, and in a few cases begun deployment of very large constellations of small to medium-sized satellites. These constellations will add much more complexity to space operations. Table 1 shows some of the constellations that have been announced for launch in the next decade. Two dozen companies, when taken together, have proposed placing well over ~~20,000~~ [twenty thousand] satellites in orbit in the next ~~10~~ [10]years. For perspective, fewer than ~~8100~~[eight thousand one hundred] payloads have been placed in Earth orbit in the entire history of the space age, only 4800 [1] remain in orbit and approximately 1950 [2] of those are still active. And it isn't simply numbers – the mass in orbit will increase substantially, and long-term debris generation is strongly correlated with mass.

[Table 1 Omitted]

This table is in constant flux. It is based largely on U.S. filings with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and various press releases, but many of the companies here have already altered or abandoned their original plans, and new systems are no doubt in work. Although many of these large constellations may never be launched as listed, the traffic created if just half are successful would be more than double the number of payloads launched in the last 60 years and more than 6 times the number of currently active satellites.

Current space safety, space surveillance, collision avoidance (COLA) and debris mitigation processes have been designed for and have evolved with the current population profile, launch rates and density of LEO space.

By almost any metric used to measure activity in space, whether it is payloads in orbit, the size of constellations, the rate of launches, the economic stakes, the potential for debris creation, the number of conjunctions, NewSpace represents a fundamental change.

3. Compounding effects of better SSA, more satellites, and new operational concepts

The changes in the space environment can be seen on this figurative map of low Earth orbit. Fig. 1 shows the LEO environment as a function of altitude. The number of objects found in each 10 km “bin” is plotted on the horizontal axis, while the altitude is plotted vertically. Objects in elliptical orbits are distributed between bins as partial objects proportional to the time spent in each bin. Some notable resident systems are indicated in blue text on the right to provide an altitude reference. The (dotted) red line shows the number of objects in the current catalog tracked by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network (SSN). All the COLA alerts and actions that must be taken by the residents are due to their neighbors in the nearby bins, so the currently visible risk is proportional to the red line.

The red line of the current catalog does not represent the complete risk; it indicates the risk we can track and perhaps avoid. A rule of thumb is that the current SSN LEO catalog contains objects about 10 cm or larger. It is generally accepted that an impact in LEO with an object 1 cm or larger will cause damage likely to be fatal to a satellite's mission. Therefore, there is a large latent risk from unobserved debris. While we cannot currently track and catalog much smaller than 10 cm, experiments have been performed to detect and sample much smaller objects and statistically model the population at this size [3]. The (solid) blue line represents the model of the 1 cm and larger debris that is likely mission-ending, usually called lethal but not trackable. If LEO operators avoid collisions with all the objects in the red line, they are nonetheless inherently accepting the risk from the blue line. This risk is already present.

The (dashed) orange line is an estimate of the population at 5 cm and larger and is thus an estimate of what the catalog might conservatively be a few years after the Space Fence, a new radar system being built by the Air Force, comes on line (currently planned for 2019) [4]. Commercial companies offering space surveillance services, such as LeoLabs, ExoAnalytics, Analytic Graphics Inc., Lockheed, and Boeing, might also add to the number of objects currently tracked. Space Policy Directive 3 (SPD-3) [13] specifically seeks to expand the use of commercial SSA services.

Existing operators can expect a sharp increase in the number of warnings and alerts they will receive because of the increase in the cataloged population. Almost all the increase will come from newly detected debris [5].

The pace of safety operations for each satellite on orbit will significantly change because of the increase in the catalog from the Space Fence. This effect is compounded because the NewSpace constellations described in Table 1 will drastically change the profile of satellites in LEO. The green bars in Fig. 1 represent the number of objects that will be added to the catalog (red or orange lines) from only the NewSpace large LEO constellations at their operational altitudes. This does not include the rocket stages that launch them, or satellites in the process of being phased into or removed from the operational orbits. Neighbors of one of these new constellations may face a radically different operations environment than their current practices were designed to address.

Satellites in these large LEO constellations typically have planned operational lifetimes of 5–10 years. Some companies have proposed to dispose of their satellites using low thrust electric propulsion systems, which would spiral satellites down over a period of months or years from operating altitudes as high as 1500 km through lower orbits where the Hubble Space Telescope, the International Space Station, and other critical LEO satellites operate [6]. Similar propulsive techniques would raise replacement satellites from lower launch injection orbits to higher operational orbits. These disposal and replenishment activities will add thousands of satellites each year transiting through lower altitudes and posing a risk to all resident satellites in those lower orbits. More importantly, failures will occur both among transiting satellites and operational constellations, potentially leaving hundreds more stranded along the transit path.

1. **Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision.**

**Salter 16** [(Alexander William, Economics Professor at Texas Tech) “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words] TDI

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

1. **Time frame – Kessler effect 200 years away**

**Stubbe 17** [(Peter, PhD in law @ Johann Wolfgang Goethe University Frankfurt) “State Accountability for Space Debris: A Legal Study of Responsibility for Polluting the Space Environment and Liability for Damage Caused by Space Debris,” Koninklijke Brill Publishing, ISBN 978-90-04-31407-8, p. 27-31] TDI

The prediction of possible scenarios of the future evolution of the debris p o p ulation involves many uncertainties. Long-term forecasting means the prediction of the evolution of the future debris environment in time periods of decades or even centuries. Predictions are based on models84 that work with certain assumptions, and altering these parameters significantly influences the outcomes of the predictions. Assumptions on the future space traffic and on the initial object environment are particularly critical to the results of modeling efforts.85 A well-known pattern for the evolution of the debris population is the so-called Kessler effect’, which assumes that there is a certain collision probability among space objects because many satellites operate in similar orbital regions. These collisions create fragments, and thus additional objects in the respective orbits, which in turn enhances the risk of further collisions. Consequently, the num ber of objects and collisions increases exponentially and eventually results in the formation of a self-sustaining debris belt aroundthe Earth. While it has long been assumed that such a process of collisional cascading is likely to occur only in a very long-term perspective (meaning a time 1 n of several hundred years),87 a consensus has evolved in recent years that an uncontrolled growth of the debris population in certain altitudes could become reality much sooner.88 In fact, a recent cooperative study undertaken by various space agencies in the scope of i a d c shows that the current l e o debris population is unstable, even if current mitigation measures are applied. The study concludes:

Even with a 90% implementation of the commonly-adopted mitigation measures [...] the l e o debris population is expected to increase by an average of 30% in the next 200 years. The population growth is primarily driven by catastrophic collisions between 700 and 1000 km altitudes and such collisions are likely to occur every 5 to 9 years.89

#### State-sponsored programs make space militarization inevitable

Nagashiwa 20 [(Jun, Adjunct Professor at the National Defense Academy’s Graduate School of Security Studies in Japan, former Lieutenant General, MA in European Security from Tsukuba University) “The Militarization of Space and its Transformation into a Warfighting Domain,” Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 7/17/2020] JL

In 2018, the United States issued its first National Space Strategy, which recognized that its adversaries had turned space into a warfighting domain[1].Military use of space began with the Sputnik crisis in October 1957[2], which initiated the space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. More recently, a growing number of countries are pursuing military uses of space. India conducted an anti-satellite weapons test in March 2019 and Iran launched its first military satellite launch in April. In its reorganization in 2015, the Chinese PLA established the Strategic Support Force, which handles the fields of space, cyber, and the electromagnetic spectrum. Russia also set up an independent Space Force in the same year. In response to these developments, France established the Space Command in September 2019, and the U.S. organized the Space Force last December.

In January 2007, China carried out an anti-satellite destruction test using anti-satellite weapons (ASAT), triggering the development of space as a warfighting domain in the post-Cold War era. China needed to build asymmetric capabilities in space and cyberspace[3]as a response to an expected contingency in the Taiwan Strait. This test created a large amount of space debris and was met with intense international criticism[4]. Although space was used militarily for decades during the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union refrained from these kinds of tests because careless physical attacks could have a significant impact on all operations in space[5]. However, China, which is pursuing a strategy of asymmetric warfare, has set foot into this “sanctuary,” and forced the United States to recognize the vulnerability of its space system[6].

Space has enormous potential for not only the development of science and technology, but also for economic growth. Globalized society is increasingly dependent on the space system, and Japan is participating in the U.S.-led Artemis Program, which aims to explore lunar space. China, which aspires to global economic leadership, is also moving to make use of cislunar space[7], and is expected to work with Russia[8]. Non-military competition in acquiring growth resources in space has already begun through the development and use of relevant technologies. Next-generation information and communications technology (ICT), quantum computing and other such technologies will reduce the vulnerability of space systems.

As space becomes a more important resource, increasing the resilience of space systems has become an urgent issue. There were about 20,000 pieces of space debris as of November 2019[9], and more players are set to enter the field with new business models that use a constellation of small, cheaper satellites. As a result, “congestion” in space is expected to become more serious. Furthermore, in addition to kinetic threats like ASAT and physical deterioration, non-kinetic threats like cyberattacks and laser obstruction are becoming more dangerous. The vulnerability of space systems will inevitably increase.

In the June 2020 U.S. Defense Space Strategy, China and Russia are labelled as the biggest operational threats to the U.S. in outer space, and are designated as parties who have weaponized space and turned it into an area of great power competition. Both China and Russia, which prioritize their own usage of space, are criticized for trying to prevent other countries from freely utilizing space[10].

Space is becoming a less stable environment, even as it holds the promise of becoming a new source of human prosperity.

There are growing signs that space is being utilized for security as the concept of the battlefield has changed with advances in technology[11].Technologies to address air and missile threats are a clear example of this. The accuracy and reliability of ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems has improved in recent years, but developments in offensive technologies have outpaced this progress. China and Russia are developing flying object threats that overwhelm defensive reaction capability in Western countries. Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV), for example, travel at Mach 5 or higher, and missile threats with orbital change capabilities are difficult to intercept.

#### No miscalc – debris hits stations all the time.

Cain ’15 (Fraser; 12/23/15; writer for Universe Today; “How Do Astronauts Avoid Debris”; http://www.universetoday.com/121067/how-do-astronauts-avoid-debris)

So, just how do we keep our space stations, ships and astronauts from being riddled with holes from all of the space junk in orbit around Earth? We revel in the terror grab bag of all the magical ways to get snuffed in space. Almost as much as we celebrate the giant brass backbones of the people who travel there. We’ve already talked about all the scary ways that astronauts can die in space. My personal recurring “Hail Mary full of grace, please don’t let me die in space” nightmare is orbital debris. We’re talking about a vast collection of spent rockets, dead satellites, flotsam, jetsam, lagan and derelict. It’s not a short list. NASA figures there are **21,000 bits of junk** bigger than 10 cm, **500,000 particles** between 1 and 10 cm, and more than **100 million** smaller than 1 cm. Sound familiar, humans? This is our high tech, sci fi great Pacific garbage patch. Sure, a tiny rivet or piece of scrap foil doesn’t sound very dangerous, but consider the fact that astronauts are orbiting the Earth at a velocity of about 28,000 km/h. And the Tang packets, uneaten dehydrated ice cream, and astronaut poops are also traveling at 28,000 km/h. Then think about what happens when they collide. Yikes… or yuck. Here’s the International Space Station’s solar array. See that tiny hole? Embiggen and clarinosticate! That’s a tiny puncture hole made in the array by a piece of orbital crap. The whole station is **pummeled by tiny pieces of space program junk drawer contents**. Back when the Space Shuttle was flying, NASA had to **constantly replace their windows because of the damage they were experiencing** from the orbital equivalent of Dennis the Menace hurling paint chips, fingernail clippings, and frozen scabs.

#### Use or lose is wrong – It’d be irrational AND never be contemplated by any state.

Kroenig 18 Matthew Kroenig, Associate Professor in the Department of Government and the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, The Logic of American Nuclear Strategy: Why Strategic Superiority Matters, Oxford UPress, pp. 137-142

The second, and more common, argument as to why nuclear superiority might be destabilizing is because the state in the position of nuclear inferiority (in this case, America’s adversaries) may feel “use ’em or lose ’em” (UELE) pressures, but this argument also withers under interrogation.26

According to strategic stability theorists, a US nuclear advantage increases the danger of nuclear war because the inferior opponent may fear that its nuclear arsenal is vulnerable to a first strike. Rather, than wait for the adversary (in this case the United States) to move first and wipe out, or seriously blunt, its strategic forces, the argument goes, the inferior state may decide to intentionally launch a nuclear war early in a crisis in order to avoid suffering a disarming first strike. This is the logic most often invoked by strategic stability theorists when they claim that US nuclear advantages are destabilizing. This is also the precise problem identified and inspired by Wohlstetter’s basing studies.

Use ’em or lose ’em enjoys a certain superficial plausibility, but, upon closer inspection, there are two fundamental reasons why the logic simply does not hold up. First, it ignores the fact that the superior state retains a healthy ability to retaliate. So, even if the inferior state is worried about having its nuclear weapons eliminated in a first strike, the decision to launch its nuclear weapons first as a coping mechanism would be a decision to intentionally launch a nuclear war against a state with at least a secure, second-strike capability. This means that even if the inferior state launches its nuclear weapons first, it will be virtually guaranteed to suffer devastating nuclear retaliation. Moreover, given that it is in a situation of extreme inferiority (so extreme that it might even be vulnerable to a preemptive nuclear strike), this would mean intentionally launching a devastating nuclear war that will likely turn out much worse for itself then for its opponent. It would simply be irrational for a state to intentionally launch a nuclear war against a state with an assured retaliatory capability.