# 1NC vs Harvard Westlake

## 1NC- Off

#### CP: The United States should recognize an unconditional right to strike for worker with the exception of law enforcement

#### Current criminal justice reform depletes police unions influence.

Willis 20 [(Jay Willis, senior contributor at The Appeal.) ,” POLICE UNIONS ARE LOSING THE WAR ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM” ,The Appeal , <https://theappeal.org/police-unions-are-losing-the-war-on-criminal-justice-reform/>, Nov 10, 2020] SS

Law enforcement organizations have long treated mass incarceration as a job creation program. In 2020, the tide began turning against them.

This commentary is part of The Appeal’s collection of opinion and analysis.

Law enforcement unions are maybe the most powerful force in politics that most voters never think twice about. By quietly dumping millions of dollars in key prosecutor elections and ballot initiative fights, these organizations manage to affect everything in the criminal legal system’s orbit, usually while flying well beneath the political radar. Police unions are sort of like gravity, if gravity played a significant role in enabling agents of the state to systematically terrorize communities of color without facing meaningful consequences.

In races that take place outside the quadrennial spending bonanzas for control of the White House, these strategic allocations of time and outlays of resources can be decisive in elections, especially since no cohesive pro-reform interest group exists to counteract their influence. (Tight-knit, well-organized police unions can coordinate in ways that the larger but more heterogenous and dispersed coalition of people who favor criminal justice reform cannot.) One recent study found that law enforcement groups have spent about $87 million in local and state elections over the past 20 years, including almost $65 million in Los Angeles alone. At the federal level, their recent campaign contributions and lobbying expenditures approach $50 million, according to The Guardian.

Such expenditures are savvy investments for police unions, who keenly understand the value of having sympathetic friends in high places. Because prosecutors work so closely with police, they have a strong incentive to develop a friendly relationship with rank-and-file officers, even if earning that trust comes at the price of turning a blind eye to abuse: It is not a coincidence that researchers have tracked the rise of police unions to an increase in on-the-job police killings. In a country where law-and-order rhetoric is deeply embedded in the cultural zeitgeist, if you’re a prosecutor intent on keeping your job, filing charges against the badge-wearing hand that feeds might not feel worth the retaliatory smear campaign that will inevitably follow.

In recent years, however—and especially as a result of the sustained protests of police violence in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing in Minneapolis—people have grown more attuned to how these organizations bend the criminal legal system to their will and stymie efforts to reform it. A growing number of elected officials have pledged to refuse the support of law enforcement organizations; in California, a coalition of reform-minded prosecutors has been lobbying for a state bar ethics rule that would prohibit DAs from accepting donations from these sources altogether, arguing that prosecutors cannot ethically prosecute police officers if they are receiving the support of their unions.

“The ties that bind elected officials to police unions must be broken,” the Los Angeles Times editorial board wrote in June. “An elected official considering whether to prosecute officers should not be, in essence, on the political payroll of the agency defending the very same people.”

On Election Day 2020 in California, voters delivered police unions a series of resounding defeats that threaten to flip this time-honored paradigm on its head.

In the race for Los Angeles County District Attorney, reform-oriented challenger George Gascón ousted incumbent Jackie Lacey, earning control of a sprawling office that employs nearly 1,000 line prosecutors and retains jurisdiction over more than 10 million people. Lacey was the clear favorite of law enforcement organizations, who spent some $5 million boosting her candidacy and attacking her opponent’s. And for good reason: During Lacey’s eight years on the job, she reviewed more than 250 fatal shootings by on-duty law enforcement officers. She filed charges in one of them.

Occasionally, Lacey’s penchant for lenience extended beyond even that of high-profile police officials. None other than then-LAPD chief Charlie Beck called on Lacey to charge one of his officers, Clifford Proctor, in the 2015 killing of Brendon Glenn, an unarmed, homeless Black man. Lacey declined. “As independent prosecutors, we’re supposed to look at the evidence and the law,” she said. “And that’s what we did.” When the time came for Lacey to seek re-election, it seems that grateful police unions did not forget her choice.

Gascón’s résumé is one that might seem as if it would appeal to law enforcement types: A former LAPD patrol officer who rose to the rank of assistant chief, he also served as police chief in San Francisco and Mesa, Arizona, and as district attorney in San Francisco, before returning to run for DA in the city where he grew up. But Gascón is among the group of prosecutors who have disclaimed the support of police unions, and his campaign pledges include reducing the population of the county’s chronically overcrowded jail system, reopening investigations of high-profile police shootings that Lacey had closed, and declining to seek the death penalty altogether. For the unions, loyalty apparently extends only so far as it will allow their members to evade accountability.

Their efforts echoed those of the San Francisco Police Officers Association during last year’s DA election, when it spent some $650,000 on, among other things, mailers that declared progressive DA candidate Chesa Boudin to be “the #1 choice of criminals and gang members.” These scaremongering predictions were insufficient to prevent the city’s voters from electing Boudin—also a member of the no-money-from-cop-unions coalition—as Gascón’s successor.

Further down the ballot in 2020, California voters rejected Proposition 20, which would have reclassified certain misdemeanor theft offenses as felonies and reduced the availability of parole. (Incidentally, this would have rolled back the reforms of Proposition 47, a successful 2014 referendum co-authored by Gascón.) In other words, Proposition 20 would have resulted in more incarceration for more people for longer periods of time, which is why law enforcement organizations contributed roughly $2 million to the campaign to pass it.

Police unions also opposed San Francisco’s Proposition E, which eliminated the city’s minimum police staffing requirement, and Los Angeles’s Measure J, which earmarked hundreds of millions of dollars in public resources for non-police community investment. The Los Angeles County Professional Peace Officers Association, which represents sheriff’s deputies, claimed that Measure J would “cripple public safety,” and local law enforcement organizations combined to spend more than $3.5 million fighting it. Both measures nonetheless passed with overwhelming support.

Law enforcement unions reliably oppose criminal justice reform for the simple reason that any attempts to reduce the criminal justice system’s footprint will make police less relevant. (Over the years, they have opposed everything from body camera mandates to the simple requirement that officers wear nametags.) For them, mass incarceration is the world’s most lucrative job creation machine. To justify their lavish spending habits and the generous rules that apply to their conduct, police always frame themselves as a mere half-step ahead of staving off mass chaos, warning that any abrogation of their authority by naive do-gooders will put everyone in danger.

What this year’s election results demonstrate is that people understand the lies that infuse this narrative, which conspicuously omits from the ledger the staggering human costs that policing imposes on the communities it purports to keep safe. These losses won’t put an end to incidents of police brutality, or any other strain of rot that pervades the American criminal justice system. But they do signal that police unions are likelier to have to answer for their myriad failures, instead of relying on beneficiaries of their largesse to pretend that these failures do not exist.

#### But the plan reverses that— giving them the right to collectively bargain.

Lopez 20 [(Laura Barrón-López, is a White House Correspondent for POLITICO.), “Democrats’ Coming Civil War Over Police Unions” , POLITICO , <https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/14/police-reform-police-unions-qualified-immunity-democratic-party-420122>, 10/14/2020] SS

Earlier this year, House Democrats were close to pushing through a bill that would have cemented the power of police unions across the country. For a pro-labor party, the bill, which gave police officers the federal right to collectively bargain on working conditions, appeared to be a no-brainer. Nearly every Democrat in the House co-signed the legislation, including members of the Squad, a group of progressive superstars that includes Reps. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib.

The Democrats have supported public-sector unions for generations — often fighting with Republican state officials who’ve worked to gut the memberships of public employee unions and limit bargaining abilities. The bill would have granted the right to form a union and bargain contracts to firefighters, emergency medical personnel and police, including in states that currently prohibit some in public safety from negotiating collectively for wages and working conditions.

As talk of moving the bill increased in March, Rep. Joaquin Castro of Texas was a rare voice raising alarms. He warned his colleagues on the Education and Labor Committee that the bill would formalize the authority of police unions to determine misconduct standards in their contracts, which are increasingly viewed as a barrier to holding police accountable for wrongdoing. Castro, a Democrat, fought it, asking racial justice groups like Campaign Zero and Color of Change to talk to his Democratic colleagues. He suggested new language limiting how much police could negotiate over accountability provisions with cities.

But labor organizations weren’t pleased with the idea of singling out police affiliates by restricting their ability to bargain over disciplinary standards in the bill. Then the coronavirus pandemic exploded, and negotiations stalled.

Two months later, a video of a white police officer using his knee to pin George Floyd’s neck to the pavement for nine minutes rocketed around the country. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets across the nation in response to Floyd’s killing, calling for a full re-imagining of policing and thrusting police unions into the center of the national argument. Activists, multiple legal experts and even some conservative think tanks, say police unions are one of the biggest impediments to reform, pushing hard to weaken accountability rules, and preventing new ones from being passed.

In the wake of Floyd’s killing, the bill expanding bargaining rights for police unions is all but dead as currently written, and not because of the pandemic. House Democrats rushed to pass a first of its kind police reform bill that would, among other measures, ban choke holds, establish a national database tracking misconduct and end the doctrine of qualified immunity, which shields police officers from civil lawsuits. More quietly, they quickly backed away from the collective-bargaining bill. In the span of three months, the party had changed its calculus, now viewing a labor bill that was endorsed by nearly every House Democrat as recently as March as untouchable in its current form.

Rep. Dan Kildee (D-Mich.), co-author of the measure, said in a statement that he asked House leadership to not move the bill unless the right for police to negotiate on accountability standards is addressed. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, who also signed on to the bill, is “withdrawing her support” from it “as long as it remains in its current form,” said Lauren Hitt, a spokesperson for the New York Democrat. Rep. Matt Cartwright of Pennsylvania, author of a separate broader bill to expand collective bargaining rights of public-sector workers, is also deciding “whether any changes need to be made to [his] bill to hold officers with problematic records accountable” and will consider changes Kildee makes to his legislation, said Cartwright spokesman Matt Slavoski.

All Democrats POLITICO spoke to said they support police’s right to unionize and bargain over wages and working conditions; it’s police’s ability to negotiate misconduct standards through union contracts that some are now questioning or flat out opposing.

#### Police unions are the root cause of police brutality

Greenhouse 20 [(Steven Greenhouse, reporter at the New York Times for thirty-one years; he covered labor and workplace matters there for nineteen. He is the author of “Beaten Down, Worked Up: The Past, Present, and Future of American Labor”), “How Police Unions Enable and Conceal Abuses of Power”, The New Yorker , <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-police-union-power-helped-increase-abuses>, June 18, 2020 ] SS

Police unions have long had a singular—and divisive—place in American labor. What is different at this fraught moment, however, is that these unions, long considered untouchable, due to their extraordinary power on the streets and among politicians, face a potential reckoning, as their conduct roils not just one city but the entire nation. Since the nineteen-sixties, when police unions first became like traditional unions and won the right to bargain collectively, they have had a controversial history. And recent studies suggest that their political and bargaining power has enabled them to win disciplinary systems so lax that they have helped increase police abuses in the United States.

A 2018 University of Oxford study of the hundred largest American cities found that the extent of protections in police contracts was directly and positively correlated with police violence and other abuses against citizens. A 2019 University of Chicago study found that extending collective-bargaining rights to Florida sheriffs’ deputies led to a forty per cent statewide increase in cases of violent misconduct—translating to nearly twelve additional such incidents annually.

In a forthcoming study, Rob Gillezeau, a professor and researcher, concluded that, from the nineteen-fifties to the nineteen-eighties, the ability of police to collectively bargain led to a substantial rise in police killings of civilians, with a greater impact on people of color. “With the caveat that this is very early work,” Gillezeau wrote on Twitter, on May 30th, “it looks like collective bargaining rights are being used to protect the ability of officers to discriminate in the disproportionate use of force against the non-white population.”

Other studies revealed that many existing mechanisms for disciplining police are toothless. WBEZ, a Chicago radio station, found that, between 2007 and 2015, Chicago’s Independent Police Review Authority investigated four hundred shootings by police and deemed the officers justified in all but two incidents. Since 2012, when Minneapolis replaced its civilian review board with an Office of Police Conduct Review, the public has filed more than twenty-six hundred misconduct complaints, yet only twelve resulted in a police officer being punished. The most severe penalty: a forty-hour suspension. When the St. Paul Pioneer Press reviewed appeals involving terminations from 2014 to 2019, it discovered that arbitrators ruled in favor of the discharged police and corrections officers and ordered them reinstated forty-six per cent of the time. (Non-law-enforcement workers were reinstated at a similar rate.) For those demanding more accountability, a large obstacle is that disciplinary actions are often overturned if an arbitrator finds that the penalty the department meted out is tougher than it was in a similar, previous case—no matter if the penalty in the previous case seemed far too lenient.

To critics, all of this highlights that the disciplinary process for law enforcement is woefully broken, and that police unions have far too much power. They contend that robust protections, including qualified immunity, give many police officers a sense of impunity—an attitude exemplified by Derek Chauvin keeping his knee on George Floyd’s neck for nearly nine minutes, even as onlookers pleaded with him to stop. “We’re at a place where something has to change, so that police collective bargaining no longer contributes to police violence,” Benjamin Sachs, a labor-law professor at Harvard, told me. Sachs said that bargaining on “matters of discipline, especially related to the use of force, has insulated police officers from accountability, and that predictably can increase the problem.”

For decades, members of the public have complained about police violence and police unions, and a relatively recent development—mobile-phone videos—has sparked even more public anger. These complaints grew with the killings of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Walter Scott, Tamir Rice, Philando Castile, and many others. Each time, there were protests and urgent calls for police reform, but the matter blew over. Until the horrific killing of George Floyd.

Historians often talk of two distinct genealogies for policing in the North and in the South, and both help to explain the crisis that the police and its unions find themselves in today. Northern cities began to establish police departments in the eighteen-thirties; by the end of the century, many had become best known for using ruthless force to crush labor agitation and strikes, an aim to which they were pushed by the industrial and financial élite. In 1886, the Chicago police killed four strikers and injured dozens more at the McCormick Reaper Works. In the South, policing has very different roots: slave patrols, in which white men brutally enforced slave codes, checking to see whether black people had proper passes whenever they were off their masters’ estates and often beating them if they did something the patrols didn’t like. Khalil Gibran Muhammad, a historian at Harvard, said that the patrols “were explicit in their design to empower the entire white population” to control “the movements of black people.”

At the turn of the twentieth century, many police officers—frustrated, like other workers, with low pay and long hours—formed fraternal associations, rather than unions, to seek better conditions—mayors and police commissioners insisted that the police had no more right to join a union than did soldiers and sailors. In 1897, a group of Cleveland police officers sought to form a union and petitioned the American Federation of Labor—founded in 1886, with Samuel Gompers as its first president—to grant them a union charter. The A.F.L. rejected them, saying, “It is not within the province of the trade union movement to especially organize policemen, no more than to organize militiamen, as both policemen and militiamen are often controlled by forces inimical to the labor movement.”

#### **Police brutality is racialized structural violence that has an inter-generational impact on communities of color**

Ang 20 [(Desmond, Assistant Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government) “Wider Effects of Police Killings in Minority Neighborhoods,” The Econofact Network, 06/24/20]  
High-profile officer-involved killings of unarmed minorities have sparked nationwide protests and raised important questions about the appropriate role of law enforcement in local communities. These events comprise just a handful of the roughly one thousand officer-involved killings that occur each year in the United States. There is growing evidence that acts of police violence may have widespread impacts that go well beyond the individuals involved and their immediate families, negatively affecting academic achievement, school attendance and crime reporting in the neighborhoods where they occur.

Negative effects on educational performance are driven by the impact on Black and Hispanic students following the killing of an individual who is also part of a minority group.

The Facts:

Roughly 1,000 people are killed by American law enforcement officers each year. While whites make up the majority of those killed, these incidents disproportionately involve African-Americans and Hispanics relative to their share of the U.S. population. The number of fatal shootings by the police has been remarkably stable at close to a thousand per year, as tracked by the Washington Post since 2015. Nearly half of the people killed by police in 2019 were Black or Hispanic and about 40% were not armed with a gun. Recent research suggests that roughly one in 1,000 Black men and one in 2,000 Hispanic men will be killed by police. Black men are nearly 2.5 times more likely than white men to die at the hands of law enforcement. Young Black men face particularly high risks with police violence representing their sixth leading cause of death (behind accidents, suicides, other homicides, heart disease and cancer). At the same time, lethal shootings comprise a tiny fraction of all use of force incidents. Nearly a million people experienced nonfatal threats or use of force during contacts with police in 2015 for instance, according to a 2018 report by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (see Table 18).

Officers involved in police killings went unprosecuted in nearly all cases. Judicial precedence grants law enforcement officers wide latitude in employing force against civilians and department procedures for handling and reporting these incidents are often far from comprehensive. In one large urban county I studied just one out of over 600 incidents resulted in criminal charges against police. Nationally, researchers found 31 cases in which police officers were arrested for murder or nonnegligent manslaughter between 2005 and 2011. This amounts to one-half of one-percent of all officer-involved killings during that period.

The impacts of police violence can extend beyond the direct victims to nearby high school students. Students who live close to a police killing during high school are estimated to be 2.5% less likely to graduate from high school and 2% less likely to enroll in college than students from the same neighborhood who live farther from the shooting. To estimate these effects, I analyzed detailed data for over 600 officer-involved killings and more than 700,000 public high school students in a large, urban county. Because the data includes home addresses and tracks student performance over time, I am able to compare how achievement changes after a killing for students who lived close to the incident relative to students in the same neighborhood who lived slightly farther away. I find that students living within a half a mile of a killing are more likely to miss school the following day and experience significant decreases in GPA lasting several semesters. The highly localized effect may be due to the fact that more than 80 percent of incidents went unreported in area newspapers. Nearby students are estimated to be 15% more likely to be diagnosed with emotional disturbance  - a chronic learning disability associated with PTSD and depression - and twice as likely to report feeling unsafe in their neighborhood.

The effects of police killings on academic performance in my analysis are driven entirely by effects on Black and Hispanic students in response to police killings of other underrepresented minorities. I find no significant impact on white or Asian students, nor do I find a significant impact for police killings of white or Asian individuals. These racial differences cannot be explained by other factors like the neighborhoods where killings occur, media coverage or socioeconomic background. Even taking all of these factors into account, I continue to find significant differences in effects based on the race of the student and of the person killed. The chart shows the estimated effects on educational attainment by student race. For Black and Hispanic students, I find large, negative impacts on cumulative GPA, high school completion and college enrollment with very little margin of error, whereas for white and Asian students all the estimated effects are near zero.

The adverse effects on academic performance are largest for police killings of unarmed minorities. I find that police killings of individuals that were completely unarmed (as described in District Attorney incident reports) lead to decreases in GPA that are about twice as large as police killings of individuals that were armed with a gun. This suggests that students are not responding to those events with the most gunfire or the largest shootouts but instead to those incidents in which the use of lethal force may have been least warranted. In a similar fashion, I find that the effects of gun-related criminal homicides on GPA are only half as large as those for police killings and do not vary with the race of the person killed.

The pattern of effects is consistent with longstanding concerns expressed by minorities about how their neighborhoods are policed. The Kerner Commission, established by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1968, reported the “widespread belief among Negroes in the existence of police brutality and in a ‘double standard’ of justice and protection.” More recent national surveys, such as this one from 2015, find that a vast majority of Black and Hispanic individuals believe that police “deal more roughly with members of minority groups” and that these individuals are far more likely than white counterparts to believe that police violence is a serious issue. As national protests following the deaths of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor continue to demonstrate, police killings of unarmed minorities may have negative consequences for social cohesion and institutional trust, with much of the costs borne by underrepresented groups.

## 1NC - Off

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not spec a government

#### 1] The letter “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” – the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance

CCC ND Capital Community College [a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation], “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### 2] Government is an indefinite singular– the aff may not defend a specific set of governments

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 Sept 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a *definite singular* since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with *bare singulars* (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to government:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that China ought to have the unconditional right to strike does not entail that those governments ought to have the unconditional right to strike.

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a recognition is universal and permanent

#### Violation – they only defend the United States

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh:

#### T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here

#### Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution

#### It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### Standards:

#### Limits – there are 195 affs accounting for hundreds of governments— unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs.

Banerjee 4/12 [(Vasabjit Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mississippi State University),”How many states and provinces are in the world?” , The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-many-states-and-provinces-are-in-the-world-157847>, April 12, 2021] SS

There are 195 national governments recognized by the United Nations, but there are as many as nine other places with nationlike governments, including Taiwan and Kosovo, though they are not recognized by the U.N.

Most of these countries are divided into smaller sections, the way the U.S. is broken up into 50 states along with territories, like Puerto Rico and Guam, and a federal district, Washington, D.C.

They are not all called “states,” though: Switzerland has cantons, Bangladesh has divisions, Cameroon has regions, Germany has lander, Jordan has governorates, Montserrat has parishes, Zambia has provinces, and Japan has prefectures – among many other names.

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like the econ DA which rely on all governments having the unconditional right to strike because individual governments don’t have an impact on the global economy as a whole – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## 1NC- Case

### Underview

#### 1] No 1AR theory –

#### A] make a claim w/o warrant

#### B] no dtd- dta enough to deter future abuse

#### C] concede no rvis means the same on t

#### D] No 1ar theory first c/a from t

#### 2] No reasonability don’t hae to read every spec sheels again warrant w/o calims

### 1NC- Shutdown

#### No impact to cyber attacks

Chuipka 17 [(Adam, Junior Policy Officer at Transport Canada (the Canadian equivalent of an Assistant Secretary at the US Dept. of Transportation) and a MA in Public and International Affairs from the University of Ottawa) “The Strategies of Cyberterrorism: Is Cyberterrorism an effective means to Achieving the Goals of Terrorists?” 1/11/2017]

These cases illustrate that the threat from cyberterrorism is real but can be vastly overstated. Most of the damage or disruption caused by the cyber-attack was quickly undone, therefore the potential threat could be considerable but the actual threat is significantly lower. While attrition has proven to be the only likely strategy that cyberterrorists could pursue, its overall effectiveness is unconvincing and counterterrorism measures could make it even less effective. First, cyberterrorism attacks are unlikely to be repeated as the vulnerabilities from that specific attack are patched up, making future threats of cyberterrorism less credible. Second, if a terrorist attempts to threaten cyberterrorism, governments can immediately search for vulnerabilities and patch them, essentially making the attack fail – this may be easier said than done in most cases though warning always provides the chance to gain an advantage. In some cases you can simply go offline since an established connection is required for cyberterrorism to ultimately work. Third, Cyberterrorism is only possible because of vulnerabilities, by hardening systems and patching vulnerabilities – the chances of cyberterrorism occurring is decreased. This is one of the ongoing efforts by governments around the world. Fourth, it is also critical that governments are constantly removing zero day vulnerabilities from the market to prevent terrorists from obtaining them – they are key in a successful surprise cyber-attack. Fifth, if worst comes to worst and a cyber-attack has proven successful, one of the most effective strategies against cyber-terrorism is simply denying that the event was caused by terrorism. Regardless of a terrorist organizations claim, if the cyber-attack is downplayed by governments as just a “glitch” in the system, it can take away the desired impact of terrorists and deter future attempts at cyberterrorism. Even if a terrorist successfully conducted a cyber-attack and claimed to be the perpetrators, cyberattacks have yet to demonstrate they can actually cause terror – an essential element for a terrorist attack to be considered a success. Given that high-level cyber-attacks capable of being violent requires vast resources, intelligence, skill, and time – ultimately too much can go wrong in conducting a cyber-attack and the costs-benefit analysis weighs heavily towards terrorist use of kinetic weapons for the time being.

#### No cyber impact – their authors are hacks

Valeriano 15 [(BRANDON VALERIANO is a Senior Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow.) Internally cites (RYAN C. MANESS is a Visiting Fellow of Security and Resilience Studies at Northeastern University in Boston, Foreign Affairs) May 13, 2015, “The Coming Cyberpeace” 5/13/2015]

The era of cyberconflict is upon us; at least, experts seem to accept that cyberattacks are the new normal. In fact, however, evidence suggests that cyberconflict is not as prevalent as many believe. Likewise, the severity of individual cyber events is not increasing, even if the frequency of overall attacks has risen. And an emerging norm against the use of severe state-based cybertactics contradicts fear-mongering news reports about a coming cyberapocalypse. The few isolated incidents of successful state-based cyberattacks do not a trend make. Rather, what we are seeing is cyberespionage and probes, not cyberwarfare. Meanwhile, the international consensus has stabilized around a number of limited acceptable uses of cybertechnology—

one that prohibits any dangerous use of force.

Despite fears of a boom in cyberwarfare, there have been no major or dangerous hacks between countries. The closest any states have come to such events occurred when Russia attacked Georgian news outlets and websites in 2008; when Russian forces shut down banking, government, and news websites in Estonia in 2007; when Iran attacked the Saudi Arabian oil firm Saudi Aramco with the Shamoon virus in 2012; and when the United States attempted to sabotage Iran’s nuclear power systems from 2007 to 2011 through the Stuxnet worm. The attack on Sony from North Korea is just the latest overhyped cyberattack to date, as the corporate giant has recovered its lost revenues from the attack and its networks are arguably more resilient as a result. Even these are more probes into vulnerabilities than full attacks. Russia’s aggressions show that Moscow is willing to use cyberwarfare for disruption and propaganda, but not to inflict injuries or lasting infrastructural damage. The Shamoon incident allowed Iran to punish Saudi Arabia for its alliance with the United States as Tehran faced increased sanctions; the attack destroyed files on Saudi Aramco’s computer network but failed to do any lasting damage. The Stuxnet incident also failed to create any lasting damage, as Tehran put more centrifuges online to compensate for virus-based losses and strengthened holes in their system. Further, these supposedly successful cases of cyberattacks are balanced by many more examples of unsuccessful ones. If the future of cyberconflict looks like today, the international community must reassess the severity of the threat.

Cyberattacks have demonstrated themselves to be more smoke than fire. This is not to suggest that incidents are on the decline, however. Distributed denial-of-service attacks and infiltrations increase by the minute—every major organization is probed constantly, but only for weaknesses or new infiltration methods for potential use in the future. Probes and pokes do not destabilize states or change trends within international politics. Even common cyber actions have little effect on levels of cooperation and conflict between states.

NORMCORE IS HERE TO STAY

A protocol of restraint has emerged as the volume of cyberattacks has increased. State-based cyberattacks are expected, and in some cases tolerated, as long as they do not rise to the level of total offensive operations—direct and malicious incidents that could destroy infrastructure or critical facilities. These options are apparently off the table for states, since they would lead to physical confrontation, collateral damage, and economic retaliation.

The reproducibility of cyberattacks has also led states to exercise restraint. Enemies can replicate successful cyberweapons easily if source code and programs find their way into the wild or are reverse-engineered. Cyberweapons are not simple to design, either, which makes their use limited: Stuxnet took years of work by U.S. intelligence (with help from Israel) and cost hundreds of millions of dollars—and it still failed. The risk of creating collateral damage is high, since cyberweaponry cannot provide surgical precision and can spread into other networks of possible allies of the attackers. For example, the Stuxnet worm, intended for Iran’s nuclear program’s network, showed up in Azerbaijan, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, among other countries. As witnessed in the Russian attack on Georgia, the potential for conflict diffusion is high, as third-party allies can enter conflicts easily. Estonia sent its Computer Emergency Readiness Team experts to Georgia to keep the country’s crucial networks up and running. Poland freed up bandwidth for servers in its territory to keep Georgian government websites up and its people informed. Finally, the risk of retaliation is high, as it is in any war, especially as attribution of perpetrators is getting easier to trace with better forensic techniques. The only drawback is that exposing attribution capabilities often exposes ongoing infiltration methods.

All of these considerations have meant that, so far, cyberconflict has adhered to existing international conflict norms. That there have been no major operations resulting in death or the destruction of physical equipment (outside of the Saudi Aramco incident and Stuxnet) suggests trends toward stability and safety. Cyberoperations are increasing, but only in terms of small-scale actions that have limited utility or damage potential. The truly dangerous cyberactions that many warn against have not occurred, even in situations where observers would think them most likely: within the Ukrainian conflict or during NATO’s 2011 operations in Libya. The only demonstrable cyberactivity in the Ukraine crisis has been espionage-level attacks. There is no propaganda, denial of service, or worm or virus activity, as there was in past conflicts involving Russia and post-Soviet states.

The overall trend in cyberwarfare indicates that the international community is enjoying a period of stability. The chart below demonstrates that although cybertactics are increasingly popular, the severity of these attacks remains low. On a scale of one to five, where one is a nuisance attack (a website being defaced, for example) and five is a cyber-related death, few attacks register above a two.

DRAWING COMPARISONS

Although the public may fear cyberthreats, it remains extremely trusting of the existing digital infrastructure. People trust the Internet with their connections, private contacts, banking information, personal lives, professional careers, and even romantic interests. Such confidence may be unwarranted, but resilience, not apprehension, is key to surviving in the coming era of low-level Internet-based attacks and probes.

States must be willing to make dramatic changes to their perceptions of Internet security and governance if they are to prevent cyberattacks. Most states lack functional cooperation between government and private industry for low-level cyber infiltrations, including the United States and EU countries. In addition to greater cooperation between public and private sectors, states and companies must pursue stronger cyberhygiene regimens (providing internal training to prevent potential threats) and reform the infrastructure that supports banking, electric, and health-care systems. Finally, education initiatives would help empower citizens to understand how the Web handles their transactions. Few understand how online banking, health-care databases, and utility grids work on the Internet. Education can help people—and citizens—understand the true nature of cyberthreats.

Here, we can look to the U.S. experience with terrorism: in both instances, fear is the result of imagined consequences. Terrorism has given birth to an industry built to combat threats, and a similar process is now under way with regard to cyberattacks. The general response to terrorism has been counterproductive and damaging, lending itself to hyperbole and overreaction. It is troubling to see the same path repeated with cyberwarfare, as an industry has sprung up within the private sector and military to meet the threat. The fact that there is little evidence of severe cyberattacks should give pause.

### 1NC- Inequality

#### No civil war escalation— prefer ev after the insurrection.

Siegal 10/31 [(Lee, contributor at city journal.) “It’s Not Existential,” City Journal, 10/31/21. <https://www.city-journal.org/dont-confuse-americas-genuine-political-divisions-with-prospect-of-civil-conflict>] RR

Anton Chekhov famously said that if a gun appears hanging on a wall in the first act, it must be used in the second act. In the same way, the line is dangerously thin between warning about a peril and creating an atmosphere that makes that peril possible. Ever since last year’s presidential election, the press and countless voices on social media have been worrying, ever more loudly and insistently, about a looming civil war.

The warnings come from both ends of the political spectrum, and Americans seem to believe them. But civil war is a rare and exceptional moment in the life of a civilization. We should be careful how we use such a term, lest fears of political catastrophe become self-fulfilling prophecies. In the rising intensity of the Internet’s teeming egalitarianism—controlled as it is by the self-appointed deities of Silicon Valley—American democracy has reached its double-sided fulfillment in the way social media can make collective fantasies real. And after whipping readers into a frenzy in the matters of Donald Trump and the Covid-19 pandemic, the media are loath to lower the temperature.

Granted, you would have to possess an extraterrestrial complacency not to worry about America’s divisions. On one side are Trump’s ceaseless claims that the election was stolen, claims compounded by the unwillingness of many Republicans to counter his false assertions and denounce him for making them. Of course, in the months leading up to the election, one liberal media figure or liberal politician after another said that if Trump won, the country would cease to exist as a democracy. A patriot who believed such a thing might do everything he could to prevent such a calamitous outcome—just as a patriot who heard and believed Trump’s claims, made the very night of the election, that the election was stolen might rush to the Capitol building to defend his country. But the simple fact is that one judge after another struck down Trump’s legal efforts to prove fraud and overturn the election, and one attempt after another by Trump’s people to demonstrate the validity of his claims outside the courtroom failed.

On the other side, America’s divisions derive not from a fantasy that has displaced the facts but from polarizing facts themselves. Progressives and their liberal enablers have created a social-engineering machine now operating with incredible speed. It’s bad enough to believe that racism in America will be defeated by brainwashing white children into thinking that they are all racists, but when the country’s own attorney general designates as domestic terrorists parents who resist the indoctrination of their children, then we’re in an epistemological crisis.

Add up one progressive-sponsored assault after another on everyday life and it really does seem as if Americans are trapped between the Scylla of a revolutionary vanguard and the Charybdis of reactionary revolution. The sudden implosion of stable sexual identity; the replacement of “pregnant woman” with “pregnant person”; the shaming of any person, no matter how decent or well-intentioned, who blanches when faced with the elimination of gas stoves and gas-propelled cars; the anathematization of work: a web of illusions about an election on one hand, a web of delusions about human nature on the other.

But is an epistemological crisis the same as finding ourselves on the brink of civil war? We might see through the more hyperbolic claims of division to find our way to some obvious and consequential bonds. The often-heard claim, for instance, that Americans essentially live in different countries is a disconnection from American reality—a product of, to borrow a term from intellectual historian Arthur Lovejoy, a “climate of opinion” that sees portents of civil war everywhere. Someone in Vermont is just as likely to be listening, say, to country and western music as someone in Texas; you would quickly lose count of all the Honda CRVs bearing Black Lives Matter decals, on the one hand, and those with MAGA stickers, on the other. If the country ever comes together as one, the point of unity will probably be a large cheese pizza.

All Americans share in certain existential features of American life. And that is the point: an epistemological crisis is not the same thing as an existential one. Arguments around the Thanksgiving table are not existential emergencies; neither are intellectual disputes between spouses, lovers, colleagues, and friends. If we all had the same perspective on reality, we would all suddenly fall silent. But we talk, all the time, and our talk consists of a case being made for one version of reality over another.

An existential crisis is another matter. In 1860, people in the North and South dressed differently, spoke differently, and behaved differently, right down to the most trivial detail. And even if a wealthy landowner in the North and one in the South both spent the evening listening to a recital of Beethoven string quartets, one would ride home past free laborers and the other past black slaves. That is a radical difference not just in moral and spiritual existence, but in conceptions of labor and economy. No such spiritual and material differences prevail between Americans today.

The conditions for a civil war simply do not exist. Since civil war is only one step removed from revolution—if the South had chosen to overthrow the American republic rather than to secede from it, that would have been a revolution—the conditions for a civil war must resemble those for a revolution. That is to say, each side has to have an army behind it; each side has to be prepared to wage war. For a war to begin, classes must be divided, not just by culture but material circumstances. Vast segments of the population must feel socially disenfranchised, materially deprived, and on the verge of being not merely displaced by other groups but eliminated by them. Such violent class conflict existed in both the South and the North in the decades leading up to the Civil War. Competition for wage labor, for example, was one reason that blacks seeking work at cheaper wages were sometimes murdered by whites in the North even as the Civil War raged on.

America has always teemed with conflict among various social groups. In our time, however, the invocation of a second civil war has served both as a fashionable concept and as a demagogic strategy to divide in the name of fighting for unity. Its invocation is less a prediction or warning than an expedient tactic: call it the Civil War Strategy. Barack Obama deftly invoked the illusion of deep division to construct himself as the great uniter; Trump incites strife in the apparent hope that it will become real. This is how an expedient political strategy becomes a serious and somber prediction that, by sheer repetition, starts to make itself a reality. It is like driving a 1958 Chevy spewing black smoke into a pristine wilderness to warn everyone who lives there about climate change.

Regardless of which political side wins three years from now, Americans should remove the flush of fever from their rhetoric. They should keep the rifle hanging on the wall and allow the next act in American political life, whatever it is, to be a peaceful one.

#### No civil war—

Kelly 11/18 [(Patrick J., associate professor of history at UTSA, originally appeared in The Dallas Morning News.) “We are divided as a country but not enough to create a modern civil war,” UTSA Today, 11/18/21. <https://www.utsa.edu/today/2021/11/story/commentary-kelly-divided-not-civil-war.html>] RR

As a historian of the U.S. Civil War, I believe it is important to take a more balanced view about the current threat to our republic.

In the secession crisis that occurred during the Civil War, the deep fissures between competing political factions broke along the sectional lines of the states of the North and South. By 1860, there were 15 contiguous slave states that stretched from Texas to Delaware. These states were linked by history, climate, soil and the belief that the system of chattel slavery was central to the region’s economic success, as well as the continued maintenance of its ruthless system of white supremacy.

Today’s Americans certainly disagree bitterly about the direction of the country. Nonetheless, there is no current political issue that even approaches slavery in its potential to galvanize national division. Importantly, Donald Trump supporters and Joe Biden supporters do not live in a nation in which their disagreements break cleanly along the sectional lines of the 1860s. Yes, there are U.S. states today that are more red than blue, but within many of these states are deep internal splits between Republicans and Democrats.

Wisconsin, for example, is one of the most politically divided states in the nation. An article in the Washington Post recently declared the Badger State the “incubator of America’s tribal politics.” If Trump voters were to secede from Wisconsin, by what means would they join together with Trump supporters in deeply red states such as Mississippi and Alabama to create a new nation?

Nearly 47% of Texas voters cast their ballots for Joe Biden in 2020. If Democrats were to somehow secede from the Union, what would be the mechanism by which Democrats from the Lone Star State and states such as California or New York would join together to create a separate country? In reality, no such mechanism exists.

Unlike the 1860s, the gritty logistics of nation-building are unavailable for Trump and Biden supporters disgruntled with the current configuration of the nation. Slaveholders and their political leaders had long discussed breaking from the Union before the 1860s. When the secession crisis finally exploded into war, these experienced regional leaders were quickly able to create a slave-holding republic with a functioning government out of the 11 states that joined the Confederacy. The red and blue voters of today who share a secessionist impulse possess neither the state-building experience nor the expertise necessary to create two new nations from the remains of a fragmented United States.

The idea of secession shared by frustrated Biden and Trump supporters, in other words, is a fantasy. Nonetheless, the University of Virginia poll does show that we live in very dangerous times.

#### Alt causes to inequality

Bhala 15 – Kara Tan Bhala, President and Founder, Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics - ‎Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics (“The Causes of Economic Inequality” January 21st, 2015, <http://sevenpillarsinstitute.org/case-studies/causes-economic-inequality>) LADI

(ii) Education affects wages

Individuals with different levels of education often earn different wages [2]. This is probably related to reason one: the level of education is often proportional to the level of skill. With a higher level of education, a person often has more advanced skills that few workers are able to offer, justifying a higher wage.

The impact of education on economic inequality is still profound in developed countries and cities [3]. Although there are usually policies of free education in developed nations, levels of education received by each individual still differ, not because of financial ability but innate qualities like intelligence, drive and personal ability. For example, in Hong Kong, 12 years of free education are provided for each citizen, not covering tertiary education, offered only when students receive certain results on public exams.

Moreover, receiving the same level of education does not mean receiving education of the same quality

. This accounts for the difference in abilities and hence wages for individuals all receiving, for example, 12 years of education. Therefore, it seems no matter how good the social welfare policy of a country is at preventing denial of education due to financial difficulties, differences in education, in terms of levels and quality, still play a prominent role in economic inequality.

(iii) Growth in technology widens income gap

Growth in technology arguably renders joblessness at all skill levels [3]. For unskilled workers, computers and machinery perform a lot of tasks these workers used to be do. In many jobs, such as packaging and manufacturing, machinery works even more effectively and efficiently. Hence, jobs involving repetitive tasks have largely been eliminated. Skilled workers are not immune to the nightmare of losing jobs. The rapid development in artificial intelligence may ultimately allow computers and robots to perform knowledge-based jobs [3].

The impact of increasing unemployment is stagnant or decreasing wages for most workers, as there is a low demand for but high supply of labor. A small portion of society, usually the owners of capital, controls an ever-increasing fraction of the economy [3]. The income gap between workers who earn by their skills and owners who earn by investing in capital has widened.

Although both skilled and unskilled workers are adversely affected by the technological advance, it seems unskilled workers are subject to worse outcomes [3]. This is because the labor market may still need skilled workers to use computers and operate the advanced machines. The rightward shift in the demand for skilled labor creates an increase in the relative wages of the skilled compared to the unskilled workers. Hence, the income gap among workers also has widened.

(iv) Gender does matter

In many countries, there is a gender income gap in the labor market [3]. For example, in America, the median full-time salary for women is 77 percent of that of men [4]. However, women who work part time make more on average than men who work part-time [4]. Additionally, among people who never marry or have children, women make more than men [4].

It may be difficult to justify such differences. According to a U.S. Census report [4], the wage gap is not fully explained even after accounting for key factors that affect earnings, such as discrimination and the tendency of women to consider factors other than pay when looking for work. The only thing we know for sure is that gender does contribute to a difference in wages in society and hence economic inequality.

(v) Personal factors

It is generally believed that innate abilities play a part in determining the wealth of an individual. Hence, individuals possessing different sets of abilities may have different levels of wealth, leading to economic inequality [3]. For example, more determined individuals may keep improving themselves and striving for better achievements, which justifies a higher wage.

Another example is intelligence [3]. A lot of people believe that smarter people tend to have higher income and hence more wealth. This is debatable. In the book IQ and the Wealth of Nations, Dr. Richard Lynn opined that there is a correlation of 0.82 between average IQ and GDP. However, Stephen Jay Gould, in the book The Mismeasure of Man, criticized it for employing the wrong methods of evaluation.

In addition to innate abilities, diversity of preferences, within a society or among different societies, contributes to the difference in wealth [3]. When it comes to working harder or having fun, equally capable individuals may have totally different priorities, resulting in a difference in their incomes. Their saving patterns may also differ, leading to different levels of accumulated wealth.

Inequality is a vicious cycle

“The rich get richer, the poor get poorer” is not just a cliche. The concept behind it is a theoretical process called “wealth concentration.” Under certain conditions, newly created wealth is concentrated in the possession of already-wealthy individuals [5]. The reason is simple: People who already hold wealth have the resources to invest or to leverage the accumulation of wealth, which creates new wealth. The process of wealth concentration arguably makes economic inequality a vicious cycle.

The effects of wealth concentration may extend to future generations [3]. Children born in a rich family have an economic advantage, because of wealth inherited and possibly education, which may increase their chances of earning a higher income than their peers. These advantages create another round of the vicious cycle.