# 1NC vs Vestavia Hills DA

## 1NC-Off

#### Interpretation—: Debaters must open source disclose new affirmatives 30 minutes before they are read in round- disclosure can occur on the wiki, over message or email.

#### Violation—SS. Proves they didn’t

Graphical user interface, text, application, email, Teams

Description automatically generated

#### It is a disclosure norm and should be.

#### Net benefits -

#### 1 - Testing: There are hundreds of potential aff positions, disclosure of the aff directs pre-round prep which ensures the debate is about the substance of the position as opposed to generics, which is key to nuanced clash and in depth debate. Their interpretation forces the negative to read frivolous theory or kritiks with overly broad points of disagreement with the aff.

#### 2 - New does not mean better: Your interp encourages debaters to try to win rounds with surprise strategies as opposed to well researched positions, which kills predictability and iterative content mastery.

#### **Evidence Ethics** – Full text disclosure allows debaters to ensure that evidence has been accurately tagged and cut.

#### **Tambe and Ghandra 14** [(Arjun, ToC Quarterfinalist) and (Akhil, Three time ToC qualifier), “Evidence Ethics in LD Debate: A Proposal by Akhil Ghandra and Arjun Tambe”, VBriefly, 10/24/2014] DDFirst, we think **debaters should disclose** the **full text** of their positions on the NDCA wiki. Many articles have already been written on the importance of disclosure, so we won’t repeat those arguments here. However, we think **disclosure can help address the issue of miscutting or fabricating evidence since debaters can verify whether a piece of evidence read by their opponent has been cut ethically by reading the article the evidence is cut from.** Full text disclosure would also elevate the quality of disclosure. **Providing the first and last three words of an article can make it difficult to reconstruct a debater’s case since not everyone has access to all the databases articles may have been accessed from.** Full text disclosure expands access to debaters’ evidence.

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if Theory is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter—why schools funds debates

## 1NC-Off

#### Interpretation: The Affirmative must defend the hypothetical implementation of the resolution.

#### ‘Resolved’ preceding a colon indicates a legislative forum.

Blanche Ellsworth 81, English professor at SFSU and M.A. in English from UC Berkeley, 1/1/1981, *English Simplified*, 4th Edition, cc

A colon is also used to separate 3. THE SALUTATION OF A BUSINESS LETTER FROM THE BODY, Dear Sir Dear Ms. Weiner NOTE: In an informal letter, a comma follows the salutation: Dear Mary, Dear Uncle Jack 4. PARTS OF TITLES, REFERENCES, AND NUMERALS. TITLE: Principles of Mathematics: An Introduction REFERENCE: Luke 3:4—13 NUMERALS: 8:15 PM 5. PLACE OF PUBLICATION FROM PUBLISHER Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 6. THE WORD RESOLVED FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE RESOLUTION. Resolved: That this committee go on record as favoring new legislation.

#### Justice implies a desirable departure from the status quo – that means the aff must rectify an injust social interaction

IHS n.d. [(Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University, non-profit organization that engages with students and professors) “What is Justice?”] JL

One of the most influential accounts of the origin and nature of justice comes from Plato’s Republic. According to Plato’s account, we can think of the principles of justice as mutually agreed to principles for the coordination and structure of social interaction that would benefit all who are subject to them. What those principles are will depend on the society. In addition, there’s a second theory of justice that Plato offers that’s more general. According to this second theory, justice is “each getting what is rightfully theirs and no one getting what is rightfully another’s.” In other words, questions of justice always ask, “Who has a right to what?”

#### Justice is a policy question

Merriam Webster ND [(Mesrriam Webster) “Justice” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justice] BC

Essential Meaning of justice

1: the process or result of using laws to fairly judge and punish crimes and criminals

#### Standards:

#### Policy education – the only way to regulate private sector activity is through government policy – that kills real world education and skews topic lit which is in the context of implementation

#### Vote negative to preserve limits and equitable division of ground – the resolution is the most predictable stasis point for debates, anything outside of that ruins prep and clash by allowing the affirmative to pick any grounds for debate. That greenlights a race away from the core topic controversies that allow for robust contestation, which favors the aff by making neg ground inapplicable, susceptible to the perm, and concessionary. Two additional impacts:

#### Accessibility – Cutting negs to every possible aff wrecks small schools, which has a disparate impact on under-resourced and minority debaters. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### Link turns their education offense – getting to the third and fourth level of tactical engagement is only possible with refined and well-researched positions connected to the resolutional mechanism. Repeated debates over core issues incentivize innovative argument production and improved advocacy based on feedback and nuanced responses from opponents.

#### Prefer our impact: they’ve skewed the game which necessarily comes first because it makes evaluating the aff impossible. The role of individual debate rounds on broader subject formation is white noise – *can you remember what happened in doubles of the Loyola tournament your junior year?* – individual rounds don’t affect our subjectivity, so fairness is the only impact your ballot can resolve. You should presume all their truth claims false because they have not been properly tested

#### They can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time.

#### TVA Solves- read with a plan text and cards about its legal consequences

#### Paradigm issues: c/a

## Advantage

### Presumption

#### ROB and ROJ: Frame the 1AC through solvency, not impacts – any attempt to filter offense through the RotB or the speech act of the aff is an arbitrary goalpost that only serves to insulate it from criticism and nuanced testing – forcing us to negate the efficacy of personal strategies is at best impossible and at worst violent – the aff can’t change the material structures that produce anti-queer violence – no warrant for how the aff spills up to impact structures of politics writ large or out of debate means you vote neg on presumption.

#### They don’t solve the aff – queer oppression doesn’t magically go away if we stop mining rocks in space

#### Negate on presumption---Inherency---scholars and activists already affirm the 1AC. Their affirmation does not change the impacts they described and has no mechanism to spill up.

### Ontology

#### Other individuals will inevitably claim liberal subjectivity---“becoming” and “flux” offers no institutional strategy to convince individuals to change their behavior---even if exclusion is inevitable, we can still use institutions to distinguish between good and bad forms of exclusion.

Joseph Schwartz, Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University, *The Future of Democratic Equality*, ‘8

A politics of radical democratic pluralism **cannot be** securely **grounded by a** whole-hearted epistemological **critique of “enlightenment rationality**.” For implicit to any radical democratic project is a belief in the equal moral worth of persons; to embrace such a position renders one at least a “critical defender” of enlightenment values of equality and justice, even if one rejects “enlightenment metaphysics” and believes that such values are often embraced by non-Western cultures. Of course, **democratic norms are developed by** political practice and struggle **rather than** by abstract philosophical argument. But this is a sociological and historical reality rather than a trumping philosophical proof. Liberal democratic publics rarely ground their politics in coherent ontologies and epistemologies; and even among trained philosophers there is no necessary connection between one’s metaphysics and one’s politics. There have, are, and will be Kantian conservatives (Nozick), liberals (Rawls), and radicals (Joshua Cohen; Susan Okin); teleologists, left, center, and right (Michael Sandel, Alasdair McIntyre, or Leo Strauss); anti-universalist feminists (Judith Butler, Wendy Brown) and quasi-universalist, Habermasian feminists (Seyla Benhabib, Nancy Fraser). Post-structuralists try to read off from an epistemology or ontology a politics; such attempts **simply replace enlightenment** **meta-narratives with** **postmodern** (allegedly anti) **meta-narratives**. Such efforts represent an idealist version of the materialist effort—which post-structuralists explicitly condemn—to read social consciousness off of the structural position of “the agent.” A democratic political theory must offer both a theory of social structure and of the social agents capable of building such a society. In exchanging the gods of Weber and Marx for Nietzsche and Heidegger (or their epigones Foucault and Derrida), poststructuralist theory has **abandoned** the **institutional analysis** of social theory for the **idealism of** abstract philosophy. Connolly, Brown, and Butler reject explicit moral deliberation as a bad faith Nietzschean attempt at “ressentiment.” Instead, they celebrate the amoral, yet ethical strivings of a Machiavellian or Gramscian realist “war of position.”44 Sheldon Wolin, however, has written convincingly of how Machiavelli can be read as an ethical realist, a theorist of moral utilitarianism.45 Even a Machiavellian or Gramscian political “realist” must depend upon moral argument to justify the social utility of hard political choices. That is, if one reads both as ethical utilitarians who believe that, at times, one must “dirty” one’s hands in order to act ethically in politics, then they embrace a utilitarian, “just war” theory of ethical choice. According to this consequentialist moral logic, “bad means” are only justifiable if they are the only, unavoidable way to achieve a greater ethical good—and if the use of such “bad means” are absolutely minimized. Such “**hard” political choices yield social policies** **and political outcomes** that fix identities **as well as transform them**. Not only in regard to epistemological questions has post-structuralist theory created a new political “metaphysics” which misconstrues the nature of democratic political practice; **the post-structuralist analysis of** “the death of man” and “**the death of the subject**” also radically preclude meaningful political agency. As with Michel Foucault, Butler conceives of “subjects” as “produced” by powerknowledge discourses. In Butler’s view, the modernist concept of an autonomous subject is a “fictive construct”; and the very act of adhering to a belief in autonomous human choice is to engage in “exclusion and differentiations, perhaps a repression, that is subsequently concealed, covered over, by the effect of autonomy.”46 That is, the power of discourse, of language and the unconscious, “produces subjects.” If those “subjects” conceive of themselves as having the capacity for conscious choice, they are guilty of “repressing” the manner in which their own “subjectivity” is itself produced by discursive exclusion: “if we agree that politics and a power exist already at the level at which the subject and its agency are articulated and made possible, then agency can be presumed only at the cost of refusing to inquire into its construction.”47 Susan Bickford pithily summarizes the post-structuralist rejection of the modernist subject: “power is not wielded by autonomous subjects; rather through power, **subjectivity is crafted**.”48 Bickford grants that post-structuralism provides some insight into how group and individual identity is “culturally constructed.” But Bickford goes on to contend that after post-structuralism exposes the “lie of the natural” (that there are no natural human identities), “socially constructed” modern individuals **still wish to act in consort with others and** to **use human communication to influence others**: “people generally understand themselves as culturally constituted and capable of agency.”49 For if there is no “doer behind the deed,” but only “performative” acts that constitute the subject, how can the theorist (or activist) assign agency or moral responsibility to actors who are “constituted by discursive practices.” (“Discursive practices” engaged in by whom, the observer may ask?) Butler insists that not only is the subject “socially constituted” by power/knowledge discourses, but so too is the “ontologically reflexive self” of the enlightenment. Now if this claim is simply that all social critics are socially-situated, then this view of agency is no more radical a claim than that made by Michael Walzer in his conception of the social critic (or agent). Walzer argues that even the most radical dissident must rely upon the critical resources embedded within his own culture (often in the almost-hidden interstices of that culture). Effective critical agency cannot depend on some abstract universal, external logic.50 Asserting that critical capacities are themselves socially constructed provides the reader with no means by which to judge whether forms of “resistance” are democratic and which are not. That is, no matter how hard one tries to substitute an aesthetic, “**ironic**,” “amoral ethical sensibility” for morality, **the social critic and political activist cannot escape engaging in moral argument and justification with fellow citizens**. Butler astutely notes that “resistance” often mirrors the very powerknowledge discourses it rejects—resisting hegemonic norms without offering alternative conceptions of a common political life. But Butler seems to affirm the possibility (by whom?) of effective rejection of such “norming” by “performative resignification.” But the “resignification” of “performative” discursive constructions provides **no criteria** by which to judge whether a given “resignification” is emancipatory or repressive.51 And just who (if not a relatively coherent, choosing human subject) is “performing” the resignification. Furthermore, if all forms of identity and social meaning are predicated upon “exclusion,” then the democratic theorist needs to distinguish among those identities which “exclude” in a democratic way and those which exclude in an anti-humanist, racist, and sexist manner. Some social “identities” are democratic and pluralist, such as those created by voluntary affiliations. But other “identities,” such as structural, involuntary class differences and racial and sexual hierarchies, must be transformed, even eliminated, if democracy is to be furthered. And how we behave—or “perform”—can subvert (or reinforce) such undemocratic social structures. **But if these** social **structures are immutably inscribed by “performative practices,”** then there can be no democratic resistance. In her call for an ironic politics of “performative resistance,” Butler seems to imply that human beings have the capacity to choose which “performative practices” to engage in—and from which to abstain. If this is the case, then a modernist conception of agency and moral responsibility has covertly snuck its way back into Butler’s political strategy.52