# 2NR

#### Most of their satellites are unable to stay in space for long—

GAMBRELL & VAHDAT 20 [(JON, reports from Dubai, United Arab Emirates), “Iran again fails to put satellite into orbit amid US worries”, https://apnews.com/article/iran-tehran-ap-top-news-middle-east-7c8247674c294c23d408b034e9d4ee5a, February 9, 2020] SS

Iran had spent just under 2 million euros to build the Zafar 1, Jahromi previously said. Officials planned for the satellite, whose name means “victory” in Farsi, to remain in orbit for 18 months before crashing back through the Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrating.

#### No permanent and not intended to be—prefer ev specifically about Iran and not ones that are contextualized to other states—

Wikipedia 4/6 [“Iranian Space Agency” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian\_Space\_Agency, Updated 6 April 2022] SS

[Navid-e Elm-o Sanat](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navid_(satellite)) (also known as 'Ya Mahdi') which is an "experimental satellite" built by students for testing camera and telecommunications equipment was revealed to the public on 3 February 2010. It has store-dump capability and a resolution of 400 meters. On 3 February 2012, Iranian press reported that Iran has successfully launched its domestically-built Navid-e Elm-o Sanat satellite into orbit.[[citation needed](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Citation_needed)] The satellite remained in orbit for two months, before [reentering the atmosphere](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atmospheric_reentry) on 1 April 2012.[42]

[Fajr](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fajr_(satellite)), is an imaging satellite which also carries an experimental locally made GPS system built by [Iran Electronics Industries](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran_Electronics_Industries). The satellite had a life span of 1.5 years and an imaging resolution of 500 meters. It is the first Iranian satellite to use "cold gas thruster" and has solar panels. Originally, it was to be launched in 2012. As were alleged, non-announced by Iran one failed launches of Fajr satellites occurred on 23 May in 2012.[[43]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Space_Agency#cite_note-Fajr_failure?-43) Finally, Fajr was successfully launched and placed into orbit on 2 February 2015.[[44]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iranian_Space_Agency#cite_note-44) On 26 February 2015, Fajr [reentered](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atmospheric_entry) earth's atmosphere after 23.8 days in orbit.[45]

# 1NC vs AG

## 1NC-Off

#### Interpretation and violation: appropriation requires the exclusive use of property with a sense of permanence - satellites don’t meet that criteria

Gorove 84 Stephen Gorove, Major Legal Issues Arising from the Use of the Geostationary Orbit, 5 MICH. J. INT'L L. 3 (1984). Available at: <https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol5/iss1/1> //RD Debatedrills

Crucial to a proper analysis of this issue is an understanding of the concept of "appropriation." The term "appropriation" in law is used most frequently to signify "the taking of property for one's own or exclusive use with a sense of permanence." 12 The word" thus indicates something more than just casual use. The question then becomes whether the continued exclusive occupation by a geostationary satellite of the same physical area is a violation of the ban on national appropriation. While a state may certainly exercise exclusive control over a traditional object, such as a ship, or an aircraft, or a part of airspace, it is not clear that a satellite in geostationary orbit would be able to maintain its exact position and occupy the same area over a period of time. 13 Even if a position could be accurately maintained, and thus possibly constitute an "appropriation" within the meaning of article II, the satellite would have to be kept in that orbit with a "sense of permanence" and not on a temporary basis. It has been suggested that the keeping of a solar power satellite in geostationary orbit for a period of thirty years would not constitute appropriation. 14 In point of fact, thirty years would probably satisfy the "sense of permanence" requirement, unless the geostationary orbit were considered a natural resource as characterized by the International Telecommunication Convention of 1973 (ITC) 15 and as claimed by the equatorial countries. Authority exists to support the view that the ban on national appropriation of outer space does not relate to resources. 16 In view of this and the additional fact that solar energy is an inexhaustible and unlimited resource, its utilization for transmission to earth by satellites does not appear to fall under the prohibition of article II of the 1967 Treaty.

#### Satellites definitely don’t meet the 30 year criteria

Ault 15 Alicia Ault, Smithsonian Magazine, 2-6-2015, "Ask Smithsonian: How Does a Satellite Stay Up?," <https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/ask-smithsonian-how-does-satellite-stay-180954165/> mvp

Most satellites are dropped in a range of up to 2,000 km above the earth. The satellites in the very low end of that range typically only stay up for a few weeks to a few months. They run into that friction and will basically melt, says McDowell.

#### Independently, satellite positioning is de facto appropriation, not appropriation proper – repeatedly upheld in application of space law

Matignon 19 [Louis de Gouyon Matignon, PhD in space law from Georgetown University, “ORBITAL SLOTS AND SPACE CONGESTION,” 06/03/19, *Space Legal Issues*, https://www.spacelegalissues.com/orbital-slots-and-space-congestion/, EA]

Near-Earth space is formed of different orbital layers. Terrestrial orbits are limited common resources and inherently repugnant to any appropriation: they are not property in the sense of law. Orbits and frequencies are res communis (a Latin term derived from Roman law that preceded today’s concepts of the commons and common heritage of mankind; it has relevance in international law and common law). It’s the first-come, first-served principle that applies to orbital positioning, which without any formal acquisition of sovereignty, records a promptness behaviour to which it grants an exclusive grabbing effect of the space concerned. Geostationary orbit is a limited but permanent resource: this de facto appropriation by the first-comers – the developed countries – of the orbit and the frequencies is protected by Space Law and the International Telecommunications Law. The challenge by developing countries of grabbing these resources is therefore unjustified on the basis of existing law. Denying new entrants geostationary-access or making access more difficult does not constitute appropriation; it simply results from the traditional system of distribution of access rights. The practice of developed States is based on free access and priority given to the first satellites placed in geostationary orbit.

#### Past international legal precedent is the only way to resolve legal ambiguities of space law and terminology – reject random lawyers writing their aff is topical

**Trapp 13** (TIMOTHY JUSTIN TRAPP, JD Candidate @ UIUC Law, ‘13, TAKING UP SPACE BY ANY OTHER MEANS: COMING TO TERMS WITH THE NONAPPROPRIATION ARTICLE OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2013 No. 4])//DebateDrills RD

As commercial space flight becomes more and more prevalent,153 the question of whether private entities can appropriate property in space becomes very important. Whereas once it took a nation to get into space, it will soon take only a corporation, and scholars have pondered whether these entities will be able to claim property in space.154 Though this seems allowable, since the treaty only prohibits “national appropriation,”155 allowing such appropriation would lead to an absurd result. This is because the only value that lies in recognition of a claim is the ability to have that claim enforced.156 If a nation recognized and enforced such a claim, this enforcement would constitute state action.157 It would serve to exclude members of other nations and would thus serve as a form of national appropriation, even though the nation never attempted to directly appropriate the property.158 Furthermore, the Outer Space Treaty also requires that non-governmental entities must be authorized and monitored by the entities’ home countries to operate in space.159 Since a nation cannot authorize its citizens to act in contradiction to international law, a nation would not be allowed to license a private entity to appropriate property in space.160 While this nonappropriation principle is great for allowing free access to space, thereby encouraging research and development in the field, it makes it difficult to create or police a solution to the space debris problem. A viable solution will have to work without becoming an appropriation. There is, however, very little substantive law on what actually counts as appropriation in the context of space.161 So, the best way to see what is and is not allowed is to look both at the general international law regarding appropriations and to look at the past actions of space actors to see what has been allowed (or at least tolerated) and what has been prohibited or rejected.

#### Precision comes first and link turns predictable limits – the resolution is the only predictable stasis point for dividing ground—any deviation justifies the aff arbitrarily jettisoning words in the resolution at their whim which decks negative ground and preparation because the aff is no longer bounded by a predictable stasis point.

#### Predictable limits—including satellite slots offers huge explosion in the topic since they get permutations of different satellite systems – LEO MEO and GEO, plus different companies, plus sizes of constellations, et cetera. Letting temporary occupation be appropriation is a limits diaster - any aff about a single space ship, satellite, probe, or weapon would be T because they temporarily occupy space. Limits explodes neg prep burden and draws un-reciprocal lines of debate, where the aff is always ahead, turns their pragmatics offense

#### Drop the debater—Topicality is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations – it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for—there’s no way for the negative to know what constitutes a “reasonable interpretation” when we do prep – reasonability is arbitrary and causes a race to the bottom, proliferating abuse

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game, and fairness is necessary to determine the winner of the game, and education is the reason why schools fund debate.

#### No rvi— no warrant for why it turns theory, no warrant for education and allow us to debate the best type of from of definition of appropriation which still gives us policy education—no shouldn’t win if it not something—just in the way you drop a cp if you kick out of it it doesn’t mean youll win

#### There is type of appropriation that is permanent and exclusive—settlements, ex lunar bases, mars settlements,long term mining operations, and sort of colonization, mega constellations with long term infrustructure

## Case

#### Vote neg on presumption—

#### Lamson conceded that Iran military still has a strong force for satellites along with other strategic military capabilities—Immac reads yellow

**Lamson 21** [Jim Lamson, (senior editor of the Texas national security review), 12-20-2021, “Iranian President Raisi’s Renewed Emphasis on Space Is Likely to Create New Tensions“, Texas national security review, https://warontherocks.com/2021/12/iranian-president-raisis-renewed-emphasis-on-space-is-likely-to-create-new-tensions/]

Iran’s goals under its state space program are longstanding and genuine. Iranian leaders see space, along with nuclear and missile capabilities, as important “[power-creating](https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5286149/)” (eghtedar-saz) industries for Iran’s economy, military, and security. Iran’s official goal is to achieve “[first place](https://rc.majlis.ir/fa/law/show/838896) in the region” in terms of space capabilities. Iranian officials frequently emphasize joining what they call the “[space club](https://www.mehrnews.com/news/5071190/)” of technologically advanced states. While Iran’s military is deeply involved in Iran’s space programs, it would be wrong to see the space program as a mere [cover](https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/world/middleeast/iran-spacecraft-pompeo.html) for Iran’s significant and very public missile programs.

#### Can’t solve— Jalilov says that it is part of the ISA—which is the country’s own research institute their own card—immac reads yellow

**Jalilov 2/4** [Orkhan Jalilov, (Insitute for strategic analysis, Experienced Senior Journalist with a demonstrated history of working in the broadcast media industry. Skilled in Negotiation, Analytical Skills, Translation, International Relations, and English. Strong media and communication professional with a Master's degree focused in International Relations and Affairs from Baku State University.), 3-1-2022, “Iran Unveils Its First Satellite Designed by Private Sector“, Caspian News, https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/iran-unveils-its-first-satellite-designed-by-private-sector-2022-2-4-46/]

[The Nahid-1 satellite](https://www.irna.ir/news/84565068/) is the first stage in Iran's strategic program to develop communications satellites, and it was unveiled in early 2017. The project is designed to help Iran gather knowledge, technical capacity and gain experience in designing, building and launching such satellites. The satellite was commissioned by the ISA from the country's Satellite Research Institute, itself a part of the Iranian Space Research Centre (ISRC).

#### Even if its not true—the ev says that the public sector is withdrawing its only because that private sector is doing well which means w/o public will just fill in if they view it as necessary

**1NC –ME War**

#### No great power draw in – stays regional, presumes Russia

Trofimov 2020 [Yaroslav Trofimov is an award-winning author and journalist who serves as Chief Foreign-Affairs Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal. Previously he wrote a weekly column on the Greater Middle East, Middle East Crossroads, in The Wall Street Journal. Iran Lacks Allies in Confronting the U.S. January 5, 2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-lacks-allies-in-confronting-the-u-s-11578253765]

Instead of leaving, President Trump now is sending thousands more American troops to the Middle East to confront Iran. As for Russia and China, they have shown little desire to get embroiled in an increasingly unpredictable conflict.

This means that despite the feverish talk of Gen. Soleimani’s death sparking a World War III, Iran nowadays can only count on itself—and on the network of irregular Shiite militias and proxies that the Quds Force commander had nurtured in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and beyond.

“Iran is one of the most strategically lonely countries in the world. It considers dozens of countries around the world its adversary, and its only reliable friend has been the Assad regime in Syria,” said Karim Sadjadpour, an Iran specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

As for Russia, Mr. Sadjadpour added, “it benefits from an isolated, anti-American Iran that can’t exploit its energy resources.”

While observers say Beijing and Moscow would be happy to watch the U.S. get bogged down even deeper in the Middle East—a diversion that would give them a freer hand in their own neighborhoods—they have no appetite for exposing themselves to the risks of a possible confrontation.

“Russia doesn’t have the slightest intention of getting involved in this squabble, and is trying to distance itself from it as far as possible—even though it will keep expressing support for Iran with very loud declarations,” said Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies, a Moscow think tank that advises Russia’s defense establishment.

“Short-term at least, this is all beneficial to Russia: oil prices are up, and the Iranians—a very difficult partner—are being forced to become much more cooperative,” he added.

Iran’s strategic isolation perhaps explains a tone of caution that has accompanied its denunciations of Gen. Soleimani’s death. Iranian Armed Forces spokesman Brig. Gen. Abolfazl Shekarchi on Saturday promised a revenge that will be “tough”—but “not hasty,” an indication that Tehran may seek to avoid an immediate escalation that could risk sparking an all-out war with the U.S.

“Iran is talking about a response, a revenge, and not about initiating a war,” said Abas Aslani, senior fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran.

Should such a direct conflict erupt, he added, “I don’t think Iran expects Russia and China to start a war with the U.S. on its behalf. The help they may offer to Iran is different: political support, support in some international institutions. Whether that can also be applicable to providing Iran with some equipment, that is the question.”

Iran certainly craves military hardware to replace its obsolete warplanes, ships and tanks—but neither Russia nor China can legally supply such equipment until October at the earliest, the date when United Nations sanctions on most military sales to Tehran are set to expire.

Russia did deliver an S-300 air-defense system to Iran in 2016, but even that happened after six years of delays that ended only as a result of Moscow’s alienation from the West following its invasion of Ukraine.

In their official reactions, both Moscow and Beijing condemned the strike against Gen. Soleimani—but stopped short of pledging to do anything about it.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a phone call Friday with Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the killing “grossly violates the norms of international law” and urged Washington to “solve all problems at the negotiating table,” according to a Russian foreign ministry statement.

China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, a day later told his Iranian counterpart that Beijing condemns “the military adventurist act by the U.S.” and that China will continue to “play a constructive role in safeguarding peace and security in the Gulf region.”

Though China has promised to invest hundreds of billions of dollars in Iran’s oil and gas infrastructure, so far U.S. economic sanctions on Iran have hobbled such plans.

Russia and Iran have teamed up in Syria—with Russian warplanes using Iranian airspace and even briefly operating out of an air base in Iran—but as the Syrian regime stabilized and Moscow found a new accommodation with Turkey in recent months, Moscow’s and Tehran’s interests there have begun to diverge.

Both Moscow and Beijing maintain friendly ties with Iran’s archenemies in the region: Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Russia’s and Iran’s mutual history is rife with hostility. Russians remember the murder of Russia’s ambassador and playwright Alexander Griboedov when the Russian embassy in Tehran was sacked in 1829, and the Islamic Republic’s support for anti-Soviet rebels in Afghanistan in the 1980s.

Looming in Iran’s national memory are lands that Russia annexed from the Persian Empire over the centuries, and the Soviet military invasions and occupations of Iran in 1920 and 1941.

“Nobody in Russia really cares about Iran, the society doesn’t see Iran as a partner, and certainly not as a friend worth dying for,” said Alexander Gabuev, chair of the Russia in the Asia-Pacific program at the Carnegie Moscow Center.

Both Russia and China, he added, are secretly delighted by the rise of tensions between the U.S. and Iran, hoping that a conflict in the Middle East would give them a few years of respite by distracting American attention away from their own core areas of interests in Eastern Europe and Asia, respectively.

Even though China is now the biggest buyer of Middle Eastern oil, experts in the country’s security and foreign-policy establishment have long argued that Beijing should resist the temptation of getting involved in the volatile region—in part because oil has continued to flow despite the political shocks of recent decades.

“The Middle East presents a falling significance in the grand strategy of China,” Niu Xinchun, director of the Institute of Middle East Studies at CICIR, a think tank affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security, wrote in a 2017 policy paper. “As a matter of fact, since 2011, many Middle Eastern countries have descended into civil war at the same time, which failed to exert material impacts on China’s economy.”

China’s participation in the December naval exercises with Iran is “more symbolic than substantial,” added Zhu Feng, director of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University. “I don’t think China has any interest in getting involved in the escalation of tensions there.”

#### Limited Middle Eastern War is good

#### ME war stops Saudi Arabia nuclear energy development

Green 17 [Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia and editor of the Nuclear Monitor newsletter, published by the World Information Service on Energy. Is Saudi Arabia going nuclear? April 12, 2017. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/854/saudi-arabia-going-nuclear]

Military conflict Military conflict has been a recurring feature of Middle Eastern politics for decades and it isn't difficult to imagine military conflicts complicating and compromising nuclear power plants and associated facilities such as spent fuel stores. Since 2015, Saudi forces have intercepted missile attacks from Yemen on several occasions, including a missile attack on King Khalid International Airport in Riyadh in November 2017. "All airports, ports, border crossings and areas of any importance to Saudi Arabia and the UAE will be a direct target of our weapons, which is a legitimate right," the Houthi political office said in a statement on 7 November 2017.57 On 6 November 2017, the New York Times reported on the intercepted missile attack on the Riyadh airport: "Saudi Arabia charged Monday that a missile fired at its capital from Yemen over the weekend was an "act of war" by Iran, in the sharpest escalation in nearly three decades of mounting hostility between the two regional rivals. "We see this as an act of war," the Saudi foreign minister, Adel Jubair, said in an interview on CNN. "Iran cannot lob missiles at Saudi cities and towns and expect us not to take steps." ... The accusations raise the threat of a direct military clash between the two regional heavyweights at a time when they are already fighting proxy wars in Yemen and Syria, as well as battles for political power in Iraq and Lebanon. By the end of the day Monday, a Saudi minister was accusing Lebanon of declaring war against Saudi Arabia as well."58 Prince Turki al-Faisal said in 2016 that Saudi Arabia has "no illusions" about its limited nuclear security capabilities. "We know we have few capabilities in terms of human resources, so that's why we began a very extensive training and skills acquisition program," he said.15 A number of Middle Eastern countries (and the US) have developed their own response to the limitations of the IAEA safeguards system: bombing nuclear facilities suspected of being involved in covert weapons programs. Examples include the destruction of research reactors in Iraq by Israel and the US; Iran's attempts to strike nuclear facilities in Iraq during the 1980−88 war (and vice versa); Iraq's attempted strikes on Israel's nuclear facilities; and Israel's bombing of a suspected nuclear reactor site in Syria in 2007. Most of the above-mentioned attacks were directed at research reactors capable of producing plutonium for weapons, while Iraq attacked the partially-built Bushehr nuclear power plant in Iran in 1987. Israel has threatened to strike nuclear facilities in Iran in recent years. According to a cable released by Wikileaks, King Abdullah urged the US in 2008 to launch military strikes on Iran's nuclear program to "cut off the head of the snake".59 In time, nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia might be the targets of military strikes, either to prevent their use in a weapons program or simply as an act of war or terrorism. Bennett Ramberg, a policy analyst in the US State Department’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs under President George H.W. Bush, wrote in 2014:60 "[W]arfare is rife with accidents and human error, and such an event involving a nuclear plant could cause a meltdown. A loss of off-site power, for example, could be an issue of serious concern. Although nuclear plants are copious producers of electricity, they also require electrical power from other sources to operate. Without incoming energy, cooling pumps will cease functioning and the flow of water that carries heat away from the reactor core ‒ required even when the reactor is in shutdown mode ‒ will stop. "To meet that risk, nuclear plants maintain large emergency diesel generators, which can operate for days ‒ until their fuel runs out. The reactor meltdowns at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi power station in 2011 demonstrated what happens when primary and emergency operating power are cut. "Such vulnerabilities raise troubling questions in the event of a war. Fighting could disrupt off-site power plants or transmission lines servicing the reactor, and could also prevent diesel fuel from reaching the plant to replenish standby generators. Operators could abandon their posts should violence encroach.

#### Causes prolif – even if not, causes enrichment and reprocessing tech

Green 17 [Dr Jim Green is the national nuclear campaigner with Friends of the Earth, Australia and editor of the Nuclear Monitor newsletter, published by the World Information Service on Energy. Is Saudi Arabia going nuclear? April 12, 2017. https://www.wiseinternational.org/nuclear-monitor/854/saudi-arabia-going-nuclear]

Regardless of intent, a nuclear power program would bring Saudi Arabia far closer to a weapons capability. The reactor-grade plutonium produced in the normal course of operation of a reactor can be used in weapons, or reactors can be operated on a short irradiation cycle to produce weapon-grade plutonium. In addition, a nuclear power program would necessarily entail the development of significant nuclear science and engineering expertise which could be redeployed to a weapons program. A nuclear power program could justify the acquisition of other technologies − such as enrichment and reprocessing technology, and research reactors − which might be put to use in a weapons program. (Argentina's INVAP is building a very low power research reactor in Saudi Arabia37 and an October 2017 agreement between KACARE and Russia's Rosatom envisages construction of another research reactor in the Kingdom.

#### Prolif causes nuclear war and terrorism – accidents, brinksmanship, adventurism, and preemptive strikes – all of that makes Middle East war more escalatory

Kroenig 15 [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015]

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program. Nuclear War The greatest threat posed by the spread of nuclear weapons is nuclear war. The more states in possession of nuclear weapons, the greater the probability that somewhere, someday, there will be a catastrophic nuclear war. To date, nuclear weapons have only been used in warfare once. In 1945, the United States used nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, bringing World War II to a close. Many analysts point to the 65-plus-year tradition of nuclear non-use as evidence that nuclear weapons are unusable, but it would be naïve to think that nuclear weapons will never be used again simply because they have not been used for some time. After all, analysts in the 1990s argued that worldwide economic downturns like the Great Depression were a thing of the past, only to be surprised by the dot-com bubble bursting later in the decade and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.48 This author, for one, would be surprised if nuclear weapons are not used again sometime in his lifetime. Before reaching a state of MAD, new nuclear states go through a transition period in which they lack a secure-second strike capability. In this context, one or both states might believe that it has an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. For example, if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, neither Iran, nor its nuclear-armed rival, Israel, will have a secure, second-strike capability. Even though it is believed to have a large arsenal, given its small size and lack of strategic depth, Israel might not be confident that it could absorb a nuclear strike and respond with a devastating counterstrike. Similarly, Iran might eventually be able to build a large and survivable nuclear arsenal, but, when it first crosses the nuclear threshold, Tehran will have a small and vulnerable nuclear force. In these pre-MAD situations, there are at least three ways that nuclear war could occur. First, the state with the nuclear advantage might believe it has a splendid first strike capability. In a crisis, Israel might, therefore, decide to launch a preventive nuclear strike to disarm Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Indeed, this incentive might be further increased by Israel’s aggressive strategic culture that emphasizes preemptive action. Second, the state with a small and vulnerable nuclear arsenal, in this case Iran, might feel use them or lose them pressures. Th

at is, in a crisis, Iran might decide to strike first rather than risk having its entire nuclear arsenal destroyed. Third, as Thomas Schelling has argued, nuclear war could result due to the reciprocal fear of surprise attack.49 If there are advantages to striking first, one state might start a nuclear war in the belief that war is inevitable and that it would be better to go first than to go second. Fortunately, there is no historic evidence of this dynamic occurring in a nuclear context, but it is still possible. In an Israeli–Iranian crisis, for example, Israel and Iran might both prefer to avoid a nuclear war, but decide to strike first rather than suffer a devastating first attack from an opponent. Even in a world of MAD, however, when both sides have secure, second-strike capabilities, there is still a risk of nuclear war. Rational deterrence theory assumes nuclear-armed states are governed by rational leaders who would not intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war. This assumption appears to have applied to past and current nuclear powers, but there is no guarantee that it will continue to hold in the future. Iran’s theocratic government, despite its inflammatory rhetoric, has followed a fairly pragmatic foreign policy since 1979, but it contains leaders who hold millenarian religious worldviews and could one day ascend to power. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as nuclear weapons continue to spread, some leader somewhere will choose to launch a nuclear war, knowing full well that it could result in self-destruction. One does not need to resort to irrationality, however, to imagine nuclear war under MAD. Nuclear weapons may deter leaders from intentionally launching full-scale wars, but they do not mean the end of international politics. As was discussed above, nuclear-armed states still have conflicts of interest and leaders still seek to coerce nuclear-armed adversaries. Leaders might, therefore, choose to launch a limited nuclear war.50 This strategy might be especially attractive to states in a position of conventional inferiority that might have an incentive to escalate a crisis quickly to the nuclear level. During the Cold War, the United States planned to use nuclear weapons first to stop a Soviet invasion of Western Europe given NATO’s conventional inferiority.51 As Russia’s conventional power has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, Moscow has come to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons in its military doctrine. Indeed, Russian strategy calls for the use of nuclear weapons early in a conflict (something that most Western strategists would consider to be escalatory) as a way to de-escalate a crisis. Similarly, Pakistan’s military plans for nuclear use in the event of an invasion from conventionally stronger India. And finally, Chinese generals openly talk about the possibility of nuclear use against a US superpower in a possible East Asia contingency. Second, as was also discussed above, leaders can make a ‘threat that leaves something to chance’.52 They can initiate a nuclear crisis. By playing these risky games of nuclear brinkmanship, states can increase the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. Historical crises have not resulted in nuclear war, but many of them, including the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, have come close. And scholars have documented historical incidents when accidents nearly led to war.53 When we think about future nuclear crisis dyads, such as Iran and Israel, with fewer sources of stability than existed during the Cold War, we can see that there is a real risk that a future crisis could result in a devastating nuclear exchange. Nuclear Terrorism The spread of nuclear weapons also increases the risk of nuclear terrorism.54 While September 11th was one of the greatest tragedies in American history, it would have been much worse had Osama Bin Laden possessed nuclear weapons. Bin Laden declared it a ‘religious duty’ for Al- Qa’eda to acquire nuclear weapons and radical clerics have issued fatwas declaring it permissible to use nuclear weapons in Jihad against the West.55 Unlike states, which can be more easily deterred, there is little doubt that if terrorists acquired nuclear weapons, they would use them.56 Indeed, in recent years, many US politicians and security analysts have argued that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to US national security.57 Analysts have pointed out the tremendous hurdles that terrorists would have to overcome in order to acquire nuclear weapons.58 Nevertheless, as nuclear weapons spread, the possibility that they will eventually fall into terrorist hands increases. States could intentionally transfer nuclear weapons, or the fissile material required to build them, to terrorist groups. There are good reasons why a state might be reluctant to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, but, as nuclear weapons spread, the probability that a leader might someday purposely arm a terrorist group increases. Some fear, for example, that Iran, with its close ties to Hamas and Hizballah, might be at a heightened risk of transferring nuclear weapons to terrorists. Moreover, even if no state would ever intentionally transfer nuclear capabilities to terrorists, a new nuclear state, with underdeveloped security procedures, might be vulnerable to theft, allowing terrorist groups or corrupt or ideologically-motivated insiders to transfer dangerous material to terrorists. There is evidence, for example, that representatives from Pakistan’s atomic energy establishment met with Al-Qa’eda members to discuss a possible nuclear deal.59 Finally, a nuclear-armed state could collapse, resulting in a breakdown of law and order and a loose nukes problem. US officials are currently very concerned about what would happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons if the government were to fall. As nuclear weapons spread, this problem is only further amplified. Iran is a country with a history of revolutions and a government with a tenuous hold on power. The regime change that Washington has long dreamed about in Tehran could actually become a nightmare if a nuclear-armed Iran suffered a breakdown in authority, forcing us to worry about the fate of Iran’s nuclear arsenal. Regional Instability The spread of nuclear weapons also emboldens nuclear powers, contributing to regional instability. States that lack nuclear weapons need to fear direct military attack from other states, but states with nuclear weapons can be confident that they can deter an intentional military attack, giving them an incentive to be more aggressive in the conduct of their foreign policy. In this way, nuclear weapons provide a shield under which states can feel free to engage in lower-level aggression. Indeed, international relations theories about the ‘stability-instability paradox’ maintain that stability at the nuclear level contributes to conventional instability.60 Historically, we have seen that the spread of nuclear weapons has emboldened their possessors and contributed to regional instability. Recent scholarly analyses have demonstrated that, after controlling for other relevant factors, nuclear-weapon states are more likely to engage in conflict than nonnuclear-weapon states and that this aggressiveness is more pronounced in new nuclear states that have less experience with nuclear diplomacy.61 Similarly, research on internal decision-making in Pakistan reveals that Pakistani foreign policymakers may have been emboldened by the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which encouraged them to initiate militarized disputes against India.62 Currently, Iran restrains its foreign policy because it fears major military retaliation from the United States or Israel, but with nuclear weapons it could feel free to push harder. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely step up support to terrorist and proxy groups and engage in more aggressive coercive diplomacy. With a nuclear-armed Iran increasingly throwing its weight around in the region, we could witness an even more crisis prone Middle East. And in a poly-nuclear Middle East with Israel, Iran, and, in the future, possibly other states, armed with nuclear weapons, any one of those crises could result in a catastrophic nuclear exchange.

### 1NC –Space War

#### No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space.

Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want.

It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS.

Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex.

In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!”

First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun.

More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals.

Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted.

The Reality

The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space.

That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern.

More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do.

However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs.

Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming.

Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space.

These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report.

Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

#### No space war – prefer data over political rhetoric

Klimas interviewing Weeden 18 [Brian Weeden, smart space guy. Is the space war threat being hyped? August 3, 2018. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/03/space-war-threat-hype-force-760781]

There’s been increasing rhetoric...about the militarization of space and the potential for conflicts on Earth to extend into space. That’s driven in part by reports about anti-satellite testing in Russia and China...The report really grew out of our frustration at the level of publicly available information on this topic.

A lot of what you get are public statements from military leadership or politicians, or sometimes news articles talking about something and it’s really hard to get down to details and...sort through what might be real, what might be hype. Our goal was to dig into the open source material and see what we could determine from a factual standpoint was really going on -- what types of capabilities were being developed and how might they be used in a future conflict.

Ultimately we hoped that would lead to a more informed debate about what U.S. strategy should be to address those threats.

What sort of feedback have you gotten so far?

A lot of the feedback has been either informal or private because a lot of the issues we talk about, people in the government research using classified materials. So it’s difficult for them to give detailed feedback.

In general, the feedback we’ve gotten has been pretty positive. People have said they like the fact that this sort of stuff is being put in the public domain and encouraged us to continue.

Were your findings better or worse than the picture public discourse paints?

In general, it’s a little bit better. A lot of political rhetoric and news stories focus on the most extreme examples, so using kinetic weapons to blow up satellites. While there is research and development going on to develop those capabilities, what we found is there’s yet to be any publicly-known example of them being used.

What is being used and what seems to be of the most utility are the non-kinetic things, like jamming and cyber attacks. The good news is we have yet to see the most destructive kinetic attacks that can cause really harmful long-term damage to the space environment, but unfortunately we are seeing non-kinetic attacks being used, and that’s likely to continue.

### 1NC- NoKo War

#### No North Korean war or draw-in---all sides have huge incentives to limit conflict

Michael C. Horowitz 18, professor of political science and the associate director of Perry World House at the University of Pennsylvania; and Elizabeth N. Saunders, associate professor of political science at George Washington University, 1/3/18, “Analysis: Why nuclear war with North Korea is less likely than you think,” https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/analysis-why-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-is-less-likely-than-you-think/ar-BBHPJfL

Last night, in response to Kim Jong Un’s claim to have a nuclear button on his desk, President Trump tweeted, “I too have a Nuclear Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than his, and my Button works!” This is not the first time that things have gotten personal in the U.S.-North Korea standoff. Much of the rhetoric between the two leaders and media commentary on the risk of war focuses on the leadership of Trump and Kim — or “Little Rocket Man,” as Trump has called the North Korean leader. But how much could these two singular leaders really propel us to a nuclear war? Trump’s tweets and other actions certainly can increase the risk of conflict — consistent with our research on how the decisions of individual leaders affect military conflict. However, in this case, other factors, including geography and military capabilities, will matter more than tweets or the characteristics of leaders. And these factors reduce the likelihood of war. Leaders can be important for international conflict For the past few generations, political scientists who write about the outbreak of conflict mainly argued that leaders were irrelevant, focusing instead on international factors such as great power relations or domestic political factors such as whether the two countries involved had democratic institutions. But more and more scholarship suggest that leaders make a large difference in determining whether and how countries go to war. And it’s not just in dictatorships such as North Korea; even more constrained leaders, such as U.S. presidents, matter. Leaders’ beliefs and experiences before coming into office can be critical in determining whether a country goes to war and what military strategy will be used in the event of war. But structural forces are strong in this case Even if leaders have discretion, they are constrained by material and situational constraints. No U.S. or North Korean leader can realistically change or avoid some of these constraints. One constraint stems from the two sides’ formidable military capabilities, which mean that a general war with North Korea would be devastating, as Barry Posen argued last year. Even before it acquired a nuclear capability, North Korea’s artillery put tremendous pressure on South Korea. Add to that its missile arsenal — which, as nuclear experts have chronicled, can now probably deliver an intercontinental ballistic missile armed with a nuclear warhead against the United States. A second unavoidable constraint is geography, which may make war less likely. North Korean artillery points directly at Seoul, just 35 miles from the demilitarized zone (DMZ). South Korea may oppose a war, which could influence U.S. behavior. North Korea also borders China, a powerful country whose economic support keeps North Korea afloat. But China faces its own geographic reality with respect to North Korea, and China is increasingly frustrated with North Korea’s behavior. In the event of war, China does not want refugees flooding across the border into China. Yet China also does not want a unified Korean Peninsula with U.S. troops on its border. Indeed, in the Korean War, the United States tested geographic constraints by pushing beyond the prewar dividing line, the 38th parallel, in an attempt to unify Korea. China intervened to prevent such an outcome, and the conflict stopped where it started. All sides know that a war would be a huge and difficult military and political problem. So there are strong incentives to try to deter the other side, rather than escalate. U.S. and North Korean leaders have reason to make war even less likely Although the focus on Trump and Kim almost always suggests that their behavior increases the risk of war, they actually have strong incentives to reduce the prospect of war. Despite rhetoric about North Korea’s irrationality, Kim’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and long range missiles was rational. He wants to stay in power, and nuclear weapons constitute invasion insurance. But a war would probably spell the end of the regime, giving North Korea little reason to start a war. On the U.S. side, few wars have probably been war-gamed more than a conflict on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. decision-makers know how costly a war might be. Knowledge of these costs makes war less likely.