# 1NC vc Taft EL

## 1NC – Off

#### Interpretation: outer space consists of regions outside the atmospheres of celestial bodies

Tanabe 19 [(Rosie, updater and writer at NWE) “Outer space,” New World Encyclopedia, 1/8/2019] JL

Outer space (often called space) consists of the relatively empty regions of the universe outside the [atmospheres](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Atmosphere) of celestial bodies. *Outer* space is used to distinguish it from airspace and terrestrial locations. There is no clear boundary between [Earth's atmosphere](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Earth%27s_atmosphere) and space, as the [density](https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Density) of the atmosphere gradually decreases as the altitude increases.

#### Violaition—The moon has an atmosphere

Siegal 21[(Ethan, a Ph.D. astrophysicist and author of "Starts with a Bang!" He is a science communicator, who professes physics and astronomy at various colleges. He has won numerous awards for science writing since 2008 for his blog, including the award for best science blog by the Institute of Physics.) “The “airless” Moon really does have an atmosphere, after all,” Big Think, November 17, 2021. <https://bigthink.com/starts-with-a-bang/airless-moon-atmosphere/>] RR

And yet, the Moon actually does have an atmosphere: one that’s measurable and detectable. In addition, it has something even better than an atmosphere: an atmospheric “tail” made of sodium atoms. Here’s the fascinating science behind our lunar companion’s tenuous, but nonnegligible, atmosphere, which we mustn’t ignore any longer.

#### Standards:

#### Limits – their interpretation allows for the elimination of private appropriation on Earth, Mars, comets, moons, etc. Given the amount of celestial bodies, that would destroy neg prep burdens since outer space activity is so vague – no generics exist to answer both the earth and the moon aff, so affs would just win with a tiny impact every round.

#### Ground – debates about celestial bodies denies the neg links to core generics that utilize the LEO like debris good, satellites good, water wars DA, etc. – that kills clash by forcing negatives to the fringes of argumentation that disagree with everything and kills fairness by giving the aff a major prep advantage since they only need to frontline the few negative arguments that link to their aff.

#### Fairness and education are voters – debate’s a game, and fairness is necessary to determine the winner of the game, and education is the reason why schools fund debate.

#### Drop the debater – dropping the argument doesn’t rectify abuse since winning T proves why we don’t have the burden of rejoinder against their aff.

#### Use competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since there’s no consensus as to what’s reasonable.

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are logical litmus tests and they incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which turns substance crowdout

## 1NC – Off

#### JCPOA passes now, but it’s tentative and the window is closing

Norman 3/15 [(Laurence, deputy bureau chief at Dow Jones Newswires and The Wall Street Journal based in London) “Russia Softens Iran Demands, Re-Opening Way for Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal, 3/15/2022] JL

Russia walked back recently made demands on Washington related to the Iran nuclear deal, clearing the way for Tehran and Washington to revive the 2015 agreement, senior western diplomats said.

On Tuesday, after Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met in Moscow with his Iranian counterpart, both Mr. Lavrov and Hossein Amir-Abdollahian said Russia wasn’t standing in the way of the accord.

Russia earlier this month had demanded guarantees from Washington that its economic ties with Iran wouldn’t be affected by the Western sanctions imposed on Moscow over Ukraine. The last-minute move was the driving factor that prevented a deal to revive the 2015 nuclear agreement over the past 10 days, western diplomats have said.

The European Union, which coordinates the talks, announced a break in the negotiations on Friday, blaming “external factors” for preventing a deal that is “essentially ready.”

A senior Western diplomat said Tuesday evening that Russia’s chief negotiator at the talks, Mikhail Ulyanov, had informed the EU that Russia would accept narrower guarantees ensuring that Russia could carry out the nuclear work it is mandated to do under the 2015 nuclear deal. That includes a uranium swap with Iran, the redesign of the Fordow nuclear facility and the provision of nuclear fuel to Iranian reactors.

“Russia says happy with guarantees on nuclear projects and not asking for anything else,” said the diplomat, who asked to remain unidentified because of the sensitive nature of the talks. “So we can go ahead with negotiations that are now exclusively US-Iran.”

State Department spokesman Ned Price said Tuesday evening that “we are not going to sanction Russia for undertaking, for participating in nuclear projects that are part of the” nuclear deal.

The negotiations, which have taken place for almost a year now, aim to reach agreement on the steps Washington and Tehran will take to return into compliance with the 2015 agreement, which lifted most international sanctions on Tehran in exchange for tight but temporary restrictions on Iran’s nuclear work.

After the Trump administration took the U.S. out of the accord and reimposed sweeping sanctions on Iran, saying the accord was too weak, Tehran expanded its nuclear work and has now gathered almost enough nuclear high-grade enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, according to the United Nations nuclear agency.

Iran says its nuclear program is purely peaceful and U.S. officials have said there is no evidence Iran has decided to build a nuclear weapon.

Over the weekend, a senior U.S. official told The Wall Street Journal that only “a handful of issues left” remained between the U.S. and Iran to reach an accord, mainly on the issue of the scope of sanctions relief Iran would receive from Washington. The official said the U.S. side felt the resolution of these issues was “within reach.”

The U.S. official and senior European diplomats said they wouldn’t negotiate broad carve-outs from Western sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with Moscow to save the nuclear deal. They warned that if Russia didn’t back off its demands, they would seek to complete an agreement with Iran, bypassing Russia.

Mr. Ulyanov said Tuesday evening on Twitter it was a lie that Russia had stood in the way of the accord with its demands for guarantees. He added that “some demands were accepted.” Iran, which has friendly ties with Moscow, has also continued to blame Washington for not completing the deal.

Negotiations between the U.S. and Iran could resume without negotiators returning to Vienna, where the talks have been held since April 2021, the senior western diplomat said. Iran so far has refused to talk directly with the Americans and instead have negotiated through the European powers at the talks. With so few issues still to be resolved, negotiators could work from capitals to resolve the remaining differences.

Time is pressing. U.S. and European officials say that Iran’s nuclear work has expanded close to a point that the deal’s main benefit to the West—keeping Iran months away from amassing enough nuclear fuel for a nuclear weapon—would be impossible.

European diplomats in particular have warned that with the war in Ukraine becoming ever-deadlier, the diplomatic window for concluding the deal is closing.

#### Space diplomacy directly trades off with nonproliferation agreements – finite manpower, money, and political will within the AVC

Johnson-Freeze 16 [(Joan, Professor and former Chair of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island) “Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens,” Cass Military Studies, 11/8/2016] JL

 \*The plan is legislated in the AVC (same bureau of the State Department that’s concerned with the JCPOA)

Proactive policymaking takes commitment, manpower, and money. A quick look at the money and manpower devoted to diplomacy in the US State and Defense departments compared to the resources available for the hardwareproducing military–industrial complex efforts described in Chapter 5 is enlightening. The Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Verification, and Compliance (AVC) leads space-related diplomacy in the State Department. The AVC Bureau is responsible for “all matters related to the implementation of certain international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements and commitments; this includes staffing and managing treaty implementation commissions.”34 The AVC arms control portfolio includes nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and all related issues. The AVC section charged with space issues is the Office of Emerging Security Challenges; this office also handles missile defense issues and the promotion of transparency, cooperation, and building confidence regarding cybersecurity. As of financial year 2013, AVC had a budget of $31.2 million and 141 employees35 to be active participants and leaders in all of these issues.

By way of comparison, the Space Security and Defense Program, a joint program of the DoD and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was programmed for a similar budget amount in financial year 2015: $32.3 million. That program is described as a “center of excellence for options and strategies (materiel, non-materiel, cross-Title, cross-domain) leading to a more resilient and enduring National Security Space (NSS) Enterprise.”36 A majority of SSDP funding is allocated to the development of offensive space control strategies. So basically, the same budget is allocated for all US global space diplomacy efforts as for an in-house Pentagon think tank to devise counterspace strategies.

Within the Pentagon, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy is charged with all issues related to space policy, including diplomacy. The responsibilities of the Space Policy office are to:

• Develop policy and strategy for a domain that is increasingly congested, competitive, and contested

• Implement across DoD — plans, programs, doctrine, operations — and with the IC and other agencies

• Engage with allies and other space-faring countries in establishing norms and augmenting our capabilities.37

The breadth of those responsibilities, which includes reviewing space acquisitions, means that there may be only a handful of individuals actually engaged in multilateral diplomatic efforts, acting, for example, as advisors to diplomatic discussions such as those through the United Nations. Additionally, the expanse of the Pentagon results in a chain of command that makes organizational competition for attention to subject matter challenging at best. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, who then reports to the Principle Deputy Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, who then reports to the Under Secretary of Defense for Defense Policy. There are also a multitude of space players in other governmental organizations to coordinate and contend with, particularly within the Air Force and intelligence communities. Personnel are spread thin.

US government-wide space diplomacy needs a mandate, manpower, and a supporting budget. Diplomacy, especially multilateral diplomacy, can be timeconsuming, manpower-intensive, and frustrating; and patience is not a strong American virtue. The recent experience in the UN LTS Working Group is emblematic of everything that causes the United States to shun multilateralism. Under the auspices of this group, countries had worked in good faith over the past five years to develop technical guidelines as reciprocal constraints, as insisted upon by the developing countries when they rejected the ICOC. Yet group success appeared thwarted at the February 2016 meeting of the LTS Working Group by one country, Russia.

#### Iranian proliferation goes nuclear – causes regional war and spurs proliferation cascades across the Middle East

Chilton and Hoshovsky 20 – [(Kevin, led U.S. Strategic Command and has participated in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s Generals and Admirals Program; Harry, policy analyst at JINSA’s Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy) "Avoiding a nuclear arms race in the Middle East," Defense News, 2-13-2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/02/13/avoiding-a-nuclear-arms-race-in-the-middle-east/] TDI

This raises two immediate concerns. First, **should Iran race for the bomb, it is** almost inevitable that the United States and/or Israel will take preventative military action **to stop it from crossing that fateful threshold**. This could easily spiral into a regional war as Iran activates its various proxy forces against the United States and its allies.

Second, **an Iranian nuclear breakout attempt could** spur a proliferation cascade throughout the Middle East, **beginning with Saudi Arabia.**

Mohammed bin Salman, **the Saudi crown prince, openly stated in 2018 that if Iran developed nuclear weapons**, Riyadh would quickly “follow suit.” **One suggested approach would see Saudi Arabia purchase a nuclear power reactor from a major supplier like South Korea and then build a reprocessing plant that would yield enough weapons-grade plutonium in five years**.

A half-decade delay isn’t optimal, however, when the goal is achieving nuclear deterrence quickly. Thus, there is the so-called Islamabad option.

This refers to Riyadh’s role in financing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program and an alleged commitment from Islamabad that it would repay the favor. While Pakistani and Saudi officials have denied any such understanding, **there is the possibility that the two could work out an arrangement where Islamabad could deploy some of its nuclear arsenal on Saudi soil following a successful Iranian breakout.**

Although this maneuver would draw sharp, international criticism, in theory, it would allow Riyadh to remain in good standing vis-a-vis the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Nevertheless, Pakistan might not be willing to play spoiler against a nuclearized Iran. If it is, Middle Eastern geopolitics would become extremely unstable.

**If Saudi Arabia acquires nuclear weapons**, many believe Turkey would follow suit. Last September, Turkish President Recep Tayyip **Erdogan declared that he “cannot accept” the argument from Western nations that Turkey should not be allowed to attain nuclear weapons.** In 1958, Charles de Gaulle proclaimed that a nation without nuclear weapons “does not command its own destiny”; two years later, France tested its first bomb. Erdogan’s comments echo those earlier remarks and raise the possibility that Ankara could become the second NATO member to leave the alliance’s nuclear umbrella in favor of its own independent arsenal.

#### Prolif cascades undermine deterrence and cause nuclear war – this is predictive of what a multi-nuclear Middle East would look like

Krepinevich 13 – [(Dr. Andrew F, the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) “Critical Mass: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East,” 2013, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Nuclear-Proliferation-in-the-Middle-East.pdf] TDI

As more countries over time develop nuclear capabilities and build up their nuclear arsenals, the competition will evolve from an Israeli-Iranian affair to a multi-state rivalry. For illustrative purposes **we will assume that** in the 2025-2030 timeframe, **Iran**, **Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and perhaps Egypt** and/or Iraq **have nuclear arsenals** in the low double-digit range (i.e., ten to forty weapons). What form might a nuclear competition among these powers and Israel assume? The remainder of this chapter attempts to shed some light on this issue, and its potential implications, with emphasis on those affecting regional stability.

The challenge of preserving stability when confronted with military competition among five nuclear-armed states within the Middle East and with other powers external to the region engaged in a Great Game for influence is formidable. At first blush, one thing seems apparent: **many** Cold War-era metrics **for assessing the competition and gauging where it might be headed** appear to be of little utility; in fact, **they may actually prove misleading and dangerous**. The same can be said of those looking to apply Cold War-era arms control metrics as a way of keeping the peace in general and avoiding nuclear use in particular.

**During the Cold War, many nuclear strategists came to view nuclear parity** (the possession of roughly equivalent arsenals capable of inflicting roughly equivalent levels of destruction) **between the United States and the Soviet Union as stabilizing**. The perception of these strategists is that the rough equivalence contributed to the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons, and was thus desirable. Parity enabled both sides to avoid the perception of being inferior to their rival, and perceptions are critical to deterrence and to preserving the confidence of one’s allies and security partners. If accepted by both sides, parity could enable them to avoid the cost and instability associated with “racing” toward ever-larger arsenals. Accordingly, maintaining parity was a major objective of U.S.-Soviet (and later U.S.-Russian) arms control negotiations. Yet irrespective of its merits, parity is not an option for states engaged in an n-player competition. Each competitor cannot have a nuclear force equivalent to all the others. Even if the competition should solidify into two coalitions so as to mimic the two-player Cold War competition, questions would almost certainly arise regarding the willingness of a coalition partner that has not been attacked to risk its own destruction by using its nuclear weapons in response to an attack on its ally. Indeed, these concerns were raised during the Cold War, and formed a major justification for France pursuing its own force de frappe. 93

**In a Middle Eastern “n-player” competition, all nuclear powers would be** challenged to establish an “assured destruction” capability **against all the other regional nuclear powers**, another Cold War desideratum, **given their relatively modest economies. An “assured destruction” capability in an n-state competition would require that each state have weapons sufficient to survive an initial attack by all potential rivals and still be able to devastate the countries of all attackers**. It would also require that the source of the attack be reliably identified. As noted earlier, this may prove difficult given likely limitations on these states’ ability to field advanced early warning systems. For example, would Israel be able to determine with confidence the owner of a ballistic missile launched from a location along the Iranian-Turkish border? The origin of any cruise missile launched from a sea-based platform? Even assuming a state could identify the source (or sources) of an attack, could its command and control systems survive the attack sufficiently intact to execute a retaliatory strike? **A decapitation strike could preclude an “assured destruction” retaliatory strike even if sufficient weapons survive to execute one.**

**This, in turn,** raises the possibility of a “catalytic” war**—one that is initiated between two states by a third party. Given a proliferated Middle East as described above, the chances that a regime would incorrectly attribute the source of an attack cannot be easily dismissed. To the extent** cyber weapons can introduce false information **into a state’s decision-making process, the risks of catalytic war only increase.**

Further complicating matters, **the early warning requirement following a proliferation cascade could be multidirectional, and at some point perhaps 360 degrees**, especially if nuclear rivals begin deploying a portion of their nuclear forces at sea. **Early warning requirements would be stressed even further** (and the costs of such a system increase correspondingly) **if a neighboring state** (e.g., Iran in the case of Turkey or Iraq; Turkey in the case of Israel; etc.) **were to acquire nuclear weapons**. In this case warning times would be even more compressed than in an Israeli-Iranian competition. Owing to its proximity to Iran, **Saudi Arabia**, for example, **could have less than five minutes to react to an Iranian ballistic missile attack no matter how advanced its early warning and command and control systems are.**

As noted earlier in this assessment, regardless of what assumptions are made regarding a regional nuclear power’s early warning system, given the short ballistic missile flight times it seems likely that preserving command and control of the state’s nuclear forces while under attack will prove challenging. **States might be tempted to adopt a launch-on-warning posture**, but this requires both early warning and a highly responsive command and control system. Should a state determine that it will not be able to launch-on-warning and instead attempt to “ride-out” a nuclear first strike and retaliate, it would still need its command and control system to function effectively in the wake of the nuclear attack. **Absent a highly resilient command and control system,** a state’s ability to launch a retaliatory **nuclear strike** may require nuclear release authority to be diffused to lower-level commanders. But again, absent an effective early warning system it may not be possible to determine the attack source with confidence in a region with multiple nuclear powers.

#### AND—The JCPOA returns Iran to global oil markets – increased supply and perception solve market volatility

Shokri 3/3 [(Omid, visiting research scholar at the School of Policy and Government at George Mason University and is an analyst at Gulf State Analytics (GSA) who specializes in energy security, author of US Energy Diplomacy in the Caspian Sea Basin: Changing Trends Since 2001) “Can Iranian oil stabilize a volatile market?” Atlantic Council, 3/3/2022] JL

As fuel prices skyrocket following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, another major supplier of oil and natural gas is poised to play an important role.

Before Donald Trump‘s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal and the imposition of sanctions on Iran’s oil exports, Iran produced 3.8 million barrels of oil per day. Afterwards, this dropped as low as 1.9 million barrels and currently it is about 2.4 million barrels. It will take time for the country’s production to return to pre-sanction levels due to this significant drop as well as low levels of investment in recent years. However, Iran’s oil and gas condensate reserves in tankers, as well as onshore oil storage facilities, will help Iran accelerate its exports which currently total more than 1 million barrels per day.  Some sources predict that with the lifting of the sanctions, Iran could ship an additional 500,000 barrels of oil per day to international markets from April to May, and by the end of this year this figure could reach an additional 1.3 million barrels per day.

All of this assumes that current talks in Vienna on reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) are successful. Without sanctions relief, any new disruptions in US supplies could boost oil prices beyond $100 a barrel to as high as $150. As reported by GasBuddy**,** the United States is already struggling to cope with its highest level of inflation in four decades. The price of gasoline has risen about $4 a gallon in many parts of the country since the Ukraine crisis began.

Iran has said that it is ready to increase its oil exports significantly if sanctions imposed by the Trump administration are lifted, but it will take time to restore relationships with customers in Europe and Asia. In February, officials from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) traveled to Seoul, the capital of South Korea, to hold talks with several refineries on the prospects for resuming oil deliveries.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) has increased its forecast for demand growth in 2022, stating that global demand for oil will increase by 3.2 million barrels per day this year to a record 100.6 million barrels per day. These forecasts show that there is a market for more oil and that this is an opportunity for producers to increase oil sales and export revenues.

Iran will clearly be a major beneficiary of this increase if it can resolve its problems with the United States over a return to the JCPOA.  Iran is asking the US government to remain committed to the deal in the event of a change of administration in Washington. But this is something that President Joe Biden, or any other US leader, cannot promise. Tehran must decide whether it is worthwhile to reach an agreement that could last only three years.

After the JCPOA went into implementation in 2016, Iran increased its oil production much faster than expected. Most analysts had predicted that Iran would increase its production by 500,000 barrels per day within a year after the lifting of sanctions, but in fact Iran reached this figure in less than four months, and by the end of the year had increased production by nearly one million barrels.

After sanctions were reimposed following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, Iran stored oil in tankers. It is estimated that Iran has stored more than 85 million barrels of oil and gas condensate at sea. These supplies can be exported rapidly if sanctions are lifted.

The elimination of important oil exporting countries from the market has major ripple effects. Other producers often raise prices and pursue their own interests. Even if Iran returns to the market, not all problems of oil and gas will be solved, but an Iranian return can have a major psychological impact in helping the oil market move towards equilibrium. There is also the possibility that Iran can play a role in replacing Russian gas exports to Europe.

#### High oil prices and volatility cause nuclear war

King 8 [(Neil King, Global Economics Editor for the WSJ), Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, September, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS\_Working%20Paper\_PeakOil\_King\_Sept2008.pdf] TDI

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round an d very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

## 1NC – Off

#### Interpretation: The aff may not defend that a subset of appropriation should ban

#### Limits – there are countless affs accounting for every subset of space actors, like nations and companies – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like space col good, the heg DA, Xi DA, and the NewSpace econ DA, because the link is premised on reducing space privatization across the board – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### Violation—they only defend lunar mining

#### Paradigm issues – cx from above

## Case

### Proper

#### No private sector— your ev is about NASA sponsored projects, means the aff can’t solve.

#### Private sector thumps—no ev on how privates are key only that they have more incentives but if country do want as much resources as possible they can circumvent

### Resource Wars

#### No resource conflicts in space—communication in squo solves

Hickman 07 [(John, associate professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at Berry College) “Still crazy after four decades: The case for withdrawing from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,” Space Review, 9/24/2007] JL

The second argument is that competition for territory in space could cause military conflict as it did competition between the powers on Earth in previous centuries. The argument misunderstands history and thus makes a poor analogy. In fact, the gunpowder empires found more reasons and locations to wage war close to home much more often than in distant colonial possessions. Imperial competition for vast amounts of the Earth’s surface was often resolved peacefully. In the late 18th century and continuing into the 19th century Britain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and the United States divided Australasia and the central island Pacific without war. Britain, the United States, and Imperial Russia successfully negotiated a resolution of their claims to northwestern North America in the mid 19th century without war. During the “Scramble for Africa” Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and Italy divided sub-Saharan Africa without fighting one another, the results of which were recognized at the Congress of Berlin. To be sure, wars were fought in these new colonial territories but they were wars between colonizers and the colonized. Thus, any future competition for sovereign territory on celestial bodies is highly unlikely to lead to war because spacefaring states are capable of negotiating their different claims and because there are no extraterrestrial natives anywhere else in the Solar System who might object to national appropriation. Our solar system would be a more interesting place if Martians did exist but they are conspicuous by their absence.

### Space War

#### Space wars don’t cause escalation

James Pavur 19, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science at Oxford University and Ivan Martinovic, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training at Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space”, 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle T. Minárik, S. Alatalu, S. Biondi, M. Signoretti, I. Tolga, G. Visky (Eds.), <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>

A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

#### No one’s going to war over satellites

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more.

The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.