# 1NC vs Apple Valley

## 1NC-Off

#### Interpretation—: Debaters must disclose new affirmatives on the wiki 30 minutes before they are read in round- disclosure can occur on the wiki, over message or email.

#### Violation—SS. Proves they didn’t

Graphical user interface, text, application, email

Description automatically generated

#### Net benefits -

#### 1 - Testing: There are hundreds of potential aff positions, disclosure of the aff directs pre-round prep which ensures the debate is about the substance of the position as opposed to generics, which is key to nuanced clash and in depth debate. Their interpretation forces the negative to read frivolous theory or kritiks with overly broad points of disagreement with the aff.

#### 2 - New does not mean better: Your interp encourages debaters to try to win rounds with surprise strategies as opposed to well researched positions, which kills predictability and iterative content mastery.

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start – tournament rules says they should lose the roundGraphical user interface, text, application Description automatically generated

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

## 1NC – Off

#### Xi is consolidating unprecedented political power – that’s only possible with strong PLA support

Chang 21 [(Gordon, columnist, author and lawyer, has given briefings at the National Intelligence Council, the CIA, and the State Department, JD from Cornell Law School) “China Is Becoming a Military State,” Newsweek, 1/14/2021] JL

At this moment, the Communist Party is taking back power from all others in society, including the State Council, and the military is gaining influence inside Party circles.

Why is the People's Liberation Army making a comeback? The answer lies in succession politics.

Xi Jinping was selected the top leader because he was not identified with any of the main factional groupings—like the Communist Youth League of Hu Jintao or the Shanghai Gang of Jiang—that dominated Party politics. Xi, in short, was the least unacceptable choice to the Party's squabbling factional elders.

Xi, once chosen, apparently decided that in order to rule, he needed a base, so he made certain officers the core of his support. As longtime China watcher Willy Lam told Reuters in 2013, Xi Jinping's faction is the military.

And with the help of the military, Xi has accumulated almost unprecedented political power, ending the Party's two-decade-old consensus-driven system and replacing it with one-man rule.

As Wang, a professor at the Georgia Institute of Technology, notes, Xi, with the amendments to the National Defense Law, is demonstrating his power of "leading everything and everyone." He is wrapping that effort in a "rule by law" move that is formalizing his perch at the top of the Chinese political system.

How is Xi using his newfound power? There is a hint in the National Defense Law amendments. These changes, Fisher tells us, "increase the powers of the CMC to mobilize the civilian sector for wartime and to better authorize the CMC to engage in foreign military exercises to defend China's 'development interests.'" As such, the changes "point to China's ambition to achieve 'whole nation' levels of military mobilization to fight wars, and give the CMC formal power to control the future Chinese capabilities for global military intervention."

"The revised National Defense Law also embodies the concept that everyone should be involved in national defense," reports the Communist Party's *Global Times*, summarizing the words of an unnamed CMC official. "All national organizations, armed forces, political parties, civil groups, enterprises, social organizations and other organizations should support and take part in the development of national defense, fulfill national defense duties and carry out national defense missions according to the law."

That sounds like Xi is getting ready to pick even more fights with neighbors—and perhaps the United States. On January 5, he ordered People's Liberation Army generals and admirals to be prepared to "act at any second."

Why would Xi want to start a war? "This is really indicative of there being instability in China, and Mr. Xi seeking to consolidate power around himself. ...The new National Defense Law essentially removes the alternative power base of the premier of the State Council, in this case Li Keqiang, from interfering with Mr. Xi's own power ambitions," said Charles Burton of the Ottawa-based Macdonald-Laurier Institute to John Batchelor, the radio host, earlier this month. As Burton noted, the amendments to the National Defense Law undermine Premier Li Keqiang, the head of the State Council and long-standing rival to Xi.

"I think this really gives the green light for him to dispatch the military on any pretext that he feels is necessary to defend his power," Burton says. "China is becoming a military state."

#### The plan alienates the PLA – they view space dominance as the linchpin of China’s legitimacy – specifically, public-private tech development is key

Economic Times 20 [(Economic Times, Indian daily newspaper, internally cites Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation and the Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, former analyst in the International Security and Space Program at the Office of Technology Assessment, BA in Politics from Princeton University) “China attempting to militarize space as it seeks to modernize its military power,” 8/31/2020] JL

The Jamestown Foundation, a US think-tank, hosted a webinar on August 19 entitled "China's Space Ambitions: Emerging Dimensions of Competition." One presenter, Dean Cheng, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, noted that Beijing's space programme is linked to China's central concept of comprehensive national power. "This is basically how the Chinese think about how they rack and stack, how they compare with other countries."

China recognises that military power is important, but it is not the only factor in being a great power. Cheng drew a parallel with the former USSR, where military power alone did not ensure survival of that communist state. Other comprehensive national power factors are political unity, economic power, diplomatic strength, science and technology, and even culture. "Space touches every one of these aspects in comprehensive national power, and that is a part of why Chinese see space as so important."

Indeed, a strong space industrial complex will generate benefits that ripple through the rest of China's economy. Furthermore, he said space achievements "promote pride within China, especially for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ... It's symbolic of how far China has come," he said, and "it gives the CCP legitimacy".

China is pushing into space services, including satellite launches, satellite applications and Earth observation/satellite imagery for others. Satellite customers include Belarus, Laos, Pakistan and Venezuela, for example, attracting hard currency and influence. Cheng said most underestimate the impact this has, as such countries grow almost totally dependent on Chinese equipment, assets and training over time. Incidentally, China could have manufactured back doors into these systems for foreigners to allow it access.

Mark Stokes, Executive Director at the US-based Project 2049 Institute think-tank, said in the same webinar that PLA requirements have always been fundamental to development of Chinese space capabilities. Potential PLA space missions in support of joint warfighting in a crisis include targeting (battlefield surveillance, electronic reconnaissance and ocean surveillance), communications, PNT services (obtaining target data, navigation information, navigation support and timing services), space jamming (encompassing space communications, radar, electro-optical and PNT) and space protection.

Stokes said the end of 2015 was "significant" for Chinese space efforts because consolidation of end-users under the PLA's Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) occurred, specifically within the Space Systems Department. In terms of developing and meeting requirements, the PLASSF is now "much more efficient," the American analyst posited.

Indeed, China created its space force in 2015, just a few months after Russia. After formally establishing its Space Force in December 2019, the US is still getting its equivalent off the ground. Cheng said both China and Russia have been pushing to militarise space, even though such a term is probably meaningless given that 95 per cent of space technology has dual applications for both military and civilian use. Certainly, outer space can no longer be viewed as a sanctuary.

Stokes said that "not much has changed really in terms of the space launch infrastructure and the launch, tracking and control of space ... but they are now integrated with end-users, and that is going to have an effect on making the whole system more efficient."

China has freedom of action in space, and the creation of the PLASSF and consolidation of space/counter-space research, development and acquisition, as well as training and operations, have benefitted from a single integrated command. The PLA's ability to interfere with American military operations in places like Taiwan will continue to grow yearly.

Cheng said, "The Chinese see future war as revolving around joint operations, which are not just land, air and sea forces." They also include the outer space and electronic warfare domains, which are necessary for information dominance." China, therefore, wishes to deny an adversary like the US the use of space, plus it needs to give the Chinese military every advantage.

China has therefore developed the ability to target hostile space-based assets (from the ground or space) and their all-important data-links. Indeed, jamming and electronic warfare complement anti-satellite weapons (which China has already tested), any of which can achieve effective mission kills against US and allied satellites. Stokes has not yet ascertained which agency is responsible for satellite kinetic kills, but it could well be the PLA Rocket Force, which is traditionally very tightly controlled by the Central Military Commission.

A detailed report entitled China's Space and Counter-space Capabilities and Activities, prepared for the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, was published on March 30. Its authors, Mark Stokes, Gabriel Alvarado, Emily Weinstein and Ian Easton, summarised China's counter-space capabilities as follows.

"China has an operational counter-space capability that will evolve through 2020 and out to 2035. These capabilities include anti-satellite kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) and space electronic countermeasures ... On the non-kinetic side, the PLA has an operational ground-based satellite electronic countermeasures capability designed to disrupt adversary use of satellite communications, navigation, search and rescue, missile early warning and other satellites through use of jamming."

China obtained its first ground-based satellite jammers from Ukraine in the late 1990s, but it has developed its own solutions since then. "The PLA is capable of carrying out electronic countermeasures to disrupt, deny, deceive or degrade space services. Jamming prevents users from receiving intended signals and can be accomplished by attacking uplinks and downlinks.

The PLA and defence industry are developing and deploying jammers capable of targeting satellite communications over a large range of frequencies, including dedicated military communication bands. The PLASSF also has advanced cyber capabilities that could be applied in parallel with counter-space operations."

Nonetheless, the report asserted that the US still assumed a technological lead in space.

"China also is carrying out research, development and testing on potential space-based counter-space systems. The PLASSF and defense industry have carried out advanced satellite maneuvers and are likely testing orbital technologies that could be applied to counter-space operations." The PLASSF Network Systems Department probably oversees satellite jamming operations.

#### That factionalizes the CCP and emboldens challenges to Xi – the PLA is increasingly powerful and not unconditionally subservient

Simpson 16 [(Kurtis, Centre Director with Defence Research and Development Canada, has been conducting research on China’s leadership, Communist Party politics, the People’s Liberation Army and foreign policy for over 30 years,Master’s Degree and a Ph.D from York University, previously served as an intelligence analyst at the Privy Council Office and leader of the Asia Research Section at the Department of National Defence’s Chief Defence Intelligence (CDI) organization) “China’s Re-Emergence: Assessing Civilian-Military Relations In Contemporary Era – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 12/21/2016] JL

Paralleling divided loyalties between Chinese Party, military and government bodies, one must also recognize that within each, factions exist, based upon generational, personal, professional, geographic, or institutional allegiances.19 These minor fault lines are most pronounced during crises, and they continue independent of professionalization.20 As was demonstrated by the civil-military dynamics of the Chinese government’s suppression of student demonstrators, both divisions and allegiances of interests emerged with respect to how to contain this situation and factional interests largely determined which troops would carry out the orders, who commanded them, what civilian Party leaders supported the actions, and who would be sanctioned following the mêlée. A consequence of factionalism within the PLA is that the Party’s control mechanisms (particularly because rule of law and constitutional restraints on the military are weak) needs to be robust to control not only a single military chain of command but (particularly during crises) perhaps more than one. This is not likely the case. A review of the evidence indicates the military’s influence, on the whole, is increasing, and the Party’s control decreasing.

On one level, the Party clearly controls the military as the Central Military Commission or CMC (the highest military oversight body in the PRC) is chaired by a civilian, President Xi Jinping. Moreover, the PLAs representation on formal political decision-making bodies (such as the Politburo Standing Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the NPC) has decreased over the years, but this does not necessary equate to a reduced level of influence. For example, the two Vice-Chairman of the CMC are now military generals, as are the remaining other eight members. Irrespective of institutional membership, military leaders retain considerable say. Personal interactions and informal meetings with senior party elites provide venues to sway decisions. They do, also, hold important places on leading small groups dedicated to issues like Taiwan and other security questions, such as the South China Seas.21

In a similar vein, other methods of Party influence, as exercised through political commissars, party committees, and discipline inspection commissions are no longer empowered to enforce the ideological dictates of a paramount leader. In the face of diffuse reporting chains, competing allegiances, and often effective socialization by the military units they are supposed to be watching over, most do not provide the Party guardian and guidance function once so pervasive.

While perhaps overstated, Paltiel’s observation that “…China’s energies over the past century and half have given the military a prominent and even dominant role in the state, preempting civilian control and inhibiting the exercise of constitutional authority” is likely now truer than ever before in history.22 While still loyal to the party as an institution, the PLA is not unconditionally subservient to a particular leader and retains the resources to enter the political arena if (at the highest levels) a decision is made to do so.

The civilian-military trend lines evident in China since the end of the Cultural Revolution affirm that the symbiotic nature of the Party-PLA relationship has morphed in important respects since the late 1960s. The promotion of professionalism, a reduced role for ideological indoctrination, an increasing bifurcation of civil-military elites, and growing state powers (complete with divided loyalties and continued factionalism) has complicated the political landscape informing how the CCP interacts with the PLA. If, as postulated, we have moved from a fused, ‘dual role elite’ model to one of ‘conditional compliance’ in which the military actually holds a preponderance of the power capabilities and where its interests are satisfied through concessions, bargaining, and pay-offs, empirical evidence should reflect this. A review of China’s three major leadership changes since the transition from the revolutionary ‘Old Guard’ to the modern technocrats confirms this.

Formally anointed and legitimized by Deng in 1989, Jiang assumed leadership without military credentials and few allies, viewed by many as a ‘caretaker’ Party Secretary in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre. Despite his limitations, Jiang was well versed in the vicissitudes of palace politics. Informed by a high political acumen, he immediately promoted an image as an involved Commander-in-Chief, personally visiting all seven military regions, a sign of commitment not made by either the likes of Mao or Deng. Symbolic gestures like this were bolstered by his providing incentives to the PLA, such as: consistent raises in the defence budget; funds for military modernization; as well as equipment, logistics, and augmented R&D.23

Referred to as the ‘silk-wrapped needle,’ Jiang marshalled Party resources to not only reward, but to punish.24 His institutional authority over appointments enabled him to manipulate factions, dismiss those who opposed him, enforce new rigid retirement standards, and promote loyalists. A delicate equilibrium was established during the early-1990s until his semi-retirement in 2004,25 where Jiang guaranteed military priorities such as supporting ‘mechanization’ and an ‘information-based military’ (promoting the concept of RMA with Chinese characteristics) in exchange for the PLA backing of his legacy contributions to Marxist Leninist Mao Zedong thought with the enshrinement of his “Three Represents” doctrine.

Like Jiang, Hu Jintao’s succession was the product of negotiation, compromise, and concessions. While neither opposed by the PLA, nor supported by the military ‘brass,’ Hu was a known commodity, having served as Vice-President (1998) and CMC Vice-Chairman since 1999. He was deemed acceptable until proven otherwise. In the shadow of Jiang (who retained the position of CMC Chair until 2004), Hu did not exert the same kind of influence in, nor engender the same kind of deference from, China’s military, but equally proved capable of fostering a pragmatic relationship with the army which ensured its interests, and in so doing, legitimized his leadership position.

Ceding much of the military planning and operational decisions to the PLA directly, Hu played to his strengths and focused upon national security issues (such as the successful resolution of SARs in China), which bolstered his credibility as a populist leader among the masses, indirectly increasing his power within both the military and the Party. Additionally, he focused upon foreign military security affairs (most notably, North Korea-US negotiations), which enabled him to link his personal political agenda with the military’s latest ambitions.

In according the military a distinct place in China’s national development plan, supporting China’s rise, and ensuring its vital interests, Hu recognized the military’s evolving requirement to ‘go global’ and its worldwide interests in non-combat operations, such as peacekeeping and disaster relief, as well as stakes in the open seas, outer space, and cyberspace as interest frontiers with no geographic boundaries.26 Under the slogan of ‘China’s historical mission in the new phase of the new century’ and his acquiescence to the PLA’s stated requirements ‘to win local wars under modern conditions’ by funding new technology acquisition, Hu received the army’s formal recognition for his contributions to military thought based upon “scientific development” which informed a “strategic guiding theory,” resulting in a new operational orientation for China’s military. Emulating his predecessor, Hu won ‘conditional compliance’ from the PLA by successfully bartering military needs and wants for the army’s support and endorsement of his political tenure. This was not done outside of self-interest. Hu, as did Jiang, skillfully coopted, fired, and promoted select Generals to serve his greater ends, and he did this through varied means. Ultimately, however, it was done in a manner acceptable to the military.

Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2012, while replicating the ‘horse-trading’ of Jiang and Hu, marks a fundamental departure in leadership style. Often described as a transformative leader, Xi is openly critical of his predecessors and rails against earlier periods where reform stalled and corruption grew.27 An advocate of ‘top-level design,’ incrementalism is being supplanted by a massive attempt to centralize all aspects of the CCP’s power, which includes a major restructuring of the economy, government, administration, and military.

Nicknamed “the gun and the knife” as a slight for his attempts to simultaneously control the army, police, spies, and the ‘graft busters,’ Xi’s power appears uncontested at present. Nevertheless, he is also viewed as ‘pushing the envelope too far’ and endangering the equilibrium which has been established between the Party and PLA over the past 25 years. For example, only two years into his mandate, he fostered a Cult of Personality, “the Spirit of Xi Jinping” which was officially elevated to the same standing as that of Mao and Deng, by comparison, foundational figures in Chinese history. His open attacks of political ‘enemies’ (most notably Zhou Yongkang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and former security czar) breeds fear among almost every senior official, all of whom are vulnerable on some point. Equally true, an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign is inciting comrades to turn on comrades, not unlike a massive game of prisoner’s dilemma.

Nowhere is the pressure for reform greater than in the PLA. Xi advocates administering the army with strictness and austerity, promoting frugality and obedience. At his direction, “mass-line educational campaigns” designed to “rectify work style” through criticism and self-criticism are being implemented.28 Ideological and political building is now equated with army building, as a means of ensuring the Party’s uncontested grip over the troops ideologically, politically, and organizationally. Select military regions (those opposite Taiwan and adjacent to the South China Seas) and commanders from those regions are witnessing favoritism and promotion at the expense of others. Moreover, a new “CMC Chairmanship Responsibility System” has been instituted, which directly calls into question the support of some of Xi’s senior-most generals.

A ‘hardliner’ by nature, Xi recognizes that he must earn the support of the PLA. New military priorities he supports include: accelerating modernization; Joint Command and C4ISR; training; talent management, as well as equipment and force modernization. That said, his goal of achieving the Chinese dream of building a “wealthy, powerful, democratic, civilized, and harmonious socialist modernized nation” by 2021, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP, is exceptionally ambitious. It will require endless commitments to competing interests in a period of economic stagnation and global economic downturn. Should the PLA come to believe they are not first in line for government largess, support for Xi could erode very quickly.29

#### CCP instability collapses the international order – extinction

Perkinson 12 [(Jessica, MA in international affairs from American University) “The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American University School of International Service, 2012] JL

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast. Not only does China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct investment, economic stability and trade. China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait. For the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic. As the United States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive goods to feed demand within the US.

It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the stability of the international order as a whole. For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - forreform of the CCP should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one, it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability, particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

#### Independently, Xi will lash out to preserve cred in the SCS – US draw-in ensures extinction

Mastro 20 [(Oriana Skylar, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute) “Military Confrontation in the South China Sea,” Council on Foreign Relations, 5/21/2020] JL

The risk of a military confrontation in the South China Sea involving the United States and China could rise significantly in the next eighteen months, particularly if their relationship continues to deteriorate as a result of ongoing trade frictions and recriminations over the novel coronavirus pandemic. Since 2009, China has advanced its territorial claims in this region through a variety of tactics—such as reclaiming land, militarizing islands it controls, and using legal arguments and diplomatic influence—without triggering a serious confrontation with the United States or causing a regional backlash. Most recently, China announced the creation of two new municipal districts that govern the Paracel and Spratly Islands, an attempt to strengthen its claims in the South China Sea by projecting an image of administrative control. It would be wrong to assume that China is satisfied with the gains it has made or that it would refrain from using more aggressive tactics in the future. Plausible changes to China’s domestic situation or to the international environment could create incentives for China’s leadership to adopt a more provocative strategy in the South China Sea that would increase the risk of a military confrontation.

The United States has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea. Maintaining free and open access to this waterway is not only important for economic reasons, but also to uphold the global norm of freedom of navigation. The United States is also at risk of being drawn into a military conflict with China in this region as a result of U.S. defense treaty obligations to at least one of the claimants to the contested territory, the Philippines. China’s ability to control this waterway would be a significant step toward displacing the United States from the Indo-Pacific region, expanding its economic influence, and generally reordering the region in its favor. Preventing China from doing so is the central objective of the U.S. National Security Strategy and the reason the Indo-Pacific is the U.S. military’s main theater of operations. For these reasons, the United States should seek ways to prevent Chinese expansion, ideally while avoiding a dangerous confrontation and being prepared to deftly manage any crises should they arise.

China considers the majority of the South China Sea to be an inalienable part of its territory. Exercising full sovereignty over this area is a core component of President Xi Jinping’s “China Dream.” China does not accept or respect the sovereignty claims of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, or Vietnam in this region. Although China has been cautious in pressing its claims thus far, three developments could convince Xi that China should be more assertive.

Xi could feel compelled to accelerate his timeline in the South China Sea to maintain his consolidated position within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), particularly if the political situation in Hong Kong worsens, peaceful reunification with Taiwan becomes less likely, or domestic criticism of his management of the novel coronavirus outbreak increases. With China’s economic growth for 2020 projected to hit only 1.2 percent—the lowest since the mid-1970s—Xi could find it necessary to demonstrate strength while Beijing deals with internal fallout from the pandemic. China has already declared two new administrative districts in the South China Sea in April 2020 and has escalated its criticism of U.S. freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) in the area. Moreover, with expectations that the first stage of China’s military modernization efforts will be completed in 2020, Xi could become more confident that China would succeed in pressing its claims militarily, especially if the United States is distracted internally with managing the coronavirus pandemic or its aftermath.

## 1NC – Case

### UV

#### Yes 1ar theory but reasonability and drop the arg – disincentives going all in on theory too early which kills topic ed and checks 2ar judge psychology - no such thing as infinite abuse in finite speech times and 2ar collapse solves time tradeoff – intervention’s inevitable so intervene for substance

### Framing

**Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

**Reducing the risk of extinction is always priority number one.   
Bostrom 12** [Faculty of Philosophy and Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford.], Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.  Forthcoming book (Global Policy). MP. http://www.existenti...org/concept.pdfEven if we use the most conservative of these estimates, which entirely ignores the   possibility of space colonization and software minds, **we find that the expected loss of an existential   catastrophe is greater than the value of 10^16 human lives**.  **This implies that the expected value of   reducing existential risk by a mere one millionth of one percentage point is at least a hundred times the   value of a million human lives.**  The more technologically comprehensive estimate of 10  54 humanbrain-emulation subjective life-years (or 10  52  lives of ordinary length) makes the same point even   more starkly.  Even if we give this allegedly lower bound on the cumulative output potential of a   technologically mature civilization a mere 1% chance of being correct, we find that the expected   value of reducing existential risk by a mere one billionth of one billionth of one percentage point is worth   a hundred billion times as much as a billion human lives. **One might consequently argue that even the tiniest reduction of existential risk has an   expected value greater than that of the definite provision of any ordinary good, such as the direct   benefit of saving 1 billion lives.**  And, further, that the absolute value of the indirect effect of saving 1  billion lives on the total cumulative amount of existential riskâ€”positive or negativeâ€”is almost   certainly larger than the positive value of the direct benefit of such an action.

### Top Level

#### C1 Distributeive: the aff cause more resource scarcity

#### Starlink is key to rural broadband expansion

Weinschenk 2/25 [(Carl, IT and telecom journalist for Telecompetitor, Teleco Transformation, and IT Business Edge) “Report: Starlink Looks Very Promising for Rural Broadband,” Telecompetitor, 2/25/2021] JL

SpaceX’s Starlink satellite broadband service has the potential to be a game changer for rural broadband, according to an analysis by PCMag of Starlink speeds. The analysis is based on beta tester data exclusively provided to it by Ookla Speedtest.

The site looked at data from rural, suburban and urban areas. Among its more than 10,000 users in its semi-public beta were “a perplexing” number in urban and suburban areas where a variety of high-speed options already are available. The story cites Chicago, Seattle and Minneapolis as places where there were testers, despite readily available alternatives.

The site compared download speeds against other fixed service providers in 30 counties with at least 30 samples in any month from December 30 to February 24. The counties in which the fixed providers had the biggest speed advantage over Spacelink were urban or suburban: Los Angeles and Santa Clara counties, CA; Cook County, IL; King County, WA and Washington County, MN.

It is in rural areas that Starlink shines, according to the research. The five counties in which Starlink had the biggest download speed advantage over the fixed group were rural: Vilas County, WI; Ravali County, MT; Waldo County, ME; Okanogan County, WA and Lamoile County, VT.

The number of counties in which Starlink beat the fixed providers and those in which the fixed providers beat Starlink appeared to be about equal, as was the speed differential.

“Our own analysis shows that Starlink will make the biggest difference in rural, low-density, low-population counties with few options other than lower-quality satellite services,” wrote Sascha Segan, author of the PCMag article about Startlink rural speeds.

#### Broadband is key to precision agriculture transition

ABI 19 [(American Broadband Initiative, a leading force in driving changes across Federal Agencies to identify and remove barriers to broadband access and leverage public assets and resources to expand our Nation’s broadband infrastructure capacity.) “A Case for Rural Broadband,” The United States Department of Agriculture, 4/2019] BC

HOW E-CONNECTIVITY WILL TRANSFORM THE BUSINESS OF AGRICULTURE

Across the agricultural production cycle, farmers and ranchers can implement digital technologies as other modern businesses are doing, enhancing agriculture by driving decision-making based on integrated data, automating processes to increase operational efficiency, improving productivity with tasks driven by real-time insights, augmenting the role of management in the business of farming, and creating new markets with extended geographic reach.

These patterns of digital transformation create fundamental shifts in agricultural production, developing new ways of working that make the industry more productive, attractive, and financially sustainable for farmers and ranchers. Tech companies which stand to benefit from industry transformation continue to capitalize on these shifts by developing new technologies, which according to one recent study, may help position themselves to capture a portion of an estimated $254 billion to $340 billion in global addressable digital agriculture market.13

BUSINESS MANAGEMENT shifts decisionmaking from instinct to integrated data

Precision Agriculture is transforming the way producers collect, organize, and rely on information to make key decisions. Traditionally, producers’ long-term experiences have created a competitive advantage: years of experiments have produced insights and instincts about the land they have farmed and the animals they have raised. But the volume of data that is possible

to collect today can accelerate that learning curve, helping producers learn faster and more rapidly adapt to market shifts—particularly on new fields and with new animals—and creating more nuanced insights, enabling them to act on leading indicators. This creates a disparity between producers who can utilize high-speed Internet service and those who cannot. Examples include the ability to do the following:

create decision tools to help farmers and ranchers estimate the potential profit and economic risks associated with growing one particular crop over another • decide which fertilizer is best for current soil conditions • apply pesticides in targeted areas of the field, to control pests rather than applying pesticides over the entire field • use limited water resources more effectively • respond to findings of sensors that monitor animal health and nutrition

Better choices about what, where, and when to plant, fertilize, and harvest—or breed, feed, and slaughter—can drive above-average returns by removing unrecognized inefficiencies and scaling insights.

DIGITIZATION shifts supply chain management and resource allocation from generic to precise

Precision Agriculture helps make the business of farming more efficient by minimizing inputs— such as raw materials and labor—and maximizing outputs.

For example, previous research has found that 40 percent of fields are over-fertilized, which not only inflates the cost of inputs but also results in 15 percent–20 percent yield loss suffered from improper fertilizer application.14 Precise application of inputs, such as fertilizer, herbicides, and pesticides, allows farmers to adjust inputs to location-based characteristics and use exact amounts needed, which saves money and increases sustainability due to more efficient resource stewardship. Improved fertilizer, soil, and water use can significantly improve water quality with less runoff and reduce climate gas emissions, which is important since agriculture accounts for 10-15 percent of worldwide emissions.15 Despite reductions in necessary inputs, Next Generation Precision Agriculture helps maintain or increase yields, leading to significant gains in efficiency14.

Real-time insights also improve logistics. When growing melons, for instance, real-time data can help farmers overcome challenges in storing and shipping their products. Melons should be stored in an optimal refrigeration environment to minimize spoilage, and real-time precision sensors can reduce spoilage by alerting staff to suboptimal variations in temperature and humidity, allowing the execution of remedies before major losses occur. When refrigerated storage is full or the market price is at a peak, the “Internet of Things” can provide real-time information about where trucks are located and locating customers to market products to help make the sale.

LABOR EFFICIENCY boosts productivity by automating routine processes and enabling real-time response

Connected devices equip farmers with a clear picture of their operations at any moment, making it possible to prioritize tasks more effectively and triage the most pressing issues. While routine inspection and scouting has typically been a regular part of farm management and has increased farm profitability14, connected technologies can track, sense, and flag where a producer should focus their time and attention that day. Similarly, e-connectivity has allowed rural farms to access new training resources and high-skilled labor that has not been previously available.

#### Food insecurity causes state collapse, nuclear war, and terror – extinction

DeFeo 17 [(Michael, Regional Organizing Director at Arizona Democratic Party who graduated in 2019 with a bachelor’s degree in political science from Gettysburg College) “Food Insecurity and the Threat to Global Stability and Security in the 21st Century” Inquires Journal, 2017] BC

Poor Institutional Capacity

Although the developed world experiences food insecurity, it is the lack of infrastructure and government institutions in developing countries that contribute to civil wars and state fragility. Foreign exchange shortages can provoke food and fuel scarcities that force governments to spend less on essential services and public goods. Accordingly, citizens see their medical and educational entitlements melt away. Such circumstances create breeding grounds for internal conflict.

All violent conflicts destroy land, water, and social resources for food production. Developing countries do not have massive industrial machines that can remedy such losses, therefore, the population will suffer. Food insecurity is a recruitment tool for violent extremist groups. Promising food and water to a starving population, especially in urban areas, makes recruiting young and disgruntled youth easier (Messer & Cohen, 2015). Syria had limited institutional capacity to deal with the mass displacement, and that lead to a civilian revolt and recruitment into the Islamic State.

Countries that fail to provide their people with basic services often experience gross economic inequality, and even human-rights violations, as was the case in both Syria and Sudan. Both countries are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs). LDCs are distinguished not just by their widespread poverty, but also by their structural weaknesses in economic, institutional, and human resources that make them unable to maintain stability during a drought. The combination of drought and political instability or violence led to famine in Somalia (another LDC) in 2011. Even with urgent humanitarian action, the country still plunged into chaos and violence (Messer & Cohen, 2015). Severe drought, like Somalia's, may result in crop failure in major food producing areas, which in turn is a significant threat to social stability and peace (Wischnath, 2014).

Sometimes droughts of exceptional severity (and the civil unrest that follows) are attributed to climate change, especially in particularly arid regions. Scholars are divided on whether climate change actually impacts civil conflict. That is why African countries like Somalia and Sudan are prime case studies. Africa has the lowest percentage of irrigated land in the world. Agriculture is the most important sector of most African countries. Very high percentages of civilians in African countries live in rural areas. Those characteristics combined with low economic and state capacity make African, particularly sub-Saharan African countries the most vulnerable to climate change and civil instability. Africa experiences more civil conflict than other parts of the world, therefore, it is possible to argue that a lack of climate variability effect on civil conflict in Africa would make it unlikely to cause civil conflict in other parts of the world (Koubi et al., 2012). Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon attributed the conflict in Darfur to an ecological crisis arising “at least in part from climate change” (Ki-moon, 2007). The Fourth Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change assessed that climate change will continue to worsen. As it does, it will increase food shortages, which may lead to conflict (AR4, 2007). The report also stated that forced displacement and rising social instability is the most likely result of food insecurity. This is almost exactly what happened in Syria. The first step towards conflict might be food riots, which often occur during a food shortage or when there is an unequal distribution of food. These are usually caused by food price increases, food speculation, transport problems, or extreme weather. In 1977, Egyptians became so desperate for food that they attacked shops, markets, and government buildings just to obtain bread and grain (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013).

Moreover, civil war can create economic opportunities for certain groups, so they try to avoid resolving the conflict. Urban elites in Somalia profited tremendously off of internal conflict because of the absurd amount of foreign aid that was pumped into the country and then largely stolen (Shortland, Christopoulou, & Makatsoris, 2013). Once a country experiences a food shortage, it may lead to protests, riots, and violence. This all contributes to state instability, but it is not the state alone that suffers. If one country fails, it creates a crisis that could destabilize an entire region.

State Failure and the Threat to Regional Stability

Although fragile governments in developing countries are at a heightened risk for internal conflict that could topple them, that risk also threatens the country’s neighbors. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Afghanistan found itself alone in regional trade. Without a guaranteed source of cereal, the government had to turn to Iran and Pakistan for support in order to avoid its own collapse (Clarke, 2000). Unlike Afghanistan, many other developing countries have been unable to work together on food and water security. Thirteen of the twenty-two members of the Arab League rank among the most water-scarce nations on the planet. Food cannot be grown without water. The majority of the world is engaged in some sort of agreement with neighboring countries to share water supplies, but thirty-seven countries still do not share their water resources (El Hassan, 2014). Lack of cooperation can cause civil as well as interstate conflict. South Sudan legally has no share of the Nile River and the effects of that lack of water access have been mass starvation and violence.

The effects of climate change, water shortages, and mass migrations have resulted in acute food insecurity not just in Syria, but across the region (El Hassan, 2014). Food insecurity, plus an increase in the prices of staple foods have destabilized much of the area. The Arab Spring was the beginning of multiple conflicts that have affected countries like Syria, Egypt, and Libya. In Syria, food insecurity resulted in mass violence and has now created an international crisis involving multiple world powers.

Food insecurity is such a threat to entire regions because people cannot live without food and people want to live. When a region experiences food scarcity and that population feels threatened by hunger, it will relinquish dependency on any political authority and take up arms in order to ensure its well-being (Paveliuc-Olariu, 2013). This is human survivalism. It is important for developing countries in areas that are at risk for food insecurity to formulate policy that ensures aid goes to the food insecurity hotspots so as to maintain stability.

South Sudan experienced what happens when countries do not work together to feed their people. After gaining its independence from Sudan in 2011, 360,000 South Sudanese refugees returned to the country. This influx of human beings, coupled with drought conditions exacerbated economic strain and drove food prices up. The increases were the result of trade restrictions between Sudan and South Sudan. The overall reason for the food crisis, however, was the government's preoccupation with fighting a political and quasi-ethnic civil war rather than negotiating fair access to the Nile River (Tappis et al., 2013). Because of South Sudan’s weak institutions, it has done little to address the food shortage. That inability to solve the problem fuels insurgent recruitment that continues the bloodshed in South Sudan. The conflict is keeping regional rivalries alive with Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Sudan; all of whom have attempted to intervene in South Sudan militarily to bring about stability (Council on Foreign Affairs 2016). Aside from South Sudan, multiple conflicts across Africa are consuming massive amounts of diplomatic, political, and humanitarian resources in a region that faces a multitude of threats.

South Sudan, Somalia, and Syria are all failing states that are experiencing huge food shortages, humanitarian crises, and most importantly, extreme civil violence. South Sudan is mired in a civil war. Somalia is controlled by warlords and terror organizations. Syria has both of those problems. Conflict has turned these countries into “breeding grounds of instability, mass migration, and murder” rather than sovereign states with a monopoly on violence and control over their borders (Rotberg, 2002). To be sure, failing states are a concern because of their ability to destabilize entire regions, but states at risk for failure are also very important. Countries like Pakistan that are politically unstable and have food and water shortages could result in uncontrollable civil upheaval (The Fund for Peace, 2016).

Global Consequences of State Failure

Failing states and destabilized regions are not just a problem for the developing world. They are a very real concern for the United States and other developed countries as well. The Islamic State fed off of the Syrian Civil War and helped destabilize Iraq, Syria, Libya, and even Afghanistan and the Philippines. They have at also inspired terror attacks in Europe and the United States. They are a threat to both the developed and developing world. State instability allows them to recruit and train without government interference, which in turn allows them to plan attacks outside the region. An important source of income for the Islamic State has been agriculture from Iraq and Syria. While this revenue has received less media attention than oil extraction, it is still an important part of their economy (Jaafar & Woertz, 2016). It is also a key aspect of their political legitimacy because it allows them to feed their soldiers and those they control. Controlling some of the most fertile regions of the two countries has also helped the Islamic State starve off areas that have resisted them (Jaafar & Woertz, 2016). If Syria or Iraq are ever going to stabilize, those breadbaskets must be retaken and the food must reach the civilians in the cut off areas.

In the 20th century, state failure had few implications for international peace and security. Thanks to globalization, that is no longer the case. Failed states pose a threat to themselves, their neighbors, and the entire international community (Rotberg, 2002). Islamic State - inspired terror attacks in Belgium and France are a direct result of state collapse in Syria and Iraq. Preventing states from failing, rather than having to intervene militarily when they do, ought to be a top priority in the foreign policy of rich nations. Although the situations in Syria, Somalia, and South Sudan seem beyond repair, nation-building projects have had success in the past. Tajikistan, Lebanon, Cambodia, Kosovo and East Timor are all examples of relatively successful attempts to put failing states back on the right track (Rotberg, 2002). Developed countries must have the political will to ensure that people in developing countries are fed so that they remain pacified. It is often severe food insecurity that precedes ethnic or religious violence, as has been the case in South Sudan, therefore, adequate food is paramount to avoiding humanitarian crises that accompany ethnic and sectarian conflict (The Economist, 2016).

While it is true that many developed countries, especially the United States, are weary of providing so much financial aid and intervening militarily in war-torn, developing countries, it is imperative that the rich do not abandon the poor to a fate of internal destruction. Money must not be thrown blindly towards humanitarian crises and military intervention must be the last resort. Developed countries provided $1.4 billion for humanitarian aid in South Sudan in its first year of independence, but without specific conditions, that money went to kleptocrats rather than infrastructure projects or public services (The Economist, 2016).

Paying to help developing nations is expensive and will continue to be so. Afghanistan and Iraq are proof of that. But the war on terror, repeated military intervention, and humanitarian aid are expensive as well. In 2002, Robert Rotberg suggested that a new Marshall Plan was required for places like Afghanistan, the DRC, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Sudan. If it is true that food and water security are the keys to keeping relative peace in new and developing countries and their collapse threatens the safety of the developed world, it seems logical that assisting those countries is wise.

In 1999, Susan L. Woodward argued that military leaders focus too much on force versus force combat rather than the issues of insurgency and terrorism in failed states. In 2017, military leaders have adjusted their strategies accordingly. Woodward believed that globalization made states less important, but their failure would still be felt around the world. Failed states cannot exercise their monopoly on violence and they cannot control their borders, thus threatening more than just the failed state (Woodward, 1999). Because state failure is so consequential, the United States military must continue to look into measures it can take to prevent it.

The Threat of the Future

Finally, the threats from food shortages in South Sudan, Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria are important to the United States and the international community at large, but there is one country that, while it is not a failing state right now, could easily become one if the wealthy nations of the world do not ensure its stability. That country is Pakistan. The Fund for Peace ranked Pakistan as the 14th most fragile state in the world in 2016, giving it a “High Alert” designation for state failure (The Fund for Peace, 2016). Its Demographic Pressure Indicator was an 8.9 - 10.2 Although it improved by one-tenth of a point last year, its decade trend is worse by seven-tenths of a point and its five-year trend is worse by four-tenths of a point, suggesting that the food situation is actually worsening overall (The Fund for Peace, 2016). If internal conflict and potential state failure at its most basic level begins with food and water insecurity, then Pakistan could become a real problem very soon.

Considering the risk of state failure, Pakistan poses the greatest threat to the rest of the world because of the existence of nuclear weapons within the country. Pakistan is not a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet it has about 120 nuclear weapons. It also has a Shaheen 1A ballistic missile that can reach targets 550 miles away (Pakistan Defence, 2015). Should a food crisis arise in Pakistan that results in civil war and governmental collapse, those weapons could end up in the hands of a group that intends to use them maliciously as an act of terror. That prospect should be incentive enough for the developed countries to realize that they cannot and must not leave food insecure countries to devour themselves.

While it is difficult to argue that food insecurity immediately and directly causes civil conflict, there is no denying that people need food and water and will fight to survive. In South Sudan, ethnic and political armies fight one another. In Syria, rebels and government forces fight each other while also fighting the Islamic State. And in Somalia, warlords and their armies fight. The Syrian Civil War began six years ago after a water shortage forced thousands of migrants into urban centers. Developing countries tend to be most affected by climate change, poor governance, and food price increases. Therefore, they are the most prone to instability that may lead to outright violence. Without the wherewithal to handle civil conflict, these countries may become fragile or even failing states. Once that happens, they represent a threat not just in their region of influence, but the whole world. That is why the developed Western nations must pay attention and provide aid to the developing world in order to maintain stability. There will be more food crises in developing countries in the future, but if the North has the strength to continue aiding the South, perhaps it will be able to curb mass starvation and avoid the horrendous violence that consumes starving countries.

#### Can’t solve global north will always find a way to circumvent- they will use this to an advantage and through the aff they don’t know which countries will give the money or when only that they will do so

#### C2 – Efficiency

#### Cant discourage- aff ev from 20 years ago more recently updated shows how this isnt true and if the aff ev about how countries are very ruthless means they will try to exploit the auctioning off from the UN as much as possible