## 1NC - Off

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not spec a government

#### 1] The letter “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” – the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance

CCC ND Capital Community College [a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation], “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### 2] Government is an indefinite singular– the aff may not defend a specific set of governments

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 Sept 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a *definite singular* since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with *bare singulars* (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to government:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that China ought to have the unconditional right to strike does not entail that those governments ought to have the unconditional right to strike.

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a recognition is universal and permanent

#### Violation – they defend the EU

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh:

#### T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here

#### Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution

#### It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### Standards:

#### Limits – there are 195 affs accounting for hundreds of governments— unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs.

Banerjee 4/12 [(Vasabjit Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mississippi State University),”How many states and provinces are in the world?” , The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-many-states-and-provinces-are-in-the-world-157847>, April 12, 2021] SS

There are 195 national governments recognized by the United Nations, but there are as many as nine other places with nationlike governments, including Taiwan and Kosovo, though they are not recognized by the U.N.

Most of these countries are divided into smaller sections, the way the U.S. is broken up into 50 states along with territories, like Puerto Rico and Guam, and a federal district, Washington, D.C.

They are not all called “states,” though: Switzerland has cantons, Bangladesh has divisions, Cameroon has regions, Germany has lander, Jordan has governorates, Montserrat has parishes, Zambia has provinces, and Japan has prefectures – among many other names.

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like the econ DA which rely on all governments having the unconditional right to strike because individual governments don’t have an impact on the global economy as a whole – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## 1NC - Off

#### Business Confidence is high now – best surveys.

ICAEW 8-20 8-20-2021 "Business confidence remains at record high as economy gets sales boost" <https://www.icaew.com/about-icaew/news/press-release-archive/2021-news-releases/business-confidence-remains-at-record-high-as-economy-gets-sales-boost> (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales)//Elmer

Friday 20 August 2021: **Business confidence** has **hit a record high** for the second quarter in a row, a survey of chartered accountants published today has found. Business confidence at record **high for second consecutive quarter**, ICAEW survey finds Strong sales growth projections key to confidence boost Companies face new challenges as economy reopens Business confidence has hit a record high for the second quarter in a row, a survey of chartered accountants published today (FRIDAY 20 AUGUST 2021) has found. Sentiment tracked by ICAEW’s Business Confidence Monitor™ (BCM) found **optimism at 47 on the quarterly index**, its **highest** level **since** the **survey was launched** in 2004 and surpassing the previous record set last quarter. [1] The optimism was **shared by businesses of all sizes across all sectors, nations and regions** in the UK. The record reading was a likely reflection of the expectation of strong sales growth in the year ahead, especially in the domestic market where a record rise of 7.4% is predicted over the coming 12 months. Companies also expect a sharp boost in export sales, which will rebound to pre-pandemic rates of increase. [2] However, the likelihood of confidence remaining positive is highly dependent on the COVID-19 situation not deteriorating further, ICAEW said. Decisions on interest rates, the winding down of support schemes, such as furlough, could also have an impact on future business sentiment. Office for National Statistics figures published last week showed that Britain’s economy grew 4.8% between April and June, below the 5% that the Bank of England had forecast. Michael Izza, ICAEW Chief Executive, said: “Business confidence has now hit record levels for two quarters in a row - companies are clearly benefitting from rising customer demand as the economy reopens and life begins to return to normal. The high level of optimism is unsurprising but it remains vulnerable to a possible resurgence of COVID-19 as we head into the autumn. “While confidence is high across all sectors, with companies reporting record expectations for domestic sales growth, they also told us they **face challenges from** **skills shortages**, wage increases and rising costs. “This is a crucial stage for the economy. Despite having to cope with the winding down of government financial support and possible interest rate rises, businesses are definitely bouncing back, but **finances are fragile** and any **additional costs could threaten** the recovery.”

#### Specifically, EU business confidence is high now and increasing.

**CEIC 21**, [CEIC 2021 updated monthly "EU Business Confidence Growth, 1986 – 2021," CEIC, <https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/european-union/business-confidence-growth>] Adam

European Union Business Confidence Growth

1986 - 2021 | MONTHLY | % POINT | CEIC DATA

Key information about EU`s Business Confidence Growth

European Union Business Confidence grew 23.5 % in Sep 2021, compared with an increase of 25.0 % YoY in the previous month.

EU Business Confidence: YoY Change is updated monthly, available from Jan 1986 to Sep 2021, with an averaged rate of 0.3 %.

The data reached an all-high of 41.9 % in Apr 2021 and a record low of -38.4 % in Mar 2009.  
CEIC calculates monthly Business Confidence Change from monthly Industrial Confidence Indicator. The European Commission's Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs provides Industrial Confidence Indicator with range from -100 to 100 with neutral point 0. Contribution of member-states data to EU-wide aggregate is weighted according to the country's gross value added at constant prices by the Industry sector excluding Construction. Business Confidence covers Manufacturing sector only. European Union stands for EU27 excluding UK.

View European Union's Business Confidence Growth from Jan 1986 to Sep 2021 in the chart:

#### Corporate optimism, specifically investment, drives self-sustaining recovery.

Van der Welle 7-7 Peter Van der Welle 7-7-2021 “How capex holds the key to a self-sustaining economic recovery” <https://www.robeco.com/latam/en/insights/2021/07/how-capex-holds-the-key-to-a-self-sustaining-economic-recovery.html> (Strategist within the Global Macro team, M.A. in Economics from Tilburg University)//Elmer

Title: How capex holds **the key to a self-sustaining economic recovery**. **Capital expenditure** to fix supply shortages and meet burgeoning demand is seen figuring strongly in the post-Covid recovery. [Author and summary omitted]. **Companies** are **expected to invest heavily** in new equipment and capacity as they seek **to meet** the pent-up **demand released from** economic **reopening**. “The world is emerging from the pandemic, and much of the focus has been on the release of huge pent-up demand for goods and services that have been inaccessible for much of the past year,” says Peter Van der Welle, strategist with Robeco’s multi-asset team. “But there is a bigger issue regarding the ability of companies to supply these goods and services, due to the supply side constraints that have emerged through economic reopening. We believe this is powering a resurgence in capital expenditure by companies, and those which are investing in new equipment to meet greater demand will be the more sought after stocks.” Capex intentions Van der Welle says this trend can already be seen in the US Federal Reserve’s Capex Intentions Index, which shows that steep year-on-year increases in capital expenditures are planned. “So, that's **promising for** a near-term **rebound** in the capex cycle,” he says. “The market has already picked up on that theme because you can see a clear outperformance of capex-intensive stocks compared to the broader market year to date.” Fiscal dominance Van der Welle says five elements support the multi-asset team’s view that capex will rise from here onwards. “The first is the overarching macroeconomic picture in that we are increasingly moving towards an environment of fiscal dominance and away from one that has been monetary-led via quantitative easing,” he says. “Central banks have pursued very easy monetary policies, but they have hit the nominal lower bounds with regard to policy rates.” “This is a hard constraint because real rates are difficult for central banks to push even lower than they are nowadays, given the strong consensus among both central bankers and market participants that inflation is transitory.” Big spending plans For stimulus, fiscal policy is better suited to address the negative supply shock that Covid-19 has posed. Fiscal dominance can be seen in the huge infrastructure spending planned in the US, with the USD 1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan already in motion, and the USD 2 trillion American Jobs Plan going through Congress. In Europe, the disbursement of the EUR 750 billion EU Recovery Fund is due to start later in July. “An era of f**iscal dominance** is able to **say goodbye to** the secular **stagnation** thesis, which holds that the economy is suffering from under-investment,” says Van der Welle. “Under-investment due to insufficient demand, which was the biggest problem after the global financial crisis, has become less likely.” “We saw very subdued consumption growth both in the US and elsewhere between 2009 and 2019. That story is reversing in the US. Households’ income has been supported by fiscal policy during the Covid-19 recession, while burgeoning consumer demand in the reopening phase could prove to be more sticky as employment prospects continue to improve in the medium term.” Tobin’s Q looks good A third reason to expect higher capex is driven by ‘Tobin’s Q’ – the market value of a company divided by its assets' replacement cost. If this ratio is above one, then corporates have an incentive to invest directly in the underlying assets rather than buying another company at market value to acquire the same assets. The Tobin’s Q ratio is currently at 1.7 for the US. “So it's very expensive to do M&A, and it is wiser for corporates to invest in the underlying capital goods themselves,” Van der Welle says. “We should therefore expect a gradual move away from M&A activity towards companies making direct investments in capital goods.” Supply-side constraints The fourth element is the severe supply-side constraints seen in the global economy, as capacity shut down during the pandemic. “This is reflected in the ISM Prices Paid Index, which reached an all-time high in June in reflection of rampant shortages of raw materials and labor,” says Van der Welle. “Clearly the issue today following the pandemic is not demand related, but supply related. This will also trigger more awareness to push the productivity frontier and incentivize capital expenditure.” Less reliance on labor The fifth element is the partial substitution from labor to capital in the US against the backdrop of lingering labor shortages. “A decline in the labor force participation rate shows that people are not quickly returning to the labor force, as they have been disincentivized by the subsidies and pay checks they have gained from the stimulus plans, and/or structural changes in their work/life balance due to the pandemic,” says Van der Welle. “When the cost of labor becomes more expensive, substituting labor with capital becomes more attractive for employers. Typically, the inflection point for capex intentions becoming positive is when unit labor costs rise by more than 2% year on year, which is the case today.” Capex will lengthen the earnings cycle Regarding earnings, **there is a** significant **relationship** **between** capex intentions and productivity, though the lag from intending to invest to actually getting a realized productivity gain is quite long – up to several years. **Higher capex that eventually brings higher productivity** **growth will sustain the earnings cycle**, Van der Welle says. Higher productivity gives corporates more pricing power because they suppress unit labor costs, and that means profit margins can stay elevated for longer.

#### Business confidence is the best indicator for growth.

Khan 20, Hashmat, and Santosh Upadhayaya. "Does business confidence matter for investment?." Empirical Economics 59.4 (2020): 1633-1665. (Economics Professor at Carleton University)//Elmer

Abstract Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output. Whether it has information about future investment is, however, unclear. We determine how informative business confidence is for investment growth independently of other variables using US business confidence survey data for 1955Q1–2016Q4. Our main findings are: (i) **business confidence has predictive ability for investment growth**; (ii) remarkably, business confidence has **superior** forecasting power, relative **to conventional predictors**, for investment downturns over 1–3-quarter forecast horizons and for the sign of investment growth over a 2-quarter forecast horizon; and (iii) exogenous shifts in business confidence reflect short-lived non-fundamental factors, consistent with the ‘animal spirits’ view of investment. Our findings have implications for improving investment forecasts, developing new business cycle models, and studying the role of social and psychological factors determining investment growth. Introduction Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output, especially during economic downturns, and receives attention from the media, policymakers and forecasters. Somewhat surprisingly, the direct link between business confidence and investment has not yet been investigated. Our paper fills this gap. We provide a quantitative assessment of the information in business confidence for future investment growth, after **controlling for** the conventional determinants such as **user cost, output, cash flow and stock price**. Understanding the predictive power of business confidence is valuable along three dimensions. First, it can help forecasters and policymakers improve their investment forecasts. Second, it can provide a rationale for explicitly including **business confidence**—either **as causal or** as **anticipatory**—**in** theoretical models of **business cycles**. Third, it can help motivate studies on the how investment managers’ social and psychological circumstances influence investment decisions over and beyond rational cost-benefit analyses.Footnote1 We consider the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)’s business confidence index for the USA as a measure of business confidence and ask the following three questions.Footnote2 Does business confidence have independent information about future business investment growth? Does it have forecasting power for investment downturns? Does it help in making directional forecasts—the positive or negative movements in the trajectory of investment growth? Previous literature that used business confidence has primarily studied its predictive properties for variables other than investment. Heye (1993) examines the relationship between business confidence and labour market conditions in the USA and other industrialized countries. Dasgupta and Lahiri (1993) show that business sentiments have explanatory power of forecasting business cycle turning points. Taylor and McNabb (2007) find that business confidence is procyclical and plays an important role in forecasting output downturns. Although we focus on business confidence, our paper is related to a large body of previous research that has studied consumer confidence or sentiment and its ability to forecast macroeconomic variables. Leeper (1992) finds that consumer sentiment does not help predict industrial production and unemployment, especially when financial variables are taken into account. On the other hand, Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) reject the hypothesis that consumer sentiment does not predict output. Carroll et al. (1994), Fuhrer (1993), Bram and Ludvigson (1998), Ludvigson (2004) and Cotsomitis and Kwan (2006) find that the consumer attitudes have some additional information about predicting household spending behaviour. Lahiri et al. (2016) employ a large real-time dataset and find that the consumer confidence survey has important role in improving the accuracy of consumption forecasts. Christiansen et al. (2014) find that consumer and business sentiments contain independent information for forecasting business cycles. Barsky and Sims (2012) find that consumer confidence reflects news about future fundamentals and a confidence shock has a persistent effect on the economy. More recently, Angeletos et al. (2018) quantify the role of confidence for business cycle from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. They construct a measure of confidence within a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework by taking the linear combination of the VAR residuals that maximizes the sum of the volatilities of hours and investment at frequencies of 6–32 quarters. Their measure likely captures a mixture of consumer and business confidence and is, therefore, distinct from the survey-based measure that we use in our analysis. We find that business confidence leads US business investment growth by one quarter. It leads structures investment, which is one of the major components of business investment, by two quarters. Our **empirical analysis shows** that **investors’ confidence has** statistically **significant predictive power for** US business investment **growth** and its components (equipment and non-residential structures) after **controlling for other determinants of investment**. To better gauge the role of business confidence for investment growth, we also perform Out-Of-Sample (OOS) test for 1990Q1–2016Q4. Our findings suggest that the OOS test results are similar to the in-sample test results.Footnote3 While, as we found, business confidence has predictive power for total investment, it may also contain additional information on the trajectory of investment as captured by downturns and directional changes. This information would be of interest to policymakers in assessing the economy’s near-term outlook, over and above the general ability of business confidence to forecast investment. Indeed, we find that contemporaneous correlation between business confidence and investment growth rises during NBER recession dates. This property of the data suggests that it is worthwhile to explore the forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns and directional changes. Towards this end, we define investment downturns as business investment growth below the sample average for more than two consecutive quarters.Footnote4 Using a static probit forecasting model, we assess the OOS forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns for 1990Q1–2016Q4. A key finding of this approach in the literature is that term spread and stock price contain information for forecasting US recessions (Estrella and Mishkin 1998; Nyberg 2010; Kauppi and Saikkonen 2008). We follow a similar approach and find that business confidence has statistically significant forecasting power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons in the US economy. It has stronger forecasting ability than the traditional predictors such as term spread, credit spread and stock price at 1–3-quarter forecast horizons. We also find strong evidence that the business confidence has good incremental predictive power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons, controlling for other predictors of downturns.

**Economic decline causes global nuclear war**

**Tønnesson 15** [(Stein, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University) “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311, 2015] SJDI

Several **recent works** on China and Sino–US relations **have made** substantial **contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances** a combination of **nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers**. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that **interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict** are right. **Interdependence raises the cost of conflict** for all sides **but** **asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations** may **generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that** in turn **increase the risk of military conflict** (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, **decisions for war** and peace **are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations**. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. **If leaders** on either side of the Atlantic **begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s** decline then they **may blame** this on **external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain** respect or **credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and** ultimately **refuse to be deterred by** either **nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly**, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions **in East Asia** are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more **precarious**. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. **This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so**. **Deterrence could lose its credibility**: one of the two **great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional** limited **war**, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

the process and to involve employees in mapping out the solutions to each work environment challenge.

#### Nuclear war causes extinction – famine and climate change

Starr 15 [(Steven, Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program and a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility) “Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction,” Federation of American Scientists, 10/14/2015] DD

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs.

Following the detonation (in conflict) of US and/or Russian launch-ready strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke (up to 180 million tons, according to peer-reviewed studies), which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere. [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts.]

The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere.

Once in the stratosphere, the smoke (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a dense stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere. Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia. [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences.]

Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer. Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years?

The results of such a scenario are obvious. Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death.

Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed, resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet.  Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment?

## 1NC - Off

#### The European Union should:

#### Merge the position of President of the Commission with that of President of the European Council and publicize all declarations of candidacy and debates between candidates

#### Merge the position of President of the Eurogroup with that of Vice-President of the Commission to create a Minister of Finance

#### **Mandate biannual Interparliamentary Conferences**

#### Create a Eurozone subcommittee

#### Adopt a system of proportional representation for the European Parliament

#### Solves EU legitimacy — only the counterplan implements necessary reforms that solve a weak executive, infighting, and popular discontent AND avoids the link to democracy, no bearing on populist leaders.

Chopin 16 [(Thierry, Associate Professor at the European School of Political and Social Sciences, Assistant Director of the ESPOL-LAB Research Center, visiting Professor at the College of Europe (Bruges), teaches at Mines ParisTech, previously served as Head of Research at the Robert Schuman Foundation, a French Think-Tank on EU affairs based in Paris and Brussels, scientific advisor to the Strategic Analysis Center (Policy Planning Staff of the French Prime Minister) and advisor at the Policy Planning Staff of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, associate expert at the Center for International Studies of Sciences Po (CERI) and Visiting Fellow at the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), PhD in political science from the School for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences), “Euro zone, legitimacy and democracy: how do we solve the European democratic problem?,” Robert Schuman Foundation, 4/4/2016] JL

The economic crisis raises a challenge in terms of leadership, coherence and efficacy for the governance of Europe [12]. In a situation of crisis, which demands that the European Union and its Member States provide answers to the problems that they are experiencing, Europeans are discovering with frustration the limits of European governance and its "executive deficit" [13]: weakness of the European executive; the polyarchic nature of the community institutions and its corollary, a lack of clear political leadership; competition between the European institutions and the Member States; slowness and unpredictability of the negotiation process between Member States. As for the euro zone, leadership is assumed by the ECB which has no other power but its own and which has no strong political correspondent; the lack of an executive more legitimate than the Eurogroup is a particular problem in this instance.  
With this in view solving the problem of Europe's "executive deficit" necessarily implies the creation of a clearer, more legitimate and more accountable leadership:  
  
The President of the Commission leader of a parliamentary majority, representing (appointed in advance) of a political group which has won the greatest number of seats in the European Parliament  
This interpretation of article 17.7 TEU seems to have been fulfilled - with the election of Jean-Claude Juncker as the President of the Commission in 2014. However we shall have to wait until 2019 to see whether this procedure has set a precedent that will be respected in the future by all of the players in the institutional game.  
It is the inevitable point of departure for any agenda that aims to politicise the functioning of the European Union. However since the Treaties are ambiguous on this issue, this acquis is still a fragile one. Indeed the European political parties must first play ball and then the European Parliament has to be able to assert itself before the Council which may - as was also the case in 2014 - aspire to interpret the latter article in a minimalist manner.  
However, even if this measure became the norm, without adapted supportive measures, it would not be enough.  
The merger of the position of President of the Commission and President of the European Council.  
The Convention, which laid out the project for the European Constitutional Treaty, did not go as far as this for fear of giving too much power to one single person. But the Lisbon Treaty does not reject this possibility in the future: the European Council would simply have to appoint the same person for two seats, which would lead to greater coherence, thereby substituting the danger of competition inherent to the present system. It was in order to open up this path that the ban on the accumulation of European posts with a national mandate was retained in the Lisbon Treaty, whilst that with another European mandate was withdrawn. It offers the following advantages:  
- It avoids rivalry that is potentially damaging to the efficacy and legibility of the Union's work;  
- It would allow the European Union to speak with one voice;  
- It would create a position high in democratic and intergovernmental legitimacy;  
- It would simplify the European institutional structure and lend it a more personal aspect, which undoubtedly is a necessary prior condition to greater identification (whether this is positive or negative) between the Union and its citizens.  
Using this possibility would imply definitively granting a major political role to the President of the Commission, who would enjoy community and intergovernmental legitimacy and be politically accountable to the European Parliament.  
A modification of this type does not require the modification of the treaties. An interinstitutional agreement would suffice [14].  
This single President could be elected by indirect universal suffrage according to the model in force in most of the 28 Member States (appointment by parliament), which would suppose that the European Council commits - even informally - to the appointment of the candidate put forward by the majority party or coalition in the European Parliament to the post of President of the Commission.  
As the treaties stand the European Council is allowed to propose as President of the Commission the candidate put forward by the winning party in the European elections (which would be in line with the obligation provided for in the treaties that the European Council takes the result of these elections into account) and elect as President of the Council the President of the European Commission.  
In the meantime a revision of the appointment procedure of the President of the European Council is called for.  
The appointment of H. Van Rompuy, just as that of D. Tusk was the result of an opaque negotiation between the heads of State and government, without public debate open to the citizens. As long as the appointment of the holder of this position does not evolve towards a merger with the Presidency of the Commission, a procedure that becomes a high point in European debate will have to be developed by:  
- demanding a real declaration of candidacy, together with a clear political programme by each candidate, and at the same time ruling out the possibility of this person acceding to this post without fulfilling this prior condition;  
- organising a public hearing of the candidates and a public debate between them;  
- making the debate and the vote of the European Council on this issue public.  
The position of President of the Eurogroup should be merged with that of Vice-President of the Commission responsible for the euro, in order to create a Minister of European Finance who is accountable to the European Parliament [15].  
- He would use the Eurogroup work group for the preparation and follow-up to euro zone meetings and the Economic and Financial Committee in view of meetings involving all of the Member States.  
- Under his command he would have the General Secretariat of the Treasury of the euro zone whose remit would depend on the goals of on-going budgetary union (notably via insurance mechanisms and existing budgetary instruments). The recent creation of an independent European budgetary committee might provide a solution which would circumvent a risk inherent to this merger: the European Minister of Finance being able to "*demand sanctions against a State and then chair the Council during which this proposal would be validated or rejected?" [16]; the independent European budgetary committee would be able to "externalise the supervision of excessive deficits by giving this task to a discrete authority from the departments of the DG Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN), (...) over which the Commissioner would have no authority. The introduction of an independent budgetary committee of this nature would free the Commissioner of his role as prosecutor and allow him/her to accumulate his/her office with that of President of the Eurogroup.*" [17]  
From this point of view the fact that the appointment of the members of the European budgetary committee, established on 1st November 2015, depends uniquely on the competence of the Commission and its departments' secretariat, raises the issue of the real independence of this committee. The rules of the appointment of its members and its functioning must therefore be revised in view of achieving greater independence [18].  
- The Vice-President of the Commission and the Council responsible for the euro and its economic affairs would be the face and voice of the euro policy. He/She would be in charge of communicating the Eurogroup's decisions and of the euro zone's external representation within the international financial institutions. He/She would be responsible for explaining how budgetary or structural polices of the euro zone member states form a coherent policy mix with the ECB's monetary policy.  
The remit of the Vice-President of the Commission and the Council responsible for the euro and for economic affairs could be defined under the Eurogroup's Protocol.  
In terms of strengthening democratic legitimacy national parliaments and the European Parliament have a decisive role to play.  
Beyond the work of supervising the governments of the Member States by national parliaments (the intensity of which is variable depending on the States), this might involve:

developing the role played by the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Coordination and Governance within the Union created by the TSCG [19] - which is not mentioned in the 5 Presidents' Report.  
To do this the format of the Interparliamentary Conference would have to be changed (since it involves too many participants), for example in a format of ECON+2 participants per national parliament and provide it with an explicit mandate (failing which it would not have any power and would only be a forum), for example in terms of budgetary supervision.  
This Interparliamentary Conference would be given an important role in the economic and budgetary supervisory mechanisms planned for EMU Member States:  
- its two annual meetings should take place at key points in the European Semester (November/December after the annual assessment of growth and in June after the draft recommendations have been made by the European Commission on the stability and reform programmes and before the adoption of these recommendations by the Council [20];  
- not only would it meet for regular sessions but it might be completed by the convocation of exceptional sessions;  
- on the base of the reports presented by the Member States and the Commission (which should lead to the establishment of a consolidated vision of the euro zone's public accounts), and also the fact-finding missions that it might launch under its own initiative, this Conference could ensure the strength of the euro zone and the respect of the commitments made by the Member States;  
- it would also need to be informed of the progress of the measures taken as part of the conditions set by the aid programmes;  
- finally it would have the power to audition the Member States' Economy and Finance Ministers, members of the European Commission responsible for economic, financial and monetary issues, the President of the ECB, the president of the Eurogroup as well as members of the European budgetary committee.  
A revision of the treaty would be required according to a simplified procedure provided for in article 48-3 TFEU. However, according to the Interparliamentary Conference's perimeter of competence, a modification of the treaties according to the ordinary revision procedure cannot be ruled out (IGC preceded by a convention).  
An institutional modification in the monetary area (for the hearing of the President of the ECB, if he is obliged to attend on invitation of the Interparliamentary Conference) is possible according to the simplified revision procedure provided for in article 48-6 in the TEU but this would require a decision on the part of the European Council deciding unanimously after consultation with the European Parliament, the Commission and the ECB.

Beyond the initiatives taken by the European Parliament to strengthen parliamentary supervision under the European Semester (notably in the shape of "economic dialogue" between the Parliament, the Council, the Commission and the Eurogroup) this might involve:  
Creating a "euro zone subcommittee" within the European Parliament on the basis of a simple modification of its internal regulations. The progress of the euro zone's integration raises the issue of strengthening differentiation from a political and institutional point of view. As an example, in order to reinforce the legitimacy and democratic supervision of European decisions on EMU, the question of creating a specific euro zone assembly has been raised. The European Parliament would evidently prefers this assembly not to compete with it and for it to be one of the sub-committees, in the same way the Eurogroup is a sub-committee of the Ecofin Council and the euro zone summit is a sub-committee of the European Council.  
The institutions of the euro zone (ESM etc.) would be accountable to this sub-committee. The chair of this sub-committee would also be invited to the Eurogroup meetings and to the euro zone summits for audition [21]. This modification might be made as part of a revision of the Eurogroup's Protocol.  
  
Representation that is more proportional with the population would enhance the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament. Currently the European Parliament is far from the principle of fair democratic representation: the number of MEPs per inhabitant is for example twice as high in Finland than in France. But since citizens should all have the same political rights in a democratic system their vote should carry the same weight [22]. In other words the number of inhabitants per MEP should be the same in all countries (with a minimum representation however to guarantee that even the least populous States are represented) [23], which is an objective criteria that is difficult to challenge. But given the significant growth in the powers of the European Parliament as the Treaties have progressed, strengthening the democratic legitimacy of this institution, which is moreover the only one to be elected by direct universal suffrage, is a real stake, as recalled by the jurisprudence of the German Constitutional Court [24].  
A modification of this nature would require a revision of article 14-2 TEU according to an ordinary revision procedure of the treaties (IGC preceded by a Convention).

## Case

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#### No link to EU solving all of democracy.

#### Populism wont go away

Olsen 3/18 [(Henry Olsen is a Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Olsen began his career as a political consultant at the California firm of Hoffenblum-Mollrich. After three years working for the California Assembly Republican Caucus, he returned to school to become a lawyer. Following law school he clerked for the Honorable Danny J. Boggs on the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and as an associate in the Philadelphia office of Dechert, Price & Rhoads. He then joined the think tank world where he spent the next eighteen years as an executive), “Opinion: Europe is proof that right-wing populism is here to stay “, Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/03/18/europe-is-proof-that-right-wing-populism-is-here-stay/, March 18, 2021 ] SS

It may be tempting, given the defeat of former president Donald Trump, to assume that right-leaning populist movements around the world are in decline. A closer look shows that’s not true.

Consider the recent elections in Germany and the Netherlands. While incumbents were reelected in both cases, populist parties of the right fared reasonably well. In Germany, where the states of [Rhineland-Palatinate](https://www.tagesschau.de/wahl/archiv/2021-03-14-LT-DE-RP/index-content.shtml) and Baden-Württemberg voted on Sunday, the conservative anti-establishment [Free Voters](https://www.freiewaehler.eu/) gained about 3 percent of the vote since five years ago, offsetting a decline in the vote share from the larger, nationalist populist Alternative for Germany. In Wednesday’s Dutch vote, three right-wing populist parties — the Party for Freedom, Forum for Democracy and JA21 — combined for a record-high [29 seats](https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/1778457413/zo-stemde-nederland-hier-live-de-uitslagen) in the 150-seat Tweede Kamer. Despite the overall verdict in these places, populist sentiments continue to garner substantial support.

The evidence of continued populist strength is even stronger elsewhere in Europe. Two right-wing Italian populist parties, the anti-immigrant Lega and the socially conservative Brothers of Italy, combine for 41 percent of the vote in [recent polling](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/italy/) averages. Former prime minister Silvio Berlusconi’s once-dominant party, Forward Italy, has shrunk to a mere 7 percent. In Italy, the center-right is almost exclusively populist.

Meanwhile, in Finland, the populist Finns Party is tied in polls with the country’s ruling Social Democrats at [21 percent](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/finland/). In Spain, the hyper-nationalist Vox has skyrocketed from less than a quarter of a percent of the vote [in 2016](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_Spanish_general_election) to [18 percent](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/spain/) in the latest polling average. Belgium’s anti-immigrant Flemish Interest party, which supports Flemish independence, leads [the polls](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/belgium/) in that country, and anti-immigrant, nationalist parties fare well in polls in [Sweden](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/sweden/), [Portugal](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/portugal/) and [Austria](https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/austria/). Whether they are rising or merely holding steady in support, right-leaning populists are not going away.

Their concerns influence public policies even in countries where mainstream parties dominate. Austria’s ruling Austrian People’s Party was well behind in [the polls](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2017_Austrian_legislative_election#2017) in the run-up to 2017’s parliamentary elections. It ditched its old leader and appointed 30-year-old Sebastian Kurz, who had gained fame for his anti-immigrant proclamations, as its new leader. Almost overnight the party took the lead, cannibalizing votes that had previously been going to the sternly populist Freedom Party. Kurz and his party won that election and another in 2019 and today sit comfortably atop the polls.

Denmark’s Social Democrats pulled the same trick in 2019, [backing](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/04/denmark-centre-left-predicted-win-election-social-democrats-anti-immigration-policies) the populist Danish People’s Party’s immigration policies in a bid to regain working-class support. It worked, with the populists dropping from [21 percent](http://www.dst.dk/valg/Valg1487635/valgopg/valgopgHL.htm) in 2015 to a mere [9 percent](http://www.dst.dk/valg/Valg1684447/valgopg/valgopgHL.htm) in 2019. They have continued their populist immigration policies in power, recently proposing to limit the share of “non-Western” immigrants in a neighborhood to 30 percent, a policy UnHerd’s Peter Franklin [calls](https://unherd.com/thepost/is-denmark-creating-an-inverted-apartheid/) “inverted Apartheid.”

Britain’s Boris Johnson is the best-known mainstream practitioner of populist politics. His staunch support of Brexit and firm immigration controls allowed him to win a “stonking” majority in the United Kingdom’s 2019 election. Like Trump, he gained massive numbers of votes in formerly safe Labour Party working-class seats that English pundits had labeled the “[Red Wall](https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-7791079/How-Boris-Johnson-smashed-Red-Wall-Seat-seat-swings-took-North-storm.html)” (in Britain, the Labour Party is red, while Conservatives are blue). The Conservatives, who have traditionally pulled from the upper class, now draw their support from English and Welsh working-class voters, an inversion of the curve that typified British politics for more than a century.

These findings are all evidence of the enduring appeal of populist values in a large segment of the population almost everywhere. Native-born voters without a college degree or similar qualifications want nationalist policies that restrict migration and ensure that economic growth is shared across groups and regions. Socially conservative and religious voters worry that their values, once dominant everywhere in the West, will be preserved in some fashion before liberalism sweeps them away. These demographics are not a majority in any significant country, but they are persistent and large enough that they cannot be easily brushed aside.

#### Alt causes to democracy decline – discrimination, special interests and partisan polarization.

**Freedom House 3/22** [(Freedom House is a news organization founded on the core conviction that freedom flourishes in democratic nations where governments are accountable to their people. It focuses extensively on geopolitical relations and how they impact freedom and democracy from nations around the globe) “US Democracy Has Declined Significantly in the Past Decade, Reforms Urgently Needed” Freedom House. March 22, 2021.] AW

Today, Freedom House released a special report, From Crisis to Reform: A Call to Strengthen America’s Battered Democracy, which identifies three enduring problems that have undermined the health of the US political system: unequal treatment for people of color, the outsized influence of special interests in politics, and partisan polarization. This report comes in response to a decade-long decline in US democracy and is based in Freedom House’s global comparative research.

The report concludes that these three major problems compound one another, creating a vicious circle of distrust and dysfunction, and that addressing them with urgency and conviction is crucial to restoring Americans’ faith not just in their government, but also in democracy itself.

“Our democracy is in trouble,” said Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House, “and the strength of American democracy is important for people everywhere, not just here at home. Congress and the Biden administration must make it a priority to strengthen our institutions, restore civic norms, and uphold the promise of universal liberty on which our nation was founded.”

“The state of US democracy has implications for freedom and democracy around the world,” said Sarah Repucci, vice president of research and analysis at Freedom House. “Democracy movements in other countries look to the United States for inspiration and support, and authoritarian leaders falsely point to America’s problems as proof of democracy’s inherent inferiority and as a sort of license for their own abuses of power.”

Key drivers of long-term decline

Unequal treatment for people of color

As a nation and a society, the United States has struggled to move past the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. While great strides have been made in terms of formal desegregation and the codification of civil rights, the unequal treatment of people of color in practice remains a great and pressing challenge.

Discrimination in the criminal justice system, from police violence against Black Americans to the disproportionate incarceration of people of color, is especially damaging to US society and Americans’ faith in government.

Special-interest influence in politics

A major cause of public distrust in government is the outsized influence of powerful special interests in politics and policymaking. The 2010 Citizens United ruling, in which the Supreme Court found that the constitution prohibited government restrictions on political advertising by corporations and other legal entities, exacerbated the problem.

The United States is an outlier among its peers with respect to the scale and duration of campaign expenditures and the fundraising efforts required to fuel them. In few similar democracies does private money have such a large impact on the political sphere.

Partisan polarization

Deepening partisan divisions have distorted political and civic discourse, encouraged extremism, and led to governmental dysfunction, often preventing the country from addressing shared problems and advancing the public interest.

Weaknesses in the US electoral system, such as partisan gerrymandering, feed polarization by incentivizing radically partisan positions in primary elections, tying partisan affiliation to demographic traits, and undermining a sense of common national identity.

#### A. EU makes Russia war more likely - increased legitimacy won’t significantly affect what Russia does or its approach to the EU

Schmidt-Felzmann 14 [(Anke, a foreign and security policy research fellow in the Europe and Russia program at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, focusing on security challenges from Russia in the Baltic Sea and Eastern neighborhood.) “Is the EU’s failed relationship with Russia the member states’ fault?” L'Europe en Formation, 4/2014] BC

EU unity—the ‘wrong end of the stick’

The most prominent argument about the EU’s many failures regarding Russia is that divisions among the member states undermine the EU’s credibility, bargaining position and effectiveness. If the member states just managed to speak with one voice, the EU’s policy towards Russia would be much more effective. Arguably, much EU unity has been achieved as a result of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Germany’s strong leadership and the willingness of Chancellor Merkel to take decisions that are costly to Germany, but necessary for the EU, helped unite the twenty-eight member states behind the policy of restrictive measures towards Russia. However, with the benefit of hindsight, developments in 2014 give a clear indication that EU unity is only one factor and internal divisions do not explain the EU’s failure to anticipate and address the fundamental crisis in its ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia. Greater EU unity, in and of itself, will not significantly affect what Russia does in the shared neighbourhood, nor will it fundamentally change Russia’s approach to the EU and how Russia deals with the different member states. [44]

The EU’s inbuilt weaknesses

The EU’s failures can be attributed to its special structure, composition and nature which is neither conducive to quick decision-making nor to the adoption and pursuit of fast and powerful responses. The Russian President has central control over the Russian state apparatus, its intelligence services and key economic actors and he has the capacity and willingness to quickly take decisions and implement them. This places the EU, as a different kind of actor, in a difficult position. The EU’s member states could be blamed for not having empowered the EU to become a federal state with strong military capability, for not having appointed a real EU Commander in Chief, and for not having provided the High Representative for Foreign and Security policy with a strong European intelligence service, copious resources, long-term strategic planning capabilities and real rapid reaction capacity, that is, first and foremost, a political readiness to take decisions and implement them quickly, in a matter of hours, rather than days or weeks.

Six EU member states, including Sweden, located in the proximity of the Russian exclave Kaliningrad, and Russia’s direct neighbour Finland, are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What is more, NATO includes non-EU members and states that have different interests and relations with Russia. This fact (and a number of other unresolved issues) prevents a more effective coordination between NATO and the EU regarding Russia. There are many good (and many lamentable) reasons for why the EU’s member states are not willing to empower the EU to become a strong federal state actor, an

d why the High Representative has neither the powers nor the resources of a Commander in Chief. That the EU’s capacity in foreign and security policy has remained weak is however only a partial explanation for why the EU’s relations with Russia have gone so very wrong. Another reason is the effectiveness of Russia’s strategy of maskirovka—the art of deception—which characterizes Russia’s diplomatic relations and its public diplomacy. The EU requires therefore, in addition to greater resources and more efficient and effective structures, a much greater knowledge of Russian intentions and a better understanding of the logic of action to engage more successfully with Russia.

Lacking intelligence, or disregarding expertise on Russia?

The EU learned the hard way that it apparently drew the wrong conclusions about Russia, its trust in the EU and the power of ‘Europeanization’ through cooperation and integration. Explanations provided in a much-cited British House of Lords report on the UK’s and EU’s relations with Russia, suggested that the failure to correctly predict and assess Russian actions regarding Ukraine stems from the downgrading of British intelligence operations in Russia since the end of the Cold War. [45] It is a credible claim that the downgrading of national intelligence services’ operations in Russia had a negative impact also on the EU’s capacity to correctly understand and effectively respond to Russian developments and actions. A fundamental challenge limiting the capacity of the EU to assess and effectively react to developments in Russia is arguably the extent to which national intelligence from the twenty-eight member states is shared with the EU institutions, and between the member states. As national governments still guard much of their sensitive intelligence for reasons of national security, it is reasonable to assume that the EU institutions were lacking some of the ‘bigger picture,’ despite the regular consultations that were taking place on Russia in the Council working groups and at higher political levels.

Another contributing factor is arguably the limited extent to which assessments of Russia by the direct neighbours (Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) fed into the EU’s evaluation of Russia as a cooperation partner. The 1995 enlargement and the eastward enlargement (2004 and 2007) They did brought states into the EU that had experienced a rather different kind of relationship with Russia.not share the ‘old’ member states’ more positive assessment of Russian domestic and foreign policy developments in the post-Cold War era. [46] Indeed, many officials from the Central and East European member states argued for greater caution in the EU’s engagement with Russia and explained, based on their own experiences, that trade and energy were being used by the Russian government as a pressure tool and that Russian actions, not words, should guide the EU’s assessment of cooperation with Russia in different sectors and on different issues. [47]

Whereas decision-makers in the ‘old’ EU member states held a profound belief in President Putin’s willingness to turn Russia into an open, liberal Western democracy, and whereas they believed in his professed commitment to cooperation and integration with the EU, the conclusions drawn by Russia’s direct geographic neighbours were—in accordance with their own historical experience—much more pessimistic, but (in hindsight) also more accurate. [48] However, since the experiences of Russia’s privileged partners—Germany, France and Italy, in particular—did not match those of the Central and East European states, and since the difficult relations of the latter countries with Russia could be attributed also to unresolved bilateral issues with Russia, greater emphasis was placed on the established views and EU policy line. Another reason for the predominance of a skewed view of the actual developments in Russia are the asymmetric power relations which impact both the member states in the EU and their position vis-à-vis Russia. When more credence is given to the views of the larger member states who are strong and desirable cooperation partners for Russia, and whose experience of dealing with Russia is consequently very positive, the EU’s assessment of Russia is necessarily biased, and does not reflect the complete story. In this sense, the EU’s problem has been less one of disunity and more of not listening sufficiently to the voices of the smaller, more exposed member states.

The failed Europeanization of Russia

The EU’s failure to both anticipate and respond effectively to the Russian government’s domestic and foreign policy, has its roots arguably in the conclusions that were drawn by Western actors from the two World Wars; in particular their belief in the transformative power of close cooperation, and specifically the development of the European integration project. Russian domestic developments were closely watched and reform efforts were supported by EU member states, representatives from EU institutions as well as national industries over a twenty-five year period. They all had been in regular contact with their Russian counterparts in different forums, at the political and at the working level, including civil society exchanges. But none of these contacts and institutionalized cooperation structures made a real difference. Why were the common rules and trust-building efforts not able to ‘Europeanize’ Russia and change how Russian elites view the EU? [49]

One of the problems is that the EU’s assessment of the relationship was based on a scenario that assumes that there is a level playing field, which there never was. The highly asymmetric nature of their relationship fuelled suspicions and resentment in Russia, especially against the EU’s acquis communautaire. That Russia would need to adjust and align (some of) its own legislation to that of the EU in order to gain full access to the EU’s markets, but not vice-versa, is strongly resented. Mistrust of the EU—and just about any national and international actor—is also deeply ingrained in the way in which Russian decision-makers engage with their European counterparts. This has less to do with EU member states’ foreign policy choices than it has to do with the nature of the EU as a post-war integration project designed to prevent war through the functionalist logic of cooperation.

The conviction that close cooperation will necessarily generate deep and lasting trust and a level of interdependence that will make military conflict impossible became so entrenched in the EU, that the possibility that cooperation could lead to conflict was no longer considered as a possible or credible alternative scenario. However, cooperation does not make international actors immune to conflict if they do not share the same long-term goals and do not share an understanding of the value of cooperation. Actors in the EU assumed, in good faith, that Russian policy-makers share their own assessment and put great trust in their relationship with Russia, while the Russian government, meanwhile utilized its relationship with the EU instrumentally, opting for cooperation when it appeared opportune, and disregarding past agreements, when they constrained Russia’s freedom of manœuvre or harmed Russian interests.

In addition, we cannot disregard the fact that any actor, even the EU, is limited in its ability to control another international actor’s domestic processes and external actions. There is no guarantee that a smarter, more effective and better endowed actor than the EU would have been more successful in dealing with contemporary Russia. The external environment, alternative cooperation and trade partners and markets for Russia can only be influenced, but not controlled by the EU. In the absence of full control over all other variables, the EU and its member states cannot really be held responsible for the whole chain of events that was unleashed in 2013. Under different circumstances, things might well have turned out differently.

The fear of (nuclear) war

An even more fundamental problem is that of the shadow of history and the fear of a major (nuclear) war that has affected Europe ever since the end of the Second World War. It has characterized the EU’s approach of doing everything possible to avoid a military confrontation. The emphasis placed on the argument that ‘there is no military solution’ to the Ukrainian-Russian war stems from the understanding that Russia is a nuclear power, and that a war with Russia would consequently end badly for everyone involved. That a military confrontation is a possibility—at least in theory—cannot be denied. And that the diplomatic route, combined with targeted sanctions as a pressure tool, is the only conceivable alternative for the EU, as EU High Representative Federica Mogherini indicated at the start of her term in office, [50] and which German Chancellor Merkel and others repeatedly underlined, is understandable since it is arguably also the only option that the EU has, in view of its (somewhat limited) capabilities.

The struggle in the EU between vocal supporters of helping Ukraine increase its defensive capacity and those insisting that only a political agreement can create the preconditions for durable peace and stability in Ukraine, is linked on the one hand to the practical problem of the radical reduction of EU member states’ military capabilities since the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, it is related to the fear of triggering a major war in Europe. The assumption is that arming Ukraine and supporting Ukraine militarily would provoke a powerful military reaction from Russia, which must be avoided at all cost. [51] However, there is no guarantee that diplomatic tools and sanctions against Russia will deliver the desired outcomes. Haukkala, in his assessment of past developments in EU-Russia relations, argued that Russia’s weakness actually gave it considerable power vis-à-vis the EU. [52] Indeed, the fear of pressurizing Russia too much and alienating Russian decision-makers, as well as the fear of Russia’s economic and political collapse, has been ever present in the minds of EU decision-makers. Gentle pressure and dialogue rather than force was therefore the preferred means of engagement, and repeatedly advocated by leading politicians. [53]

The ‘shadow of the past’ sets clear limits to the EU’s willingness to apply coercive pressure on Russia, further motivated by an awareness of the likely effects a major Russian domestic crisis would have on stability on the European continent. [54] But whereas the EU’s ultimate aim is that of establishing a mutually beneficial strategic partnership with Russia, President Putin’s declared aim is to defend Russian interests, with all possible means and at all cost, and to re-instate Russia as a great power on the world stage. [55] Under these circumstances, the EU’s diplomatic approach is insufficient to re-establish a peaceful order in Europe, even with the twenty-eight member states’ full support.

On a practical level, the EU’s vulnerability to military threats provides an additional explanation. The general move in Europe, and particularly in the European Union, of prioritizing social welfare and prosperity at the expense of military capabilities has created new vulnerabilities. The underinvestment and downgrading of their Armed Forces is a common problem in virtually all of the EU’s member states, although to varying degrees. The fact that EU member states are no longer ‘armed to their teeth’ to defend their territorial borders, has created an environment in which trust has been fostered through the regular and close cooperation in the EU, to such an extent that national governments can assume that their conflicts with neighbours can be addressed by non-military means. On the assumption that it would be irrational to engage in war with a close trade and political partner, as it would be very costly in the short and long term, investing in trade and limiting military expenditure to an absolute minimum is certainly a sensible decision when the state is surrounded by cooperation partners that have made a similar assessment and limited their own military spending. But that was not the case with Russia.

The EU’s assumption that Russia has ‘nothing to win’ with aggression against the EU (or any of its member states) since it is its closest trade and cooperation partner, was a legitimate view given the EU’s own post-war development, and the shared experience of two major wars. But it assumed flawed premises, namely that Russian decision-makers had drawn the same conclusions from their shared historical experience, which was certainly not a given, considering historical experiences. After the turn of the century, it became increasingly obvious that cooperation with Russia did not preclude the possibility of renewed military aggression, at least not from the Russian perspective. Decision-makers in the EU assumed that Russian decision-makers would share their understanding of the ‘new European order’ and take the EU’s commitment to peace and security face value. They also assumed that Russian decision-makers would act in a spirit of solidarity and cooperation towards the neighbours, simply because it is the ‘right,’ and ‘logical’ thing to do—from the EU’s point of view. But clearly, this logic of action, and the understanding of the (assumed) positive implications of cooperation and integration was not shared by key Russian decision-makers.

#### Russia will use tactical nuclear weapons to first strike against members

Bowman and Gabel 6/14 [(Bradley Bowman is senior director for the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, where Andrew Gabel is a research analyst.) “The US must deploy a sub-launched low-yield nuke” 6/14/2019] BC  
Sometimes characterized as “escalate to de-escalate,” Moscow has developed a war-fighting strategy and doctrine that emphasize the first use (or threat of use) of low-yield tactical nuclear strikes against conventional military targets. Such an approach would aim to coerce the U.S. and its NATO partners into backing down and accepting Moscow’s new gains achieved through aggression. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review assessed that this Russian nuclear strategy increases the chances of “dangerous miscalculation and escalation.”

The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission specifically addressed a scenario in which Moscow used false reports of atrocities against Russian populations in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to justify an invasion of these NATO member countries under the guise of a “peacekeeping” mission. In this scenario envisioned by the commission, “As U.S. and NATO forces prepare to respond, Russia declares that strikes against Russian forces in those states will be treated as attacks on Russia itself — implying a potential nuclear response.”

Would Moscow actually use a low-yield nuclear weapon against NATO conventional forces responding to Russian aggression in the Baltics? Facts and prudence do not permit ruling that out. NATO leaders would be forced to decide whether Moscow was engaging in a nuclear bluff. If the fear of Russia’s potential use of a low-yield nuclear weapon prevented a NATO response, Russian President Vladimir Putin would achieve his leading grand strategic goal — the effective end of NATO as a collective-defense alliance.

Yet, if NATO did honor Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty and responded by sending conventional forces to push Russian forces out of NATO territory, Moscow might be tempted to employ low-yield nuclear weapons if it thought it could get away with it. It seems certain that some Russian military planners would assess that the U.S. would not risk global nuclear war by responding to Moscow’s tactical nuclear strike with a high-yield nuclear weapon, thereby increasing the chances Moscow might employ a low-yield attack in the first place.

Such a scenario may seem far-fetched and too horrible to contemplate for many Americans, but a review of Russian nuclear strategy and doctrine makes clear that the Kremlin views nuclear weapons differently. As the Nuclear Posture Review confirms, “Moscow threatens and exercises limited nuclear first use.”

In short, assuming Moscow would not employ low-yield nuclear weapons in this manner — and making defense policy decisions based on that assumption — would be both dangerous and unwarranted.

Critics argue that the deployment of low-yield nuclear weapons on submarines would spark or exacerbate a nuclear arms race. Moscow has already taken tangible steps toward an arms race: The Kremlin began a comprehensive and aggressive modernization of its nuclear arsenal years ago. Today, Russia already possesses a stockpile of up to 2,000 active nonstrategic nuclear weapons.

#### No democracy impact---new tech, non-state actors, military autonomy, and eroding institutional constrains undermine DPT

**Potter, 16** - Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at the University of Virginia (Philip B.K. Potter, "Four Trends That Could Put the Democratic Peace at Risk," *Political Violence at a Glance*, 10-14-2016,

The point is **that it’s not democracy alone that matters**. Rather it is the limits that these regimes can put on their leaders to force them to be careful and selective when doing things like making threats and starting fights. This also means it’s not a baked-in advantage that a democracy can take lightly – even well-meaning leaders in democracies have every incentive to figure out how to slip these constraints. Limits yield long-term advantages, but in the immediate term they tie leaders’ hands, preventing them from engaging with the international problems or opportunities that they feel they should.

There are four trends that indicate this process is well under way and is putting the “democratic advantage” at risk.

**Militaries are less closely tied to voters**

Democratic advantages in conflict are commonly traced to the nature of democratic militaries and their relationship with political power. Going all the way back to Kant, there has been the notion that societies with citizen soldiers and the vote are not going to support unnecessary wars when they are going to bear the costs. The problem is that Kant’s vision isn’t what modern armies look like, and they’re intentionally moving away from the target rather than toward it.

In the US, military service is all-volunteer, and the recruits are increasingly drawn from concentrated segments of society. This divorces the consequences of fighting from the day-to-day experience of most voters. Increasingly, this is a limited force supplemented by private sector contractors, placing even more distance between the individual with the gun and the democratic process.

The emphases on covert operations, Special Forces, and technological superiority further **water down the link between society and soldiers**. This was, in fact, part of the point of moving to an all-volunteer force and one of the rationales for investments in stealth, information technology, and precision guided munitions, e.g. the precision strike complex. By replacing bodies with dollars, planners have consistently sought to increase the flexibility that the US has in its use of force. In the immediate term, that goal makes sense – it allows policy makers to do what they believe needs to be done without having to worry about a fickle public. But over the long term, it has the potential to lead to **less caution** and **selectivity when engaging in conflicts**.

**Adversaries are proliferating and changing**

The emergence of non-state actors as a primary threat has further **loosened constraints** on leaders. The shift from the possibility of total war with the Soviet Union to myriad smaller-scale challenges **accelerated the transition** from a mass military to an elite, highly specialized force more isolated from society. Compounding the challenge, this type of adversary and conflict leads to more significant informational advantages for leaders, which make democratic constraints less binding. Citizens and political opposition are always playing catch-up with the executive when it comes to foreign policy information, but the challenge is harder when the **adversaries are less familiar**, the **engagements shorter**, and the issues **more complex**.

**Technology is reducing constraint**

New technologies are driving citizens and political opposition ever further out of the loop. The extraordinary rise of unmanned vehicles in combat reduces the risk of casualties and extends the range for projecting force. This has undeniable strategic advantages, but **there is less visibility and**, accordingly, **less accountability** associated with the use of this technology. This means leaders worry less about the ex-post constraints and costs that typically come with casualties.

**Institutions and practices increasingly favor the president**

The recent nuclear agreement with Iran was an executive agreement rather than a treaty. This is the norm – most international agreements are now unilateral actions of the president. A polarized Congress is ever more cautious in its exercise of what little foreign policy power it has; two years into the campaign against Islamic State and Congress still hasn’t weighed in one way or the other. In the US this is an expansion of the widely accepted argument that there are two presidencies – a constrained one in domestic politics and a relatively autonomous one abroad. What’s unappreciated is that this growing presidential autonomy (which may well be needed to run a Superpower) also **decreases constraint** and with it the foreign policy “advantages” we associate with democracy.

While these advantages are real, they are also **fragile**. Key institutional constraints – such as a robust political opposition and a knowledgeable citizenry – are susceptible to seemingly **minor changes** in institutions and/or practices that loosen the limits of leaders’ foreign policy decisions. As technologies advance, threats shift, and institutional constraints wax and wane, **the foreign policy advantages embedded within democratic systems may begin to erode**. The potential for such a shift is a possibility that should not be taken lightly.