# 1NC v Harvard Westlake JH

### 1NC – DA

#### Lula wins now but its close---insert chart.

Spigariol 11-3 (, A., 2021. Lula still polling first for 2022, but no longer pulling away. [online] The Brazilian Report. Available at: <https://brazilian.report/liveblog/2021/11/03/lula-polling-first-bolsonaro-2022/> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

Lula still polling first, but no longer pulling away

Lula’s **support** **slipped** by a single point compared with late September, with Mr. **Bolsonaro** polling at a **stable** **28** **percent**. Center left candidate Ciro Gomes is the only “third-way option” above the 10-percent mark, with others at 4 percent or less.

The pollster included a scenario with former Justice Minister Sergio Moro, poised to join the center-right Podemos party, reportedly with presidential ambitions. However, the former federal judge managed no more than 8 percent of support.

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

#### Bolsonaro is making key changes.

AP 11-10 (,Associated Press, 2021. Bolsonaro Joins a Centrist Party in Brazil Ahead of 2022 Re-election Bid. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/world/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-liberal-party.html> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

**Bolsonaro** **Joins** a **Centrist** **Party** in Brazil Ahead of 2022 Re-election Bid

President Jair Bolsonaro, who has not belonged to any political party for two years, is joining the centrist Liberals, they said on Wednesday.

BRASILIA, Brazil — After going two years without belonging to a political party, President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil sealed an agreement with the centrist Liberal Party to back his 2022 re-election bid, according to a party statement released on Wednesday.

The decision followed a meeting between Mr. Bolsonaro and the Liberal Party leader, Valdemar Costa Neto, in Brasília, the capital, the statement said. The president’s formal enrollment in the party’s ranks will take place on Nov. 22.

Joining one of the parties that form part of the so-called Cenbtrao **group** seems to signal that Mr. Bolsonaro, a right-wing populist, is shifting course from his 2018 campaign strategy, when he criticized the group’s old-school political practices.

In early polls ahead of the October 2022 vote, Mr. Bolsonaro trails former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the leftist who led Brazil from 2003 to 2010.

The Liberal Party, or P.L., is known along with other Centrao parties for **ideological** **malleability**, often **exchanging** **support** **for** **gov**ernment **appointments** and earmarks. Mr. Bolsonaro was affiliated with such parties during most of his seven terms as a federal lawmaker, but cast himself as a political outsider during his 2018 presidential campaign. He vowed then not to embrace the horse trading that benefited entrenched actors and enabled corruption.

“It is very **symbolic** **how** **Bolsonaro** has **started** **to** **play** the **traditional** game of Brazilian **politics**,” said Maurício Santoro, a political science professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. “The P.L. is helping Bolsonaro survive.”

When Mr. Bolsonaro ran in 2018, it was under the banner of the Social Liberal Party, which he left one year after his election victory amid disagreements with its leadership over funding and regional nominations. He set out to forge his own party, but failed to garner enough signatures and has been without a political home since.

The presidential press office didn’t respond to a request for comment from The Associated Press to confirm the P.L.’s statement. Earlier Wednesday, Mr. Bolsonaro had said in a radio interview that there was a “99.9 percent chance” he would join the P.L.

Reports that Mr. Bolsonaro was seeking a Centrao party to sponsor his re-election bid had already generated commentary from analysts that he was departing from his prior anti-establishment stance. As rumors of his agreement with the P.L. intensified this week, comments criticizing Mr. Costa Neto, the party leader, were deleted from the social media accounts of some of Mr. Bolsonaro’s family members.

Editors’ Picks

‘When Are You Getting Married?’

Taylor Swift’s ‘All Too Well’ and the Weaponization of Memory

The Real Surprise of ‘Passing’: A Focus on Black Women’s Inner Lives

Mr. Bolsonaro himself has previously said that Mr. Costa Neto was corrupt, noted Carlos Melo, a political analyst and professor at Insper University in São Paulo. In 2012, Mr. Costa Neto, then a lawmaker, was convicted of corruption and money laundering in a vast vote-buying scandal that almost brought down Mr. da Silva’s administration. He served time in prison.

Over the past year, Mr. Bolsonaro has turned to the Centrao for political shelter from increasing pressure on his administration, including more than 100 impeachment requests, a Senate investigation into his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and his plunging popularity. In August, he appointed a senator from the Centrao to be his chief of staff.

“If you take away the Centrao, there’s the left,” the president told a small conservative news outlet, Jornal da Cidade Online, on Tuesday. “So where do I go?”

#### Strike crackdowns is prompting polling for Lula---the plan’s radical change is key to building Bolsonaro voter popularity.

Castanheira 10-14 (, T., 2021. São Paulo teachers and public employees strike against attack on pensions. [online] World Socialist Web Site. Available at: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/10/15/braz-o15.html> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

The criminal agreement between the Unions’ Forum and the government for the unsafe return to in-person classes included the requirement that educators pay back the hours spent on strike. Therefore, teachers are now working grueling overtime, exposing themselves even more to the risk of infection with the coronavirus in order not to have their salaries cut. This situation, which threatens teachers with having their salaries completely cut off if they join the new strike, is seen by many workers as the opportunity the government saw to advance its attacks. In the face of these threats, the **broad** **participation** of workers **in** the **strike** movement **is** a **direct** **response** **to** the terrible **social** **crisis** **facing** the entire Brazilian **working** **class**. With millions having fallen into poverty in Brazil since last year, workers are seeing their purchasing power violently eroded by high inflation, especially in food and fuel prices. Recently, strikes in defense of wages have broken out at General Motors in São Paulo, at the Jurong shipyard in Espírito Santo, among metalworkers in Paraná, and app delivery workers in several Brazilian cities. The World Socialist Web Site interviewed workers participating in Wednesday’s protest in São Paulo. Leandro, who works at a Child Education Center (CEI), serving children under the age of 2, explained to the WSWS what led him to the demonstration. “We who work double shifts, 12 hours a day, pay the maximum income tax rate of 27.5 percent of our salaries and another 14 percent in pension contributions,” he said. “In other words, almost half of what I earn is only for taxes. They want to raise this even more. And after I retire, even though I would have contributed for more than 40 years, I will continue to pay the same tax rate. Today, this percentage is only charged on [monthly] salaries exceeding 6,433 reais (US$ 1,166). With this new change, it will be charged of everyone who earns more than a minimum wage (US$200).” Leandro’s wife, Kauane, an educator at an Early Childhood Education School (EMEI), serving children from 2 to 6 years old, added that it is inconceivable for “a 60-year-old teacher to remain in an early childhood education classroom, with toddlers [as the new bill imposes]. They won’t have the physical or psychological structure to cope with that.” She also noted that “in the last four years we have been without any wage adjustment, not even for inflation. But our latest struggles have been only against the removal of rights. We are losing right after right. We see all the services being scrapped, there is no investment in health care. We are treated as numbers. If something happens to us, tomorrow they’ll put someone new in our place. We are not seen as human beings, who have families.” Kauane and Leandro have children, one of them with asthma, and are seriously concerned about the unsafe reopening of schools. On Wednesday, hours before the demonstration, São Paulo Governor João Doria (PSDB) announced the mandatory return to in-person classes in state schools with 100 percent occupation of classrooms, eliminating any mandatory distancing between students. Later that day, Mayor Nunes announced the same measure will be followed by municipal schools. “Now we’ve had the news that they’re going to fully open schools and we have a very big concern, especially for the children who have not been vaccinated,” said Kauane. “As long as it is not safe and I can, my children will stay at home. But we know that this is not a reality for everyone. There are younger children whose parents need to work, and there are many parents who have no one to leave their children with.” Sheila, a kindergarten teacher, declared that the strike movement is also “in the name of quality public education.” She and her school colleagues denounced the homicidal operation of schools in São Paulo. “How can we take 1-year-old babies, who are just starting to walk, and have distancing? It was really a reckless act by the mayor,” she declared. “In the beginning there were only a few children, but now it is practically full,” said Sheila. “As soon as he approved 60 percent [of occupancy of the CEIs] several children in our CEI had COVID. Only 10 days went by, and children already started to show basic symptoms like coryza, malaise. Now I ask myself, how could we guarantee the safety of such small children? Infection was inevitable.” Sheila said that “in other CEIs near ours, some teachers died of COVID but were not counted. At no time were infections of teachers and children with COVID mentioned by the media. It was simply, ‘teachers return, the families need it,’ they never worried about infections.” The same situation was denounced by educators in Elementary Schools (EMEFs). Márcia, an art educator on the east side of São Paulo, described the situation as “chaos.” She said: “Every week, in my school two or three people are dismissed because of COVID, employees and children. They dismiss only those in the same classroom, but we, who are ‘specialist teachers’ and teach all the classrooms, are not dismissed. These are super unhealthy conditions.” The demonstration had a significant participation by retired teachers and employees, who will immediately suffer a 14 percent cut in their income with the approval of the bill. Amalia, a retired English teacher, declared: “I’ve been in these movements for 40 years and there are few times I haven’t participated. Municipal teachers are always overwhelmed, for lack of staff in the schools, lack of salaries.” “City councilors should have the role of defending us against authoritarian government projects, but what happens is that we have to fight against both the government and the councilors,” she continued. “The public service is scrapped, everyone says that. In my opinion, the intention of these governments is to privatize them. Meanwhile, we pay absurd taxes that nobody can explain. What I’m looking to learn is what the state is for.” Tatiana, an English teacher working with Márcia, said that “as long as these people are in power, I think it’s very difficult for us to solve these problems. **Until** **we** have a really **popular** **government**, **for** the **workers**, **there** **isn’t** much of **a** **perspective**.” Talking about the latest strikes, she said that “the performance of the union was sad. It is the same thing that I saw [with the São Paulo state teacher’s union, APEOESP] in the 2015 90-day strike. I saw them ending the strike despite the vote to continue it, and here it was the same thing. I think it’s sad, because we don’t know who is really on our side.” The unions and political parties linked to them, principally the PT and the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL), are once again striving to divert workers from confronting the capitalist system which is responsible for the successive attacks on public employees and the working class as a whole. These **political** **forces** **advance** as the only viable strategy for the workers’ movement the pressuring of “indecisive council members” **to** “**flip their vote**.” In their speeches, the union officials claimed that councilors who vote against the workers should face a settling of scores in the next elections: in 2024! This criminal proposition unequivocally exposes the reactionary character of the trade unions and the pseudo-left, who work to disarm the working class in face of the bourgeois state. Other **union leaders** who took the stage also **claimed** that the **election of** a new PT **government headed by** Luiz Inácio **Lula** da Silva **is the real solution to workers’ problems**. This perspective is a complete fraud. Lula is openly working to reestablish his corrupt alliances with the right-wing parties and to present himself to the capitalist class as their best representative to contain an imminent social explosion in Brazil and defend their economic interests against the working class. São Paulo municipal **workers** **can** **advance** **their** **struggle** **only** **by** **breaking** the **political** **control** of their movement by the unions, the PT and its pseudo-left satellites. They cannot accept new betrayals, and having their strikes broken through the same antidemocratic maneuvers used in 2019 and earlier this year!

Workers in São Paulo must orient themselves not to the bourgeois state, but to their fellow workers throughout Brazil and internationally who face the same attacks from the capitalist class.

A rank-and-file workers’ rebellion is already taking place around the world. On October 1, parents and rank-and-file workers called an independent strike against the unsafe reopening of schools, receiving global support. A second strike has been called for October 15. Across the United States, the strongest wave of strikes in decades is erupting, with workers rejecting rotten contracts promoted by the unions and the companies.

Brazilian workers must unite their struggles with this global movement, building independent rank-and-file committees in every workplace and joining the Rank-and-File Committee for Safe Education in Brazil (CBES-BR). The CBES-BR calls upon all workers to participate in the event How to end the pandemic: The case for eradication that will be held October 24 by the International Workers Alliance of Rank-and-File Committees (IWA-RFC) and the WSWS.

#### And, Lula is hope for workers---plan is a 180.

Fogel 21 (, B., 2021. Brazil: Lula’s Return Means There Is Finally Some Hope for Workers. [online] The Wire. Available at: <https://thewire.in/world/brazil-lulas-return-means-there-is-finally-some-hope-for-workers> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

Brazil: **Lula’s** **Return** **Means** There Is Finally Some **Hope** **for** **Workers**

Despite being imprisoned for nearly two years, the centre-left leader enjoys far more popularity than President Jair Bolsonaro, who he could take on in the next elections.

On March 8, Brazilian Supreme Court judge Luiz Edson Fachin ruled to annul all of the former president Lula da Silva’s convictions. Fachin said that the court that convicted Lula in the southern city of Curitiba did not have the legal authority to convict Brazil’s first Workers’ Party (PT) president. As such, he must be retried by a federal court in the capital city of Brasília.

The most important effect of the overturning is that it restores Lula’s political rights, allowing him to run in next year’s presidential election. Under Brazil’s Ficha Limpa (“Clean Slate”) law — ironically passed by the PT government — politicians convicted of crimes or impeached are unable to run for elected office.

Lula was convicted of money laundering and corruption in 2016 for making improvements to a beachfront apartment he never lived in and served 580 days in prison before being released on appeal in November 2019.

The case against Lula was always weak, but it didn’t stop him from getting convicted due to the fact that Sergio Moro, the judge hearing the trial, was illegally colluding with prosecutors to make a case against the former labour leader. His conviction was the crowning achievement of Brazil’s historic Operação Lava Jato (“Operation Car Wash”) investigation, but we now have clear evidence that prosecutors and judges conspired to imprison him explicitly to prevent him from competing in the 2018 elections, which saw the election of the far-right Jair Bolsonaro.

Lula’s legal team declared on Twitter that “The decision that today affirms the incompetence of the Federal Justice of Curitiba is the recognition that we have always been correct in this long legal battle.” Another twist in this saga is possible that is the Supreme Court still has to affirm this ruling, and another court could convict him again. But, for now, the centre-left Lula is back.

Lula versus Bolsonaro

Lula’s return to the political arena has already sent shock waves throughout Brazil, and judging by the latest polling, he is still the most popular politician in Brazil even after being imprisoned and years of media smears. And while he may not have the historic approval ratings he enjoyed after leaving office, his PT is still the largest party in the country.

A recent poll published in the Estado de S. Paulo newspaper found that 50% of those surveyed would definitely or probably vote for Lula as opposed to 38% for Bolsonaro. Lula’s disapproval rate of 44% is also lower than any of the other potential candidates such as right-wing São Paulo governor João Doria and the vacuous TV personality Luciano Huck. In fact, Lula was the only one of the 10 candidates surveyed that outperformed Bolsonaro.

Brazil’s centre-right is also in full-on panic mode as their own electoral chances are going to sink rapidly. Despite their official opposition to Bolsonaro, many of them would prefer a second term of the far-right president to a PT government. The “moderates” have been vainly searching for somebody — a Brazilian Macron — **who can pose as the leader of the broad front for democracy against Bolsonaro**, while pursuing the more or less same economic agenda as Brazil’s president.

For all the moderate opposition’s talk about democracy, it is unlikely that they would back a centre-left candidate in the second round against Bolsonaro. Brazil’s centrists not only removed Dilma Rousseff from office in 2016 but helped elect Bolsonaro in his contest against the PT’s Fernando Haddad. Some of the names being floated as potential candidates like former health minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta served in Bolsonaro’s cabinet and others like Doria and Huck supported Bolsonaro in 2018.

Bolsonaro himself shrugged off the news, claiming that “I believe that the Brazilian people don’t even want to have a candidate like this in 2022, much less think of the possibility of electing him.” The manufactured disasters of the Bolsonaro government could make many who voted against the PT in 2018 or voted null consider Lula as a viable alternative candidate in 2022.

It’s telling, though, that Brazil’s stock market fell by 4%, and the real slipped to record lows against the dollar following the news of the verdict. Investors apparently were not too worried about the apocalyptic COVID-19 death numbers coming out of Brazil — but the return of Lula led to full-on panic.

Last week was the deadliest week for the country since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic with a record 1,910 deaths recorded on Thursday alone. Brazil has recorded over 265,000 deaths and 11 million cases. Intensive care wards across the country are fast running out of space, cities are running out of vaccines, and government appears to be encouraging the virus to rage out of control.

The department of health is warning that Brazil could see as many as three thousand deaths per day in the coming weeks, and the country still lacks a national vaccination campaign. Health experts are warning the effects of letting a pandemic spread uncontained in such a large country could even threaten the global COVID-19 vaccination campaign as the virus mutates and new variants emerge.

Bolsonaro’s latest gambit involves pushing an untested nasal spray as the latest miracle cure. All the while, he continues to attack public health responses and incite his supporters against anyone who tries to control the spread of COVID-19. Congress has so far done almost nothing to hold Bolsonaro and his government accountable for its homicidal response to the pandemic.

Despite Bolsonaro’s murderous response to the COVID-19 crisis, open criminality, and the fact that Lula presided over one of the greatest economic booms in Brazilian history, big capital, much of the mainstream media, and Brazil’s centrists continue to depict Lula and Bolsonaro as two sides of the same coin. This type of mendacious “pox on both sides” type of politics is backed up by the united hostility to the Left among Brazil’s respectable opposition and the forces that back Bolsonaro.

#### American democracy is systematically blamed for liberal erosion under 4 more years of Bolsonaro---spills over and decimates US democratic institutions.

Adler and Long 11-15 (, D. and Long, G., 2021. We need a new observatory of democracy in the Americas | David Adler and Guillaume Long. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/15/organization-of-american-states-democracy-observatory> [Accessed 21 November 2021] David Adler is the general coordinator of the Progressive International. Guillaume Long is a senior policy analyst at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and former foreign minister of Ecuador.)-rahulpenu

We need a new observatory of democracy in the Americas

On 20 October, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, traveled to Ecuador to set out a vision for democracy in the Americas. Over the past five years, the **hemisphere** has **suffered** an **assault** **on** its **democratic** **institutions**, as political leaders from Donald Trump to Jair Bolsonaro have adopted a new authoritarian playbook: lies, violence, repression, and more lies. Two-thirds of US citizens now believe that democracy is under threat, while a majority of Brazilians fear a military dictatorship will return to the country. “We find ourselves in a moment of **democratic** **reckoning**,” announced Blinken.

But the Biden administration continues to put the US on the wrong side of this reckoning. Consider Blinken’s recent trip. In Quito, he lavished praise on President Guillermo Lasso in the same week that Lasso declared a nationwide state of emergency to intimidate critics of his government and distract from an investigation into alleged tax fraud following his appearance in the Pandora Papers leak. In Bogotá hours later, Blinken applauded the democratic credentials of the Colombian president, Iván Duque – “We have no better ally on the full range of issues that our democracies face in this hemisphere,” Blinken said – while his government stands accused of targeting protesters and allowing an unprecedented number of assassinations of Indigenous, Black, and peasant leaders to take place under his watch.

The **US** government is **complicit** **in** these **attacks** **on** **democracy**, not only as an “ally” but also **as** a **leading** **member** **of** the Organization of American States (**OAS**). Just two days after Blinken’s South America jaunt, the governments of Bolivia, Argentina, and Mexico held their own event at the Washington DC headquarters of the OAS to discuss the organization’s controversial role in the 2019 Bolivian election. The experts’ findings were clear – and damning: while the OAS found no evidence of fraud in the election of President Evo Morales, it lied to the public and manipulated its own findings to help depose him. “It was later reported that the US representative to the OAS actually pressured and steered the observation mission to reach a determination of fraud,” testified Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Bolivia is not an isolated case. In Haiti, for example, the anti-democratic interventions of the OAS stretch over decades. In 2000, the OAS observer mission concluded that the Haitian election had been a “great success” only to change its position under pressure from Washington to claim it was illegitimate. The goal was evident: “to dislodge the Aristide administration”, as Dr Paul Farmer, deputy special envoy for Haiti at the United Nations, testified to Congress. Then, 10 years later, the OAS intervened again to reverse the result of the 2010 presidential election on the basis of faulty statistical methods. It is difficult to overstate the destabilizing consequences of these interventions. Juan Gabriel Valdés, the former head of the UN in Haiti, recently described the 2010 OAS decision as “the origin of the present tragedy” in the country.

The OAS, then, is **no** **longer** a **credible** observer of democracy in the Americas – particularly under the present **leadership** of Luis Almagro, which has been described as the “**worst** **in** **history**”. In the eyes of several member states, the **institution** **is** **too** **beholden** to **US** **interests** to provide an effective defense of democratic institutions, **leading** some to call for “**autonomous**” **organizations** **to** **contest** **it**. “The world is currently going through a very worrying moment, where attacks on democratic institutions happen with frightening frequency,” said Brazil’s former foreign minister Celso Amorim. “The creation of an international electoral observatory – popular and non-partisan – will fill an important gap in defense of democracy and human rights.”

What would such an observatory do? Three capacities are critical. The first would be to organize delegations to countries where democratic institutions are clearly under threat – both by domestic actors and international observers like the OAS. Bringing together data scientists and parliamentary representatives, these delegations would provide independent analysis of the electoral process and a defense against false narratives that threaten to derail it. The goal is not only to observe how votes are cast and counted; it is also to observe the observers.

The second critical capacity would be to launch investigations of unlawful interventions in the democratic process. Over the course of the last decade, the dominant mechanism of democratic undoing has been legal, namely the weaponization of the judicial system to intimidate, exclude, and even incarcerate political opponents – a tactic known across Latin America as legal warfare, or “lawfare”. Deploying a global network of legal experts, a new observatory could challenge these tactics to help ensure a free and fair democratic process.

The third and final capacity of the new observatory would be communications. In the technological era, bad information often travels faster than good. Big tech platforms such as Facebook not only serve to disseminate false stories and stir civic conflict; evidence suggests that their executives intervene to favor some candidates and ban others from the platform altogether. In the context of such bias, this new observatory would need to build an autonomous communications infrastructure to ensure that the findings of its delegations and investigations are rapidly spread, widely read, and well understood.

The call for a new observatory could not be more urgent. Contentious elections lie just on the horizon in 2022. In May, Colombia will head to the polls after a year of roiling protests against government violence, corruption, and a failed pandemic response. Five months later, Jair **Bolsonaro** will **face** **Lula** da Silva after **profiting** **from** his **flagrant** **persecution** on the road to the presidency in 2018. **Bolsonaro** and his allies in Congress have already pushed a legislative package to **rewrite** **Brazil’s** **electoral** **laws**, while **parroting** **lies** **about** potential **fraud** in the country’s electoral system.

Meanwhile, back in Washington DC, Secretary Blinken is moving ahead with plans for a Summit for Democracy. Convening leaders from “a diverse group of the world’s democracies” in early December, the summit aims to encourage commitments to fight corruption and respect human rights – an opportunity, as the White House press release suggests, to “speak honestly about the challenges facing democracy so as to collectively strengthen the foundation for democratic renewal”.

But the crisis of democracy will not be solved by summitry alone. We cannot delegate “democratic renewal” to our presidents, nor to the OAS that claims to represent them. We need an observatory to defend democracy from the bottom up – an institution with the capacity and credibility to fight authoritarian tactics and even the playing field for democracy to flourish. That fight starts now.

#### Internationalism grounded in democratic norms averts a laundry list of existential catastrophes.

Brooks 14 [Rosa; November 14; Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow with the New America and Arizona State University Future of War Project, former Senior Advisor at the U.S. State Department; Foreign Policy, “Embrace the Chaos,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/; RP] – recut rahulpenu

I. The Character of the Mess

Defining the character of the current mess is the easy part. Briefly:

* The last century’s technological revolutions have made our world more globally interconnected than ever.
* Power (along with access to power) has become more democratized and diffuse in some ways, but more concentrated in other ways.
* For most individuals around the globe, day-to-day life is far less dangerous and brutal than in previous eras; for the species as a whole, however, the risk of future global catastrophe has increased.
* The continuously accelerating rate of technological and social change makes it increasingly difficult to predict the geopolitical future.

Nothing is particularly original about these observations; they’re repeated in some fashion in every major national strategic document produced over the last decade. They probably teach this stuff to kindergarteners now. Indeed, we’ve heard it all so often that it’s tempting to dismiss such claims as meaningless platitudes: Been there; theorized that. Can we get please get back to foreign-policy business as usual?

No, we can’t. Not if we want our children and grandchildren to live decent lives. If we care about the future at all, we need to do more than prattle on at cocktail parties about globalization, interconnectedness, complexity, danger, and uncertainty. We need to feel these seismic changes in our bones.

So bear with me. Let’s try to breathe some life into the clichés.

I’ve written about these issues before (here and here), and at risk of being both a narcissist and a broken record, I’ll quote myself:

The world has grown more complex. Believe it. The world now contains more people living in more states than ever before, and we’re all more interconnected. A hundred years ago, the world population was about 1.8 billion, there were roughly 60 sovereign states in the world, the automobile was still a rarity, and there were no commercial passenger flights and no transcontinental telephone service. Fifty years ago, global population had climbed to more than 3 billion and there were 115 U.N. member states, but air travel was still for the wealthy and the personal computer still lay two decades in the future.

Today? We’ve got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states and a handful of other territories. These 7 billion people take 93,000 commercial flights a day from 9,000 airports, drive 1 billion cars, and carry 7 billion mobile phones around with them.

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars.

In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends.

All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive, bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers.

Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people).

Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable.

Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously:

We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on….

That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?…

Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes — as with earthquakes — pressure may be building up over time, undetected….

Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable — until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power — until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under “Stable” should be recategorized under “Hasn’t Collapsed Yet”?

This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

II. The United States in the Mess: Goodbye, Lake Wobegon?

For Americans, the good news is that the United States remains an extraordinarily powerful nation. The United States has “the most powerful military in history,” Obama declared in a recent speech. Measured by sheer destructive capacity, he is surely right. The United States spends more on its military than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and India combined. The U.S. military can get to more places, faster, with more lethal and effective weapons, than any military on Earth.

The United States also manages to gobble up a disproportionate share of the world’s wealth and resources. By the year 2000, wrote Betsy Taylor and Dave Tilford, the United States, with “less than 5 percent of the world’s population,” was using “one-third of the world’s paper, a quarter of the world’s oil, 23 percent of the coal, 27 percent of the aluminum, and 19 percent of the copper.” In 2010, Americans possessed 39 percent of the planet’s wealth.

The bad news for Americans? U.S. power and global influence have been declining. In part, this is because various once-weak states have been growing stronger, and in part, it’s because no state can be as autonomous today as it might have been in the past. The United States’ geographical position long helped protect it from external interference, while its strong military and economy enabled it to dominate or control numerous less powerful states. But globalization has reduced every state’s autonomy, creating collective challenges — from climate change to the regulation of capital — that no state can fully address on its own.

U.S. power and global influence have also declined in absolute terms, as America’s own political and economic health has been called into question. The United States now has greater income inequality than almost every other state in the developed world — and most states in the developing world. American life expectancy ranks well below that of other industrialized democracies, and the same is true for infant mortality and elementary school enrollment. Meanwhile, the United States has the world’s highest per capita incarceration rate, and on international health and quality-of-life metrics, the United States has been losing ground for several decades. This domestic decline jeopardizes the country’s continued ability to innovate and prosper; it also makes American values and the American political and economic systems less appealing to others.

Worse, the political system that Americans rely on for reform and repair seems itself to be broken; the federal government shutdown in 2013 offered the world a striking illustration of U.S. political dysfunction. Add to this the divisive national security policies of George W. Bush’s administration — many of which were continued or expanded by the Obama administration — and it’s no surprise that the United States has recently become less admired and less emulated around the globe, reducing American “soft power.”

No matter how you slice it, it comes to the same thing: Compared with 30 years ago, the United States today has a greatly reduced ability to control its own destiny or the destiny of other states. The United States still has unprecedented power to destroy (Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden both discovered this, to their detriment). But the country’s capacity for destruction is not equaled by its capacity to shape the behavior of other states or their populations, and the United States has less and less ability to insulate itself from the world’s woes.

Unfortunately, American political leaders share a bipartisan inclination to deny these realities. Mostly, they succumb to the Lake Wobegon effect: “Declinism” and “declinist” have entered the American political vocabulary, but only as purely pejorative terms.

This is both stupid and dangerous. How can we adapt our global strategy to compensate for the ways in which U.S. power has been declining if we refuse to admit that decline?

Continued U.S. decline is certainly not inevitable, and some argue that the United States is in fact poised for an economic and political resurgence. There is no way to know for sure — but it’s worth recalling that, historically, every significant empire has eventually declined. Are we prepared to bet that the United States will prove an exception?

There is also no way to know for sure what form continued or eventual U.S. decline will take. We don’t know whether it will be fast or slow; we don’t know whether the American Empire is in for a hard landing or a soft one. Will the United States crash, like the former Soviet Union? Or will a slow decline in power leave the country an intact and influential nation, like the United Kingdom? Will America’s future be more like Canada’s present, or more like Brazil’s?

III. Behind the Veil of Ignorance: Uncertainty as Lodestone

We don’t know what America’s future will look like, and we can make fewer and fewer geopolitical predictions with confidence. The world has changed too much and too fast for us to accurately assess the probabilities of many types of future events. Perhaps this is why it’s so tempting for Americans to stay in Lake Wobegon, with eyes closed and fingers crossed. Uncertainty is frightening.

But paradoxically, this very uncertainty should be a lodestone, pointing realists and idealists alike toward a sensible, forward-looking global strategy. In fact, radical uncertainty can be a powerful tool for strategic planning.

That may seem oxymoronic, but consider one of the 20th century’s most influential thought experiments: In his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, philosopher John Rawls famously sought to use a hypothetical situation involving extreme uncertainty to derive optimal principles of justice.

Imagine, said Rawls, rational, free, and equal humans seeking to devise a set of principles to undergird the structure of human society. Imagine further that they must reason from behind what Rawls dubbed a “veil of ignorance,” which hides from them their own future status or attributes. Behind the veil of ignorance, wrote Rawls, people still possess general knowledge of economics, science, and so forth, and they can draw on this knowledge to assist them in designing a future society. Their ignorance is limited to their own future role in the society they are designing: “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”

If we were collectively designing social structures and rules, but could not know our own individual future positions in that social structure, what structures and rules would we come up with? Applying a version of decision theory, Rawls concluded that in the face of such radical uncertainty, rational, free, and equal beings behind the veil of ignorance would be drawn toward a “maximin” (or “minimax“) rule of decision, in which they would seek to minimize their losses in a worst-case scenario. Since those behind the veil of ignorance don’t know whether they’ll be among the haves or among the have-nots in the society they are designing, they should seek to build a society in which they each will be least badly off — even the luck of the draw leads them to start with the fewest advantages.

Rawls posited that such a rule of decision should lead those behind the veil of ignorance to support two core principles: the first relating to liberty (“each person [should] have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others”), and the second relating to social and economic goods. (Social goods should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would serve the common good and be “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” while “offices and positions [should remain] open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”)

This is in some ways intuitive: On a national level, it is the reason Americans across the political spectrum continue to express substantial support for the maintenance of unemployment benefits, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and so on. Any one of us might someday face a job loss or illness; nearly all of us will eventually face old age. We know we might someday need those benefits ourselves. In the face of uncertainty about the future, we all recognize the value of insurance, savings, and at least some minimal social safety net.

In the international arena, the same is true.

This has obvious implications for global strategy. Empires, like individuals, can sink into poverty, illness, or simple old age — and in an era of uncertainty, empires, like individuals, would do well to hedge against the possibility of future misfortune.

Indeed, two decades after the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls sought to apply a form of this thought experiment to derive the core principles that he believed would characterize a just global order. His arguments are complex, and I can’t do justice to them here — but fortunately, unlike Rawls, I am not interested in coming up with abstract principles of global justice. My less lofty agenda is limited to arguing that a crude version of Rawls’s thought experiment can help us delineate the contours of a sensible U.S. global strategy — a “maximin” strategy that is well-suited to protecting the interests of the United States and its people, both in today’s messy world and in a wide range of future messes.

Here’s my thought experiment.

Imagine a crude version of Rawls’s veil of ignorance, with only the United States behind it. This veil of ignorance doesn’t require us to disavow what we know of history (America’s or the world’s), nor does it require us to disavow what we know of recent trends, present global realities, U.S. values, or our current conception of the good. It only hides our future from us: Behind this veil of ignorance, we don’t know whether energy, food, water, and other vital resources will be scarcer or more plentiful in the decades to come; we don’t know whether global power will be more or less centralized; we don’t know whether new technologies and new forms of social organization will make existing technologies and institutions obsolete.

Most of all, we don’t know whether, in the decades to come, the United States will be rich or poor, weak or strong, respected or hated. For that matter, we don’t know whether the United States — or even the form of political organization we call the nation-state — will exist at all a century or two from now. In the face of such radical uncertainty, what kind of grand strategy should a rational United States adopt?

Of course, this shouldn’t really be called a “thought experiment” at all: The United States already operates behind a veil of ignorance, if we could only bring ourselves to admit it. We know the past; we have a reasonable understanding of recent trends; we know that the world is messy and dangerous; we know that the potential for rapid and potentially catastrophic change is real; and we know that our ability to predict future changes and quantify various risks is profoundly limited.

This knowledge is profoundly unsettling. Thus, we try our best to know and not know, at the same time: We speak glibly of complexity, accelerating change, danger, and uncertainty, but then fall back into the comfortable assumption that continued U.S. global dominance is a given and that catastrophic change is unlikely to occur. As long as we remain willfully ignorant of the veil of ignorance that hangs over us, we can avoid asking hard questions and making harder choices.

But this is shortsighted and dangerous. Empires that refuse to accept reality tend to rapidly decline. A clear-eyed acceptance of uncertainty and risk is the surest route to a more secure future. Instead of blinding us or paralyzing us, the uncertainty of our future should motivate us to engage in more responsible strategic planning.

If the United States can manage to be as rational as Rawls’s hypothetical decision-makers, it should adopt a similar maximin rule of decision: It should prefer international rules and institutions that will maximize America’s odds of thriving, even in a worst-case future scenario. In fact, we should wish for international rules and institutions that will be kindest to the individuals living in what is now the United States and their descendants, even if the United States should someday cease to exist entirely.

Could happen, folks. Look around you. Do you see the Roman Empire, or the Aztec Empire, or the Ottoman Empire?

IV. From Messiness to Strategy: A Preliminary Sketch

This has urgent implications for U.S. strategic planning. Precisely because U.S. global power may very well continue to decline, the United States should use the very considerable military, political, cultural, and economic power it still has to foster the international order most likely to benefit the country if it someday loses that power.

The ultimate objective of U.S. grand strategy should be the creation of an equitable and peaceful international order with an effective system of global governance — one that is built upon respect for human dignity, human rights, and the rule of law, with robust mechanisms for resolving thorny collective problems.

We should seek this not because it’s the “morally right” thing for the United States to do, but because a maximin decision rule should lead us to conclude that this will offer the United States and its population the best chance of continuing to thrive, even in the event of a radical future decline in U.S. wealth and power.

But, one might argue, the United States already tries to promote such a global order — right?

Sure it does — but only inconsistently, and generally as something of an afterthought. We pour money into our military and intelligence communities, but starve our diplomats and development agencies. We fixate on the threat du jour, often exaggerating it and allowing it to distort our foreign policy in self-destructive ways (cf. Iraq War), while viewing matters such as United Nations reform or reform of global economic institutions or environmental protection rules as tedious and of low priority. If we take seriously the many potential dangers lurking in the unknowable future, however, fostering a stronger, fairer, and more effective system of international governance would become a matter of urgent national self-interest and our highest strategic priority — something that should be reflected both in our policies and in our budgetary decisions.

An effective global governance system would need to be built upon the recognition that states remain the primary mode of political and social organization in the international sphere, but also upon the recognition that new forms of social organization continue to evolve and may ultimately displace at least some states. An effective and dynamic international system will need to develop innovative ways to bring such new actors and organizations within the ambit of international law and institutions, both as responsible creators of law and institutions and as responsible subjects.

### 1NC – CP

#### CP Text - The Federative Republic of Brazil ought to:

#### recognize an unconditional right of non-Trucker workers to strike.

#### make striking by all Trucker workers a federal crime and implement penalties modelled after New York City Taylor Law including two-for-one fines, lifetime bans from federal jobs, and jail time.

#### Trucker Strikes obliterate Food Security and turns the Economy.

Woody 18 Katherine Woody 7-3-2018 "Economic Impact of the Brazilian Trucker Strike" <https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Economic%20Impact%20of%20the%20Brazilian%20Trucker%20Strike_Brasilia_Brazil_7-3-2018.pdf> (Agricultural Attaché at US Foreign Agriculture Service)//Elmer

Report Highlights: On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of **Brazil’s** nearly 2 million **truck drivers began** an 11-day **strike** to protest high diesel prices, a move that **slowed Brazil’s economy**, **crippled** **transportation-dependent industries**, and **caused** estimated **losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector**. **A month after** Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), **transportation and logistics challenges still persist** **for Brazil’s exporters**, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, **supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks**, and debate and **uncertainty about** Brazil’s transportation **policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector** Background On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of Brazil’s nearly 2 million truck drivers began an 11-day strike to protest high diesel prices, a move that slowed Brazil’s economy, crippled transportation-dependent industries, and caused estimated losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector. Truck drivers parked their rigs along roads across the country, refusing to make deliveries of cargo and creating roadblocks on more than half of Brazil’s 500 busiest highways. Within a few days, the **effects** of the strike were **widespread** and painful, as gas stations ran out of fuel, drivers waited for hours in lines for what small fuel supplies remained, **supermarket shelves began to empty** and some **stores rationed perishable products**, and airports began cancelling flights as fuel supplies dwindled. Virtually **all segments of Brazil’s agricultural sector were affected in some way**, but livestock and poultry operations were particularly hard hit by feed delivery disruptions, idled slaughterhouses, export stoppages, and ultimately the culling of tens of millions of animals. A month after Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), transportation and logistics challenges still persist for Brazil’s exporters, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks, and debate and uncertainty about Brazil’s transportation policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector. The truckers’ rebellion was particularly painful for Brazil because the country lacks extensive rail and waterway infrastructure to transport goods, instead relying on trucks to carry more than 90 percent of all freight (excluding crude oil and iron ore). Additionally, Brazil’s limited road infrastructure meant that it was easy for striking truckers to create massive bottlenecks by setting up roadblocks along major roads, many of which are only one lane in each direction. Unlike the United States, where many **agricultural goods** are transported to export terminals by railways or river barges, Brazil’s farmers are **dependent on trucks** to move their goods within the domestic market and to ports for sale to the international market. The effects of the strike were wide-ranging, especially as gas stations ran out of fuel, supermarket shelves began to empty of fresh foods, and ports ran low on commodities to load for export. At the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná, one of the main soybean routes was interrupted. At the beginning of the strike, authorities warned that the blockage obstructed the arrival of a thousand soybean trucks per day in the terminal. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association (APAS), Brazilian retailers lost R$1.3 billion due to shortages of perishable items. In Sao Paulo alone, supermarkets losses were estimated at R$400 million. Causes The strike was spurred by rapidly rising fuel prices (diesel prices were up 43 percent since July 2017), combined with the effects of the Brazil real continuing to weaken against the U.S. dollar. Last year, Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, changed its pricing policies allow daily fluctuations of fuel prices pegged to the international oil market and scrapped subsidies that had kept domestic fuel prices lower. Most Brazilian truck drivers are largely self-employed and daily increases in fuel costs had begun to cut deeply into their incomes. Brazilian citizens of all economic classes supported the truck drivers, and by the eighth day of the strike, 87 percent of the population approved of the strike and sympathized with what many saw as another example of the injustice of government taxes, according to one public opinion poll by Brazilian firm Datafolha. However, the same firm on June 11 published results of a separate opinion poll that showed that 69 percent of Brazilians thought the trucker strike was harmful for the Brazilian economy. The survey also showed that Brazilians want more control of gas and fuel prices. Even before the strike, high fuel prices were affecting the competitiveness of Brazilian agricultural exports. Brazil’s transportation lobby, the National Confederation of Transport, estimated that before the strike Brazilian diesel prices were about 15 higher than in the United States, and argued that diesel fuel in Brazil was more expensive than in similarly developed countries such as Mexico and Russia. Roughly half of the Brazilian fuel price paid by consumers goes to government taxes. A study by the College of Agriculture at the University of Sao Paulo (ESALQ) found that farmers were paying an average of 9.05 reals (US$ 2.42) more per ton than early 2017 to transport oilseeds and grains from Mato Grosso to the Port of Santos in Sao Paulo. ESALQ estimated that in 2017, the cost to move Brazilian agricultural goods around the country reached 120 billion reals, with 87.5 percent going to transportation costs. Diesel prices at the pump in the major agriculture-producing states of Mato Grosso, Sao Paulo, and Paraná increased by 13-15 percent between January 2017 and May 2018, according to the ESALQ study. Resolution As the strike dragged on Brazilian President Michel Temer authorized intervention by military and federal police to clear roadblocks and begin escorting some trucks to their destinations, especially rigs carrying fuel to airports and other strategic locations. Desperate to jumpstart the country’s economy, Brazilian officials met with the leaders of several trucker unions, but a deal with union leaders to temporarily cut fuel prices was rejected by large numbers of independent truckers, who used social media apps to coordinate their response and garner public support for the continued strike. On the ninth day of the strike, the Brazilian government agreed to reduce diesel prices by 0.46 reals per liter, hold prices stable for 60 days, reduce tolls for large trucks, and suspend or eliminate some taxes in an effort to coax drivers back to the roads. The measures largely worked, with most truckers returning to the road and deliveries of food, fuel, and medicine beginning to flow again, albeit at a slower, more unreliable pace. Still, the concessions reportedly cost the Brazilian government 9.5 billion reals (US$ 2.48 billion) and contributed to the resignation of the Petrobras CEO. Market analysts have revised upward Brazil’s budget deficit for the year, now estimated at R$151 billion (US$ 40 billion), up more than R$12.5 billion (US$ 3.3 billion) from the previous month’s estimate due to the increased cost of fuel subsidies agreed to under negotiations to end the strike. Effects Although goods of all kinds, including agricultural products, started flowing again by the beginning of June, the strike left lasting scars on the Brazilian economy. Forecasters are estimating total losses of between US$ 25-30 billion to Brazil’s economy as a result of the strike. Brazil’s National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA) estimated losses to the agricultural sector due to the trucker strike at 6.6 billion reals (about US$ 1.75 billion). CNA also estimated that it **could take** Brazilian agricultural producers 6 months to **a year to recover fully** from the effects of the strike. Brazil’s central bank released its June report and **cut** **projected** 2018 **GDP** growth **to 1.6 percent**. One of the Brazilian government’s concessions to end the strike, a minimum freight rate guaranteed to truckers, is continuing to wreak havoc on the agricultural industry. The policy, which was implemented by presidential decree on May 30, was immediately criticized by a number of transportation-dependent industries, chief among them agriculture. CNA argued that the policy is unconstitutional and completely **upends** **logistics for agricultural producers**, many of whom have already concluded marketing contracts for 2018 crops. CNA reports that **soy and corn** producers and traders are already **paying** an **additional** R$ 500 million (US**$ 132 million**) for transportation **every day,** for a total of more than R$ 10 billion (US$ 2.65 billion) so far. Analysis by CNA forecasts that the policy is increasing freight rates by approximately 50-150 percent throughout the country, with Brazil’s powerhouse agricultural region in the interior of the country being hit the hardest. CNA and other players in the agricultural sector have challenged the measure in court through more than 50 lawsuits. Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Luiz Fux has been trying to mediate a solution satisfactory to both the transportation sector and the agricultural and industrial sectors dependent on those services. In the meantime, he suspended the pending lawsuits and left in effect the minimum freight rate table published on May 30 by the National Agency for Terrestrial Transportation (ANTT). President Temer has said he will abide by the court’s decision, truck drivers have threatened to strike again if the minimum price policy is invalidated. ANTT has publically estimated that judicial proceedings will continue through at least early August. Count Justice Fux confirmed that a new round of negotiations on this topic is scheduled for August 27, after the Supreme Court recess. The Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) has warned that the lack of certainty over truck freight rates has hindered transportation of commodities to the ports and subsequently caused shipping delays. Nearly two weeks after the end of the strike, MAPA Minister Blairo Maggi told reporters, “There are a lot of products waiting for transportation. We should be moving 450,000 tons of goods to ports every day, but we are not.” He also noted that the situation has affected forward sales of agricultural commodities since traders cannot accurate price the contracts without knowing how much will need to be spent on transportation. CNA argues that since the policy went into effect, **productivity of Brazil’s agricultural sector has slowed by half**, as producers have slowed the volume of shipments they are sending to ports while they wait for a resolution. Meanwhile, the number of ships waiting to load at Brazilian ports has continued to grow. According to shipping agency Williams, the number of ships berthed and loading in mid-June was about 40 percent lower than the same period last year, while the ship line-ups had grown to be about 60 percent larger than 2017, with as many as 70 ships waiting, according to some industry sources. CNA estimated that the shipping delays have cost about R$ 135 million (US$ 36 million) in demurrage charges for ships that have been delayed in loading at Brazilian ports. Moreover, the problems created by continued uncertainty about the policy are expected to worsen as Brazil’s second-crop corn harvest progresses. Brazil’s second-crop corn is currently less than 10 percent harvested, but limited silo capacity in the country means that commodities must generally start flowing to the ports as it comes out of the ground. With a record soybean crop this year and slow delivery to the ports in June, Brazilian corn will be forced to compete with soy for transportation and storage capacity, and freight rates are expected to rise as more Brazilian corn comes onto the market. Impact on the Agricultural Sector Livestock Swine and Poultry: The most significant losses from the strike were born by the chicken and pork production sector. Shortages of fuel and animal feed affected farms and feedlots, while slaughterhouses idled their production lines when transportation to the ports was cut off and refrigerated warehouses filled to capacity. Analysts estimated a loss of R$4 billion (US$ 1.05 billion) in exports, with 120,000 metric tons of chicken and pork meat not exported because of the strike. The Brazilian Association of Animal Protein reported that the strike caused the closure of 137 poultry plants and 30 swine slaughterhouses, forcing 220,000 industry workers to go on temporary leave. As feed rations ran low, some poultry operations were only feeding birds once every 48 hours, considered starvation rations, according to MAPA Minister Maggi. Particularly worrisome for the world’s largest exporter of chicken was the fact that poultry operations were forced to cull an estimated 70 million birds (about 7 percent of Brazil’s flock of 1 billion birds), bringing the level of chicks on breeder farms down to their lowest levels in a decade. Minister Maggi called on President Temer during the strike to ensure security forces were escorting trucks of feed rations to poultry farms. By mid-June, all affected processing plants had resumed operations, according to the Brazilian Association of Animal Protein. However, the disruption in supply was expected to cause a spike in Brazilian chicken prices as the sector could take more than 2 months to fully recover. Wholesale prices for frozen chicken in Brazil were up more than 40 percent. Moreover, Rabobank revised downward their forecast of the Brazilian poultry sector to an estimated 3 percent decline for the year (down from a forecasted 2-percent expansion). Cattle: The trucker strike came at a very unfortunate time for the beef sector. With the beginning of winter in Brazil, cattle on pasture begin to lose weight and needed to be sent to slaughter, but the strike forced the closure of virtually all of Brazil’s more than 100 cattle slaughterhouses. Most of the losses in the beef industry occurred not through the mortality of animals on farm, but rather through estimated lost exports of R$ 620 million (US$ 164 million). More than 40,000 metric tons of beef were unable to reach ports, and the domestic market saw an uncalculated amount of beef spoiled on the road as an estimated 3,750 refrigerated trucks sat idle during the strike, according to meatpacking trade association ABIEC. The industry calculates total losses to the sector could reach R$ 8 billion (US$ 2.1 billion). ABIEC noted that 90 percent of animal protein production was interrupted. On a positive note for beef producers, some analysts expect beef prices to rise in response to lower chicken meat volumes. Dairy Dairy producers across Brazil were severely affected by the transportation paralysis, with news media depicting dire scenes of the disposal of hundreds of millions of liters of milk by farmers who could not store their perishable products. The discarded milk alone was valued at more than R$ 1 billion (US$ 260 million). Milk supply in Brazil is expected to decline 9 percent year over year in the second quarter of 2018 as a consequence of the strike. Moreover, production will take a while to recover and will likely drop 6 percent year-over-year in the third quarter. Market analysts evaluate that milk prices paid to producers are expected to peak in the third quarter of 2018. Following 12 months of low profitability, farmers and processors were forced at a particularly difficult time to absorb the losses caused by the May strike. **Grains** and **Oilseeds** When the strike began in late May, Brazil’s soybean harvest was nearly finished and the harvest for second-crop “safrinha” corn was just beginning. The largest producing area for both of these crops is Brazil’s center-west region in the interior of the country, located very far from points of export in Brazil’s southeast and north arc regions. Loading at some of Brazil’s largest **soybean**-exporting ports, including Santos, Paranagua, Rio Grande, and Santarem, ground to a halt during the strike, as on-port stocks emptied and roadblocks kept trucks from delivering commodities for export. Most export terminals ran out of soybeans for shipment about 8 days into the strike, with soybeans reportedly arriving to the Port of Paranagua in Paraná state on the afternoon of the tenth day when trucks were able to reach the port complex for the first time since the strike had begun. Trucks reportedly unloaded more than 40,000 tons of soybeans at the port in the first 24 hours after the strike concluded. The Port of Santos, Latin America’s largest port, was also idled when trucks could no longer make deliveries. Cargo transported by rail were unaffected by the strike, but this makes up only a small portion of exports from the Port of Santos. Brazil’s soybean crushers association, ABIOVE, reported that all 63 of Brazil’s soy-crushing facilities came to a standstill during the strike due to a lack of supplies. The Mato Grosso Institute for Agricultural Economics (IMEA) reported that the corn harvest stalled out as fuel supplies in the state ran low. The aftermath of the strike and uncertainty about the minimum freight rate have stifled forward sales for soybeans, with traders complaining that they are unable to accurately set prices for futures contracts without a reliable estimate of transportation costs. As of late June, some of the country’s largest grain traders have virtually stopped buying soybeans and **corn** for export, even though IMEA reported that about one-third of Mato Grosso’s safrinha corn is still unsold. Grain and oilseed traders are also reportedly delaying picking up commodities from farmers’ storage facilities while they angle to avoid paying rapidly rising freight rates and wait to see what happens to the government’s minimum transportation price policy. This could be a major problem for a country whose agricultural producers have a lack of on-farm storage and will be faced with tough decisions of where to place safrinha corn. Brazil’s National Association of Cereal Exporters estimated that as of mid-June, about 10 million tons of soybeans were paralyzed in the interior of the country while more than 50 vessels were waiting to be loaded at ports. CNA reported that exports of at least 6.8 million tons of soybeans and soybean meal have been delayed due to surging freight prices under the government’s minimum price policy. Meanwhile, the number of trucks arriving at the Port of Santos was down more than 20 percent from a month earlier, despite abundant soybean supplies in the country ready for export. At the Port of Paranagua, truck volume was down more than 10 percent and while the port has been receiving enough soybean volume to load waiting vessels, it has not been able to begin rebuilding its 1.5 million metric tons of on-port stocks, which were completely depleted during the 11-day strike. This makes the port particularly vulnerable if there is a second truck driver strike if the government’s minimum freight rate policy is rescinded. The backlog of ships at Brazil’s ports are not merely waiting to load commodities for export; they are waiting to unload cargoes of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer needed by Brazil’s farmers for the wheat planting currently underway, as well as preparing fields for soybean planting, which will commence in a few months. CNA estimated that about 35 ships are currently lined up and waiting to unload fertilizer at Brazilian ports, more than half at the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná in southern Brazil. According to Brazil’s Fertilizer Blenders Association, 60 percent of fertilizer deliveries have been delayed as a result of the backlog. Sugarcane and Ethanol The strike began just as the harvest kicked off in the world’s largest sugarcane-growing regions, Brazil’s center-south. Progress on the sugarcane harvest slowed as fuel supplies dwindled and at least 220 sugar mills were forced to close, according to trade group Forum National Sucroenergetico. Meanwhile, UNICA, Brazil’s Sugar Growers Association, reported that 150 sugar mills closed in the state of Sao Paulo alone, where 60 percent of Brazil’s sugar and ethanol production occurs. The state of Sao Paulo produces about 150,000 tons of sugar and 100 million liters of ethanol daily, and the sugar industry in that state suffered losses in revenue of about US$ 48 million daily during the strike. The disruption caused international sugar futures to rise as sugar exports were unable to reach the ports. Once fuel supplies began flowing again, harvest and crushing operations were able to quickly get back up to speed. Losses in the sector are calculated at R$ 740 million (US$ 196 million). However, this calculation does not include lost/delayed sales of ethanol stored at the mills for exports or use in the domestic market, as no data of this type has been released. Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of sugar, with more than 20 million tons exported in the previous season. Coffee Brazil is the world’s largest coffee grower and exporter, and the trucker strike hit just as the country’s main Arabica harvest was commencing, which caused international Arabica futures prices to increase by about 2 percent. According to Brazil’s Coffee Exporters Council (CeCafe), the strike affected issuance of export certificates and delayed shipments, but CeCafe noted that most sales were already concluded and overall exports for the season are expected to remain at roughly the same levels estimated before the strike. According to the Brazilian Coffee Industry Association, coffee producers lost an estimated R$ 70 million (US$ 18.5 million) per day during the protests, while CeCafe estimated export losses and extra port costs of R$ 560 million (US$ 148 million). Seafood Brazil’s seafood industry was affected by a disruption of deliveries between producers and processing centers, according to trade group Peixe BR. The state of Paraná is Brazil’s largest producer of fish, raising more than 100,000 tons of tilapia last year, while the state of Sao Paulo has seen rapid growth of the industry, producing more than 65,000 tons of tilapia last year. These two states’ aquaculture sectors were the hardest hit, according to Peixe BR. At one point during the strike, a large, multi-commodity agricultural cooperative in southern Brazil, was forced to halt tilapia processing operations when truck drivers blocked roadways and cut off supplies for processing, as well as the route for distributing the final product. Fruits and Vegetables As a result of the strike, many of Brazil’s wholesale markets saw supplies of fresh products dwindle and spoilage of other products in cases where usual customers were unable to make routine purchases. The Sao Paulo Warehouse Company (CEAGESP), Latin America’s largest and the world’s third-largest wholesale market, reported losses of nearly R$ 100 million (US$ 26 million) of fruits, vegetables, and nuts, including imported products. During a normal day, CEAGESP would normally see about 1,800- 2,000 trucks come and go from the market with fresh and perishable products. However, during the strike this was reduced to less than 100 trucks per day. In addition to losses of perishable products, the prices of remaining products sored because CEAGESP prices serve as a reference for states in Brazil. Supermarkets The Brazilian Supermarket Association (ABRAS) reported total losses of R$ 2.7 billion (US$ 712 million) due to the truckers strike. In addition to losses with fresh, frozen, and perishable products, ABRAS reported shortages of other consumer goods that could not be delivered to stores. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association, in Sao Paulo alone supermarkets losses reached R$ 400 million (US$ 105 million).

#### The Counterplan shuts down Trucker Strikes.

Bauernschuster et Al 17, Stefan, Timo Hener, and Helmut Rainer. "When labor disputes bring cities to a standstill: The impact of public transit strikes on traffic, accidents, air pollution, and health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9.1 (2017): 1-37. (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Passau, Innstra)//Elmer

New York City's **Taylor Law,** which was put into effect **in response to a transit strike** in 1966, represents an example of a particularly draconian measure. Under Section 210, the law **prohibits** any **strike or** other concerted **stoppage** 01 worn or slowdown by public employees (Division of Local Government Services 2009). Instead, it prescribes binding arbitration by a state agency to resolve bargaining deadlocks between unions and employers. **Violations** against the prohibition on strikes are **punishable with hefty penalties**. The fine for an individual worker is **twice** the striking employee's **salary** **for each** **day** the strike lasts. In addition, union leaders face **imprisonment**. Since its inception in 1967, the Taylor Law has generated a lot of controversy. To proponents, it was **successful in averting several potential transit strikes** that would have imposed significant costs on the city and its inhabitants (OECD 2007). Indeed, New York City has only seen two transit strikes over the past four decades—in 1980 and in 2005. In both cases, harsh monetary penalties were imposed on workers and unions. The 2005 transit strike additionally led to the imprisonment of a union leader, and saw the Transport Workers Union (TWU) filing a formal complaint with the ILO. Since then, the ILO has urged the United States government to restore the right of transit workers to strike, arguing that they do not provide essential services justifying a strike ban (Committee on Freedom of Association 2011, 775). So far, the Taylor Law has not been amended in this direction.

#### Brazil key to Global Food Supply

Moreira 21 Assis Moreira 7-5-2021 "Brazil to remain world leader in food supply, OECD and FAO say" <https://valorinternational.globo.com/agribusiness/news/2021/07/05/brazil-to-remain-world-leader-in-food-supply-oecd-and-fao-say.ghtml> (Geneva Correspondent on Agribusiness)//Elmer

**Brazil** will **continue** to increase its **role as a major global food supplier**, including in products such as beef and even with a slower pace of growth in demand from China. These projections are **in the report on agricultural outlook** 2021-2030 released Monday by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). China will continue to have enormous influence on agricultural markets. The Chinese deficit in agricultural trade has grown to $86 billion in 2020 from $2.6 billion in 2000. For the next ten years, Beijing will continue to expand imports, but at a slower pace due to lower population growth, saturation in consumption of some commodities, and efficiency gains in its own production. In addition, the Chinese market will pose tougher competition as trade tensions with the United States ease. The report predicts that China could once again become the main market for U.S. agricultural exports. In this scenario, **abundant land and water** will **make Brazil the dominant producer**, and Latin America as a whole **will see** its **agricultural production grow by 14%** over the next ten years. The **net value of the region’s exports is expected to expand by 31%** — just over half the rate achieved between 2011 and 2020. By 2030, the region will continue to grow its share of global markets for key commodities. It may have 63% of world soybean exports, 56% of sugar exports, 44% of fish, 42% of beef exports, and 33% of chicken shipments.

#### Food insecurity spurs conflict and on face kills millions of innocents.

FDI 12 (Future Directions International, a Research institute providing strategic analysis of Australia’s global interests; citing Lindsay Falvery, PhD in Agricultural Science and former  Professor at the University of Melbourne’s Institute of Land and Environment, “Food and Water Insecurity: International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points,” <http://www.futuredirections.org.au/workshop-papers/537-international-conflict-triggers-and-potential-conflict-points-resulting-from-food-and-water-insecurity.html)//Elmer>

There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources.¶ Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world.¶ In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. .¶ He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.”¶ “Hunger feeds anarchy.”¶ This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” ¶ He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.”¶ As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves.¶ Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry.¶ A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon.¶ The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

## 1NC - Off

#### Interpretation: the affirmative may not spec a government

#### 1] The letter “A” is an indefinite article that modifies “just government” – the resolution must be proven true in all instances, not one particular instance

CCC ND Capital Community College [a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation], “Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles AG

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### 2] Government is an indefinite singular– the aff may not defend a specific set of governments

Nebel 20 [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Indefinite Singular Generics in Debate” Victory Briefs, 19 Sept 2020. no url AG

I agree that if “a democracy” in the resolution just meant “one or more democracy,” then a country-specific affirmative could be topical. But, as I will explain in this topic analysis, that isn’t what “a democracy” means in the resolution. To see why, we first need to back up a bit and review (or learn) the idea of generic generalizations.

The most common way of expressing a generic in English is through a *bare plural*. A bare plural is a plural noun phrase, like “dogs” and “cats,” that lacks an overt determiner. (A determiner is a word that tells us which or how many: determiners include quantifier words like “all,” “some,” and “most,” demonstratives like “this” and “those,” posses- sives like “mine” and “its,” and so on.) LD resolutions often contain bare plurals, and that is the most common clue to their genericity.

We have already seen some examples of generics that are not bare plurals: “A whale is a mammal,” “A beaver builds dams,” and “The woolly mammoth is extinct.” The first two examples use indefinite singulars—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite article “a”—and the third is a *definite singular* since it is preceded by the definite article “the.” Generics can also be expressed with *bare singulars* (“Syrup is viscous”) and even verbs (as we’ll see later on). The resolution’s “a democracy” is an indefinite singular, and so it very well might be—and, as we’ll soon see, is—generic.

But it is also important to keep in mind that, just as not all generics are bare plurals, not all bare plurals are generic. “Dogs are barking” is true as long as some dogs are barking. Bare plurals can be used in particular ways to express existential statements. The key question for any given debate resolution that contains a bare plural is whether that occurrence of the bare plural is generic or existential.

The same is true of indefinite singulars. As debaters will be quick to point out, some uses of the indefinite singular really do mean “some” or “one or more”: “A cat is on the mat” is clearly not a generic generalization about cats; it’s true as long as some cat is on the mat. The question is whether the indefinite singular “a democracy” is existential or generic in the resolution.

Now, my own view is that, if we understand the difference between existential and generic statements, and if we approach the question impartially, without any invest- ment in one side of the debate, we can almost always just tell which reading is correct just by thinking about it. It is clear that “In a democracy, voting ought to be compul- sory” doesn’t mean “There is one or more democracy in which voting ought to be com- pulsory.” I don’t think a fancy argument should be required to show this any more than a fancy argument should be required to show that “A duck doesn’t lay eggs” is a generic—a false one because ducks do lay eggs, even though some ducks (namely males) don’t. And if a debater contests this by insisting that “a democracy” is existen- tial, the judge should be willing to resolve competing claims by, well, judging—that is, by using her judgment. Contesting a claim by insisting on its negation or demanding justification doesn’t put any obligation on the judge to be neutral about it. (Otherwise the negative could make every debate irresolvable by just insisting on the negation of every statement in the affirmative speeches.) Even if the insistence is backed by some sort of argument, we can reasonably reject an argument if we know its conclusion to be false, even if we are not in a position to know exactly where the argument goes wrong. Particularly in matters of logic and language, speakers have more direct knowledge of particular cases (e.g., that some specific inference is invalid or some specific sentence is infelicitious) than of the underlying explanations.

But that is just my view, and not every judge agrees with me, so it will be helpful to consider some arguments for the conclusion that we already know to be true: that, even if the United States is a democracy and ought to have compulsory voting, that doesn’t suffice to show that, in a democracy, voting ought to be compulsory—in other words, that “a democracy” in the resolution is generic, not existential.

Second, existential uses of the indefinite, such as “A cat is on the mat,” are upward- entailing.3 This means that if you replace the noun with a more general one, such as “An animal is on the mat,” the sentence will still be true. So let’s do that with “a democracy.” Does the resolution entail “In a society, voting ought to be compulsory”? Intuitively not, because you could think that voting ought to be compulsory in democracies but not in other sorts of societies. This suggests that “a democracy” in the resolution is not existential.

#### It applies to government:

#### Upward entailment test – spec fails the upward entailment test because saying that China ought to have the unconditional right to strike does not entail that those governments ought to have the unconditional right to strike.

#### Adverb test – adding “usually” to the res doesn’t substantially change its meaning because a recognition is universal and permanent

#### Violation – they only defend x

#### Vote neg:

#### Semantics outweigh:

#### T is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden – they agreed to debate the topic when they came here

#### Jurisdiction – you can’t vote aff if they haven’t affirmed the resolution

#### It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement – there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it

#### Standards:

#### Limits – there are 195 affs accounting for hundreds of governments— unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden – potential abuse doesn’t justify foregoing the topic and 1AR theory checks PICs.

Banerjee 4/12 [(Vasabjit Banerjee, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Mississippi State University),”How many states and provinces are in the world?” , The Conversation, <https://theconversation.com/how-many-states-and-provinces-are-in-the-world-157847>, April 12, 2021] SS

There are 195 national governments recognized by the United Nations, but there are as many as nine other places with nationlike governments, including Taiwan and Kosovo, though they are not recognized by the U.N.

Most of these countries are divided into smaller sections, the way the U.S. is broken up into 50 states along with territories, like Puerto Rico and Guam, and a federal district, Washington, D.C.

They are not all called “states,” though: Switzerland has cantons, Bangladesh has divisions, Cameroon has regions, Germany has lander, Jordan has governorates, Montserrat has parishes, Zambia has provinces, and Japan has prefectures – among many other names.

#### Ground – spec guts core generics like the econ DA which rely on all governments having the unconditional right to strike because individual governments don’t have an impact on the global economy as a whole – also means there is no universal DA to spec affs

#### TVA solves – read as an advantage to whole rez

#### Paradigm issues:

#### Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start

#### Comes before 1AR theory – NC abuse is responsive to them not being topical

#### Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation

#### No RVIs – fairness and education are a priori burdens – and encourages baiting – outweighs because if T is frivolous, they can beat it quickly

#### Fairness is a voter ­– necessary to determine the better debater

#### Education is a voter – why schools fund debate

## Case

### Adv 2

#### Econ growth doesn’t cause war – it encourages decreased defense spending, threat deflation, threat prioritization, international coop, and better leaders.

Clary ’15 (Christopher; 4/25/15; Ph.D. in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University; MIT Political Science Department Research Paper, “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=2597712)

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns **encourage austerity and economizing behavior** in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on **data** from 109 **distinct rival** dyads **since 1950**, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may **result from economic troubles**. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant politicalmilitary threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to **downplay** **the seriousness** of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to **consider** threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international **economic** cooperation. Leaders **seek foreign aid**, **enhanced trade**, and **increased investment** from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as **capable of** resolving **economic** difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it **much more likely** that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this **causal logic** in greater detail, while also providing **historical examples** that these mechanisms recur in practice. Economic Crisis Leads to **Austerity** Economic crises generate pressure for austerity. Government revenues are a function of national economic production, so that when production diminishes through recession, revenues available for expenditure also diminish. Planning almost **invariably assumes growth** rather than contraction, so the deviation in available revenues compared to the planned expenditure can be sizable. When growth slowdowns are prolonged, the cumulative departure from planning targets can grow even further, even if no single quarter meets the technical definition of recession. Pressures for austerity are **felt** most **acutely** in governments that face difficulty borrowing to finance deficit expenditures. This is **especially the case** when this borrowing relies on international sources of credit. Even for states that can borrow, however, intellectual attachment to balanced budgets as a means to restore confidence—a belief in what is sometimes called “expansionary austerity”—generates incentives to curtail expenditure. These incentives to cut occur precisely when populations are experiencing economic hardship, making reductions especially painful that target poverty alleviation, welfare programs, or economic subsidies. As a result, mass and elite constituents strongly resist such cuts. Welfare programs and other forms of public spending may be especially susceptible to a policy “ratchet effect,” where people are **very reluctant** to forego benefits once they have become accustomed to their availability.6 As Paul Pierson has argued, “The politics [of welfare state] retrenchment is typically treacherous, because it imposes **tangible losses** on concentrated groups of voters in return for diffuse and uncertain gains.”7

#### COVID-19 makes econ collapse inevitable – capitalism cannot function in an 18-month shutdown

Roos 4/5 [(Jerome, a fellow in international political economy at the London School of Economics) “Capitalism Causes Disasters, Socialism Can Solve Them” Jacobin, 4/5/2020] BC

The coronavirus pandemic is rapidly threatening to escalate into a global crisis of epochal proportions. As the virulent disease holds the world in its grip, the disastrous handling of the outbreak in the United States and Europe also highlights a number of structural weaknesses in the political-economic configurations of the Western world. This is demonstrating in the most unambiguous terms just how ill-equipped market-oriented capitalist societies are to deal with an emergency of this scope and intensity.

There are at least three interrelated aspects to the current crisis, all of which expose fundamental flaws at the heart of the established order. The first and most important of these is, of course, the medical dimension: a public health emergency that takes the form of a relentless exponential increase in the number of detected cases, in the number of hospitalized patients, and in the number of fatalities. In the United States and many European countries, a repeat of the Italian scenario is now imminent, as the sudden influx of critically ill intensive-care patients threatens to overwhelm structurally underfunded or outright unaffordable public health care systems.

In the short term, the immediate priority of governments should therefore be to stave off the coming humanitarian catastrophe and save as many lives as possible. Yet it has rapidly become clear that bringing this raging pandemic under control will require much more than government officials “nudging” citizens toward behavioral changes. This strategy, which effectively seeks to privatize the costs of the crisis by placing the full burden of adjustment on individuals, is the ultimate market-conforming approach. As the dithering of several Western governments over the past weeks has amply demonstrated, a public campaign for handwashing, elbow-sneezing, and voluntary social distancing simply will not be enough to stem the rising rate of infections.

According to the World Health Organization, suppressing the pandemic will require radical state action, from enforced lockdowns and quarantines to far-reaching public health interventions. The latter will need to include not only a rapid upscaling of hospital capacity and a herculean effort to produce ventilators, protective gear, and other medical supplies, but also an immediate and widespread government-led rollout of testing capacity, contact tracing, and supervised isolation of those who have been infected — not to mention the fast-tracked development of an effective vaccine. Such a state-led emergency response is clearly necessary, but it will force most Western governments to go far beyond the neoliberal remit they have long since established for themselves as the guarantors of “free enterprise.”

It is also clear that some of these public health interventions will come at an immense cost. This in turn highlights the second dimension of the current crisis: the economic one. As the virus continues its rapid spread, advanced capitalist democracies suddenly find themselves in the extraordinary position of having to defy business interests and effectively shut down all nonessential workplaces to enable their working populations to stay at home. Of course, employers are actively challenging the “necessity” of such radical measures — yet public health experts are adamant that a failure to institute them would rapidly overwhelm hospital capacity.

Economic Collapse

At present, we are yet to apprehend what the consequences of such a sudden stop in productive and commercial activity will be. All we know is that the economic fallout will be immense — far worse than anything we have ever seen outside of a major war — and that it could potentially pose an existential threat to the heavily indebted world economy and the global financial system as we know it. As the billionaire hedge fund manager Bill Ackman recently put it to CNBC, “capitalism does not work in an 18-month shutdown.”

Ever keen to prop up the established order, Western governments and central banks have therefore moved aggressively to respond to this second aspect of the crisis. Even as they hesitated to safeguard the health of the general public, they moved swiftly to preserve the health of the markets. In the space of just weeks, officials have already pledged a number of record-shattering rescue packages to prevent a system-wide meltdown, including a raft of groundbreaking new monetary interventions by the Federal Reserve and the $2tn fiscal stimulus program recently passed by the Senate.

#### Only degrowth solves– infinite growth relies on burning fossil fuels, depleting natural resources, mining REMS, and pollution – COVID means a transition is possible

Herbert and Mastini 6/8 [(Joe Herbert, a doctoral researcher in Human Geography at Newcastle University) (Riccardo Mastini, a doctoral researcher in Political Ecology in the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona) “Economic Growth Can't Go Back to Normal If We Are to Solve the Ecological Crisis” Common Dreams, 6/8/2020] BC

The COVID-19 pandemic has delivered a sharp and sudden shock to the global economy’s usual diet of ever-expanding economic growth. Measures to tackle the virus have seen industries grind to a halt, and high streets become ghost towns. Experts are predicting the worst global recession since the 1930s, and the UK’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is forecast to fall by 14% in 2020.

For the beneficiaries of our existing economic system, this hit to growth is a waking nightmare.

Growth is heralded as a rising tide that lifts all boats, creating larger incomes and more jobs, as well as funding essential public services like healthcare and education. Strong and uninterrupted growth is considered an unquestionable good that benefits all of society.

The problems with growth

But what drives economic growth? Our economy relies on burning fossil fuels and depleting natural resources to expand production and consumption, while polluting the environment with the waste. Most of us are forced to work for wages in order to survive, creating the goods and services which generate growth, while a minority siphon off the profits. In 2018, 82% of new wealth created went to the world’s richest 1%, while the poorest half of the global population got nothing.

Most scientists agree that an unprecedented economic transformation is now needed to limit global temperature rise to 1.5°C and avert climate breakdown. Meanwhile, the destruction of ecosystems to claim land and resources in service of more economic growth is contributing to the sixth mass extinction of life on Earth.

“Green growth” has been touted as a solution to these problems. But recent research suggests that growth cannot be decoupled from environmental pressures at a scale or speed sufficient to halt ecological breakdown.

Transitioning to renewable energy can reduce carbon emissions, but it increases pressures on rare Earth minerals and land to build wind and solar farms. Reducing emissions in one country often involves exporting dirty production processes to another. When goods are made more efficient, they become cheaper to produce, and their lower ecological impact is often offset by increased consumption. Think of someone switching to a fuel efficient car but driving more often. Put simply, attempts at “greening” growth often shift, rather than eliminate, environmental impact.

Governments have taken action to reduce the spread of COVID-19 at the expense of economic growth. But as the post-pandemic recession kicks in, rebooting growth will be the priority. This would set us right back on the path of ecological catastrophe.

Yet, polling suggests a public appetite to prioritise wellbeing over growth in the post-COVID economy. To achieve this while tackling ecological crisis would require turning the current short-term disruption to growth into a long-term managed downscaling of the economy. As researchers, we work with a concept which can guide this task: degrowth.

Well-being without growth

Degrowth calls for a fundamental restructuring of the economy to reduce its ecological impact and improve well-being by abolishing economic growth as a social objective.

The pandemic will shrink the global economy, but not in a targeted way that downscales carbon-intensive sectors. For this reason, a degrowth transition would look very different to a crisis-driven recession such as the present one. Still, there are useful lessons to be drawn from COVID-19. Firstly, when confronted with a major crisis, we must stop activities that threaten well-being, regardless of the impact on growth.

Once we have established the necessary boundaries to protect well-being – whether it’s closing non-essential industries to prevent the spread of a virus, or curtailing those which threaten to push global warming beyond 1.5°C – our task as a society is to build an economy which helps everyone live well within those limits. For instance, the appeal during the pandemic to “stay home” could afterwards become “stay grounded”, as we scale down the enormously carbon-intensive aviation industry while expanding green public transport.

Secondly, COVID-19 has also prompted society to reconsider how we value different forms of labour. The heroes of the pandemic are those undervalued by our current economic system, often working for low wages or in poor conditions. They are, among others, the cleaners, shop workers, farmers, nurses, rubbish collectors, teachers, postal workers and food couriers. Feminist economists describe this work - disproportionately done by women - as the “reproductive economy”, so called because it provides the essential services on which the rest of society depends for its day to day functioning.

Lots of vital reproductive work also occurs outside of the waged labour market, such as care of relatives in family homes. If all this unwaged labour were paid, it’s estimated that its global value would total $10.8 trillion per year. A care income could support all those doing unpaid work caring for other people and their local environments.

Reproductive work is central to sustaining well-being, but it also tends to have a lower ecological impact than much of the industrial economy. For these reasons, a degrowth transition could reduce ecological degradation by shrinking the sectors that pollute the most, like the fossil fuel industry and aviation, while expanding reproductive sectors such as health care, education and ecosystems restoration.

The COVID-19 pandemic has undeniably created an upsurge of political imagination. Now, as the restructuring of the post-pandemic economy begins, we must resist the return to infinite growth. The future of life on Earth depends upon it.

**Warming causes extinction – any reduction should be prioritized above other impacts**

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Climate change is becoming an existential threat with warming in excess of 2°C within the next three decades and 4°C to 6°C within the next several decades. Warming of such magnitudes will expose as many as 75% of the world’s population to deadly heat stress in addition to disrupting the climate and weather worldwide. Climate change is an urgent problem requiring urgent solutions. This paper lays out urgent and practical solutions that are ready for implementation now, will deliver benefits in the next few critical decades, and places the world on a path to achieving the longterm targets of the Paris Agreement and near-term sustainable development goals. The approach consists of four building blocks and 3 levers to implement ten scalable solutions described in this report by a team of climate scientists, policy makers, social and behavioral scientists, political scientists, legal experts, diplomats, and military experts from around the world. These solutions will enable society to decarbonize the global energy system by 2050 through efficiency and renewables, drastically reduce short-lived climate pollutants, and stabilize the climate well below 2°C both in the near term (before 2050) and in the long term (post 2050). It will also reduce premature mortalities by tens of millions by 2050. As an insurance against policy lapses, mitigation delays and faster than projected climate changes, the solutions include an Atmospheric Carbon Extraction lever to remove CO2 from the air. The amount of CO2 that must be removed ranges from negligible, if the emissions of CO2 from the energy system and SLCPs start to decrease by 2020 and carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, to a staggering one trillion tons if the carbon lever is not pulled and emissions of climate pollutants continue to increase until 2030.

There are numerous living laboratories including 53 cities, many universities around the world, the state of California, and the nation of Sweden, who have embarked on a carbon neutral pathway. These laboratories have already created 8 million jobs in the clean energy industry; they have also shown that emissions of greenhouse gases and air pollutants can be decoupled from economic growth. Another favorable sign is that growth rates of worldwide carbon emissions have reduced from 2.9% per year during the first decade of this century to 1.3% from 2011 to 2014 and near zero growth rates during the last few years. The carbon emission curve is bending, but we have a long way to go and very little time for achieving carbon neutrality. We need institutions and enterprises that can accelerate this bending by scaling-up the solutions that are being proven in the living laboratories. We have less than a decade to put these solutions in place around the world to preserve nature and our quality of life for generations to come. The time is now.

The Paris Agreement is an historic achievement. For the first time, effectively all nations have committed to limiting their greenhouse gas emissions and taking other actions to limit global temperature change. Specifically, 197 nations agreed to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels,” and achieve carbon neutrality in the second half of this century.

The climate has already warmed by 1°C. The problem is running ahead of us, and under current trends we will likely reach 1.5°C in the next fifteen years and surpass the 2°C guardrail by mid-century with a 50% probability of reaching 4°C by end of century. Warming in excess of 3°C is likely to be a global catastrophe for three major reasons:

• Warming in the range of 3°C to 5°C is suggested as the threshold for several tipping points in the physical and geochemical systems; a warming of about 3°C has a probability of over 40% to cross over multiple tipping points, while a warming close to 5°C increases it to nearly 90%, compared with a baseline warming of less than 1.5°C, which has only just over a 10% probability of exceeding any tipping point.

**•** Health effects of such warming are emerging as a major if not dominant source of concern. Warming of 4°C or more will expose more than 70% of the population, i.e. about 7 billion by the end of the century, to deadly heat stress and expose about 2.4 billion to vector borne diseases such as Dengue, Chikengunya, and Zika virus among others. Ecologists and paleontologists have proposed that warming in excess of 3°C, accompanied by increased acidity of the oceans by the buildup of CO2 , can become a major causal factor for exposing more than 50% of all species to extinction. 20% of species are in danger of extinction now due to population, habitat destruction, and climate change.

The good news is that there may still be time to avert such catastrophic changes. The Paris Agreement and supporting climate policies must be strengthened substantially within the next five years to bend the emissions curve down faster, stabilize climate, and prevent catastrophic warmin**g**. To the extent those efforts fall short, societies and ecosystems will be forced to contend with substantial needs for adaptation—a burden that will fall disproportionately on the poorest three billion who are least responsible for causing the climate change problem**.**

Here we propose a policy roadmap with a realistic and reasonable chance of limiting global temperature to safe levels and preventing unmanageable climate change—an outline of specific science-based policy pathways that serve as the building blocks for a three-lever strategy that could limit warming to well under 2°C. The projections and the emission pathways proposed in this summary are based on a combination of published recommendations and new model simulations conducted by the authors of this study (see Figure 2). We have framed the plan in terms of four building blocks and three levers, which are implemented through 10 solutions. The first building block would be fully implementing the nationally determined mitigation pledges under the Paris Agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition, several sister agreements that provide targeted and efficient mitigation must be strengthened. Sister agreements include the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down HFCs, efforts to address aviation emissions through the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), maritime black carbon emissions through the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the commitment by the eight countries of the Arctic Council to reduce black carbon emissions by up to 33%. There are many other complementary processes that have drawn attention to specific actions on climate change, such as the Group of 20 (G20), which has emphasized reform of fossil fuel subsidies, and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC). HFC measures, for example, can avoid as much as 0.5°C of warming by 2100 through the mandatory global phasedown of HFC refrigerants within the next few decades, and substantially more through parallel efforts to improve energy efficiency of air conditioners and other cooling equipment potentially doubling this climate benefit.

For the second building block, numerous subnational and city scale climate action plans have to be scaled up. One prominent example is California’s Under 2 Coalition signed by over 177 jurisdictions from 37 countries in six continents covering a third of world economy. The goal of this Memorandum of Understanding is to catalyze efforts in many jurisdictions that are comparable with California’s target of 40% reductions in CO2 emissions by 2030 and 80% reductions by 2050—emission cuts that, if achieved globally, would be consistent with stopping warming at about 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Another prominent example is the climate action plans by over 52 cities and 65 businesses around the world aiming to cut emissions by 30% by 2030 and 80% to 100% by 2050. There are concerns that the carbon neutral goal will hinder economic progress; however, real world examples from California and Sweden since 2005 offer evidence that economic growth can be decoupled from carbon emissions and the data for CO2 emissions and GDP reveal that growth in fact prospers with a green economy.

The third building block consists of two levers that we need to pull as hard as we can: one for drastically reducing emissions of short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) beginning now and completing by 2030, and the other for decarbonizing the global energy system by 2050 through efficiency and renewables. Pulling both levers simultaneously can keep global temperature rise below 2°C through the end of the century. If we bend the CO2 emissions curve through decarbonization of the energy system such that global emissions peak in 2020 and decrease steadily thereafter until reaching zero in 2050, there is less than a 20% probability of exceeding 2°C. This call for bending the CO2 curve by 2020 is one key way in which this report’s proposal differs from the Paris Agreement and it is perhaps the most difficult task of all those envisioned here. Many cities and jurisdictions are already on this pathway, thus demonstrating its scalability. Achieving carbon neutrality and reducing emissions of SLCPs would also drastically reduce air pollution globally, including all major cities, thus saving millions of lives and over 100 million tons of crops lost to air pollution each year. In addition, these steps would provide clean energy access to the world’s poorest three billion who are still forced to resort to 18th century technologies to meet basic needs such as cooking. For the fourth and the final building block, we are adding a third lever, ACE (Atmospheric Carbon Extraction, also known as Carbon Dioxide Removal, or “CDR”). This lever is added as an insurance against surprises (due to policy lapses, mitigation delays, or non-linear climate changes) and would require development of scalable measures for removing the CO2 already in the atmosphere. The amount of CO2 that must be removed will range from negligible, if the emissions of CO2 from the energy system and SLCPs start to decrease by 2020 and carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, to a staggering one trillion tons, if CO2 emissions continue to increase until 2030, and the carbon lever is not pulled until after 2030. This issue is raised because the NDCs (Nationally Determined Contributions) accompanying the Paris Agreement would allow CO2 emissions to increase until 2030. We call on economists and experts in political and administrative systems to assess the feasibility and cost-effectiveness of reducing carbon and SLCPs emissions beginning in 2020 compared with delaying it by ten years and then being forced to pull the third lever to extract one trillion tons of CO2

The fast mitigation plan of requiring emissions reductions to begin by 2020, which means that many countries need to cut now, is urgently needed to limit the warming to well under 2°C. Climate change is not a linear problem. Instead, we are facing non-linear climate tipping points that can lead to self-reinforcing and cascading climate change impacts. Tipping points and selfreinforcing feedbacks are wild cards that are more likely with increased temperatures, and many of the potential abrupt climate shifts could happen as warming goes from 1.5°C in 15 years to 2°C by 2050, with the potential to push us well beyond the Paris Agreement goals.

Where Do We Go from Here?

A massive effort will be needed to stop warming at 2°C, and time is of the essence. With unchecked business-as-usual emissions, global warming has a 50% likelihood of exceeding 4ºC and a 5% probability of exceeding 6ºC in this century, raising existential questions for most, but especially the poorest three billion people. A 4ºC warming is likely to expose as many as 75% of the global population to deadly heat**.** Dangerous to catastrophic impacts on the health of people including generations yet to be born, on the health of ecosystems, and on species extinction have emerged as major justifications for mitigating climate change well below 2ºC, although we must recognize that the uncertainties intrinsic in climate and social systems make it hard to pin down exactly the level of warming that will trigger possibly catastrophic impacts. To avoid these consequences, we must act now, and we must act fast and effectively. This report sets out a specific plan for reducing climate change in both the near- and long-term. With aggressive urgent actions, we can protect ourselves. Acting quickly to prevent catastrophic climate change by decarbonization will save millions of lives, trillions of dollars in economic costs, and massive suffering and dislocation to people around the world. This is a global security imperative, as it can avoid the migration and destabilization of entire societies and countries and reduce the likelihood of environmentally driven civil wars and other conflicts.

Staying well under 2°C will require a concerted global effort. We must address everything from our energy systems to our personal choices to reduce emissions to the greatest extent possible. We must redouble our efforts to invent, test, and perfect systems of governance so that the large measure of international cooperation needed to achieve these goals can be realized in practice. The health of people for generations to come and the health of ecosystems crucially depend on an energy revolution beginning now that will take us away from fossil fuels and toward the clean renewable energy sources of the future. It will be nearly impossible to obtain other critical social goals, including for example the UN agenda 2030 with the Sustainable Development Goals, if we do not make immediate and profound progress stabilizing climate, as we are outlining here.

1. The Building Blocks Approach The 2015 Paris Agreement, which went into effect November 2016, is a remarkable, historic achievement. For the frst time, essentially all nations have committed to limit their greenhouse gas emissions and take other actions to limit global temperature and adapt to unavoidable climate change. Nations agreed to hold “the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” and “achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century” (UNFCCC, 2015). Nevertheless, the initial Paris Agreement has to be strengthened substantially within fve years if we are to prevent catastrophic warming; current pledges place the world on track for up to 3.4°C by 2100 (UNEP, 2016b). Until now, no specifc policy roadmap exists that provides a realistic and reasonable chance of limiting global temperatures to safe levels and preventing unmanageable climate change. This report is our attempt to provide such a plan— an outline of specifc solutions that serve as the building blocks for a comprehensive strategy for limiting the warming to well under 2°C and avoiding dangerous climate change (Figure 1). The frst building block is the full implementation of the nationally determined mitigation pledges under the Paris Agreement of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and strengthening global sister agreements, such as the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol to phase down HFCs, which can provide additional targeted, fast action mitigation at scale. For the second building block, numerous sub-national and city scale climate action plans have to be scaled up such as California’s Under 2 Coalition signed by 177 jurisdictions from 37 countries on six continents. The third building block is targeted measures to reduce emissions of shortlived climate pollutants (SLCPs), beginning now and fully implemented by 2030, along with major measures to fully decarbonize the global economy, causing the overall emissions growth rate to stop in 2020-2030 and reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Such a deep decarbonization would require an energy revolution similar to the Industrial Revolution that was based on fossil fuels. The fnal building block includes scalable and reversible carbon dioxide (CO2 ) removal measures, which can begin removing CO2 already emitted into the atmosphere. Such a plan is urgently needed. Climate change is not a linear problem. Instead, climate tipping points can lead to self-reinforcing, cascading climate change impacts (Lenton et al., 2008). Tipping points are more likely with increased temperatures, and many of the potential abrupt climate shifts could happen as warming goes from 1.5°C to 2°C, with the potential to push us well beyond the Paris Agreement goals (Drijfhout et al., 2015). In order to avoid dangerous climate change, we must address these concerns. We must act now, and we must act fast. Reduction of SLCPs will result in fast, near-term reductions in warming, while present-day reductions of CO2 will result in long-term climate benefts. This two-lever approach—aggressively cutting both SLCPs and CO2 –-will slow warming in the coming decades when it is most crucial to avoid impacts from climate change as well as maintain a safe climate many decades from now. To achieve the nearterm goals, we have outlined solutions to be implemented immediately. These solutions to bend down the rising emissions curve and thus bend the warming trajectory curve follow a 2015 assessment by the University of California under its Carbon Neutrality Initiative (Ramanathan et al., 2016). The solutions are clustered into categories of social transformation, governance improvement, market- and regulation-based solutions, technological innovation and transformation, and natural and ecosystem management. Additionally, we need to intensely investigate and pursue a third lever—ACE (Atmospheric Carbon Extraction). While many potential technologies exist, we do not know the extent to which they could be scaled up to remove the requisite amount of carbon from the atmosphere in order to achieve the Paris Agreement goals, and any delay in mitigation will demand increasing reliance on these technologies. Yet, there is still hope. Humanity can come together, as we have done in the past, to collaborate towards a common goal. We have no choice but to tackle the challenge of climate change. We only have the choice of when and how: either now, through the ambitious plan outlined here, or later, through radical adaptation and societal transformations in response to an ever-deteriorating climate system that will unleash devastating impacts—some of which may be beyond our capacity to fully adapt to or reverse for thousands of years.

2. Major Climate Disruptions: How Soon and How Fast? “Without adequate mitigation and adaptation, climate change poses unacceptable risks to global public health.” (WHO, 2016)

The planet has already witnessed nearly 1°C of warming, and another 0.6°C of additional warming is currently stored in the ocean to be released over the next two to four decades, if climate warming emissions are not radically reduced during that time (IPCC, 2013). The impacts of this warming on extreme weather, droughts, and foods are being felt by society worldwide to the extent that many think of this no longer as climate change but as climate disruption. Consider the business as usual scenario:

15 years from now: In 15 years, planetary warming will reach 1.5°C above pre-industrial global mean temperature (Ramanathan and Xu, 2010; Shindell et al., 2012). This exceeds the 0.5°C to 1°C of warming during the Eemian period, 115,000– 130,000 years ago, when sea-levels reached 6-9 meters (20-30 feet) higher than today (Hansen et al., 2016b). The impacts of this warming will affect us all yet will disproportionately affect the Earth’s poorest three billion people, who are primarily subsistence farmers that still rely on 18th century technologies and have the least capacity to adapt (IPCC, 2014a; Dasgupta et al., 2015). They thus may be forced to resort to mass migration into city slums and push across international borders (U.S. DOD, 2015). The existential fate of lowlying small islands and coastal communities will also need to be addressed, as they are primarily vulnerable to sea-level rise, diminishing freshwater resources, and more intense storms. In addition, many depend on fsheries for protein, and these are likely to be affected by ocean acidifcation and climate change. Climate injustice could start causing visible regional and international conficts. All of this will be exacerbated as the risk of passing tipping points increases (Lenton et al., 2008).

30 years from now: By mid-century, warming is expected to exceed 2°C, which would be unprecedented with respect to historical records of at least the last one million years (IPCC, 2014c). Such a warming through this century could result in sea-level rise of as much as 2 meters by 2100, with greater sea-level rise to follow. A group of tipping points are clustered between 1.5°C and 2°C (Figure 2) (Drijfhout et al., 2015). The melting of most mountain glaciers, including those in the Tibetan-Himalayas, combined with mega-droughts, heat waves, storms, and foods, would adversely affect nearly everyone on the planet.

80 years from now: In 80 years, warming is expected to exceed 4°C, increasing the likelihood of irreversible and catastrophic change (World Bank, 2013b). 4ºC warming is likely to expose as much as 75% of the global population to deadly heat (Mora et al., 2017). The 2°C and 4°C values quoted above and in other reports, however, are merely the central values with a 50% probability of occurrence (Ramanathan and Feng, 2008). There is a 5% probability the warming could be as high as 6°C due to uncertainties in the magnitude of amplifying feedbacks (see Section 4). This in turn could lead to major disruptions to natural and social systems, threatening food security, water security, and national security and fundamentally affecting the great majority of the projected 11.2 billion inhabitants of the planet in 2100 (UN DESA, 2015).

3. What Are the Wild Cards for Climate Disruption? Increasing the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere increases radiative forcing (the difference between the amount of energy entering the atmosphere and leaving) and thus increases the global temperature (IPCC, 2013). However, climate wild cards exist that can alter the linear connection with warming and anthropogenic emissions by triggering abrupt changes in the climate (Lenton et al., 2008). Some of these wild cards have not been thoroughly captured by the models that policymakers rely on the most. These abrupt shifts are irreversible on a human time scale (<100 years) and will create a notable disruption to the climate system, condemning the world to warming beyond that which we have previously projected. These climate disruptions would divert resources from needed mitigation and upset mitigation strategies that we have already put in place.

1. Unmasking Aerosol Cooling: The frst such wild card is the unmasking of an estimated 0.7°C (with an uncertainty range of 0.3°C to 1.2°C) of the warming in addition to mitigating other aerosol effects such as disrupting rainfall patterns, by reducing emissions of aerosols such as sulfates and nitrates as part of air pollution regulations (Wigley, 1991; Ramanathan and Feng, 2008). Aerosol air pollution is a major health hazard with massive costs to public health and society, including contributing to about 7 million deaths (from household and ambient exposure) each year (WHO, 2014). While some aerosols, such as black carbon and brown carbon, strongly absorb sunlight and warm the climate, others refect sunlight back into space, which cools the climate (Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008). The net impact of all manmade aerosols is negative, meaning that about 30% of the warming from greenhouse gases is being masked by co-emitted air pollution particles (Ramanathan and Carmichael, 2008). As we reduce greenhouse gas emissions and implement policies to eliminate air pollution, we are also reducing the concentration of aerosols in the air. Aerosols last in the atmosphere for about a week, so if we eliminate air pollution without reducing emissions of the greenhouse gases, the unmasking alone would lead to an estimated 0.7°C of warming within a matter of decades (Ramanathan and Feng, 2008). We must eliminate all aerosol emissions due to their health effects, but we must simultaneously mitigate emissions of CO2 , other greenhouse gases, and black carbon and co-pollutants to avoid an abrupt and very large jump in the near-term warming beyond 2°C (Brasseur and Roeckner, 2005).

2. Tipping Points**:** It is likely that as we cross the 1.5°C to 2°C thresholds we will trigger so called “tipping points” for abrupt and nonlinear changes in the climate system with catastrophic consequences for humanity and the environment (Lenton, 2008; Drijfhout et al., 2015). Once the tipping points are passed, the resulting impacts will range in timescales from: disruption of monsoon systems (transition in a year), loss of sea ice (approximately a decade for transition), dieback of major forests (nearly half a century for transition), reorganization of ocean circulation (approximately a century for transition), to loss of ice sheets and subsequent sea-level rise (transition over hundreds of years) (Lenton et al., 2008). Regardless of timescale, once underway many of these changes would be irreversible (Lontzek et al., 2015). There is also a likelihood of crossing over multiple tipping points simultaneously. Warming of close to 3°C would subject the system to a 46% probability of crossing multiple tipping points, while warming of close to 5°C would increase the risk to 87% (Cai et al., 2016). Recent modeling work shows a “cluster” of these tipping points could be triggered between 1.5°C and 2°C warming (Figure 2), including melting of land and sea ice and changes in highlatitude ocean circulation (deep convection) (Drijfhout et al., 2015). This is consistent with existing observations and understanding that the polar regions are particularly sensitive to global warming and have several potentially imminent tipping points. The Arctic is warming nearly twice as quickly as the global average, which makes the abrupt changes in the Arctic more likely at a lower level of global warming (IPCC, 2013). Similarly, the Himalayas are warming at roughly the same rate as the Arctic and are thus also more susceptible to incremental changes in temperature (UNEP-WMO, 2011). This gives further justifcation for limiting warming to no more than 1.5°C.

While all climate tipping points have the potential to rapidly destabilize climate, social, and economic systems, some are also self-amplifying feedbacks that once set in motion increase warming in such a way that they perpetuate yet even more warming. Declining Arctic sea ice, thawing permafrost, and the poleward migration of cloud systems are all examples of self-amplifying feedback mechanisms, where initial warming feeds upon itself to cause still more warming acting as a force multiplier (Schuur et al., 2015).

#### Capitalism is the root cause of disease – it encourages industrial ag, loss of ecological diversity, and increased interaction with pathogens

Duzgun 4/5 [(Eren, teaches Historical Sociology and International Relations at Leiden University, Netherlands.) “Capitalism, Coronavirus and the Road to Extinction” The Bullet, 4/5/2020] BC

Contradictions on a Global Scale

Critical biologists and epidemiologists have put the blame on industrial agriculture as the root cause of the emergence of new pathogens since the 1990s. According to Rob Wallace, giant agribusiness and resource extraction firms have now reached the last virgin forests and smallholder-held farmlands in the world, subordinating them to the logic of capitalist markets.

The loss of the ecological diversity and complexity of these huge tracts of land has increasingly forced wild food operators to hunt in previously untouched parts of the jungle, which, in turn, has increased “the interaction with, and spillover of, previously boxed-in pathogens, including Covid-19.” Likewise, global warming has forced or allowed pathogens to escape their natural habitat. As a result, new viruses against which we have no immunity “are being sprung free, threatening the whole world.” In short, as John Vidal writes, “we disrupt ecosystems, and we shake viruses loose from their natural hosts. When that happens, they need a new host. Often, we are it.”

That some agribusiness firms have been blatantly risking lives for profit would not come as a surprise to the critical reader. Even Bill Gates has been sounding the alarm about the potentially deadly consequences of irresponsible business practices and new viruses. Yet, what tends to remain underemphasized in these debates is that the blame belongs neither solely to ‘greedy’ firms that have driven viruses out of their natural habitat, nor to ‘short-sighted’ politicians who have not invested enough in vaccine technology or national health systems. Instead, the problem is rooted in the very structure and rationality of the system as a whole. That is, we may go extinct as a result of the ‘successes’ of the very system ‘we’ created in the first place, i.e., capitalism.

How did we end up losing control of an ‘economic’ system of our own making? This is indeed an anomaly in human history. The conception of the ‘economy’ as an autonomous sphere dictating its own rules over society did not exist in non-capitalist societies. As the economic anthropologist Karl Polanyi put it, “neither under tribal, nor feudal, nor mercantile conditions was there… a separate economic system in society.” The economy either “remained nameless” or had “no obvious meaning,” for the economic process and prices were instituted through non-market means, such as kinship, marriage, age-groups, status, political patronage, etc. Even “where markets were most highly developed, as under the mercantile system,” the economic system, as a rule, “was absorbed in the social system” and showed “no tendency to expand at the expense of the rest.”

In this sense, the market with a distinctive logic, autonomy, and dynamic of its own was completely unknown to our ancestors, and indeed, the emergence of the idea of ‘self-regulating’ markets represented a complete reversal of the way in which past economies functioned.

In order for ‘self-regulating’ markets to ‘self-regulate’, a variety of political and institutional arrangements had to be initiated to progressively eliminate the non-market survival strategies that humans previously relied upon. Most notably, the age-old communal systems of social and moral regulation needed to be eradicated, a process that systematically subordinated the ‘natural and human substance of society’, i.e., land and labour, to market relations for the first time in history.

Rise of Capitalism

At the heart of the rise of capitalism, therefore, rested a ‘political’, legal, and violent process that led to the historically unprecedented characterization of land and labour as commodities. Without commodifying land and labour, i.e., without treating the planet’s living substance as commodities, it would have been impossible to view the ‘economy’ as an institutionally and motivationally self-regulating sphere of life, an almost robotic creature functioning at the expense of human lives and livelihoods.

Capitalism presupposed from the very beginning a radical transformation in the human use of nature as well as in the provision of life’s essential requirements. In this sense, the danger of global extinction which we have been going through is not a temporary hiccup in an otherwise smoothly operating capitalist ecosystem but has always been a possibility built into the very structure of market society.

On the one hand, by treating land and labour as commodities, by subjecting people’s utilization of land and enjoyment of life to their ability to continuously increase market competitiveness and productivity, capitalism has enabled massive technological advancements in all spheres of life. This, in turn, has generated, above all, an unprecedented potential to feed, clothe, and accommodate an ever-increasing world population.

On the other hand, however, as Ellen Wood argues, by subordinating all other considerations to the imperatives of market competition, capitalism has also created poverty, homelessness, environmental destruction and pandemics. Billions of people who could be fed and housed are subjected to immense doses of insecurity, living their lives under the constant threat of joblessness, homelessness, loss of status and starvation. In a similar fashion, the environment that could be protected is systematically destroyed for profit, and killer viruses that could be contained are unleashed.

Undoubtedly, Covid-19 has become the archetypal example that lays bare “the destructive impulses of a system in which the very fundamentals of existence are subjected to the requirements of profit.”

Can the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ outcomes of capitalism be somewhat reconciled? Indeed, for a brief period in the Global North, it seemed they could be. During the so-called Golden Age of Capitalism (1945-70), massive productivity increases (alongside working-class struggles) allowed for steady increases in wages, job security, expansion of welfare state, improvements in the living conditions of the majority of the labouring masses as well as the expansion of civil and political liberties.

Yet, this brief period of generalized prosperity and stability also facilitated the incorporation of the western working classes into the dominant capitalist ideology, causing them to turn a blind eye to the economically destabilizing, environmentally destructive, and socially degrading impact of global capitalism in the Global South.

The main ‘problem’ with the Global South has been, by and large, a question of ‘timing’. Once capitalism was established and consolidated in the Global North, it has not only led to the birth of new and more effective forms of imperialist control and neocolonial expansion but has also irrevocably undermined the potentially positive outcomes of capitalist development elsewhere.

For example, the MIT political economist Alice Amsden, a large chunk of whose work in the 1970s and 1980s sought to explain the success of the ‘Asian Tigers’, more recently concluded that the massive technological and infrastructural gap between the North and the South has literally made impossible capitalist ‘development’ of any sort in the vast majority of southern economies since the 1990s. The economic situation in the Global North has gotten progressively worse too. Under the conditions of increased global economic competition wages have been stagnating or declining since the 1970s, while decades of fiscal austerity wiping out most of the economic and social gains of the earlier period. The new reality of high unemployment, stagnant wages, long work hours and precarious jobs has been masked for a while by a debt-driven growth, the unsustainability of which has been bitterly testified by millions of people since the 2008 financial crisis.

All in all, market imperatives have been regulating social reproduction almost worldwide for a long time but with no prospect of capitalist ‘development’ for an overwhelming majority of the world’s population in the South and the North alike. Furthermore, the ecologically disastrous and socially inhumane consequences of capitalism have long outweighed the prospects of material gain in the Global South. In this respect, what is being painfully realized in the current conjuncture is that the North is no longer able to externalize the worst consequences of such an unsustainable mode of life. The North isn’t and won’t be spared the existential threats posed by global capitalism.

The implication is that any meaningful attempt at solving the present, and future crises needs to take the bull by the horn. There is literally no choice to be made between ‘capitalism’ and ‘capitalism with a human face’. As long as the underlying dynamics of our lives remain the same, as long as we keep treating nature and human beings as commodities, no cosmetic surgery will do.

To the contrary, historical experience suggests that such minimal interventions will sooner or later backfire, re-legitimizing capitalism pure and simple. The only way to ‘re-embed’ our economies and save our lives from ecological collapse is by intervening in the very heart of the beast: land and human beings need to be taken out of the market. The beast is not tameable; it needs to be killed. •

#### Diseases cause extinction – they’ll start in the U.S., which avoids burnout

Bar-Yam, 16 - SB and PhD in physics from MIT, president of the New England Complex Systems Institute (Yaneer Bar-Yam, "Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world," *Medium*, 7-3-2016, https://medium.com/complex-systems-channel/transition-to-extinction-pandemics-in-a-connected-world-153867fe98f4#.2bxv2alfc)

When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread.

As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold.

In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world.

The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events.

A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase.

So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens.

While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated.

As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase.

Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable.

Watch this mock video of a pathogen spreading globally through land and air transportation. Long range transportation will continue to pose a threat of pandemic if its impacts cannot be contained.